

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Warwickshire Police Major Crime

July 2008



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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Geographical Description of Force Area

The county of Warwickshire is situated in the West Midlands Region. The county covers an area of 764 square miles consisting of two areas, intersected by the city of Coventry and the borough of Solihull, which reside in the metropolitan county of the West Midlands. The north of the county (36 % of the surface area) is more urban with traditional legacy industries such as coal mining, textiles, cement production and heavy engineering. Much of this traditional industry has now declined. The southern part of the county (64% of the surface area) is more predominately agricultural with historic county towns and some tourism. The county is served by a good transport infrastructure consisting of rail links and motorways. This, combined with the pleasant countryside, makes Warwickshire a desirable place for commuters to live. The centralised location of Warwickshire combined with its good transport links has also brought about a growth in the logistics and service sector industries in the county.

Demographic Description of Force Area

The estimated population for Warwickshire in mid 2005 was 533,900. Between 2004 and 2005 the population of Warwickshire increased by 1.6%, above the national average for the same period of 0.7 %, with more growth being recorded in Stratford and Warwick Districts than others. Despite the recent decline in manufacturing industry, manufacturing is still the biggest employer in the county, closely followed by wholesale and retail occupations. Average household incomes in the county are higher than the national average, however there are some areas of social and economic deprivation with the highest concentration in the old industrial areas in the northern borough council areas. Warwickshire's population is ethnically diverse with sizeable ethnic communities in the boroughs of Nuneaton and Bedworth and Rugby and Warwick District.

Structural Description of Force

As of February 2008 Warwickshire Police had an establishment of 1043.78 Police Officers and 745.48 Police Staff (Full Time Equivalent).

Recently Warwickshire Police has carried out a major restructuring programme entitled 150 forward. The '150forward' programme has conducted a complete review of the force structure, its mission, vision and values and provided a new focus on 'Protecting people from harm' by managing risk more effectively.

Under '150forward' the force has replaced its two Basic Command Unit (BCU) structure with three Directorates, (Protective Services, Resources and Local Policing). The Local Policing Directorate is divided into boroughs and districts, which are coterminous with local borough and district council areas.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) team is located at headquarters and consists of:

- Chief Constable **Keith Bristow**

Reporting to the Chief Constable is:

- Deputy Chief Constable **Andy Parker**, responsible for Corporate Development and Professional Standards

Reporting to the Deputy Chief Constable are 3 Directors:

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- Director of Local Policing, Assistant Chief Constable **Bill Holland**, responsible for Area Policing, Community Safety, Diversity, Judicial Services, Special Constabulary and the force Control Room
- Director of Protective Services, Assistant Chief Constable **Lewis Benjamin**, responsible for Protective Services.
- Director of Resources **Simon Pameley**, responsible for Corporate Communications, Business Improvement, Contracts and Purchasing, Finance, Property Services, HR, Learning and Development, IT, The Programme Office and Transport

The Protective Services Directorate

The importance of delivering effective protective services has grown over recent years. Warwickshire Police has recognised this, introducing a Protective Services Directorate with notable investment in its capacity and capability to deliver high quality policing services. This process has been informed by a comprehensive risk-based approach, which has been integral to the forces '150 forward' restructuring programme.

The Protective Services Directorate encompasses a number of functions designed to manage risk, protect people from harm and undertake the most complex major and serious crime investigations. The Directorate provides a centrally managed and intelligence led function. Available around the clock it enables dynamic risk assessments on incidents to be undertaken, response to crime and investigation. A co-ordinated central tasking function has been created with daily risk based Tasking meetings and a bi-weekly force-wide Tactical Tasking meeting. A Co-ordination & Tasking Office (CATO) has been created, which in directing our resources ensures that we provide the best possible protection to our communities.

The force has also created a uniformed team of staff, which can be deployed to target problems and offenders. A five-shift system ensures that there is a fifth shift available to be deployed proactively. This 'Taskforce', in delivering the forces strategic roads policing, firearms and other specialist policing services, provides boroughs and districts with the support they require to protect communities from harm. This multi-skilled team is deployed, via the forces daily and bi-weekly tasking meetings and is available to support planned policing events and provide response functions to critical incidents.

In addressing commitment to improving the quality of service the force delivers to the investigation of serious crime the force has centralised the leadership and management of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and created a number of highly skilled specialist teams to deliver services and effectively manage risk and demand.

Force Strategic Priorities for 2007/08

The mission statement for Warwickshire Police is "Protecting our communities together".

Protecting people means reducing harm by:

- Reducing the number of people killed on our roads or by crime
- Reducing crimes of violence and road injuries
- Protecting people from loss, such as having their possessions stolen

- Protecting against distress – giving individuals and communities confidence to go about their lives without fear

Major Achievements

On the 15th of December 2006 the Warwickshire Police Authority gave the Chief Constable a mandate to design a new “affordable, acceptable and sustainable” force and implement it by April 2011. It also agreed financial investment to support the management of this significant change. This programme is called “150forward” in recognition of the 150th anniversary of the foundation of the force.

The 150forward programme has delivered a blueprint for the force. Throughout the year the force has implemented the first year of recommendations from the blueprint and the new vision.

Under 150forward Warwickshire Police has been re-structured into three directorates, [Protective Services, Resources and Local Policing] each of which is led by a Director at ACC level or equivalent. Basic Command Units (BCU) has been replaced by Safer Neighbourhood teams and borough and district policing teams. All other services are provided once, at force level.

As part of 150forward the Protective Services Directorate has received funding for an additional 38 critical posts within Public Protection, Domestic Abuse, Major Incident Unit, Serious and Organised Crime areas, as well as increasing detective supervisory resilience.

Between January and December 2007 Warwickshire Police successfully dealt with a number of major crimes and serious incidents.

These included:

Bringing to justice the people who assaulted a police officer with a crow bar during a robbery in Bedworth. The officer received life-threatening injuries. In recognition of his bravery the injured officer PC Peter Doherty was subsequently nominated and received the 12th annual police bravery award, presented by Prince Charles at the Dorchester Hotel.

In August 2007 Gerard Michael Tobin, a member of the Hells Angels UK, was murdered on the M40 motorway shortly after leaving the Bulldog Bash motorbike event near Stratford upon Avon. This case presented the force with a difficult and demanding investigation. The case has been brought to a successful conclusion with seven men from a rival motorcycle group charged and awaiting trial.

On the 2nd of November 2007 there was a major fire at Atherstone on Stour in which four fire fighters tragically lost their lives. The deconstruction and forensic examination of the scene of the fire has consumed a considerable amount of resources, and the investigation itself has presented unique issues with regards to the fire service. Officers from surrounding forces have provided mutual aid for to the investigation, which is a police-led joint investigation with the Health and Safety Executive.

The force continues to provide substantial resources to the enquiry but this significant abstraction has been mitigated by the increased resilience provided by the new structures and staff within Protective Services. This incident has demonstrated Warwickshire's capability to deal with a major incident and still carry on business as usual.

Major Challenges

The force intends to continue the momentum achieved by the 150forward programme in bringing about the changes required to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness from available resources

This year a good start has been made in combating serious and major crime. The force will build on this foundation in the future in order to reduce public fear of crime and bring offenders to justice

The force believes the new structure and investments will achieve the improvements required by the force strategic priorities listed above and make real the promise of “Protecting our communities together” by managing the risk of harm they face.

The force aims to improve public satisfaction with the service provided. To achieve this it will ensure that quality of service is at the forefront of all employees thinking. This must extend from the first point of contact through to the response provided and the follow up of an incident or crime.

Contextual Factors – Major Crime

Warwickshire Police has a Major Crime Investigation Unit (MIU) comprising a team of detectives, analyst and a HOLMES Unit. The MIU is lead by a detective superintendent and a detective chief inspector (DCI) supplemented by other staff as required to effectively investigate major crime. The force has prioritised the expansion of the MIU in its 08/09 budget planning. Major investigations are also carried out with the assistance and cooperation of other regional, national and international forces and agencies.

A night detective scheme has been introduced to provide 24/7 cover across the county.

The force has seven Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) who advise the force on areas of specialist interest. These groups have been called upon to help with serious and major incidents where minority or specialist or hard to reach groups are involved. A list of contacts for IAGs has been circulated to all Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs).

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Warwickshire Police capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 pop.	0.446	0.429	-3.81%	0.368
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.094	0.056	-40.43%	0.095
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	80.00%	133.33%	+53.33pp*	83.49%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.375	0.131	-65.07%	0.133
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	0.00%	42.86%	+42.86pp*	35.80%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.300	0.281	-6.33%	0.261

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% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	43.75%	60.00%	+16.25pp*	47.95%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.000	0.019	Not Applicable	0.016
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	0.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.131	0.094	-28.24%	0.103
% of murders detected/convicted	85.71%	140.00%	+54.29pp*	97.59%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	1.948	1.929	-0.98%	2.108
% of rapes detected/convicted	13.46%	20.39%	+6.93pp*	22.27%

*"pp" is Percentage Points.

****Most Similar Family (MSF) for Warwickshire is: Cambridgeshire; Cheshire; Essex; Kent; Northamptonshire; West Mercia and; Wiltshire.**

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that life threatening and gun crime poses a potential threat to Warwickshire Police. The rate of offences (per 1,000 population) is above the MSF average despite a fall in 2007. However the rate of offences is not high when compared to the rest of England and Wales.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Warwickshire Police is strong when compared to the rest of the MSF group. Warwickshire is performing at a level above the MSF average for all crime types with the exception of rape where the sanction detection rate is slightly below the MSF average after showing improvement in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Warwickshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Warwickshire has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped.

The force strategic assessment demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified violence and dangerous offenders, (including terrorism, murder, child abuse, gun related crime, robbery, domestic abuse, sexual crime), class A drug supply and organised crime networks as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on these categories

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and/or addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with SOCA and other forces are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary - The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation and equipment.

Strengths

- A new analytical structure commenced in February 2008, with all analysts working directly to the principal analyst in the harm analysis and intelligence group (HAIG), with a total of 16 posts. This group includes three force intelligence officers (FIOs), two crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) analysts and a community safety analyst. Analysts and FIOs are deployed in a desk structure that mirrors the control strategy priorities of death and injury, loss, fear and distress and a desk focusing on drug supply and OCGs. The role of the HAIG is to understand both current and emerging harms and threats, and inform policing and partner activity to have maximum impact on protection from harm. Prior to the physical co-location of the HAIG, it has been operating as a 'virtual entity' with the principal analyst allocating responsibilities and bringing elements of the HAIG outstream incrementally.
- The director of intelligence and principal analyst encourage an innovative approach to national intelligence model (NIM) products and analysis.
- A 24/7 force intelligence capability has been embedded in the force communications centre, commencing in January 2008. The unit supports the force dynamic response to major crime and critical incidents and also harvests intelligence from all other incidents while assisting in the deployment of resources to time-critical emerging harms. While still embryonic, early successes include the development of intelligence that led to the rapid apprehension of offenders for burglary and the locating of a vulnerable missing person.
- A dedicated analyst has been assigned to the major investigation unit (MIU), who is line managed within the unit. Additional support is available from force analysts through the HAIG.

Work in progress

- Work commenced in December 2007 to identify measures by which the effectiveness of analytical products and satisfaction of internal customers can be measured and evaluated.
- The current force strategic assessment (FSA) (October 2007) was produced within tight deadlines by the principal analyst when she came into post, following a period when this role had been vacant. An FSA working group has been formed to ensure that it becomes a 'living document', reviewed on a quarterly basis and adapted to emerging threats.
- A multi-agency violent crime strategy group, led by the assistant chief constable

(ACC) (director of protective services) has been formed which oversees eight sub-groups; each of these concentrates on a specific area of violent crime to inform preventative and enforcement activity. Each sub-group is led by a nominated 'silver', who has analytical support; PIERO (prevention, intelligence, enforcement, reassurance and organisational) plans are being prepared. Silver leads will be required to report quarterly with exception reporting to the force executive board (FEB).

Area(s) for improvement

- Both researcher posts are currently vacant, and consequently analysts are conducting their own research. Even when filled, these posts may well be insufficient to conduct all research to support the HAIG structure fully.
- The newly formed HAIG will provide additional resilience, with analysts supporting priority areas, silver leads and specialist units, but currently the analytical capacity is stretched. Only one dedicated analyst is allocated to the MIU and this is not considered to be sufficient to meet predicted demand.
- Work to complete a homicide problem profile has been delayed due to operational commitments and is not expected to be delivered until October 2008 (the due date was December 2007). This highlights the lack of resilience in the MIU analyst function and is inconsistent with the major crime strategy, which requires the MIU analyst to maintain a live homicide problem profile that identifies prevention and reduction opportunities. The responsibility to complete the profile has been passed to another analyst so work on this can start.
- Information stored on the case administration tracking system (CATS) IT system used by the domestic abuse and child abuse teams is not of the quality or structure needed for analytical purposes. The system was designed as a case management tool and does not currently have the ability readily to identify repeat offenders and victims. Until a resolution is found, tactical analytical support cannot be provided and a strategic picture of domestic abuse cannot be competed.
- Analysts do not currently have access to the violent and sex offenders register (ViSOR) and limited analytical work has been undertaken into child abuse and sex offenders. The force is trying to find a solution to the access problems and is currently engaged with the procurement department to try and resolve these issues.
- The ANPR development strategy includes the intention to evaluate analytical tools. There is an awareness and understanding of the value of ANPR data to major crime and serious and organised crime investigation.

Summary - The force shares intelligence about Level 2 and Level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be embryonic. The force's community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are appropriately undertaken following major crime and critical incidents. They are the responsibility of the local chief inspector, who liaises with the senior investigating officer (SIO). All intelligence strategies prepared for major crime investigations include an objective to support staff in the production of accurate and timely CIAs.
- Members of the force independent advisory group (IAG) are consulted upon, and involved in both the preparation and review of CIAs. Their involvement is not restricted solely to major crime – for example, they were consulted in the local response following terrorist activity at Glasgow Airport.
- There are effective working relationships between regional forces and partners at the regional intelligence group (RIG), where intelligence about major and serious and organised crime is shared. Partners include the British Transport Police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), customs and immigration.
- Intelligence gathered during a homicide investigation has been shared with a neighbouring force following a serious wounding offence in their force area. Officers from Warwickshire have provided essential information leading to the arrest and charge of the alleged offenders.
- Elements of major crime and the drivers of homicide are included in the analysis of neighbourhood area profiles. This includes analysis on death and injury factors, including serious violent offending, robbery, sexual offences and drug offences. Understanding of these drivers is developing and the focus on profiling - which incorporates elements of problem, target, victim and situational factors will lead to a more holistic response to reducing harm.

Work in progress

- The special investigations intelligence development unit will support the protecting vulnerable people units, the serious and organised crime team (SOCT), the MIU and level 2 operations. The special investigations intelligence development unit comprises four detective constables (DCs) and two police staff investigators (PSIs).
- The control room is working on a prioritisation matrix based on harm and community impact factors, which will be implemented by April 2008.
- Work is in progress to establish minimum standards and information sharing agreements between agencies for responding to survivors of forced marriage, honour based violent crime and female genital mutilation.

Area for improvement

- While established relationships with partners exist - for example, through CDRPs, the local safeguarding children's board, multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and the local criminal justice board - and strong local arrangements exist at safer neighbourhood team level and with the Warwickshire observatory, major crime type intelligence is not dynamically shared between partners.

Summary - The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the Force Control Strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles are satisfactory. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- Major crime features within the FSA, with sections specifically focused on violence against the person, homicide, domestic abuse, child abuse, dangerous offenders, sexual offences, robbery, gun crime, abduction, blackmail and kidnap and drug and road related death. While these areas are included in the October 2007 FSA, it recommends removing some areas and thematic crime types from the control strategy to be progressed by force champions – ‘silver leads’. Organised criminality is specifically dealt with in the all harms section, which also includes human trafficking and motorcycle gangs. Emerging trends are considered in the FSA.
- The FSA produced in October 2007 is significantly slimmer than the previous version. In production, the aim was to provide information that succinctly outlined the force position and make recommendations. It has been widely read and consulted upon and was described as ‘streamlined and purposeful’.

Work in progress

- Silver leads have been nominated for thematic crime types and they will be held accountable for performance, process, policy and procedure in their areas. They are currently identifying the PIERO (prevention, intelligence, enforcement, reassurance and organisational) issues, which will be prioritised on a harm basis.
- The director of intelligence and principal analyst encourage their team to provide NIM products which are innovative and add value.

Area(s) for improvement

- The 2006 FSA identified a need for a problem profile for rape to be prepared but this has not yet been undertaken. A further requirement was identified by the director of protective services to support the violent crime reduction group – ie, examining domestic abuse and rape. Warwickshire Police has a low rape detection rate compared with its MSF group and a high attrition rate but the reasons for these anomalies are not currently understood.
- Joint strategic assessments have not been prepared, although the principal analyst intends to do so during 2008.
- As of January 2008, work had yet to commence on the next iteration of the FSA, although it is intended that it should be subject to formal six-monthly review and quarterly health checks.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and BCUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for hot briefing whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat, or where the nature of the analysis, demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as SOCA, CDRPs, RART, ARA and RIU exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MOPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The management of police information (MoPI) implementation project board is chaired by the deputy chief constable (DCC) and an assessment by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) reported there to be a sound governance structure.
- A comprehensive MoPI action plan is systematically being progressed, managed by the MoPI lead (chief inspector); each requirement has been risk assessed and ownership assigned.
- A centralised registry for information-sharing agreements is in place and these agreements are accessible on the intranet.
- Information is submitted to the serious crime analysis section (SCAS) of NPIA through a nominated SCAS single point of contact – the MIU analyst. This will be taken over by the sexual offences unit when it is operational, which is scheduled for the first quarter of 2008.
- SIOs are proactive in their use of specialist advice, which is sought in most investigations. Some 91 enquiries were made to the NPIA specialist operations centre which, pro-rata per 100 police officers, was the highest number of contacts for all forces in England and Wales, and only behind three large metropolitan forces in total enquiry numbers. Investigators make use of the NPIA databases and specialist advisors appropriately – for example, assistance was provided by a ballistics expert in a recent category A murder, attending the crime scene and providing specialist advice. In another case, a specialist interviewer was provided to assist with significant witness interviews in an unexplained death enquiry; specialist advice has also been provided in the form of ground penetrating radar and cadaver dogs.

Work in progress

- Work is progressing to ensure that the information and physical security arrangements of partners with whom information is shared are fit for purpose, and data is adequately stored and protected. Information sharing has recently been suspended with one partner, following concerns about their arrangements in this regard.
- Finance has been secured for data warehousing, under the open access to information project, which is being developed in collaboration with West Midlands Police, and a pilot has been undertaken to test the effectiveness of the system. The objectives of the project are to provide users with a single point of access to

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information to improve the quality of decisions and efficiency. Warwickshire will submit information to the West Midlands data warehouse daily from nine source applications and additional applications will be added over time. West Midlands Police is providing support to the pilot and training for staff.

- A communications strategy and training plan are currently being prepared to ensure that all officers and staff are cognisant of the requirements of MoPI. The plan defines the requirements for users, supervisors and managers, and is to be supported by corporate messages via the intranet from the DCC and the Chief Constable.

Area(s) for improvement

- The intranet has a policies section that is searchable, but this has not been effectively maintained and the search mechanism does not allow for ease of retrieval. Many policies are supported by more detailed procedure documents, which are stored on different intranet pages and cannot be easily found or searched.
- The awareness of the need to develop intelligence-sharing agreements with partners is apparent through reference to the Warwickshire Police Authority risk register. This commences with the identified risk of 'lack of progress in forming collaborative agreements with other forces'. It acknowledges the potential outcome of this as 'deterioration of partnership working with other forces and authorities leaves Warwickshire vulnerable because of its size and financial constraints'. Despite the force and the Authority acknowledging the risk, Warwickshire has yet to contribute to regional collaboration with significant committed resources.
- While in some specialisms MoPI is embedded, there remains scope for improvement in the knowledge, awareness and working practices within the SOCT and MIU arenas.
- Some 11 different arrangements cover the exchange of information with different agencies, some of which are no longer fit for purpose. Most staff are unaware of the existence and implications of these documents.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- The IAG has been proactively involved in developing engagement strategies to reach specific communities.
- The Chief Constable chaired a bespoke strategic tasking and co-ordination group, which examined the FSA and determined the control strategy priorities and intelligence requirement.
- Potentially dangerous persons (PDPs) are managed by a multi-agency meeting falling outside the MAPPA structure, arranged by the MAPPA co-ordinator. The focus on managing PDPs is through the health service and a 'mental health risk of harm' information-sharing protocol has been implemented.
- Community cohesion officers effectively engage with minority communities and focus on those who traditionally have been hard to reach and hear. They have received training for this role and liaise closely with the SNTs, community groups including key community leaders within all main religious and ethnic groups, and maintain a force level register of key community contacts including private sector organisations, public sector groups and voluntary organisations. The officers work closely with Warwickshire County Council to ensure up to date knowledge of new and emerging communities is captured and fed back into relevant agencies.
- The FSA does provide some analysis of vulnerable communities, for example in the area of distraction burglary.

Work in progress

- The FSA contains a section on community understanding under 'all harms'. Recommendations include the need to improve understanding of communities and methods of harvesting and storing community intelligence. These have been adopted in the control strategy and a 'silver lead' nominated.

Area(s) for improvement

- Community profiles have been prepared to support neighbourhood policing which include minority community, demographic and socio-economic data but links are not made to organised criminality.
- The district intelligence detective inspector (DI) is the nominated silver lead for community intelligence and work is progressing to improve understanding,

collection and storage. Currently, intelligence which is not actionable is deleted from the intelligence management system (IMS) without feedback to the person submitting it.

Summary – The Force did not have a comprehensive strategic risk register at the time of inspection, nor were there effective auditable risk management processes in place, but work is in progress to develop in this area .

Strengths

- The Police Authority has a comprehensive risk register with a proactively monitored action plan.
- There are business continuity plans for disaster recovery should the telecommunications links to Warwickshire fail, whereby calls are re-routed to a neighbouring force. There is a duplicate control room from which the control room could operate if necessary.
- Following the initial scoping work in the 150 Forward programme, all posts were risk assessed to determine their priority.
- The HOLMES server is located in, and supported by, West Midlands Police, with a service level agreement detailing this arrangement. The business continuity arrangements for the West Midlands Police in this regard have been commented upon positively in its inspection report.

Work in progress

- The force has stated its commitment to business continuity and increased support with greater proactivity towards major and serious and organised crime financial management.
- External consultants undertook a strategic risk review and the findings were published in April 2007. A risk assessment and prioritisation workshop followed, where the top six risks were identified, one of which was inadequate business continuity planning resources and arrangements. The consultants provided working examples of an action plan, and a worksheet was prepared outlining how to align risk management practices with business strategy and objectives (which were considered as critically important). An action plan to address the risks was not rigorously progressed. A business continuity manager has recently been appointed and an officer seconded to the post of risk manager. To support developments, the external consultants have again been appointed and workshops are planned for February and March 2008, following which a new risk register will be developed, mitigating controls will be identified and a risk management strategy and structure will be implemented. The consultants will liaise with the Audit Commission to facilitate an inspection and assist in recruiting a full-time risk and insurance manager. This work has subsequently resulted in a risk management strategy and policy statement being signed by the Chief Constable and Police Authority lead in March 2008. A scoring methodology has been agreed which mirrors that used by the Authority, and arrangements made to move those risks managed to an acceptable level to a tactical register. Risk champions will be appointed, and a risk manager will be in place by June 2008. The business improvement board (BIB) will monitor progress of the register on

an exceptions basis.

Area(s) for improvement

- Business continuity arrangements are reviewed by the deputy director of resources (physical) but such reviews are not linked to the risk register.
- The protective services directorate does not hold a register and risk management is neither documented nor auditable. The benefits of having a robust and inclusive risk management regime are not widely appreciated.
- There is no clear strategic oversight of IT risks, although a number of separate projects to address specific issues are currently operating in isolation. Failure to ensure sufficient provision for ICT and support services is identified as a risk on the police authority risk register.

Summary – the force is fully collaborating with some forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from force intelligence bureau (FIB). The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- ANPR data is used by investigators as an investigative tool to aid detection of major crimes; in two recent murder enquiries, this data has been of significant evidential value and this saved investigative time and assisted in tracing offenders.
- A guide to ANPR has recently been distributed to all SIOs and will also be circulated to all DIs in 2008.
- Two CDRP analysts work from HQ as part of the HAIG structure. These analysts have access to data from other agencies.
- Staff within the FIB in Warwickshire have direct access to the West Midlands Police intelligence and briefing system.
- Where homicide investigators have used a dedicated intelligence cell they have achieved live-time inputting of intelligence into the IMS, before the information is entered onto HOLMES. The IT enables sensitive information to be locked to the major incident room (MIR). Such information is not released into IMS until such time as it is appropriate.
- A single point of contact in the FIB assists other forces to access Warwickshire intelligence, and arrangements to ensure that intelligence is received and actioned in a timely manner have recently been reinforced.
- A protocol to improve direct exchange of intelligence between a single point of contact in West Midlands and Warwickshire force intelligence bureaux has been agreed.
- The force has an agreement with West Midlands regional intelligence unit to maintain subject flags on level 3 criminals.

Work in progress

- Arrangements to expand access to the West Midlands Police intelligence system (FLINTS) are in hand. Since the force ended its involvement in the Central Motorway Policing Group, access has been via one terminal, but this arrangement will be enhanced and specified staff given access to the system. Direct access to FLINTS is currently available in the FIB and the open access to information project will further enhance the availability and use of data.
- Automated links between the firearms and shotgun database and command and control are being developed, to make available information on certificate holders

to control room staff in real time. It is acknowledged that the interim solution is not the panacea to provide information in a readily accessible format for all incidents, but should improve information provided to first responding officers.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is a lack of inter-operability between many systems within Warwickshire Police and no integrated suite of analytical software is available to interface the various data systems. This particularly hampers the efficiency of analysts, who have to move data manually between systems before they can begin analysis.
- The crime information system does not record details of nominals suspected of offences, only when an offence is detected.
- Information stored on the CATS IT system used by the domestic abuse and child abuse teams is not of sufficient quality or structure to make it suitable for analytical purposes. The system was designed as a case management tool and does not currently allow easy identification of repeat offenders and victims; until a resolution is found, tactical analytical support cannot be provided and a strategic picture of domestic abuse is not available.
- Information cannot be extracted from systems to analyse mental health or so-called 'honour crime' due to the way that data is stored in force systems.
- The ANPR development strategy includes the intention to evaluate analytical tools. Staff have an awareness and understanding of the value of ANPR data to major crime and serious and organised crime investigation.
- While ANPR data has been used effectively and proactively in major investigations, information is not routinely used as an investigative or intelligence development tool for crime, other than homicides.
- The MIU does not have dedicated intelligence staff and there are no robust processes to ensure officers submit intelligence into the IMS system. Information held on HOLMES is not routinely moved into the intelligence system until the end of the investigation, as it is classified as secret until the end of the enquiry (when it is downgraded to restricted). A growth proposal to attach an intelligence officer to each MIU investigative pod has been put forward for the financial year 2008/09.
- No formal policy or guidance document is in place for the creation of an intelligence cell linked to an MIR. Such a document should set out formally the set-up, staffing and responsibilities, management of covert tactics, handling of sensitive information and the exchange of intelligence from the major incident room and HOLMES onto IMS.
- Intelligence submissions per officer are below the national average and submissions are neither prioritised nor routinely entered in a timely fashion.
- Crime scene examiners do not routinely submit intelligence to the intelligence system (IMS). While they do complete an entry onto the computerised scenes of crime system, this is not widely accessed by the intelligence or analytical community and intelligence opportunities can be lost. The procurement

department is seeking a solution which will give analysts access to the data.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is effective.

Strengths

- The detective superintendent (major and district crime) actively ensures effective and early governance of major crime investigations, and written reviews are conducted in all such cases. Three SIOs are fully trained in review techniques, and an additional course is booked for a temporary detective superintendent. The director of protective services (ACC) has personally conducted the review of a category A homicide, where the SIO was the detective superintendent. Road death investigations are subject to ongoing review at chief inspector level – although less structured, this is compliant with the Road Death Investigation Manual.
- DIs and detective chief inspectors (DCIs) review rape investigations at a district level. Greater scrutiny will be provided once the sexual offences unit (SOU) is operational.
- The review process is welcomed by force SIOs as supportive in helping them achieve the objectives of the investigation. Reviews are conducted and fed back to the SIO constructively.
- Lessons learned from investigations and review are shared in the monthly SIO meeting, chaired by the detective superintendent (major and district crime). Road death investigators share best practice in two-monthly meetings chaired by the chief inspector.
- A 'closure panel' process has been introduced to scrutinise undetected major crime. This panel has not yet needed to meet, but the arrangements are that it will be chaired by the director of protective services (ACC); the panel will comprise senior detectives, members of the IAG and representatives from the Police Authority and staff associations, as appropriate.
- DIs and above display a good knowledge of external support available to investigations, and were confident about seeking advice and guidance from colleagues acting as critical friends and mentors. Examples were given where articles published in the Journal of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation had been read and the SIOs' actions had been influenced by national best practice, which was subsequently shared with colleagues. Following a firearms discharge during the early hours of a morning, a ballistics expert was called out from Manchester using a telephone number which had been supplied on a list of specialist support resources circulated to all SIOs.

Work in progress

- The major crime strategy was published in June 2007, although the appendix relating to major incident review has yet to be published. However, the

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timescales for review contained within the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual (MIM) are widely known and complied with.

- A paper was presented to the January 2008 FEB to mainstream 'learning the lessons' in a consistent and robust manner. It was agreed that new procedures will be implemented in spring 2008, thus requiring closure reports to be submitted following operations, major events and large single or multi-agency exercises, and the lessons learned recorded on the intranet. Recommendations and necessary changes in policy or training will be managed by the force management group (FMG). Adoption of this policy will address the current lack of debriefing following operations conducted by specialist and local policing teams.
- Arrangements are in hand to introduce a domestic homicide review panel by April 2008, in compliance with the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.

Area(s) for improvement

- Officers who attend the initial scene of major incidents and homicide, and those who subsequently perform cordon or guard duties, are not routinely debriefed or contacted by investigating officers in accordance with the MIM chapter 3 (paragraph 3.13) and chapter 5 (paragraph 5.5).
- Although the detective superintendent (major and district crime) actively monitors reported death and major crime, there is little resilience in the arrangements to instigate review in his absence.

Summary – The force Tasking and Co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals an understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- A daily tasking meeting takes place at force level to review incidents and risk across the force during the previous 24 hours. The process is supported and administered by the co-ordination and tasking office (CATO), which provides an electronic daily tasking document. Meetings are chaired by the deputy director of local policing or, in his absence, the deputy director of protective services, and attended in person or via telephone conferencing by key personnel and all district and area commanders. The on-call silver commander chairs meetings at weekends and public holidays. Precursor offences are discussed, ownership and action scrutinised and resources allocated in line with the control strategy priorities and protection from harm. This process has improved grip in the areas of missing and vulnerable persons, threats to life, major and serious crime and identifying trends.
- The detective superintendent intelligence holds two-weekly tasking and co-ordinating meetings to assess the threat of harm across the whole force area, where the focus is on harm rather than the categorisation of level 1 or level 2 criminality. This process then combines with priorities from district tasking forums to determine priority actions.
- The new force structure enables resources to be moved more flexibly and subtly to match demand.
- A corporate electronic tasking system has been developed to assist the CATO tasking manager and district tasking officers. Tasks are e-mailed to officers and supervisors and progress monitored by the CATO. All operations are prioritised against the control strategy and the resources committed to them are auditable.

Work in progress

- Force level tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) meetings are held two-weekly, chaired by the director of protective services. The format and attendance at the TTCG was changed in January 2008 and benefits of the new arrangements have yet to be realised.
- The structure of the force is being aligned to the vision of protecting communities from harm where form follows function. Six elements are considered as key to success;
 - single points of contact;
 - 24/7 intelligence function;
 - the CATO;
 - sufficient intelligence capacity;
 - effective IT; and

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- the confidential unit.
- The CATO is responsible for maintaining the taskable assets and operations register, assessing harm and risk proactively, determining success criteria, setting and monitoring budgets and undertaking results analysis. The unit is operational but still embryonic.
- Regional tasking arrangements are currently under review but are considered to be too infrequent to be effective in either tasking or co-ordination functions. The proposed new arrangement, whereby the responsibility for regional resource tasking is held by the ACC (intelligence) West Midlands Police is fully supported by Warwickshire Police. This has since been implemented, together with new tasking arrangements, including the response to hot intelligence and a clearer remit has been agreed for the RIG.
- The director of protective services monitors specialist policing activity undertaken by the SOCT, either through the force TTCCG or discussed separately. Consideration should be given to how the force records the outcome of specialist policing activity.
- The process of briefing and tasking is still in the early stages of development and it is anticipated that the HAIG will identify emerging issues for tasking through the CATO, which has access to all operations and resources. It also has the authority of the director of protective services to perform 'hot taskings' throughout the force area.
- The principal analyst is currently working with the performance manager to align performance management and the analytical and NIM processes.
- New procedures were implemented in early February 2008 requiring officers to submit intelligence logs for all incidents identified as precursors to sex offending - for example, following potential abduction situations and indecent exposures - which will enable analysts to capture relevant information to inform operational and preventative activity. While this work is welcomed, data has to be double keyed and a longer-term more efficient solution should be sought.

Area(s) for improvement

- TTCCG meetings do not clearly record decisions not to resource an operation or the rationale for the decisions made. Meetings are not formally minuted, although the CATO records tasks and actions.
- Analysis has not been completed to determine the current and future demand profile of major crime types and precursors to these offences. Specific problem profiles on emerging communities, missing persons, sex offenders, PDPs, counter-terrorism, threats to life, class A drugs and gun crime have not been carried out but elements of analysis in these areas have been undertaken.

Summary – Due to appropriate training, the force’s awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Evidence

- Diversity training is delivered to all staff as part of induction or during initial police officer training and examples and scenarios which include diversity themes are included in specialist courses – for example, family liaison officer (FLO) and SIO training.
- SIOs have an understanding of hate crime as required by the MIM, and information is readily available on the intranet.
- An action plan to address forced marriage and so-called honour based violent crime has been developed, which is supported by a county wide multi-agency partnership group set up in July 2007. A conference was hosted by Warwickshire Police in November 2007, attended by representatives from other forces and the voluntary and statutory sectors, and a series of briefing sessions have been held for BME and faith groups have been held raising awareness about forced marriage, honour based violent crime and female genital mutilation.

Work in progress

- The force is about to embark on a programme of enhanced training, with a focus on mental health issues.
- The hate crime policy has been redrafted and when approved, officers and staff will receive training on the requirements. It is anticipated that the role of the SIO will be a specific learning objective.

Area(s) for improvement

- Specific diversity training has not been provided to staff engaged in major crime investigation, nor have they received input on the ACPO good practice guide for police response to racial incidents or the ACPO definition of racially motivated and homophobically motivated incidents. There is, however, a good level of awareness of diversity issues among both officers and staff and effective involvement of IAGs in major crime.

Prevention

Summary – The force has seven Independent Advisory Groups and key individual networks who are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- Seven IAGs operate in the Warwickshire Police area, four at district level and three centrally. The central IAGs comprise a main group, a disability IAG and a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender IAG. Representative(s) from the IAG are invited to sit on all gold groups, and the chair of the IAG ensures that the most appropriate member is nominated. Members of the IAG are clear as to their role and have written terms of reference; they have received a briefing on major crime and critical incidents from the detective superintendent (major and district crime). Examples were provided where IAG contributions had positively impacted on police actions, and where IAG members were able to exert influence and reassurance to communities.
- The major crime strategy requires SIOs to seek independent advice to inform their strategy and processes wherever appropriate, including from those within communities including key individual networks and through specialist groups such as the IAG.
- There are written guidelines for independent advice at critical or major policing incidents, which clarify the role of the IAG members(s) – ie, to assist, advise, support and make recommendations to the SIO in meeting agreed objectives. Independent advisors are clear of their role in major crime enquiries and the chair and deputy chair are proactive in ensuring that members of the IAG reflect the community and retain their independence.
- Members of the Warwickshire IAG are involved in the national IAG working group, chaired by the ACPO lead on IAGs.
- Bespoke engagement strategies have been adopted to reach specific communities – for example, the Polish community. The IAG has been proactively involved in this development.

Work in progress

- Members of IAGs have signed confidentiality agreements and formal information-sharing protocols are under development.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified

Summary – Contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- Policies are summarised for operational use by the control room in the call receivers manual, which gives details of the processes to be carried out following the report of an incident. This provides clarity of ownership and accountability during the ‘golden hour’ of critical incident management, and is an effective aide memoir for all necessary actions. The manual was developed following wide consultation and process mapping. Specified offences of rail, aircraft, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, emergency, explosion, hate incident, firearms discharge, industrial accident, kidnapping, sexual offences, suspicious package, bomb alert, domestic violence and high-risk missing persons are automatically referred to the control room inspector for his/her ownership and effective management.
- Formal on-call rotas exist for senior SIOs (DCI and detective superintendent ranks); for SIOs (DIs); detective sergeants (DSs) and senior crime scene managers. This is supported by an on-duty night DC post, which has been in place since January 2007. Sufficient kidnap SIOs, hostage negotiators and ‘red centre’ trained staff are available 24/7. An adequate number of rape chaperones have been trained to provide two staff per borough or area on duty at any one time (ten in total), and detectives who perform night duties have received additional training in rape investigation.
- DIs and chief inspectors are exposed to major crime investigation training and development. The career profile of senior detectives is known and there are options to fill posts with trained and skilled staff should those currently occupied by experienced SIOs become vacant.
- A series of critical incident leadership seminars have been held for inspectors covering golden hour principles from the 2005 practice advice on core investigative doctrine.
- DIs and above display a good knowledge of the range of external support available to investigations and were confident in seeking advice and guidance from colleagues acting as critical friends and mentors. Examples were given where articles published in the Journal of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation had been read and the SIOs’ actions had been influenced by national best practice, which was subsequently shared with colleagues. Following a firearms discharge during the early hours of a morning, a ballistics expert had been called out from Manchester using a telephone number which had been supplied on a list of specialist support resources circulated to all SIOs.
- An MIU has been set up which includes dedicated investigative officers and staff and dedicated HOLMES and incident room staff.

Work in progress

- The shift pattern of locally based detectives has been revised to provide additional cover beyond core hours. This was implemented in January 2008 and should strengthen operational resilience, in particular at weekends and in the evening.
- The standard operating procedure outlining the response to homicide and sudden and unexplained deaths has been drafted but not yet finalised or issued.
- A service level agreement has been developed to outline the support that the MIU will provide to districts in the event of a major crime, but is yet to be implemented. The unit is developing a broad skill base across a range of specialisms to minimise the need for staff to be precepted from districts.
- The MIU has been set up with additional posts provided through the 150 Forward programme, but a second investigative team was classed in the programme as 'urgent posts'. Developments to date have increased the capacity of the section by filling the critical posts of a DI and four investigators. However, the MIU is currently precepting staff from local policing, as there is insufficient capacity to meet current demand, and some homicide investigations have been investigated by local DIs. While recognising that the second half of 2007 placed unprecedented demands on the protective services directorate, the Police Authority has been asked to consider expanding the MIU to secure four investigative teams; this would minimise long-term abstractions from local policing to major investigations.

Area(s) for improvement

- A lack of clarity is evident among some communications centre staff as to what factors should be considered when determining the operational response to a kidnap. Specific training has not been given, and while information in the call reception manual is sufficiently detailed to guide the operator, success depends on the initial categorisation of the call. This is over-reliant on the terminology used by the caller to determine whether the response should be overt or covert.
- Control room staff are not familiar with the concept or principles of Osman warnings. Training and awareness should be provided, in particular to supervisors.
- Inconsistent language is used throughout the force which affects the response to reports of death. The terms 'suspicious', 'unexplained' and 'sudden' are used interchangeably by some officers and staff. Standard terminology would reduce the potential for miscommunication and help to ensure the correct level of attendance and notification for all deaths. Despite recent circulations requiring a DI or above to attend all reports of unexplained deaths, and the standard operating procedure stating that an inspector be apprised and asked to attend where the circumstances appear to be natural causes or suicide, this does not occur routinely. It is worryingly common practice that relatively inexperienced officers attend the report of a death and are the only member of the service to

attend scenes. Consideration should be given to strengthening the requirement for a supervisory officer to attend the scene of all deaths and the minimum attendance policy robustly monitored.

- The major crime strategy states that the decision to set up an MIR and the location where it will be accommodated is that of the head of the MIU. Clear criteria with minimum standards for various incident categories are not specified.
- A self-assessment against the ACPO threshold standards for protective services has been conducted, which identified business continuity as an area for improvement. The business continuity manager is to progress the work in this area.
- No formal succession plan for senior detectives or specialist posts has been developed.

Summary - The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- The force vision of 'protecting the public of Warwickshire from harm' has provided a clear focus for all officers and staff. The definition of harm as 'death and injury, loss, fear and distress' has resulted in staff using this as a method of determining priorities and has built in risk identification and assessment to determine priorities.
- The Chief Constable holds the ACPO violent crime portfolio.
- A violent crime reduction strategy has been developed under the leadership of the director of protective services with eight strands - domestic abuse, street violence, so-called 'honour' crime, rape and sexual offences, mental health issues, child abuse, criminal networks and dangerous and sex offenders. A working group has been established for each strand, aiming to reduce violence to people and communities and to disrupt precursor or signpost events before they become acts of violence. The main focus is prevention and the co-ordination of effort to identify problems, provide solutions, share intelligence and conduct analysis of the issues. Partners and IAG members are involved in this work.
- Performance management integrates all the activities of the force through the corporate performance framework. Harm is measured through a series of indicators aligned to the control strategy. The performance management culture is vision driven to secure appropriate outcomes for the community, in that work is prioritised against the vision to protect communities from harm. Staff clearly identify with, and show pride in, the county of Warwickshire.
- The referrals unit has been successfully taking referrals for child protection and vulnerable adults since November 2005. The role was expanded in 2007 to include domestic abuse and public protection as part of the protecting vulnerable people unit, supported by a domestic abuse single point of contact on each district. The force has invested to improve the response to domestic abuse in both prevention and detection of offences, as reflected in the HMIC Phase One inspection report published in October 2007.
- Operation Ontario was instigated as a proactive response to harm reduction over the 2007 Christmas and New Year period. It included strategies to reduce and prevent violent crime and town centre violence by targeting victims, locations and offenders. The domestic abuse campaign ran alongside, with the provision of a dedicated domestic abuse car and the use of headcams by officers to improve evidence gathering.
- A preventative approach is taken to domestic abuse, and an effective risk assessment process is in place. Significant improvements have been made in this area, supported by an extensive training programme, as reflected by the HMIC inspection report published in October 2007.
- The daily tasking meeting, supported by CATO and the 24/7 intelligence unit identifies near miss offences and signal crimes, giving the chair the opportunity to ensure that the appropriate action has been taken to minimise harm and prevent

escalation. Where further opportunities to prevent or disruption criminality and reduce harm are identified, specialist or additional resources will be tasked.

Work in progress

- The domestic abuse forum identifies the 'top 10' repeat victims and offenders for priority actions, the results of which will be monitored through the force TTCG.
- All calls received in the communications centre will be assessed against community impact factors, risk assessed against a harm matrix and then prioritised. The work to introduce the formal assessment is nearing completion. Staff are currently clear that resources are dispatched against harm prioritisation.

Area for improvement

- Automatic notifications of the release of dangerous offenders are sent by e-mail to local areas, but action required on receipt of these emails is not standardised throughout the force area and, consequently, the arrangement is not robust. While it is anticipated that the 24/7 intelligence processing unit will take responsibility for prison release risk assessment, interim measures should be devised to ensure that positive action follows all such notifications.

Summary - The policy covering threats to life is minimally accessible to staff and partially understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are evident.

Strengths

- SIOs have effectively used tactics to protect individuals, including pseudonym statements, witness protection and Osman warnings. Good awareness of available tactics is evident among officers and staff working in major and serious and organised crime units.
- Some 11 Osman warnings were issued in 2007, half of which were on individuals resident in other forces. In each case, there was close liaison between the forces and tactical options were developed to manage the risk effectively. In significant cases, officers have discussed the risk with individuals and drawn up a memorandum of understanding with the victim, detailing the threat and confirming the advice and support offered.
- A guidance document has been produced on the criteria for Osman warnings which has been circulated to all silver commanders and since this time, there has been an increased use of this tactic. ACC authority is required to issue an OSMAN warning.
- Training has been provided to critical incident inspectors on threats to life including escalation issues, golden hour principles, Osman warnings and the implications of the stated case *Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire* 2006.
- The daily tasking meeting identifies any threats to life issues over the preceding 24 hours and provides an opportunity to ensure the correct steps have been taken to prevent crime or the escalation of threat. This is dynamically supported by the 24/7 intelligence unit.
- Opportunities to disrupt major crime are taken where protracted operations are either not viable or not prioritised, for example by dealing with subjects for motoring offences including drink and disqualified driving, tax and VAT evasion and offences under the POCA legislation.
- Tactics are considered and used to disrupt major crime, examples of which include operations mounted across force boundaries and across crime types.

Work in progress

- An Osman warning library is being developed by the director of intelligence, who is responsible for the preparation of warning letters and arranging for ACPO signature. Resilience will be built into the new policy, so that the senior SIO on call can provide out-of-hours cover.
- The threat-to-life policy is being updated to reflect national best practice. This will contain a requirement for a senior SIO (DCI or above) to be consulted prior to

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ACPO authorising an Osman warning. The content of the policy was accepted in February 2008 and is subject to impact assessment prior to formal adoption, but in the interim staff in the protective services directorate are working to the principles. When the policy is formally adopted all Inspectors will receive a workbook for completion in all cases where such threats are evident, which guides officers through a standard template for cases where there is a threat to life and provides a risk assessment tool, flow chart to aid decision making and legislative guidance. The workbook details the circumstances of the threat, the officers considerations, outlines policy decisions taken, and contains authorising officer signatures.

- Osman warnings were issued in only one major investigation during 2007, with no other examples of use. Improved awareness of this violence reduction tactic has resulted in increased usage in 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- Operational uniformed staff have not received training or inputs on threat-to-life prevention tactics, such as Osman warnings, and limited awareness of options available. On receipt of an out-of-force request relating to an Osman warning, one officer was unable to find any information on the intranet and relied on open source information, accessed through a search engine on the internet, for guidance.
- Current arrangements do not afford access to information about previous issue of Osman warnings other than through the director of intelligence. The recent introduction of the 24/7 intelligence unit now is responsible for the collation of Osman warnings, and when the new policy is launched the availability of such details will be circulated.
- Control room staff are not familiar with the concept or principles of Osman warnings. Training and awareness should be provided, in particular to supervisors.
- The domestic abuse risk assessment is not linked to the threat-to-life policy.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by dedicated covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by dedicated staff and senior managers only. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- A dedicated witness protection unit (WPU), has been set up to replace ad hoc arrangements in place since 2004, whereby staff have been abstracted permanently from other posts. The intention to migrate all witness protection roles from officers to police staff has been delayed until 2009/10 to ensure continuity and retain experience. New accommodation is being adapted to meet their needs.
- Training has been provided to all new staff on the WPU, with three officers attending the NPIA course in early 2008.
- A regional witness protection meeting is attended quarterly. Warwickshire officers have developed a close relationship with the Home Office central witness unit, which provides advice and support as required.
- Witness protection officers attend six-monthly mandatory welfare checks with the occupational health department. They are vetted to SC level and are subject to compulsory management vetting.
- Collaboration with other forces takes place on a case-by-case basis, and always in advance of relocation to another force area. Where Warwickshire has not been notified of relocations into its area and subsequently becomes aware of them, protracted negotiations have taken place with the 'sending' force to ensure that effective intelligence flows and agreements are reached on the financing of extended protection provision. During some extended negotiations with other forces, the WPU has remained focused on the protection of the client as its overriding priority.
- The policy and capability to protect witnesses are well known and understood by SIOs and senior detectives. Should an appropriate case not be proactively referred, this is now identified through the daily tasking process. A threat-to-life case was identified in this way and the WPU gave effective advice and guidance to the officer in charge.
- Thorough risk assessment processes are adopted by the WPU and all decisions made are recorded in policy logs.
- Recommendations following an external review conducted by another force into the WPU arrangements have been implemented. Improvements include improved risk assessment templates, revised arrangements to deal with client breaches of agreements and clarity of occasions requiring management intervention.
- Pseudonym statements have been used and SIOs have a good understanding of the application of such techniques. Work to protect anonymity is in line with the

force focus on protecting communities from harm.

Work in progress

- Working practices and covert facilities for the WPU are currently being finalised and should be prioritised for implementation. The experience of officers who have worked in this area since 2004 has guided the approach taken, together with consultation with other specialists.
- The WPU will become the responsibility of the director of intelligence on 1 April 2008; training and shadowing is under way for the DI in the FIB. In the interim, the unit continues to be managed by the DCI currently responsible for protecting vulnerable people, who has experience in this field, and a smooth handover will ensure continuity.

Area for improvement

- The WPU conducts all transactions in cash. This creates increased supervisory responsibilities, as cash is audited frequently, and expenditure requires manual auditing. Work to rectify this is under way but should be prioritised and expedited.

Summary - The force has adequate systems to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- Warwickshire Police's mission is to protect communities from harm - defined as death and injury, loss, and fear and distress. This has been consistently and clearly communicated to all staff, who display a commitment to this mission. All performance measurements, risk assessments and strategic decisions are based on the protection from harm, as are operational dynamic decisions.
- The impact of major crime policing activity is currently not specifically routinely monitored but community confidence measures are and these are presented to the force performance group. These measures focus on ease of contact, police actions, follow-up, treatment and the whole experience and predominantly relate to staff in the local policing directorate.
- Community tension is monitored at a ward level and a strategic objective is to work in partnership 'to protect our communities from harm and to create fair, tolerant and cohesive communities through a combined community safety unit', and support the activity of the community cohesion and inclusion section of the 'stronger' block of the local area agreement.

Work in progress

- Work is progressing to support the national richer picture. Special Branch has provided training to student officers, trainee detectives, safer neighbourhood officers and police community safety officers (PCSOs) to facilitate this.

Area(s) for improvement

- Some monitoring of post-operations activity has been undertaken; for example, following a drugs operation the quantity of intelligence submitted was assessed as an indicator of disruption activity, although this is not embedded. It is acknowledged that results analysis has been neglected to date and staff have a desire to improve.
- The force recognises that the submission of community intelligence needs to be improved and it intends to set up a dedicated community intelligence bureau. Each safer neighbourhood team will have bespoke intelligence requirements, which will then be monitored. Development of this initiative is at an embryonic stage.

- The number of intelligence logs submitted is estimated to be less than half of that expected when benchmarked against other forces. To some extent this is due to the limited processing capacity, which has resulted in some of the intelligence that has been submitted not being entered or stored on force systems. The new structure of the intelligence community will provide greater resilience to process intelligence and the introduction of quality point scoring, which includes intelligence submissions, should increase the number and quality of submissions.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- Recruitment and internal vetting processes for police staff, officers and PCSOs are robust and there is a good understanding of security issues and the potential for corruption by staff responsible for this area.
- All officers and staff working on sensitive investigations or operations are required to sign confidentiality agreements. The signing of such agreements is compulsory for all staff involved in a current joint investigation with the Health and Safety Executive.
- The professional standards department (PSD) manages the Police National Computer (PNC) integrity audit function and conducts 'with cause' interviews and physical checks. In one case, this led to the dismissal of a member of staff, who was found to be using the PNC inappropriately.
- A 'service confidence' procedure is in place and has been used proactively.
- There are robust vetting processes for new joiners to the service and a robust management vetting process for all designated posts, including those within major and serious and organised crime teams. These processes have resulted in some individuals not being accepted into the service, being dismissed where information has failed to be disclosed, and to some movement of staff.
- Warwickshire Police undertakes the national police contractor vetting scheme on behalf of other forces.
- A proactive test of physical security arrangements in an HQ department was conducted, which led to procedures being tightened and reinforced.
- IT equipment is not installed in new locations until a security audit has been conducted by the information security officer.
- Officers in the PSD are predominantly experienced detective officers. The DI is an accredited SIO, participates in the on-call rota and attends the bi-monthly SIO meetings.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The list of designated posts should be refreshed and marketed in light of the new force structure and growth in protective services. Regular review of the list should be introduced to ensure the vetting regime targets all posts of high vulnerability.
- There are no formal integrity management arrangements in place between the PSD and the MIU.
- The department has the capability to covertly monitor systems, but proactive testing is not undertaken.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of independent advisory groups and community membership of Gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The director of protective services is the force strategic lead for major crime and is appropriately trained and experienced in criminal investigation. In his absence, there is resilience in the skills and experience of other members of the chief officer team. Chief officers are proactive in their contact with SIOs in major crime.
- Chief officers have chaired gold groups for appropriate major and critical incidents, involving the Police Authority, independent advisors and external bodies as necessary. Senior officers have experience in the benefits of setting up early gold groups in appropriate circumstances, and the first such group meeting took place on the evening of a category A homicide, chaired by a chief superintendent and handed to a chief officer the following day.
- The Police Authority has a nominated protective services lead for major crime who has been a member of the gold group where such a group has been formed, and has been subject to basic vetting checks. He subsequently prepares reports to the full Authority and meets with the chair and vice-chair two weekly to provide a briefing. This ensures that information is shared in real time.
- Police Authority governance arrangements have been amended to fit the new structure of the force and in doing so have abolished non-essential committees and meetings.
- Performance is measured and accountability mechanisms are in place through daily tasking, the FEB and the FMG, supported by a briefing from corporate services to ACPO each Monday afternoon. Performance information presented is aligned to the control strategy. The statutory performance indicator data is considered in the background by the performance team, which monitors trends and reports on any issues of risk.
- The DCC chairs a critical incident review group, which considers the broad implications arising from critical incidents which are beyond the remit of the gold group. Five cases are currently subject to such scrutiny. External representation from independent bodies and the police authority is drawn upon as appropriate. Following a domestic homicide, the critical incident review was pivotal to the instigation of changes made to force policy, procedures and actions taken in response to cases of domestic abuse.

Work in progress

- An accountability framework for major crime is being prepared following consultation between the authority and the force, the target for completion being

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April 2008. The proposed framework includes measures for the percentage of offences brought to justice against the total number taken on by the MIU, abstractions from districts and boroughs; the number of intelligence logs submitted per major enquiry; witness satisfaction; and sanction detections against local crimes investigated by the MIU.

- The Police Authority is working to establish bespoke governance structures, built into the regional franchising model for protective services, which is currently being developed. This will enable specific governance arrangements to be implemented for each operation, to programme manage the operation against specified objectives.
- The governance structure is developing with partners. A series of workshops have been held jointly with Warwickshire County Council to develop joint accountability mechanisms and align control strategy priorities under local area agreement themes. Measures are being developed to maximise the impact of joint working.

Area for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The ACPO lead, the deputy director of protective services, and head of major crime are trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime and kidnap and extortion. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACPO lead is an experienced SIO. He is trained in the role of officer in overall command (OIOC), having undertaken the major and linked serious crime (MLSC) course and the SIO kidnap and extortion course, and is an experienced gold commander. He has performed the role of OIOC for a serial rape series and a series of homicides in south-east England and is supported in his current role by SIOs experienced in major crime investigation; the head of major and district crime investigation is currently the deputy OIOC in a cross-border investigation. The Chief Constable, DCC and ACC (local policing) have attended the MLSC course, as has the deputy director of protective services, who has also received SCIMTAR training.

Work in progress

- None identified

Area for improvement

- The major crime strategy does not include reference to cross-border investigations, including the requirement for the appointment of an OIOC.

Summary - The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The detective superintendent (major and district crime) actively ensures effective and early governance of major crime investigations, and written reviews are conducted in all such cases. There are three fully trained SIOs in review, and an additional course is booked for a temporary detective superintendent. The ACC (director of protective services) has personally conducted the review of a category A homicide where the SIO was the detective superintendent. Road death investigations are subject to ongoing review at chief inspector level – although less structured, this is compliant with the Road Death Investigation Manual.
- Rape investigations are reviewed by DIs and DCIs at a district level. Greater scrutiny will be provided once the SOU is operational.
- The review process is welcomed by force SIOs as supportive in helping them achieve the objectives of the investigation. Reviews are conducted and fed back to the SIO constructively.
- Lessons learned from investigations and review are shared in the monthly SIO meeting, chaired by the detective superintendent (major and district crime). Road death investigators share best practice in two-monthly meetings chaired by the chief inspector.
- A 'closure panel' process has been introduced to scrutinise undetected major crime. This panel has not yet had the need to meet, but the arrangements are that it will be chaired by the director of protective services (ACC); the panel will comprise senior detectives, members of the IAG and representatives from the Police Authority and staff associations, as appropriate.
- DIs and above display a good knowledge of external support available to investigations, and were confident about seeking advice and guidance from colleagues acting as critical friends and mentors. Examples were given where articles published in the Journal of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation had been read and the SIOs' actions had been influenced by national best practice, which was subsequently shared with colleagues. Following a firearms discharge during the early hours of a morning, a ballistics expert was called out from Manchester using a telephone number which had been supplied on a list of specialist support resources circulated to all SIOs.
- The director of protective services chairs the West Midlands regional forensic strategy review group; this forum enables best practice and innovative practice to be shared.
- Lessons learned during major investigations are shared with the NPIA. For example, there is active current liaison in relation to the investigation into the circumstances of the deaths of four firefighters in autumn 2007, where learning is being shared for future dissemination. A presentation has been given to the NPIA

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on motorcycle gangs following an investigation where a member of one such gang was murdered; Warwickshire Police is now leading for the regional collection plan, linking with other forces and law enforcement agencies.

- A murder investigation costing protocol outlines the requirements for the SIO to submit a request for funding to the DCC within 72 hours of the commencement of the investigation. Guidelines state that a category C investigation will be allocated up to £25,000 and category B a maximum of £60,000. Additional expenditure must be subject to a further application to the DCC.
- Homicide and major crime investigations can be costed, as each person attached to the incident is required to complete activity-based costing (ABC) forms, and projections for items of major expenditure are identified by the SIO, for example forensic and telecoms cost. A detailed paper has been prepared in a current major investigation to inform the gold group, outlining current spending, commitments and projections.

Work in progress

- The major crime strategy was published in June 2007. The appendix to the strategy relating to major incident review has yet to be published. However, the timescales for review contained in the MIM are widely known and complied with by the force.
- There is a written performance measurement expectation for the MIU, but measurement is in its infancy. It includes measures relating to detections, attrition rates, local policing satisfaction, witness satisfaction, intelligence submissions, public confidence, sickness and performance development review completion rates.
- A paper was presented to the FEB to mainstream 'learning the lessons' in a consistent and robust manner. While current arrangements are effective for those in post, the lack of a central repository is a weakness which the recommendations in this paper should address.

Area(s) for improvement

- Officers who attend the initial scene of major incidents and homicide, and those who subsequently perform cordon or guard duties, are not routinely debriefed or contacted by investigating officers in accordance with the MIM chapter 3 (paragraph 3.13) and chapter 5 (paragraph 5.5).
- Although the detective superintendent (major and district crime) actively monitors reported death and major crime, there is little resilience in the arrangements to instigate review in his absence.
- SIOs have to make bids to the DCC for a budget for major crime investigation through the operational contingency budget held centrally. There are no written

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or other comprehensive measures in place proactively to review the ongoing budget allocation or expenditure profile for each enquiry, although all forensic submissions are submitted through the central submissions bureau, which acts in an advisory capacity to the SIO. To date, investigative lines of enquiry for major crime have not been hampered by budgetary restrictions placed on SIOs.

- While the monthly SIOs meetings share best practice and the outcomes of reviews, DSs and DCs are largely unaware of this learning, and therefore opportunities to develop other staff and ensure continual development are not being captured.
- Consideration should be given to involving external independent reviewers in appropriate cases. Such a review has been commissioned for an ongoing critical investigation, although to date all completed reviews have been conducted internally. While the SIOs are confident that internal processes are robust and would stand scrutiny, externally this has not yet been tested.

Performance Management and Resilience

Summary - The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with the Serious Organised Crime Agency exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need, when supported by informal agreements with other forces. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The 150 Forward programme reviewed how policing was delivered in Warwickshire following the decision not to proceed with force amalgamations. This full service review examined the force capacity and capabilities to deliver a service-focused approach to the community and fill the protective services gap. The initial assessment was that over 100 posts should be added to the establishment to provide sufficient resources to deal with all demands without mutual support from other forces or agencies in specialist areas. Each gap was risk assessed as urgent, critical or necessary and the urgent posts were subsequently funded. Significant investment, realignment, reorganisation and cultural change have followed and the ability to deliver all specialist investigations has been enhanced. Some 38 posts have been created with the following posts being added to the establishment:
 - detective superintendent, serious and organised crime and protecting vulnerable people;
 - DCI protecting vulnerable people;
 - DI MIU;
 - DI protecting vulnerable people;
 - DI SOCT;
 - DI special branch;
 - MIU – two DCs, two PSIs, three indexers;
 - analyst;
 - SOCT - DS, four DCs, four PSIs;
 - specialist investigation intelligence development unit – two DCs, two PSIs;
 - domestic abuse – two PCs;
 - public protection unit - DS, two DCs, two constables; and
 - referrals desk – two constables, two PSIs.
- A business case has been submitted to increase the MIU by a further DI, two DSs, ten DCs, two PSIs and an additional analyst. It is widely supported internally, but implementation is dependant on securing funding from the authority. The changes made in the structure of the force and the growth in specialist posts provide sufficient investigative capability to meet predictable homicide demand. However, resources to meet a wide range of major crime investigations in compliance with the MIU terms of reference while maintaining an effective review and cold case capability are insufficient.
- The MIU consists of a detective superintendent, a DCI and DI, two DSs, ten DCs, two PSIs and an analyst. They are supported by a permanent HOLMES team.

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The terms of reference for the unit includes all category A+, A and B murder investigations, category C as directed by the head of the unit, manslaughter, certain stranger rapes, unexplained deaths, kidnap, armed robbery where a firearm is discharged, cold case murder and serious sexual offence reviews, high-risk missing persons where a crime is suspected and reviews of investigations.

- Formal on-call rotas exist for senior SIOs (DCI and detective superintendent ranks), for SIOs (DIs), DSs and senior scenes of crime scene managers. This is supported by an on-duty night DC post, which has been in place since January 2007. Sufficient kidnap SIOs, hostage negotiators and 'red centre' trained staff are available 24/7. An adequate number of rape chaperones have been trained, to provide two per area on duty at any time and detectives who perform night duties have received additional training in rape investigation.
- The introduction of the night detective post in January 2007 has provided additional resilience in the golden hour. This has been supplemented by critical incident seminars, provided to inspectors, and two days additional training for all detectives who have not been through the initial crime investigators' development programme in the investigation of sexual offences. DSs undertake the IMSC course.
- The initial categorisation of homicide is made by the senior SIO on duty or on call. The decision regarding primacy and the appointment of the SIO are reviewed at the earliest opportunity by the detective superintendent (major and district crime).
- Procedural guidance has been published, advising how to deal with deaths in healthcare settings, drug-related deaths and work-related deaths, as appendices to the major crime strategy. The documents include initial action, investigation management, family liaison and media issues. The guidance contains links to additional guidance and case law.
- The director of protective services ensured resilience in a recent category A homicide investigation by relieving the SIO and deputy SIO of all their other responsibilities, explaining his rationale in the policy book. Officers promoted to temporary ranks have been appointed to cover their core functions and ensure continuity of development of the 150 Forward programmes.
- A costed training plan, prepared by the learning and development unit, includes the protective services directorate and has been the subject of previous positive comment from HMIC. The plan is developed through three local training panels – resources, local policing and protective services – which report to the main training panel and all requests are costed using ABC and risk assessed, using the Home Office model, against force objectives.
- MIU accommodation at HQ has recently been refurbished to provide a bespoke operating and training environment. Four additional MIR facilities are available across the force.
- An exercise to test the casualty bureau response has been undertaken and arrangements found to be effective. There are sufficient trained personnel to meet the national commitment, the majority of whom were involved in the

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exercise or have previous experience.

- All handlers in the dedicated source unit have been trained to level 3 (dangerous, vulnerable, and juvenile sources). Covert arrangements for the unit are established.
- Special constables with specialist skills are being recruited. Two such special constables have been sworn in to support covert investigation and financial investigation.
- (and SO21) A regional agreement between the four forces in the west midlands region to provide firearms support to meet operational need is in place which outlines the initiation procedures, authorisation levels required, standards of support and financial arrangements. Arrangements are reviewed on a six monthly basis.

Work in progress

- A service level agreement has been developed to identify the support that the MIU will provide districts in the event of a major crime, but is yet to be implemented. The unit is developing a broad skill base across a range of skills to enable them to minimise occasions when staff will be precepted from districts and enable them to be as self sufficient as they can be.
- Arrangements relating to all aspects of FLOs are currently under review, with the lead responsibility passing from roads policing to major crime. Current arrangements for the appointment, use, training, equipment, development and welfare audits are inadequate to meet the requirements of current and forthcoming guidance. The portfolio responsibility has been handed to an experienced crime FLO and significant change is planned, with a view to being largely compliant with new guidance by November 2008. The review has identified a number of areas of risk - in particular, training, deployment and welfare which should be prioritised with clear accountability and timescales for delivery.
- A kidnap exercise was run in partnership with the SOCA in January 2008, attended by over 60 Warwickshire officers and staff, from a broad range of specialisms together with control room inspectors and supervisors. An action plan has been prepared which identifies the current areas of risk.
- All DIs (including the DI in the PSD) have attended the national SIO development programme and Hydra exercise, and have either completed or are completing their professionalising the investigative process (PIP) portfolios. Two Senior SIOs (a detective superintendent and a DCI) have completed their portfolios and are on the national register, while all other senior SIOs are working towards PIP level 3 accreditation.
- A new CID shift pattern was introduced in January 2008 to provide extended hours cover and improve resilience at weekends. These arrangements should enhance golden hour specialist advice and response to major crimes.

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- An SOU will commence in March 2008. The DS on the unit has been identified and staff are currently being recruited to fill the five officer and four PSI posts. They will have responsibility for all investigations and victim care and will investigate undetected historic allegations. An action plan has been developed to address outstanding issues from the rape stocktake and HMIC thematic report *Without Consent*. Terminology of 'rape chaperones' will change to sexual offence liaison officers (SOLOs), supported by trained initial response officers, while members of the SOU will receive enhanced specialist training.
- The police and the Crown Prosecution Service jointly review performance. Work is in progress to identify blockages and performance inhibitors.
- Although the MIU has been set up, with additional posts which have been provided through the 150 Forward programme, a second investigative team was classed in the programme as 'urgent posts'. Developments to date have increased the capacity of the section by filling the critical posts of a DI and four investigators. However, the MIU has precepted staff from local policing for extended periods, as there is insufficient capacity to meet the current exceptional demand, and some homicide investigations have been investigated by area DIs. While recognising that the second half of 2007 placed unprecedented demands on the protective services directorate, the Police Authority has been asked to consider the expansion of the MIU to secure four investigative teams and thus minimise long-term abstractions from local policing to major investigations.

Area(s) for improvement

- The MIU does not have sufficient capacity to deal with all homicide investigations. Area DIs investigated three such cases in late 2007, because the specialist officers were committed to other investigations; they were category C cases and all were detected. They provided development opportunities for staff but proposed growth in the unit should reduce this requirement in the future.
- Inconsistent language is used throughout the force, which affects the response to reports of death. Some officers and staff use the terms 'suspicious', 'unexplained' and 'sudden' interchangeably. Standard terminology would reduce the potential for miscommunication and help to ensure the correct level of attendance and notification for all deaths. Despite recent circulations requiring a DI or above to attend all reports of unexplained deaths, and the standard operating procedure stating that an inspector be apprised and asked to attend where the circumstances appear to be natural causes or suicide, this does not routinely occur. It is common practice that relatively inexperienced officers attend the report of a death and are the only members of the service to attend scenes. Consideration should be given to strengthening the requirement for a supervisory officer to attend the scene of all deaths and the minimum attendance policy robustly monitored.
- There are no formal arrangements for calling out members of the MIU. Officers and staff indicate their availability to be called out if necessary at the start of each week, and these arrangements have provided sufficient response to incidents to date. Monitoring arrangements should be initiated to ensure compliance with the working time directive, and that staff welfare is not compromised in the desire to

support the reactive needs of the force.

- The accommodation arrangements for some units within the protective services directorate are not fit for purpose. A long-term strategy for the estate is in development, but in the short to medium term, current arrangements and the uncertainty over the future location of some units are having a detrimental impact on performance and morale.
- The MIU does not have a sufficient number of dedicated intelligence staff to support an active intelligence cell fully, with one intelligence officer per team and only one dedicated analyst. The new HAIG and intelligence structures should provide additional resilience, but there should be some monitoring of the impact on local policing of abstractions to support major crime. Should the Police Authority support the development of two additional teams in the MIU, each would have intelligence development officer posts.
- Detectives in the MIU do not have equal access to read or research HOLMES accounts for investigations on which they are deployed. While reluctance to train investigators fully is acknowledged, officers are experiencing delay and frustration when requiring printing or research, as they are reliant on trained staff to assist.
- It is recognised that Warwickshire officers have supported major crime investigations in other forces, while cross-border support has been provided to Warwickshire to assist with an unprecedented demand from major investigations in 2006 and 2007. Examples include support for the 2007 investigations of a category A murder and the death of four firefighters, and in 2006 to assist in the investigation of the rape of an 11-year-old girl in a supermarket toilet. Short-term advice and guidance have been provided from other forces and agencies, while longer-term assistance has supported the HOLMES and enquiry functions. Such arrangements have not been secured through formal protocols or formal cross-border agreements. Where cross-force support is provided and the absence is for longer than seven days, this is notified to the force establishment panel, chaired by the head of human resources. While there has been a reliance on informal arrangements, it would be beneficial to have a clear policy statement outlining who can commit resources to other forces and the review/ratification process for deployments outside of initial assistance, where it may become complex or long term.
- Three victim suites in the force area have dual use, as interview suites for vulnerable victims and for the examination of victims following allegations of sexual assault. The frequent use creates problems at points of overlapping demand, resulting in some victim examinations being conducted in doctors' surgeries, which are not forensically sound. The suites are owned and managed (including cleaning arrangements) by a partner agency. The suitability of these arrangements should be examined with the forensic science service, to ensure that exhibits and evidence are not compromised. Work is progressing locally with partners to develop a sexual assault referral centre in the longer term, which should address the issues identified.
- The training for rape chaperones covers two days, with a two-hour session covering crime scene management, cross-contamination, the golden hour, forensic strategy, core investigative doctrine, statement of first complaint, consent issues (Fraser guidelines), suite facilities and the rape evaluation form.

Each of these areas is critical to the effective investigation of sexual offences and the course content should be reviewed to ensure that it is fit for purpose, with consideration as to whether a session should be delivered by a senior investigator. With the introduction of the SOU, there will still be a need to use trained, first contact officers in the role of chaperone, and the proposal is to train between 20 and 30 in the 2008/09 period. Consideration should be given to the number required for the new arrangements, the roles from which they are drawn, and the gender of participants to ensure that those trained are available for deployment to meet demand. Training should also be provided to front-counter staff and response officers covering the golden hour principles and ensuring that early evidence is not lost, for example through the use of early evidence kits.

- Rape chaperones receive training for their role in the medical examination that follows an allegation of a serious sexual assault, but this does not include visits or familiarisation with the victim suites. Officers are left to attend the suites and familiarise themselves with the facilities, outside the course. There is no audit process to ensure that this is done and no structured mentoring arrangements exist to provide support or ongoing professional development to chaperones.
- The CMC is not able to update the wanted/missing marker on PNC at all times and relies on neighbouring forces to update this when necessary, as it has not been able to access sufficient course places to give resilience. The terminology used in force is 'body updating', which is inappropriate in the context of missing persons.
- There is only one tier 5 interview-trained member of staff in the MIU and the unit relies on precepting staff to fulfil this function. In total, five officers have received tier 5 training.

Summary - Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of additional investigative resources are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which have been used for major investigations during 2007. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The move to a directorate structure enables movement of resources across and between units and directorates. The daily tasking and co-ordination meeting allows resources to be prioritised to provide support to investigations and incidents and dynamic tasking is provided by the CATO.
- There is resilience in specific specialist covert skills.
- All level 2 operations assigned to the SOCT have a financial strategy and nominated financial investigator. The financial investigator has regular meetings with the SOCT and SIO.

Work in progress

- The use of financial investigation as a method of intelligence gathering, alongside or replacing traditional covert methods, is increasing but has yet to become embedded. Such an approach has been actively used in recent homicide investigations.
- Scenes of crime officers do not use digital photography equipment, resulting in delays in the provision of photographs while product is developed as well as significant developing and copying costs. Finance has been identified for the provision of digital equipment and it is anticipated that this will be used operationally in the first quarter of 2008/09. The switch should result in operational improvements and significant long-term efficiency savings could be realised.
- A review has been conducted into specialist assets in line with the force planning processes and additional resources identified. A submission has been made to the police authority to enhance resilience in the MIU by establishing an additional two teams, each comprising a DI, two DSs and 12 DCs/PSIs.

Area(s) for improvement

- Warwickshire Police uses the resources in the West Midlands Police confidential unit to provide covert capability in support of major crime, where appropriate. It is acknowledged that it would not be cost effective to train and maintain an in-house unit to the level of West Midlands, and collaboration in this regard is working effectively. It is intended that a DS and DC will be embedded into the West Midlands unit in early 2008/09.
- Good relationships with other forces have resulted in the ability to run covert

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operations over an extended period. Such arrangements have been made on a case-by-case basis; it may be appropriate to formalise them.

- There is limited capacity for the financial investigation unit to support the enhanced level 2 capability and provide expert advice in Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) legislation – for example, in money laundering cases. The workload and welfare of staff should be monitored to ensure that the demands placed on the team are realistic, especially when the POCA training is rolled out across the force, almost certainly generating additional demands on the team.
- There is little resilience in the telecoms single point of contact role. Senior managers should ensure that arrangements provide sufficient resilience to meet demand.
- Intelligence strategies for major crime investigations include the requirement for the intelligence cell to convert as much intelligence as possible into evidence, while protecting sensitive sources. Strategies do not specify the need to put intelligence into the IMS in real time, thus making it accessible to a wider audience.

Summary – The force has an on-demand case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- A major crime review guidance document outlines the process and conduct of reviews for current investigations, including commissioning and undertaking reviews. This includes 24-hour, 72-hour, seven-day and 28-day processes, ongoing review and case closure procedures. I
- A protocol for the conduct of cold case reviews was approved in June 2007.
- An independent review of a current major investigation has been commissioned and is being undertaken by a metropolitan force to ensure independence from the chain of command.

Work in progress

- A schedule of unsolved cases has been produced and six cases (including rape, unexplained death and a non-stop fatal road collision) are being re-examined against written terms of reference to determine if they warrant further investigation. Where the original case or investigating officer is still a member of the force, then they are preparing the report – in all other cases, this is being done by a member of the MIU.
- An approach which is compliant with the MIM and the core investigative doctrine has been proposed for the investigation of unsolved case reviews, and a guidance document has been prepared. If adopted, this will provide a systematic approach to such investigations.
- Cold case reviews are presented to a panel chaired by the detective superintendent major and district crime. The first such panel took place during February 2008, and will be held quarterly thereafter; this considers each case in a structured and consistent manner. It is recognised that there is currently insufficient capacity to deal with both reactive investigations and cold cases in the MIU, and should the police authority support MIU development, the investigation of cold cases will be improved.
- All rape files are reviewed by the DCI district crime prior to filing. However, this process would be enhanced if a proactive review regime, similar to that adopted for major crime, was introduced.

Area(s) for improvement

- The investigation of unsolved serious cases is the responsibility of the MIU. Cases that fit the criteria include homicide, rape and serious sexual assault,

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grievous bodily harm and wounding, robbery involving serious violence or loss and aggravated burglary. There is a written protocol for the conduct of such investigations, with all investigations subject to approval by the detective superintendent major crime, and investigated by a SIO of DI rank or above. As there is no dedicated capability, the progress of such investigations is reliant on the capacity of the unit to meet demand for current investigations.

- There is no dedicated ownership or central storage facility housing exhibits and case papers for unsolved major crimes. This renders the force vulnerable and steps should be taken to account for papers and exhibits, to protect their integrity and ensure ongoing retention as a matter of priority.
- Consideration should be given to involving external independent reviewers for appropriate cases. To date, all reviews have been conducted internally and while there was confidence that the processes are robust and would stand scrutiny externally, this has not been tested.
- Rape cases are managed by either DSs or DIs on districts depending on the availability and specific circumstances of the allegation. This should be reviewed and minimum expectations clarified, including operational review and the use of policy books.
- The director of protective services has personally conducted the 48-hour review for a current major investigation. As an experienced detective, he has the skills and experience to do so. In such circumstances, his role as a reviewing officer must be explicit to remove the potential for conflict between his line management and governance role as chair of the gold group. Such reviews should only be conducted in exceptional circumstances.

Summary - The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and Major Incident Room Standardised Operating Procedures.

Strengths

- All major investigations are categorised in line with the major incident room standard administrative procedures (MIRSAP) manual and the reasons for the decision are detailed in policy logs. The major crime strategy states that all 'such investigations must be conducted efficiently, professionally, with integrity and in accordance with identified best practice, following such guidance as laid down in the MIM and the MIRSAP manual. Warwickshire Police will apply the principles within these documents and conduct all such investigations in accordance with them'.
- Linking is understood by key staff, and has been used for intelligence and research purposes in recent years.
- Policy files, including separate sensitive files where appropriate, are maintained for relevant categories of crimes. Decisions to pursue or not to pursue lines of enquiry are properly recorded, and the files are compliant with MIRSAP.
- In compliance with the MIM, the director of protective services regularly reviews the resources dedicated to major crime investigations. Cognisant of the demands of the role undertaken by an SIO dealing simultaneously with two major investigations, provision was made for the SIO to be temporarily relieved of his other responsibilities, and the director explained his reasoning in the policy book. This arrangement has been subject to regular review.
- National Centre for Policing Excellence/NPIA doctrine reports are managed through the corporate development department and inform policy and practice. The deputy director of protective services chairs an NPIA board.
- Historically, some MIRs operated with minimum staffing levels with individuals performing multiple roles, as SIOs did not want to impact adversely on other areas of the force. While SIOs recognise the importance of the flexible use of MIRSAP, they recognised that this approach was detrimental to their investigation. In light of this, they now seek sufficient staff to meet the requirements of the investigation.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ABC	Activity-based Costing
ABE	Achieving Best Evidence
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti-social Behaviour

B

BANES	Bath and North East Somerset
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic

C

CAIT	Child Abuse Investigation Team
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
COG	Chief Officer Group
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

D

DC	Detective Constable
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DCI	Detective Chief Inspector
DI	Detective Inspector
DS	Detective Sergeant
DDA	Disability Discrimination Act

DV Domestic Violence

E

ECM Every Child Matters

F

FIG Force Intelligence Group

FTE Full-time Equivalent

G

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

I

ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators Development Programme

ICT Information and Communications Technology

K

KPI Key Performance Indicator

L

LSCB Local Safeguarding Children Board

M

MAPPA Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements

MARAC Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

N

NBM	Neighbourhood Beat Manager
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency

P

PACT	Police and Communities Together
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PIM	Performance Improvement Meeting
PIP	Professionalising the Investigative Process
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PPU	Public Protection Unit

Q

QoSC	Quality of Service Commitment
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R

RSO	Registered Sex Offender
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S

SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment
SDVC	Specialist Domestic Violence Court
SGC	Specific Grading Criteria
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SMT	Senior Management Team
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPP	Special Priority Payment
SSN	Safer Stronger Neighbourhood

T

TTCG Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders' Register

