

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report

Surrey Police
Major Crime

July 2008



ISBN: 978-1-84726-740-5

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FIRST PUBLISHED 2008

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (i.e. the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical Description of Force Area

The county of Surrey is situated in the heart of the South East of England, and is the one of the most urbanised counties in England, with about 83% of Surrey residents living within the urban areas. It lies to the south of London and is bordered by the counties of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Kent, East and West Sussex, and importantly the Greater London Authority area. It also sits between two major international airports (Heathrow and Gatwick) and covers some of the busiest stretches of motorway in Europe. Terminal 5 at Heathrow was opened in March 2008 and is now contributing to increased motorway traffic.

The mixture of urban and rural areas provides widely differing contexts to policing services. Broadly, the north and west of the county have a high density of urban and commercial areas with the south and east being more rural.

Surrey is a high-performing area of the UK that generates a significant net contribution to the national exchequer, yet receives the lowest national funding for policing. In 2004, the county contributed £17 billion in gross value added, and this is expected to rise to over £20 billion by 2010. The industry of Surrey is mostly knowledge-based, and the vision of the county as a safe place to live and work is an important factor in retaining the presence of major multinational companies. There is also a hidden economic contribution from the 300,000 Surrey residents who commute to work, mostly in London.

Surrey's high value economy is reflected in the presence of large multi-nationals including:

Toshiba UK	McLaren Cars Ltd
Siemens	Eli Lilley
Sun Micro UK	Ericsson
Nokia Telecom	Sony UK Ltd
Philips Research	Fluor Daniel
Aim Aviation	Procter & Gamble
BBC R&D	Allianz Insurance
Telewest	Logica
Electronic Arts	Syntegra

Woking and Guildford are also the main hubs of the rail network and services to and from London are heavily used by commuters. The county is extremely dependent on the road network, with traffic flow densities twice the national average. It is estimated that Surrey's economy loses £500m each year through traffic delays.

Of the 445,339 houses in the county, 34% are detached, significantly higher than the national average. This contributes to the high cost of housing in Surrey, where the average price of a house is now over £312K.

Demographic Description of Force Area

Policing services are provided to a population of 1,075,500 (SCC estimated population of Surrey at 30 June 2005).

Since 2001 there has been significant housing expansion in the north and west of the County. The total area is 645 square miles, with 445,339 dwellings. The latest figures (2001 Census) indicate a population density of 1,642 people/square mile, almost twice the national average.

The county has 61.3 miles of motorway (M25, M3, M23), which is high for its size and density. The strategic roads network includes other major roads: the A3, A31 and A331. With approximately equal numbers of commuters travelling into and out of the county, (300,000 each way) and 300,000 internal journeys, about 900,000 commuter journeys take place twice a day.

Unemployment is very low at 0.9%. The percentage of the workforce engaged in entrepreneurial activity or employed in a professional or management roles is higher than the national average and the percentage of the population with degrees is also high.

Census 2001 indicates that 95% of residents describe themselves as white, compared with 97% in 1991. Inward international migration has had some effect on this and the proportion will continue to increase as the more diverse younger groups age. Less than 2% of those over the age of 60, 8% of those aged 16-24 and 7% of those under 16 are from ethnic minority communities.

Surrey has an ageing population, in line with the rest of the UK. Coupled with this is the significant decrease in the young adult population from 15.9% in 1991, to 9.8% in 2001 even though there are large communities of university students in the boroughs of Guildford and Runnymede.

There were an estimated 56,000 businesses in Surrey in 2002, and in that year the Surrey contribution to the national economy was valued at £16.5bn. Typically, the output of Surrey has grown at about 3.8% pa, compared to the average UK growth rate of 2.5% pa.

Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

There have been a number of changes to the management structure of the force since the last inspection. With the transfer of the Chief Constable to the Metropolitan Police Service, the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) was appointed Temporary Chief Constable on 1st March 2008. An Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) has been appointed Temporary DCC and a new ACC has joined the force on promotion.

Strategic Priorities

The overall strategic vision of the force, **Putting the Surrey Public First**, is to ensure local people are safe, feel safe, are satisfied with the quality of service they receive and have confidence in their local force.

The strategic priorities for delivering policing services in Surrey are:

- Confidence and satisfaction - building confidence in the police in your neighbourhood and increasing your satisfaction with the service we deliver
- Safety - keeping you and your community safe from harm
- People and resources - making the most of our resources and supporting our officers and staff.

Force Performance Overview

Governance of Surrey

Surrey has a two-tier structure. The significant county and local bodies responsible for the administration of Surrey are those with a budget for service delivery, and are as follows:

Surrey County Council
Surrey Primary Care Trust
11x District and Borough Councils
Surrey Local Police Authority
Surrey Learning and Skills Council
Surrey Connexions
80x Town and Parish Councils

In addition, Surrey is included in the portfolios of some non-elected regional bodies, such as:

SEERA (South East England Regional Assembly)
SEEDA (South East England Development Agency)
GOSE (Government of the South East)
SECSHA (South East Coast Strategic Health Authority).

Force development since 2007 inspections

Surrey remains one of the safest counties in England, with falling crime and good levels of public confidence in the policing services provided.

In 2007 Surrey Police was assessed as 'Excellent' in Neighbourhood Policing, Performance Management, Child Abuse, Domestic violence and Public Protection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Home Office.

Neighbourhood Policing continues to be at the heart of Surrey's approach to policing. Results for the fourth quarter of 2007/08 show a continued improvement throughout the year with a result of 40.1% of those surveyed being aware of their local neighbourhood officer or team, compared with 29.6% during 2006/07. With an end of year result of 35.7% compared to a target of 30%, the policing plan target has been achieved.

Recent British Crime Survey results indicate that with a confidence level of 57.9%, Surrey is recording higher levels of public confidence in local police than either the national average of 52% or their most similar family of forces average of 54.1%.

In early 2008 Surrey joined three other forces in looking at better ways of enabling officers and staff to use discretion to more appropriately resolve situations and reduce bureaucracy.

To achieve this aim a number of principles have been outlined in a programme entitled **Surrey Public First**, the overall aim of which is to contribute to improved customer service. Officers are being encouraged to use discretion, within the boundaries of public interest and justice. This has arisen from the compelling evidence that the pendulum of measurement and audit has swung too far, leading to unhealthy risk aversion and focus on process rather than outcome by investigating crimes that have the most serious impact on volume not communities.

Surrey Public First is about becoming a 'thinking' Force whose officers apply professional discretion in such borderline cases, and resolve issues effectively with a more customer focussed approach that simultaneously reduces bureaucracy.

This year Surrey Police learned that they faced the threat of capping from the government on their budget. As a result, the force has made some difficult decisions to address their financial situation. Having made £50million efficiency savings over the past nine years, they continue to look for more.

A robust budget-setting process has helped to identify where savings can be made while maintaining high standards of policing. Surrey has reduced the number of Basic Command Units (BCUs) – the operational areas into which the Force is divided - and rationalised the non-operational support. Savings will also be achieved via a review of support services within the force, which aims to improve working processes.

Surrey police continue to explore opportunities for collaborating with neighbouring forces in certain specialist areas. These include: TSU, advance search, witness protection, forensics, confidential units, high tech crime, air support and internet-based paedophilia.

In addition, Surrey police are at the forefront of workforce modernisation and business process reform, both of which offer the potential to release much needed resources.

Surrey Police is seeing increasing levels of criminality committed by people who do not live in Surrey. Almost half of all burglary, vehicle crime and robbery is committed by offenders travelling from neighbouring high-crime areas. The nature of the terrorist threat has also changed in recent years and the force is investing significantly in counter-terrorism resources to address this.

Research indicated the need for the force to modify policing methods to deal with the threat of increased cross-border criminality. To counteract this threat, Surrey Police aim to implement an initiative known as Operation Shield which has been developed to improve the ability to deal with the threat of intruding criminals and terrorism. Recent trend data demonstrates the increased threat of crime within Surrey being committed by cross-border offenders. In 2003/04, 39% of people identified forensically resided outside the force area, and this increased to 47% in 2007/08. Additionally:

- 59% of Organised Crime Groups operating within Surrey are based in London
- Over 30% of offenders/suspects for murder and manslaughter in Surrey come from outside the county
- 35% of all robberies in Surrey are committed by persons residing in London

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Surrey police capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening & gun crime per 1,000 population	0.242	0.207	-14.46%	0.300
No. of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
No. of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.065	0.139	+113.85%	0.100
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	66.67%	-33.33pp*	72.03%
No. of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.279	0.158	-43.37%	0.121
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	4.00%	52.94%	+48.94pp*	34.08%
No. of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.205	0.279	+36.10%	0.245
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	63.64%	46.67%	-16.79pp*	48.37%
No. of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.000	0.028	Not Applicable	0.026
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not Applicable	66.67%	Not Applicable	56.25%
No. of murders per 10,000 population	0.065	0.074	+13.85%	0.082

July 2008

% of murders detected/convicted	114.29%	50.00%	-64.29pp*	92.61%
No. of rapes per 10,000 population	1.339	1.302	-2.76%	2.128
% of rapes detected/convicted	27.78%	20.71%	-7.07pp*	20.69%

**pp" is Percentage Points.

***Most Similar Family (MSF) for Surrey is: Cambridgeshire; Dorset; Essex; Gloucestershire; Warwickshire; West Mercia and; Wiltshire.*

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime type of attempted murder poses a threat to Surrey. The rate of offences rose significantly in 2007 and is above the MSF average as well as being one of the higher rates in England and Wales. Blackmail and kidnapping pose a potential threat in that they are above the MSF average but are not high when considering England and Wales.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Surrey is comparable with the rest of the MSF group. Surrey is performing at a level above the MSF average in some areas (blackmail and manslaughter) but below the MSF average in other areas (attempted murder and murder).

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Surrey was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While OCG mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Surrey police has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types are thoroughly mapped. It is currently estimated that 44 OCGs impact the force area, across 5 major crime types

The Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has strong dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the Force. The Force has fully committed to its major crime investigations with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment, and funding.

Strengths

- The force has an establishment of 40 analysts. Of this number, a senior analyst and four analysts are dedicated to producing analytical products for major crime incidents, supported by a team of four researchers.
- The current analytical structure is effective, with analysts forming an integral part of each major enquiry, working within the major incident room (MIR) alongside the enquiry teams. Analysts attend all major crime briefings, and examples were provided of intelligence gaps being identified through analysis and 'tasked out' to progress the enquiry. The senior analyst is co-located with the senior investigating officers (SIOs), enabling a close working relationship.
- Intelligence and information from force sources is used to inform the preparation of analytical products, including association charts, telephone analysis and timelines. The range of products produced is comprehensive, directed by the SIO and tailored to the requirements of the individual investigation. Data sharing will be enhanced further by the increased use of the ibase IT solution (see work in progress).
- The current structure meets the needs of major crime investigation. An example is Operation Palm, a murder investigation where mapping and association charts prepared by major crime analysts provided crucial evidence in court.
- The senior analyst on the major crime team undertakes quality assurance of analytical products by undertaking a dip sample of completed products.
- There is a weekly meeting attended by major crime researchers and analysts, a section of which discusses analytical good practice. For example, the timelines used in Operation Palm received positive comment during the trial and were cited as good practice. This example was stored in an electronic folder on the force intranet accessible by all analytical staff.

Work in progress

- The ibase project is being extended to ensure integration of major crime information from the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) into the data warehouse and force systems. At present information/intelligence has to be manually extracted from HOLMES and submitted separately in the form of intelligence reports. This extension of ibase should be completed by December 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about Level 2 and Level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be leading effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.

Strengths

- Surrey Police makes extensive use of specialists within the MIR. For example, on Operation Palm there were distinct attack and body deposition sites and the force called upon entomologists to attend the scene along with the Home Office pathologist. A good level of awareness of National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) specialist advice was found.
- Specialist covert assets are available for use within the MIR at the discretion of the SIO. Policy files were dip-sampled by the inspection and evidence was found of this being an early investigative consideration and policy file entry.
- Protocols exist between Surrey Police and key partner agencies. An example is Operation Pin, an investigation into a death within a healthcare setting, in which protocols with the healthcare trust and the relevant social services department facilitated easy access to records and documents to assist the investigation. (See also areas for improvement.)
- The force enjoys good working relationships with the five independent advisory groups (IAGs), (one central and one on each basic command unit (BCU)). The IAGs have good interaction with the crime management department (CMD) through various fora and receive effective support from the force diversity directorate. In addition to their advisory role, members of the IAGs have attended crime briefing days and the force crime forum, to observe and to deliver specialist advisory input. The structure of the IAGs is undergoing review.
- Community impact assessments (CIAs) are the responsibility of the BCU, with ongoing liaison with the SIO. Assessments are stored electronically and are accessible to local officers. Each CIA is monitored throughout the life of a major incident and reviewed by the SIO with the BCU representative at significant points, such as prior to arrest or at point of charge. A dip-sample was conducted which evidenced early consultation with the relevant IAG.
- Surrey Police has a good understanding of the drivers of homicide, having commissioned research into both domestic and non-domestic homicide. The research involved detailed academic analysis and has generated a strategic action plan and preventative strategies, with specific plan owners. Progress on objectives is monitored through the crime management meeting.
- During the inspection, a dip-sample was undertaken of multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) and multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) minutes, which provided clear evidence of the force commitment to this critical partnership work.
- Surrey Police has commissioned academic research into homicide suppression, with separate pieces of research for domestic and non-domestic incidents. The research has profiled all homicides and near-miss incidents and has generated a comprehensive prevention strategy, a section of which is dedicated to recommendations for engaging with hard-to-reach groups.

Work in progress

- While specific examples were given of work achieved with partners under existing protocols in general, a better exchange of partnership intelligence and information to achieve force priorities has been identified within the force control strategy as an area for improvement. Although progress is being made upon this issue, this is not being formally monitored.

Area(s) for improvement

- The amount of information and intelligence received from partners is not specifically measured.

Summary – The Force Strategic Assessment (FSA) has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime comprehensively. Consequently, the Force Control Strategy is found to be equally thorough. Problem profiles for major crime issues are satisfactory with links to force and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The deputy chief constable (DCC) oversees the annual review of the FSA within the strategic tasking and co-ordination forum. The FSA is informed by strategic assessments (SAs) from level 2, special branch, roads policing, tactical firearms, BCUs, public protection and the professional standards department (PSD). Control strategies are produced from the FSA, reflecting organisational priorities and divided into intelligence, prevention, enforcement and communication sections.
- The level 2 SAs provide a comprehensive overview of the threat and risk to the force from level 2 issues such as Class A drugs, organised illegal immigration, firearms and serious violence. In addition, the FSA reflects the threat from money laundering and links to other crime types. The FSA highlights emerging trends: for example, honour-based violence has been highlighted as an issue, with a recommendation that it become part of the force intelligence requirement and that confidence in reporting should be increased.
- Each major incident has a unique strategic intelligence requirement, disseminated to BCUs, which outlines intelligence requirements to progress the investigation. For example, during Operation Fleet, an enquiry into a series of sexual assaults, a specific intelligence requirement was formulated, together with terms of reference for the dedicated intelligence cell, so enabling the enquiry to be progressed.
- Risk analysis is undertaken on specific issues to assist risk management planning. For example, a problem profile of individuals with mental health issues and potentially dangerous offenders was produced, with analysis of risk behaviour and recommendations made (see also areas for improvement).
- A range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products is produced. For example, for the regional issue of large-scale cannabis cultivation, linked to organised crime, comprehensive problem profiles, market profiles, association charts and analysis of forensic intelligence were produced, bringing together evidence and intelligence from across the region.

- The force has robust processes in place to manage individuals within the MAPPA process.
- The force collates and reviews firearms intelligence on a weekly basis through a weekly intelligence log. Intelligence is gathered and tasked by the force intelligence bureau (FIB) and the weekly return is signed off by the DCC. Intelligence is used to identify trends.
- Neighbourhood profiles are maintained as 'living documents' and are updated by safer neighbourhood team staff with relevant information and intelligence. Intelligence from neighbourhood profiles is transferred onto intelligence report forms, which are entered into the intelligence system. Safer neighbourhood team staff receive initial training in the submission of intelligence, delivered on a rolling basis by the detective inspector (DI) on the intelligence management team.

Work in progress

- The FSA process is under review, to ensure that it is a key driver of force business.
- Surrey Police is developing a tactical tasking and co-ordinating group (TTCG) 'scorecard' document to assess performance against the control strategy. This will be a simple yet effective means of mapping progress, enabling easy identification of areas of underperformance.

Area(s) for improvement

- While specific research has been undertaken to identify a number of individuals potentially posing a risk to the public and themselves, and recommendations have been made, this procedure is not embedded as working practice. This constitutes an area of risk, as potentially dangerous offenders outside the MAPPA process are not routinely identified and risk-managed.
- Major crime analysts have access to information across the force via the data warehouse. However, intelligence analysed to map organised crime groups (OCGs) and criminality comes primarily from the dedicated source-handling unit, due to technical difficulties with the existing criminal intelligence system. Long-term information technology (IT) solutions are being scoped to resolve this issue via Project Enterprise.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for 'hot briefing' when there is a significant change in either the major crime threat or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as PCT exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MOPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The Osman policy is in place and available via the force intranet
- An example of evidence of threats being shared in a timely manner to disrupt or prevent a threat to kill is provided by Operation Legend, an investigation into a

planned contract killing. The force threat to life (Osman) policy was applied and the relevant warning served. The planned offence was successfully disrupted.

- Intelligence about potential major crime issues is shared where appropriate – for example Operation Harwood, the response to the planned protests at Heathrow Airport, involved a five-force collaboration around intelligence and proactive operational resources, as well as a robust and effective crime and prisoner handling arrangements. Many partners were engaged, including business forums, Surrey Highways and Surrey County Council.
- The injuries database was utilised in Operation Harebell, an investigation into the death of an infant during which potentially unusual injuries were identified. The case was referred to a forensic odontologist who was able to confirm that the injuries were non-accidental.
- The force submits serious crime analysis system (SCAS) and National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) returns, co-ordinated centrally within the FIB. Interviews with major crime staff demonstrated a clear understanding of specialist knowledge assets available through the NPIA. As an example, a referral was made to SCAS following a recent series of sexual assaults and the particular modus operandi of the suspect. The force made 12 referrals to SCAS between 9 January and 31 December 2007.
- The force utilises its human resources management system as an additional skills database, identifying specific staff skills for use on enquiries. For example, an officer who spoke Polish was identified through the database and was able to facilitate communication between SIOs in the UK and Poland.
- A good level of awareness exists of the specialist facilities of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the NPIA and the National Centre for Policing Excellence, and examples were provided of the use of specialists accessed through these facilities. Examples were also provided of the use of specialist databases such as Catchem and Genesis.

Work in progress

- The MoPI action plan is monitored through the Bichard steering group, chaired by the head of information and communications technology (ICT), who is the strategic lead of the project. An experienced programme manager leads the MoPI Impact project, with a team of three staff and a seconded police inspector. The team meets formally on a monthly basis. The MoPI action plan is comprehensive, containing 259 actions at present, with significant work to be undertaken. The force is working towards achieving the 2010 deadline.

Area(s) for improvement

- Notwithstanding the positive comments above, the exchange of information with partners tends to concern single crimes rather than the overarching impact of the crime types upon the various organisations.

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is incomplete, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity not fully understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are not identified sufficiently early.

Strengths

- Surrey Police uses Mosaic and Origins (mapping tools) for understanding the demographic profile of the force area. These provide data to household level, including countries of origin of residents, which in part informs the force about specific community groups.
- Comprehensive neighbourhood profiles are completed for each neighbourhood
- The homicide prevention analysis work completed provides in-depth profiling, together with recommendations. A section of the prevention strategy is dedicated to recommendations for engaging with hard-to-reach groups. There are a number of dedicated recommendations allocated to specific business area owners. (See also areas for improvement.)
- The force has a robust approach to MAPPA, and in the last year 543 MAPPA cases were referred into the multi agency process, with information and intelligence exchanged between partners.
- The force has developed an initiative of attaching a special branch officer to each of the three BCU intelligence units for six months in the role of counter-terrorism liaison officer. The officer is specifically tasked to enhance and develop the understanding of community intelligence through the Rich Picture programme. An increase in community intelligence and an increase in referrals for potential covert human intelligence sources (CHISs) has been an early benefit of this initiative.

Work in progress

- Communities are profiled within the BCU SAs, and mapped alongside key individual networks and other sources of community engagement to identify risks and threats. The force has led the use of Mosaic in this defined way, and a senior analyst who was leading this work presented the methodology at the NPIA Neighbourhood Policing workshop in September 2007.
- The force is undertaking a piece of work with Surrey County Council and other partners to scope migration into the county and the effects on service delivery. This exercise builds on previous research by the force reassurance group researching demographic information of vulnerable communities. This is a developing area of research that will inform the FSA

Area(s) for improvement

- While work is being undertaken using Mosaic, Origins and neighbourhood profiles, the force has not completed any specific work to map and identify vulnerable communities linked to the threat posed by major crime.
- The prevention strategy actions on hard-to-reach groups are allocated to various business owners within the organisation; however, they do not appear to be centrally collated and monitored.

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to map the threat from major crime to vulnerable and emerging communities.

Summary – Regarding elements of Intelligence, the Force Strategic Risk Register is reviewed every month by the DCC who oversees the Force Risk Committee. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan; these are robustly monitored and controlled.

Strengths

- The DCC chairs the quarterly risk management advisory board (RMAB), which monitors and reviews the risk register.
- Surrey Police takes a robust approach to risk management. A risk management handbook has been published. Roles and responsibilities are clearly identified, together with terms of reference for all risk-related meetings. In addition, there are a number of internal risk consultants, trained and able to advise on risk issues.
- The FSA contains specific details of organisational threat and risk. The projection of risk ensures that threats to the organisation are considered in strategic planning.
- The force risk register is stored electronically and managed by a member of staff within the corporate development department. The register is electronically updated following each RMAB meeting.
- The head of crime is responsible for managing major crime risks. A portfolio co-ordination meeting is held every month to identify action and review departmental risks, involving senior managers from within each department. In addition, identified risks are reviewed at the weekly crime management meeting and fed into the RMAB.
- The PA's responsibilities in respect of managing risk are clearly documented within the risk management handbook. On a practical basis, PA members are closely involved in the force management processes and are represented at the RMAB. In addition, key risk issues are reviewed at each Surrey Police evaluation of computerised statistics (SPECS) meeting.
- The two key risks to major crime policing are staff vacancies within crime management and the impact of significant demand upon the unit. Both issues are monitored through the weekly crime management meeting. Measures are in place to ensure additional resilience in the event of extraneous demand, with trained detective staff available to provide support from within the CMD.
- To manage the loss of experienced staff through transfer to other forces, Surrey Police has introduced a retention package to offset the cost of housing and transport within Surrey. The number of officers transferring out of the force almost halved between 2006/07 and 2007/08.

Work in progress

- The force has undertaken significant research work on cross-border offending, which presents a significant risk to the force as 48% of offences within Surrey are committed by out-of-county offenders. Operation Shield is a cross-border project, proposing additional protective services at level 1. Projected benefits include an improved response to cross-border criminality, an increase in detections through better intelligence development and forensic conversion and additional asset confiscation potential. The estimated cost of the project is £7.8 million over three years, and it will employ an additional 85 staff. The funding for year 1 of the project has been agreed and recruiting is taking place.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The Force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable from ibase. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- The force uses ibase to enable easy exchange of crime, incident and intelligence data (see work in progress).
- The homicide prevention work was informed by force and partner data.
- A team of five response intelligence officers (RIOs) works within the force incident-handling centre (IHC), providing 24/7 access to all intelligence systems, including ViSOR, and enabling relevant intelligence to be used to support live operations.
- The confidential unit ensures that all sensitive data from covert methods is appropriately sanitised and disseminated by the experienced staff within the unit. This provides a clear 'sterile corridor' and adequate protection levels for sources of sensitive intelligence.
- The major incident team has a dedicated intelligence team, consisting of a detective sergeant (DS) and five staff, tasked to support the development of intelligence for major enquiries.
- The force has effective working relationships with neighbouring forces, and intelligence is exchanged through the FIB and through single points of contact (SPOCs) within other forces, in addition to limited access to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 'crimint' system (see areas for improvement).
- After an initially slow start, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) is developing within the force, and Back Office Facility 2 (BOF2) has recently been purchased. There are a number of fixed sites and a mobile capability, together with a dedicated team of staff. (See also work in progress).
- A DS is posted to SOCA, which ensures a good relationship between the two organisations and enables a smooth transition of data.

- The force has a robust approach to MAPPA and in the last year 543 MAPPA cases were referred into the multi agency process, with information and intelligence exchanged between partners.
- The force has a robust authorisation process for data protection act (DPA) enquiries and examples of compliance were provided. While the force has an information access team, departmental managers are responsible for monitoring compliance with DPA.
- The Bichard steering group manages progress on recommendations from the Bichard enquiry and progress towards full MoPI compliance. The MoPI project plan details all recommendations, with specific timescales. The force has taken part in two peer reviews, carried out by the NPIA.
- Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) exist with key partners and are stored electronically on the force intranet for ease of access.

Work in progress

- The force has invested significantly in ibase, which is described as 'revolutionary' to the work of the analysts as it facilitates easy access to information across the majority of force intelligence systems. However, HOLMES has yet to be integrated into the data warehouse and ibase – this will take place during phase 2 of the project.
- Ibase is only accessible to analysts at present. The force is currently negotiating with i2 to develop a web-based IT solution, enabling ibase data to be managed via the data warehouse. In the interim, all researchers and intelligence officers have been trained in the use of the data warehouse, to enable them to access the same datasets as analysts within the force. There are plans to enable neighbourhood officers to access the data warehouse. The expected completion date for this work is December 2008.
- While the ANPR strategy has recently been written, the force has not yet fully exploited ANPR. The strategy was not written until BOF2 had been fully installed, which has meant a significant delay in implementing ANPR as a tactic.

Area(s) for improvement

- Surrey Police has only one MPS computer terminal, giving restricted access to 'crimint'. While Operation Shield aims to embed officers into neighbouring forces to improve the exchange of intelligence, a risk to the force exists in the meantime.
- While specific examples of good practice were seen, there is a need to progress effective collection and sharing of intelligence and information with partners.
- There is no means of measuring the volume and quality of intelligence collected from partners, and any such intelligence is not at present automatically integrated into ibase.

Summary – The Force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is highly effective. (*This refers to organisational learning*)

Strengths

- The force major crime review team is headed by a former detective chief inspector (DCI) who is a qualified SIO, and staffed by two investigators and an administrator. The review team conduct all 7 and 28 day reviews for major crime. In addition, its terms of reference include review of all undetected rape offences at 56 days. All collapsed trials and some critical incidents are also subject to review. The formal review of a critical incident is commissioned by the assistant chief constable, specialist operations (ACC SO).
- The force review policy is revised annually, with the last revision taking place in December 2007.
- Each review has defined terms of reference and progress against the objectives is monitored through mechanisms such as the head of crime's weekly meeting.
- A review panel, headed by the ACC (SO) oversees all 28-day reviews of major crime.
- The force demonstrated to the inspection that it is a learning environment. For example, an internal enquiry was commissioned by the ACC (SO) to review policy compliance during rape investigation. Recommendations were made at the conclusion of the enquiry and progress is monitored through the best practice forum, chaired by the head of crime.
- Data is submitted in accordance with NCRS requirements. The force has recently undertaken a review of compliance of data submission in cases of rape.
- Learning from outside the force is captured within the six-weekly crime forum meetings, which have wide representation from departments within the force including the FIB, public protection, crime operations and performance development, along with BCUs. Examples provided include lessons learnt from judicial reviews and coroner's court cases. Learning points from reviews, such as one on minimising unnecessary activity at crime scenes, are promulgated through the force.
- Surrey Police has appointed an organisational learning co-ordinator (see work in progress).

Work in progress

- In April 2007, Surrey Police appointed an organisational learning co-ordinator, tasked to ensure that the force continues to develop as a learning organisation. The role has been designed to deliver an innovative approach to organisational learning and to achieve real change and improvement by capturing all learning both from individuals and from debriefs and other learning fora. Learning points are integrated into training and developed by the use of methods such as the use of case studies. There is a three-year development plan in place to manage the change. The co-ordinator is working on a pilot project with the PSD, with the intention of using this as a best practice model for the force. The organisational learning co-ordinator reports directly to the DCC, who is the champion for this developing area of work.

Area(s) for improvement

- While there are mechanisms in place to monitor the outcomes and progress of major crime reviews, there is no formal quality assurance process of the work undertaken by the review team.

Summary – The Force Tasking and Co-ordination process functions cohesively to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The DCC oversees the annual review of the FSA within the strategic tasking and co-ordination forum. The FSA is informed by SAs from level 2, special branch, roads policing, tactical firearms, BCUs, public protection and professional standards. Control strategies are produced from the strategic assessments, reflecting organisational priorities and divided into intelligence, prevention, enforcement and communication sections.
- The level 2 SA provides a comprehensive overview of the threat and risk to the force from level 2 issues such as Class A drugs, organised illegal immigration, firearms and serious violence. In addition, the FSA reflects the threat from money laundering and links to other crime types. The level 2 SA is reviewed on a yearly basis and provides detailed analysis of each crime type, with recommendations governing future activity.
- In addition, the major crime team has recently merged from two small teams into one large operational team, based at force headquarters (HQ). Prior to the integration of the two teams, research was conducted, including demand analysis, and a business case proposed to support the move.
- Each BCU holds a crime series meeting, identifying trends and emerging issues and feeding into the BCU (level 1) tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG). An executive summary of each TTCG is prepared, which, along with a bid for resources, feeds into the fortnightly force tasking and co-ordination group (FTCG).
- The head of crime chairs the level 2 TCG, which mirrors the level 1 process and feeds into the FTCTG. Summarised details of major crime and serious and organised crime operations are provided to the FTCTG chair, ensuring a fully informed decision-making process within the FTCTG.
- The force tactical assessment document (TAD) is prepared by the FIB and provides an update on each operation/priority, including specialist activity, and a review of original operational objectives, outstanding actions and results and progress on outstanding issues.
- All level 2 operations are matrix-scored within the TAD following the level 2 meeting, enabling informed decision making.
- The rationale for non-deployment is usually documented within the TAD (see areas for improvement).

Work in progress

- The FSA has received positive endorsement from the NPIA, but the force is reviewing the document to ensure that it is driving force business.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has realigned the tasking and co-ordination process in accordance with recommendations from the NPIA NIM team. During inspection, some confusion was noted regarding the names of the various groups within the tasking and co-ordination process, such as the FTCG (also referred to as the force resource meeting or FRM), the level 1 TCG and the level 2 TCG. Consideration should be given to renaming the meetings within the process.
- The audit trail for operations which are not resourced, together with a documented rationale, is not captured consistently within the TAD.

Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is acute.

Strengths

- Crime management department officers undertake the force diversity training package, and in addition there are training days in December and February each year which external speakers are invited to attend so as to provide professional input. For example, in September 2007 the department hosted a cultural awareness day. All crime management staff are mandated to attend the training.
- The CMD facilitates quarterly training seminars themed around current and emerging issues – for example in September 2007 the seminar included an input on honour-based killings and an awareness session on CIA.
- The IAGs are involved with training and IAG members recently arranged for a group of student officers to travel to a Sikh Gurdwara in London in order to raise awareness and develop understanding of community issues.
- During the inspection, good examples were noted of the use of external measures to enhance understanding of cultural issues during major enquiries. For example, consultation took place with the New Zealand Embassy during Operation Geranium to enhance staff awareness of the Maori community.
- The crime management training and learning department ensures that all CMD staff receive relevant learning and development. The department has a comprehensive business plan which consolidates all learning methods and includes performance indicators for training and learning. Progress against the plan is performance-managed by the head of crime.
- Surrey Police has fully embraced workforce modernisation. The CMD is staffed by 205 police officers and 238 police staff, with approximately 45% of the total establishment being female. As of March 2007, the percentage of officers from ethnic minority backgrounds was 3.2%, showing good progress towards the 2010 target of 4%.

- Additional diversity training is undertaken according to need, and examples were given of early contact being made with an IAG and specialist input being provided by an IAG member to assist in communication with a specific section of the community.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Prevention

Summary – The Force has an Independent Advisory Group and this is always used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- Surrey Police has five well-established IAGs, the longest-running group having been in place for almost seven years. At present, the IAG structure comprises a central IAG and four BCU IAGs, each with a chair and vice-chair. In line with the move from a four- to three-BCU model, the IAGs are also undergoing restructure, and as of 1 April 2008, there will be three IAGs, one on each BCU and no central IAG.
- The IAGs are consulted appropriately on force issues and are always part of the gold group for major enquiries. An example was provided of a policy file entry showing contact being made with an IAG within an hour of the initial report of an incident, as a result of the identified community issues.
- The IAGs are actively involved in assisting with training within the force. An example was given of a training session on transgender awareness issues, at which a number of key learning points were identified and fed into the crime forum.
- Members of the IAGs are fully committed to the role and three members have recently attended critical incident training with police colleagues at Bramshill.
- A dip sample of gold group meeting minutes was checked by the inspection and appropriate IAG attendance and advice given was noted. In addition, policy files were seen to be updated with advice given and decisions made as a result, and issues raised were considered within the CIA.

Work in progress

- Under the restructure, the central IAG will cease to exist and the majority of its members will join the BCU IAGs. In addition, there will be a partnership meeting, attended by the chair and vice-chair of each IAG who will discuss current partnership issues with representatives of the PA.
- The current IAG terms of reference are under review in light of the proposed IAG restructure.

- The force is developing a 'critical friend' role for the IAGs, to enable communication between the IAGs and community members who do not wish to attend the meetings.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force should consider developing an IAG that is representative of young people.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were fully understood and tested call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- IHC staff have access to drop-down menus to inform action appropriate to the nature of the call. Potential critical/major incidents are electronically routed to the senior duty officer within the IHC for supervisory advice.
- A cadre of critical incident managers at chief inspector rank supervise management of critical incidents. A critical incident training package is provided to all officers and refresher training is undertaken. An example was given of the detective superintendent (crime operations reactive) giving an input on golden hour principles to a recent refresher training course.
- An on-call rota exists for force SIO duties. There are six DCI SIO officers covering major crime issues, all of whom are accredited or working towards professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 accreditation. An on-call detective superintendent provides supervisory resilience. In addition, an on-call SIO covers BCU issues. The BCU SIOs provide resilience in screening calls prior to incidents being referred to the force SIO. In addition, information is easily accessible to identify duty officers for Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and other specialist roles.
- Resilience is provided by the nightshift DS and two detective constables (DCs), who provide the initial overnight response to a critical/major crime incident. In the event of further resilience being required prior to the early shift major crime investigation team (MCIT) commencing duty, a DS from the MCIT is tasked to call out a team of officers. (See also areas for improvement.)
- The team of five RIOs within the IHC provides initial live intelligence support to potential critical incidents.
- The MCIT has a dedicated intelligence team staffed by a DS and five officers, providing an intelligence development capability for all major enquiries.
- The Surrey incident response strategy provides a framework for response to major incidents, including opening a specialist incident-handling centre, a facility which has been used at times of national emergency, for example providing support after the July 2005 London bombings.
- The setting up of an MIR is endorsed by the on-call detective superintendent. It is normally created at force HQ, although there is an additional facility available at Horsham, Sussex (in agreement with Sussex Police).

- Contingency planning arrangements are in place (see developing practice – appendix 2).

Work in progress

None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is no formalised on-call process for MCIT staff of constable/investigator rank; instead there is an expectation that staff will be available to support a major incident, under a general agreement within the MCIT.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately.

Strengths

- The level 2 SA provides comprehensive information about the threat to the force from this level of criminality, and makes recommendations about priorities for the force. It informs the control strategy and strategic intelligence requirement in prevention, intelligence, enforcement and communication opportunities.
- The threat from gun crime and firearms offences is assessed within the level 2 SA. The FIB produces a weekly briefing of firearms intelligence which analyses all intelligence received and action taken. This analysis is used to inform the SA.
- The strategic gun crime group, chaired by the detective superintendent (crime operations (proactive) meets on a quarterly basis and works to agreed terms of reference to maintain the current low level of gun crime, seek opportunities to prevent gun crime and intervene in identified risks. The group has an audit and review role and monitors issues such as gun crime and incident data and firearms licensing on a bi-monthly basis.
- The homicide prevention analysis also assessed 'near miss offences' and recommendations are included within the prevention strategies.
- Prevention strategies have been generated from the research into homicide prevention. There are two strategies, domestic and non-domestic, with 65 and 89 recommendations respectively. The recommendations have been delegated to specific business areas within the force. (See also areas for improvement.)
- Surrey Police uses a 16-point risk indicator plan to assess risk in domestic abuse cases. This informs a wider risk management plan tailored to individual need. MARAC meetings were introduced in January 2007, providing a multi-agency response to risk.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- While 'near-miss' offences were monitored during the homicide analysis research, such incidents are not subject to ongoing analysis to inform preventative measures.

Summary – The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are patchy.

Strengths

- The force threat-to-life policy is accessible via the force intranet. An example of the use of the policy is given by Operation Establish, an investigation into a threat to life. An investigation was undertaken which resulted in a high-profile conviction for soliciting murder.
- The inspection found that staff are aware of the existence of the policy and that it is available on the intranet. (See also areas for improvement.)
- Joint initiatives are taken against gun crime. For example, the force recently worked with Wiltshire Police on a regional firearms surveillance operation where one of the subjects was operating in Surrey. As the intelligence developed, the MPS also became involved, and a joint disruption took place using surveillance with armed capability.

Work in progress

- The inspection revealed a number of weaknesses within this area, namely a lack of risk assessment, official oversight, audit and review. The force has responded by instigating a review of policy and processes to ensure that each case has an appropriate formal risk assessment, the right level of formal oversight and a clear audit trail.
- The review of the threat-to-life process has identified the need for a defined process to manage threats which do not fit the Osman criteria, but which pose a risk to individuals. This work is being progressed as a matter of urgency.
- The force threat-to-life policy is under review to take account of changes to case law such as R v Van Colle.
- A set of draft guidelines, providing information on storage and accessibility of threat-to-life warnings, has been issued to staff pending the review of the policy.

Area(s) for improvement

- Training has not been delivered to staff to ensure a thorough understanding of the response to a threat-to-life scenario.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should undertake a training needs analysis of the knowledge and awareness of the threats to life procedures, in order improve understanding of all staff in this area of risk.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by dedicated staff only. The force is partially collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- Witness protection is managed from within the special branch department. The ACC (SO) is responsible for authorising entries to the scheme. A DS and two DCs have undertaken the national training course and manage cases on a day-to-day basis. The line management structure is through the DI and DCI within special branch. (See also areas for improvement.)
- The inspection found staff aware of the existence of the witness protection capability, although no specific training had taken place. In order to raise the departmental profile, an awareness initiative recently took place, with information placed in the force newspaper and on the special branch website. A targeted message was sent to critical incident managers.
- At the time of inspection, there were no live cases and seven referrals had been made to the unit since April 2007, none of which met the scheme criteria. These cases were referred back to the originating BCU for management (see areas for improvement).
- The force policy provides guidance on the definition of and requirements of the witness protection scheme, together with information such as criteria for adoption onto the scheme. The policy is accessible via the intranet. (See also areas for improvement.)
- Examples were given of joint working with other agencies.

Work in progress

- A draft collaboration protocol and memorandum of understanding has been drawn up between Surrey, Hampshire, Thames Valley and Sussex Police. The document suggests a set of minimum standards to be achieved by each force, which are being progressed by forces. Due to the low numbers of cases within Surrey, some of the minimum requirements could not be easily achieved. This issue is being progressed.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is a lack of understanding between supervisors of roles and responsibilities for managing the force witness protection scheme.
- In-force training for staff at management level has not taken place.
- There is no formal training for BCU staff responsible for managing cases which are not accepted onto the force witness protection scheme.
- The force witness protection policy was last reviewed in August 2006.

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force consider the delivery of training on witness protection to staff at management level.

Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The SPECS process has a suite of indicators measuring crime types against public confidence.
- The force has comprehensive neighbourhood profiles, which are 'living documents'. The profiles are updated by safer neighbourhood team staff with relevant information and intelligence. Intelligence from neighbourhood profiles is transferred onto intelligence report forms, which are entered into the intelligence system. Safer neighbourhood teams receive initial training in the submission of intelligence, delivered on a rolling basis by the detective inspector on the intelligence management team.
- The force makes extensive use of survey data to map and measure public confidence.
- In addition to monitoring of public confidence, a harm reduction index has been developed and is monitored on a monthly basis through the crime management business plan scorecard. Indicators have been developed to assess the impact of level 2 crime, measuring fear of personal violence and numbers of offences of violence involving weapons and drugs, and mapping these against public satisfaction and fear of crime. Trends are monitored in order that intervention can be considered. The scorecard is also monitored through the SPECS process.
- All analysts have access to Mosaic data and the Origins database. Socio-economic data is used within SAs.

Work in progress

- The force is developing its use of neighbourhood mapping tools. At present, data is collated and has to be manually submitted into force IT systems. The development of the neighbourhood mapping tools will incorporate crime and incident data, and the force is scoping the inclusion of partnership data in the process.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force sometimes considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The DCC is the force portfolio holder for professional standards. The PSD is managed by a detective superintendent and staffed by a DCI, three DIs, four DSs and a team of ten investigators, police staff and officers. Staff work within four groups; intelligence, anti-corruption, prevention and learning.

- The force has security policies for management of information and operational security. Compliance is tested during quality assurance checks by the anti-corruption team. Checks are monthly, risk-based and linked to the PSD SA. Recent checks have looked at use of email and buildings access, with results reported to the relevant force lead and the organisational learning co-ordinator, and featuring in the FSA documents. (See also work in progress.)
- The monitoring of intelligence systems occurs where there is an identified issue/cause for concern. For example, a potential corruption issue was identified where intelligence was being shared outside the organisation. An investigation was undertaken and a member of staff was dismissed from the force. The force uses a standard confidentiality agreement applied to operations where there is an identified risk, or wherever else it is deemed necessary. (See also areas for improvement.)
- The DCI (PSD) fulfils the operational security manager role, attending the weekly crime management meeting where all major crime and serious and organised crime operations are discussed.
- Anti-corruption awareness is addressed by tackling 'front-end issues' such as use of email, and in addition a quality assurance process is built into the checking of responses to police incidents (this is a covert process, so detail is scant, but it includes the generating of incidents for BCU staff to deal with and checking of the quality of the response). All probationary officers, sergeants, inspectors and police community support officers receive at least one input on anti-corruption issues during initial training courses. (See also areas for improvement.)

Work in progress

- A security policy review in December 2007 highlighted gaps in the force community security policy. A prioritised action plan has been developed to close these gaps; progress against the plan is performance-managed through the force information strategy board (chaired by the ICT director).
- The force is developing a process whereby an anonymous email can be sent to the PSD from anywhere within the force, to initiate covert contact and provide an additional means for staff to report potential PSD issues.
- The force has been working to resolve the risk presented by a gap in management vetting levels, with 737 posts identified as appropriate for vetting and only 157 staff vetted as of January 2008. The issue has been logged on both the force and BCU risk registers, together with comprehensive progress reports and ongoing liaison between the force and the staff support mechanisms. A communications strategy has been developed to ensure that staff are appropriately briefed on the issue.

Area(s) for improvement

- The PSD is not currently linked to the data warehouse, which impacts upon its ability to share relevant information across the force.
- While monitoring of intelligence systems takes place where there is an identified need, consideration should be given to a more proactive approach.
- There is no strategy in response to the risk of infiltration and corruption from OCGs, as identified within the UK threat assessment. Consideration should be given to linking this issue to the force risk register.

Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review systems and processes to ensure a robust approach to the risk of infiltration and corruption from organised crime groups.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of independent advisory groups and community membership of Gold command groups.

Strengths

- The lead for major crime is the ACC (SO). Performance is managed via the crime management weekly meeting, and the ACC (SO) has regular meetings with the head of crime. The quarterly SPECS meeting monitors and reviews performance.
- PA members are fully informed on crime matters and there is very clear evidence of effective engagement and good working relationships with the force. There are link members for serious and organised crime and major crime who attend the control of crime panel, created to improve the understanding of major and serious and organised crime issues. In addition, link authority members attend the level 2 TCG and the crime management weekly meeting. The force makes every effort to ensure that the PA is fully briefed, which enables the authority to hold the force to account. In addition a quarterly performance report is prepared for the PA.
- Both the chair and the chief executive of the PA have developed vetting status, and lead members are vetted to security clearance level
- Gold groups are convened when appropriate, and representation includes PA and IAG members. During the inspection, minutes of gold group meetings were examined, and these evidenced appropriate attendance and representation together with documenting of advice given.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The ACPO lead and the Head of the Crime Department are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACC (SO) and the head of crime have both undertaken the national management of linked and series crime course. To add further resilience, an additional superintendent will be undertaking the course during April 2008.
- There is a 24/7 superintendent PACE/critical incident rota, accessible through the force IHC. The rota is supported by other specialist functions such as firearms officers and negotiators.
- Where appropriate, the force is able to appoint an officer in overall command.
- The FIB has three desks, with staff working within the areas of drugs and firearms, travellers, rogue traders, distraction burglary, and human trafficking and sex offending. The structure ensures that the force is well prepared for the management of serial offenders and series crimes, as there is a daily briefing to review priorities and intelligence.
- The responsibility for the completion of CIAs rests with each BCU. The SIO is personally involved in developing the CIA and account it taken of the investigative strategy. CIAs are subject to additional review at critical points within the investigation, for example at the point of arrest or charge of a suspect.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Consideration should be given to sharing all CIAs with the relevant IAG.

Summary – The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of costs, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Management reviews for major crime operations are conducted in accordance with the Murder Investigation Manual (MIM). Seven-day reviews are commissioned by the head of crime, with 28-day reviews being commissioned by the ACC (SO). Progress is shared within the weekly crime management meeting.
- The major crime review team consists of experienced detectives. The team works to written terms of reference, supporting live major crime and serious and organised crime enquiries. In addition, reviews of some critical incidents (domestic violence and incidents involving vulnerable adults and missing people), as well as of all undetected homicides and failed trials, are undertaken.

- A standard review template is completed for every operation: this assesses the effectiveness of the operation and highlights good practice, which is fed into the force crime forum for wider learning.
- Surrey Police has appointed an organisational learning co-ordinator, reporting directly to the DCC (see work in progress).
- Organisational learning from reviews, the coroner's court and judicial hearings is fed into the six-weekly crime forum meetings, which have good force representation from BCUs and specialist departments. During the inspection, minutes of the meetings were examined, and these showed effective sharing of reviews, force updates, emerging issues and best practice.

Work in progress

- In March 2007, the force appointed an organisational learning co-ordinator, tasked to make Surrey Police a learning organisation. The role has been designed to deliver an innovative approach to organisational learning and to achieve real change and improvement. There is a three-year development plan in place to manage the change. The co-ordinator is working on a pilot project with the PSD, with the intention of using this as a best practice model for the force.
- The force uses an electronic activity-based costing process, linked to the duty diary to cost resource time spent on each operation. In addition, a spreadsheet of costs is maintained for each operation, and all finance issues are stored on the force web-based financial system. This process is being developed to enable SIOs to produce accurate costings for each operation.

Area(s) for improvement

- A regular review of major crime investigations takes place. However, at present there is no means of measuring desired outcomes against cost, inputs or outputs. Once the force understands the efficiency of its tactics it will be more able to make decisions about the use of these tactics against its future operational goals.
- The force could develop the activity-based costing system to monitor and understand the amount of resource being committed to prevention, intelligence, enforcement and communication. This would enable the balancing of resource costs to each activity area within an operation.

Performance Management and Resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the primary care trust are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- Surrey Police has protocols in place for unexplained deaths in communities and institutions. An example of the use of this policy is Operation Pin, an investigation into a death at the Royal Surrey Hospital. The use of the protocol ensured ease of communication between agencies.
- The CMD has a learning and development team, tasked to identify training needs. For example, corporate manslaughter training was identified as a need for major crime staff and training will be delivered in early 2008.
- The force policy on sudden and unexplained deaths documents lines of accountability. In addition, a robust supervisory process exists to quality-assure the outcomes of sudden and unexplained death investigations.
- Scene of crime staff are available through an on-call rota, details of which are available on the force intranet. Staff are paid an allowance for each call-out during their on-call period. In addition, there are two forensic co-ordinators who work solely for the MCIT. There is a dedicated forensic trainer.
- All coroners' files prepared within the MCIT are checked by a crime management supervisor. There is close liaison with the coroner and the coroner's officers, which provides advice and guidance on submission of documents for the coroner's file.
- The IHC staff and front-line staff are aware of the concept of a critical incident and the expected response. In addition, the duty incident-handling centre (IHC) supervisor plays an integral part in the quality assurance of the response to such incidents. Knowledge is developed through training and learning.
- Critical incident managers receive a package of training on appointment, which includes refresher training in golden hour principles.
- Contingency plans are in place and linked to the SMART system, within which the force is aiming for 80% preparedness for any major/critical incident
- Training is provided for front-line staff in golden hour principles, with refresher training being provided on the Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme and through learning and development. Effective call-out systems for senior officers and crime scene investigation are held within the IHC.
- There are PIP-accredited officers at every level, including five accredited to PIP level 3 and three working towards that accreditation. All DSs are PIP level 2 trained, and DCs have either completed or are in the process of completing the accreditation.
- The force has a total of 42 investigators in four teams, each with a DS, which is sufficient to cope with predicted demand. The supervisory structure of three major crime SIOs supported by four deputies also provides resilience.
- The force has fully embraced the workforce modernisation agenda and the major crime investigation team is staffed by a mixed economy of police officers and police staff. Agency staff are not used, as there is sufficient resilience within the major crime investigation team. Effective working relationships are in place with neighbouring forces, in particular Sussex Police, with whom collaborative arrangements exist around training and development.

- Surrey Police is the lead regional force for casualty bureau functionality. Collaborative arrangements are in place with neighbouring forces.
- Surrey Police is fully involved in regional issues – as evidenced by its lead on the regional cannabis factories issue. The work of the regional TCG (RTCG) reflects national priorities and the SA reflects the United Kingdom threat assessment (UKTA).

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- While enquiries are undertaken into all sudden and unexplained deaths, the percentage of cases where investigation is undertaken is not currently measured.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of covert investigation are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.

Strengths

- The force has adequate dedicated and trained specialist resources to meet demand, as detailed below:
 - a. **Surveillance** – the force has a dedicated full time surveillance capability, supplemented by an additional team of officers who are trained in surveillance as a secondary skill, but who work elsewhere within crime management and can be deployed in times of significant need. Regular training is undertaken with firearms officers, to ensure a well-trained and robust armed surveillance capability.

There are officers trained in rural surveillance and technical surveillance.
 - b. **Covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), undercover officers (UCO) and test purchase officers (TP)** – The force has a number of CHIS controllers and source handlers. There are sufficient undercover resources and officers trained for test purchase. The covert unit has a TP co-ordinator and an office manager.
 - c. **Financial investigation (asset recovery/money laundering)** – the economic crime unit has a dedicated DI and staff working in three teams (financial investigation, suspicious activity reports and commercial crime), of which a number are trained in investigation. In addition there are now financial investigators on BCUs. Training for these additional staff has been scheduled throughout 2008 (this was previously identified as an area for improvement).
 - d. **Deployment of mobile and static ANPR equipment and databases** – the force's capability encompasses fixed sites and cameras. In addition the force has mobile capability, supplemented by freestanding units, managed by a team of dedicated staff. There is a support team of four staff based within the unit, managing the database.

- e. **High-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery** – A team of staff are committed to high-tech crime, including forensic computer analysts and forensic mobile phone examiners.
 - f. **Witness protection** – A team of officers manage the delivery of witness protection and have undertaken the national training course.
 - g. **Effective management of investigations, including the MCIT** – the MCIT is fully staffed, with an establishment of 42 police staff and officers on four enquiry teams. Two of the three DCI SIOs are accredited to PIP level 3, with the third undertaking the accreditation process.
 - h. **Family liaison officers, search support and HOLMES capacity** – while this has been a risk register issue in the past, the force now has adequate capacity of FLOs. The family liaison co-ordinator role is managed by a DCI. FLO staff have undertaken recent specialist training.
 - i. **Case preparation, including disclosure and case management** – case preparation and disclosure are roles managed from within the MCIT.
 - j. **Kidnap investigation** – the SPOC for kidnap and extortion sits on the regional kidnap and extortion board. All SIOs have attended the kidnap and extortion training course. There is a force kidnap group, which has generated an action plan and meets on a bi-monthly basis.
 - k. **Technical support and intrusive deployments** – An adequate number of staff are trained for covert deployment, in addition to access to regional resources under an MOU.
- Good collaborative arrangements exist regionally and Surrey Police is the lead for the South East consortium, where a formal approach can be made to resource operations using covert resources.
 - The RTCG is the forum where priorities and resources are discussed, with commitment expected from all regional forces to tackling regional problems. For example, Surrey Police led on the regional cannabis factories operation and produced a range of NIM products, while other parts of the operation were outsourced to other forces, managed via the RTCG.
 - Conflicting force priorities are managed within the tasking and co-ordination meeting chaired by the ACC (SO). This meeting is informed by the various level 1 and 2 TCG meetings which define their priorities prior to bidding for resources at the FTCTG.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Whilst the force has a full surveillance capability, consideration should be given to improving the gender mix and increasing recruitment of black and minority ethnic operatives.

Summary – The Force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is highly effective. (Refers to impact on cases).

Strengths

- The force has a dedicated major crime review team headed by a former SIO and staffed by two review officers, both with criminal investigation department background, and one administrator. All staff have undertaken professional training courses, including the national major crime review pilot course.
- There are a number of historic cases (some 1,959) for which the exhibits and paperwork cannot be found; this is a situation experienced by many forces. More recent case papers and evidence are stored effectively and accessible within the archive department, and are reviewed every two years in accordance with national guidance.
- The team undertakes 7- and 28-day review of major crime enquiries, and in addition reviews critical incidents (domestic violence and incidents involving vulnerable adults and missing people), undetected homicides and failed trials. For each review there are terms of reference, and progress is monitored through the weekly crime management meeting. In addition, 28-day review cases are managed through a review panel chaired by the ACC (SO).
- There is a regional MOU for assisting other forces, and the Surrey Police major crime review team has assisted other forces with reviews.
- All 'cold cases' are reviewed every two years, and actions are raised on the HOLMES system. Reviews in progress are discussed at the weekly crime management meeting.
- All reviews are conducted in compliance with major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) and MIM.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Consideration should be given to developing a quality-assurance process for the work undertaken by the major crime review team.

Summary – The inspection found that the force was fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and Major Incident Room Standardised Operating Procedures.

Strengths

- The learning and development team within the crime management department ensures that all investigative learning is current and relevant.
- NPIA doctrine documents are available and referred to by all staff.
- The weekly crime management meeting is a review and learning environment where all crime management department operations are discussed.
- Flexible application of MIRSAP is evidenced by the fact that the MCIT has a wide remit and often takes on investigations from BCUs. For example, the MCIT recently assisted on Operation Paladin, an enquiry into a missing person who was eventually located safe and well. In addition, BCUs have access to the HOLMES database, and examples were given of aspects of the database being used to manage actions and documents for large BCU enquiries.
- Policy logs are used for every major crime, and sensitive policy logs are used where appropriate. Decisions are recorded within policy files, including decisions not to pursue lines of enquiry.
- During the inspection, SIO policy logs were viewed and thorough entries noted in both non-sensitive and sensitive policy files. Quality assurance is conducted through the weekly crime management meeting, where all operations are reviewed.
- The head of crime operations (reactive) conducts a dip sample of policy book entries on the HOLMES system.

Work in progress

- The force monitors and progresses HMIC recommendations and areas for improvement via the portfolio co-ordination meeting, chaired by the ACC (SO).

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop intelligence sharing processes with partners and review its internal processes to ensure all functions within the force contribute to tackling major crime.

Recommendation 2

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should develop corporate systems and processes which effectively measure and assess harm and threat to map the threat from major crime to vulnerable and emerging communities.

Recommendation 3

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force should undertake a training needs analysis of the knowledge and awareness of the threats to life procedures, in order improve understanding of all staff in this area of risk.

Recommendation 4

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force consider the delivery of training on witness protection to staff at management level.

Recommendation 5

Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force review systems and processes to ensure a robust approach to the risk of infiltration and corruption from organised crime groups.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACC (T)	assistant chief constable territorial
ACO	assistant chief officer
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ARA	Assets Recovery Agency
ARV	armed response vehicle

B

BCU	basic command unit
BIA	Border and Immigration Agency
BME	black and minority ethnic

C

CAIU	child abuse investigation unit
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
COMAH	control of major accident hazard
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CRISP	cross-regional information sharing project

D

DAT	drug action team
DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable

DCI	detective chief inspector
DI	detective inspector
DS	detective sergeant
DPA	Data protection act
DSU	dedicated source unit

E

ECU	economic crime unit
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F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIMU	force intelligence management unit
FIO	field intelligence officer
FSA	force strategic assessment

G

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	headquarters

I

IAG	independent advisory group
ICT	information and communications technology
IMPACT	intelligence management, prioritisation, analysis, co-ordination and tasking
IRIS	integrated records information system
IT	information technology

J

JARD joint asset recovery database

K

KIN key individual network

M

MAPP multi-agency public protection

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MFH missing from home

MIAG major incident advisory group

MIM *Murder Investigation Manual*

MIMA Middlesborough Institute of Modern Art

MIR major incident room

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MIT major incident team

MoPI management of police information

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NIM national intelligence model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG organised crime group

OCU organised crime unit

OIOC officer in overall charge

OSC Office of Surveillance Commissioners

P

PCSO	police community support officer
PDR	performance development review
PFI	private finance initiative
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
PND	Police National Database
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2004
POLSA	police search of area
PPU	public protection unit
PSD	professional standards department

R

RART	regional asset recovery team
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit
RMS	records management system

S

SARC	sexual abuse multi-agency referral centre
SCAS	serious crime analysis system
SDG	strategic development group
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOC	serious and organised crime
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPECSS	separation/pregnancy/escalation/cultural/sexual assault/stalking
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact

T

TCG tasking and co-ordination group

TSU technical support unit

V

ViSOR Violent and Sex Offenders' Register

W

WPS witness protection scheme

Appendix 2 Developing Practice

INSPECTION AREA: Major Crime
TITLE: SMART capabilities
<p>PROBLEM:</p> <p>To comply with obligations under the Civil Contingencies Act, Surrey Police has reviewed its business continuity management process and plans, and sought to ensure a state of preparedness in the event of flood, pandemic or terrorist attack. The MCIT has responsibility for reactive investigation in the event of a terrorist attack, and as such needs to develop the capability to conduct an efficient and thorough counter-terrorist investigative response.</p>
<p>SOLUTION:</p> <p>In order to manage the process of highlighting risk areas in the business continuity plans, the force has adopted the specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely (SMART) methodology of capability assessment.</p> <p>A number of capabilities have been identified across the force which would be required in response to a terrorist incident. As the major crime investigation team provides the investigative response to a terrorist incident, its capability and capacity in key areas has been assessed using the SMART methodology. Where gaps have been identified, action plans are in place to resolve them. The following are some of the capabilities and resources identified for the MCIT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – a counter-terrorism SIO; – a counter-terrorism deputy SIO and management structure; – CCTV viewing; – exhibit storage and handling; – action teams; – house-to-house enquiries; – high-tech crime; and – mortuary management. <p>The SMART methodology allows for all aspects of the capability to be assessed, including the actual resources involved, their means of communication and transport following an incident, where they will be located, the call-out procedure and whether effectiveness has been tested through exercise.</p>
<p>OUTCOMES:</p> <p>Surrey Police is committed to being prepared for a terrorist incident. The force aims to demonstrate that it is 'capable' in each area identified, equating to a score of 80% within the SMART methodology. Some capabilities are already above this threshold, and are graded as 'robust'. It is intended that each area will be achieve the 'capable' standard by the end of March 2008.</p> <p>Areas that have significantly improved are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – nomination of a dedicated counter-terrorism SIO; – interviewing of suspects and witnesses; – exhibit storage and handling; and – house-to-house enquiries.

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There are a number of other areas that are already robust or that are under development.

Based on the identified capabilities, portfolio holders have been given ownership to ensure compliance; this arrangement is overseen by the ACC (SO). A structure is in place to monitor action plans in detail, to ensure that risks are identified and addressed through in-force development, work with partners or collaboration.

The force's performance in this area is overseen by ACPO and linked to the local policing plan, monitored by the PA.

The next generation of the methodology will incorporate staffing levels within the force on a live basis. This will allow the force to review its capabilities in the event of a disaster or a period of heightened abstractions, such as the main summer annual leave period.

FORCE CONTACT:

Detective Chief Inspector Gary Sumner. Tel. 0845 125 2222