


Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Wiltshire Constabulary **Major Crime**

July 2008



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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.

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- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.
- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to

discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

Wiltshire Police is a mainly rural force. It includes the expanding conurbation of Swindon, the historic city of Salisbury and many market towns and villages. The M4 motorway runs through the north of the county and the busy A303 crosses the south of the county.

Wiltshire has a rich and unique heritage - inside the county boundaries are the world heritage sites of Stonehenge and Avebury, and about 20,000 sites of archaeological or wildlife interest. About three quarters of the land in the county is protected as an area of outstanding natural beauty, special landscape or green belt. Salisbury Plain, the largest remaining expanse of chalk grassland in England, divides the county from north to south.

The unemployment rate in Wiltshire is well below the national average at 1.2%, compared to the national average of 3.5%. The armed forces have a significant presence, particularly in the south of the county. Major civilian employers include Airsprung Beds (Trowbridge), Avon Automobile Components (Melksham), Bowyers (Trowbridge), Virgin Mobile (Trowbridge) and Westinghouse Signals (Chippenham).

Demographic Description of Force Area

Wiltshire is a predominantly rural county in the south-west of England. It has a population of 631,000, nearly half of whom live in towns or villages with fewer than 5,000 people. A quarter of the county's inhabitants live in settlements of fewer than 1,000 people. Some 2.55% of the population are from a minority ethnic background and 17% of the population are under the age of 20 years.

Structural Description of Force including Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

The command team comprises:

- Chief Constable, responsible for setting the vision and direction of the Force;
- Deputy Chief Constable (DCC), whose responsibilities include a number of corporate functions within the Strategy & Performance Department and Corporate Communications Department;
- Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) with the Local operations portfolio that includes the two BCUs, and also for two departments: Justice and Partnerships & Neighbourhoods;
- Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) with the Force operations portfolio that includes Protective services, newly formed Citizen Focus and PSD;
- Director of Finance and Facilities;
- Director of Human Resources;

There has been a period of change in the top team and among senior managers since the last Baseline Assessment.

The ACPO changes, being the appointment of a new Chief Constable, the imminent retirement of the Deputy Chief Constable and subsequent recruitment of a new Deputy Chief Constable. The appointment of an additional ACC in the Local Operations role, and the secondment of the Director of Finance to the regional collaboration group.

During the reporting period policing has been delivered by Two Basic Command Units (BCUs) County Division and Swindon Division based at Melksham and Swindon. The BCUs are supported by several specialist departments, including operations support, criminal investigation, community safety and criminal justice, corporate development, human resources, finance & facilities and professional standards.

As at September 2007 the force had the following:

- 1,212 police officers
- 839 police staff
- 140 police community support officers (PCSOs)
- 184 special constables.

Strategic Priorities

Our Strategic Priorities are to:

- Deliver safe and satisfied communities
- Take Our Staff with Us
- Manage Our Risks
- Communicate Our Success
- Consolidate and Co-ordinate Effort

The force's vision is:

'Wiltshire - The safest county in the country'.

Impact of Workforce Modernisation and Strategic Force Development

Wiltshire Constabulary's Workforce Modernisation Project is about creating a flexible and dynamic employment framework to meet the changing demands on our service. Part of this is matching the available skills to tasks, and identifying blockages in the work processes and developing solutions to improve job efficiency

The reform and development (R&D) board, which is chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable, oversees three programmes of work, namely infrastructure, modernising operational service delivery and professionalising policing.

Each programme is managed by a chief officer and includes a number of individual projects. The R&D process is comprehensive, with a requirement for pieces of work to be registered and business cases produced in order that appropriate linking and resources decisions may be made.

The process includes the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) programme of work, which is accommodated within the relevant programme as it becomes available. The Police Authority Chief Executive is a core member of the R&D board. The development of the R&D programme has benefited from external consultancy, including work focused on risk management.

Major Achievements

- There has been significant investment in level2/protective services and one of the outcomes of this is the development of a Major Investigation Team and a Volume Crime team;
- Neighbourhood policing teams in all areas have been rolled out and are contributing positively to Force performance;
- There has been significant progress in the Mobile and Remote working program which will culminate in roll out in November 08;
- The Force has seen significant improvements with the creation of Crime Management Units in each division ;
- The continuing success from the Optimus project and specifically the Force recognising a need to make changes in the way that policing services are delivered throughout the county to ensure a better service for the people of Wiltshire.

Major Challenges for the Future

The main challenges in the coming year as described by the force include:

Deliver Satisfied Communities

- To provide an excellent quality of service to victims and witnesses of crime
- To provide the public with a quality service and easy access to policing services
- To increase public satisfaction and confidence in the service provided

Deliver Safe Communities

- To deliver local policing that is visible, reassuring and responsive to local concerns

- To work effectively and innovatively with our partners to identify and tackle issues of crime (particularly where it is drug or alcohol related), anti-social behaviour and road safety
- To respond speedily to the most urgent incidents
- To reduce crime
- To increase the number of crimes solved through improved investigation from the initial report through to submission of a high quality file to the Crown Prosecution Service
- To tackle serious and organised crime
- To support victims of domestic violence, child abuse and other crimes that leave people vulnerable

Take our staff with us

- To ensure that every member of the Force understands and delivers his or her personal contribution to performance
- To actively support and engage with staff
- To consistently demonstrate clear and positive leadership by the Chief Officers and management at all levels of the Force

Manage our risks

- To minimise the dangers and risks to the public and to staff;
- To manage the risks facing the organisation in relation to finance, performance and reputation.

Communicate our success

- To effectively communicate with the public, our staff and other key stakeholders
- To actively engage with the wider media to convey the achievements of the Force and promote key messages.

Consolidate and Co-ordinate Effort

- To increase our productivity
- To better manage changes in the Force, with an emphasis on service delivery

Performance

Wiltshire Police has a stated commitment to ensuring that Wiltshire is the safest and satisfied county in the country.

In the 2007/08 Policing Plan the Force set out its strategic priorities as;

- Enhancing Safer Neighbourhoods
- Strengthening Public Protection
- Reduce and Detect Crime.

In setting the Control Strategy which focuses resources to achieving improved performance against these priority areas, specific stretching measures and targets are also set.

The figures show overall crime is down 1.1 per cent, which equates to 500 less offences, while detection rates are up across the board.

The British Crime Survey (September 2007), which measures public satisfaction, also rated the force as second among its group of most similar forces (MSF), for the number of people who think their local police are doing a good job.

When comparing the force's annual performance figures for 2007/2008 with 2006/2007:

- Overall crime is down 510 offences to 44,588
- Violent crime is down 564 offences to 9,050
- House burglaries are down 172 offences to 1,729
- Vehicle crime is up 52 offences to 4,752
- Overall detection rates are up from 22 per cent to 27 per cent
- Violent crime detection rates are up from 42 per cent to 49 per cent
- House burglary detection rates are up from 14 per cent to 21 per cent
- Vehicle crime detection rates are up from 11.5 per cent to 14 per cent

Compared with its MSF, Wiltshire Police has:

- the second lowest number of house burglaries
- the second lowest number of vehicle Crime
- the second highest detection rate for robbery and vehicle crime

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Wiltshire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.


	2006 Calendar Year	2007 Calendar Year	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 pop	0.427	0.263	-38.41%	0.283
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.095	0.174	+83.16%	0.077
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	66.67%	45.45%	-21.22pp*	99.89%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.301	0.048	-84.05%	0.121
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	15.79%	33.33%	+17.54pp*	41.34%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.317	0.222	-29.97%	0.212
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	45.00%	57.14%	+12.14pp*	59.62%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.048	0.032	-33.33%	0.012
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	33.33%	50.00%	+16.67pp*	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.063	0.079	+25.40%	0.084
% of murders detected/convicted	50.00%	140.00%	+90pp*	97.08%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	2.474	2.109	-14.75%	2.055
% of rapes detected/convicted	12.82%	23.31%	+10.49pp*	23.85%

*"pp" is Percentage Points.


**Most Similar Family (MSF) for Wiltshire is: Cambridgeshire; Cheshire; Gloucestershire; North Yorkshire; Suffolk; Warwickshire and; West Mercia.

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The National Protective Services Analysis Tool, released in September 2007, revealed that Wiltshire Constabulary faces an improving level of performance in respect of the policing response to reducing and detecting offences of kidnapping, which have reduced by almost 30% in the last calendar year shown in the table above and to a figure in line with the average of its MSF peer forces.



Kidnap (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS



From the SPI data for the calendar year contained in the table on page 12 above it can be seen that the crime type of attempted murder poses a threat to Wiltshire Police. The rate of offences (per 10,000 population) rose in 2007 and is above the MSF average and amongst the higher rates in England and Wales for attempted murder.

The SPI data also indicates that whilst Major Crime investigation in Wiltshire Police has produced improvement in sanction calendar year detection performance against the MSF group remains comparatively low. Wiltshire is performing at a level below the MSF average for all crime types with the exception of the sanction detection rate for murder, which rose in 2007 and is significantly above the MSF average.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Wiltshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts in this regard have been included in this report.

The Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates a limited understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The Force has identified violent crime with a particular focus on vulnerability areas including domestic violence, violence against the person, alcohol fuelled crime and organised crime groups as its major crime priorities within the Force Control Strategy. The force strategic

intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on counter terrorism, child protection, vulnerable adults and paedophile activity.

The Force has invested substantial resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction in order to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with partner forces in the South West region and beyond are recognised, albeit they are at a very early stage.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has not yet fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite analytical staff, although accommodation and equipment are well funded.

Strengths

- Considerable investment in protective services has been made and is continuing, totalling £3 million by the end of 2007/08.
- In the event of a reactive major crime investigation, analysts are sourced from basic command units (BCUs) or from other headquarters (HQ) posts, for example, the force intelligence unit – FIU. This meets the needs of the major crime investigation, but impacts negatively elsewhere in the force.
- The force has prepared a homicide and violent crime reduction strategy, based on some problem analysis, and has prepared a problem profile on rape.
- Although the FSA is complete, it predated BCU activity, so did not encompass local issues effectively.
- Twenty-four-hour intelligence sharing is provided by the force control room inspector. There are no call-out arrangements to alert specialist analysts, although the force does call them out on occasion and has not encountered difficulties. (This was tested in recent kidnaps.)
- A dedicated Special Branch analyst undertakes open source scanning.

Work in progress

- The force is currently reviewing its intelligence structures.
- The force has redefined the role of a strategic analyst in the performance and strategy group to undertake analysis across both major crime and serious and organised crime, enhancing the force approach to harm reduction.

Areas for improvement

- At the time of the inspection the force did not have a dedicated analyst post in the major investigation team (MIT), which impacted on BCUs to support major crime investigations. Whilst funding had been agreed for a dedicated MIT analyst, at the time of inspection the post had not been filled.
- The force has no analysts dedicated to protecting vulnerable people (PVP).

Recommendation 1.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the analytical capability for major crime should be enhanced with dedicated resource(s).

Summary – The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. Although the intelligence exchange is effective, it has not included a full range of profiles and is thus assessed as embryonic. The force’s community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate, and their completion is checked by the major crime review regime.

Strengths

- The force’s approach to town centre violence at Swindon (Operation Diamond) includes a joint activity with partners, including trading standards.
- The force has a joint intelligence cell (JIC) with ten partners, supported by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and an information exchange agreement to exchange information on crime, immigration, terrorism, etc.
- The force has in place a range of information-sharing protocols related to multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA).
- The force is leading the regional approach to distraction burglaries (Operation Montana) and has responded with a trigger plan.
- The force contributes to a multi-agency domestic violence board.
- There is evidence of effective community impact assessments (Operation Markivka).
- There is evidence of the use of major incident room (MIR) specialists through the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) for example blood pattern analysis. The force has also used toxicology, soil analysis and psychological profiling. Crime scene co-ordinators are embedded in the MIT.

Work in progress

- Swindon Division is producing a partnership strategic assessment (incomplete at the time of the inspection). This is supported by a data officers group that includes representation from children’s services, the youth offending team, probation services, the primary care trust and the Fire and Rescue Service. Although in the early stages, this group is exploring data-sharing issues and joint working to the priorities arising from the partnership strategic assessment.
- The recently produced homicide and serious violence reduction strategy is expected to strengthen information sharing on major crime.

Area for improvement

- There have been few NIM problem profiles in respect of major crime types produced to date. With finite resources available the focus of the force analysts had understandably been on enforcement and reactive intelligence gathering. The force should review its capacity to deliver these key strategic documents in order that more might be produced as a contribution towards improving crime prevention.

Recommendation 2.

Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force should develop its intelligence and analytical systems and processes in order to effectively map and predict crime types and risks to inform the force strategic assessment and help in developing prevention strategies.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime only to a limited degree. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly patchy. Problem profiles for homicide, serious violence and rape are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU-level plans. There is evidence that the force does not completely understand the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The FSA and control strategy consider violent crime, with particular focus on vulnerability areas, including domestic violence, violence against the person, alcohol-fuelled crime and OCGs.
- Links to BCU plans are sometimes evident, eg Swindon night-time economy activity – Operation Diamond.
- The force strategic intelligence requirement considers counter-terrorism, child protection, vulnerable adults and paedophile activity. Intelligence is sought to understand the detailed local threat that these areas pose, eg honour crimes among minority ethnic groups, child abuse.
- A problem profile is in place for OCGs in the sex industry.
- The FSA review demonstrates a growing awareness of the impact of OCGs across the force area.

Work in progress

- The force has defined prevention activity around violent crime, which includes night-time economy, domestic violence enforcement and child abuse.

Areas for improvement

- The force should ensure that the FSA incorporates a clearer focus on the prevention of homicide and serious violence.
- The force should undertake analysis to better understand the threat posed by kidnap and extortion (K&E) incidents.
- The force should incorporate MAPPA risks within the FSA.
- Neighbourhood profiling should be enhanced, to inform understanding of risk within the FSA.
- The force should ensure that BCU assessments inform the FSA effectively. Sequencing failures last year resulted in the BCU removing Class A drug supply from its control strategy – an item that was a priority for the force.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are infrequent, so are rarely shared with partners or BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for ‘hot briefing’ whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a rapid response. Information-sharing protocols exist with key partners, such as those forming the joint intelligence group. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

- Wiltshire Police is a key participant in a number of strategic partnerships, including crime and disorder reduction partnerships, local area agreements, youth offending services, drug and alcohol action teams and the camera safety partnership.
- The force shares intelligence through multi-agency risk assessment conferences, MAPPA and meetings about vulnerable adults. .
- The force has in place five MoPI-compliant information-sharing agreements with: the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS); Swindon Borough Council; courts and solicitors; Victim Support; and the Swindon and Wiltshire joint protocol on information exchange.
- There is evidence of the timely sharing of threats to allow prevention activity.
- The force has a clear, well-managed MoPI action plan, showing 67% compliance during the fourth quarter of 2007.
- The Catchem database is not used.
- The Injuries database is used.
- NPIA help desk officers are consulted.

Work in progress

- The draft homicide and serious violence reduction strategy outlines the need for improved information sharing. Mental health issues have been identified as a contributory factor in 38% of Wiltshire homicides (against a national average of 15%).
- The force has approved 12 new growth posts arising from the MoPI action plan.
- The force has commissioned an information management health check to ensure that the current and future focus of activity is correct.
- The force is fully engaged with the regional business continuity working group and is actively benchmarking its plans against those of other forces, for example Gloucestershire in light of its recent experiences with the flood crisis.

Areas for improvement

- Formal major crime information-sharing arrangements need to be put in place and effective processes developed to include data within force NIM products/tasking.
- No formal strategic group exists to share information on dangerous offenders.
- On occasion, primary care trust mental healthcare professionals have failed to share information on imminent threats. The force should explore how to overcome this.
- A dedicated detective constable completes serious crime analysis system (SCAS) returns, but the force performance for timeliness has been poor, with only 25% (three out of 12) being returned on time.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified well in advance.

Strengths

- The force has undertaken some OCG mapping and has an understanding of the OCGs active in the force area.
- The force identifies potential category 3 MAPPA subjects for consideration at MAPPA meetings for management at level 2 or 3.
- The force representative within the regional intelligence unit (RIU) is leading on developing community profiling for the region. Results will inform future in force activity.

Work in progress

- The homicide reduction strategy makes recommendations in general terms on engagement with minority ethnic communities.
- The FSA also advocates the development of a community mapping document in order to further inform the terrorism threat and to identify vulnerable communities. This has not yet been delivered.
- FSA recommendations (October 2007) include enhanced communication with minority ethnic groups susceptible to honour crimes, targeting of hidden communities in respect of counter-terrorism threats, and recognition of the need to undertake profiling activity around human trafficking.

Area for improvement

- Community profiling that is being carried out on neighbourhoods has not yet informed the FSA, so threats to vulnerable communities are not well understood. To inform the FSA, the force should identify vulnerable communities and the major crime risks that they face.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed quarterly by the director of finance and facilities, who oversees the force risk committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan; however, robust monitoring is only recently emerging.

Strengths

- The force records risks relating to major crime within a force strategic risk register, which is owned by the director of finance and facilities.
- The strategic risk register includes consideration of business continuity planning, security breaches, prolonged operations, forensic deficiencies, senior investigating officer (SIO) resilience and a high level of unsolved historical cases.

- Risk registers for the criminal investigation department (CID) sit beneath and inform the corporate risk register. The risk assessment process used by the force reflects standard good practice.
- Risks have been benchmarked against other forces in the region.
- Action plans to manage risk sit within the force crime strategy and include:
 - developing a cadre of SIOs (the head of CID and the director of intelligence are currently undertaking Professionalising the Investigative Process (PIP) level 3 assessor training);
 - a review of HOLMES (currently version 11c; UNISYS is contracted to upgrade to version 12 before year end); and
 - development of the MIT (in place since January 2007, part of £1.5 million investment over two years to build MIT, level 2 structure and the PVP function.
- Police authority committee papers show clear links between spending priorities and the management of risk, for example the clear and ambitious prioritisation of resources towards functions receiving poor grades from the 2006 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) baseline assessment, including PVP.

Work in progress

- The force has devised a revised approach to risk management that awaits consideration by the police authority.

Area for improvement

- Although the intranet crime strategy includes descriptions of risk control measures and named risk owners, the relevant columns in the emerging CID risk register were blank at the time of the inspection. The force should ensure that measures to mitigate risk are being actively managed.

Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from the RIU. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- The force has some system interoperability through the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) and other custom-designed PVP database systems.
- Intelligence from neighbouring forces is accessed via the IMPACT nominal index and the RIU.
- The force sexual assault referral clinic at Gable Cross undertakes some information exchange.
- HOLMES is networked to UK Pentameter 2 at Gloucestershire Constabulary.

- Internally, the force has implemented the Niche integrated record management system, effectively connecting intelligence to crime, custody, case and an emerging range of other themes.
- HOLMES and Niche are not interoperable, but the staff 'double enter' data when appropriate.
- Automatic number plate recognition reads from local and nationwide sources are used, and hotlists are updated daily.
- The force has worked with Gloucestershire to develop the Charter database for covert use. Interoperability between the two forces is possible but not yet implemented. Intelligence from Charter is entered onto the force Niche intelligence application where it is judged appropriate.
- A ViSOR intelligence unit, jointly funded and staffed with the probation service, links to probation service IT system to the force across a wide area network (WAN) link.
- The force employs a data protection officer to ensure Data Protection Act compliance.
- The force maintains liaison with the cash-in-transit industry and prisons through dedicated points of contact in the FIU.
- MOUs exist for information exchange at MAPPA meetings.

Work in progress

- Following a murder investigation in Swindon the MIT has commenced real-time intelligence sharing with divisional intelligence units. This is achieved via the incident room receiver directing intelligence for sharing with the relevant divisional intelligence units.
- The Niche working group is overseeing a review of iBase.
- The force is developing a remote data provision, which will include data warehousing.
- The force is scoping the provision of an interoperable system to serve the needs of the JIC.

Areas for improvement

- Intelligence from neighbouring forces cannot be interrogated other than by the RIU.
- Analyst work groups within iBase need to be reconfigured, to ensure integrity and security.
- BCUs provide intelligence cell staff for major crime events, yet few staff are trained on HOLMES. The two intelligence staff who are currently trained received training while in previous posts.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance; the policy is effective.

Strengths

- The force has a review policy for major crime cases, which includes seven-day self-inspection and 28-day reviews. This approach accords with guidance found within the national ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual*.
- The policy is used in all major crime cases. Evidence of its use is apparent in Operation Markivka.
- There is evidence of the use of external reviews in Operation Arrow.
- The force operates a real-time SIO buddying system of mutual support.
- There is evidence of early formal case review by the head of CID in Operation Markivka.
- The force implements learning from reviews via the incorporation of actions in the crime strategy document (including action owners and timescales).

Work in progress

- The crime performance and strategy unit is due to commence work with an MIT detective chief inspector (DCI) to pick up learning from reviews and apply it across the force. This will include nomination of a lead officer who will be accountable for delivery.
- The crime performance and strategy unit now has responsibility for producing development plans to pick up recommendations from major crime reviews, from HMIC or from other external reviews, in order to drive corporate responsibility for implementation. This is very recent and no plans have been completed as yet.

Areas for improvement

- The current review system reports to the single assistant chief constable (ACC). A greater degree of independence would be achieved if reviews reported elsewhere, eg to the deputy chief constable. Models elsewhere incorporate review teams that often form part of the professional standards department (PSD).
- The force has no dedicated review capability to allow for review of historical unsolved cases, although three rape cases have been actioned. (The force has no unsolved murders.)

Recommendation 3.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop a systematic review process or system that rigorously identifies learning and measures the effectiveness of operational tactics.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a growing understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- Tasking and co-ordinating processes are regular and robust, and consider the dispositions and deployments of all specialist assets.
- A covert operations management meeting considers tasking and results of specialist policing activity.
- There is an understanding of historical homicide demand, which informs current and future demand via the strategic review of homicide in October 2007.
- The force has undertaken reviews of tasking processes, including an external review by NPIA – with positive findings.

Work in progress

- The force is establishing a multi-agency homicide reduction strategy board to enhance partnership working and information sharing.
- A rape review has been commenced (November 2007).
- The strategic analyst is compiling a problem profile on firearms and knife crime, which will scan all unactioned intelligence reports with a view to better understanding demand and addressing risk. (6 months)
- The strategic analyst has been tasked to review how best to manage the risk from sub-MAPPA nominals with partners in probation.
- The crime strategy includes a number of relevant objectives, eg analytical work to identify a full range of tactical plans to respond to precursor offences to major crime. These are listed together with actions, eg develop a murder prevention strategy, enhance the analytical capability to enable the focus on precursor crime, and undertake a review of hate crime offences.

Area for improvement

- The force should continue developing the role of the strategic analyst, to enhance understanding of current and future harm around major crime.

Summary – Due to inadequate training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.

Strengths

- All inspectors across the force have undertaken critical incident training, which included elements on diversity.
- The force has undertaken a PIP audit in collaboration with the NPIA (although this does not include consideration of diversity issues).

- Building upon experiences from recent enquiries the MIT has worked closely with BCU-based community and race relations teams to understand the impacts of diverse communities on major crime investigation.
- The force has held diversity themed days to raise awareness of issues. Some MIT staff attended.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area for improvement

- The force has provided little evidence of diversity training for staff engaged in major crime investigation, and it should ensure that all MIT staff are appropriately trained to understand diverse community needs.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an independent advisory group (IAG), which only recently became operational, so it has not yet been used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The force has established an IAG, which has not yet been deployed because of vetting issues that have only recently been resolved. The IAG is now ready for deployment.
- The IAG has been configured to advise the police and the other criminal justice agencies, rather than the police exclusively.
- IAG members have been subject to vetting tests.
- Prior to the establishment of the IAG, the force made use of the race equality and diversity board to provide appropriate advice to major crime investigations.

Work in progress

- The force is developing formal working practices between the MIT and the IAG.

Area for improvement

- Now that the IAG is deployable, the force should work without delay to embed productive liaison.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force has ensured that contingency and trigger plans are in place.
- Call-handling staff are cognisant of ‘golden hour’ principles and are supported by drop-down menus.
- All staff have access to standard operating procedures via the intranet and an aide memoir entitled *50 Things to Consider at Serious Crime*.
- Swindon BCU has attached detectives to operational response teams, to further enhance the ‘golden hour’ response.
- Call-out rotas are in place and are accessible via the force operations room inspector.
- Dedicated major crime resources are available through the MIT, which deploys at the earliest opportunity and ensures a robust response to the investigation.
- The force has defined the scale of resources allocated to major crime investigations, dependent on their size and complexity.
- Professional judgement is used to define the scale of the response by MIR/HOLMES (the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) in adhering to major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP). (They tend to ‘over-deploy’, to allow staff to maintain the currency of their skills and gain new experience.)

Work in progress

- A programme to deliver investigative skills training to all operational staff is under way (completion in June 2008). Enhanced training for supervisors commenced in March 2008.

Area for improvement

- The force should review its training approach to front-line staff in this regard and consider provision of dedicated training time.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are being analysed adequately.

Strengths

- Drug OCG network charting is being undertaken, as is methamphetamine use.
- FSA recommendations (October 2007) detail a variety of intelligence requirements around counter-terrorism that demonstrate an understanding of local vulnerabilities.
- The force supports Operation Trammel, which targets terrorism fundraisers.

- The force understands the risks posed by the night-time economy and town centre violence at Swindon, and has undertaken analysis to inform the response.
- The force has adopted a preventative approach to domestic violence, based on the Cardiff risk model and augmented by the findings of a prominent domestic violence case in force.

Work in progress

- A rape review has been commenced.
- A gun and knife crime problem profile is now complete.

Areas for improvement

- The force needs to scan and analyse more effectively in a way that enables it to predict issues, rather than simply responding to current issues. The change of emphasis for the strategic analyst should include this predictive focus.
- The force should then define prevention strategies that take account of risks of harm to specific groups, and should direct activity accordingly.
- The force should enhance its understanding of historical, current and predicted gun crime.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is not easily accessible to staff but the principles were understood and implemented. An example of joint, cross-border, multi-agency operation was witnessed by HMIC and illustrated capability in this regard.

Strengths

- The force has a clear threat-to-life policy and relies on warnings being delivered in person and recorded as a statement. Warning letters are not used without specific ACPO consent.
- Gold groups are convened to oversee threat-to-life activity when necessary.
- The policy includes options for proactive and disruptive responses as well as warnings.
- Threats to life are recorded on the force Niche RMS database, making searching of previous events or other attendant intelligence straightforward.
- The force has provided evidence of disruptive tactics being deployed.
- The force engages in Operation Barker 3, to combat the firearms threat across the region.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- The force should undertake analysis of threat-to-life reports on Niche RMS as part of the development of an understanding of harm risk, in order to drive prevention activity in relation to major crime.
- The force should consider the development of a firearms suppression strategy.
- The force should ensure that the threat-to-life policy and attendant trigger plans are available to call handlers, despatchers and first-line responders.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to – but not fully understood by – all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The force has recognised an increase in cases of refusal to testify or threats against witnesses. It has responded with a comprehensive witness protection programme policy and guidance document.
- The policy includes advice and guidance on assessment.
- HMIC found the witness protection policies and resourcing appeared to meet current force requirements.

Work in progress

- Funding has been approved to select and train additional witness protection officers.
- The witness protection unit has prepared an awareness-raising presentation, to be delivered to SIOs, senior detectives and divisional CID officers. This has not yet been implemented.

Areas for improvement

- Two areas for improvement have been identified but due to their sensitive nature are not detailed within this report. These have been shared directly with the force.

Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force operates a robust performance management system, which in 2007 focused on volume crime issues.

- Performance improvement meeting (PIM) measures include data for murder, manslaughter and infanticide (volume and detections). MIT performance data includes family liaison officer deployments and SCAS submissions.
- Totals and detections of racially aggravated and homophobic hate crime are measured as part of the force's performance management regime.
- The force monitors the street price of drugs and relates this to operational activities.
- The force gathers intelligence from hard-to-reach communities, eg Asian women, through community and race relations teams on BCUs.

Work in progress

- The force crime strategy includes the preparation of a full range of tactical plans to respond to precursor offences to major crime. These include a murder prevention strategy, enhancing the analytical capability in order to focus on precursor crime, and reviewing domestic violence and hate crime offences.
- The FSA recommendations (October 2007) include intelligence requirements that will contribute to understanding harm in communities.
- The force has deployed a strategic analyst to enhance the force's approach to understanding harm in communities.

Areas for improvement

- The force should develop processes that measure the effect of prevention activity, and should incorporate this within the current PIM framework.
- The force should ensure that the whole policing family contributes to this process.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has an effective PSD, which is able to undertake a range of proactive tactics to deliver security of operations.
- The force has a robust approach to security of intelligence and systems. Some staff have been dismissed or have resigned for improper disclosure of information.
- The force has in place security policies, including vetting, computer misuse, drug and alcohol abuse, service confidence and integrity.
- The force has undertaken awareness-raising initiatives and has put in place a confidential hotline for employees to report wrongdoing.

Work in progress

- A business case is under consideration which, if accepted, would see the creation of a force vetting unit within the PSD.

Areas for improvement

- The force should engage the PSD in all major crime investigations and operations, to undertake integrity checks.
- HMIC inspected the vetting procedures and two areas for improvement have been identified and shared directly with the force.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, with emerging use of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- A strong ACPO lead on major crime issues is exercised by the single ACC, who plays an active part in the review of live cases and who reviews and signs policy books.
- The force performance management regime is robust and incorporates a monthly PIM, in which performance data across a range of relevant indicators is considered and staff are held accountable.
- The police authority is kept informed of these issues through formal monthly meetings between the chief constable, the chair and chief executive of the police authority, as well as through reports to a number of police authority groups.
- There is evidence of strategic discussion between the police authority and the force on investment and risk.
- Police authority members are vetted to an appropriate level.
- The force makes use of gold groups chaired by the ACC. These have included independent membership (Operation Arrow) and community representation through the race equality and diversity board.
- The force makes use of a covert operations management meeting, which aids in the governance of major crime enquiries.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The ACPO lead is not yet trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime (MLSC), although the head of crime is. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- Although the ACC is a trained and experienced SIO, he is not yet trained in MLSC.
- The head of crime is trained in MLSC.
- The infrastructure for addressing linked and series crimes is in place and senior detectives (for the region) meet monthly. There are standing arrangements in place, but no protocols for joint activity.
- HOLMES capabilities allow all regional MITs to be linked.
- Considerations include the appointment of officer in overall command (OIOC), which would be achieved through regional tasking.
- All operational inspectors have received training in critical incident command.
- Community impact assessments are undertaken (Operation Markivka).

Work in progress

- The ACC awaits course availability for MSLC training.
- MLSC training has been identified as a development area for the superintendent (crime operations).
- The head of crime intends for all detective superintendents, and all detective chief inspectors from the MIT, public protection, FIU and the crime performance and strategy unit, to be accredited to PIP level 3. HMIC questions whether there is sufficient volume of demand in the force to enable these staff to acquire the necessary evidence for accreditation and subsequent retention.

Area for improvement

- The force should work with others in the region to define more formal protocols for MLSC.

Summary – The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of results and costs.

Strengths

- The force performance management regime is robust, having been developed over the past 12 months by a performance improvement project.

- Rigorous performance management relies upon a thorough performance data report describing a range of suitable metrics.
- A performance management meeting takes place monthly, at which the ACC holds senior staff accountable. In turn, he is held accountable by the Chief Constable in a further meeting.
- Operational reviews are undertaken for each investigation, and there is evidence of external reviews being undertaken.
- An internal SIO 'buddying' system provides early and constant peer review in support of SIOs.
- Investigations are funded against bids set out by SIOs in the early days of the investigation and scrutinised by the head of crime. This system has delivered a more efficient use of resources.

Work in progress

- Plans are in place for the crime performance and strategy unit to commence work with the MIT DCI, to pick up learning from reviews and apply these across the force. This will include nomination of a lead officer, who will be accountable for delivery.
- The responsibility for the MIT forensic budget has been passed to the MIT forensic co-ordinator.

Area for improvement

- The force should implement a system to compare more effectively the cost and benefits of individual tactics deployed during major crime investigations. .

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with the Serious Organised Crime Agency exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide limited protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- A major investigation team is in place led by an experienced DCI SIO. The team is able to meet predictable demand.
- The force responds to all unexplained deaths by treating them as homicide in the first instance. This means that MIT and other staff are called out (MIT has deployed 22 times in 12 months, although only seven unexplained deaths transpired to be murders). This provides an effective response to each case and ensures that MIT staff maintain their skill base.
- Effective call-out procedures are largely in place for a variety of specialist staff (excluding MIT and police search advisers), and are understood by staff.

July 2008

- One of the MIT detective sergeants has the portfolio for training, overseen by HQ training. A mentoring programme is being considered. (Three of the detective constables are tutors on the initial crime investigators development programme.)
- The MIT currently has two interview co-ordinators (level 5).
- The force has an army and military deaths protocol (Operation Arrow).
- The force has an awareness of corporate manslaughter and maintains a protocol with, and has undertaken some joint training with, the Health and Safety Executive.
- The force has undertaken a reactive regime of care home visits, and as a result some have been closed down. Vulnerable adult investigators are located on each BCU (but managed by HQ CID) and maintain an understanding of care home risks.
- The force keeps records of unexplained deaths. The superintendent (crime operations) is the strategic lead for the force with the coroner. Two formal meetings take place annually about quality of files, etc. Weekly dialogue is maintained by telephone.
- Critical incident management is part of the role of all operational inspectors who have been suitably trained.
- PIP processes are in place but have not yet delivered PIP 3 SIOs. The head of crime is training as an assessor.
- The force has widely utilised private sector staff (eg Dream Policing), for example on volume crime teams, allowing it to dedicate more of its own staff to major crime issues. The force has not used such staff for major crime.

Work in progress

- SIOs are not yet accredited to PIP level 3. Portfolios are being prepared for accreditation.
- It is intended that all specialist investigators will be trained to PIP level 2.
- Six investigators (officers and staff) are currently interview-trained to tier 3; Four are listed for tier 3 witness training.
- The force is looking at the creation of protocols with hospitals with regard to hospital deaths. It currently uses national protocols.
- A serious crime users group is being developed with other forces in the region.

Areas for improvement

- There is no call-out process for police search advisers. This has presented difficulties out of hours. The call-out system for MIT staff, while historically effective, would benefit from a greater degree of management formality.
- The number of detective sergeants found within the MIT is low, which is an area for consideration by the force.

July 2008

- There are no formal protocols with neighbouring forces with regard to support in the investigation of category A murders. The force should consider developing these protocols with its neighbours across the SW region and beyond if appropriate.
- Training for HOLMES indexers should be reviewed, to ensure that those trained are used and that the skills are in place where they are needed.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective and developing. Elements of witness protection and surveillance are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are thoroughly tested in operational use. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The force infrastructure for specialist assets comprises:
 - major crime resources under a dedicated superintendent, managing the: major investigation team; HOLMES team; economic crime unit; financial investigation team; incentivisation team; hi-tech crime team; and
 - intelligence resources under a dedicated superintendent (the director of intelligence), including the: dedicated surveillance team; FIU team; authorities bureau; NIM team; Police National Computer team; Criminal Records Bureau; and a dedicated source-handling unit.
- The infrastructure meets predicted demand, with some exceptions cited elsewhere in this report.
- Resources are deployed via regular NIM-compliant tasking and coordination group (T&CG) meetings.
- The extent to which MIT is deployed to events which perhaps do not merit it illustrates the general sufficiency of the regime to meet day-to-day demand.

Work in progress

- A business case for the implementation of SOCITs is approved for implementation in the 2008/09 financial year.

Area(s) for improvement

- none identified

Summary – The force has a part-time and on-demand case review function within the MIT that is rarely deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance.

Strengths

- The force maintains a clear policy for the review of unsolved cases, which are the responsibility of the MIT.
- The force has no cases in which a body was found – or in which intelligence/evidence suggested homicide – that remain unresolved.
- The force has 12 long-term missing persons (six months or more – some going back to the 1980s). These are maintained within a cold case list for review by MIT, although the capacity to deal with these has been limited. These cases have previously received considerable investigation and review, and are likely to be transferred in the longer term to the new role of major crime review officer.
- The force has prioritised review of unsolved rape cases with solvability factors. Two were undertaken between August 2006 and June 2007, and a further case was opened in November and awaited charge during the inspection period. These two cases represent 25% of unsolved rapes in the force.

Work in progress

- The force is reviewing its approach to unsolved historical cases.

Area for improvement

- The force should consider the appointment of an independent review capability to conduct 28-day and unsolved case reviews. This post might also drive forward organisational learning.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP).

Strengths

- The force document submission provided clear evidence of compliance with the ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual*.
- The force takes a mature approach to MIRSAP application, in which professional judgements are made to 'scale' the MIR response. Nonetheless, the force deploys MIT resources at every opportunity, to ensure currency of their skills.
- Policy files are created for all cases, with separate policy files in the case of sensitive decision making. Some incidents have several files.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- Contrary to national MIRSAP guidance neither of the two staff who undertake the MIT receiver role are supervisory detective officers. In addition, staff undertaking the document reader function should be proven investigators to ensure MIRSAP compliance. This is an area for consideration by the force.

Recommendation 4.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should undertake a review of its major investigation team to ensure it is effectively staffed and develop a plan towards achieving MIRSAP compliance.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the analytical capability for major crime should be enhanced with dedicated resource(s).

Recommendation 2.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop its intelligence and analytical systems and processes in order to effectively map and predict crime types and risks to inform the force strategic assessment and help in developing prevention strategies.

Recommendation 3.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop a systematic review process or system that rigorously identifies learning and measures the effectiveness of operational tactics.

Recommendation 4.

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should undertake a review of its major investigation team to ensure it is effectively staffed and develop a plan towards achieving MIRSAP compliance.

Appendix: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU	basic command unit
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C

CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CID	criminal investigation department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSI	crime scene investigator

D

DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DIP	drugs intervention programme
DS	detective sergeant

F

FIU	force intelligence unit
FSA	force strategic assessment

G

GPRS	general packet radio service
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H

HMI	Her Majesty's inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	headquarters

I

IAG	independent advisory group
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J

JIC	joint intelligence cell
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K

K&E	kidnap and extortion
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M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MIT	major investigation team
MLSC	management of linked and series crime
MoPI	management of police information
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSF	most similar force(s)

N

NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NPSAT	National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG organised crime group

P

PDR personal development review

PIM performance improvement meeting

PIP professionalising the investigative process

POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

PSD professional standards department

PVP protecting vulnerable people

R

R&D reform and development

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

RIU regional intelligence unit

S

SCAS serious crime analysis system

SGC specific grading criteria

SIO senior investigating officer

SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency

SOCIT serious and organised crime investigation team

SPI statutory performance indicator

SPOC single point of contact

T

T&C tasking and co-ordination

TTCG tactical tasking and co-ordination group

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders Register