



**Protocole facultatif
se rapportant à la Convention
contre la torture et autres
peines ou traitements cruels,
inhumains ou dégradants**

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**Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment us-**

**Visit to United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland undertaken from 9 to 18 September 2019:
recommendations and observations addressed
to the State Party**

Report of the Subcommittee*

* In accordance with article 16 (1) of the Optional Protocol, the present report was transmitted confidentially to the State Party on 27 October 2020

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I. Introduction

1. In accordance with its mandate under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment carried out its first visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK or United Kingdom) from 9 to 18 September 2019.
2. The UK became a party to the Convention against Torture on 8 December 1988 and became a party to the Optional Protocol on 10 December 2003. In 2014, the State party extended the ratification of the OPCAT to the territory of the Isle of Man¹.
3. The Subcommittee members conducting the visit were: Daniel Fink (Head of Delegation, Switzerland), Satyabhooshun Gupt Domah (Mauritius), Susanne Jabbour (Lebanon), Kosta Mitrovic (Serbia), June Caridad Pagaduan Lopez (The Philippines) and Zdenka Perovic (Montenegro). The Subcommittee was assisted by three human rights officers and two security officers from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
4. The objectives of the visit were to:
 - a) Provide advice and technical assistance to the NPM, along with the State party, on their treaty obligations under OPCAT, taking into account the Subcommittee's guidelines on national preventive mechanisms (CAT/OP/12/5); and
 - b) Visit a range of places of deprivation of liberty, in order to assist the State party in discharging effectively its obligations under the Optional Protocol and to reinforce the protection of persons deprived of their liberty from the risk of torture and ill-treatment.
5. The planning of this visit took into account the June 2018 "Exchange of Letters" between the SPT and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) which seeks to enhance the complementary nature of their respective mandates and work². Bearing in mind the visits undertaken by the CPT to the UK, especially its last visit³, the SPT decided to focus its visit primarily on the functioning of the NPM and to visit places of deprivation of liberty which had not recently been visited by the CPT.
6. The Subcommittee held meetings with those listed in annex I, visited the places of deprivation of liberty listed in annex II, and interviewed persons deprived of their liberty, law enforcement and detention officers, medical personnel and others. Moreover, to observe the NPM work in practice, the Subcommittee conducted joint visits to several places of deprivation of liberty chosen by the Mechanism. Those visits were led by the representatives of the national preventive mechanism, with the members of the Subcommittee acting as observers.
7. At the end of the visit, the delegation presented its confidential preliminary observations orally to government authorities and the national preventive mechanism.
8. In the present report, the Subcommittee sets out its observations, findings and recommendations relevant to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty under the jurisdiction of the UK.
9. The Subcommittee reserves the right to comment further on any place visited, whether it is mentioned in the present report, in its discussions with the United Kingdom arising from the report. The absence of any comment in the present report relating to a specific facility or place of detention visited by the Subcommittee does not imply that it has a positive or negative opinion of it.

¹ https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9-b&chapter=4&clang=_en#5.

² <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23407&LangID=E>

³ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/united-kingdom>

10. **The Subcommittee recommends that the present report be distributed to all relevant authorities, departments and institutions, including but not limited to those to which it specifically refers.**

11. **The present report will remain confidential until such time as the UK decides to make it public in accordance with article 16 (2) of the Optional Protocol. In order to enhance effective regional co-operation and coherence in the prevention of torture and ill-treatment in Europe, the SPT strongly encourages the United Kingdom authorities to consider permitting the SPT to exchange information contained in its report with the CPT or to give it access to it, irrespective of whether it is made public in accordance with OPCAT article 16 (2), and to inform the SPT of this.**

12. **The Subcommittee firmly believes that the publication of the present report would contribute positively to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment in the UK. The Subcommittee recommends that the UK request the publication of the present report in accordance with article 16 (2) of the Optional Protocol.**

13. The Subcommittee draws the attention of the UK and the national preventive mechanism to the Special Fund established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention (art. 26). Only recommendations contained in those Subcommittee visit reports that have been made public can form the basis of applications to the Fund, in accordance with its published criteria.

14. The Subcommittee wishes to express its gratitude to the authorities and to the liaison officer for their help and assistance relating to the planning and undertaking of the visit.

II. National preventive mechanism

A Description of the NPM's background and structure

15. On 31 March 2009, the United Kingdom designated, through a ministerial statement to the Parliament, 18 existing oversight bodies as the NPM. In the statement, the Minister of State indicated that the requirements of OPCAT would be fulfilled in the UK by the collective action of existing inspection bodies. In December 2013 and January 2017, three other institutions were added to the NPM, bringing the membership to a total of 21 individual bodies.

16. Therefore, the current composition of the NPM is the following:

a) For England and Wales

- Care Inspectorate Wales;
- Care Quality Commission (CQC);
- The Children's Commissioner for England (CCE);
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP);
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services;
- Healthcare Inspectorate Wales;
- Independent Monitoring Boards;
- Independent Custody Visiting Association;
- Lay Observers;
- Office for Standards in Education, Children's Service and Skills (Ofsted).

b) For Northern Ireland

- Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland;
- Independent Monitoring Boards (Northern Ireland);
- Northern Ireland Policing Board Independent Custody Visiting Scheme;

- The Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA);

c) For Scotland

- Care Inspectorate;

- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland;

- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland;

- Independent Custody Visiting Scotland;

- Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland;

- Scottish Human Rights Commission;

and

d) The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation with responsibility in the whole of the United Kingdom.

17. Through designation of numerous pre-existing bodies to form the NPM, the UK Government wished to put to good use and continue an old tradition of independent inspection of places of detention. As a result, this multi-body mechanism composed of 21 institutions turns out to be a unique and complex NPM. Characterized by a great diversity of entities, the UK NPM comprises bodies with explicit mandate in different detention settings, as well as those with a broad mandate but only in specific territorial jurisdictions of the UK.

18. Another particularity of the UK NPM is that it comprises lay and professional bodies. Furthermore, some NPM members monitor places of detention as just one part of a much wider regulatory role, while other members are dedicated to inspection function only. For example, RQIA and CQC regulate and inspect the quality of all health and social care services in Northern Ireland and England respectively. Ofsted inspects and regulates all services providing education and skills (e.g. schools and colleges, and education provision in prisons), as well as services that care for children and young people, including secure children's centres and secure training centres. On the other hand, the key role of HMIP, ICVA, IMB, HMIPS and Lay Observers is to provide independent scrutiny of the conditions and treatment of persons deprived of liberty in a variety of detention settings.

19. The SPT notes with great appreciation the extent of the collective work of the 21 members/bodies across the four nations of the UK. According to the figures provided by NPM, each year, dedicated volunteers make at least 66,000 visits to prisons, young offender institutions, immigration detention facilities, police custody, court custody and to observe escorts; and inspectors carry out 1,500 inspections across the UK.

20. The UK government designated Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons - HMIP (England and Wales) to coordinate the NPM's members/bodies. HMIP is an independent inspectorate whose role is "to provide independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of prisoners and other detainees".⁴ An NPM Secretariat was created within the HMIP, taking into account its coordinating function.

21. In 2016, NPM members/bodies appointed by agreement an independent Chair from outside the NPM membership/bodies to advise and support the NPM in fulfilling its OPCAT mandate. The term in office of the NPM Chair was renewed in October 2017 for a period of four years.

22. The NPM's annual report is presented to Parliament by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice.

B. Legislative basis

23. Albeit all 21 institutions have a legal basis of their own,⁵ the NPM as a collective entity does not have a separate legal basis in the UK. Indeed, no legislation or other formal

⁴ <https://www.justiceinspectores.gov.uk/hmiprison/about-hmi-prison/>

⁵ <https://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk/members/>

document or process was created or enacted to establish the NPM, and, to date, the Ministerial statements of 2009 to Parliament constitute the only basis for the NPM's designation. Furthermore, only two of the 21 members/bodies of the NPM have a specific reference to their OPCAT mandate written into legislation that created them.⁶

24. This lack of a formal legislative text, which establishes the UK NPM, has long been a matter of concern to the SPT. The SPT's unequivocal view is that the situation of an NPM in UK remains precarious without being underpinned by a clear legislative basis. It is vital that the law specifies the NPM's roles and responsibilities, particularly taking into account the complexity of the model chosen by the UK to fulfil the NPM's mandate. In that context, the SPT notes with appreciation the proactive pursuit of legislative changes by the NPM itself.⁷ Recently, the Committee against Torture also recommended that the UK set out in legislation the mandate and powers of the secretariat and members/bodies of the NPM and guarantee their operational independence.⁸

25. The SPT is also concerned that the statutes of the individual members/bodies of the NPM do not mention specifically their OPCAT mandate. As a result, the specific NPM-related activities are not necessarily given the proper importance when members/bodies are working within their statutory mandate. The Subcommittee welcomes the dialogue between the Ministry of Justice and the NPM on the draft protocol that would include provisions for the NPM to "issue statutory guidance" with regard to amendments of the statutes of the member organisations. The Subcommittee notes, however, that the elaboration of the Protocol cannot be a substitute for a proper legislative basis for the UK NPM.

26. Given the scale and complexity of the UK NPM's multi-body structure, coordination function is essential to the implementation of OPCAT. However, the lack of NPM legislation also means that the Chair of the NPM has no official legal status, job description, powers or immunities and is thereby inhibited in fully discharging its OPCAT obligations. Similarly, the functions and crucial coordinating role of the Secretariat also need to be recognized in legislation.

27. The Subcommittee urges the State Party to provide as soon as possible the UK NPM with a formal legislative basis⁹ with a clear definition of its powers and its functions, its roles and responsibilities, in order for the UK to comply with its international obligations under OPCAT. In addition, an explicit reference to the NPM's mandate and OPCAT responsibilities should be incorporated into each of its members/bodies' own statutes, in order to comply with the OPCAT provisions and UK's international obligations.

28. The SPT also recommends that the functions of an independent Chairperson and the supporting and coordinating role of the NPM's independent Secretariat be embedded in the legislative text to be adopted.

Military detention and independent oversight in Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.

29. The SPT was informed that military facilities in the UK were inspected by HMIP every two to three years. This includes the Military Corrective Training Centre and service custody facilities, which are cells where Navy, Air Force and Army police hold military personnel

⁶ The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 refers explicitly to the SPT and OPCAT (s. 93-96). The Public Services Reform (Inspection and Monitoring of Prisons) (Scotland) Order 2015 also introduces a reference to the SPT and OPCAT into the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989.

⁷ For instance, the Chair of the NPM provided written and oral evidence to the Justice Committee's inquiry on prison reform in January 2017, noting that the failure to provide a legislative basis for the NPM is in violation of the requirements of the SPT.

⁸ CAT/C/GBR/CO/6, para 17

⁹ CAT/OP/12/5, para. 7

who have been arrested. However, the visits take place only upon agreement and by invitation from the military, which is incompatible with the OPCAT's purpose and objectives¹⁰

30. Moreover, no member of the UK NPM has explicit powers to visit extraterritorial places of detention, including temporary detention facilities set up by the UK military abroad¹¹, the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies of the UK, which leaves a significant territorial gap in the State Party's protection of persons deprived of their liberty from torture and ill-treatment.¹²

31. **The Subcommittee notes the CPT's recommendations regarding the role of the UK NPM in Overseas Territories, ensuing from its visits to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) of Cyprus and Gibraltar. The CPT called on the UK authorities to "adopt specific legislative powers for the mandate of the NPM, which should include the automatic right to visit all places of deprivation in the United Kingdom, as well as in British Overseas Territories and the SBA."**¹³

32. **The Subcommittee recommends that, in order to meet the requirements of OPCAT, the NPM must have the ability to conduct unannounced visits to all places of detention, as well as to have access to all information referring to the treatment of detainees and the conditions of their detention. The Subcommittee echoes the CPT's recommendation¹⁴ and urges the State party to take all the necessary measures to ensure the applicability of the Optional Protocol across all of the UK's Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, including through unannounced visits to military detention facilities. In that regard, the SPT calls upon the UK authorities to consider using the existing NPM structure or designating or establishing new NPM bodies to ensure promptly the full compliance with the OPCAT, i.e. that all places of deprivation of liberty under the UK de jure or de facto control are visited by an independent preventive body.**

C. Independence

33. The independence of the NPM, and its members/bodies, as NPM, is a fundamental principle that enables NPMs to effectively prevent torture and ill-treatment as an independent preventive mechanism.¹⁵ In this connection, the OPCAT requirements refer specifically to the responsibility of the State to ensure that it has in place an NPM, which complies with the

¹⁰ OPCAT, article 20

¹¹ See CAT/C/GBR/CO/5, especially paragraph 9: The Committee is concerned by the State party's position on the extraterritorial application of the Convention, in particular that although its armed forces are required to comply with the absolute prohibition against torture as set out in the Convention, it considers that the scope of each article of the Convention "must be considered on its terms" (CAT/C/GBR/Q/5/Add.1, para. 4.5) (art. 2). The Committee calls on the State party to publicly acknowledge that the Convention applies to all individuals who are subject to the State party's jurisdiction or control, including to its armed forces, military advisers and other public servants deployed on operations abroad. Recalling its general comment No. 2 (2008) on the implementation of article 2 by States parties, the Committee reminds the State party of its obligations to take effective measures to prevent acts of torture not only in its sovereign territory but also "in any territory under its jurisdiction", including all areas where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with international law (para. 16).

In addition, in its following concluding observations, and in reference to the State party's military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Committee against Torture was concerned at the findings contained in the 2018 reports of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, following its inquiry into the actions of UK security and intelligence agencies in relation to the handling of detainees overseas. See CAT/C/GBR/CO/6, paras 32-35.

¹² CAT/OP/12/5, para. 10

¹³ CPT/Inf (2017) 37, page 10 (<https://rm.coe.int/pdf/168076e130>)

¹⁴ Ibid, page 10, para 16

¹⁵ OPCAT, article 18.1; and CAT/OP/12/5, paras. 8, 12, 16 and 18

requirements of NPM's functional independence, independence of its personnel, and financial autonomy.¹⁶

34. In order to guarantee functional independence, the NPM must have a clear legislative basis that guarantees its structural autonomy from all government branches. In that context, the SPT notes that, in January 2017, the NPM Chair wrote to the Ministry of Justice highlighting lack of statutory guarantees of independence for the NPM or its members. In its Ninth Annual Report, the NPM indicated that "lack of a clear legislative basis of the NPM in the UK results in the lack of statutory guarantee of independence."

35. It is worth mentioning that, in its letter to the UK NPM, dated 29 January 2018, the SPT stated the following: "*The experience of the SPT is that the situation of an NPM remains precarious without its being underpinned by a clear legislative basis. We have seen, unfortunately, too many examples of cases in which States have put pressure on NPMs, directly or indirectly, which they have not been able to challenge for the want of a clear basis on which to do so. Practical effectiveness is dependent on functional independence, and the independence is threatened when the NPM is vulnerable to political pressure or political exigencies. The role of the SPT in relation to NPMs includes ensuring that they are protected from such pressures.*"¹⁷

36. In addition, the absence of independent premises for the NPM and its Secretariat, from those of the HMIP, with its own offices, services and staff¹⁸ is a clear example of this material, logistical and financial dependence from governmental structure, which does not participate for this mechanism to be perceived as an independent preventive body.

37. The SPT recommends the UK authorities to ensure that the NPM enjoys autonomy, independence, effectiveness and credibility as an independent preventive body¹⁹, in conformity with articles 17, 18 and 19 of the OPCAT. The NPM independent functions of all the different members/bodies composing its structure must be legally guaranteed, and the State Party must take all the necessary measures to this effect. In addition, its material, logistical and financial separation from governmental structure must be achieved in order to ensure its independence, including functional, as foreseen in the Protocol.

38. In addition to the lack of general NPM legislation, the Subcommittee was informed that two NPM members/bodies – the Independent Monitoring Boards and the Lay Observers – raised their concerns with UK authorities regarding lack of statutory underpinning for their national governance structures, which would support their independence. In January 2017, the NPM Chair also expressed his concerns that the IMB secretariat continues to be "*line managed by civil servants of the Ministry of Justice, which also has operational responsibility for most of the places IMBs monitor*"²⁰.

39. The SPT recommends the UK authorities to review the statutes of the Independent Monitoring Boards and the Lay Observers to ensure their full independence and prevent actual or potential conflicts of interest as NPM.

40. The Subcommittee reminds that the independence of the NPM, both real and/or perceived, should be fostered by a transparent process of selection and appointment of members who are independent and do not hold a position which could raise questions of conflict of interest.²¹ In that regard, the SPT notes that HMIP's Chief Inspector is appointed by the Secretary of State upon recommendation for the Ministry of Justice. Given that HMIP functions as the coordinating body of the NPM, the perceptions of State involvement could

¹⁶ CAT/OP/12/5, para. 2

¹⁷ See Ninth Annual Report of the UK's NPM, 1 April 2017 - 31 March 2018, page 56, available at <https://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk>

¹⁸ E.g. the current email address of the UK NPM staff is "hmiprisons.gov.uk".

¹⁹ See PREVENTING TORTURE, The Role of National Preventive Mechanisms, A PRACTICAL GUIDE, Professional Training Series No. 21 (OHCHR) at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/NPM_Guide_EN.pdf

²⁰ See Eighth Annual Report of the UK's NPM, 1 April 2016 – 31 March 2017, page 58, available at <https://www.nationalpreventivemechanism.org.uk>

be detrimental to the NPM's credibility. In SPT's view, this appointment by the Executive creates a loophole that calls for further reflection and strengthening of safeguards for independence.

41. **The Subcommittee calls upon the UK authorities to ensure the functional independence of the HMIP as well as the independence of its personnel through a transparent process of selection and appointment of the HMIP's Chief Inspector. The Subcommittee also recommends that, in compliance with the OPCAT, the State party ensure that NPM members are independent and do not hold a position which could raise questions of real or perceived conflict of interest.**

D. Human and financial resources

42. The Subcommittee was informed that some NPM members/bodies face challenges with the budgets necessary to carry out their NPM functions. This is due to a range of factors including recent budget cuts, and budgets for NPM work within the 21 members/bodies not being ring-fenced to carry out NPM preventive work and thus being allocated alongside competing priorities.

43. Bearing in mind that the OPCAT is unequivocal on the need for the State party to allocate specific resources to NPM²², so as to guarantee the operational independence of the mechanism²³, and that the Subcommittee guidelines on NPMs indicate explicitly that the mechanism should enjoy complete financial and operational autonomy²⁴, the Subcommittee recommends the specific earmarked allocation of funds to the function of the NPM for each of its members/bodies.

44. In addition, and while noting that staffing at the NPM Secretariat recently increased from two part-time roles to a part time Head of Secretariat and a full time Assistant Coordinator, the Subcommittee believes that resources provided to the NPM Secretariat remain insufficient, the more so considering the complex institutional structure of the mechanism.

45. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party increase the financial and human resources of the NPM Secretariat, also as a guarantee of its independence, as per the OPCAT provisions.**

E. Visibility

46. Whilst noting that the members/bodies composing the NPM are well known and respected by key national actors, the Subcommittee observed that the NPM is not always perceived as such when exercising its NPM role. During its visits the SPT observed that persons deprived of their liberty often perceived the NPM as an oversight body and not as a preventive body, which is detrimental to the visibility of preventive nature of their work under the OPCAT as the NPM of the UK.

47. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party ensure that its NPM is recognized as a key component in the country's system for prevention of torture and ill-treatment and adopt an effective strategy to raise the NPM's visibility and profile. In this regard, the Subcommittee recommends that the State party take all necessary measures, when establishing the formal legislative basis of the NPM, to ensure that each of its different oversight bodies/members composing the NPM exercise their mandate as NPM when they do so, in order to avoid any confusion with their other functions.**

Annual report

48. The Subcommittee notes with appreciation the annual reports prepared by the NPM bodies and the NPM as a collective body. However, the Subcommittee notes that the Lord

²² OPCAT, article 18 (1)

²³ CAT/OP/12/5, para. 8

²⁴ Ibid, para. 12

Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice present those to Parliament. In this connection, presentation of NPM findings to Parliament by representatives of the Executive is contrary to the NPM's mandate, which is to assess independently and impartially how the government complies with its domestic and international human rights obligation to prevent torture.

49. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party adopt legislation enabling the NPM to present its annual report in Parliament directly and to be accountable to Parliament for the implementation of its NPM mandate.**

F. Conclusion

50. **The SPT observes that the UK NPM's structure, composed of multiple pre-existing bodies, represents an additional challenge for the State party's adherence to the principles enshrined in the OPCAT on NPMs, especially articles 17, 18 and 19. In this connection, the SPT believes that a clear policy from the UK Government is required to ensure that the UK NPM, and all its composing members/bodies, is compatible with the provisions of the OPCAT. Such policy needs to address current deficiencies in the NPM's statutory basis, ensuring the independence of each and all of its members/bodies when acting as NPM, as well as the need for sufficient resourcing of the NPM. Moreover, given the scale and complexity of the UK NPM's multi-body structure, a robust independent coordination function is essential to the effective practical implementation of the objectives of the Protocol. In addition, in order to ensure the guarantees of independence and effectiveness in terms of prevention of torture, the independence of the NPM's Chair and Secretariat need to be recognised in law and supported in practice through sufficient provision of resources.**

51. **The SPT trusts that the present report will serve as a road-map towards the UK's compliance with the OPCAT.**

III. Overarching issues

A. Legal and institutional framework

Indefinite length of immigration detention

52. The Subcommittee notes with concern the lack of progress regarding the establishment of a maximum length of immigration detention, despite repeated recommendations of CAT in 2013²⁵ and 2019²⁶, as well as of the Human Rights Committee in 2015²⁷. Whilst the State party argues that immigration detention is being used sparsely and for the least period possible, the SPT encountered several detainees in IRC of Heathrow that were detained there for over 12 months in prison-like environment and with little information on the progress of their case and/or removal. Moreover, the NPM has been reporting on hundreds of similar cases across the UK, including a person detained for nearly five years.²⁸

53. The SPT is concerned that the absence of a time limit may lead to de facto indefinite detention, affect mental health of migrants deprived of their liberty and increase risk of torture and ill-treatment.

²⁵ CAT/C/GBR/CO/5, para. 30

²⁶ CAT/C/GBR/CO/6, paras 54 and 55

²⁷ CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, para. 21

²⁸ See, for example, UK NPM Submission to CAT 66, paras. 21 to 28.

²⁹ In 2018, 25,061 individuals were placed in immigration detention and 26,440 were released. Of those who left that year, 33.7 per cent had been held for longer than 29 days and 4.5 per cent had been held for more than six months. (National Statistics (2018), 'How many people are detained or returned?')

³⁰ A 2018 report by HM Inspectorate of Prisons identified one man who had been detained for more than 4.5 years. (HMIP (2018), 'Report on an unannounced inspection of Heathrow Immigration Removal Centre Harmondsworth Site')

54. **The Subcommittee urges the State party to establish a reasonable time limit for administrative immigration detention and ensure that detention is a measure of last resort and is justified as reasonable, necessary and proportionate³¹.**

Age of criminal responsibility

55. The Subcommittee notes with concern that, despite reiterated recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)³², Human Rights Committee³³ and CAT³⁴, the age of criminal responsibility remains at 10 years in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and at 12 years in Scotland.

56. **The Subcommittee urges the State party to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility, in accordance with international standards³⁵.**

Separation of remand and sentenced persons

57. In all the prisons visited, the SPT observed that remand and sentenced prisoners were kept together and were subject to the same regime. Remand prisoners have the presumption of innocence and their detention must not assume the characteristics of those held after being given a prison sentence.

58. **In accordance with international standards,³⁶ the Subcommittee recommends that the State party ensures that remand persons be segregated from convicted persons and be subject to a separate treatment, in conformity with their status of unconvicted persons.**

Impact of austerity measures

59. The Subcommittee received information that the austerity measures adopted by the government of the State party since 2010 resulted in severe cuts in public sector, including in the penitentiary system, and had a negative impact in the enjoyment of rights of persons deprived of liberty. For example, the understaffing of prisons hampered the delivery of health services and increased waiting times for prisoners to access treatments. Staff shortages have been also linked to lack of prisoners' access to purposeful activities and extended lockdowns. Moreover, material conditions of detention deteriorated, due to the cuts of public funds.

60. The SPT notes the information provided by the authorities that important investments are being currently made, such as staff recruitment and improvement of prisons' infrastructure. While welcoming these measures, the Subcommittee notes that more needs to be done to overturn the negative effects of the long lasting austerity measures.

61. **The SPT recommends that the State party analyses the consequences of the austerity measures on the right of persons deprived of their liberty, take steps to revert the negative impact, and ensure the full compliance with international standards for the treatment of prisoners, including health services, regime and other rights at all times.³⁷**

B. Over-representation of ethnic minorities in criminal justice system

62. The Subcommittee is concerned at the over-representation of the ethnic minorities in the criminal justice of the UK, as acknowledged by the authorities during the meetings. The Subcommittee notes that over-representation of Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups is

³¹ See SPT's 11th annual report (CAT/C/63/4), paragraph 48 to 51.

³² CRC/C/GBR/CO/5, para 78a.

³³ CCPR/C/GBR/CO/7, para 23.

³⁴ CAT/C/GBR/CO/6, para 22.

³⁵ See the CRC General Comment n.24 (CRC/C/GC/24) and the Beijing Rules.

³⁶ International Covenant on civil and political rights, Article 10a; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), Rule 11.

³⁷ The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules)

attributable to a broad range of factors requiring targeted responses, which go well beyond those currently provided by the criminal justice system.

63. In this connection, the Subcommittee is concerned at the numerous reports received that:

a) Persons from Black, Asian and other minority ethnic groups are more than four times more likely to be detained than people from White ethnic groups. Black Caribbean people experience particularly high rates of detention.³⁸

b) Persons from ethnic minorities are more likely to be subject to restraint and other restrictive practices, and experience disproportionate numbers of deaths in custody and/or mental health care.^{39 40}

c) Persons from ethnic minorities, both male and female, are significantly over-represented in prisons⁴¹, which has been attributed to a number of factors including discriminatory sentencing.⁴² In data collected between October and December 2018, 27% of the prison population identified as an ethnic minority, compared with 13% in the general population in the UK.⁴³

d) Proportion of the youth custody population from Black, Asian, and minority ethnic groups doubled between 2005-2006 and 2017-2018, while the number of children in custody decreased overall.⁴⁴

64. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party take urgent measures to tackle the causes of racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system and ensure protection of minority ethnic groups from torture and ill treatment. The Subcommittee further recommends that the State party take necessary steps to:

a) ensure that detention is not used discriminatorily against certain groups of people and that arrests, stops and searches are not based on appearance, colour or membership of national and ethnic groups;

b) tackle the disproportionate use of restraint on individuals from ethnic minorities;

c) implement programmes, which support reintegration, produce tangible outcomes and focus on preventing reoffending of persons from ethnic minority background in prisons,

d) reduce the over-representation of children from ethnic minorities in youth custody, including through adoption of alternatives to detention; and

e) intensify the training and awareness-raising of prosecutors, judges, lawyers, and police officers in the criminal justice system.

C. Healthcare in places of deprivation of liberty

Medical Safeguards

65. The delegation is concerned that medical screening and physical examination, required by the Mandela Rules as a fundamental safeguard against torture, is not systematically complied with; detainees are only examined on referral by the officer in charge or upon request by the detainees themselves.

66. In addition, poor documentation of injuries was observed, as health staff do not recognize their ethical responsibility for reporting their findings other than to submit them to

³⁸ UK Government (2019), 'Arrests', in *Ethnicity Facts and Figures*.

³⁹ OGL (2018) Modernising the Mental Health Act: final report of the Independent Review

⁴⁰ UK Government (2019), 'Detentions under the Mental Health Act', in *Ethnicity Facts and Figures*

⁴¹ OGL (2018) Modernising the Mental Health Act: final report of the Independent Review

⁴² Lammy, D. (2017), 'Treatment of, and outcomes for Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the criminal justice system'

⁴³ House of Commons library (2019) UK prison population statistics, Briefing Paper 23 July.

⁴⁴ UK Government (2019), 'Young people in custody', in *Ethnicity Facts and Figures*

their superior. No follow-up was done on the information submitted, including if further investigation was necessary.

67. The delegation is also concerned about the inadequate forensic training of medical staff as none of the interviewed personnel was aware of the Istanbul Protocol or the Mandela Rules.

68. Accuracy of data records varied from the different places visited. The delegation noted the recurrent absence of inputs in the Prisoner Record Forms regarding important information related to risk assessment. For example, the delegation encountered an undocumented case of a mentally ill detainee, with multiple head injuries allegedly sustained in the hands of prison guards.

69. **The SPT recommends that the State Party integrate the Mandela Rules and the Istanbul protocol in the training curriculum (including in continuous exercises) of police and health care professionals. Medical personnel must be able to examine alleged victims of torture and ill-treatment, detect and report such cases in line with the provisions of the Istanbul Protocol.**

Mental health in prisons

70. The Subcommittee notes with concern the high rates of chronic and acute mental disorders in detention, in particular within the prison population. The Subcommittee is concerned at the high prevalence of self-harm and self-inflicted deaths in prisons, including among juvenile offenders.⁴⁵

71. The Subcommittee is concerned that prisons and police stations are being used as “safe environment” to prevent self-harm or harm of others, while awaiting placement in a specialized psychiatric facility. The Subcommittee received ample information from civil society, NHRI and NPM indicating that the prison personnel was not adequately trained to deal with the prisoners with mental health problems and psychosocial disabilities. Delays, in some cases for several months, in transfers of persons, including young offenders, from prisons to psychiatric hospitals, due to difficulty of retrieving of data for proper disposition and management of mentally ill detainees, the lack of psychiatric beds, exacerbate mental health problems and increase the risk of ill-treatment.

72. Furthermore, the Subcommittee is alarmed at the instances of placement of prisoners with acute mental health conditions in segregation units. The Subcommittee is concerned that some persons, as a result of mental health conditions they suffer, may present violent behaviour and that staff’s response in these cases is largely punitive. The SPT interviewed several persons in segregations units in HMP Risley and Manchester and concludes that the current capacity of the system to address properly the mental health of persons in detention does not match the actual needs. It is of note that the CPT found in 2016 that the use of segregation for inmates at serious risk of attempting self-harm or suicide was unsuitable and unacceptable.⁴⁶

73. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party develop a comprehensive national policy and strategy to ensure appropriate access to health care and mental health-care services across the criminal justice system, with particular attention to juvenile offenders. It also recommends that the State party transfer immediately persons, especially children with acute mental health problems, to an appropriate psychiatric facility and abstain from using police cells and prisons as “safe environment”. In this connection, high priority should be given to increasing the number of beds in psychiatric hospitals.**

74. **The Subcommittee echoes the CPT recommendation that prisoners with severe mental-health conditions should not be placed in segregation units as an alternative to normal accommodation; “instead, such prisoner patients should be treated in a closed**

⁴⁵ Prison Reform Trust (2019) “Prison: the facts”
<http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Bromley%20Briefings/Prison%20the%20facts%20Summer%202019.pdf>

⁴⁶ CPT/Inf (2017) 9

hospital environment, suitably equipped and with sufficient qualified staff to provide them with the necessary assistance.”⁴⁷

75. The Subcommittee also recommends that all prison staff be trained to recognise the possible symptoms of mental health problems and apply prompt and appropriate referral procedures to medical personnel.

IV. Situation of persons deprived of their liberty

76. The Subcommittee wishes to record that it did not come across any cases of torture in the places of detention visited.

A. Police detention

77. The SPT wishes to put on record that the material conditions of the custody cells in the police establishments visited were generally very good. The SPT commends in particular the cleanliness of installations, sufficient size of cells, as well as adequate provision of food, water and hygiene items.

78. However, the SPT observed a lack of access to natural light in the cells at Bishopgate Police in London and Greater Manchester North Central Park station. Moreover, cells at Liverpool Merseyside police did not have windows.

79. The Subcommittee also notes with concern that access to shower, phone calls and other rights were provided upon request from detainees and not as a right. Depending on the availability of the staff, these rights could be enjoyed or denied. Whilst noting that the length of police detention rarely surpass 24 hours, the SPT notes with concern that most establishments visited were not equipped with exercise yards, and in the police stations where they existed, they are obviously not used.

80. The Subcommittee recommends that appropriate steps be taken to remedy the inadequacies in police stations and cells, including by improving natural light.⁴⁸ The Subcommittee also recommends ensuring the enjoyment of rights to shower⁴⁹, phone calls and exercise, on a regular basis.⁵⁰

81. The Subcommittee notes with appreciation that all police stations visited had CCTV monitoring and that records checked were kept in an accurate manner.

82. The Subcommittee also notes that, in general, persons deprived of their liberty by the police were afforded the safeguards laid down in PACE Code C.

83. The Subcommittee welcomes the regular presence of paramedical staff in police custody. But it also notes their concerns and police officers too, because they have not been trained on how to treat detainees with mental health problems.

⁴⁷ CPT/Inf (2017) 9

⁴⁸ Mandela Rules, Rule 14

⁴⁹ Mandela Rules, Rule 15 and 16

⁵⁰ Mandela Rules, Rule 23 and Rule 42

B. Penitentiary institutions

Prolonged use of segregation

84. The Subcommittee is seriously concerned at numerous reports of the prolonged use of segregation in UK prisons.^{51,52} In HMP Manchester, for instance, the Subcommittee observed first hand that several persons have been segregated for periods of up to two months. The Subcommittee reminds that the Mandela Rules prohibit the prolonged solitary confinement, which refer to a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days.⁵³

85. It further notes that oversight of the use of segregation and safeguards to prevent long-term segregation of prisoners with mental health issues appear to be insufficient. Furthermore, the Subcommittee is concerned at the long lockdowns in segregation unit and that reportedly persons get in average 30 minutes per day out of the cell.

86. The Subcommittee found a particularly dramatic case of alleged excessive use of force and prolonged segregation at HMP Risley. On that occasion, the Subcommittee interviewed a person that had fresh wounds in his head, a broken nose and bruises on his body. He alleged that he was severely beaten by five prison guards the night before. The person also alleged that he suffered from diagnosed mental health problems. However, it appeared from the records that no medical help was provided that night, no incident report was made, including on the use of force, and nobody camera from five guards was working that night. The records also confirmed that on the day of the SPT's visit, the detainee spent 80 days in the segregation cell. The SPT; communicated this case to the authorities in compliance with the principle of due diligence.

87. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice kept the SPT informed of the ongoing steps taken by the relevant authorities, including the investigation by Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), as well as the investigation by the Prison and Probation Ombudsman (PPO). The SPT was also invited to review video material of the incident (CCTC) at the UK Mission to the WTO, UN and Other International Organisations (Geneva), which a member of the SPT did on 10 December 2019.

88. Based on the results of the investigations and the video material reviewed, the SPT is unable to corroborate the detainee's version of events, and considers the matter adequately investigated. The SPT notes and commends the pro-activeness and seriousness of the authorities regarding this matter, including keeping the SPT informed of the ongoing investigations as they progressed.

89. Similar records checked by the Subcommittee indicated that several persons spent over two months in the segregation unit at HMP Ripley. Whilst there is a formal requirement of a regular review every two weeks, several interviewed prisoners were of the view that the review was a mere procedure that "is there just to tick the box".⁵⁴

⁵¹ For example, HMIP, *HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2016–17*, pp.25–26 and *HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2017–18*, p.26, <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspections?s&prison-inspection-type=annual-reports>

⁵² IMB report on Lowdham Grange, p.13, <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1ocod6bqky0vo/uploads/2018/06/Lowdham-Grange-2017-18-1.pdf>, that refers to prisoners who were in segregation for over 100 days and one prisoner who was segregated for 200 days.

⁵³ Mandela Rules, Rule 44

⁵⁴ .See HMIP report on Whitemoor (2017) [1.48]-[1.54] available at <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/07/Whitemoor-Web-2017.pdf> and IMB Whitemoor Annual Report 2017/18, Section 6.2, available at <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1ocod6bqky0vo/uploads/2018/10/Whitemoor-2017-18.pdf>. See also, for example, reports on HMP Bedford (2018) by HMIP 1[26]-[1.30] available at <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/01/Bedford-Web-2018.pdf> and IMB Bedford Annual Report 2017/18, Section 7.1, available at <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1ocod6bqky0vo/uploads/2018/10/Bedford-2017-18-.pdf> accessed 20 March 2019.

90. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party ensure segregation of prisoners is a last resort and for as short as time as possible, and never longer than 15 consecutive days, and that segregated prisoners are provided with a purposeful activity and meaningful human contact each day in line with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela rules)**

Violence and excessive use of force

91. The Subcommittee is also seriously concerned at the reports of the UK NPM of increasing levels of violence and use of force and restraint in a number of prisons.⁵⁵ Both HMIP and the IMB noted that low staffing levels, inexperienced staff, the use of illicit substances, mental health issues and poor prison conditions and time out of cell appear to have contributed to the increase.⁵⁶

92. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party:**

a) **Strengthen the oversight of the use of force in all detention settings to ensure that force is only used in accordance with law and is strictly necessary and proportionate;**

b) **Review behaviour management policies across prisons with the aim of identifying and reducing the underlying causes of violence and use of force; and**

c) **Provide mental health care that meets the needs of all detainees and consider introducing a statutory time limit on transfers of detainees to mental health inpatient facilities.**

Material conditions

93. The Subcommittee wishes to put on record generally good material conditions in the prisons visited. There were some exceptions, however, such as the HMP Ripley. This prison is over 150 years old and despite ongoing refurbishment works, the Subcommittee found several cells in residential units with mold on the walls, dirty floors, broken windows, bed bugs, cockroaches and mice.

94. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party ensure all detainees are held in clean and sanitary conditions, and address promptly inadequate detention conditions at HMP Ripley.**

C. Institutions for juvenile offenders

95. The Subcommittee shadowed the visit of HMIP NPM to Her Majesty's Young Offender Institution (HMYOI) of Cookham Wood. Whilst the SPT had a role of observer, it managed to have a grasp on a number of systemic issues pertaining to its mandate.

96. Based on the interviews observed and records consulted, the Subcommittee is concerned that children in the Bridge Section and in the Induction Unit spent long periods for up to 23,5 hours locked in their cells; use of force had increased; and that responses to complaints didn't fully address the issue or involve the child.

97. **The Subcommittee calls upon the authorities to implement fully the recommendations of the last visit report of HMIP on HMYOI of Cookham Wood.**

D. Immigration detention

98. The SPT observed the work of IMB at IRC of Heathrow, and visited Dungavel House Removal Centre in Scotland. Based on these visits, the SPT heard several persons deprived of their liberty that criticized the quality of healthcare provided in these immigration detention centres, including the availability of mental health services. The Subcommittee is

⁵⁵ NPM's Alternative report to CAT 2019, page 2

⁵⁶ Indem, page 34

concerned at reports of a significant increase in deaths, especially self-inflicted deaths, in immigration detention over recent years.

99. In addition to the lack of time limit on immigration detention already addressed in paragraphs 51 to 53 of the present report, the SPT spoke to individuals whose mental health was affected by the short notice of removals. The fact that the Home Office gives detainees notice of a removal window (usually a three-month period) rather than notice of the specific day exacerbate greatly the persons' distress. At IRC of Heathrow, several persons approached the SPT to express their anxiety of not knowing if they would be woken up and removed the next night.

100. Furthermore, the SPT endorses the concern expressed by the NPM that access of immigration detainees to legal aid and its quality at IRC Heathrow are suboptimal.⁵⁷

101. **The Subcommittee recommends that the State party:**

a) Ensure immigration detainees are detained only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time and consider replacing the current practice of removals and implement a time limit on immigration detention⁵⁸;

b) Ensure all immigration detainees (including those in short-term holding facilities) have access to good quality, free, legal advice. Ensure all detainees have effective access to fair and accessible procedures to challenge the decision to detain and/or deport;

c) Ensure effective oversight, monitoring and complaints policies and procedures in the immigration detention estate to ensure that any ill-treatment is immediately identified and ensure the effectiveness of investigations into allegations of ill-treatment.

d) Introduce independent processes, both when a decision to detain is made and during detention, for the identification of people who may face a particular risk of harm in detention.

E. Court custody

102. The Subcommittee shadowed a visit of Lay Observers to temporary detention facility of the Westminster Magistrates Court in London. In its role of observer, the Subcommittee was able to assess the situation at this facility and shared key concerns identified by the NPM.

103. For example, the Subcommittee observed that the Person Escort Records (PERs) were incomplete. The purpose of the PER document is to ensure that all staff transporting and receiving detainees are provided with all necessary information about them, including any risks or vulnerabilities. The Lay Observers identified and showed to the Subcommittee a number of PERs where name of the receiving officer, information on detainee's risk of self-harm, as well as information on medication the person was taking appeared empty. Another issue brought to the Subcommittee's attention refer to the lack of interface between three computer systems used by police, prisons and courts, which leads to inconsistent and incomplete information that may put at risk the person deprived of liberty as well as an escorting officer (in case of record of previous assaults on staff). Reportedly, the escort staff end up acting toward any person in their custody as a possible risk, which often leads to unnecessary use of means of restraints.⁵⁹ For example, the Subcommittee observed during

⁵⁷ <https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/imb-prod-storage-1ocod6bqky0vo/uploads/2020/04/Heathrow-IRC-Annual-Report-2019.-for-circulation.pdf>

⁵⁸ See the SPT Eleventh annual report (CAT/C/63/4, paragraphs 47 to 51).

⁵⁹ See HMIP report on North and West Yorkshire court custody [1.23] and [4.11] <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/12/N-W-YORKS-COURTS-WEB-2018.pdf>. See also HMIP, *HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2017–18*, p.88 and *HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2016–17*, p.86, available at <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/inspections?s&prison-inspection-type=annual-reports>

the visit that a child was being handcuffed and escorted by three officers. The custody officer explained that this is a standard procedure for all, which meant that children were treated in the same way as adults.

104. **The Subcommittee calls on the State Party to implement the recommendations of the reports of the NPM member (Lay Observers) and to ensure that:**

- a) **the accurate and complete records, in particular of PERs, are maintained;**
- b) **an individualized risk assessment is made for each person in court custody; and**
- c) **staff receives training to meet the individual needs of detainees, particularly children.**

V. Next Steps

105. **The Subcommittee requests a reply to the present report be provided within six months from the date of its transmission to the Permanent Mission of UK. The reply should respond directly to all the recommendations and requests for further information made in the report, giving a full account of action that has already been taken or is planned (including timescales) in order to implement the recommendations. It should include details concerning the implementation of institution-specific recommendations and concerning general policy and practice.⁶⁰**

106. **Article 15 of the Optional Protocol prohibits all forms of sanction or reprisal, from all sources, against anyone who has been, or who has sought to be, in contact with the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee reminds the UK of its obligation to ensure that no such sanctions or reprisals take place and requests that in its reply it provides detailed information concerning the steps it has taken to ensure that it has fulfilled that obligation.⁶¹**

107. **The Subcommittee recalls that prevention of torture and ill-treatment is a continuing and wide-ranging obligation.⁶² It therefore requests that the UK inform it of any legislative, regulatory, policy or other relevant developments relating to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty and regarding the work of the national preventive mechanism.**

108. **The Subcommittee considers both its visit and the present report to form part of an ongoing process of dialogue. The Subcommittee looks forward to assisting the UK in fulfilling its obligations under the Optional Protocol by providing further advice and technical assistance, in order to achieve the common goal of prevention of torture and ill-treatment in places of deprivation of liberty. The Subcommittee believes that the most efficient and effective way of developing the dialogue would be for it to meet with the national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Subcommittee's recommendations within six months of receiving the reply to the present report.**

109. **The Subcommittee recommends that, in accordance with article 12 (d) of the Optional Protocol, the national authorities of the UK enter into dialogue with the Subcommittee on the implementation of the Subcommittee's recommendations, within six months of the Subcommittee's receipt of the reply to the present report. The Subcommittee also recommends that the UK initiate discussions with the Subcommittee**

⁶⁰ The reply should also conform to the guidelines concerning documentation to be submitted to the United Nations human rights treaty bodies established by the General Assembly. See letters sent to Permanent Missions on 8 May 2014.

⁶¹ The manner in which the Subcommittee addresses the issue of reprisals and sanctions is set out in CAT/OP/6/Rev.1.

⁶² See CAT/OP/12/6 and the Committee's general comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 2.

on the arrangements for such a dialogue at the time of the submission of its reply to the present report.⁶³

⁶³ The United Kingdom is encouraged to consider approaching the OHCHR treaty body capacity-building programme (registry@ohchr.org), which may be able to facilitate the dialogue. [The contact details of the Special Fund are available at www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Fund/Pages/SpecialFund.aspx].

Annexes

Annex I

List of places of detention jointly visited by the national preventive mechanism and the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture

- Visit with Independent Custody Visiting Association (ICVA), Charing Cross police station, Agar St, Charing Cross, London WC2N 4JP
- Visit with the Lay Observers to Westminster Magistrates Court, 181 Marylebone Rd, Marylebone, London NW1 5BR
- Visit with Mental Health Act reviewers' visit to the multi-ward hospital Bracton Centre, Leyton Cross Road Dartford, Kent DA2 7AF
- Visit with Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) members and National Chair of IMB to Heathrow
- Visit with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) to St. Leonard's police station, 14 St. Leonard's St, Edinburgh EH8 9QW
- Visit with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) to a center for juvenile offenders Cookham Wood, Sir Evelyn Road, Rochester ME1 3LU

Annex II

List of places of detention visited by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture

- Livingston Police Station, West Lothian Civic Centre, Howden S Rd, Livingston EH54 6FF
- Dalkieth Police Station, Newbattle Rd, Dalkeith EH22 3AX
- Bishopsgate Police Station, 182 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 4NP
- Dungavel House Removal Centre, Strathaven, South Lanarkshire, ML10 6RF
- St. Anne Police Station, St Anne St, Liverpool L3 3HJ
- Central Park North Greater Manchester Police Station, Manchester M40 5BQ, UK
- Merseyside Police Station, 43A Ganworth Rd, Speke, Liverpool L24 2XG
- HMP Risley, Warrington Road, Risley, Warrington WA3 6BP
- HMP Manchester, Southhall Street, Manchester M60 9AH
- HMP Altcourse, Brookfield Drive, Fazakerley, Liverpool L9 7LH

Annex III

List of government officials and other interlocutors with whom the Subcommittee met⁶⁴

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

- Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Justice
- UK Government (Ministry of Justice)
- UK Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- UK Government (Ministry of Defence)
- UK Government (Ministry of Health)
- UK Government (Ministry of Education)

Scottish Government

- Cabinet Secretary for Justice
- Scottish Government (Human Rights)
- Scottish Government (Prison Policy)
- Scottish Government (Police Division)
- Scottish Government (Mental Health)
- Police Scotland, Criminal Justice Service Division
- Scottish Prison Service
- Health & Social Care in Prisons Programme Board

Chair and Secretariat of the UK National Preventive Mechanism

- Members of the National Preventive Mechanism
- Scottish Human Rights Commission
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland
- Care Inspectorate
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland
- Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (representative)
- Care Quality Commission
- Independent Custody Visiting Scotland
- Independent Custody Visiting Association
- Independent Monitoring Boards
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons
- Care Inspectorate Wales
- Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority
- Lay Observers
- The Children's Commissioner for England (representative)

⁶⁴ As requested during the visit, interlocutors are listed only by their respective institutions and/or organisations.

- Chief Executive from the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland

The Equality and Human Rights Commission

Civil Society Representatives

- The delegation met with representatives from various non-governmental organisations active in the field of deprivation of liberty, including:
 - Bristol University;
 - Howard League for Penal Reform;
 - Children's Rights Alliance for England and Director of Policy and Campaigns;
 - Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees;
 - Inquest.
-