



*Winning the Race - Embracing Diversity*



*Winning the Race*

*Embracing  
Diversity*



*Consolidation Inspection  
of Police Community  
and Race Relations  
2000.*

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## Foreword

The commitment of the police service to community and race relations (CRR) is fundamental to securing and nurturing the doctrine of policing by consent as the cornerstone of policing style in England and Wales. My belief, and that of HM Inspectors, that CRR should be at the core of strategic police thinking and operational action has led to over four years of intense inspectorate activity.

*Winning the Race Revisited* in 1999, the follow-up to the original thematic in 1997, reported that the Service had been less than vigorous in addressing the recommendations and guidance of the earlier Inspection. It was disappointing to find the Service failing to maximise the opportunities that *Winning the Race* had presented. The lack of activity was all the more surprising given the evidence offered to *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* and the attendant publicity reported during the fieldwork phase of the Revisit Inspection.

Such is the importance of sound CRR to contemporary and future policing that this third Inspection was announced in *Winning the Race Revisited*. The concentration of inspection effort in a relatively short space of time on a single, though multi-faceted, topic is unique in the history of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). As opposed to the conventional thematic approach of concentrating on a representative sample of focus, every one of the 43 forces in England and Wales was visited and inspected.

It is at last reassuring that the Service has now responded to the wake-up call of the previous thematics and the imperatives for action of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report. For the most part chief constables individually and collectively have seized the issue and faced its organisational ramifications. Without their continuing and visible leadership ongoing achievement will be limited. Whilst providing evidence of tangible progress that suggests grounds for optimism, at the same time the report is ruthless in exposing real and potential frailties so that corrective action can be taken.

There is an underlying will, across the Service, to make policing inclusive of the policing needs of everyone, and for the Service itself to demonstrate inclusivity by being more representative of the richness of diversity.

To help the Service maintain the momentum HMIC will include CRR in its sophisticated risk assessment process that will determine the focus of inspections of individual forces. I have had the privilege of appointing two non-police Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary, both from visible ethnic minorities, who will have a key role in, alongside HMIs, ensuring the Service both consolidates progress and continues to improve. Their expertise and experience will be vital to HMIC and I have offered their personal assistance to every chief constable. Inspection is but one limb of the body of help HMIC places at the Service's dispersal.

The report of the Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence is proving a catalyst for change. The synergy of the observations and recommendations of that Inquiry with our earlier thematics was compelling. Whilst HMIC has played its part in indicating to the Service that it was off course, improved service delivery to those who are different from the



majority in colour or lifestyle, should be one of many testaments to a young man whose potential was denied to the wider society by racist thugs.

It is a key leadership responsibility of chief constables to keep CRR at the forefront of their individual and collective agendas. It is their duty to ensure the relentless pursuit of continuous improvement. Government, police authorities, HMIC and, most importantly, communities themselves will be vigilant to ensure that there is both the required effort and commensurate improvement. The furtherance of policing with the consent of all will be the necessary milestone of tangible progress.

I am grateful to Chief Constables, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service and the Director of National Police Training for facilitating the scrutiny of their organisations. The inspection team and I express our thanks for the time, frankness and assistance of the many police staff and community representatives who contributed to the Inspection.

*Sir David J O'Dowd CBE QPM*  
*HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary*

## Acknowledgements

This second follow-up Inspection was led by HM Inspector of Constabulary, Mr Dan Crompton CBE QPM CIMgt. He offers his thanks and sincere appreciation to all Chief Constables in England and Wales, including the Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police, and the Acting Director of National Police Training (NPT) for their assistance during this Inspection. This extends to the liaison staff in each of the 43 forces visited and those interviewed or who actively took part in focus groups.

HM Inspector extends his thanks to individual members of the public and to the community groups who contributed to the Inspection by attending meetings and providing an invaluable external perspective on the crucial issues which were raised. These thanks are also extended to the members of a number of police authorities who provided additional insight for the Inspection Team.

HM Inspector for Police Training, Mr Robin Field-Smith MBE, MA, FCIPD, FIMgt, provided support and advice to the Team on the inspection of community and race relations (CRR) training. The contribution made by Mr Field-Smith and his staff was both welcome and valuable in ensuring a corporate approach by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) on this important topic.

HM Inspector warmly acknowledges the support and commitment of the Inspection Team itself. This team comprised a non-police Assistant Inspector of Constabulary (Race and Diversity), staff drawn from HMIC, and seconded staff from the following police organisations or Home Office departments:

- ◆ Lancashire Constabulary
- ◆ Metropolitan Police Service
- ◆ Ministry of Defence Police
- ◆ Norfolk Constabulary
- ◆ Northumbria Police
- ◆ South Wales Police
- ◆ Royal Ulster Constabulary
- ◆ West Mercia Constabulary
- ◆ Police Resources Unit - Home Office
- ◆ Policing and Reducing Crime Unit - Home Office

The combined efforts of team members, coupled with the open and transparent response from all the 43 forces in England and Wales, made the completion of this Inspection report a reality.



## Executive Summary

**1** This report is a significant milestone reflecting four years of intense inspection activity into police and community relations. The original choice of community and race relations (CRR) as a topic for thematic probing and the sustained thematic inspection effort to help the Service progress, is indicative of its importance to contemporary and future policing. CRR, particularly sound and productive relationships between police and diverse communities, is fundamental to policing with continuing consent and should be at the core of police strategic thinking and operational action.

**2** Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) original thematic, *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities (Winning the Race)* published in 1997, revealed that CRR, for a variety of reasons, was not at the core of police thinking but had edged to the periphery. In addition to considered advice and guidance, the report contained 20 recommendations to help the Service move forward. A follow-up Inspection, conducted during 1998, found that little had changed despite the added impetus of the reported evidence given to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. The report of the revisit Inspection, *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities Revisited (Winning the Race Revisited)*, added 6 further recommendations and re-affirmed the validity of the 20 in the original *Winning the Race*. At the same time HM Inspector declared his intention to conduct a further Inspection in 2000 to audit progress and, uniquely in thematic inspection history, all 43 forces in England and Wales would be inspected, not just a representative sample.

## The Inspection in Context

**3** HM Inspector is acutely aware that, whilst the Service needs to take all necessary steps to safeguard and progress CRR, this is but one aspect of policing within the kaleidoscope of change and demand at both strategic and operational levels. Whilst the police service can make an impact on the improvement or impairment of quality of life, it is not the sole determinant. The over representation of visible minority ethnic communities within any scale of relative deprivation is not a phenomenon manufactured by the police service. Action is still necessary, beyond the police service, to ensure that minority ethnic citizens secure a more substantial stake in our society. The relative proximity to school age of most perpetrators of racist violence and harassments leads HM Inspector to share the concern of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry regarding the role of education in confronting racism. Definitive fairness in our society requires collective effort.

## Terms of Reference

**4** The aim of this Inspection was to benchmark all 43 forces against the 26 recommendations of the previous thematics. The synergy between those thematic reports and many of the recommendations and observations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry is both re-assuring and perhaps encouraging but it is the Home Secretary's Steering Group that drives these latter recommendations forward. In assessing forces on the thematic recommendations concerning the recruitment, retention and progression of visible ethnic minorities, due acknowledgement is accorded to the Home Secretary's targets set out in *Dismantling Barriers to reflect the community we serve (Dismantling Barriers)*.

## Methodology

5 The evidence gathered during *Winning the Race Revisited*, supplemented by information gained from a comprehensive questionnaire and supporting documentation obtained from each force, were analysed against an objective assessment model. Each force was then allocated one of three levels of inspection commensurate with the analysed information. No consequential negative value judgement can be associated with those forces who hosted lengthier inspections, as the search for potential good practice could determine a longer inspection just as much as more negative concerns. Over 2,100 documents were examined and 600 focus groups or interviews were conducted in one of the largest single-topic HMIC inspections.

6 The benchmarked performance of each force is shown in one of three clusters under ten headings. The rationale behind the clustering process must not be misunderstood. The clustering assessment indicates the progress of a particular force against its own historical performance. The position of a force in a particular cluster does not facilitate direct comparison with any other force. It follows, therefore, that any attempt to construct a league table from the clustering information would be to construct a fiction and sacrifice the intrinsic value of the process. A summary of the clusters is attached to this document (Appendix A).

7 HM Inspector used the cluster technique so that forces can readily identify their specific developmental needs and the 'good practice' forces from whom they might learn. It must be emphasised that progress and continuous improvement require a holistic approach. For example, a force that has demonstrated creativity and particular commitment on the recruitment of visible ethnic minorities will not succeed if its service delivery to those minorities is inadequate, despite the fact that other forces can learn from their recruitment good practice. Sustained effort and positive leadership is required across all areas of activity. Similarly, the inevitable changes in the aspirations and expectations of Diversity can only be met if the Service has the mechanisms and, more importantly, the will to remain in tune with those aspirations and expectations.

## Strategic Drivers and Policy Initiatives

8 Awarding full committee status to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) CRR Committee is both a welcome move forward and tangible evidence of the ACPO commitment to progress. Its changed status as a policy-making body in its own right, free of subordination to a parent committee, enables it to maximise the expertise of its membership and communicate policy and guidance directly to the Service. The recent ACPO Diversity Strategy should provide strategic direction and complimentary guidance for forces.

9 At the time of the last thematic less than half of forces had produced a CRR strategy. Two years on 98 per cent of forces work from or are developing their own strategic document. Some strategies are not the product of a meaningful consultative process. This unilateral approach is inherently counter-productive with lack of external and internal ownership the likely consequence.

**10** Too many Basic Command Unit (BCU) commanders, taking advantage of an illusion of autonomy, are exercising personal choice on CRR well beyond what should be the limits of their discretion. There must be corporate imperatives on CRR matters and discretion necessarily circumscribed. BCU commanders are key individuals in enabling the Service to achieve the Home Secretary's priority to secure *"the trust and confidence in policing of visible ethnic minorities"*. It is difficult to recognise circumstances where any BCU commander who failed the corporate test on CRR, should continue to occupy that position.

**11** The importance of unequivocal and positive leadership regarding CRR is emphasised by HM Inspector. It is essentially such leadership that translates the necessary and the desirable into reality. The positive response of chief constables to earlier criticisms of aspects of their leadership on CRR issues has been refreshing and has provided an impetus for beneficial change. This leadership, apparent in resourcing decisions just as much as in reinforcing the appropriate message to the public and staff alike, must be sustained and constantly recharged if achievement is to continue to replace aspiration.

### **Consultation**

**12** It was encouraging to see the genuine and sustained commitment throughout the Service to improve the consultative mechanisms, especially the efforts to secure the views of those previously ignored or historically silent. The encouragement to forces in the earlier thematics to establish meaningful liaison with 'hard to reach' groups has, despite the potential for definitional difficulty, proved the catalyst for thought and action as intended.

**13** HM Inspector notes the collective frustration around the efficacy of the statutory Police Community Consultative Group (PCCG) process. It is encouraging that forces have gone well beyond that statutory requirement to secure minority views in some refreshingly innovative ways. The disciplines of the Best Value regime, particularly the important element of consultation, provides both police authorities and chief constables with the opportunity to improve service delivery by maximising that consultative requirement.

**14** In acknowledging progress, HM Inspector reminds forces of the added value to be gained in using the consultative outcomes in their strategic thinking and policy making in a transparent way. The ensuring credibility of consultation will be recognised by the public. The virtuous circle will be complete as the established credibility will encourage the active involvement of all sections of the public in an inclusive way. What the public want is not always what the Service thinks they want. What sections of the public believe is possible is not always readily achievable.

### **Community Intelligence**

**15** It is unlikely that the necessary link between consultation and service delivery can be securely in place unless Community Intelligence is a part of the information conduit. Such intelligence provides the picture of the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups. It needs to be fully integrated into an integrated intelligence strategy if its potential is to be realised. Its integration and use must be subject to the existing regulations and codes of practice governing intelligence as a whole.

## Serving the Community

**16** Most forces have responded positively to earlier thematics and conducted an audit of their current CRR status. Some have moved on and exploited the findings to inform their CRR Strategies. A few had embedded the audit process on a cyclical basis as an in-built monitor. A minority had yet to conduct an audit or had not made effective use of the audit product.

**17** The definition of a racist incident, revised as recommended in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, is well known throughout the Service. However, there is still a resistance by some officers, including some supervisors and managers, to come to professional terms with the underpinning rationale of the definition. The definition is known: it is now the task of leadership to penetrate the residual resistance of the cynical and gain acceptance of the professionally obvious.

**18** Generally there has been substantial progress in dealing with homophobic incidents in a sensitive and appropriate manner. Whilst the requisite sensitivity is acute in responding to incidents in and around established gay venues, officers have less confidence in drawing on their professionalism when dealing with incidents in neutral locations.

**19** It is a testament to substantial progress that the clusters respectively relevant to racist incidents and service provision to the gay community are the only clusters where the majority of forces are classified as 'exhibiting examples of good practice'.

**20** The seeming complacency in some forces regarding the apparent disproportionality in the use of the stop and search tactic is a cause for concern. Insufficient analysis of the statutory data is being undertaken to establish trends and, importantly, the pattern of team and individual use. Supervision is often restricted to the bureaucratic rectitude of the forms whilst failing to monitor and improve the quality of stop and search encounters on the street. The recently published research papers by the Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRCU), which confirm many of the observations in previous HMIC reports, collectively provide a template for action. The use of stop and search powers will continue to be a key determinant in the level of public confidence enjoyed by the Service. This should not be taken to imply that HM Inspector discourages the use of stop and search: he stoutly supports it – but stop and search should always be seen as applied both professionally and fairly.

**21** Despite examples of imaginative good practice, the Service for the most part remains obsessively secretive to the exclusion of consultation and involvement in advance of some operations. The delicate balance of professional judgement is acknowledged but the benefits of openness, taking into account the attendant risk, are not always given due weight.

**22** The Service has progressed impressively since the original thematic in its approach to those repetitive incidents that, whilst individually at the foot of the ladder of criminal gravity, collectively go to the heart of quality of life. The added impetus of partnership obligations regarding quality of life under the *Crime and Disorder Act* is welcome. There is, however, room for improvement in the deployment and protection from abstraction of Community Beat Officers (CBOs) who often are the very officers who can resolve such localised problems in a locally acceptable way.



**23** It was refreshing to learn in focus groups of the public, particularly from representatives of the minority ethnic communities, of a renewal or, in some cases, a birth of confidence in their police. This is deserved and has been earned by the Service but must be nurtured to maturity. The job is not yet done but the tools are now more appropriate and the practitioners more appropriately skilled.

### **Reflecting the Community**

**24** A police service that is more representative of the diverse communities it serves is a logical and definitively recognisable contribution to foster the envied doctrine of policing by consent. A visible stake in policing is likely to make that consent the more readily forthcoming. Chief constables and chairs of police authorities accepted, without question, the targets of due proportion in terms of the recruitment, progression and retention of visible ethnic minorities now contained in *Dismantling Barriers*. There has been overall progress since the previous inspection particularly on the targeted element of recruitment. The effort and initiative to improve the recruitment profile is not matched by equivalent energy and creativity in addressing progression and retention. These three strands are implicitly intertwined and cannot be unravelled without the definite possibility of overall failure.

**25** The value of cultural auditing is now accepted within the Service and the consequential action on completion of the audit process will ultimately lead to an improved organisational culture. This will not only contribute towards the eradication of institutional racism but also eradicating discrimination however it is manifested. The selection and promotion of all staff remains an area where individual attitudes on diversity can be tested. Some progress has been made but with only modest gains regarding appraisal. Logically an approach that will assess individual performance on diversity issues should be part of the product of the National Competency Framework.

**26** The ability of the Service to both challenge and deal with inappropriate behaviour is much improved. The business of challenging and dealing with inappropriate attitudes is more complex. It is the subject of examination within the following section on training and developing staff. Until such challenges are seen as the norm throughout all forces organisational culture will not improve and the efforts to recruit, retain and fully develop minority ethnic staff will be at risk.

**27** Finally the role which support networks can play within forces should not be underestimated. Whether they be formal or informal, affiliated or otherwise, they are a powerful stakeholder in the drive to make the Service more professional in dealing with diversity both internally and externally.

### **Staff Training and Development**

**28** HM Inspector previously acknowledged that training alone will not guarantee improved service delivery. Equally police officers and support staff must be equipped with the knowledge and the skills that breed the confidence that is crucial to improved service delivery. The Inspection revealed an inconsistent picture across England and Wales. At the



upper end of a sliding scale some forces have the key elements of effective CRR training firmly in place, whilst at the other extreme some forces have no such training in place. This extreme of inaction fails both staff and public alike.

**29** HM Inspector is critical of the lack of a training needs analysis in many forces and the absence of timely training evaluation. There is an associated cost of such activity but HM Inspector is firmly convinced that the ultimate cost of ignoring these necessary disciplines will be greater. The absence of the active involvement of members of the local minority communities in some force training programmes is a further cause for concern.

## Conclusion

**30** After the professional disappointment of the two earlier thematics, HM Inspector is pleased to record optimism that the Service is at last on the road to recovery. The leadership of chief officers and others is evident and the range of initiatives in relation to consultation, recruitment and service delivery are as varied as they are impressive.

**31** Increased knowledge and awareness by those actually delivering the service at street level is clear from the widespread knowledge of the definition of a racist incident and the improvement of service provision to the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. In part this is a reflection of the awareness of staff responding to leadership direction but it is also a product of the service extending the consultative process beyond the limited and the comfortable. Both are extremely positive developments that should lead to cohesive improvement.

**32** More needs to be done. More will always be needed to be done. In addition to driving change forward and consolidating progress, police leadership must ensure that whatever the barriers to progress, whatever the conflicting or changing priorities that dynamic times may generate, there is no regression. The Service took significant strides forward in the wake of *The Scarman Report 1981* which inspired the Service to take a courageous and revealing look in its attitudinal mirror. The Service benefited from the resulting reflection. Whilst some of the post-Scarman progress is still evident, much was allowed to ebb away on the tide of changing fashion. The gains in response to the thematics, the positive response to the organisational catharsis on the publication of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, must not be allowed to evaporate in the same way. This requires not only the vigilance of police leadership but an ongoing determination to secure the gains and capitalise on them.

**33** HMIC will be equally vigilant and will continue to encourage, to advise and to criticise. None of the inspection issues consolidated in this report will be lost but will be incorporated into the HMIC Risk Assessment Model for individual force inspections. This Model has attracted praise from other inspectorates and other external bodies. HMIC now has the benefit of the skills and expertise of two non-police Assistant Inspectors, both of a minority ethnic background, who will have a specific remit to help and advise HM Inspectors on this element of their inspections. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary has written to forces to make these skills and expertise available on request. HMIC is not just the author of criticism but also an ongoing source of help.

**34** The significant investment of energy and valuable resources by HMIC has been both appropriate and necessary. The need to place CRR centre stage of police thinking and to keep it in the spotlight of policy makers as opposed to an extra in the wings, was forced home not only by the thematics but by the extrinsic imperative of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry.

**35** It casts a pall of sadness over our society that a young black man with so much to offer that society should lose his life, and that same society be deprived of his considerable potential, simply but most cruelly because his skin was not white. Whilst such abhorrent barbarity remains a feature of our society, it is the overwhelming duty of the police service to respond professionally, sensitively and purposefully to its victims. *Winning the Race* was the flashing neon light that advertised to the Service some of its frailties. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry demonstrated how aggregated frailties are the ingredients of catastrophic failure. The Service must never fail again.

**36** Leadership must continue to place CRR at the core of policing. The indication from this Inspection is that the point is not only taken but being acted upon. The Service must remember that just as the aspirations of life and leisure styles of police officers change and increase over time, so do those of minority ethnic citizens. Forces need to keep pace with those latter changing aspirations and be ready to alter the course of service delivery accordingly. Structures, systems, processes and mechanisms, even HMIC reports, are important but their importance begins and ends in their impact on the quality of service delivery. The ultimate arbiter of quality policing is the quality of service delivery to the individual. That service has quality when it is service according to need. Policing according to need will ensure that the Service across England and Wales retains the mandate of all to police by consent.



## 1. Introductory Background

**1.1** This report is the culmination of four years of intense inspection activity into police and community relations. Sound and productive relationships between police and their diverse communities are of pivotal importance in ensuring that the treasured doctrine of policing by consent is both safeguarded and progressed. The acknowledgement by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) of this fundamental tenet of policing a diverse society within a liberal democracy resulted in a thematic inspection of community police and race relations. The report of that Inspection *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities (Winning the Race)* was published in 1997.

**1.2** It was a natural progression from the 1995 HMIC thematic *Developing Diversity in the Police Service* which concentrated on internal fairness issues. The impact on community and race relations (CRR) of developments in partnership approaches to crime prevention and reduction, as well as the move to intelligence-led policing, were further ingredients in a comprehensive rationale for a thematic study. The key determinant remained, however, the ongoing need for good community and race relations.

**1.3** The thematic report contained 20 recommendations and offered guidance aimed at enhancing police and community relationships throughout England and Wales. The key message resulting from the Inspection was that CRR had edged towards the periphery of police strategic thinking and tactical action, and was not at the core of such activities where it rightfully belonged. The importance of the issues raised led HM Inspector to conduct a follow-up Inspection during 1998 to assess progress. The HMIC report, *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities (Winning the Race Revisited)*, reflected the disappointment of HM Inspector that little had essentially changed between the original Inspection and the follow-up. The lack of substantial action was the more surprising as the follow-up Inspection took place as the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was taking evidence. The wind of change advocated by the first thematic should have increased to gale force on the reported evidence to that Inquiry. HM Inspector notes that had the Service had in place the recommended approach to CRR at the time of the original thematic inspection, it could have faced a public inquiry with less professional pain. Although that Inquiry was into aspects of policing by the Metropolitan Police Service, HM Inspector is cognisant that many of the criticisms of that force on the specific issue of race were equally applicable to other forces.

**1.4** The HMIC report *Winning the Race Revisited* reaffirmed the recommendations and guidance of the original report and made 6 additional recommendations. HM Inspector also declared an intention to conduct a further inspection in 2000 to audit progress and, for the first time in thematic inspection history, all 43 forces would be inspected, not just a representative sample.

### **The Inspection in Context**

**1.5** The *Winning the Race* report detailed the dynamics of change that the previous 30 years had on police thinking and policing style, and the consequential implications for police and community relations. The pace of change has proved unrelenting during the 4 years of inspection activity. Along the multi-faceted spectrum of change the introduction of

statutory partnerships under the *Crime and Disorder Act*, the strategic shift to crime reduction, the disciplines of the Best Value regime and latterly the thrust of human rights legislation, whilst welcome developments, have imposed considerable strain. The ongoing demand for the reassurance of increased visibility and the needs of rural communities whilst police officer numbers were in decline have proved a difficult paradox to resolve.

**1.6** At the same time our society has become increasingly diverse both in its ethnic make-up and its range of lifestyles. A sophisticated police service must police according to the needs of difference if it is to retain the mandate to police by consent. This truism requires each of the 43 forces to be more receptive to the articulated needs of minorities and to seek out the needs of both the previously unheard and hitherto silent.

**1.7** Positive and sensitive policing has a particular role in the quality of life of all communities. It is not, however, the sole determinant of quality of life. The police service serves society: it does not construct it. In the course of that service the most perfunctory scan of the environment leads to an immediate understanding of the diversity of disadvantage. Around 40 per cent of African-Caribbean households and 83 per cent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi households receive less than half the average national household income, whilst just 28 per cent of their white counterparts suffer the same misfortune. Black members of our communities are three times more likely to be unemployed, whilst in London – the home of almost half the visible minority ethnic population – 60 per cent of young black men are unemployed compared with 11 per cent of their young white counterparts. Regrettably qualifications, even to degree standard, do not substantially enhance the chance of employment consistent with their qualification. Disadvantage is clear to see across a whole range of indicators.

**1.8** The role of the education service in the prevention of racism was clearly enunciated in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report. The fact that the perpetrators of racist attacks and racial harassment are for the most part close in age to the completion of statutory education leads HM Inspector to share the concern of that Inquiry. The fact that specific action by police to combat racism in different parts of the country has not received unequivocal support from all sections of the majority community or all sections of the press should be a cause for concern beyond policing. The police service can only go so far in combating racism and valuing diversity. A national collective consciousness is still needed to appreciate its riches.

## **Terms of Reference**

**1.9** Primary Inspection Aim: to benchmark all 43 forces in England and Wales against the recommendations contained in the HMIC reports *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*.

**1.10** It was not the purpose of this Inspection to benchmark forces on their progress towards the recommendations of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report. HM Inspector acknowledges the vital role played by the Home Secretary's Steering Group in driving forward progress on those recommendations. This Inspection concentrated its efforts on assessing the progress of forces against the 26 recommendations of the two previous HMIC

reports. Not surprisingly there was a synergy between those recommendations and many of the recommendations and observations in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report. Those correlations are acknowledged within this report.

**1.11** Similarly, when assessing forces on thematic recommendations on issues concerning the recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic staff, due acknowledgement is given to the targets set out in the Home Secretary's document *Dismantling Barriers to reflect the community we serve (Dismantling Barriers)*.

**1.12** Chapter 7, which deals with the key issue of police training, consciously extends the parameters of the Inspection. Specific recommendations (48 to 53) of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, as well as commentary from the HMIC thematic inspection *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training*, add value and, at times, greater precision to the recommendations and analysis of the previous thematics on the broader issues of CRR. The advantage has been seized to comment on the current position of the Service against the recommendations in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report and the analysis in *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training*. HM Inspector was reassured that these important additional ingredients were entirely consistent with the approach to training on CRR advocated in the earlier thematics. The importance of helping the Service to benefit from additional direction to facilitate progress in training is marked by HM Inspector making seven additional recommendations which take full account of all available knowledge and informed opinion.

## Methodology

**1.13** HMIC has developed a sophisticated 'risk assessment model' for generic inspections of forces. The utility of the model was tailored to the specific needs of this Inspection which also benefited from the audit trail approach of *Winning the Race Revisited*. The standards-based approach recommended in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report was adopted and, where nationally agreed standards existed, in relation for example to the definition of a racist incident and Minimum Effective Training Levels (METLs), force performance was benchmarked against those accepted standards.

**1.14** The database of documents and background information gathered during *Winning the Race Revisited* was used to benchmark the previous performance of forces. In addition each force was required to complete a comprehensive questionnaire and to supply relevant documentation in support of their replies. The collated results were analysed against an objective assessment model. Each force was then allocated a level of inspection commensurate with the analysed information. It should be noted that there was no negative value judgement necessarily involved in determining the lengthier and consequently more penetrating inspections. The search for potential good practice could determine the lengthier inspection just as much as more negative concerns.

**1.15** The inspection levels:

- ◆ **One-day Health Check:** Inspection to confirm information contained in the pre-inspection documentation and responses to the questionnaire, and to test certain key areas.

- ◆ **Two/three-day Intermediate Visit:** More detailed inspection, extending to key interviews and staff focus groups, to examine in greater detail force responses and to gather any additional information required.
- ◆ **Ten-day Full Inspection:** Initial five days including evenings (Community Perceptions Phase) prior to inspection spent with local community groups and representatives to assist in the assessment of force progress from the perspective of service recipients. Contact with these community groups was made, in the majority of cases, directly by the Inspection Team rather than through force contacts. The objective was specifically to obtain a more representative cross-section for focus groups and to access 'hard to reach groups' (for example the homeless).

A further five days allocated to a comprehensive inspection programme extending from the strategic apex of the force to the operating core, encompassing a visit to a Basic Command Unit (BCU).

**1.16** Fourteen forces received a 'one-day health check', and 20 forces received a 'two/three day intermediate visit'. Nine forces, including the Metropolitan Police Service and West Midlands Police, received a 'ten-day full inspection'. A breakdown of all 43 forces and their designated levels of inspection are included at Appendix B.

**1.17** The Community Perceptions Phase was led by one of the non-police Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary, Mr Maqsood Ahmad MA, MBA, DMS, who were appointed directly as a result of Recommendation 8 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report.

**1.18** A visit was also made to National Police Training (NPT) to examine the CRR occupational standards which were being developed for the Service nationally.

**1.19** Care was taken to ensure consistency in the approach, collection, and analysis of the resulting data. To date this has been one of the largest single inspections ever conducted by HMIC. In total over 2,100 documents were examined, 600 focus groups attended or interviews conducted.

## **Report Structure**

**1.20** This Inspection report is structured around the following specific topics (and associated chapters) which directly correlate with the recommendations contained in the HMIC reports *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*:

- ◆ strategy and policy
- ◆ community consultation
- ◆ the use of Community Intelligence
- ◆ service delivery
- ◆ recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic staff
- ◆ CRR training and development



**1.21** The benchmarked performance of forces is presented within each section in one of three clusters. Those clusters represent:

- ◆ Cluster 1 – Good Practice
- ◆ Cluster 2 – Progressing Satisfactorily
- ◆ Cluster 3 – Scope for Improvement


**1.22** It is important that the rationale underpinning the clustering process is clearly understood. Forces were not compared against each other or within ‘families’ of forces with similar characteristics of demography, size, geography or other variables. Nor was progress assessed against a pre-established norm. The position of a given force in clusters 2 and 3 represent an assessment of progress against the benchmark of its own historical performance and the complexity of the task it faced. Obviously a force featuring in the ‘Good Practice’ cluster has progressed to a standard that, whilst not necessarily a beacon for all, can be a source of light for some. In addition, particular examples illustrating the range and variety of good practice feature in the text.

**1.23** It follows, therefore, that a position in a particular cluster is not an indicator that facilitates direct comparison between one force and another. Any attempt to construct a league table, either within a cluster or by aggregating clusters, would be to design a myth and deny reality.

**1.24** HM Inspector has adapted this approach so that forces can readily see their specific developmental needs and from whom they might learn. It is emphasised that progress and continued improvement require a holistic approach. For example, a force that has demonstrated creative thinking and commitment on recruitment issues – from which other forces can learn – will not succeed if its service delivery to minority ethnic groups is less than adequate. In fact, in this example, the inadequate service will be the key determinant in whether the imaginative effort in terms of recruitment will reap the reward that effort deserves. The critical but encouraging eye of force leadership must maintain a perpetual watch over the panoramic entirety. Whilst particular vigour may be used to address weaknesses in specific areas, sustained effort is required across all areas to attain continuous improvement. It is only such improvement that will achieve the quality of service that the public seek and the police service wants to deliver. The changing aspirations and expectations of diversity can only be met if the Service itself remains in tune with those aspirations and expectations.

**1.25** The ‘Perpetual Cycle Model’ (Figure 1.1 overleaf), which featured prominently in the previous inspections, is as appropriate and relevant now as it was in its 1997 conception in *Winning the Race*.





**1.26** This model is still the real test of a force's CRR strategy, and the policies and practices that emanate from its organisational structures at every level. It is a model that can be used effectively in the formulation of force and local policing plans and sits comfortably with Crime and Disorder strategies within BCUs. It is the canvas upon which *Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity* is painted.

## 2. Strategic Drivers and Policy Initiatives

### Introduction

**2.1** This chapter examines the position of the police service throughout England and Wales regarding strategy and policy making, and outlines the developments the Service has made since the publication of the HMIC report *Winning the Race* under the following principal heads:

- ◆ the importance of strong leadership of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and individual ACPO officers across forces
- ◆ the imperative of effective consultation in the process of strategy formulation
- ◆ the impact on strategy of BCU commanders
- ◆ the necessity for communication of strategy throughout a force

**2.2** Previous HMIC reports *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*, encouraged each force to develop a comprehensive CRR strategy, and placed the responsibility for its development firmly with the chief constable.

*“Forces should publicly reaffirm their commitment to investing in good community and race relations as a core function of policing, this being reflected in the production of sound policies and strategies.”*

#### ***Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.1***

**2.3** *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report reinforced the need for this investment in sound CRR by recommending that a ministerial priority be established for all police services:

*“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.”*

**2.4** CRR should be at the core of the strategy of a force, ensuring its influence and impact is felt throughout strategic thinking and resulting policy making. A published CRR strategy should give a clear lead to the force and provide a mandate for co-ordinated action. It should be viable within the context of the national ACPO Diversity Strategy, whilst reflecting the particular needs of the range of diversity within a force area.

**2.5** Commitment is demonstrated by the communication of the strategy throughout the whole organisation. A key ingredient of that communication is the constant reinforcement, by all with leadership responsibilities, that penetrates thinking and action at all organisational levels. It must be clear that the strategy is intended to make a difference to service delivery by increasing its quality and the transparency of its fairness. External communication of strategy should demonstrate the will to make necessary improvements and the ability to address the needs of the public, particularly the minority public, whose needs the Service is keen to address appropriately.

**2.6** HM Inspector accepts that progress can be made, even good practice can emerge, as highlighted later in this report in discrete aspects of CRR outside a strategic framework. However, the need to progress in a holistic way and sustain continuous improvement across the entire range of CRR activity is unlikely to be satisfied. Ad hoc and individual benefits are no substitute for the width of vision and concerted action that are the mark of a strategic approach.

### **Leadership of the Association of Chief Police Officers**

**2.7** The creation of the ACPO Presidential Task Force as a direct response to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, was a clear message to both the Service and the wider community of the significance of CRR, and reinforced the leadership position of the ACPO. A significant outcome of the Task Force was the elevation of the ACPO CRR Sub-Committee to full Committee status. As a consequence, that Committee became a decision-making and policy-making body without subordination to a parent committee. This has allowed its work and particular expertise to be communicated directly to the Service. HM Inspector welcomes the membership of the non-police Assistant Inspectors (Race and Diversity) on that Committee.

**2.8** The recent ACPO Diversity Strategy reaffirms that the principle of policing by consent has long been a primary tenet underpinning the functioning of the British police service. Good community and race relations are pivotal to the beneficial maintenance and development of this established and envied tradition. The ACPO Diversity Strategy therefore promotes the Service's commitment to diversity and equitable service delivery through its guidance.

**2.9** HM Inspector, who recommended in *Winning the Race Revisited* that the ACPO should continue the development of a Diversity Strategy, was pleased to note the timeliness of this publication during this Inspection. It should assist the Service in addressing the issues with a co-ordinated approach across England and Wales. This Inspection found that the Service was anxiously awaiting the strategic direction and guidance provided by this ACPO publication. It is as yet too soon for the Service reaction to the ACPO Diversity Strategy to be measured, however HM Inspector welcomes this corporate direction which allows all forces flexibility to address local needs.

### **Community and Race Relations Strategy**

**2.10** The findings of the HMIC follow-up report, *Winning the Race Revisited*, were that insufficient progress had been made, with only 37 per cent of forces inspected having a CRR strategy in place and a further 23 per cent still in the development phase (Figure 2.1 opposite). HM Inspector declared this situation to be unsatisfactory and underlined the importance for all forces, including those with small minority ethnic populations, to take a strategic approach.

Figure 2.1 – Development of Force Progress in CRR Strategy Instigation				
	Number/Percentage of forces			
	Strategy in place		Developing strategy	
	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Winning the Race Revisited</i> findings (1998)	16	37	10	23
<i>Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity</i> findings (2000)	33	77	9	21
Figures Drawn from all 43 Forces in England and Wales				

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**2.11** Only one force, Gwent, has yet to formulate a CRR strategy. A small number of forces, among those who had formulated a strategy in response to criticisms in *Winning the Race Revisited*, seem to have residual doubts about the advantage of doing so. HM Inspector accepts that such a document is not a condition precedent to progress in discrete areas of CRR. However, the likelihood of structured, coherent, accountable and holistic progress is much more probable within the framework of a strategic document.

**2.12** In some forces the strategy document had been written without any apparent community consultation. Such an approach is likely to be counter productive. HM Inspector draws attention to the fact that if strategies and policies are not the products of meaningful consultation they are likely to offend those who should have been involved, whether community members, staff associations or senior managers within the force. It is acknowledged that the views, however strongly held, of every group cannot be reflected in strategy and policy that has wide application. It is important, however, that those involved in the consultative processes are kept fully informed as to the reason for the exclusion of any viewpoint.

**2.13** Members of some minority ethnic communities, who had not been involved in strategy or policy making, suggested that, in the absence of this consultation, existing good work already being undertaken by many individuals and teams of officers was discounted. HM Inspector invites individual forces to seek ratification, through consultation, of their existing strategy if it had not been developed as a product of meaningful community consultation.

**2.14** In some forces it was not surprising, in the absence of consultation, that there was very little ownership of the strategy by either departmental heads, front line staff members or members of minority communities. As a result operational staff had little, if any, awareness regarding the contents and existence of their force's CRR strategy.

**2.15** In most cases CRR strategies benefited from linked action plans. Regrettably in many instances these action plans were formulated without tangible success factors, measurable targets or project milestones. Such action plans need to state how success will be measured as well as who is accountable for the outputs sought within the plan. HM Inspector urges forces to provide the necessary clarity regarding performance measurement, and to recognise that accountability is required to provide the prerequisite rigour for community based strategic plans.

**2.16** Certain police authority members considered that some police officers had insufficient understanding of the need for consultation or where it leads. Without this understanding it is difficult to make the link between strategic intention and the nature and style of policing that operational staff deliver. Generally police authority members felt there was still a need for key managers and supervisors, in particular sergeants, to acknowledge the importance of a strategic approach to CRR. Members recognised the need for effective training of managers and supervisors that would provide them with the requisite knowledge and confidence to explain the outcome of the strategic process to their subordinates. It is only such knowledge and confidence that will enable them to fulfil their role managerial/supervisory responsibility for the professional behaviour of their staff. Police authority members felt that there was a lot of disparate action, much of it of merit, within forces but it was unclear how this amounted to a cohesive strategic approach.

**2.17** For the majority of forces, the central theme in their CRR strategy was race relations. Their justification for this focus was a belief that this thematic inspection would focus on race alone. Some forces had taken the initiative and embraced the wider issue of diversity and sought positive developments across all the elements of society. Examples include:

- ◆ Greater Manchester Police's CRR Strategy, which includes wider diversity issues.
- ◆ The Metropolitan Police Service's Diversity Strategy 'Protect and Respect' (second phase) which encompasses homophobia, domestic violence and hate mail issues.

### **Advisory Panels**

**2.18** Some forces have established progress monitoring groups in the form of advisory panels with a significant lay element. By forming an advisory group, with the active involvement of a member of the ACPO team, beacon forces were demonstrating a genuinely consultative approach to strategy formulation and monitoring. Such advisory panels are typically comprised of senior operational commanders, departmental heads, representatives from the Black Police Association (BPA) and external advisers from diverse communities. Some examples of good practice included:

- ◆ Staffordshire Police: Working group led by the Chief Constable including representatives from minority ethnic communities, with a sub-group tasked with the examination of the Force's culture chaired by a member of the public with expertise of particular minority issues.

- ◆ Bedfordshire Police: CRR strategy that related to a five-year Best Value Plan on which divisional plans were based. This 38-point action plan, developed from a systematic analysis of HMIC thematic inspections and *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, listed specific actions on CRR issues with action owners, time scales and success criteria.

## **The Role of Basic Command Unit Commanders**

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**2.19** BCU commanders hold key positions within forces and they have a responsibility to bring life to the strategy through service delivery: theirs is the pivotal role in translating strategy and policy into the action of service delivery. BCU commanders can be either a conduit for, or an obstruction to organisational progress.

**2.20** This Inspection found within BCUs that there were differing levels of commitment to CRR. In some forces, BCU commanders clearly supported their chief officer's commitment and actively promoted force strategy within their BCU command. There needs to be an ongoing consistency in forces that does not exclude BCU commanders to the extent that they feel they are outside the decision-making processes regarding strategy formulation. In a minority of forces, CRR and issues of diversity were viewed as being centrally controlled or led from headquarters departments. Within these forces CRR was therefore perceived as a mandated responsibility and a burden, thus there was a dilution of commitment and ownership of CRR and diversity issues.

**2.21** In a minority of cases, individual front line staff took personal responsibility and became champions of aspects of CRR, either in support of policy or in the absence of policy decisions. In the majority of cases, forces' commitment to CRR issues had not permeated to operational level. Many clung to a residual cynicism in suggesting that the impetus driving this commitment would soon disappear when media interest ceased. The question of leadership, and associated commitment to CRR, was often raised and there was a degree of scepticism that the drive behind CRR issues represented transient pressure on chief officers. On occasion this resulted in a lack of ownership amongst front line staff.

**2.22** Once the appropriate internal consultative mechanisms and channels of communication are established, there should be no excuse for a lack of corporacy regarding the core importance of CRR within a force. Any BCU commander who fails the corporate test on CRR issues, whether in pursuit of an illusionary autonomy or other cause, is unlikely to deliver real quality of local service, enhance the reputation of a particular force, or secure *"the trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities"*. In such circumstances the continuing occupancy of a BCU command becomes untenable.

## **The Leadership Mandate**

**2.23** The importance of clear leadership regarding CRR is emphasised by HM Inspector. The positive response of chief constables to the criticism of aspects of leadership in the previous thematics is acknowledged and welcomed. Where gaps still exist they must be filled continuously by those charged with the privilege of leadership. In fact, it is unlikely that a gap will remain unfilled for long. Experience is that others will assume leadership and



it is then an accidental coincidence if the necessary positive CRR influence is exerted. Such a necessary ingredient of contemporary and future policing cannot be left to chance.

**2.24** The leadership that has now emerged must be constant and consistent. Inappropriate or absent leadership will inhibit progress or lead to a failure to consolidate existing CRR success. Positive CRR developments in particular areas of policing will be inhibited from achieving or sustaining their full potential. Leadership commitment should be apparent just as much in resourcing decisions as in reinforcing the appropriate message to the public and staff alike. Whilst accepting their own accountability, leaders at all levels in forces should hold others accountable as appropriate to their organisational roles. Without leadership and consequential accountability for CRR external service delivery will lack a cutting edge.

## Summary

**2.25** The granting of full committee status of the ACPO CRR Committee is a welcome development and tangible evidence of the ACPO commitment to progress. The recent publication of the ACPO Diversity Strategy should provide the necessary strategic direction and complimentary guidance for forces.

**2.26** At the time of the *Winning the Race Revisited* thematic fewer than half of the 43 forces had produced a CRR strategy. Two years later that situation has improved substantially with 98 per cent of forces working from a strategic document. Regrettably some forces have not subjected the building of their strategy to the necessary rigours of a meaningful consultative process. Such an approach is inherently counterproductive and a lack of ownership both externally and internally is a likely consequence.

**2.27** There are still too many examples of BCU commanders exercising their personal preferences and commitment to CRR outside the remit of force policy. As key individuals in the translation of strategy and policy into service delivery, discretion must be limited within a force corporate CRR framework.

**2.28** The positive response of chief constables to criticisms of aspects of their leadership on CRR issues has been refreshing and has provided an impetus for beneficial change. This leadership must be sustained and constantly recharged if aspiration is to convert into ongoing achievement.

## 3. Consultation With Communities

### Introduction

**3.1** The linking thread throughout this series of thematic inspections has been the encouragement to the Service to police according to need. Such needs are best ascertained through a process of meaningful consultation which touches the aspirations of all. Since the encouragement of *The Scarman Report 1981* into the Brixton disorders the Service has devoted countless hours of senior management time to the consultative process. The requisite skills have improved in a commensurate way. This Inspection sought to judge whether the time and the skills were being used in the most appropriate way to secure the maximum consultative advantage.

**3.2** This section of the report proposes to do three things:

- ◆ To set out the current legislative framework within which police authorities and chief constables are required to consult with the communities they police and the consequential benefits of that consultation.
- ◆ To provide an overview of the inspection findings in relation to the progress made by the Service in England and Wales on the recommendations contained in *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*. Included within these findings will be an overview of the progress made in relation to utilising community intelligence as part of a comprehensive intelligence-led policing model.
- ◆ To cluster forces on their progress to date demonstrating where good practice has been identified, which forces are progressing satisfactorily and those forces where HM Inspector considers there is scope for further improvement.



### The Obligations

**3.3** Police authorities and the police service have a moral and legal responsibility to consult and engage in dialogue with the diverse communities they serve.

**3.4** The moral obligations arise as a consequence of:

- ◆ the need to restore and maintain the trust and confidence of the public, particularly the minority ethnic public
- ◆ the continuing need to police with the consent of the whole community

**3.5** These obligations are further reinforced by Recommendation 16 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report which states that all possible steps should be taken by police services at local level in consultation with local authorities and other agencies and local communities to encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes.

**3.6** The legal requirements arise as a consequence of:

- ◆ Section 96 of the *Police Act 1996* (formerly Section 106 of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984*)



The focus on community consultation and its potential value emerged from Lord Scarman's inquiry into the inner-city disturbances of the early 1980s. The subsequent Section 106 of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984* (now included in Section 96 of the *Police Act 1996*) stated that arrangements shall be made in each police area for obtaining the views of local people about matters concerning local policing and to obtain their co-operation in the prevention of crime. The police authority has primacy in these arrangements after consulting with the chief constable, as to what arrangements would be appropriate. These arrangements are subject to review by the Secretary of State. The resultant Police Community Consultative Group (PCCG) structure remains today. A separate arrangement exists for the City of London Police in conjunction with the Common Council of the City of London. The *Greater London Authority Act 1999* brought the Metropolitan Police Service into line with other forces with the formation of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Prior to this the Metropolitan Police Service had a system of PCCGs in line with guidance from the Home Secretary in his role as Police Authority for the force.

◆ Section 4 of the *Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994*

This Act reinforces that before determining any local policing objectives a police authority shall consult the chief constable for the area and consider any views obtained under Section 106 of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984* (amended by Section 96 of the *Police Act 1996*).

◆ Section 8 of the *Police Act 1996*

There is a requirement for every police authority to produce an Annual Policing and Performance plan which includes the need to indicate the consultation that has taken place within the local community and within the force in the identification and prioritisation of local objectives.

◆ Section 6 of the *Crime and Disorder Act 1998*

This Act places a duty on local authorities and the chief officer of police jointly to formulate Crime and Disorder strategies in each unitary authority area in England and Wales. The prerequisite to drawing up a strategy is a Crime and Disorder Audit and a requirement to consult widely in the local community to obtain views on both the problems they face and their priorities for crime reduction activity.

◆ *Local Government Act 1999*

This Act requires that the Best Value authority (police authority) must consult council tax, non-domestic ratepayers, and others with an ongoing interest in the area.

**3.7** The legislative framework is clear and unambiguous. The primary responsibility for consultation lies with police authorities by virtue of Section 96 of the *Police Act 1996* and the *Local Government Act 1999* (in their role as Best Value authorities). For chief constables this legislative framework promotes the partnership principles embedded into current professional police thinking. In practice the reality of partnership between police

authorities and their chief constables is likely to be pragmatic in the allocation of reviewing resources. The Best Value consultation process requires dedicated resources that few police authorities would readily have available. During this Inspection chief constables were frequently allocating the necessary resources with guidance from police authorities and thus providing tangible evidence of the dual commitment to fulfil both their consultative obligations.

## **The Benefits of Consultation**

**3.8** The benefits of consultation have been defined in the Cabinet Office publication *How to Consult your Users: An Introductory Guide*:

### *“Consultation*

- *helps you plan services better to give users what they want and expect*
- *helps you prioritise your services and make better use of limited resources*
- *helps you set performance standards relevant to users’ needs (and monitor them)*
- *fosters a working relationship between your users and you, so they understand the problems facing you, and how they can help*
- *alerts you to problems quickly so you have a chance to put things right before they escalate*
- *symbolises your commitment to be open and accountable*
- *puts service first”*



**3.9** More recently the Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRCU) publication *Not Rocket Science? Problem Solving and Crime Reduction* concluded that community consultation is important to establish mechanisms that will elicit the co-operation and involvement of residents that is often needed if crime reduction measures are to be effective.

## **The Consultative Picture in Previous Inspections**

**3.10** The importance of the police service improving links with the whole community and in particular, those who are more vulnerable or difficult to reach, was set out in both *The Scarman Report 1981*, and more recently in the previous thematic reports.

**3.11** *Winning the Race* identified three areas of concern on community links:

- ◆ there was limited minority involvement in police-community consultation
- ◆ the extent of police reliance on formal links with spokespersons whose representative validity may not be current amongst minority communities
- ◆ the partial failure of the police to improve the links

**3.12** In addition to this *Winning the Race Revisited* identified:

- ◆ that the vast majority of forces had put procedures in place to consult minority ethnic and other vulnerable communities
- ◆ that regrettably in some forces this consultation was little more than ritualistic
- ◆ that harder to reach and possibly confrontational elements of local communities were often excluded from the consultative process
- ◆ disenchantment on the part of police and communities themselves with PCCGs

**3.13** *Winning the Race Revisited* urged forces to put mechanisms in place to encourage those neglected sections of society into the consultative process. The extent to which forces were receptive to this advice was reflected in this Inspection.

## External Consultation

### Responsibilities

**3.14** This Inspection revealed varied activity taking place, much of which was innovative, in an attempt to ascertain the communities' views on the police services they receive and wished to receive. Despite this HM Inspector found a lack of co-ordinated effort between chief officers and police authorities. There remains considerable debate in relation to primacy in the consultative process.

**3.15** Within the boundaries of the chief officers' consultative responsibilities, it is important that the consultative roles and responsibilities of staff are clear and unequivocal. The force is then in a position to maximise the product of consultation to inform the strategic planning and policy making processes. HM Inspector believes that the transparent application of the consultative product is an essential prerequisite to the improvement of service delivery.

### Crime and Disorder

**3.16** The *Crime and Disorder Act 1998* dictates that the police, together with their local authority partners, should draw up and implement a strategy for reducing crime and disorder in their area. To identify the priority objectives within that strategy, a thorough review (Crime and Disorder Audit) of the levels and patterns of crime and disorder must be conducted. A key element in the review is thorough consultation throughout the community. There has been a considerable and sustained effort across the country to develop and maintain close working relationship with partner statutory agencies within the *Crime and Disorder Act*. This Inspection became aware of a growing consensus among non-statutory bodies and community groups that the effort required to fulfil *Crime and Disorder Act* consultation obligations with statutory partners was diverting police consultative attention from the community itself.

**3.17** HM Inspector recognises the demands on police management time, but reminds forces that their consultative responsibility to the people themselves is necessarily ongoing. There is no substitute for that direct consultative contact and no statutory or other

developments should place that contact in shadow. HM Inspector is of the view that further progress could be made if forces exploited their statutory partnerships to maximise upon the consultative processes already in place for other agencies as part of a co-active approach as recommended in the recent HMIC thematic report *Calling Time on Crime*.

## Police Community Consultative Groups

**3.18** Section 96 of the *Police Act 1996* (formerly Section 106 of the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984*) sets out the requirement to obtain the views of local people about local policing. Such consultation continues across England and Wales. HM Inspector found that both the police and community have mixed views of the effectiveness of these arrangements.

**3.19** *Winning the Race* reported that the influence exerted by PCCGs was limited in informing policing plans and priorities. This was reinforced in the follow-up Inspection which went further in indicating that in many cases consultation was little more than ritualistic and that harder to reach groups and possibly confrontational elements were often excluded from the process. Overall the findings indicate that many PCCGs are not truly representative and are not adopting a strategic approach. In a process that consumes a significant amount of time and energy of all the parties such a lack of meaningful outcomes leads to mutual and reciprocal dissatisfaction.

**3.20** This Inspection found notable but isolated exceptions to this position particularly in London.

*"The PCCG in Lambeth is very powerful and gets things done, it has produced a community spirit and joined-up approach to tackling things in Brixton."*

**Community Representative – London**

**3.21** Elsewhere there had been significant efforts to revitalise the PCCGs to broaden the representativeness and enhance their role. A good example exists in West Mercia Constabulary where an enhanced consultation and accountability process has been set up drawing upon the model set out in *The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland* published in September 1999. This approach is intended to develop a process that is more representative than the current PCCG in an attempt to improve local accountability.

**3.22** HM Inspector urges police authorities in conjunction with chief constables and the public to revisit PCCGs within their force areas in order to make them a more effective consultative tool for both the police and the public and, for Best Value reasons, to link this form of consultation with all other consultative efforts.

**3.23** There was overwhelming evidence that many forces had invested a lot of time and effort in consultative processes, at a force-wide level, but this was not always as co-ordinated and cohesive at BCU level. This was an area of concern to many members of the community.

**3.24** There remained a reluctance in some forces to recognise that consultation needed to extend beyond the ritualistic. In some cases there was still an over reliance on self-appointed representatives of a particular group or community, with minimal enthusiasm to

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extend their dialogue to other sub-groups within these communities. This brought into question the commitment of police to the consultative process, leading to perceptions from some people that forces were just 'ticking the box' by forming a group or committee. It was recognised that this criticism was not exclusively levelled at the police:

*"Many agencies think that consulting the forum is consulting the community, it is not."*

***Member of a minority ethnic community group***

**3.25** The most fruitful consultation took place in an environment of mutual trust in which the barriers to communication had been dissolved. This observation was repeatedly voiced during the inspection process. It was disappointing to find that in many cases front line staff did not feel they had the time, or responsibility, to engage in local informal consultation processes. Further effort is required to ensure that staff at all levels recognise that consultation is a benefit to policing and not a chore.

## **Alternative Approaches**

**3.26** To obtain a wider perspective on community concerns and needs, other consultative mechanisms need to operate in conjunction with the formal statutory framework. It was acknowledged in *Winning the Race* that the most important links for gauging community concerns were often the least formal. This reinforced the findings of the Police Research Group *Paper 22 It's Good to Talk: Lessons in Public Consultation and Feedback* which concluded that PCCG meetings on their own are not likely to be fully effective in meeting the aims of the consultative arrangements.

**3.27** There have been many innovative examples across the country where Independent Advisory Groups on CRR have been introduced. These include the Metropolitan Police Service, West Yorkshire Police, West Midlands Police, South Wales Police and Merseyside Police, whilst many other forces were in the process of formulating such groups or incorporating a wider range of advice in existing fora.

**3.28** The introduction of the Independent Advisory Group in the Metropolitan Police Service was endorsed by the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO) in a recent document *Let's Get It Right - Race and Justice 2000*. NACRO suggest that such an approach could be adopted by other criminal justice agencies. HM Inspector supports these observations and commends them as positive steps in improving accountability through a transparent approach. The Metropolitan Police Service initiative, now being mirrored in other forces, was a significant but logical step forward from consultation to the more challenging but potentially more rewarding position of participation and involvement.

**3.29** HM Inspector commends the definition of lay involvement provided by the Metropolitan Police Service Independent Advisory Group (in June 1999) as:

*"The process that takes place when people independent of the police service monitor, observe or participate in any police activity in such a way that they*

*have no responsibility for the outcomes but are free to make observations both within the Service and to the broader community. For maximum benefit to the community and the Service, such people will be drawn from those who are:*

- *able to critically appraise police policies and practices*
- *representative of and command the respect of communities policed*
- *able to make dispassionate assessment of what they experience*
- *committed to improving community and police relations*
- *can bring relevant expertise*

*The terms of reference reinforce that lay involvement enhances operational policing and poses no threat to the office of constable or the Commissioner as it does not affect the particular powers, responsibilities or accountabilities of either."*

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**3.30** There have been other considerable successes around the country from the involvement of independent advice. In the Toller Lane division of West Yorkshire Police a 'Transparency Panel' has been set up consisting of a group of trusted people from the local community who were selected by the local council. They are called upon if a local operational problem arises and provide advice to the police on how to deal with the situation from a community perspective. This group was utilised during a public order incident involving youths from minority ethnic communities. It resulted in an early resolution of the problem that attracted considerable local praise.

**3.31** Whilst there have been notable successes from the involvement of independent advisers, HM Inspector believes that chief officers, police authorities and prospective advisers should give careful consideration to the following issues prior to the establishment of an advisers group/panel:

- ◆ the role/terms of reference of the group
- ◆ the level the group will operate at, for example local or force-wide
- ◆ the selection/de-selection procedures to ensure the group have the necessary skills and abilities
- ◆ that the group is representative of the diversity of the community in which they will operate
- ◆ measures of success
- ◆ risk of personal harm to the members of the group
- ◆ the effect that their involvement will have amongst the community in which they live and work
- ◆ how their advice will be actioned
- ◆ the demands on individuals' time



- ◆ whether the group will be part of the consultative process or merely informed on developments
- ◆ the financial implications (for example payment of expenses)
- ◆ relationships with other consultative fora
- ◆ the relationship with the police authority

This will ensure a structured, co-ordinated and professional approach that will maximise the potential for success.

**3.32** The 'advisory group' model is not the only example of innovative informal community consultation. Other approaches include:

- ◆ West Midlands Police: the Sector Liaison Committees alter the venue of their community consultative meetings to match the agenda being debated.
- ◆ Newcastle West (Northumbria Police): a website has been developed aimed at creating dialogue with young people.
- ◆ In Devon and Cornwall Constabulary: a questionnaire survey has been used in schools by Youth Affairs Officers as a catalyst to prompt discussion and debate over the role of police in society and citizenship generally.

**3.33** HM Inspector supports the continued development of consultative processes that extend beyond the orthodox and exceed minimum statutory arrangements. It was refreshing to find so many examples of innovative thinking in forces to secure the views of their public in a progressive and proactive way. Such innovation must continue if the Service is to reach the desired position of knowing with a degree of certainty the policing needs and policing aspirations of their diverse communities.

### **'Hard to Reach' Groups**

**3.34** There was considerable variance around the country on what actually constituted a 'hard to reach' group. In many cases groups identified as 'hard to reach', such as the gay community and disabled people, were indeed not hard to reach at all. Frequently such groups and individuals were accessible and willing to participate in consultative processes, but were unfortunately overlooked. 'Hard to reach' is not synonymous with failed to reach.

**3.35** *Winning the Race Revisited* identified groups such as disaffected youth, the homeless and other groups of those socially disadvantaged being amongst those 'hard to reach' groups. Once contact has been made, liaison established and the foundations of meaningful dialogue constructed, the label of 'hard to reach' becomes redundant. The intention was not to apply generically this term to particular groups based on socio-economic or any other status. Providing a definitive list therefore would not only be inaccurate, it would also be unhelpful as it was apparent that 'hard to reach' groups cannot be solely defined around a single group or community. The parameters for defining 'hard to reach' more often centred around the willingness, and commitment, of both the police and individuals in the community to engage in open dialogue, in which both parties not only listen, but actually

hear what is being said. In many cases these individuals or groups were disproportionate users of police services.

**3.36** It was apparent that many of those groups or individuals that are perceived as ‘hard to reach’ by the police may also fall into this category for many other partner agencies. This view is reinforced by the observation in the HMIC thematic inspection *Calling Time on Crime* that statutory partnerships had experienced limited success in establishing meaningful dialogue with ‘hard to reach’ groups.

**3.37** HM Inspector is aware, but surprised by the definitional difficulty the term ‘hard to reach’ caused in some forces. It is hoped that the above will add clarity. Whilst recognising the potential lack of definitional precision, HM Inspector notes that, despite academic research subsequent to the HMIC report *Winning the Race Revisited*, a more appropriate phrase has proved illusive. The fact that so much effort has been made in various forces to seek the views of the previously ignored or the previously silent is evidence that ‘hard to reach’, as a term, has proved, as was intended, the catalyst for necessary thought and action.

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### **Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Communities**

**3.38** During the previous inspections on *Winning the Race*, whilst there were pockets of good practice around the country in the consultative processes with lesbians and gay men in the community, these were isolated and sporadic. HM Inspector noted that whilst there was still room for improvement there had been an impressive drive from the police, lesbians and gay men to work together to address issues of common concern.

**3.39** The National Advisory Group for the Policing of the Lesbian and Gay Communities has continued to work tirelessly with many forces around the country to assist with advice and guidance in establishing local contacts. The majority of forces have established consultative forums to consult local lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities in line with the National Policing Charter produced by the National Advisory Group and endorsed by the ACPO.

**3.40** Whilst ongoing consultation with lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender groups in the Metropolitan Police Service and Greater Manchester Police remains impressive, the progress made in Merseyside was particularly noteworthy, with the involvement of lay advisers across a wide range of police activity. This was warmly supported both internally and externally throughout the inspection process.

**3.41** Whilst much of the work in this area was impressive, HM Inspector found that many of the consultative forums focused on issues affecting public sex environments and hate crime which had a tendency to marginalise those issues more specific to lesbians. HM Inspector would urge forces to review these consultative forums to ensure they reflect the needs of women as well as men.

### **Accessibility and Developing a Capability to Consult**

**3.42** To engage the community in consultation, consideration needs to be given to accessibility. This includes accessibility of staff, buildings and the appropriateness of



documentation to all in the community. The latter point is particularly relevant for minority ethnic citizens if English is not the predominant language read or spoken. In many cases annual reports were available in written English only. Furthermore, those issues around accessibility to disabled and hard-of-hearing people were *“not part of consultation considerations”*. This lack of responsiveness has the potential to further alienate what could already be a dissatisfied section of the community.

**3.43** The use of audio and visual briefings in languages other than English was strongly supported by community groups during the Inspection. There was a feeling that this approach reached out to a far wider section of the community. Indeed such an approach will benefit those members of society who have less than standard levels of literacy who are often forgotten.

**3.44** There was repeated criticism during the Inspection of the disruption to the consultative process caused by the regular transfer of police staff. This meant that the considerable time and effort that had been invested from all quarters in building up trust and confidence was wasted when staff were moved on to new roles. The knock-on effect was that much of the ‘bank of goodwill’ that had developed over time was sometimes lost to the detriment of both the police and the community. HM Inspector acknowledges the difficulties faced by chief officers around this issue. However, HM Inspector would encourage them to balance the competing demands of the development of individual officers and the wider needs of the public.

**3.45** The overall position of forces on the issue of consultation is portrayed in Figure 3.1 opposite. Those forces that are progressing satisfactorily have complied with their statutory requirements and are making effective use of these consultation processes. Those who exhibited good practice have gone much further and have identified and engaged in dialogue with ‘hard to reach’ groups and in some cases set up additional informal independent or lay advisory panels and are acting upon the information gleaned from this process. This is reflected not only in operational activity but also in the formulation and revision of force policies. It represents a move beyond mere consultation to actual community involvement. However, a minority of forces are still not maximising the potential of their consultative mechanisms. This is evident in one of two ways. Firstly they had consultative processes in place but were not using the resulting consultative products or secondly they had processes that were fragmented and lacking in cohesion or structure. This provides the rationale for clustering these forces under the scope for improvement heading.

## Figure 3.1 – Cluster grouping: Community consultation processes

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



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### **Best Value Role and the Way Forward**

**3.46** It was encouraging to see that there has been, generally speaking, a genuine and sustained commitment throughout the Service in England and Wales to improve the way in which the community is consulted, particularly those groups and individuals who have been less than vocal in the past.

**3.47** In order to maintain this momentum HM Inspector would urge forces to ensure that their consultative arrangements are sufficiently co-ordinated and that the relative responsibilities of the police authority and chief constable in the process are clearly set out. A customer-focused approach to seek out, listen and respond to the views of those in receipt of the policing service is undoubtedly the way ahead. Figure 3.2 opposite sets out a model which forces should consider when formulating their approach to consultation, both statutory and non-statutory.

**3.48** HM Inspector urges those forces that have not done so to review their existing consultative processes against this model. This should ensure that they adequately reflect the views of all elements of the community, even those who historically have little contact with the police, or are reluctant to engage in meaningful dialogue. It is essential that a formalised structure is in place that allows the information gleaned from these processes to be fully utilised at the strategic and all other levels.

**3.49** At the outset of this chapter reference was made to the *Local Government Act 1999* and the duty placed upon police authorities as Best Value authorities. Within the Best Value context there is the important element of **consultation**. The importance of this element is not lost on HM Inspector and was obviously recognised by the majority of forces in England and Wales. Best Value provides both police authorities and chief constables with the opportunity of improving the quality and efficiency of service delivery by maximising on the consultative requirements inherent within the discipline of the Best Value review process. This sits comfortably with the model at Figure 3.2 (opposite). The Service as a whole should embrace this opportunity as the best way forward to enhance local consultation and therefore service delivery to all sections of society.

**3.50** This report acknowledges the progress the Service in general has made in developing its consultative activity and welcomes the innovative approaches in a number of forces. HM Inspector reinforces the added value that forces can gain using the consultative outcomes in their strategic thinking and policy making. The ensuing credibility of consultation will be recognised by the public. This established credibility will encourage the active involvement of all sections of the public in their policy in an inclusive way.

**Figure 3.2 – Community Consultation Model**  
**Key Questions and Issues to be Addressed Prior to the Consultation Process**

Why Consult?	Who With?	How and When?	Consult	Use of Information	Feedback
<p>Define purpose (beyond compliance with statutory obligation)</p> <p>What do you actually want to achieve?</p> <p>Will the benefits be tangible at both operational and strategic level?</p> <p>Will the consultation exercise actually improve policing services?</p> <p>Are the resources available to do it (cost/benefit)?</p> <p>Can the consultation be shared with other agencies/bodies?</p> <p>Are staff adequately skilled to do it?</p> <p>What are the risks to the organisation (raised expectation/inability to deliver, etc)?</p> <p>What does success look like (are PIs in place)?</p>	<p>Define customer base:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elective: those that make a choice to use service</li> <li>• Captive: those with no choice as police only provider of service</li> <li>• Unwilling: those subject to use of police powers (arrest, stop and search, etc)</li> <li>• Non-users: those that do not directly use but benefit from the service</li> </ul> <p>Is there a further breakdown of the community required to identify those with whom you need to consult (minority, ethnic communities, youth, etc)?</p> <p>How accessible is the organisation to minority groups (language, disabled facilities, etc)?</p>	<p>What methodology (or mix of methodology) is best suited to those with whom you need to consult:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• User comments/complaints/suggestion schemes</li> <li>• Feedback from staff/suggestion schemes</li> <li>• Mystery shopping</li> <li>• Open/public meetings</li> <li>• Face-to-face interviews</li> <li>• Focus groups</li> <li>• Citizens panels/juries</li> <li>• Questionnaire-based surveys</li> <li>• Open days/roadshows</li> <li>• Internet</li> </ul> <p>Will the timeliness of the consultation exercise allow for feedback into the planning cycle?</p> <p>Consider publicity/timing/location of meetings?</p>	<p>Communicate purpose of consultative approach</p> <p>Define the role of those being consulted</p> <p>Negotiate and agree terms of reference where appropriate</p> <p>Allow sufficient time for full consideration of issues upon which consulted</p> <p>Communicate the benefits to the organisation/those consulted</p>	<p>Ensure that the information/advice and feedback is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysed</li> <li>• Assessed</li> <li>• Linked to other relevant data (other consultative feedback/survey information, etc)</li> <li>• Fed into the strategic planning function at local and organisational level</li> </ul>	<p>Ensure that provision is made to inform those consulted of the organisational changes made as a result of consultation.</p>
<p><b>Continual process of review:</b> Timing, methodology, information exchange, cost/benefit.</p> <p>Are target groups responding?</p> <p>Is the consultation driving the planning process?</p> <p>Is there tangible service improvement?</p>					
<p><b>Source:</b> HMIC report: <i>Policing London: Winning Consent</i>, Cabinet Office publication <i>How to Consult Your Users</i>, and the TQMI handbook <i>Achieving Best Value</i></p>					



## 4. Community Intelligence

### Introduction

**4.1** The importance of community consultation and the inherent links to improved service delivery are fundamental to the thrust of this report. Community intelligence as a concept was acknowledged within *Winning the Race* as one of the linking strands between consultation and service delivery.

*“Forces should recognise that ‘community intelligence’ is as valuable as ‘crime intelligence’ to effective policing and quality of service”.*

#### ***Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.15***

**4.2** The continued development of an intelligence-led and problem-solving approach to policing puts a premium on both criminal and community intelligence. The value of the rationale underpinning this recommendation therefore increases in due proportion. In *Winning the Race Revisited* the specific value of community intelligence was reaffirmed with the addition of two important ingredients.

**4.3** Firstly, a practical definition of the term was required. Community intelligence may be defined as:

*Local information, direct or indirect, that when assessed provides intelligence on the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups, that informs both the strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities.*

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This definition not only relates to the collection of information from the community but also information about the community from whatever source. Essentially it is about gaining a comprehensive knowledge of the local environment and the quality of life local people enjoy. It is not about the assembly of criminal intelligence in respect of individuals.

**4.4** Secondly, there was a requirement for an integration methodology into a force’s gathering and use of other intelligence. Both these ingredients provided the rationale for assessing the progress on the original recommendation in *Winning the Race*. The content of this chapter assesses progress against this revised background. However, policing does not stand still and there have been a number of significant developments in the intelligence field since the publication of both previous thematic reports. These developments are part of the context of this part of the inspection.

### Background

**4.5** HMIC has endorsed an intelligence-led approach to policing for a number of years. This endorsement was consolidated in 1997 with the publication of the thematic inspection report, *Policing with Intelligence*. Amongst other guidance this report recommended that forces should:

- ◆ vest the leadership of intelligence at chief officer level
- ◆ publish a strategy

- ◆ implement an integrated intelligence structure
- ◆ develop effective partnerships with a view to an exchange of intelligence

**4.6** To a large extent the Service has embraced these recommendations and an intelligence-led approach is well established within the current thinking on the British policing model. HM Inspector believes that such an intelligence-led approach is entirely consistent with enhanced consultation processes and more effective service delivery.

**4.7** A full understanding of the current position of community intelligence within such a model requires forces to be mindful of the developments since 1997 that continue to have a significant impact upon the way police forces collect, record and use intelligence. These include:

- ◆ *ACPO Covert Law Enforcement Techniques - Codes of Practice*, particularly the section entitled 'The Recording and Dissemination of Intelligence Material', specifically outlines the circumstances that must apply before intelligence can be recorded and disseminated.
- ◆ The National Intelligence Model developed by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). This model has been promulgated to all forces as a system for managing all elements of intelligence.
- ◆ *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000*.
- ◆ *Human Rights Act 1998*.

## **Inspection Findings**

**4.8** HM Inspector found significant variation between the forces in England and Wales in their approach to community intelligence. At one end of the continuum the intelligence strategies of some forces facilitated the integration of community intelligence into wider intelligence systems. Within these forces community intelligence was not only part of the system, but was also a factor that enhanced the overall intelligence-led approach to policing. Such integration was evident in the recording, analysis and dissemination of community intelligence and the impact that it had upon local service delivery. It was interesting to note the positive correlation between those forces who performed well on community consultation also excelled in the field of community intelligence.

**4.9** Good examples of this were found in the:

- ◆ Metropolitan Police Service, where all intelligence is recorded on the force CRIMINT intelligence system.
- ◆ Lancashire, which had successfully achieved an acceptable level of integration and was utilising the resultant intelligence products on a daily basis to inform and direct local policing initiatives.



**4.10** This Inspection also found that the collection of community intelligence was frequently seen as a role for specialists, particularly Community Beat Officers (CBOs), as opposed to the responsibility of all staff. Staff at operational level, particularly those working in a sector-policing model, are a valuable and rich seam of community intelligence. In a majority of forces this seam has remained largely untapped.

**4.11** Furthermore, many of the staff at operational level did not have a clear understanding of what actually constituted community intelligence and how it assisted sector-policing, problem-solving approaches and intelligence-led activity. This can only reinforce the view that community intelligence is the sole preserve of a small number of specialists. HM Inspector found this disappointing and would urge chief officers to ensure that the definition, and its rationale of community intelligence is widely promulgated to all staff and its value emphasised. The opportunity should be grasped to reinforce the same responsibility of all staff for the collection of community intelligence. This mirrors the responsibility that they have and accept for other forms of intelligence.

**4.12** At the other end of the continuum a number of forces had not sufficiently integrated community intelligence into their force intelligence systems. Common themes to excuse this lack of integration suggested that:

- ◆ community intelligence was seen as an entity totally separate from criminal intelligence
- ◆ forces had set up 'stand-alone' systems, usually at BCU level, for recording community intelligence thereby denying the opportunity for integration
- ◆ recording analysis and dissemination was not possible as community intelligence was not compatible with the NCIS National Intelligence Model or the ACPO Codes of Practice

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**4.13** HM Inspector has considered the background to these explanations and consulted with NCIS on the issue of integration and summarises the position as follows:

- ◆ In light of recent developments regarding intelligence per se, community intelligence is best viewed as sitting under the intelligence umbrella.
- ◆ Responsibility for the handling and integration of community intelligence must now sit with the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). The advice in *Winning the Race* suggesting it should sit within a force Community Affairs Branch is no longer valid in light of these developments.
- ◆ The FIB should ensure that the collection, recording and dissemination of community intelligence is compliant with the *Human Rights Act*, *ACPO Code of Practice on Covert Law Enforcement Techniques*, *The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act* and the National Intelligence Model.



## Summary

**4.14** The definition of community intelligence in *Winning the Race Revisited* remains valid. It is just another form of intelligence and should be handled with the same technical and professional precision as any other form. HM Inspector is not in a position to be prescriptive regarding the integration and application of community intelligence. This is a specialist policing function and one that is now the subject of exacting regulation. Forces should therefore be guided by the regulations and codes of practice that determine how intelligence material is generally integrated and used.

**4.15** Community intelligence must be viewed as existing within, rather than outside the generic approach of the Service to intelligence. This relatively untapped resource will benefit from inclusion within an integrated intelligence strategy. It is intrinsic to the range of measures needed to improve service delivery. It is highly unlikely that the necessary link between consultation and service delivery can be fully in place unless community intelligence forms a significant part of this information conduit. It is only full integration that will realise the potential benefits.

## 5. Serving the Community

### Introduction

**5.1** Policing according to need is the cornerstone of the provision of real quality of service. Those individual needs, multi-faceted as they are in a society characterised by increasing diversity of ethnicity and lifestyle, require a police service that is mature enough to welcome that diversity as integral to policing. This chapter examines progress against service delivery recommendations of previous thematic inspection reports:

- ◆ CRR auditing
- ◆ the impact of strategies and policies on the community
- ◆ the investigation of racist and homophobic incidents
- ◆ the use of the stop and search tactic
- ◆ measuring local community satisfaction
- ◆ police liaison within schools
- ◆ the policing of asylum seekers

### Community and Race Relations – Positioning the Organisation

**5.2** To assist the assessment of the impact of policing, Appendix 1 in the HMIC report *Winning the Race* included a comprehensive checklist for forces. Prompted by weakness identified during inspection, the report recommended that:

*“Forces should consider a community and race relations audit of all Divisions/Departments to identify their potential for improving community and race relations.”*

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#### **Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.11**

The application of the ‘CRR checklist’ is a process that informs decision-makers on the organisation’s position as a precursor to their determination of necessary remedial action.

**5.3** This Inspection found that the majority of forces had used the checklist as a tool for assessing their current status. A number of forces had taken the next logical and intended step of using the findings to inform their CRR strategies. Suffolk Constabulary, having completed an audit as a result of the HMIC report *Winning the Race Revisited*, repeated the process to inform further action plans regarding their work in the community. West Midlands Police updated the original checklist results by re-inspecting the force every six months. HM Inspector welcomes the use of the checklist as a cyclical tool. Regrettably there were a small number of forces that had failed to use the checklist or had not secured optimum value from its use.

**5.4** Those forces that had embraced the recommended approach to organisational development were rewarded with an inventory of their CRR position. Some forces such as Dorset Police and Suffolk Constabulary had decision-making fora that included both staff and

community representatives to inform their decision making. This approach gave these forces a suite of policies that are sensitive to community needs and tightened the focus on efficient service delivery.

**5.5** Figure 5.1 (opposite) shows how each force in England and Wales has progressed with CRR auditing. Some forces within ‘scope for improvement’ had not conducted a CRR audit. Others had either conducted an audit with a less than effective process or had failed to identify the potential within the results. The clusters show a significant number of forces making satisfactory progress and many exhibiting good practices. Such good practice goes beyond the recommendations and guidance provided in both HMIC reports *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited* and demonstrably feeds into the policy- and decision-making process in these forces.

## Service Delivery

**5.6** Policing will not be judged on the quality of strategic documents and policy files alone, the final judgement will come from the public who use the service the police have to offer. There are essentially two separate and distinct categories of police service delivery:

- ◆ response activities – focus in this Inspection being on racist and homophobic incidents
- ◆ intervention activities using discretionary powers – focus in this Inspection being stop and search

## Response Activities

### Racist Incidents

**5.7** Since the publication of the HMIC report *Winning the Race, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report redefined and simplified the previous ACPO definition of a racist incident. This revised definition has been adopted by the ACPO.

*“A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.”*


**5.8** The removal of specific references to investigating officers, who are now inherently included in the wider group of ‘any person’, and the shift of emphasis from the motivation behind racist crimes towards that of victim perception, are the changes brought about by this definition. These changes have been widely publicised and therefore no excuses can be accepted from members of the Service for failing to grasp the meaning and purpose of the definition.

**5.9** Further recommendations of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report outlined the framework within which this definition should be applied and some of these recommendations endorsed previous ACPO policy and gave useful guidance. Such endorsements included applying the definition of a racist incident to both crimes and non-crime incidents and required a holistic, multi-agency approach to prevention and investigation.

**Figure 5.1 – Cluster grouping: Community and race relations auditing**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)

(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



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**5.10** This Inspection found that throughout the Service and amongst other partner agencies, for example local authorities and Race Equality Councils (RECs), there was universal adoption of the reformed racist incident definition. There appeared to be a total ability, amongst managers, operational personnel and support staff, to recite the definition and to understand its meaning. HM Inspector is heartened by these developments and the marked improvement since the previous Inspections that such developments represent.

**5.11** Regrettably HM Inspector found that although the actual definition of a racist incident has been adopted and is understood by officers, this does not extend to an acceptance, or even a comprehension, of the rationale underpinning the definition. The emotional gravity of a racist incident is far greater than that caused by minor physical injury or financial loss suffered by victims. Supervisors and managers themselves have failed to grasp this crucial point. In the absence of understanding by many of their managers and supervisors it is hardly surprising that too high a proportion of operational officers also fail to understand. The lack of a cogent explanation represents a gap in professionalism which must be addressed if the response to racist incidents is to be marked by its quality.

**5.12** There remain a small number of operational police officers with a preconceived resistance to classifying an incident as 'racist'. A small number of forces still refer to 'racially motivated incidents.' This is not a semantic difference but a sign of a culture that is reluctant to change from defining incidents on the basis of motivation as opposed to the perceptions of victims. The effect of individuals within the Service still requiring confirmation against their own terms of reference before accepting an individual complainant's view on the nature of an incident, can only serve to undermine public confidence.

**5.13** To provide clarity regarding this issue, Appendix C provides some guidance on how the definition of racist incidents has changed and details in simple terms some of the surrounding issues. HM Inspector urges forces to promote this information to their staff.

**5.14** The Racial and Violent Crime Task Force (which is part of the Metropolitan Police Service Diversity Directorate) has won considerable support within and outside the Service, for its activities in tackling racist crimes in the London area. Through positive leadership, coupled with a determined effort to inform public opinion, the task force is acknowledged as a credible source of assistance and advice for borough commanders and the majority of staff throughout the Metropolitan Police Service. Importantly, this task force has also had a positive effect on police and community relations within minority ethnic communities. Other forces readily seek advice from the task force and the ACPO *Guide to Identifying and Combating Hate Crime* owes its authorship to this department. As previously recognised in the HMIC report *Policing London: Winning Consent* HM Inspector commends the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force as a beacon of good practice for the police service nationally.

**5.15** Solving racist crime and the provision of satisfactory resolutions to reported incidents is a function that does not lie solely with the police service. Other agencies have important roles to perform. The recommendations within *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report regarding multi-agency approaches to racist incidents have been the subject of recent Home Office guidance in the *Code of Practice on Reporting and Recording Racist Incidents*. This

Inspection was reassured to find an almost complete awareness and understanding of both the challenge surrounding multi-agency reporting and the existence of the recently published guidance.

**5.16** West Midlands Police provided an example of good practice in the field of multi-agency reporting. The Birmingham Partnership Against Racial Harassment (BPARH) is a multi-agency partnership that has the primary function of supporting victims of racist crime in Birmingham. The relevant reporting agencies in Birmingham are partners in the group and independently accept racist incident reports, often from third parties, then share that information on common paperwork through agreed common systems. The group sit on a regular basis and analyse reports to find the most appropriate resolution in the circumstances of each case. Closing these incidents and the ratification of the resolution can only take place with the agreement of the group, and members quality assure the work of their colleagues prior to this taking place. West Midlands Police are acknowledged as key stakeholders in the group and HM Inspector ardently supports their continued involvement in this venture.

**5.17** This example of multi-agency reporting was one of many examples found during this Inspection. The BAPRH project (Birmingham) is highlighted within this report as an example of a determination to share reporting practices and one that tackles racist incidents with a transparency that fosters the necessary trust amongst its partners. Victims are the ultimate beneficiaries.


**5.18** This Inspection has highlighted a continuing lack of faith amongst some minority ethnic communities that still leads to reluctance to report racist attacks. Despite these findings, recent endeavours to increase the incidents of reporting racist incidents have resulted in nation-wide increases in these recorded events. This is in part a testimony to an increase in public confidence and a growing belief that the police are taking these matters seriously alongside increased multi-agency activity. The extent of these increases in reported incidents is demonstrated in Figure 5.2 (overleaf).

**5.19** Increases in racist incident reports allow the Service to gather accurate information regarding trends and areas of vulnerability, both geographically and for particular groups of people. As the Service improves its 'professionalism' in dealing with racism and hate crime the opportunity to maximise on growing public faith and confidence can be realised.

**5.20** This Inspection noted a view amongst some chief officers that forces may have sufficient information, through increased reporting, to progress beyond the establishment of trends to the actual reduction of racist incidents. HMIC, whilst encouraging preventive and enforcement action through partnership and operational activity, does not share the view that the entire picture of racist incidents is yet apparent. It certainly is not the experience of representatives of minority ethnic communities.

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**Figure 5.2 – Racist Incidents**

**Source: Reported Racist Incidents**

**5.21** Figure 5.3 (opposite) highlights the significant progress made by the Service in the recording and investigation of racist incidents. The vast majority of forces exhibited innovative good practice. This was reinforced by ten forces that have made satisfactory progress. However, it was disappointing to judge that eight forces still had scope to improve. Those forces were failing to spotlight perception as opposed to motivation and officers were basing their operational decisions on their own judgement not the perception of the victim.

**5.22** HM Inspector is pleased that in conjunction with HMIC and the Home Office, ACPO have developed a working definition of what constitutes 'further investigation' in relation to racist incidents. The recent promulgation of this common standard to the Service should lead to improved comparable data. This development should in turn influence the development of common standards of service delivery.



## Figure 5.3 – Cluster grouping: Dealing with racist incidents

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)

(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)

### DEALING WITH RACIST INCIDENTS

Forces need to re-issue the ACPO definition of a racial (now racist) incident, ensure systematic and comprehensive recording, effectively monitor the patterns shown and improve the quality of response, including increasing the effectiveness of multi-agency approaches. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.18)

This Recommendation has been further developed by Recommendations 12 to 14 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report.

During this Inspection, forces were assessed commensurate with their own particular circumstances and policing environment, for example size, population, demography, geography, etc. Forces were NOT norm referenced against one another or within 'families' of forces. (See paragraphs 1.22 and 1.23)

### EXHIBITING GOOD PRACTICE (25 FORCES)

Avon & Somerset  
Cheshire  
Cleveland Police  
Cumbria  
Devon & Cornwall  
Dorset Police  
Durham  
Dyfed Powys Police  
Gloucestershire  
Greater Manchester Police  
Kent County  
Lancashire  
Lincolnshire Police  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Northamptonshire Police  
Northumbria Police  
North Wales Police  
Nottinghamshire Police  
South Wales Police  
Staffordshire Police  
Suffolk  
Thames Valley Police  
West Mercia  
West Midlands Police  
West Yorkshire Police

### PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY (10 FORCES)

Bedfordshire Police  
Cambridgeshire  
Hampshire  
Hertfordshire  
Leicestershire  
Merseyside Police  
Norfolk  
Sussex Police  
Warwickshire  
Wiltshire

### SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT (8 FORCES)

City of London Police  
Derbyshire  
Essex Police  
Gwent Police  
Humberside Police  
North Yorkshire Police  
South Yorkshire Police  
Surrey Police

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## Homophobic Incidents

**5.23** HM Inspector is now satisfied that the vast majority of staff now understand the definition of a racist incident. Unfortunately this situation was not mirrored regarding homophobic incidents. This Inspection also found that amongst forces the definition of a homophobic incident has followed a similar rationale to that of racist incidents:

*“A homophobic incident is any incident which is perceived to be homophobic by the victim or any other person.”*

**5.24** There was clear evidence of the Service dealing with reported homophobic incidents in a robust and purposeful way. Where forces had combined elements of racism and homophobia as ‘hate crime’ there was no evidence of this detracting from overall service delivery. On one hand some observers comment that a generic label detracts from the individuality of either component whilst others suggest that similarities in the emotional effects on victims predicate parallel policing responses and complimentary policing skills. There is no definitive way forward and forces are deciding for themselves whether to deal with such incidents generically as hate crime or to deal with them as separate components. HM Inspector believes there is merit in both approaches depending on the needs of particular victims in a particular force.

**5.25** Throughout this Inspection there were many examples of good practice regarding the policing of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender venues. The Service as a whole, however, finds greater difficulty in maintaining the service quality towards members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities when they are away from such environments.

*“The police still need educating in how to be sensitive to gay people outside the gay village. I have less faith in them being fair in non-city centre environments.”*

### **Member of Lesbian Gay and Bisexual Community Forum**

**5.26** Officers attending incidents in and around gay venues were instinctively aware of the needs of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. This has resulted in officers overcoming previously common stereotypical and homophobic behaviour patterns by dealing with victims and offenders equitably, regardless of their sexual orientation. Officers attending crimes and incidents taking place away from traditional gay venues, where the sexual orientation of the victim or informant was not known to them, often reacted negatively when faced with such information, resorting to homophobic and stereotypical behavioural patterns.

**5.27** Such reactions reduce confidence amongst lesbian, gay and bisexual community members and can frustrate other initiatives aimed at restoring confidence. HM Inspector strongly advises forces to consider including within sexual orientation awareness training programmes a particular emphasis on the likely emotional and suspicious response that unwittingly inept and clumsy police reactions can generate.

**5.28** Figure 5.4 (page 48) outlines the considerable development within the Service in England and Wales regarding the policing of, and for, the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. The large number of forces displaying good practice is testimony to the advances that have been made in dealing with offences against this potentially vulnerable group. The good practice was vividly and dramatically evidenced, not only in the work of the Metropolitan Police Service before and after the hideous bombing of the Admiral Duncan public house in

Soho, but also in the excellent work in other parts of the country in advising and reassuring local gays through preventive action and advice.

**5.29** Only five forces have scope for significant improvement in this area and HM Inspector encourages those forces to respond positively to these findings. They arise from a combination of circumstances including a lack of understanding amongst staff of the implications of homophobia, a lack of a co-ordinated approach and the absence of identified contact persons with knowledge and empathy with this community.

**5.30** Although this Inspection has generally found a professional sensitivity concerning policing of gay issues there were disturbing findings in some forces. In one force, victims of homophobic attacks had to reveal their sexual orientation to the reporting officer before they would receive the benefits of a specialised support network. Such interpretation of homophobic incidents is unacceptable and the Service should have advanced beyond this restrictive practice. The Service should be mindful of the potential harm such actions could have on victims some of whom are particularly vulnerable.

**5.31** The policing of a diverse community has one certainty, diversity will increase, and society itself will become more tolerant of what was previously and suspiciously referred to as difference. HM Inspector encourages forces to recognise this fact as a challenge for the future and to adopt an appropriate professional and ethical stance towards the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities whilst remaining cognisant of developments within a society that is becoming refreshingly more tolerant and less judgmental.

### **Intervention Activity – Stop and Search**

**5.32** *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report and the *Home Secretary's Action Plan* both acknowledged that stop and search is an important tactical option in the prevention and detection of crime. On the other hand stop and search has been frequently cited as a significant link in the chain of causation of failing public confidence amongst members of minority communities. There are three main threats to public confidence that can be directly attributed to the use of stop and search as a policing option:

- ◆ disproportionality to the prejudice of those from minority ethnic backgrounds
- ◆ poor management of encounters by the police
- ◆ inadequate explanations by officers to those stopped and searched

**5.33** *Winning the Race Revisited* reported that few forces were using the data collected by statute to analyse stop and search trends to inform policy making in order to secure optimum and equitable use of the stop and search tactic. This Inspection found that this situation has remained constant across England and Wales. Project work in some forces, for example the Metropolitan Police Service, Surrey Police, Thames Valley Police and Norfolk Constabulary, was a refreshing indication of what can be achieved to increase the opportunities for positive stop and search outcomes. For the most part, however, there remained a general complacency regarding disproportionality.

**Figure 5.4 – Cluster grouping: Service provision for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender communities**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



**5.34** The difficulties faced by the Service in addressing disproportion were detailed at some length by HM Inspector in *Policing London: Winning Consent*. The range of perspectives were examined and the report acknowledged that however diligent and radical the effort, the Service alone could not cleanse itself of the taint of unfairness that is the commonly held perception. HM Inspector recommended independent research of the issues and is pleased to note the products of the PRCU research in the *Police Research Series (Papers 127-132)*. The research confirms empirically many of the points made by HM Inspector in earlier reports, especially *Policing London: Winning Consent*. The research explored the recommended concept of monitoring stop and search activity against ‘available population’ as opposed to outdated demographic data. It was interesting that such monitoring ironed out much of the apparent disproportionality. There is now no excuse for forces that have sat on their professional hands awaiting this Research Series, appearing confounded by the inadequacy of census data a decade old, to postpone any longer meaningful analysis and action.

**5.35** The analysis of stop and search data should enable a force to know the stop and search pattern of all its constituent BCUs and policing specialisms. The cascade should extend to every manager and supervisor being aware of the pattern of their teams and individuals. This Inspection found few forces were conducting such analysis. Most supervision centred on a ritualistic check of the accuracy of the information on stop and search forms, rather than quality assuring the grounds for the reasonable suspicion that the law requires. The question should transcend ‘are all the boxes completed?’ and reach the important interrogatives ‘why was this person stopped and searched?’ and ‘was that action both lawful and reasonable?’.

**5.36** The clear and consistent message from members of the public, particularly the visible minority ethnic public, during both this Inspection and its predecessors was in turns ‘it’s not what you do but the way that you do it’ – a view confirmed in recent research.

*“Public confidence in the police use of stop and search is primarily based on being treated fairly and with respect, and being given a satisfactory reason for the stop or search.”*

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### **The views of the public on stop and search.**

*Police Research Series Paper 129*

**5.37** HM Inspector was disappointed in the levels of supervision and management regarding stop and search. Even a comprehensive analysis of stop and search forms cannot alone satisfy the requirements of the public who reasonably demand that officers conducting lawful stop and searches explain the reasons for their actions and treat the person with respect. There is a Service-wide necessity for supervisors and managers to be involved in these encounters and give priority to supervising the officers under their charge. This focus should include the operational use of discretionary powers, including the use of stop and searches, as operational police tactics amongst which stop and search is the important centre of public debate.

**5.38** The proper use of stop and search powers is and will continue to be a key determinant in the level of public confidence the police service enjoys. It is important that the Service not only gets it right, but can be seen by all to be acting lawfully, fairly, and to be respecting

individual dignity. The judicious use of the stop and search tactic will remain the barometer of equitable policing in the eyes of the public. It is incumbent on the Service that 'fair' is the predominant reading. HM Inspector is a staunch advocate of the stop and search tactic, subject to the caveat of 'fairness' being applied.

## Community Impact

*"The community and race relations implications of policies, procedures and practices - including the planning of specific operations - should be routinely considered alongside other resource implications."*

### **Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.12**

**5.39** Day-to-day operational police work is the tangible measure against which local people judge their police service. A force CRR strategy and associated policy publications, no matter the sincerity of their thrust, will be judged insincere if operational activity is outside their parameters or contrary to their expressed professional values. Operational style is the fruit of policing; the strategic seed will not be recognised if that fruit lacks customer appeal.

**5.40** The sensitive use of an officer's discretion, the effective use of appropriate communication skills, all supported and directed by a leadership style that displays an awareness of the needs of society, can, on the other hand, serve to underpin and embellish the effect of other pro-active police work with the community.

**5.41** Whilst HM Inspector identified many examples of good practice there were still gaps in some forces' ability to plan pro-actively for the likely impact on the community as a result of specific police operations. Although some forces monitor 'tension indicators' after a police operation, and carry out this monitoring quite successfully, few consider consultation with, far less the active involvement of, community representatives prior to an operation taking place.

**5.42** Chapter 3 discussed the Service's progress regarding community consultation. Such consultative processes with the public must also consider obtaining assistance regarding specific, often contentious, police operations. Some forces have embraced this challenge of transparency in community consultation to good effect. The Greater Manchester Police and local councillors are actively engaged at the planning stages of sensitive operations and Greater Manchester Police pro-actively use the media to explain the reasons behind their activity. Another good example is Bedfordshire Police where specific community impact forms are used as a basis for all operational planning.

**5.43** Avon and Somerset Constabulary also appreciate the difficulties of consultation when conducting spontaneous incidents, especially those involving the deployment of firearm officers. To overcome these difficulties the force have a policy of contacting the Support Against Racist Incidents (SARI) representative as soon as a scene is secured and the operation is contained. Following such operations community representatives are given the opportunity of visiting the custody suite to check on the welfare of any detainees.

**5.44** This Inspection found that it was often the professionalism of individuals that would generate good practice rather than guidance from the centre by policy makers. In many cases

it is the enthusiasm and leadership qualities of individual BCU commanders that drive effective policing rather than direction and guidance of force-wide policy statements. Policy documents and operational procedures can, and most likely will, go some way to decreasing community tensions, but they are dependent on and are products of effective consultation and communication with the community. HM Inspector advises the Service to consolidate and further develop a pro-active approach to consultation, especially in operational day-to-day policing.

### Quality of Life Issues

**5.45** The HMIC report *Winning the Race* highlighted the need for the Service to develop a constructive and creative approach to deal with repetitive incidents that are not recorded as crimes in accordance with Home Office guidelines. The report drew attention to the fact that the number of incidents most often experienced by the public were of a non-crime nature. The inspection referred to these incidents as ‘quality of life’ or ‘repetitive non-crime’ issues. *Winning the Race* recommended that:

*“Forces give a higher priority to dealing with neighbourhood incidents and anti-social behaviour; i.e. quality of life issues.”*

*“Account is taken of these non-crime issues in Annual Policing Plans and Divisional/Area action plans.”*

#### **Winning the Race, Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3**

**5.46** *Winning the Race Revisited* reported improvement with 41 forces beginning to address quality of life issues. Generally this Inspection found that the momentum had continued and many forces had developed some form of problem-solving philosophy to deal specifically with quality of life issues. These findings are reflected in Figure 5.5 (on page 52) which outlines that there are no forces currently having ‘scope for improvement’ in this regard. Indeed there were a number of examples of good practice including:

- ◆ Lancashire Constabulary, where repetitive non-crime incidents had retained a high profile. Within BCU priorities there is a bespoke information technology (IT) system to support the extraction of data. This practice benefited further from the personal interest and leadership shown by the Deputy Chief Constable.
- ◆ Sector-policing in Avon and Somerset Constabulary increased the focus on quality of life issues and repetitive non-crime incidents. A comprehensive approach in dealing with such issues was evidenced, for example by the maintenance of a ‘hot spot’ list.

**5.47** Figure 5.5 (on page 52) highlights the fact that forces are clearly demonstrating in their Annual and BCU Policing Plans that account has been taken of repetitive non-crime incidents.


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**Figure 5.5 – Cluster grouping: Dealing with repetitive non-crime incidents**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



**5.48** Since the revisit Inspection the momentum of local police accountability and partnerships has gathered pace under the *Crime and Disorder Act*. This legislative thrust puts community safety at the heart of the work of all agencies in their various service roles within the community. In welcoming the progress being made to reduce repetitive non-crime and disorder incidents, HM Inspector acknowledges the assistance that the Crime and Disorder Act has provided in focusing upon local quality of life.

### **Community Beat Officers**

**5.49** The importance of community police was underlined in the earlier thematics. There is considerable value in having dedicated officers that are adept, not only at cultivating confidence, establishing and maintaining vital channels of communication, but also solving local problems in a locally acceptable way.

*“The contribution made to community and race relations by community beat officers and the value which the public attaches to their role should receive greater acknowledgement. In particular they should not be abstracted for protracted periods, unless absolutely necessary.”*

#### **Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.9**

**5.50** That report raised concerns that forces often failed to recognise the benefits of CBOs, despite the value placed upon them by local communities. This Inspection found this issue still unresolved. There is a mixed picture across the forces of England and Wales with only 16 forces having policies concerning CBO deployment and abstraction. A high number of forces devolved the decision regarding CBO abstraction rates to their BCU commanders. This approach, if properly monitored, has its merits, however, HM Inspector still endorses the need for a corporate policy framework. Such a framework will allow BCU commanders to deal with the tactical aspects of CBO abstractions whilst remaining within rigorously monitored corporate standards.

**5.51** Some BCU commanders, who supported the CBO's function, ensured that abstractions were minimised, whilst others left abstractions at the behest of operational requirements and need. Some forces, for example Northamptonshire Police, viewed the CBO's role as a key part of the public/police interface, and have rigorously monitored policy guidance in relation to CBO abstraction.

**5.52** Amongst the examples of community policing models found during this Inspection there were many creative alternatives to the traditional community police officer role. Generally it was such forces that had managed to overcome the dilemma that surrounds CBO abstractions to provide the response function, and this is reflected in Figure 5.6 (page 55) that shows 12 forces exhibiting good practice with 10 still having scope for further improvement. Some examples of creative and good practice include:

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- ◆ Avon and Somerset Constabulary who use a sector-policing model and therefore do not consider the specialist/exclusive role of CBOs as necessary. This force indicated that its sector-policing model allocates individual officers to their beat for patrols.
- ◆ Merseyside Police who do not use the term CBO, as the force wished to remove the perception of the 'bobby on the beat'. These officers therefore formed 'Community Action Groups' with a role that encompasses intelligence gathering and problem solving for the allocated community area.
- ◆ West Midlands Police has developed the concept of 'Microbeats'. This is an innovative approach to locally focused policing and is supported by front line staff who are assigned small geographic areas for which they have ownership regarding non-emergency police matters.
- ◆ Humberside Police has a high visibility policing policy. Officers are encouraged to adopt a highly visible presence in the community as often as possible. Police officers who work in non-operational environments are required to return to the operational fold on a regular basis to assist the high visibility campaigns.
- ◆ Cheshire Police have formed Community Action Teams (CATs). These teams are comprised of re-deployed community police officers. The rationale behind the team approach to community policing includes minimising the harmful affects of abstractions by having a core team who are still in a position to police quality of life issues within their sector or BCU.

**5.53** Those forces displaying 'scope for improvement' were consistently failing to identify the primacy of the CBO role and frequently abstracting officers to provide other, less community based, policing roles. Such forces often had ad hoc arrangements regarding CBO abstraction and deployment, and this was often regulated by the demands of the response provision.

**5.54** There remains across the nation a situation where the Service is striving to balance the strongly expressed wishes of the public to have identifiable community police officers with the requirements of the same public to deliver a prompt response to their calls for help. Whilst HM Inspector recognises this is integral to the debate on resources for policing, nevertheless forces must acknowledge the importance of the CBO in their deployment thinking and where CBOs are frequently abstracted to review critically their policing model. The art of the possible is demonstrated in the above examples of creative and good practice.

### **Demographic Changes**

*"Forces should monitor and plan for demographic changes in terms of age/ethnicity profile of the community they serve to ensure effective links with the younger generations in particular."*

***Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.17***

**Figure 5.6 – Cluster grouping: Abstractions of community beat officers**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)

(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



**5.55** This Inspection found that 26 (60 per cent) of the 43 forces visited had not taken specific action to update their demographic data. Most still relied on 1991 census data, and acknowledged that this information was out of date and did not reflect their current community profile. Many forces were waiting for the fresh census to assist them in mapping out their community, however, HM Inspector draws attention to the fact that this information is still two years away. Forces and BCU commanders need more accurate information on which to base decisions and that information is needed now.

**5.56** Whilst some BCU commanders have endeavoured to generate demographic information through local authorities, data collecting processes, generally BCU commanders have little ethnicity and age profile information. An exception to these findings was found in West Midlands Police which showed an element of good practice by working closely in partnership with their seven local authorities on demographic data. Analysis of that data allowed the force to identify vulnerable location 'hot spots' which aided the efficient allocation of crime fighting funds and officers to those areas.

**5.57** Accurate demographic information is beneficial not only in informing a tailored, local service delivery, but will also have a positive effect elsewhere in the organisation. An excellent example of such an additional benefit was in Suffolk Constabulary. The force has anticipated a likely increase in the targets for its recruitment of minority ethnic staff in light of current and projected demographic information on the population of the county.

**5.58** HM Inspector suggests that forces draw demographic data from the many disparate sources of information available to them including local authorities, housing associations and central government sources. The aim should be to paint a more accurate picture to assist the shaping of both their strategic decision making and subsequent planning processes.

## **Community Satisfaction**

*"Forces should develop performance indicators constructed around local community satisfaction rates. Satisfaction rates must be measured regularly and individual results obtained for key sub-groups within the local community. Forces should use this information to identify gaps in the quality of their service delivery to the community at large and thus establish a linkage with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act."*

### **Winning the Race Revisited, Recommendation 9.6**

**5.59** Public satisfaction surveys are accepted as a viable mechanism across the public and private sectors to measure public perceptions. Since 1991 ACPO and then the Audit Commission have maintained a suite of Performance Indicators (PIs). Measuring customer satisfaction has therefore become a marker for the police in their commitment to achieving a quality service.

**5.60** This Inspection has revealed that forces conducting public attitude surveys are generally not receiving sufficient return rates from members of minority ethnic communities for the results to be classed as statistically significant. The Service as a whole has difficulty gaining an accurate picture of the satisfaction amongst members of minority ethnic communities.

**5.61** Those forces striving to gather accurate community perceptions were applauded by members of minority communities confirming that this was a step in the right direction and a positive aspect of police management.

*“The police have league tables with key indicators: these are good because the police should be dealing with communities’ needs.”*

***Member of a minority ethnic youth focus group***

**5.62** A small number of forces were working hard to boost the sample size and return rates for community satisfaction surveys amongst the diverse communities. In particular some forces were in liaison with the Home Office and regional colleagues to discover the most appropriate way forward regarding this aspect of performance management. HM Inspector has accepted this fact as an indication of the difficulties that the Service faces in gathering accurate data on customer satisfaction. Where forces were recording minor successes in this regard, there were common themes such as multilingual questionnaires or explanatory notes, and active sample ‘boosting’ in residential and business areas with a significant ethnic minority population. Questionnaires may be typical but they are not an exclusive method of gathering useful data.

**5.63** One particular example of notable creativity was found in Suffolk Constabulary. Suffolk has invested a considerable amount of partnership money in an electronic data capturing system. Attendees at community meetings are given an electronic keypad and when asked specific questions in the meeting they can ‘record’ their answer via this individual terminal. During the meetings results can be displayed, discussed or analysed with the attending community members. As a consequence the Constabulary can gain an accurate picture of the relevant community satisfaction rates. The flexibility of this system to be used in the heart of traditionally ‘hard to reach’ areas cannot go unnoticed.

**5.64** There is a clear gulf between levels of satisfactory performance, that is surveying in compliance with existing guidelines, and good practice exhibited by Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Suffolk Constabulary and West Midlands Police as shown in Figure 5.7 (overleaf). These forces have gone further than their counterparts in addressing the recommendation of *Winning the Race Revisited*. It was surprising that a number of forces need to improve in order to achieve a satisfactory performance standard.

**5.65** Overall there had been insufficient attention given to the gathering, recording and analysis of accurate customer satisfaction data from members of diverse communities. The revised quality of service satisfaction indicators under the auspices of Best Value should be used as a vehicle to overcome this deficit. Although HM Inspector recognises the difficulties facing the Service in this regard he reiterates the recommendations made previously, in particular that cited above from the HMIC report *Winning the Race Revisited*.

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**Figure 5.7 – Cluster grouping: Community satisfaction surveys**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



## Schools Liaison

*“The value of youth and school liaison officers to foster links and enhance the image of the police should be similarly recognised.”*

### **Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.10**

**5.66** Historically, the placing of police officers into the national education system has been piecemeal and without structure. The most recent Home Office circular on this subject was issued in 1989, and focused policing activity in schools on the following activities:

- ◆ informing schools on the role of the police
- ◆ informing about the law and rights and duties of citizens
- ◆ to make young people aware of dangers
- ◆ to help in fostering crime prevention

Recommendation 67 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report stated:

*“That consideration be given to amendment of the national curriculum aimed at valuing cultural diversity and preventing racism, in order better to reflect the needs of a diverse society.”*

**5.67** Within Recommendation 70, the report required members of Crime and Disorder partnerships, obviously including police forces, to specifically consider implementing community and local initiatives aimed at promoting cultural diversity. This recommendation was in the ‘Prevention and the Role of Education’ section of the report and it would appear explicit therefore that the police and education authorities have a joint role to perform regarding education.

**5.68** This Inspection found disparate levels of police involvement in schools. At one end of a continuum were forces that were at best leaving schools programmes at the total discretion of individual schools liaison officers. At the opposite extreme one force, Sussex Police, had a detailed schools education programme managed by a qualified teacher originally on secondment from the Education Authority. This practice has led to clarity of purpose within schools/police education and a more professional approach to the issues of child education by the police than the force had previously witnessed.

**5.69** HM Inspector is aware that there is a need amongst forces for national guidance regarding police schools liaison. There is a need for ACPO to visibly lead the Service on this issue. The current discussions involving the Service, and the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), will specifically target crime and disorder problems within schools and should harness the considerable energy regarding this subject with a view to producing national guidance or protocols. HM Inspector is hopeful that the publication of this work will provide the guidance and direction required.

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## Asylum Seekers

**5.70** The previous elements of this chapter of the report have dealt with the ability of forces to plan and deliver a high quality service that can be foreseen and expected. There remains within the policing function a need to be able to have a contingency to respond to unexpected community needs by providing a quality service in circumstances that lack clarity and are often unexpected. Recent increases in asylum seekers entering the United Kingdom highlight this demand.

**5.71** In the 12 month period leading up to the writing of this report Kent County Constabulary dealt with over 9,000 asylum seekers in their county. The Force has invested a great deal of time and money in the policing of these developments and the success of their operations is recognised by HM Inspector. The recently published ACPO guidance regarding asylum seekers was largely written by members of the Kent County Constabulary and their contribution was of immense value.

**5.72** This Inspection revealed forces dealing with asylum seekers in a positive manner and many were tackling these issues in partnership with local councils. Cumbria Constabulary are working in partnership with the County Emergency Planning Team and under the guidance of a Sector Inspector, who has successfully assisted with the accommodation of over 350 Kosovan refugees. The emerging plans have become the benchmark for other force strategies and other endeavours between the two organisations.

**5.73** The significant numbers of asylum seekers has led to considerable debate regarding the ability of the Service to meet the requirements of increasingly diverse communities. The capability of the Service to meet these demands has placed a great burden upon police resources and furthermore exposed forces to increased examination of the policing of sensitive and vulnerable communities.

## Summary

**5.74** Most forces have responded positively to earlier thematics and conducted an audit of their current CRR status. Some have moved on and exploited the findings to inform their CRR strategies. A few had embedded the audit process on a cyclical basis as an in-built monitor. A minority had yet to conduct an audit or had not made effective use of the audit product.

**5.75** The definition of a racist incident, revised as recommended in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, is well known throughout the Service. However, there is still a resistance by some officers, including some supervisors and managers, to come to professional terms with the underpinning rationale of the definition. The definition is known: it is now the task of leadership to penetrate the residual resistance of the cynical and gain acceptance of the professionally obvious.

**5.76** Generally there has been substantial progress in dealing with homophobic incidents in a sensitive and appropriate manner. Whilst the requisite sensitivity is acute in responding to incidents in and around established venues, officers have less confidence in drawing on their professionalism when dealing with incidents in neutral locations.



**5.77** It is a testament to substantial progress that the clusters respectively relevant to racist incidents and service provision to the gay community are the only clusters where the majority of forces are classified as ‘Exhibiting Examples of Good Practice’.

**5.78** The apparent complacency in some forces regarding the apparent disproportionality in the use of the stop and search tactic is a cause for concern. Insufficient analysis of the statutory data is being undertaken to establish trends and, importantly, the pattern of team and individual use. Supervision is often restricted to the bureaucratic checking of forms whilst failing to monitor and improve the quality of stop and search encounters on the street.

**5.79** The recently published research papers by the PRCU, which confirm many of the observations in previous HMIC reports, collectively provide a template for action. The use of stop and search powers will continue to be a key determinant in the level of public confidence enjoyed by the Service.

**5.80** Despite examples of imaginative good practice, the Service for the most part remains obsessively secretive to the exclusion of consultation and involvement in advance of some operations. The delicate balance of professional judgement is acknowledged but the benefits of openness, accepting the attendant risk, are not always given due weight.

**5.81** The Service has progressed impressively since the original thematic in its approach to those repetitive incidents that, whilst individually at the foot of the ladder of criminal gravity, collectively go to the heart of quality of life. The added impetus of partnership obligations regarding quality of life under the *Crime and Disorder Act* is welcome. There is, however, room for improvement in the deployment and protection from abstraction of CBOs who often are the very officers who can resolve such localised problems in a locally acceptable way.

**5.82** It was refreshing to learn from communities, particularly those representative of the minority ethnic public, of a renewal or, in some cases, a birth of confidence in their police. This is deserved and has been earned by the Service but must be nurtured to maturity. The job is not yet done but the tools are now more appropriate and front line officers more appropriately aware.

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## 6. Reflecting the Community

### Introduction

**6.1** The thematic inspection report *Developing Diversity in the Police Service* set out the business case for making the police service more representative of the communities it seeks to serve. As a Service that prides itself on policing with consent the value of a personnel complement that reflects the community must be a priority. This importance was clear in *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*.

*“Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment.”*

***Winning the Race, Recommendation 4.14***

*“Forces should establish achievable yet challenging targets for recruitment and retention of police officers and civilian support staff from ethnic minority communities.”*

***Winning the Race Revisited, Recommendation 9.2***

**6.2** The second of these recommendations set the stage for achievable yet challenging targets for staff from minority ethnic backgrounds. Figure 6.1 clearly shows that only 2.2 per cent of police officers in England and Wales are from minority ethnic backgrounds contrasting with 6 per cent in the overall population.

**Figure 6.1 – Breakdown of Police Officers in England and Wales by Rank, Ethnicity and Gender as at April 2000**

	White				Minority ethnic			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
ACPO	180	91.40	15	7.60	2	1.00	0	0.00
Superintendent	1,137	93.90	64	5.30	10	0.80	0	0.00
Chief Inspector	1,437	92.40	102	6.60	15	0.95	1	0.05
Inspector	5,472	92.70	359	6.10	67	1.13	4	0.07
Sergeant	16,548	89.80	1,602	8.70	255	1.35	27	0.15
Constable	74,961	79.10	17,492	18.45	1,784	1.85	511	0.60
Total all ranks	99,735	81.70	19,634	16.10	2,133	1.70	543	0.50

**Note:** Percentage of minority ethnic population in England and Wales from 1991 Census data = 6%

This Inspection along with other authorities accepts that this Census data does not reflect the current percentage which is generally accepted to be higher.

**6.3** The debate is thankfully concluded regarding the need for a representative staff, in accepting the due proportion targets suggested by the Home Secretary and agreed by chief constables, and the chairs of police authorities have moved beyond debate to a commitment to action. HM Inspector is now satisfied that Recommendation 9.2 of *Winning the Race* is now fully addressed and the Service should now focus its attention on the targets of due proportion within *Dismantling Barriers*.

**6.4** Whilst the Inspection found a general acceptance and support for *Dismantling Barriers* along with an implicit acceptance of the need for 'positive action' at chief officer level, there was a worrying lack of understanding amongst less senior staff regarding positive action as opposed to positive discrimination. HM Inspector encourages chief constables to clarify to all staff the significant differences between these two concepts.

**6.5 Positive Action**, as an acknowledged and accredited HR process, consists of:

- ◆ lawful action to assist under represented staff, for example additional training or short term secondments
- ◆ systems solely based on merit not ethnicity
- ◆ the creation of a level playing field for under represented staff rather than tilting the field in their favour

This directly contrasts with **Positive Discrimination** that is both unlawful and unethical. Whilst it is not only acceptable but laudable to support the historically disadvantaged to the point where they can compete equally (**positive action**), it is as unacceptable as it is unlawful to select simply on the basis of that historical disadvantage (**positive discrimination**). Until the police service fully accepts the legitimacy of positive action then the medium to long term goal of creating a workforce that represents the community it serves will not be achievable.

**6.6** Within this chapter the current position on the recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic staff will be discussed and the cluster grouping model employed elsewhere in this report will be applied to each of these three subjects. Other issues that were the subject of previous inspection will also be the subject of comment within this chapter. They include organisational culture, staff appraisal and selection procedures, support networks and dealing with inappropriate behaviour.

**6.7** Whilst recruitment, retention and progression are separately reviewed for ease of reference the need for a holistic approach cannot be over estimated. A concentration of effort on recruitment alone will not resolve the representative deficit. Unless corresponding effort and initiative is devoted to all three elements in parallel, progress on recruitment will merely top up the colander. Lack of equivalent attention to progression and retention will simply allow the recruitment benefits to drain away. This is inherently counterproductive.

## Recruitment

**6.8** In light of the agreed targets for the recruitment of minority ethnic staff HM Inspector revisited recruitment to examine the application of positive action to achieve these targets. Achieving these targets will ensure that there will be over 8,000 minority ethnic officers in the Service by 2010. If the police service is not successful in attracting these officers at the recruiting stage then it is obvious that appropriate representation will never be an attainable goal. Although this subsection focuses upon the recruitment of minority ethnic police officers, the Service should not forget its allied commitment to having proportionate representation within its support staff and special constables.

**6.9** In *Winning the Race Revisited* some forces, despite having the desire to make progress, were not prepared to face the uncomfortable process of questioning their own established approach to recruitment. This situation has improved but the improvement is not yet universal. Most forces have put positive action initiatives in place to broaden the recruitment base and sharpen the recruitment process. Some regrettably have not, or have initiatives which are poorly thought through with little or no external community input or use of existing minority ethnic staff. HM Inspector believes that some forces may not achieve their agreed targets unless significant positive action is initiated immediately.

**6.10** Most forces (26) were found to be progressing satisfactorily with their recruitment initiatives. Generally these forces had civilian personnel specialists in post, with sufficient dedicated staff and other resources linked to a clear business plan. Indeed 10 forces went further and exhibited good practice in this field. Some examples of this good practice were:

- ◆ Gwent Police and South Wales Police are working in partnership to attract minority ethnic applicants from both their catchment areas.
- ◆ West Midlands Police have engaged in a comprehensive programme of positive action initiatives involving outreach work with the local community.
- ◆ Suffolk Constabulary has realigned its minority ethnic recruitment target to reflect projected changes in the demography of the county over the next five years.
- ◆ Thames Valley Police regularly revisit information provided by their recruitment questionnaires as part of a research programme on how to target potential applicants from ethnic minority communities.

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**6.11** Figure 6.2 (overleaf) positions each of the 43 forces on their performance to date in relation to recruitment. These clusters are not based upon the likelihood or otherwise of each force achieving their individual targets contained in *Dismantling Barriers*. They are based upon the positive action initiatives in place (or being put in place), the priority given at chief officer level, the mechanisms currently in use and the level of resource allocation. Consideration was also given to the responsibility placed at BCU and sector level to assist in the delivery of overall force targets. Within a devolved and increasingly locally accountable policing structure a force Human Resource (HR) department cannot unilaterally be expected to deliver on these targets. Responsibility for creating a representative workforce rests on the shoulders of all members of the Service.

**Figure 6.2 – Cluster grouping: Recruitment of minority ethnic staff**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title),



**6.12** As with all the clusters in this report forces were assessed commensurate with their own individual circumstances. Figure 6.2 shows 36 forces are progressing satisfactorily or exhibiting good practice. HM Inspector would strongly urge the remaining 7 forces to re-examine their approach to the recruitment of minority ethnic staff and rise to the challenge of *Dismantling Barriers* which chief constables have accepted and agreed.

## Progression

**6.13** In previous Inspection reports HM Inspector touched upon the lack of progression of minority ethnic staff. *Dismantling Barriers* extends this position and sets out no less than 7 targets (see Appendix D). These targets are clear and unequivocal and place progression on equal footing with both recruitment and retention.

**6.14** For the purpose of this report, progression is defined as including both promotion to higher ranks or grades and also lateral development to specialist departments or units, for example detective and road policing specialisms. Whenever reference is made to promotion or lateral development, this should be seen in the context of both police and civilian support staff.

**6.15** The police service as a labour intensive organisation delivering a multi-faceted service has always emphasised the opportunity of career progression to attract potential recruits. Unfortunately for a myriad of reasons minority ethnic staff have not progressed at the same rate as their white colleagues. They are under represented both at management levels and within specialist departments. To address this deficit and achieve proportionality positive action is both legitimate and appropriate.

**6.16** During this Inspection there was an overwhelming body of opinion from minority ethnic staff that promotion or selection should only be based on merit. Minority ethnic staff felt that promotion or selection should solely be on the grounds of merit as any other criteria was clearly unfair and also minimised the achievements of those minority ethnic staff who had gained promotion or lateral development through hard work and professionalism. This is a sentiment that HM Inspector strongly endorses.

**6.17** For the purposes of this Inspection progression was specifically examined against the following criteria:

- ◆ Was a clear equal opportunities policy in place?
- ◆ Did the force monitor the progression of its minority ethnic staff?
- ◆ Were selection processes fair and objective?
- ◆ Did the force consider the potential for negative cultural bias in such selection procedures?
- ◆ Were support mechanisms in place, for example mentoring or individual career guidance at local level?

**6.18** These provide the rationale for placing a force within a specific cluster grouping in Figure 6.3 (page 68). Again each force was assessed commensurate with its own particular circumstances. Where a force was identified as having scope for improvement this reflected a

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**Figure 6.3 – Cluster grouping: Progression of minority ethnic staff**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)

### PROGRESSION OF MINORITY ETHNIC STAFF

Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.14)

This recommendation has now been superseded by targets set in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*.

During this Inspection, forces were assessed commensurate with their own particular circumstances and policing environment, for example size, population, demography, geography, etc. Forces were NOT norm referenced against one another or within 'families' of forces. (See paragraphs 1.22 and 1.23)

In this figure, the positioning of a force within a particular cluster does not denote that they will or will not attain their overall targets as set out in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*.

Progression includes lateral development into recognised specialisms as well as promotion to a higher rank or grade.

### EXHIBITING GOOD PRACTICE (7 FORCES)

Cheshire  
Cumbria  
Devon & Cornwall  
Metropolitan Police Service  
North Wales Police  
Nottinghamshire Police  
South Wales Police

### PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY (24 FORCES)

Avon & Somerset  
Bedfordshire Police  
Cleveland Police  
Derbyshire  
Durham  
Essex Police  
Gloucestershire  
Greater Manchester Police  
Hampshire  
Hertfordshire  
Humberside Police  
Kent County  
Leicestershire  
Lincolnshire Police  
Northamptonshire Police  
Northumbria Police  
South Yorkshire Police  
Staffordshire Police  
Suffolk  
Thames Valley Police  
Warwickshire  
West Mercia  
West Yorkshire Police  
Wiltshire

### SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT (12 FORCES)

Cambridgeshire  
City of London Police  
Dorset Police  
Dyfed Powys Police  
Gwent Police  
Lancashire  
Merseyside Police  
Norfolk Constabulary  
North Yorkshire Police  
Surrey Police  
Sussex Police  
West Midlands Police

lack of implementation of positive action initiatives on progression or a lack of focus on one particular aspect. It is interesting to note that West Midlands Police and Gwent Police have identifiable scope for improvement on progression yet they are both examples of good practice in relation to recruitment. This reinforces the premise that forces can over concentrate on one particular area, albeit with successful initial or interim outcomes, but are unlikely to sustain long-term progress if progression and retention issues are not addressed with equivalent vigour.

**6.19** Seven forces exhibited good practice. In these cases the force had gone beyond the basic and implemented more sophisticated or innovative initiatives to assist them towards their individual progression targets. Some examples of good practice were found in:

- ◆ Devon and Cornwall Constabulary: If an individual minority ethnic staff member is unsuccessful in an application for a particular post they are individually supported in their personal development and encouraged to re-apply for the next available vacancy.
- ◆ Cheshire Constabulary: A monthly check is made on the progression of minority ethnic staff. The Head of Training and Development then reports back to the CRR co-ordinating group on the progress that has been made. Follow-up action then results.
- ◆ South Wales Police: Conducts a regular profile of the qualifications of minority ethnic staff to identify potential areas for personal development that would assist with progression. This is linked to succession planning processes so that staff can be properly prepared to apply for vacancies as they arise.
- ◆ Cumbria Constabulary: The force only has a total of 11 minority ethnic staff. A specially designed development course was run for this group to assist them with their personal development. As a result one officer achieved promotion and other members of staff are better placed to maximise on progression opportunities as they arise.

**6.20** Progression is a vital element in the overall performance of forces in this area. Unless minority ethnic applicants feel that the Service offers them an equal opportunity for promotion and specialisation it is unlikely they will apply to join in the first instance.

**6.21** Equally so if minority ethnic individuals who are already in the Service feel that they will not be afforded the opportunity to develop to their full potential, the likelihood of retaining their services is greatly marred. Progression must therefore always be viewed in conjunction with recruitment and retention, not in isolation.

## **Retention**

**6.22** The business case for improving the retention rates of minority ethnic staff was set out in *Winning the Race Revisited*. There is undoubtedly a waste of human and financial resources if having recruited and trained minority ethnic staff, they then disproportionately leave the Service prematurely. Both *Winning the Race* and *Winning the Race Revisited*

made specific recommendations on retention. This Inspection has followed on from those recommendations and the numerically specific retention targets set out in *Dismantling Barriers*. Previously retention has been the poor relation with recruitment receiving the greatest attention and the resulting higher levels of resources and commitment.

**6.23** A more subtle impact is the negative message this sends out to the community generally and minority ethnic communities in particular. If the Service is seen as unable to retain minority ethnic staff, then how, in the eyes of the minority ethnic public in particular, can the Service be trusted to provide a fair and equitable service? Such a negative correlation has never been fully tested, the perception of communities, which is a reflection of their individual reality reinforces such a correlation.

**6.24** Whenever HM Inspector considered the performance of forces on this topic the following were taken into account:

- ◆ whether positive action initiatives for the retention of minority ethnic staff were in place (or being put in place)
- ◆ the frequency and extent to which the retention of minority ethnic staff was monitored
- ◆ whether mentoring schemes are in place
- ◆ whether line managers, particularly at BCU and departmental level, were equipped to support and guide minority ethnic staff under their command
- ◆ whether a force was exploiting exit interviews to establish why staff were leaving
- ◆ the force policy on the role and relationship with a support network

**6.25** Figure 6.4 (opposite) shows where each force in England and Wales was clustered on this topic. This represents an improvement on the findings in *Winning the Race Revisited*. The revisit Inspection showed 27 forces (63 per cent) having systems in place to monitor the retention of minority ethnic staff. Figure 6.4 shows that now 38 forces (88 per cent) are progressing satisfactorily or exhibiting good practice on retention. This is a significant improvement.


**6.26** Specific examples of good practice were found in:

- ◆ Lancashire Constabulary: Now provides halal food in force canteens. This has significantly improved the quality of the working environment for Muslim staff members.
- ◆ Thames Valley Police: Have put an exit interview strategy in place with an early intervention scheme that is having positive impact on retention.

**6.27** The special difficulties that minority ethnic staff can experience at home, in their communities and while on duty deserves recognition by both senior managers and chief officers. The important role that formal or informal support networks can play should not be underestimated. Equally an organisational culture that is welcoming, supportive and embraces diversity will have a position effect on the retention of staff. These factors will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

**Figure 6.4 – Cluster grouping: Retention of minority ethnic staff**

(Forces are listed alphabetically within each cluster)  
(Constabularies unless 'Police' in the title)



**6.28** Overall, retention should be viewed as an element of equal importance with both recruitment and progression. These three elements must operate in full unison to be truly effective. If forces do not address them with equal commitment then success will remain elusive.

**6.29** HM Inspector was pleased to see the progress that the Service has made on the recruitment, retention and progress of minority ethnic staff. Those forces that have been identified as under performing in any of these areas must urgently address their deficit. Failure to do so will most likely put the achievement of their targets beyond their reach.

## **Organisational Culture**

**6.30** A culture that is open to external influence and sensitive to the changing aspirations of others is a requirement to delivering real quality of service to all sections of society. The part that organisational culture can play in the improvement of service delivery should not be underestimated. HM Inspector acknowledged this aspect in *Winning the Race Revisited*. In the two years since the completion of that Inspection notable improvements have been made in the internal organisational culture of the police service in England and Wales. This was apparent amongst chief officers and senior managers who are now acutely aware of the value in promoting and supporting a positive organisational culture. It was very encouraging to note that all 43 forces were in the process of conducting a cultural audit in line with the requirements of *Dismantling Barriers*.

**6.31** HMIC, ACPO and the Home Office have produced an agreed model for conducting such an audit. Home Office *Circular 14/2000* provides the template modelling cultural auditing processes. HM Inspector eagerly awaits the results of these audits. They are the next logical step for chief constables to further enhance the internal culture of their forces for the benefit of all.

**6.32** As the auditing process was ongoing during the fieldwork phase of this Inspection it would have been unfair for HM Inspector to cluster the performance of forces on this topic. However, the following notable examples of good practice were found:

- ◆ West Midlands Police: Conducted a longitudinal study of the impact the organisational culture had upon new recruits. Results from this study have been used to address aspects that were seen to be unwelcoming or confusing to the uninitiated. The force is considering continuing this study with this group as they progress through their career.
- ◆ Bedfordshire Police: The force has completed a thorough staff perception survey. The force plans to rerun this process in 18 months to track any cultural changes. These processes will be supplemented with feedback from the ongoing staff development and empowerment programme that is a mandatory programme for all staff.

**6.33** Such initiatives are an example of the leadership commitment that now exists within the Service to develop and improve organisational culture. This commitment was also found on the issue of institutional racism that by its very nature significantly impacts upon the prevailing culture of any organisation or institution.

**6.34** The work on the revisit thematic coincided with the debate across the Service, sparked by the then ongoing Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, on institutional racism. That thematic did not attempt a definition but set out some of the ingredients that HM Inspector believed should be considered when formulating such a definition. Those ingredients were evident in the definition subsequently provided by the Inquiry.

*“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.”*

#### ***The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report***

**6.35** Perhaps inevitably, parts of the Service and many individuals failed to grasp the significance and subtlety of the definition but, in the defensive climate of the time, made a quantum leap to the erroneous assumption that the definition implied that all police officers were racist. HM Inspector was pleased to find that the organisational discomfort has given way to addressing the issues that the definition intended the Service to address. The Service is at its best when it substitutes organisational emotion for its accepted and cool pragmatism. The definition, both thoughtful and workable, is making the necessary impact.

**6.36** The use of cultural auditing is a sign of the mature thinking that pervades the Service today. It is a useful tool to achieve the ultimate goal of enhanced service delivery as it assesses those formal and informal practices, policies, processes and procedures that exist within the organisation and the accompanying values, attitudes and patterns of behaviour shared by its individual members. This process fits neatly and adds value to the perpetual cycle model that outlines the force CRR strategy cycle at Figure 1.1 at paragraph 1.25 of this report. It helps to identify another piece of the corporate jigsaw assisting forces in their service provision both internally and externally.

### **Support Networks**

**6.37** The value of support networks was endorsed by *Winning the Race, Winning the Race Revisited* and the retention section of this report. HMIC has provided a clear lead in consulting with BPAs in addition to staff associations and trade unions during force inspections. On 29 November 1999 the National Black Police Association (NBPA) was officially launched in Birmingham. The recognition of the Association as a non-statutory representative body, is now fact. Since the publication of *Winning the Race Revisited* progress on the establishment of BPAs at force level has been impressive. Twenty-eight associations now exist formally within their respective forces with numerous other networks existing in a less formal capacity. HM Inspector welcomes these developments and the positive impact they are having upon the Service.

**6.38** On this Inspection some minority ethnic staff felt that there was no need for a formal support network within their particular force. In each of these cases the relevant chief officers had actively encouraged and facilitated the formation of such a formal arrangement. In these

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particular cases the lack of impetus on behalf of minority ethnic staff was more a reflection of the sound HR processes that were evident within a force rather than a reticence on the part of the chief constable to facilitate the process. Where sound HR processes were in place staff felt that these were sufficient to address any concerns they had regarding equality of opportunity or to support them if required.

**6.39** HM Inspector would encourage chief constables to continue an open door approach and to be mindful of the potential benefit of a formal support network for visible minority ethnic staff, not only for the staff themselves, but for the organisation as a whole. Such networks should not be seen as a challenge to the authority of a chief constable but supporting that officer in their leadership of the organisation. As one chair of a force BPA stated:

*“We are a support network, but it is not only about supporting Black and Asian colleagues, it’s also about supporting the organisation that we work for.”*

**6.40** This positive statement sets the tone for the continued development of support networks, both formal and informal. Such networks are now an established facet of modern British policing and the positive contribution that they make to the Service should not be underestimated. The growth and development of these networks will be an indicator of how the Service treats not only its minority ethnic staff but the workforce as a whole.

### **Selection Procedures and Staff Appraisals**

**6.41** HM Inspector made a specific recommendation in *Winning the Race* regarding selection procedures.

*“Recruitment, selection and promotion procedures should test individuals’ attitudes towards race and diversity and all personal specifications and role descriptions should include the individual’s responsibility towards equality of service provision.”*

#### ***Winning the Race*, Recommendation 4.13**

**6.42** This Inspection found that most forces had incorporated attitudinal tests into their selection procedures with varying degrees of success. Forces faced frustration in their attempts to identify a common minimum standard. The ACPO are developing a competency framework that should help the Service to finally deliver on the above recommendation. Ultimately the framework will incorporate the diversity ingredient appropriate to each specific role. These specifications will also take due cognisance of the CRR occupational standards that were completed by NPT in July 2000 and approved by ACPO the following month.

**6.43** The National Competency Framework is also charged with delivering an improved staff appraisal process for the Service, directly linked to the role specifications referred to above. The value of specifically incorporating diversity into the appraisal processes was highlighted in *Winning the Race Revisited* with the resultant recommendation.



*“Staff appraisal procedures for police managers, supervisors, investigating and response officers must contain a specific assessment criterion on individuals’ performance in relation to the handling of racial (now racist) attacks and other diversity issues.”*

#### **Winning the Race Revisited, Recommendation 9.1**

**6.44** Forces have not made sufficient progress towards implementing this recommendation. Forces addressing implementation made only limited progress in the absence of definitively clear criteria upon which objective assessment could be made. HM Inspector does not attribute blame to those forces and applauds the efforts they have made. Like forces HM Inspector eagerly awaits the publication and adoption of the revised appraisal scheme within the National Competency Framework which ought to provide the mechanism that will take this forward. The publication and adoption of this revised scheme will enable forces to actively pursue the implementation of the above recommendation on a more professional footing.

### **Inappropriate Behaviour**

**6.45** This Inspection found that all the forces in England and Wales now have equal opportunities policies in place. To varying degrees these policies address the requirements contained within Recommendation 4.4 of the original Inspection report:

*“Forces (who have not done so) should clearly state that they regard the behaviour of officers who show racial or other prejudice in their behaviour and language towards colleagues or members of the public as completely unacceptable. Clear procedures should exist for dealing effectively with such behaviour and regular communication to staff on the number of such complaints and the sanctions imposed is encouraged.”*

#### **Winning the Race**

**6.46** Many of the forces visited produced evidence of formal and informal sanctions imposed upon staff who had displayed inappropriate behaviour either to colleagues or members of the public. Such sanctions ranged from formal discipline with penalties ranging from substantial fines to dismissal and informal responses incorporating admonishments, advice, guidance and training. HM Inspector is satisfied that chief officers are exhibiting the necessary leadership in the setting of standards and are acutely aware of the need for appropriate sanctions where those standards are not maintained. This leadership is also being reflected in the approach adopted by front line supervisors and managers, that is sergeants and inspectors. During focus group and individual interviews with sergeants and inspectors their will to challenge inappropriate behaviour was much more apparent than during the revisit Inspection in 1998. HM Inspector is satisfied that the situation is much improved but that improvement is not universal. The role of supervisors and managers in confirming appropriate standards and taking decisive action where those standards are not met is of paramount importance. The Service must continue to ensure that supervisors and managers both realise and accept their responsibilities and are measured on their performance.

**6.47** Recommendation 9.4 of *Winning the Race Revisited* stated that:

*“The Police Promotion Examination Board should develop the OSPRE qualifying examination to include negative marking of candidates who display racist, sexist or homophobic behaviour.”*

**6.48** This recommendation arose from specific misgivings surrounding the ability of the Objective Structured Performance Related Examination (OSPRE) promotion examination process to effectively identify and deal with inappropriate behaviour. HM Inspector is now satisfied that the Police Promotion Examination Board (PPEB) has fully addressed this recommendation and that negative marking of such behaviour is now an explicit part of this examination process for promotion to the ranks of sergeant and inspector. This is a welcome development and one that shows the continued commitment of the Service to address inappropriate behaviour wherever it may surface.

## Summary

**6.49** This chapter reflects the Inspection findings around recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic staff and related HR issues. The situation has promise with forces now focusing upon their individual targets in *Dismantling Barriers*. There has been overall progress since the previous Inspection particularly on the targeted element of recruitment. The effort and initiative to improve the recruitment profile is not matched by equivalent energy and creativity in addressing progression and retention. These three strands are implicitly intertwined and cannot be unravelled without the threat of overall failure.

**6.50** The value of cultural auditing is now accepted within the Service and the consequential action on completion of the audit process will ultimately lead to an improved organisational culture. This will not only contribute towards the eradication of institutional racism but also eradicating discrimination however it is manifested. The selection and promotion of all staff remains an area where individual attitudes on diversity can be tested. Some progress has been made but with only modest gains regarding appraisal. Logically an approach that will assess individual performance on diversity issues should be part of the product of the National Competency Framework.

**6.51** The ability of the Service to both challenge and deal with inappropriate behaviour is much improved. The business of challenging and dealing with inappropriate attitudes is more complex. It is the subject of examination within the following chapter on training and developing staff. Until such challenges are seen as the norm throughout all forces organisational culture will not improve and the efforts to recruit, retain and fully develop minority ethnic staff will be at risk.

**6.52** Finally the role which support networks can play within forces should not be underestimated. Whether they be formal or informal, affiliated or otherwise, they are a powerful stakeholder in the drive to make the Service more professional in dealing with diversity both internally and externally.

## 7. Staff Training and Development

### Introduction

**7.1** The purpose of training and workplace development within the police service is to provide staff with the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes and behavioural characteristics that are required to prepare them for undertaking their complex duties both effectively and efficiently. It follows that this should be the purpose of CRR training. An investment in training and development that is properly constructed, designed, delivered and evaluated, enables the Service to improve existing qualities amongst police employees and contribute to better operational output. Training that is not built upon these foundations is wasteful of resources and costly to the Service as a whole.

**7.2** A key purpose of personnel management within the HR strategy should be placing the right employee with the appropriate skills and knowledge in the right place doing the right things at the right time. The links between this function and the functions of training and development are important.

**7.3** Previously, in the HMIC report *Policing London: Winning Consent*, HM Inspector had acknowledged that training alone will not guarantee improved service delivery. However, the benefit of training as a catalyst for change, and therefore an improvement in service delivery, is firmly embedded in the coherent partnership between training and HR strategies. The successful union of effective training and a focused HR strategy, together with other important factors, such as adequate resources and consultation, should deliver the requirements of the communities being policed. By doing so, the Service can have well trained, effective police officers and support staff performing a role they feel confident to discharge amid the diverse and rich communities in England and Wales.

### Background

**7.4** Prior to the publication of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, it was *The Scarman Report 1981*, which gave the stimulus for CRR training in the police service. Lord Scarman called upon the Service to develop training programmes that demonstrated an appreciation that favourable CRR was essential to effective policing.

**7.5** As a result of Lord Scarman's recommendations in 1982, the Police Training Council (PTC) appointed a working party to review CRR training for the police service. The PTC report *Community and Race Relations Training for the Police* (published February 1983) provides the foundation for all present day police service CRR training in England and Wales.

**7.6** Lord Scarman's report also recommended that there should be a CRR specialist support training unit established for the police service. After an initial period where the unit was based at Brunel University, the contract was subsequently awarded to Equalities Associates, a consultancy company based in Turvey, Bedfordshire. This Equalities Associates unit came into existence in 1989 and became known as the Specialist Support Unit (SSU) or 'Turvey'. One of the fundamental responsibilities of this unit was to train and develop

specially selected police staff to deliver and manage CRR training in their respective forces.

**7.7** After the expiry of the Equalities Associates term in 1998, the contract for providing CRR training specialist support and advice to the police service was awarded to a consultancy company called IONNAN, the current holders.

### **National Strategy for Community and Race Relations Training**

**7.8** The PTC report, *Community and Race Relations Training for the Police*, outlined a two pronged strategy for CRR training for the Service as a whole:

- ◆ All training within the Service should have a 'golden thread' of CRR integrated into the curriculum. At force level this was the responsibility of force training departments and at national training level the responsibility of a Home Office department that later evolved into NPT.
- ◆ Every force had the opportunity to have staff specifically trained as CRR trainers or managers to an agreed national standard. This training was to be delivered at Turvey by the SSU staff. On return to their workplace these 'Turvey graduates' were expected to deliver or manage CRR training that had been specifically designed for their force. There was an expectation that forces would follow a four-phase strategy to CRR training which became known as the 'cascade approach'.

**7.9** The four phase approach (outlined in Figure 7.1) for CRR training, agreed by the Home Office in 1994 in conjunction with the SSU and the PTC, became the endorsed national strategy for the delivery of CRR training.

**Figure 7.1 – The Four Phase CRR Strategy**

- ◆ Phase 1. **Awareness** – *'this phase of instruction concentrates on awareness raising and attacks the attitudinal component of negative CRR interaction between the police and members of minority ethnic communities'*
- ◆ Phase 2. **Knowledge acquisition** – *'aims to increase the job-related knowledge base of police officers relative to equal opportunity legislation and a cause and effect analysis of both positive and negative police community interaction'*
- ◆ Phase 3. **Skills** – *'training packages will concentrate on providing police officers with the practical skills necessary for positive interaction with members of ethnic minority communities as well as others'*
- ◆ Phase 4. **Follow on programme** – *'will see CRR issues threaded through the police training curriculum and will concentrate CRR within specialist units' (the 'golden thread')*

**Source: HMIC report *Policing London: Winning Consent***

**7.10** The PTC's intention was that these 'Turvey graduate' staff, suitably trained and qualified for their new role, would ensure the success of the four phases of the national CRR Training Strategy. The PTC acknowledged that these trainers were the keys to the

‘cascade approach’ success. For this strategy to be truly effective, forces would have to put into place a CRR training plan that ensured the following:

- ◆ only those with sufficient potential to become effective CRR trainers/managers were selected to attend the Turvey courses
- ◆ that a policy was in place whereby qualified ‘Turvey graduates’ returning to force were fully utilised
- ◆ that a programme was in place for delivering force-specific CRR training to the **entire** workforce
- ◆ CRR training was given a high priority
- ◆ that there was in existence a performance management framework that set targets for delivery and quality which held those responsible for delivery to account
- ◆ that there was an evaluation strategy, which measured the effectiveness of the training in achieving the required changes in knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour

## The Current Situation

**7.11** During this Inspection, HM Inspector found little empirical evidence that the police service in England and Wales had managed to put into place the key elements of the national strategy for CRR training. Few forces had actively engaged and carried through any of the core elements of the original strategy and there was no evidence of any force putting into place all of these components in a programme of training.


**7.12** This Inspection has revealed three distinct sets of ‘drivers’ that are currently propelling CRR training in the Service, namely:

- ◆ The National Impetus
  - *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report
  - the HMIC report *Winning the Race*
  - the HMIC follow-up report *Winning the Race Revisited*
  - the *Home Secretary’s Action Plan*
  - Ministerial Policing Priorities
  - Best Value
- ◆ Community Expectations
  - media coverage
  - changing demography
  - the *Crime and Disorder Act*
  - Police Authorities Priorities


◆ The Police Service

- workplace assessment and selection governed by the forthcoming National Competency Framework
- Performance Development Review (PDR)
- performance driven policing and performance indicators
- national standards for policing
- NPT Trainers' Development Programme

**7.13** Throughout the Service each of the elements of these sets of drivers appears to sit in isolation and rarely interact and complement the others. These elements are used somewhat randomly and haphazardly in an attempt to deliver CRR training that meets the espoused goal of improving service delivery to the community. The lack of coherence between these three drivers is represented in Figure 7.2.



**7.14** These drivers for change need to be positioned in a more complementary fashion in order for the Service to become universally effective in CRR training. When this becomes the case, the Service will be in a stronger position to deliver effective CRR training that is free of distractions, this will assist the formulation of a cohesive and effective training needs analysis (TNA), training design, training delivery and evaluation. This aspirational position is represented in Figure 7.3.





**7.15** In order that this repositioning can occur, CRR training requires a position of status in both national and local (force) policing plans. With a few notable exceptions, this Inspection found that this was not the case.

## Strategies

**7.16** The foundation for individual force CRR strategies should be the ACPO Diversity Strategy (approved by Chief Constable's Council and issued to forces on 19 July 2000). This document embraces the challenges facing the training functions of the police service and gives direction at a macro level regarding diversity. During this Inspection, HM Inspector found that a number of forces were awaiting the release of this strategic document before finalising their own strategic position regarding diversity. A small minority of police forces did have meaningful arrangements in place for enhancing CRR, and the ACPO Diversity Strategy will serve to further enhance this position.

**7.17** Subordinate to an overall force diversity strategy should be a CRR training strategy. HM Inspector was disappointed to discover an absence of active and meaningful CRR training strategies. The majority of forces did not have any strategic overviews of their training philosophy in place. Some notable exceptions to this were:

- ◆ Cheshire Constabulary, where the CRR training strategy is an integral element of the HR strategic plan
- ◆ the Metropolitan Police Service, where the leadership of the Deputy Commissioner has given rise to sustainable strategic management arrangements for the planning and delivery of CRR and diversity training


**7.18** The direction of the ACPO Diversity Strategy is outlined quite clearly in the following statement:

*"In the context of the overarching aims, objectives and guiding principles for the Service, to develop in partnership with others guidance and direction for police officers and support staff to assist them to deliver a professional and responsive service to diverse, vulnerable and 'hard to reach' groups in the community and the Service itself."*

### ACPO Diversity Strategy

**7.19** The Strategy's aspirational goal to reinforce service delivery rather than control national policy should not go unnoticed. However the lack of CRR training strategies within the majority of forces, coupled with the need or perceived need for direction, moves HM Inspector to emphasise the need for the adoption of a more holistic framework. This framework should embrace the emerging work from ACPO and reinforce this with appropriately planned training frameworks that are given strategic influence in the organisation. This framework proposal is set out in Figure 7.4.

**Figure 7.4 – Recommended CRR Service Delivery Framework**



**7.20** This Inspection found many examples of forces struggling with the concept of linking CRR training to a CRR strategy and then ultimately towards improving police performance. Many espoused strategies were inspected, but examination revealed that these were often little more than detailed action plans or lists of training milestones.

**7.21** There is an urgent and obvious requirement for a revised national CRR training strategy, directly subordinate and complementary to the ACPO Diversity Strategy. This training strategy should be endorsed by representatives of the tripartite agreement and managed as a project reporting directly to a recognised forum such as ACPO Performance Management or the PTC.

#### Recommendation 7.1

HM Inspector recommends that:

There should be a revised national CRR training strategy directly subordinate, and complimentary to, the ACPO Diversity Strategy.

### National Police Training

**7.22** The *Home Secretary's Action Plan*, in relation to the recommendations of Sir William Macpherson and his team, acknowledged that NPT was already working on behalf of ACPO to develop a comprehensive national programme to deal with the training issues emerging from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. This work has been incorporated in a CRR Training Project. Upon inspection, the Project was found to be suffering from a lack of adequate governance. The Project Board had not met for six months, and the position of Project Manager had effectively been vacant for that time. The newly appointed Project Manager was only capable of devoting 50 per cent of his time to the Project whilst simultaneously managing another substantial piece of work. Although in response to the Inspection action has been taken to get the Project back on track, valuable time has been lost and the momentum had slowed.

**7.23** There was also a variance in the detailed knowledge surrounding this work among NPT faculty heads and key staff. These occurrences highlight the real challenge to NPT of managing the CRR Training Project themselves whilst also being charged to respond to emergent national needs. HM Inspector strongly suggests that the senior user in this Project, the Chair of the ACPO Committee on Race and Community Relations, adopts a more proactive role in this regard. This should ensure both product delivery and project continuance against the specification contained in the agreed Project Initiation Document, thus guiding the project towards its pre-set goals.

**7.24** This Inspection of the NPT CRR Training Project confirmed its main purpose as delivering training products and solutions to satisfy the needs of the Service nationally. The delivery of these training packages and other products will provide much needed clarification guidance and a resource base for CRR training. A key output will be the CRR

Occupational Standards, a solution that the Service is eagerly awaiting. These Standards will give the Service vital guidance regarding expected behaviour and skills regarding diversity and will support existing training programmes and competency suites through their integration into human resource activities.

### Recommendation 7.2

HM Inspector recommends that:

The CRR Occupational Standards, developed by NPT, are adopted throughout the Service and absorbed into PDR processes. These standards should become the principal tool for assessing staff in relation to issues of diversity, whether on performance review or selection processes.

**7.25** From these national arrangements forces should be capable of taking direction and guidance regarding their own unique requirements for policing and training to meet the requirements of varied and diverse communities.

**7.26** NPT is unique and sits outside, and in support of, the conventional structures of the police forces of England and Wales. In this regard, NPT necessitates specific attention when examining the national CRR training environment. During the Inspection of NPT, HM Inspector detected unique evidence of a strategic approach to the 'golden thread' of CRR training within the programmes delivered. A clear example of this is the Strategic Command Course that was found to have a paucity of accurately defined and researched CRR elements within its programme. HM Inspector recommends that key stakeholders play a focused and structured role in the content and structure of this flagship training programme.

### Recommendation 7.3

HM Inspector recommends that:

The Home Office, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) and ACPO have a focused and structured role in approving the training needs for the Strategic Command Course in relation to issues of diversity.

**7.27** An exemplary exception to these findings was that of probationer foundation training. There was found to be clear evidence of continued inputs, both overt and implicit, throughout Stage 2 of NPT's Probationer Training Programme. HM Inspector especially recognises the value of the case study exercise that allows probationers to follow through a reported racist incident, via arrest to an eventual case preparation and court trial. The frequent use of role-play in this activity reinforces the commitment shown to diversity within foundation training.

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**7.28** There is a position of disparity within NPT in relation to CRR. Some faculties in the NPT training estate appear to have a firm and effective grip on CRR, whereas other examples appear to be reacting to CRR matters on a less than strategic basis. There is a clear requirement for this disparity to be tackled and for a corporate approach to CRR within NPT to be formulated.

#### Recommendation 7.4

HM Inspector recommends that:

NPT formulates its own specific CRR strategy and complimentary CRR training strategy, pan estate, that can give direction and clarity to faculty and department heads.

### Force Human Resource Strategies

**7.29** In the HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training*, attention was drawn to the way in which the key elements of the HR function are linked. This Inspection found that, with regard to CRR training, these key elements are generally not linked as recommended in that report.

**7.30** National policy is clear regarding CRR and fortified in the Ministerial Priority.

*“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.”*


*The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report Recommendation 1

**7.31** Transmission of this policing priority should therefore be transparent throughout HR strategies. It follows that the key elements of the training cycle (Figure 7.5 opposite) should also represent this statement. During the Inspection HM Inspector found that this was not always the practice. The next sections of this chapter use the key stages of the training cycle to illustrate the inspection findings.

### The Training Cycle

#### Training Needs Analysis

**7.32** This Inspection revealed that for many forces, whether guided by external training providers or acting under their own initiative, the presence of a detailed and accurate TNA was deemed to be unnecessary and costly. In these circumstances guidance would appear to have been taken from national drivers and/or subjective guesswork. The ‘average’ CRR training programme appears to rest on a two-day classroom-based course. Using a mid-range costing for a constable’s salary (£186 for two days) the national ‘opportunity’ cost for an ‘average’ length of course would be in excess of £18 million. For this level of expenditure to be based upon a less than professional needs analysis is both inefficient and wasteful of sparse resources.



**7.33** The anticipated impact of a programme that lacks local relevance can only be reduced by such subjective decision making. HM Inspector was encouraged to see that some forces had linked their cultural and CRR auditing processes together as part of their approach to TNA. Such examples included Lancashire Constabulary, Derbyshire Constabulary and the City of London Police. Although these exercises may have caused a short-term cost, the long-term benefits to the services those forces provide cannot be underestimated.

#### Recommendation 7.5

HM Inspector recommends that:

Before conducting any CRR training programmes forces carry out appropriate training needs analysis to ensure that the training provided meets the requirements of both national drivers and local community needs.

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## Design of Training

**7.34** The design of a CRR training course is within the capabilities of most suitably qualified police trainers who should consult all the relevant stakeholders and exploit available expertise. It was disappointing to discover that in the majority of forces there had been little if any consultation with local communities during course planning processes. The twofold advantages of a) a more accurate training programme and b) a transparent training process that exposes police training to the community appears to have been ignored by most training managers. Those benefits are amplified in the following *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report recommendation:

*“That police training and practical experience in the field of racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity should regularly be conducted at local level. And that it should be recognised that local minority ethnic communities should be involved in such training and experience.”*

*The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report Recommendation 50

**7.35** HM Inspector found many examples of community members, qualified as trainers, receiving a negative response when they offered their time to assist local police CRR training. HM Inspector supports the recommendations made in this respect that are contained in *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report and was disappointed in the overall responses from forces.

## Training Delivery

**7.36** The use of specifically trained staff to deliver training is inherent to the success of CRR training. Some forces were utilising the services of the newly written NPT CRR Trainers Programme, specifically drawn up in partnership with IONNAN, to develop the skills of qualified NPT trainers as an addendum to the Trainers Development Programme. There was evidence of a shortage of places on this programme due to the success of the course and the subsequent over subscription. The number of trained staff is further reduced as the majority of forces are making little use of their ‘Turvey graduates’ in training roles. There is, therefore, an under representation within police training of suitable and qualified trainers who are in a position, and in sufficient numbers, to deliver effective CRR training.

**7.37** Full recognition is given to the importance of utilising only suitable and qualified trainers to deliver programmes regarding CRR. This Inspection found variances in CRR trainers’ skills and abilities that were often having a negative effect upon both the individual trainer and the programme being delivered.

**7.38** This position was exacerbated by the absence of members of minority communities actively involved in CRR training programmes. HM Inspector acknowledges the difficulties such community involvement could cause, especially if the attitude and behaviour of police officers is challenged in the classroom. A notable and positive exception was the Metropolitan Police Service’s significant achievement in working with members of minority communities to assist them with future diversity training.



### Recommendation 7.6

HM Inspector recommends that:

Only 'qualified' trainers are used in CRR training and that NPT and ACPO compile a suitable definition of 'qualified' that the Service can adopt with common accord.

**7.39** This Inspection found an excellent example of community participation through a partnership approach in West Yorkshire, where the Force have embarked on a programme of CRR training in collaboration with a local college. This partnership gives not only an alternative perspective to training issues, but also provides some degree of objective quality assurance to the programme. College staff assist police trainers in the delivery of the programme that itself has been agreed by both participants.

**7.40** A number of forces were found to be using a small cadre of qualified trainers to deliver CRR programmes. There was evidence of this causing the 'trainer burnout' phenomenon.

*"[I feel] 'burnt out' to the point where I am considering leaving the Service rather than continue in my current role."*

#### Police officer engaged in a full time diversity training role

**7.41** Such occurrences are understandable and were in part responsible for one large force suspending its diversity training programme. A review of relevant issues led to further investments, including an increase in staff, and a reassessment of staff qualifications in order that the provision of CRR training could recommence. It has become clear, from the evidence found on this Inspection, that effective CRR training requires a higher, more appropriate level of resources, including meaningful succession planning of staff, in order that consistently high quality training programmes are delivered.

### Recommendation 7.7

HM Inspector recommends that:

Forces have in place sufficient resources for sustainable CRR training programmes and that these allow for regular staff rotation.

## Training Evaluation

**7.42** The evaluation of police training has been suggested and recommended in many previous national publications. The fact that evaluation has been proposed and recommended so frequently is testimony to the Service's collective failure to come to terms with the need for this function. Figure 7.6 (overleaf) outlines the chronology of national guidance given to the police service in relation to the evaluation of CRR training.

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**Figure 7.6 – Chronology of Police Training Evaluation**

1991	Home Office Circular 105/91 giving guidance to chief constables and police authorities in relation to the evaluation of training.
1993	Home Office Circular 39/93 outlining the current arrangements in relation to the national management of police training. This circular also laid out the PTC's strategy. The circular gives responsibility for evaluating all training to <i>"those engaged in curriculum design and training delivery, but HMIC have the right to evaluate particular courses if he/she wishes or at the request of PTC or one or more of the User Committees"</i> .
1995	HMIC report <i>Developing Diversity in the Police Service</i> stated that training needs to be monitored and during a thematic inspection found little evidence of training evaluation.
1996/97	HMIC report <i>Winning the Race</i> found that there was little evidence of CRR training being evaluated and monitored by the police service, both a recommendation and checklist were provided to assist the Service in this arena.
1998/99	HMIC report <i>Winning the Race Revisited</i> again found little evidence of CRR training evaluation and urged the Service to revisit the previous report's recommendations. <i>Winning the Race Revisited</i> also suggested that there was need for a Service-wide CRR training and evaluation strategy.
1999	HMIC report <i>Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training</i> found that virtually no training was being evaluated. The Service was provided with guidance on how to carry out the evaluation function and the report recommended a national police training evaluation strategy.
1999	Within the Specialist Support Agreement awarded to IONNAN there was a requirement for the consulting organisation to develop, on the request of the Service, PIs and evaluation processes to allow the Service to measure the quality of service delivery.
2000	HMIC report <i>Policing London: "Winning Consent"</i> gave guidance to the Service, through the report on the Metropolitan Police Service on CRR training. This report included nine strategic recommendations specifically targeting CRR training and its evaluation.
2000	The <i>Home Secretary's Action Plan</i> bestowed the lead responsibility for evaluating all force-based CRR training programmes to ACPO, with support from IONNAN and NPT.

**7.43** The HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training* defined training evaluation as:

*"A systematic approach to data collection that helps managers to arrive at an informed decision on the worth and value of a training programme."*

**7.44** Evaluation of training is acknowledged as not being an easy process to undertake, however, it is important that training is evaluated through to the ‘outcomes’ stage. Throughout this Inspection there was little evidence of compliance with Home Office Circular 105/91 *The Evaluation of Training in the Police Service*. This circular suggested the Service use a model of training evaluation as outlined in Figure 7.7.

**Figure 7.7 – The Main Reasons for the Evaluation of Training**

- ◆ the effectiveness of courses/events in achieving specified objectives
- ◆ the relevance of the specified objectives to the needs of the individual/force/police service
- ◆ the interrelationship between individual elements of the training programme
- ◆ the appropriateness of training as the most effective way of meeting identified needs
- ◆ the soundness of training programmes in terms of quality of service, equal opportunities and race relations policies.

Evaluation should also examine:

- ◆ whether training has affected the overall well-being of the organisation
- ◆ how people are selected for training
- ◆ how people are deployed after receiving training
- ◆ how force policies and procedures impact on the whole training function.

**Source: HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training***

**7.45** Levels one and two of this model satisfy the definition of ‘validation’ as:

*“A series of assessments to determine whether a training programme has achieved its desired objectives.”*

**HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training***

**7.46** HM Inspector found the majority of forces were striving to reach level two of this evaluation model, thus achieving ‘validation’ **not** evaluation of CRR training. The Inspection also found that this validation was frequently taking place in isolation without a published corporate policy. HMIC has previously recognised the ‘cost and resource intensive nature’ of some levels of training evaluation. However, HM Inspector reiterates the following statement:


*“... because training is fundamental to improved workplace performance, the cost of evaluation must be weighed against the cost of not evaluating. It is not possible for the Service to measure the effectiveness of every training event – a decision on priorities will always be necessary.”*

**HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training***

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**7.47** HMIC has previously issued guidance regarding the prioritisation of training evaluation in *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training* (Figure 7.8). Forces should again consider this guidance.



**7.48** The Home Office Circular 105/91 *The Evaluation of Training in the Police Service* recommends that training should be evaluated at several different levels, the fifth level being:

*“The soundness of training programmes in terms of quality of service and equal opportunities/race relations.”*

**7.49** The general lack of any Service-wide approach to evaluation, and the particular relevance to CRR training, leads HM Inspector to urge forces to engage in the preparation and delivery of meaningful evaluation strategies as soon as practicable. It is recommended that at the conception of any future CRR training programmes, costed and relevant evaluation should form an inherent component of training plans and strategies. The work undertaken by the Metropolitan Police Service regarding training programme evaluation shifts the emphasis of evaluation to outcomes rather than output. The adoption of such an evaluation strategy may give rise to training needs amongst already NPT-qualified evaluators.

**7.50** In forces where there is no recognised post of Force Evaluator, immediate consideration should be given to the creation of such a post. Role specifications/job profiles should reflect the need for such a post to be sustainable, independent and free from diversion into other HR-specified tasks.

### Recommendation 7.8

HM Inspector recommends that:

The Service adopts a national evaluation strategy similar to that recently developed by the Metropolitan Police Service, as this strategy has the potential to achieve the aspirational goal of independence that training evaluation requires.

## Other Issues

### Home Office Community and Race Relations Training Agreement

**7.51** The Training Agreement with IONNAN refers to evaluation in the following terms:

*The contractor shall develop an independent and comprehensive evaluation process to assess:*

- ◆ *the extent to which the Agreement objectives are achieved*
- ◆ *the effectiveness of training materials used*
- ◆ *the effectiveness of transfer of learning to the workplace and in the wider community: that is the extent to which there are changes in behaviour manifested in police performance and quality of service*

**7.52** During this Inspection, it was unclear as to the number of hours or days that have been given to NPT from this contract. It was also unclear as to the particular outputs that have been achieved. There is clear data available regarding the work being carried out by IONNAN regarding training needs analysis and training delivery within forces, however, there is a lack of clarity regarding the use of the Scarman Centre. HM Inspector believes that it is of vital importance that the external contract with IONNAN, and the associated relationship with Leicester University's Scarman Centre, is monitored and accurate records kept to enable the Home Office to manage this contract effectively.

**7.53** To ensure true independence in the spirit of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report (Recommendation 53) which is vital to the restoration of public trust and confidence, the evaluation of CRR training should be as independent as it is possible to be. HM Inspector feels that the evaluation strategy linked into the CRR Training Agreement is insufficient. HM Inspector feels the Service must go further with evaluation and embrace the recommendations of previous work as detailed in this report.

## Workplace Development

**7.54** There is an increasing emphasis and acknowledgement within the Service on an efficient and effective, community-focused policing philosophy. This emphasis has led to the ACPO Personnel and Management Committee establishing a project team to develop and compile a National Competency Framework. The ongoing work being undertaken in this regard has received previous support in the HMIC report *Managing Learning: A Study of Police Training* and The Home Affairs Select Committee *Fourth Report: Police Training and Recruitment*.

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**7.55** HM Inspector was disappointed to discover that the National Competency Framework Project has the potential to be in conflict with any National Occupational Standards that are produced and subsequently maintained by the forthcoming National Training Organisation (NTO). Although legitimate grounds exist for the distinction between the two functions, it is believed that to have two separate and non-complementary suites of skills and abilities to determine organisational competence may serve to confuse the Service and add further fuel to the ongoing debate over competences and competencies.

**7.56** HM Inspector agrees with the National Competency Framework Project Team that reporting structures for Performance Development Review (PDR) should be to a tailor made standard rather than a full adoption of the standards relating to national occupational qualifications. As a note of caution, HM Inspector observes that any product from the National Competency Framework should not be overly bureaucratic and should be IT-based as well as complementing, not duplicating, the future work of the NTO.

**7.57** A number of forces were 'plugging the gaps' in Home Office Circular 43/96 with regard to PDR and diversity issues. The competency statements of 'professional and ethical standards' contained in that circular no longer meet the requirements of the Service as they leave issues of diversity as implicit statements rather than explicitly setting standards for the Service.

**7.58** Amongst those forces completing this process, there were examples of positive progress being made regarding the workplace assessment of the skills required to serve a diverse community. HM Inspector commends Devon and Cornwall Constabulary for the association they have created between delivered CRR training and individual developmental objectives that are managed under the auspices of PDR. Cheshire Constabulary are also applauded for successfully relating the METLs to their PDR process.

**7.59** Undoubtedly the Service has anxiously awaited the delivery of the CRR Occupational Standards. HM Inspector recognises the difficulties the Service has had undertaking this task and acknowledges the potential this framework has to provide the benchmark for behaviour, performance and training in relation to CRR. To achieve these objectives HM Inspector is mindful that the CRR Occupational Standards should be included in an overt manner within the ACPO Competency Framework. HM Inspector looks forward, therefore, to the piloting and report on the Occupational Standards that is currently taking place, and the eventual production of the National Competency Framework.

## Family Liaison Training

*"That Police Services ensure the provision of training and the availability of victim/witness liaison officers, and ensure their use in appropriate areas particularly in the field of racist incidents and crimes, where the need for a sensitive approach to young and vulnerable victims and witnesses is paramount."*

***The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report Recommendation 31***



**7.60** This Inspection found that the Service has universally embraced the requisite training for family liaison officers. In particular this aspect of training would appear to frequently stand out as one where, with the exception of evaluation, all the key elements of the 'training cycle' have been put into place. HM Inspector commends the pioneering work undertaken by Avon and Somerset Constabulary in this field that has allowed many other forces to follow their example and deliver what has become a nationally recognised training product.

## Holly Royde Seminars

**7.61** The Holly Royde Seminars are annual conferences sponsored by the Home Office that deal primarily with police and race relations. This Inspection revealed a profound level of respect for previous Holly Royde Seminars, with many examples of good practice emanating from these events. HM Inspector also found amongst chief officers a desire for change in the current format of Holly Royde Seminars. There was a consensus that the configuration of these prestigious seminars required revising to meet the current needs of the Service in relation to CRR.

**7.62** HM Inspector recognises these observations and at the time of compiling this report is aware of the research which is being conducted by the Home Office regarding the future structure of Holly Royde Seminars.

## Summary

**7.63** Overall this Inspection has revealed an inconsistent picture regarding CRR training throughout the Service. At one extreme, forces such as the Metropolitan Police Service and Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, have the key elements of an effective CRR training strategy in place. Whilst at the other extreme, some forces are failing their workforce and their communities by not putting any training into place.

**7.64** The true costs of CRR training to the Service cannot be accurately assessed. One fact remains clear, any costs that are incurred without accurate needs analysis, effective and participative design, professional delivery shared with the community, and timely feedback from training evaluations, are most unlikely to effect changes to knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour of police staff, and most importantly in the quality of service to the community.

**7.65** The many reports examining training, and in particular CRR, emphasise the important role of consultation. HM Inspector commends to the Service the importance of transparency and community consultation within police training. The development of open, effective and accurately premeditated training interventions, linked to other aspects of the HR function, is crucial to the priority of increasing trust and confidence in policing amongst diverse communities.



**7.66** This Inspection has revealed a national CRR training picture that is far from adequate. The Service has still to embrace the challenge of adequately researching, designing, delivering and most importantly evaluating effective CRR training. The Service must reach agreement as to what diversity and CRR training success will look like in the short, medium and long term. Only then will it perform to the standards that the diverse communities of England and Wales expect and deserve.

## 8. Conclusion

**8.1** Two previous thematics, supplemented by detailed inspection and assessment of the Metropolitan Police Service's strategy for CRR and policy implementation, represent a concentration of an unparalleled inspection effort. The unique nature of this series of inspections, with all 43 forces being visited and assessed in completing this last in the trilogy of thematics, is indicative of the importance of CRR in the professional judgement of HMIC. The dual thrust has consistently been to steer the Service into re-establishing CRR at the core of police thinking and operational action, and to recognise as a mature organisation the requirement to police according to the differing needs of a diverse public.

**8.2** After the disappointing findings four years ago of *Winning the Race* and the lack of a significant response to the wake-up call of that report, this Inspection has revealed grounds for optimism that the Service is at last on the road to real recovery. The ACPO have illuminated the path by seizing the issue at presidential level and fashioning commitment in the tangibles of full committee status for CRR and the publication to forces of a Diversity Strategy.

**8.3** For the most part chief constables have responded positively both individually and collectively since *Winning the Race Revisited*. Their universal and unquestioning acceptance and that of the chairs of police authorities of the Home Secretary's challenging and accountable targets for the recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic staff, is a welcome comprehension of the nature of the problem and a determination to confront it.

**8.4** The knowledge at all levels of the Service of the revised definition of a 'racist incident' and the reasons for the change is a marked improvement against the paucity of awareness of the previous, and long-standing, definition just two years ago. Service provision to the needs of gay men and lesbians has noticeably improved. This improvement is in part a product of the Service gradually overcoming the mindset of limited consultation to a recognition of the need to consult even more widely. Although the mechanisms are not necessarily in place the Service has realised that its ear should be available to all.

**8.5** This developing willingness to be receptive to all is mirrored in the ACPO creating a portfolio responsibility for 'social exclusion'. Action, in partnership with others and in support of government initiatives, will bring into the fold of acceptance those who remain silent or who have previously gone unheard. A range of factors, outside police control, leave a disproportionate number of minority ethnic citizens in the limbo of exclusion.

**8.6** Whilst acknowledging both the overall progress made and the will to achieve more, the progress is not across all forces at equal pace or across all dimensions of the various interrelated issues. This Inspection has been unwavering in its search for excellence and unwilling to substitute intention for action. Both the Service and CRR, and indeed the public, deserve nothing less. The leadership drive that has secured the knowledge of the racist incident definition in staff, for example, has a further and more difficult didactic task to secure understanding of the importance of having a distinct procedure because of the gravity of the emotional impact on victims. CRR training still lacks professional rigour, is not

corporate, and in too many forces lacks the key element of involvement of local minority ethnic communities. It was disappointing that nine forces had not included CRR in their five-year programme of Best Value reviews. The comparison and consultative elements within the disciplines of Best Value present an ideal setting for checking and developing the quality of service to minorities. The disappointment is more acute when the APA recommend that the needs of diversity are built into all Best Value reviews.

**8.7** More needs to be done. More will always be needed to be done. In addition to driving change forward, and consolidating progress, police leadership must ensure that whatever the barriers to progress, whatever the conflicting or changing priorities that dynamic times may generate, there is no regression. The Service took significant strides forward in the wake of *The Scarman Report 1981* which inspired the Service to take a courageous and revealing look in its attitudinal mirror. The Service benefited from the resulting reflection. Whilst some of the post-Scarman progress is still evident, much was allowed to ebb away on the tide of changing fashion.

**8.8** The gains in response to the thematics, the positive response to the organisational catharsis on the publication of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report, must not be allowed to evaporate. This requires not only the vigilance of police leadership but an ongoing determination to secure the gains and capitalise on them

**8.9** HMIC will be equally vigilant and will continue to encourage, to advise and to criticise. None of the issues consolidated in this report will be lost but will be incorporated into the HMIC Risk Assessment Model for individual force inspections. This Model has attracted praise from other inspectorates and other external bodies. HMIC now has the benefit of the skills and expertise of two non-police Assistant Inspectors, both of a minority ethnic background, who will have a specific remit to help and advise HMIs on this element of their inspections. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) has written to forces to make these skills and expertise available on request. HMIC is not just the author of criticism but also an ongoing source of help.

**8.10** Clarity and the tidying of loose ends demand that forces be made aware that HM Inspector considers that the recommendation regarding a key performance indicator on the policing of quality of life issues (*Winning the Race* 4.20 and *Winning the Race Revisited* 9.6) has been subsumed by Government intention to establish PIs that cut across partnership activity under the Crime and Disorder Act.

**8.11** HMIC will continue to play its full part in taking forward the *Home Secretary's Action Plan* in response to *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report. In addition, during 2001 NCIS and the National Crime Squad (NCS), exempted from any of the trilogy of inspections to allow them space and time to settle as relatively new organisations, will be inspected on CRR issues.

**8.12** The significant investment of energy and valuable resources by HMIC has been both appropriate and necessary. The need to place CRR at the centre stage of police thinking and to keep it in the spotlight of policy makers as opposed to an extra in the wings, was forced home not only by the thematics but by the extrinsic imperative of the *Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* and the subsequent report.

**8.13** It casts a pall of sadness over our society that a young black man with so much to offer that society, should lose his life and that same society be deprived of his considerable potential, simply but most cruelly because his skin was not white. Whilst such abhorrent barbarity remains a feature of our society, it is the overwhelming duty of the police service to respond professionally, sensitively and purposefully to its victims. *Winning the Race* was the flashing neon light that advertised to the Service some of its frailties. The *Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* demonstrated how aggregated frailties are the ingredients of catastrophic failure. The Service must never fail again.

**8.14** Leadership must continue to place CRR at the core of policing. The indication from this Inspection is that the point is not only taken but being acted upon. The Service must remember that just as the aspirations of life and leisure styles of police officers change and increase over time, so do those of minority ethnic citizens. Forces need to keep pace with those latter changing aspirations and be ready to alter the course of service delivery accordingly. Structures, systems, processes and mechanisms, even HMIC reports, are important but their importance begins and ends in their impact on the quality of service delivery. The ultimate arbiter of quality policing is the quality of service delivery to the individual. That service has quality when it is service according to need. Service according to need will ensure that the police across England and Wales retain the mandate of all to police by consent.



# *Appendices*

## Appendix A

## Summary of Clusters (representing all the forces in England and Wales)

	Figure Reference									
	3.1	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.7	6.2	6.3	6.4
Avon & Somerset Constabulary	▲	▲	▲	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●
Bedfordshire Police	●	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●
Cambridgeshire Constabulary	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	■	■	●
Cheshire Constabulary	▲	■	▲	▲	▲	▲	■	●	▲	●
City of London Police	●	●	■	■	●	■	●	■	■	●
Cleveland Police	●	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●
Cumbria Constabulary	●	■	▲	▲	●	■	●	●	▲	●
Derbyshire Constabulary	●	▲	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Devon & Cornwall Constabulary	▲	●	▲	▲	▲	■	▲	●	▲	●
Dorset Police	●	●	▲	▲	●	■	●	■	■	●
Durham Constabulary	●	■	▲	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●
Dyfed Powys Police	●	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	■	●
Essex Police	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Gloucestershire Constabulary	●	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●
Greater Manchester Police	●	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●
Gwent Police	■	■	■	■	▲	■	●	▲	■	■
Hampshire Constabulary	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	▲	●	●
Hertfordshire Constabulary	●	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	▲
Humberside Police	■	■	■	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●
Kent County Constabulary	●	●	▲	■	●	●	●	●	●	●
Lancashire Constabulary	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	■	●	▲	■	●
Leicestershire Constabulary	●	■	●	▲	●	▲	●	●	●	●
Lincolnshire Police	●	●	▲	●	▲	▲	●	■	●	●
Merseyside Police	▲	●	●	▲	●	■	●	●	■	■
Metropolitan Police Service	▲	●	▲	▲	●	■	●	●	▲	●
Norfolk Constabulary	■	●	●	▲	▲	■	●	■	■	■
Northamptonshire Police	▲	▲	▲	▲	●	▲	●	▲	●	●
Northumbria Police	●	▲	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
North Wales Police	■	■	▲	●	●	●	■	●	▲	●
North Yorkshire Police	●	■	■	■	●	●	●	■	■	■
Nottinghamshire Police	●	●	▲	▲	●	▲	●	●	▲	▲
South Wales Police	▲	▲	▲	▲	●	▲	●	▲	▲	●
South Yorkshire Police	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Staffordshire Police	●	●	▲	●	●	■	●	●	●	●
Suffolk Constabulary	●	▲	▲	●	●	▲	▲	▲	●	●
Surrey Police	●	●	■	▲	●	●	●	▲	■	▲
Sussex Police	▲	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●	■	●
Thames Valley Police	●	▲	▲	▲	●	●	●	▲	●	▲
Warwickshire Constabulary	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●
West Mercia Constabulary	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●	▲	●	●
West Midlands Police	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	▲	■	■
West Yorkshire Police	▲	▲	▲	▲	●	●	●	■	●	●
Wiltshire Constabulary	●	●	●	▲	●	●	●	●	●	●

### Legend:

- ▲ Exhibiting Good Practice
- Progressing Satisfactorily
- Scope for Improvement

During this Inspection, forces were assessed commensurate with their own particular circumstances and policing environment, for example size, population, demography, geography, etc. Forces were NOT norm referenced against one another or within 'families' of forces.



## Figure Narrative for Summary of Clusters (representing all the forces in England and Wales)

### **3.1 Community Consultation Processes**

Provision should be made for effective feedback of minority ethnic data both within forces and with outside agencies and community groups to encourage reflection, dialogue, action (if necessary) and mutual understanding. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.16)

### **5.1 Community and Race Relations Auditing**

Forces should consider a community and race relations audit of all Divisions/Departments to identify their potential for improving community and race relations. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.11.) This includes the use made of the Community and Race Relations Audit Checklist for forces at Appendix 2 of *Winning the Race Revisited*.

### **5.3 Dealing with Racist Incidents**

Forces need to re-issue the ACPO definition of a racial (now racist) incident, ensure systematic and comprehensive recording, effectively monitor the patterns shown and improve the quality of response, including increasing the effectiveness of multi-agency approaches. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.18.) This recommendation has been further developed by Recommendations 12 to 14 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report.

### **5.4 Service Provision for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Communities**

Forces should establish policies and strategies for the policing of incidents and crimes against the gay community, acknowledging their vulnerability as a minority group, and establish systems and practices to deal effectively with homophobic attacks including monitoring arrangements. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.19)

### **5.5 Dealing with Repetitive Non-Crime Incidents**

Forces give a higher priority to dealing with neighbourhood incidents and anti-social behaviour, i.e. quality of life issues. Account is taken of these non-crime issues in Annual Policing Plans and Divisional/Area action plans. (*Winning the Race* Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3)

### **5.6 Abstractions of Community Beat Officers**

The contribution made to community and race relations by community beat officers and the value which the public attaches to their role should receive greater acknowledgement. In particular they should not be abstracted for protracted periods, unless absolutely necessary. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.9)

### **5.7 Community Satisfaction Surveys**

Forces should develop performance indicators constructed around local community satisfaction rates. Satisfaction rates must be measured regularly and individual results obtained for key sub-groups within the local community. Forces should use this information to identify gaps in the quality of their service delivery to the community at large and thus establish a linkage with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (*Winning the Race Revisited* Recommendation 9.6)

### **6.2 Recruitment of Minority Ethnic Staff**

Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment. Forces should establish achievable yet challenging targets for recruitment and retention of police officers and civilian support staff from ethnic minority communities. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.14; *Winning the Race Revisited* Recommendation 9.2). Both these Recommendations have now been superseded by targets set in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*. In this figure, the positioning of a force within a particular cluster does not denote that they will or will not attain their overall targets as set out in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*.

### **6.3 Progression of Minority Ethnic Staff**

Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.14). This Recommendation has now been superseded by targets set in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*. In this figure, the positioning of a force within a particular cluster does not denote that they will or will not attain their overall targets as set out in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*. Progression includes lateral development into recognised specialisms as well as promotion to a higher rank or grade.

### **6.4 Retention of Minority Ethnic Staff**

Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment. Forces should establish achievable yet challenging targets for recruitment and retention of police officers and civilian support staff from ethnic minority communities. (*Winning the Race* Recommendation 4.14; *Winning the Race Revisited* Recommendation 9.2). Both these Recommendations have now been superseded by targets set in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*. In this figure, the positioning of a force within a particular cluster does not denote that they will or will not attain their overall targets as set out in the Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers*.

## Appendix B

## Breakdown of Forces Within Designated Levels of Inspection

### One Day Health Check

Bedfordshire Police  
City of London Police  
Cleveland Police  
Dorset Police  
Hampshire Constabulary  
Hertfordshire Police  
Leicestershire Constabulary  
Northamptonshire Police  
Nottinghamshire Police  
South Wales Police  
Sussex Police  
Warwickshire Constabulary  
West Mercia Constabulary  
Wiltshire Constabulary

### Two/Three Day Intermediate Visit

Avon & Somerset Constabulary  
Cambridgeshire Constabulary  
Cheshire Constabulary  
Cumbria Constabulary  
Derbyshire Constabulary  
Devon & Cornwall Constabulary  
Durham Constabulary  
Dyfed Powys Police  
Essex Police  
Gloucestershire Constabulary  
Greater Manchester Police  
Gwent Police  
Kent County Constabulary  
Lincolnshire Police  
Norfolk Constabulary  
North Wales Police  
South Yorkshire Police  
Staffordshire Police  
Suffolk Constabulary  
Thames Valley Police

### Ten Day Full Inspection

Humberside Police  
Lancashire Constabulary  
Merseyside Police  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Northumbria Police  
North Yorkshire Police  
Surrey Police  
West Midlands Police  
West Yorkshire Police

## Appendix C

## Guidance on Issues Surrounding 'Racist Incident' Definition

### Racist Incidents

- ◆ Recommendation 12 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report stated that the definition of a racist incident should be: *"any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person."*
- ◆ This definition is a simpler and clearer version of the ACPO definition that was previously used by the police and other agencies. It is vital that in establishing a comprehensive system for the reporting and recording of racist incidents, the different agencies involved are working to the same definition.
- ◆ In the *Home Secretary's Action Plan*, the Home Secretary said that the Home Office would *"ensure that the Inquiry's simplified definition of a racist incident is universally adopted by the police, local government and other relevant agencies"*.
- ◆ The purpose of this definition is not to prejudge the question of whether an offender's motive was racist: that would have to be proved if, for instance, the offender is charged with a racially aggravated offence. Furthermore, the purpose of the definition is to ensure that investigations take full account of the possibility of a racist dimension to the incident and that statistics of such incidents are collected on a uniform basis.

### Guidelines on the Application of the Definition of a 'Racist Incident'

- ◆ Recommendation 13 of *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* report stated: *"That the term 'racist incident' must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes in policing terms. Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment."*
- ◆ Agencies should be committed to recording both crimes and non-crimes as racist incidents. Racist incidents are not recorded only to provide statistics at a national level, or even to provide statistics at a local level, although these are obviously useful outcomes of recording. Recording racist incidents also allows the victim to be offered support and enables intelligence to be gathered, which will help appropriate preventive measures to be put in place and information to be collected that may help in dealing with the perpetrator(s), and focus resources on areas of need.
- ◆ Recording racist incidents under the new definition should capture all incidents with a racist element, including low-level harassment and those incidents that are not identifiable offences. The rationale for this is that recording all such incidents allows the police and other agencies to identify tension indicators early on which can be used to prevent further incidents or crimes or can provide useful information if the incidents later escalate to the level of crimes. The aim is to identify underlying trends and build up a picture of racism in the local area.
- ◆ Historically there has been much under-reporting and under-recording of racist incidents. Many incidents are still not reported to the police, though some may be reported to other agencies. Even if crimes are reported, the racist element may not be mentioned.

## Appendix D

## Targets for Progression

### Targets for Progression Are:

- Target 1** From 2001 the percentage of ethnic minority officers with 5 years to under 10 years service at sergeant and above is equal to the percentage of white officers with 5 years to under 10 years service at sergeant and above. This parity should then continue subject to annual checks.
- Target 2** From 2003 the percentage of ethnic minority officers with 5 years to under 15 years service at inspector and above is equal to the percentage of white officers with 5 years to under 15 years service at inspector and above. This parity should then continue subject to annual checks.
- Target 3** From 2005 the percentage of ethnic minority officers with 10 years to under 15 years service at chief inspector and above is equal to the percentage of white officers with 10 years to under 15 years service at chief inspector and above. This parity should then continue subject to annual checks.
- Target 4** From 2007 the percentage of ethnic minority officers with 10 years to under 20 years service at superintendent and above is equal to the percentage of white officers with 10 years to under 20 years service at superintendent and above. This parity should then continue subject to annual checks.
- Target 5** From 2009 the percentage of ethnic minority officers with 15 years to under 25 years service at assistant chief constable and above is equal to the percentage of white officers with 15 years to under 25 years service at assistant chief constable and above. This parity should then continue subject to annual checks.
- Target 6** From 2000 the percentage of ethnic minority applicants accepted on the strategic command course is equal to the percentage of white applicants accepted on the course.
- Target 7** From 2001 ethnic minority officers are represented in each specialist area in each force in proportion to their level of representation within the force.
- ◆ Chief constables are accountable for targets 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7
  - ◆ The Association of Police Authorities is accountable for target 5
  - ◆ The Home Office (Extended Interview) is responsible for target 6

**Source: Home Office document *Dismantling Barriers***

## Appendix E

## Winning the Race Recommendations

### HM Inspector recommended that:

- 4.1** Forces should publicly reaffirm their commitment to investing in good community and race relations as a core function of policing, this being reflected in the production of sound policies and strategies. [Paragraph 1.9, 3.1, 3.77, 3.78]
- 4.2** Forces give a higher priority to dealing with neighbourhood incidents and anti-social behaviour, i.e. quality of life issues. [Paragraph 2.17–2.22]
- 4.3** Account is taken of these non-crime issues in Annual Policing Plans and Divisional/ Area action plans. [Paragraph 2.23]
- 4.4** Forces (who have not done so) should clearly state that they regard the behaviour of officers who show racial or other prejudice in their behaviour and language towards colleagues or members of the public as completely unacceptable. Clear procedures should exist for dealing effectively with such behaviour and regular communication to staff on the number of such complaints and the sanctions imposed is encouraged. [Paragraph 3.52, 3.55]
- 4.5** Training in community and race relations needs to be given greater emphasis and priority should initially be targeted towards first line supervision. [Paragraph 2.84–2.91, 3.71]
- 4.6** The community and race relations dimension should be explicitly recognised and catered for in all relevant force training programmes. Specific community and race relations modules should be introduced to courses where appropriate and separate training courses also developed. [Paragraph 3.6–3.71]
- 4.7** All community and race relations training should be properly monitored and evaluated. [Paragraph 2.94, 3.71]
- 4.8** The skills of officers who have benefited from national training and opportunities arising from Holly Royde projects should be better utilised by forces. [Paragraph 2.85, 2.94, 3.66]
- 4.9** The contribution made to community and race relations by community beat officers and the value which the public attaches to their role should receive greater acknowledgement. In particular they should not be abstracted for protracted periods, unless absolutely necessary. [Paragraph 2.26, 2.77, 3.67]
- 4.10** The value of youth and school liaison officers to foster links and enhance the image of the police should be similarly recognised. [Paragraph 2.51, 2.79, 2.82]
- 4.11** Forces should consider a community and race relations audit of all Divisions/ Departments to identify their potential for improving community and race relations. [Paragraph 3.4]

## Appendix E *Winning the Race Recommendations* (continued)

### HM Inspector recommended that:

- 4.12** The community and race relations implications of policies, procedures and practices – including the planning of specific operations – should be routinely considered alongside other resource implications. [Paragraph 2.11–2.14, 2.34, 2.37, 2.39, 3.5]
- 4.13** Recruitment, selection and promotion procedures should test individuals attitudes towards race and diversity and all personal specifications and role descriptions should include the individual's responsibility towards equality of service provision. [Paragraph 3.58, 3.59]
- 4.14** Forces should sustain their efforts to ensure their composition reflects the communities they serve, but they need to more robustly address the question of the retention of officers from various backgrounds as well as their recruitment. [Paragraph 2.72, 3.62]
- 4.15** Forces should recognise that 'community intelligence' is as valuable as 'crime intelligence' to effective policing and quality of service. [Paragraph 3.38, 3.39]
- 4.16** Provision should be made for effective feedback of ethnic monitoring data both within forces and with outside agencies and community groups to encourage reflection, dialogue, action (if necessary) and mutual understanding. [Paragraph 2.54–2.60, 3.46]
- 4.17** Forces should monitor and plan for demographic changes in terms of age/ethnicity profile of the community they serve to ensure effective links with the younger generations in particular. [Paragraph 1.9, 2.42, 2.43, 3.74]
- 4.18** Forces need to re-issue the ACPO definition of a racial (now racist) incident, ensure systematic and comprehensive recording, effectively monitor the patterns shown and improve the quality of response, including increasing the effectiveness of multi-agency approaches. [Paragraph 2.65, 2.66, 3.10, 3.13, 3.31–3.34]
- 4.19** Forces should establish policies and strategies for the policing of incidents and crimes against the gay community, acknowledging their vulnerability as a minority group, and establish systems and practices to deal effectively with homophobic attacks including monitoring arrangements. [Paragraph 3.14–3.30]
- 4.20** That in the next round of discussions relating to national KPI's, there may be a case for introducing an indicator more specifically targeted to 'quality of service', relating to one or more categories of non-crime incident(s). (While HM Inspector appreciates the difficulties involved in introducing such an indicator, the strength of feeling from the public in the communities visited with regard to the irritant of repetitive neighbourhood nuisances, affecting their quality of life, cannot be ignored. This is a significant aspect of this report.)

## Appendix F *Winning the Race Revisited* Recommendations

### HM Inspector recommended that:

- 9.1** Staff appraisal procedures for police managers, supervisors, investigating and response officers must contain a specific assessment criterion on individuals' performance in relation to the handling of racial attacks and other diversity issues. [Paragraph 4.2.7]
- 9.2** Forces should establish achievable yet challenging targets for recruitment and retention of police officers and civilian support staff from ethnic minority communities. [Paragraph 6.2.5]
- 9.3** ACPO should develop further a Diversity Strategy for the Service to address this important aspect of policing. Chief constables should contribute actively to its formulation and adopt it as an integral part of their overall corporate approach. [Paragraph 7.4.4]
- 9.4** The Police Promotion Examinations Board should develop the OSPRE qualifying examination to include negative marking of candidates who display racist, sexist or homophobic behaviour. [Paragraph 7.8.3]
- 9.5** A Service-wide strategy for CRR training should be established that defines scope, key components and common minimum delivery standards. [Paragraph 7.9.7]
- 9.6** Forces should develop performance indicators constructed around local community satisfaction rates. Satisfaction rates must be measured regularly and individual results obtained for key sub-groups within the local community. Forces should use this information to identify gaps in the quality of their service delivery to the community at large and thus establish a linkage with the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act. [Paragraph 7.17.6]
- 9.7** Forces re-examine their response to "*Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities*" with a view to implementing as a matter of urgency the recommendations of that report. [Paragraph 8.8]



## Appendix G

## Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity Recommendations

### HM Inspector recommends that:

- 7.1** There should be a revised national CRR training strategy directly subordinate, and complimentary to, the ACPO Diversity Strategy. [Paragraph 7.21]
- 7.2** The CRR Occupational Standards, developed by NPT, are adopted throughout the Service and absorbed into PDR processes. These standards should become the principal tool for assessing staff in relation to issues of diversity, whether on performance review or selection processes. [Paragraph 7.24]
- 7.3** The Home Office, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) and ACPO have a focused and structured role in approving the training needs for the Strategic Command Course in relation to issues of diversity. [Paragraph 7.26]
- 7.4** NPT formulates its own specific CRR strategy and complimentary CRR training strategy, pan estate, that can give direction and clarity to faculty and department heads. [Paragraph 7.28]
- 7.5** Before conducting any CRR training programmes forces carry out appropriate training needs analysis to ensure that the training provided meets the requirements of both national drivers and local community needs. [Paragraph 7.33]
- 7.6** Only 'qualified' trainers are used in CRR training and that NPT and ACPO compile a suitable definition of 'qualified' that the Service can adopt with common accord. [Paragraph 7.38]
- 7.7** Forces have in place sufficient resources for sustainable CRR training programmes and that these allow for regular staff rotation. [Paragraph 7.41]
- 7.8** The Service adopts a national evaluation strategy similar to that recently developed by the Metropolitan Police Service, as this strategy has the potential to achieve the aspirational goal of independence that training evaluation requires. [Paragraph 7.50]

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## Appendix I

## Glossary

Appendix	Definition
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers (England and Wales and Northern Ireland)
APA	Association of Police Authorities
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BPA	Black Police Association
BPARH	Birmingham Partnership Against Racial Harassment
CAT	Community Action Team
CBO	Community Beat Officer
CRR	Community and Race Relations
DfEE	Department for Education and Employment
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
HMCIC	Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HM Inspector	Her Majesty's Inspector
HR	Human Resource
IT	Information Technology
METLs	Minimum Effective Training Levels (expected levels of knowledge regarding CRR for officers of the ranks of constable, sergeant and inspector)
NACRO	National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
NBPA	National Black Police Association
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCS	National Crime Squad
NPT	National Police Training
NTO	National Training Organisation
OSPRE	Objective Structured Performance Related Examination
PCCG	Police Community Consultative Group
PDR	Performance Development Review
PI	Performance Indicator
PPEB	Police Promotions Examinations Board
PRCU	Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit
PTC	Police Training Council
REC	Race Equality Council
SARI	Support Against Racist Incidents
SSU	Specialist Support Unit or 'Turvey' (Home Office contract responsible for CRR training)
TNA	Training Needs Analysis

## Appendix J

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