



Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary – protecting vulnerable people



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FOREWORD

Protecting vulnerable people and identifying and managing risk lie at the heart of today's policing agenda. Developing the capability and capacity to keep people safe is critical to reassuring and meeting the needs of local people throughout our diverse communities. The police service is judged on its ability to provide protection and prevent harm, and the price of failure is high in terms of the potential individual loss of life and, ultimately, loss of collective confidence in policing. This report reflects the progress made by the service since the baseline inspections of 2006, but also emphasises there is no room for complacency: further developments can, and must, be delivered.

Improvements and progress are acknowledged and further improvement encouraged. Vision and commitment deliver success where they are underpinned with robust performance frameworks, and where there is good use of intelligence and information, meaningful scrutiny to test compliance with policy and consistency of service delivery. Leadership and effective governance, appropriate risk assessment, a clear review of resourcing supported by a rationale, and close partnership working all feature in successful, effective forces.

The opposite tends to be true of areas where the service has been assessed as less effective, and further progress is required. 'Areas for improvement' and 'work in progress' across the four disciplines of child abuse, domestic abuse, public protection and missing persons are detailed in this report. Challenging issues for the service now and in future include the need to develop greater sophistication in preventing harm, to become more proactive in identifying and tackling risk, and to ensure there is relentless oversight of resourcing in order to deliver a consistently high standard of service.

Furthermore, given the projections of increasing demand, particularly with regard to public protection, there is a need to pursue longer-term strategies to address sustainability. Other critical aspects addressed within this overview report include independent audit of (for example) risk assessment and evaluation, and co-ordination/management of intelligence, not only with external partners but also between disciplines. This inspection has also raised awareness of the recognition in the service that missing persons requires a higher profile nationally. HMIC is aware of the development of a strategic oversight group, and understands and supports the Association of Chief Police Officers call for a single ministerial 'champion' for this vital area of work which has a profound and costly impact upon the nation.

Finally, this report concludes with an overview of developing practice and the many current initiatives submitted by forces in England and Wales. It is hoped that this will provide a useful reference point for others throughout the service.

Appreciation is extended to all forces for their assistance during this inspection.

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1. Introduction and context

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK AND THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

- 1.1 The assessment framework for Protecting Vulnerable People (PVP) was first established in 2006 as part of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC) baseline assessment programme. It was developed from two existing frameworks – Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims, and Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims – which focused primarily on hate crimes (predominantly racially motivated), domestic violence and child protection.
- 1.2 Following consultation with practitioners and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) leads, a single framework was introduced with four components:¹
- domestic abuse (previously termed domestic violence²);
 - the investigation and prevention of child abuse (also known as child protection);
 - the management of sexual offenders, violent offenders, and potentially dangerous persons (PDPs) (known collectively as public protection); and
 - vulnerable missing persons.
- 1.3 Although the four areas are discrete, they are also linked and share a common theme – they deal with vulnerable victims where there is a high risk that an incident can quickly become critical, and where a poor police response is both life-threatening and poses severe reputational risks for the force. Consequently, when forces were inspected under the new framework in 2006, they were given a single assessment grade for their overall performance in PVP. This grade, however, was capped at the level of the weakest area of performance, as it would have been unsafe to aggregate four components to a Fair grade (thereby indicating that an overall acceptable standard of service was being delivered) when at least one area merited a Poor grading.
- 1.4 The HMIC inspection standards against which forces are assessed (known as Specific Grading Criteria – <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/methodologies/>) were first developed in 2004 when the baseline assessment programme was introduced. Reviewed annually in consultation with ACPO and other key stakeholders, the Specific Grading Criteria are consistent with all relevant ACPO guidance documents. They also take into account the recommendations and findings of the following thematic inspections:
- *Violence at Home* (2004) – a joint inspection with Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate of the investigation and prosecution of cases involving domestic violence;
 - *Keeping Safe, Staying Safe* (2005) – an HMIC inspection of the investigation and prevention of child abuse; and

¹ Hate crime is now assessed separately under a separate framework – fairness and equality.

² The term 'domestic violence' has been used to cover a wide range of abusive behaviour. As only some of this behaviour involves actual or threatened violence, ACPO has recently adopted the term 'domestic abuse' (which now replaces the term 'domestic violence'), the better to reflect the nature and range of behaviour.

- *Putting Risk of Harm in Context* (2006) – a joint inspection with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements.

- 1.5 The 2006 assessments showed that many forces were meeting acceptable performance standards across the framework as a whole, with 35 forces achieving an overall grading of Fair or better. However, a number of areas for improvement, some of which were significant, were identified within the individual component parts. As a result, no force achieved an overall Excellent grading; only three achieved a grading of Good; and eight were graded as Poor.
- 1.6 The inspection in 2007 was carried out using similar assessment standards to those of 2006, and included:
 - leadership and accountability
 - policy implementation
 - staffing, workload and supervision
 - identification, assessment and management of risk
 - performance monitoring and management
 - training
 - partnership working.
- 1.7 A new feature for 2007, however, was HMIC's move from the previous wide-ranging baseline assessment approach, which covered 23 separate business areas, to a risk-based approach which now focuses on a smaller number of key areas identified as posing most risk of harm to individuals or organisations. PVP was one of the first areas to be inspected under the new programme, with the change in approach providing for more in-depth and thorough assessment of the four component parts of the framework, and allowing each to be graded separately. As a result, a more comprehensive picture of individual force performance is now available, together with greater clarity in relation to where the strengths and areas for improvement lie (see Appendix 1).
- 1.8 The 43 force inspection reports (<http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections/> – under 'Programmed Inspections'), together with the annual Police Performance Assessments summary (<http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance>), were published in October 2007. Although simple, direct comparisons with the 2006 assessments are not possible, the overall picture to emerge has been one of considerable progress and improvement. Only six forces received a Poor grading in any one of the four framework areas – two for child abuse investigations, two for domestic abuse and two for the management of sexual, violent and dangerous offenders. The remaining 37 forces met an acceptable standard of performance and service delivery in each of the four framework areas, with 23 of those forces achieving a Good or better grading in two or more areas and eight being graded as Good or better across all four.

- 1.9 This report builds on the individual force inspection reports in two ways. Firstly, it focuses on the differences in practice between those forces graded as Fair and those graded as Good to provide a national overview of:
- the progress being made by the service as a whole; and
 - the key areas for improvement that remain.
- 1.10 Secondly, the work carried out to protect the public, particularly those most vulnerable to risk of serious harm, is complex and challenging and no single agency has the capacity to deliver the required response on its own. Success depends on participation in effective partnerships and collaborative working, while, at the same time, recognising that individual agencies have specific responsibilities and bring different roles, resources and perspectives into the safeguarding process. The demands placed on individual forces and the service as a whole are increasing year on year and public expectations of the police are high. In managing those demands and expectations, forces continue to test and develop new ways of working. This report, therefore, also complements the individual force reports by providing:
- a summary of the developing practice identified during the inspection (see paragraph 1.15); and
 - a more detailed context for the work being carried out in order to set the challenges into perspective.
- 1.11 Finally, through drawing together the learning from the strengths and areas for improvement and the developing practice highlighted in the 43 force reports into one single document, the aim is that the report can offer a resource for forces to support continued development in this area of work.

TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

- 1.12 The terminology used in the individual inspection reports, particularly in relation to specialist roles and units, reflects that used by the relevant force. In the interests of consistency, wherever possible, the terminology adopted for this report reflects that used within the relevant ACPO guidance. The key terms and definitions are:
- **child abuse investigation unit officers** – refers to the variety of groupings of police officers whose primary function is the investigation of child abuse;
 - **domestic abuse officers** – covers both specialist domestic abuse investigators and police domestic abuse co-ordinators; and
 - **public protection unit officers** – describes officers specialising in the management of sexual offenders, violent offenders and PDPs.

Explanations of other terms used are given in the relevant sections of this report.

STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT

1.13 Each section of this report relates directly to one or more Specific Grading Criteria. Some – for example, leadership and accountability – apply equally, and in the same way, to all four parts of the PVP framework. Where this occurs, a generic chapter has been produced. With others – such as staffing levels and workload – the key issues and inspection findings vary in each PVP area, in which case each has been covered separately under individual headings in the relevant section of the report.

DATA

1.14 Data for this report has been extracted from the separate force reports and additional data or information provided by individual forces. In some instances, it has not been possible to produce data based on a complete sample size of all 43 forces. Where this occurs, the sample size is provided.

DEVELOPING PRACTICE

1.15 In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share developing practice across the police service. During the 2007 inspection, forces were given the opportunity to submit examples of their developing practice, the key criteria being that the work had been evaluated by the force and that the practice would be easily transferable to other forces. Those examples published within the individual force reports are summarised at Appendix 2, together with details of the force contact for each. Further information on the examples given, including solutions and outcomes, can be obtained from the relevant force reports (<http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspections> – under 'Programmed Inspections'). HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.





2. Structures, leadership and accountability

- 2.1 All forces have child abuse investigators, specialist domestic abuse officers and public protection officers, usually located within dedicated teams or specialist units. Although the roles are similar across forces, structural arrangements for delivering the service in each of the protecting vulnerable people (PVP) areas vary depending, for example, on the size of the force and police establishment, geography and levels of devolvement. A number of forces have chosen to co-locate the different roles, because of well-established links between the different functions, bringing them under a single line-management structure to create multi-disciplinary units.
- 2.2 Irrespective of whether forces had chosen to co-locate the different roles or retain them within separate units or teams, the three most commonly encountered structures were:
- **centralised:** a single, fully centralised unit servicing the whole force, with centralised strategic and operational accountability and control;
 - **centralised with devolved units:** centralised strategic and operational accountability and control, but with units sited on Basic Command Units (BCUs); and
 - **devolved:** BCU-based units with operational accountability and control devolved to BCU Commanders, but with force strategic and policy responsibility retained centrally.
- 2.3 Force differences have to be taken into account when determining not only what will work but what is possible within an individual force. Consequently, no single structure was identified as being most effective in terms of performance and service delivery. However, the majority of forces – including the best and poorest-performing – were found to operate under a devolved structure, with operational and strategic accountability being split between BCUs (operational) and headquarters (strategic/policy). This means in practice that while strategic and policy direction is maintained centrally, decisions as to how policy is implemented are the responsibility of individual BCU Commanders.
- 2.4 Previous HMIC thematic inspections have identified that when functions are devolved across BCUs, there is the potential for significant local variations and practices to develop. Difficulties can also be created for the strategic/policy lead in ensuring that policy is applied corporately across a force and that there is a consistent standard of response and service delivery. To address this, it is essential that forces have in place unambiguous accountability frameworks, which clearly define the lines of operational and strategic responsibility at each level from practitioners through to chief officer lead. This also needs to be supported, however, by effective performance monitoring, clear lines of communication and sound governance.
- 2.5 Although most forces were found to have accountability frameworks in place, these did not always cover each of the four PVP areas. Where such frameworks had been published, the most frequently highlighted areas for improvement were:
- poorly documented or communicated lines of accountability;
 - the need for review and update to reflect changes made following restructuring;

- gaps in the chain of accountability at senior management (most notably BCU Commander) level; and
- lack of governance to ensure the effectiveness of accountability in practice.

2.6 Conversely, these areas for improvement were absent in the better-performing forces. In addition, a number of key strengths were identified:

- linking of accountability with performance management frameworks (see Chapter 6), with management information being used as a diagnostic tool to identify problems and inform improvement;
- robust internal scrutiny arrangements with regular audit, review or 'health checks' to test compliance with policy and consistency in service delivery;
- effective governance and lines of communication, with routine and structured consideration of performance at BCU, force and partnership levels; and
- active monitoring of outcomes when action has been taken to address areas for improvement.





3. Policy implementation

- 3.1 Over the last three years, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has issued comprehensive national guidance on Investigating Domestic Violence (2004); the Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons (2005); Investigating Child Abuse and Safeguarding Children (2005); and Protecting the Public (2007).
- 3.2 Produced on behalf of ACPO by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA),³ the guidance is intended for use by chief officers to shape police responses to ensure that the general public experiences consistent levels of service. There is, therefore, an expectation that forces will incorporate ACPO guidance into force policy, but with the acknowledgement that implementation of all guidance will require operational choices to be made at local level in order to achieve the appropriate police response.
- 3.3 Force policies set out expectations for service delivery locally, define standards and operational procedures, and clarify roles and responsibilities. It is essential, therefore, that they are up to date, easily accessible to all staff and widely understood.
- 3.4 Few areas for improvement were identified in relation to the issue of policy. There was evidence of high levels of compatibility with ACPO guidance, and force policies were generally found to be comprehensive and up to date. Although some gaps were identified, these related primarily to the area of public protection. At the time of the inspection, forces were awaiting publication of the ACPO *Guidance on Protecting the Public* before reviewing their policy in this area. Many of the gaps were, therefore, anticipated. There were no specific, identifiable trends in the other protecting vulnerable people areas.
- 3.5 One issue that did emerge, however, although it was significant in only a small number of forces, was lack of policy compliance in some key areas. This rarely resulted from policies being out of date or from poor levels of awareness among staff. Instead, it was more often found to be directly linked to structural and resourcing issues, in that the policy either:
- set out unrealistic expectations which it was impossible for practitioners to meet under existing structures or within existing resources; or
 - had been updated to reflect changes to roles and structures which, owing to poor or inconsistent implementation, had resulted in the policy being unworkable.
- 3.6 Consistent and robust policy compliance, on the other hand, was most clearly evident in those forces where:
- structured consultation with practitioners took place prior to any change in policy being made; and
 - structured monitoring and review were put in place as part of a change management or implementation plan.

³ Previously the National Centre for Policing Excellence (Centrex).



4. Staffing and workload

- 4.1 Resource allocation is a matter for individual chief officers, and the way in which forces configure and resource specialist teams and units varies. It is fundamental to effectiveness, however, that each should have the capacity and capability to deliver an acceptable level of service. This means that staffing levels must be sufficient to meet demand and to allow for high standards of professional practice and active supervision. Manageable workloads are also essential for the safety and welfare of staff and for resilience during periods of sickness, leave and other absences.

CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

- 4.2 The role of child abuse investigator was developed to meet the need to provide a specialist response to the investigation of child abuse and to professionalise joint working with social services. Social services departments have a statutory duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their area who are in need, and to make enquiries if they have reason to suspect that a child in their area is suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm. This is to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child's welfare. Consequently, while the police and social services have distinct roles in investigations of crimes against children, joint working is essential to ensure that children are protected from risk of harm.
- 4.3 All police forces have specialist child abuse investigators within well-established units, with a particular remit to investigate intra-familial abuse and abuse committed by professionals and those in a position of trust. Although structures vary and, in some forces, the remit has been extended to include, for example, the investigation of internet-related offences, the range of cases dealt with by these officers across England and Wales is broadly similar.
- 4.4 There are four key processes within any child abuse investigation:
- **Referral** – a referral is a communication between agencies which alerts the agency to concern for a child.
 - **Strategy discussion** – a strategy discussion between the police, social services and other agencies, when relevant, should take place if there is reasonable cause to suggest that a child is suffering or likely to suffer significant harm, or is a child in need. The purpose of the strategy discussion is to agree whether to initiate enquiries under section 47 of the Children Act 1989, and whether to commence a core assessment and assist in the co-ordination of the criminal investigation and social services action.
 - **Joint investigation** – where a criminal offence is suspected, or has been committed, against a child, a joint investigation by police and social services allows both agencies to fulfil their responsibilities and duties in a co-ordinated manner, thereby reducing the impact on the child. Joint investigations may include joint visits to see the child and establish the child's welfare.
 - **Child protection conference** (also known as Case Conference) – a child protection conference should be convened if concerns about a child are substantiated and the child is judged to be at continuing risk of significant harm. Where a criminal investigation has been undertaken or is ongoing, child abuse investigation unit (CAIU) staff should attend all initial conferences.

- 4.5 Previous HMIC thematic inspections have found that any one of these processes is at risk of breaking down where specialist units are inadequately resourced. In particular, where cases are initially assessed as low-risk, under-resourcing can lead to decisions as to whether or not to carry out a criminal investigation being based on availability of staff as opposed to established criteria, resulting in such cases being passed to social services for a single-agency response, with little or no active police involvement. Breakdowns in process within this area of work, therefore, can often be an underlying symptom of resourcing difficulties.
- 4.6 This was reflected in the overall 2007 inspection findings, in that those forces graded either Good or better evidenced few areas for improvement in relation to either staffing levels or process failures. Where staffing issues were highlighted in these forces, these primarily concerned the need to enhance specialist cover outside normal office hours and to ensure that welfare support for specialist staff met need. For the remaining forces, additional areas for improvement were identified in relation to:
- broadening of CAIU remits and changes to roles which were not reflected in job descriptions or person specifications;
 - the need to review historical staffing levels, taking into account any:
 - broadened remits and role changes; and/or
 - restructuring of specialist units, and the impact of restructuring on the role and responsibilities of supervisors;
 - lack of resilience, and poor management of long-term vacancies and abstractions to other duties; and
 - the capacity of supervisors to balance effectively their day-to-day supervisory and administrative commitments with specific responsibilities such as strategy discussions/meetings and their own investigative workload.
- 4.7 Where one or more of these areas for improvement was highlighted, there was also evidence of greater disparity in workload and/or variation in role or remit across Basic Command Units (BCUs) in individual forces. In addition, there was a clear link between staffing difficulties and lack of structured monitoring of officer caseload/workload.
- 4.8 There were three specific strengths that could be identified from the best-performing forces which provided safeguards in this area:
- the development of a staffing model to set resource levels, but with flexibility to allow for periodic growth or shrinkage depending on demographic profile and workload;
 - effective IT support, not only as a tool for practitioners and supervisors, but to allow for a range of quality-assurance and audit information to be accessed; or routine analysis of such information collected from other IT and data sources (for example, supervisory caseload spreadsheets, agreed data sets provided routinely to Performance Managers); and
 - programmed audits, reviews or health checks.

DOMESTIC ABUSE

- 4.9 It has been more than 15 years since police forces first introduced domestic abuse officers. At that time, the role was primarily one of co-ordination and liaison, providing a single point of contact for victims, and signposting and liaising with support agencies.
- 4.10 Over the years the role has evolved, with specialist officers taking on a broader range of responsibilities, such as monitoring attendance at incidents to ensure compliance with force policy, maintaining and updating records and databases, tracking cases through the court system to keep victims advised of progress, and risk assessment. As a result, these officers have faced considerable pressure in trying to balance a growing administrative commitment with the requirement to deliver an effective service to victims. More recently, in some forces, the role has developed into an investigative one or the additional role of specialist domestic abuse investigator has been introduced.
- 4.11 In order to ensure that any further changes and developments to the role were carried out in a planned and managed way, following the thematic inspection of 2004 HMIC recommended that forces carry out an assessment of workload and responsibilities and review administrative functions. In addition, it is a key element of the Specific Grading Criteria on this issue that forces should have in place a sound rationale for staffing levels which takes account of workload and abstractions.
- 4.12 Data on staffing levels was obtained from 38 forces. Of these, just over one-third (37%) indicated that staffing levels had been determined as a direct result of force review, with the remaining two-thirds indicating that staffing levels were either historical or were at the discretion of, and set by, BCU Commanders.
- 4.13 It was a noticeable feature of those forces graded as Good or better that a much higher proportion had set staffing levels following structured review than had those graded either Fair or Poor – 75% compared with 19%. As a result, the former were in a much better position to articulate clearly the rationale for staffing levels, and there was greater evidence of equity of workload (even where local variations in roles were taken into account) across individual BCUs.
- 4.14 The primary role of specialist domestic abuse officers in 55% (21) of forces was that of co-ordinator; in 24% (9), the primary role was that of specialist investigator; in the remaining 21% (8), either the roles had been combined or separate co-ordinator and investigator roles had been introduced. The main differences between those forces graded as Good and those graded as Fair were found to lie not in the roles themselves, but in the way in which the roles were managed and any role changes had been implemented.
- 4.15 For example, 45% (17) of forces were carrying long-term vacancies in specialist domestic abuse posts at the time of the 2007 inspection. The highest proportion (76%) was found in those forces where staffing levels were either historical or determined by BCU Commanders. Although routine abstractions to duties unconnected with the specialist role (such as cover for patrol officers, custody duty or high-visibility patrols) were relatively rare (13% (five) of forces), when these occurred their impact tended to be significant. In each case, staffing levels and deployment were, again, at the sole discretion of BCU Commanders and, in all instances, the

officers concerned were domestic abuse co-ordinators with responsibility for completing risk assessments (see Chapter 5). Where investigators were subject to routine abstractions, these were restricted to CID duties as part of planned rotas and, as such, tended to be better managed.


- 4.16 As a result, the following common areas for improvement were identified in those forces graded as Fair:
- the need to improve accountability for staffing levels, vacancies and abstractions; and
 - the need to revisit the way in which changes to roles have been implemented to ensure that forces have the capacity and capability to meet expectations in relation to the specialist investigator role.
- 4.17 In those forces graded as Good or better, on the other hand:
- staffing levels, vacancies and abstractions were linked to, and monitored through, performance management frameworks;
 - changes to roles had been implemented in a planned and managed way, with monitoring built into the implementation plan; and
 - forces were proactive in using management information to identify priority areas of demand and build capacity.
- 4.18 One further important development in this area of work has been the introduction and use of formal domestic abuse risk assessment processes and tools (see Chapter 5). This has, however, resulted in a significant increase in workload for domestic abuse officers. The need to identify priority areas of demand and build capacity has therefore become a particularly critical issue for the service as a whole.

PUBLIC PROTECTION

- 4.19 The Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) were introduced in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. This legislation imposed a statutory duty on the police and probation services in each area, as the Responsible Authority, to assess and manage sexual and violent offenders in England and Wales. These provisions were further developed and strengthened by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, so as to include the prison service as part of the Responsible Authority, to establish a list of agencies that have a duty to co-operate, and to introduce the concept of lay advisers.
- 4.20 In March 2003, the Home Secretary issued statutory guidance to the Responsible Authorities on how their MAPPA duties should be discharged. Known simply as the *MAPPA Guidance* (www.probation.homeoffice.gov.uk/files/pdf/MAPPA%20Guidance.pdf), it provides a common framework to enable consistency of approach in the identification, assessment and management of risk.


- 4.21 To be managed under MAPPA, offenders must have been convicted of or cautioned for an offence. Thereafter, they must also fit the criteria under one of the following MAPPA Categories:
- **Category 1** – registered sexual offenders
These are offenders subject to the notification requirements of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Individuals may also be subject to notification requirements as a result of a Sexual Offences Prevention Order.
 - **Category 2** – violent offenders and other sexual offenders
This Category relates to violent offenders who receive a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more and those who have committed specific offences against children. It includes those detained under Hospital Orders or Guardianship Orders.
 - **Category 3** – other dangerous offenders
Category 3 offenders are those offenders who do not meet the criteria under Category 1 or 2, but who have a conviction or caution for a criminal offence which indicates they are capable of causing serious harm to the public **and** are considered by the Responsible Authority to pose a risk of serious harm to the public.
- 4.22 The police role in the notification requirements process for registered sexual offenders means that the identification of Category 1 offenders is primarily a police responsibility, although some will also be subject to statutory supervision by the probation service or Youth Offending Team (YOT). As the majority of Category 2 offenders will be under the statutory supervision of the probation service, the relevant probation area or YOT will usually have primary responsibility for identifying Category 2 offenders. The identification of offenders within Category 3 is the responsibility of the agency that first deals with them.
- 4.23 Data on MAPPA offenders has been available since 2002/03, and the number of offenders managed under MAPPA has increased year on year. Increasing numbers are to be expected. For example, periods of sexual offender registration vary and can last for life. Overall numbers will increase, therefore, as new offenders enter MAPPA and existing offenders continue to be managed. The year-on-year increase according to the data available at the time of the 2007 inspection is shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Numbers of MAPPA offenders by Category, 2002/03–2005/06



- 4.24 It should be noted that the apparent decrease in the number of Category 2 offenders between 2002/03 and 2003/04 is due to a change in the way in which the data was recorded – from 2003/04, the data excludes Category 2 offenders in custody. Over the three-year period that followed, the overall number of MAPPA offenders increased by 20% (from 39,492 to 47,753). However, the majority of police workload arises from the management of registered sexual offenders (Category 1). There has been no change to the recording of data on this Category of offenders, and the increase in the four years since the data was first kept has been much higher, at 39% (from 21,513 to 29,973).
- 4.25 Although the increase shows signs of slowing, the impact on workload and capacity of public protection unit (PPU) officers has been considerable, to the extent that, at the time of the HMIC force inspections in 2006, staffing levels and workload were identified as the single most significant areas of vulnerability for the service. The variation in the number of offenders, in all Categories, managed by individual PPU officers was found to be considerable – from 40 to 200 – and there was consistent and growing concern among practitioners over capacity, in terms not only of increasing offender numbers, but also of the demand for greater proactivity in offender monitoring and management.
- 4.26 Data obtained on workload during the 2007 inspection (39 forces) shows that significant steps were subsequently taken to address this issue. Figure 2 provides an overview of the average number of cases managed per officer by frequency, with only two forces showing an average officer caseload of 100 or more.

Figure 2: Average PPU officer caseload by frequency, 2007



- 4.27 This, however, was not achieved without cost to the service. Following the 2006 inspection, just under a third of all 43 forces in England and Wales (30%) increased PPU officer staffing levels, in some cases significantly. A number of others were in the process of completing staffing reviews at the time of the 2007 inspection, including the two forces where the average officer caseload is shown in Figure 2 to exceed 100 cases. At this time, one of these forces was progressing an increase in staffing levels of four administrative and four operational posts, and the second had prepared a business case for an increase of one supervisory and five operational posts. In the force where the average officer caseload was between 90 and 99 cases, the inspection highlighted considerable variations in caseload across individual BCUs – from 61 to 196 cases per officer. Operational responsibility and accountability were devolved to BCU Commanders in this force, and the reasons for the variation could be directly linked to the lack of a clear accountability framework, together with the absence of a central performance and audit function (subsequently introduced). A specific recommendation was made for the force to address workload disparity.
- 4.28 Management of risk involves the use of interventions to match, address and reduce the risk of harm posed by individual offenders (see Chapter 5). For the police, home visits provide an important intervention and risk management tool. Used primarily in relation to registered sexual offenders, they allow for information to be gathered for risk identification, assessment and review, and for the risk posed by an individual offender to be monitored. It is essential, therefore, that home visits are carried out by trained staff who are informed about the individual case and are able to undertake visits in the most appropriate circumstances.
- 4.29 The frequency of home visits is normally determined by the level of risk at which the offender is being managed under MAPPA (although it will be increased or decreased according to need) and **all** registered sexual offenders are subject to the home visit regime. Given that there were just under 30,000 registered sexual offenders in England and Wales in 2006, this represents a significant commitment on the part of the police

service. In order to meet that commitment and develop capacity for the future, a number of forces have begun to explore new ways of working.

- 4.30 Of the 39 forces where data could be obtained, 26% (11) had delegated responsibility for visiting low- and medium-risk offenders to non-specialist officers (such as Community Beat Managers) or were piloting this approach. The rationale for this decision was that it allowed existing specialist resources to be optimised by focusing on those offenders presenting the greatest risk of harm, thereby improving the police response and contribution to MAPPA.
- 4.31 The inspection found, however, that delegation of home visits had, more often than not, been prompted by the need to address short-term backlogs and had developed into a longer-term solution to the need to improve capacity within individual BCUs without any clear planning or structure. As a result, the following common areas for improvement were identified:
- the need for non-specialist staff to be properly trained to undertake home visits and for consideration to be given to vetting and suitability requirements;
 - the need for lines of supervision and the role and responsibilities of local (as opposed to specialist unit) supervisors to be clarified in relation to this task;
 - the need for visits to be properly planned and structured and for procedural gaps to be addressed – for example, by conducting effective briefing prior to each visit and completing pre-visit risk assessments; and
 - the need for a clear process to ensure that information and intelligence from the visit are communicated promptly and accurately to the relevant PPU officer.
- 4.32 In almost all of the forces graded as Good or better, home visits were carried out by specialist public protection officers. That is not to say that other approaches will not, or cannot, be effective – however, they do involve risks. For example, it is inevitable that, where home visits are delegated to other officers, while public protection officers remain responsible (and, therefore, accountable) for risk assessments, they have little or no input into the information-gathering process upon which the risk assessments are based. It is therefore essential that:
- non-specialists are properly trained; and
 - forces are aware of, and acknowledge, the implications of delegating responsibility for home visits to non-specialist officers, and document and manage any related risks.
- 4.33 Specialist officers are reliant on the quality of information and intelligence gathered from home visits for reviewing offenders' risk and risk management plans. Any transfer of responsibility must therefore be implemented with care.

MISSING PERSONS

- 4.34 The responsibility for attending a report of a missing person and for the subsequent investigation normally rests with first response officers. In some forces, missing persons 'champions' have been appointed within BCUs, with responsibility for strategic oversight, policy and training at local level. A number of forces (40% – 17) have also introduced dedicated missing persons co-ordinators, either located centrally at

headquarters or locally on BCUs. This role varies from force to force, but two primary functions emerged from the inspection:

- to maintain oversight of missing persons investigations and reviews, quality-assure compliance with force policy, and develop and co-ordinate partnership responses; or
- to carry out missing persons investigations (or specific categories of investigation).

4.35 There was no correlation found between performance and the introduction of specialist or dedicated roles. However, what was apparent was a direct link between performance and:

- the implementation of quality-assurance processes or functions; and
- the development of intelligence-led multi-agency responses,

irrespective of the officers to whom these responsibilities had been allocated.

4.36 The inspection found the role of missing persons co-ordinator to be a developing one, and a number of forces were failing fully to exploit the potential benefits associated with the role. This was primarily because:

- the role, and lines of supervision, had not been clearly defined, and the role had not been implemented consistently; and
- where officers were located on BCUs, they were routinely required to undertake other duties unconnected to the co-ordinator role.

Not only was this hindering effectiveness but, where improvement had been realised, it was not always capable of being sustained in the longer term.

4.37 Conversely, where quality-assurance processes or functions were working effectively, and where partnership responses were properly co-ordinated:

- longer-term risks were found to be better managed through improved quality of information, risk assessment and review; and
- considerable savings were available through better targeting of resources and reductions in the incidence of repeat missing persons as a result of multi-agency problem solving (see Chapter 8).



5. Identification, assessment and management of risk

INTELLIGENCE

- 5.1 Effective risk identification and assessment are predicated in the first instance on effective information and intelligence gathering. This needs, however, to be supported by the effective recording, management and use of that information and intelligence. It is also important that the working links between the different disciplines in specialist areas are identified, so as to ensure that relevant information and intelligence are both available and shared internally among police personnel, as well as with appropriate partners.
- 5.2 Each of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance documents issued in relation to the four protecting vulnerable people (PVP) areas of work provides tailored guidance on the capture, assessment, retention and management of intelligence. A common feature, however, is the emphasis placed on the importance of up-to-date, accurate and accessible intelligence to ensuring a fully informed and, consequently, effective police response at each stage of an investigation, and to ensuring that any risks are properly managed.
- 5.3 To support the different parts of police business, a number of different IT systems have been developed over the years. Some of these are force systems – for example, command and control systems for incident handling, crime recording, custody, and intelligence. Others are dedicated systems to support the work of specialist officers – for example, domestic abuse or child protection databases.
- 5.4 As these systems (particularly those supporting specialist areas) have developed over different periods of time as new requirements have been identified, the level to which they are currently linked or integrated varies considerably from force to force; consequently, so does ease of access to information and intelligence. There are, however, a number of safeguards that forces can put in place where integration is an issue. Indeed, not all of the better-performing forces have in place quick and seamless access between different police systems. However, the inspection revealed good evidence in those forces of:
- corporate understanding of any risks associated with deficiencies in IT; and
 - effective management of those risks.
- 5.5 What was also evident in a number of the best-performing forces was the routine consideration of public protection requirements at the product specification stage of any new IT development. In other words, these forces also tended to demonstrate forward thinking in their approach to the management of intelligence, and to anticipate the need to capacity-build during IT development.
- 5.6 Overall, there were few readily identifiable trends in relation to each specific PVP area. However, there were a number of commonly occurring themes across all four:
- Lack of integration of IT systems remains a barrier to effectiveness, particularly in relation to access to information, co-ordination of intelligence and the flow of information, and effort (for example, double-keying).
 - There is a need to ensure that strategic intelligence requirements are properly managed and co-ordinated through the established National Intelligence Model (NIM) infrastructure, to improve tasking and co-ordination at all levels.

- There is further scope to exploit the use of analysis and intelligence techniques (such as NIM problem profiles and intelligence-led problem solving) across the four PVP areas; analytical capability is also an issue for some forces.
- There is over-reliance on co-location, of itself, to address the need to improve communication and information sharing across specialist disciplines.
- Front-line personnel (such as Community Beat Managers and Neighbourhood Policing teams) are underused in the intelligence-gathering process in specialist areas of business, and there is a need to consider:
 - the nature and scope of their involvement;
 - what needs to be put in place to support that involvement (for example, access to information and intelligence); and
 - co-ordination of effort.

CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

- 5.7 There is no scientific formula for the identification of risk of harm and assessment of safety of a child; and, in many cases, it may initially be unclear whether any offence has been committed. There are, however, a number of established risk factors which should be considered when determining whether a child is the victim of abuse and whether they are at risk of further harm. As the majority of concerns about children arise through routine contact with families by a range of agencies (such as social services, education and health), the true nature and extent of any risk cannot be accurately assessed until all relevant information has been shared. Furthermore, consideration has to be given to whether the circumstances present any risk to any other children. In all cases, however, the welfare of the child is paramount and investigations need to be developed with this objective clearly in mind.
- 5.8 *Working Together to Safeguard Children* (www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/workingtogether/) provides a well-established framework for multi-agency working and the identification, assessment and management of risk. Within this context, the importance of the strategy discussion cannot be overstated. It is the forum at which all relevant information is shared; where agreement is reached on the action to be taken to safeguard the child and provide support; where decisions are taken about who should be interviewed, by whom, for what purpose and when; where the way in which enquiries should be handled is planned; and where the needs of, and risk to, other children who may be affected are considered. Any information shared, all decisions reached and the basis for those decisions should be clearly recorded by all parties to the discussion.
- 5.9 Overall, the *Working Together* arrangements were found by the inspection to be well embedded in force policies and procedures. Although a number of forces were in the process of updating policy to take account of the reviewed guidance,⁴ other than those issues already highlighted in Chapter 4 and their impact on working practices, no specific trends were identified within the areas for improvement. The key difference

⁴ Reviewed guidance under *Working Together to Safeguard Children* was published in 2006.

between those forces graded as Good or better and those graded as Fair was, again, found to lie in the robustness of internal scrutiny arrangements, in that:

- forces that audited recording practices and carried out programmed reviews or health checks of critical areas (such as the quality of investigations and supervisory support, and compliance with policy on criteria for investigations and involvement in strategy discussions) were able to provide robust evidence of consistent performance; and
- when data from these activities, combined with other routine performance management information, was actively used to drive improvement, greater levels of proactivity and innovation were also found.

DOMESTIC ABUSE

5.10 The core aims of identifying, assessing and managing risk in the context of policing domestic abuse are:

- to **reduce the likelihood of future harm**, including the effects of further violence, serious injury and homicide on adult and child victims, future victims and the public; and
- to **facilitate the effective use of police powers** in protecting the public, investigating crime, targeting offenders, intelligence-led policing, reducing and preventing crime, narrowing the justice gap and contributing to the criminal justice system function of holding offenders accountable.

5.11 As with risk of harm to children, no scientific 'predictive formula' exists for the occurrence of future harm (including serious injury and homicide) in cases of domestic abuse, and there is no single nationally recognised risk-assessment tool or model for identifying and assessing risk in individual cases. However, research suggests that certain factors increase the likelihood of future harm, including homicide, and ACPO has issued guidance to police forces on the identification of established risk factors. These factors have been developed into the mnemonic SPECIAL CASES, which identifies the common 'risk indicators' which should be considered by forces when developing their own risk-assessment processes and tools.

5.12 By the time of the 2007 inspection, all forces had introduced formal risk identification and assessment processes, based primarily on one of two models. The first is commonly known by the mnemonic SPECCS+ and was first developed by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in 2004. This model allows for risk to be categorised as either 'standard', 'medium' or 'high', depending on an assessment of identified risk factors such as separation, escalation in violence, sexual assault and substance misuse. The second, commonly known as the Cardiff or South Wales model, was first developed by South Wales Police in 2002 and is based on key risk indicators identified from a review of past domestic homicides investigated by the force. The same three categories of risk are used but, following further assessment by specialist domestic abuse officers, 'very high' risk cases are identified for referral to Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) where specialist multi-agency responses are developed.

5.13 At the time of the inspection:

- 49% (21) of forces used a SPECCS+-based model;
- 16% (7) used a Cardiff-based model;
- 7% (3) used a combination of the two;
- 9% (4) had developed their own process directly from SPECIAL CASES; and
- 19% (8) had developed their own process from other sources.

In addition, 79% (31) of forces had introduced, or were in the process of introducing, MARACs.

5.14 Research shows that there are a number of key components of effective risk identification and assessment:

- Risk-assessment tools must be developed from a sound evidence and knowledge base using ACPO Established Risk Factors.
- Their introduction must be monitored and evaluated from the outset to ensure that they are properly validated.
- As risk is dynamic and changes (sometimes rapidly) over time, risk levels must be monitored to ensure that they are routinely reviewed when new information comes to light or as circumstances change.
- Risk assessments should be subject to regular audit and quality control.

5.15 Overall, irrespective of force gradings, the inspection highlighted the need for forces to ensure that:

- risk-assessment processes and tools were developed from a sufficiently well-informed knowledge base;
- risk-assessment processes and tools were properly validated and, where necessary, updated to take account of recent research and guidance;
- where MARACs had been implemented, existing force risk assessment processes were complementary to, and aligned with, those used within the MARACs model; and
- once the risk level had been identified, there was sufficient capacity to take action to reduce the level of risk and to ensure that risk was regularly reviewed.

5.16 The introduction of formal risk assessment and MARACs was also found to have had significant impact on the role and workload of specialist domestic abuse officers. Although the ACPO *Guidance on Investigating Domestic Abuse* was under review at the time of the 2007 inspection, the position taken for the purposes of the inspection was that, while the risk identification process could be undertaken by any police officer or member of police staff (based upon an awareness of established risk factors), the risk assessment and allocation of risk level should only be undertaken by domestic abuse officers with training in risk assessment and risk management.

5.17 This was the case in the majority of forces. In a number, however, there was an over-reliance on the specialist officers to act as 'gatekeepers' in ensuring compliance with force policy and procedures on incident response, as well as to quality-assure the risk identification process and carry out the final risk assessment. Where this was so,

the domestic abuse officer role was found to have become largely administrative, resulting in forces being unable to realise the full potential and benefits of developments in this area.

5.18 Forces were found to be in a better position to meet the overall demand in relation to domestic abuse where:

- independent internal audit and quality-assurance controls existed, thereby allowing specialist staff to remain focused on their core role and responsibilities;
- analysis of performance management information was undertaken as part of the audit process which, together with domestic abuse data (such as quantitative data on incidents attended and risk levels), was also used to monitor capacity and capability, as well as demand, so as to inform the strategic development of domestic abuse responses and services; and
- risk assessment processes were streamlined and efficient, but without compromising quality or effectiveness.

5.19 Finally, the drive to improve risk assessment in cases of domestic abuse has highlighted a number of vulnerabilities for the service as a whole:

- Knowledge of risk factors/indicators is still developing in this area and, although a number of common risk-assessment processes have been identified, no two forces use the same model or tool based on commonly understood risk factors/indicators.
- The lack of a common model or tool means that training provision is local. As a result, the timeliness, quality and effectiveness of training are variable and its suitability has not been tested. There was also evidence of risk assessments being carried out by untrained staff.
- There was evidence in some forces of a merging of the risk identification and risk assessment processes, with the potential for risk levels to be allocated on the basis of incomplete information and, again, by untrained staff.

PUBLIC PROTECTION

5.20 Within the context of offender management, risk assessment is the process of establishing:

- the likelihood of a behaviour or event occurring;
- the frequency with which it may occur;
- whom it will or may affect; and
- the extent to which the behaviour will cause harm.

5.21 Risk assessment sometimes involves each offender being categorised at a particular time as presenting a distinct level of risk. It also identifies the specific nature of the risk posed. Risk assessment is not, however, a precise science and relies on the correct use of both risk-assessment tools and professional judgement throughout. The standard assessment tool used by the police service is Risk Matrix 2000 (RM2000). This tool grades offenders according to their relative risk of reconviction for sexual or violent offences but does not indicate the seriousness of risk of harm to the public. As with all risk assessment tools, RM2000 has limitations. Its use, therefore, provides

the starting point for ensuring that offenders are referred to the appropriate MAPPA Level for risk management, but it is essential that the outcome of any risk assessment is considered within the context of all other available information about a particular offender.

5.22 The process of assessing risk is dynamic, and risk levels can increase or decrease depending on an offender's circumstances or environment. The agreed, standardised categorisation of risk for all MAPPA offenders is as follows:

- **Low** – there are no significant, current indicators of risk of harm.
- **Medium** – there are identifiable indicators of risk of harm. The offender has the potential to cause harm but is unlikely to do so unless there is a change in circumstances – for example, failure to take medication, loss of accommodation, relationship breakdown, or drug or alcohol misuse.
- **High** – there are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential event could happen at any time and the impact would be serious.
- **Very high** – there is an imminent risk of serious harm. The potential event is more likely than not to happen imminently and the impact would be serious.

5.23 Risk management involves the use of various strategies by the police, other agencies and the offender to reduce the risk posed by the offender. There are three Levels of risk management under the MAPPA framework:

- **Level 1** – Ordinary Agency Risk Management
This is used when the risks posed by the offender can be managed by the agency responsible for the supervision or case management of the offender. Other agencies may still be involved, but it is not considered necessary to use the MAPPA framework to facilitate this.
- **Level 2** – Active Multi-Agency Management (referred to as Level 2 MAPPA meetings)
This Level should be used where the active involvement of more than one agency is required, but where either the level of risk or the complexity of managing it is not so great as to require referral to Level 3.
- **Level 3** – Active Multi-Agency Management at Senior Management Level (referred to as Level 3 MAPPA meetings)
This Level is used to manage the 'critical few' cases where the offender requires the engagement of senior management and:
 - is assessed under specific risk-assessment processes as being at high or very high risk of causing serious harm; and
 - presents risk that can only be managed by a plan that requires close co-operation at a senior level because of the complexity of the case and/or because of the unusual resource commitments it requires; or
 - although not assessed as high or very high risk, the case is exceptional because the likelihood of media scrutiny and/or public interest in its management is very high, and there is a need to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system.

5.24 The MAPPA guidance established that offenders should be managed at the lowest Level that is consistent with providing a defensible risk management plan.

- 5.25 Each offender identified as falling within one of the MAPPA Categories or as a potentially dangerous person (see paragraph 5.35) should be the subject of a risk management plan. This should clearly identify the level of risk at which the offender is being managed, together with the rationale behind the risk level, and the multi-agency and police action being taken to manage the risk. The main risk management interventions available can be either restrictive (eg placing restrictions on the offender's activities) or constructive (eg sex offender treatment programmes) or both (eg home visits by both police and probation). The risk management plan should clearly identify any interventions used and outline what they are intended to achieve as well as how they will be enforced.
- 5.26 The Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR)⁵ is the primary tool for recording details of the management of relevant offenders, and the police are responsible for creating nominal records on ViSOR for all registered sexual offenders. Although the system was rolled out to the police service during 2005, ViSOR National Standards were not developed until 2008. Previous inspections have found that the absence of national standards has resulted in variations across forces in data input and data quality, particularly in relation to the recording of information from home visits, the comprehensiveness of risk management plans, evidence of supervisory endorsement and review, and timeliness of data input and update. This was reflected in the findings of the 2007 inspection, but with variations also being found across Basic Command Units (BCUs) in some individual forces.
- 5.27 Where areas for improvement were identified in relation to ViSOR use and maintenance, these either:
- tended to relate to specific practices that had developed within individual forces (such as the level of detail of information recorded and the way in which certain ViSOR attachments were used); or
 - were issues that were linked to ViSOR implementation (such as the extent to which antecedent information was inputted during back record conversion⁶ or record maintenance during ViSOR roll-out).
- 5.28 There were, however, two common features identified in those forces graded as Good or better that tended to be absent, or were insufficiently robust, in those forces graded as Fair:
- clear evidence of supervisory involvement in risk assessments, risk management plans and the monitoring of associated activities; and
 - regular, planned audits to test data quality.
- 5.29 Although lack of evidence of supervisory endorsements on ViSOR records did not necessarily reflect a lack of supervisory involvement in the case, the quality of information on ViSOR tended to be better where such endorsements were found.

⁵ ViSOR provides the police, probation and prison services with a confidential, shared national database to assist in the identification, risk assessment and management of certain types of offender. At the time of writing, ViSOR is being rolled out to both probation and prison services.

⁶ Back record conversion denotes the process by which information from paper records was transferred onto ViSOR.

In addition, where data quality was subject to independent testing by forces (ie beyond simple reliance on supervisors to dip-sample records), quality was consistent and there were few information gaps. In a small number of forces, audit information was also routinely fed into local ViSOR users' groups to consolidate learning and maintain consistency. The inspection evidence suggests that, where such activity has been taking place, these forces will be in a better position to meet the ViSOR National Standards (when published⁷).

- 5.30 Previous thematic inspections have found that, overall, the police contribution to MAPPA has been both significant and effective, and this was reflected in the findings of the 2007 inspection. Although some capacity issues remained, the steps taken by forces to address staffing levels and workload were realising benefits in terms of consistency of attendance, and appropriateness of rank of attending officer, at MAPPA meetings. A new, national issue emerged, however, in relation to the identification of MAPPA Level 1 offenders.
- 5.31 Although Levels of risk management do not necessarily equate directly to levels of risk, in general, the higher the level of risk, the higher the Level of risk management. The largest proportion of Category 1 and 2 offenders are managed at Level 1, with just under 80% of registered sexual offenders being managed at this Level, most of these offenders having been assessed as low- or medium-risk. While the MAPPA framework is clearly structured around multi-agency meetings at Levels 2 and 3, as MAPPA Level 1 offenders tend to be managed on a single-agency basis they are also managed outside this framework. As a result, process weaknesses have developed in relation to the identification of Level 1 offenders for the Responsible Authority as a whole.
- 5.32 In relation specifically to the police, in a number of forces (47% – 18 out of 39 forces inspected), it was found that decisions about whether a Category 1 offender could be managed at MAPPA Level 1, or should be referred to Level 2 or 3, were being left to individual public protection officers (with or without the involvement of supervisors) or following informal consultation with probation service staff. Although it is likely that the police will be the primary holders of information and intelligence about such offenders, there is a danger that the lack of a structured approach could result in information which could change an offender's risk level or MAPPA Level being missed.
- 5.33 In the remaining forces (53%), the need to ensure that the identification of MAPPA Levels was properly co-ordinated had resulted in a number of different approaches:
- centralised co-ordination for all potential MAPPA offenders – a structured referral/ notification process for all Categories of MAPPA offender, routed through the MAPPA co-ordinator, and with centrally managed consultation with other agencies;
 - centralised co-ordination for Category 1 offenders – similar to (a) above, but with referral routed through a nominated supervisor in the headquarters public protection (or equivalent) unit, and with centrally managed consultation with the probation service and other relevant agencies;
 - local co-ordination for Category 1 offenders – similar to (b) above, but with routing through nominated supervisors in local public protection (or equivalent) units, and locally managed consultation with the probation service and other relevant agencies;

⁷ The publication of ViSOR National Standards was imminent at the time of writing.

- d. joint-agency co-ordination – similar to (a) above, but with routing of Category 1 offenders through an identified police lead and of Category 2 offenders through an identified probation lead, with consultation and joint decision making taking place at the point of referral; and
- e. multi-agency co-ordination – multi-agency ‘pre-MAPPA’, ‘Level 1’ or ‘Level-setting’ meetings (mirroring the MAPPA Level 2 framework), where risk assessments are reviewed to take account of any additional information from other agencies, and where both the level of risk and the MAPPA Level at which the offender is to be managed are agreed on a multi-agency basis.

5.34 There remain risks associated with the first three approaches, in that they result in a high level of dependence on individual decision making at a critical point in the process – ie the point at which offenders enter MAPPA – and could also leave in gaps in consultation. The fourth approach was found predominantly in co-located units, where joint-agency co-ordination was already well embedded as part of the structure. The fifth is the most robust, but it is also the most resource-intensive, both for the individual agencies involved and for MAPPA as a whole.

5.35 For the police, there is a further group of individuals who, although falling outside the MAPPA criteria (and, therefore, cannot be managed under MAPPA), nonetheless need to be actively managed because of the potential risk of serious harm that they represent to the public. These individuals are known as potentially dangerous persons (PDPs). No legislation recognises their existence as a class of person and, indeed, until recently there has been no commonly accepted definition of a PDP.

5.36 This situation has been addressed within the recently published ACPO *Guidance on Protecting the Public*, which provides the following definition of a PDP:

A person who has not been convicted of, or cautioned for, any offence placing them into one of the three MAPPA Categories but whose behaviour gives reasonable grounds for believing that there is a present likelihood of them committing an offence or offences that will cause serious harm

together with guidance on the process for their formal ratification as a PDP and their management.

5.37 Although the facility exists to record and manage PDPs formally on ViSOR, the lack of a definition and management framework has meant that there has been no systematic process for gathering data on PDPs. The numbers currently being managed are therefore unknown. In addition, although the police service has always sought to identify and manage PDPs through existing intelligence-gathering and tasking and co-ordinating processes, the lack of a recognised framework has resulted in inconsistent, and in some cases ad hoc, arrangements being put in place.

5.38 The inspection found, for example, that only 59% (23) of all forces use ViSOR to record PDPs, with their identification being reliant on a variety of existing multi-agency risk assessment processes – for example, domestic abuse MARACs and mental health risk assessment meetings. That said, 30% (13) had introduced a formal process outside, but mirroring, MAPPA to provide a consistent and robust local framework for the identification and management of PDPs. This is likely to be a growing area of work in the future and forces need to ensure that they have the capacity and capability

to provide an appropriate response to managing the risks posed by PDPs as well as offenders within MAPPA.

5.39 Overall, the inspection found that there has been a strong focus across the service on ensuring that there is sufficient capacity to meet what has been a considerable and rapid growth in demand. For a number of forces, it will take time for the benefits of the improvements made to be fully realised, and this is reflected in the HMIC gradings. The main gaps between those forces graded as Fair and those graded as Good in relation to identification, assessment and management of risk now lie in:

- the ability of forces to develop a sophisticated understanding of demand which goes beyond caseload; and
- the capacity and capability to respond proactively to future challenges and demands.

MISSING PERSONS

5.40 The ACPO guidance categorises missing persons in three principal ways:

- **missing person who has voluntarily gone missing** – someone who has control over their actions and who has decided upon a course of action;
- **lost person** – a person who is temporarily disorientated and would wish to be found; and
- **missing person under the influence of a third party** – someone who has gone missing against their will.

5.41 A large number of missing person reports are made to the police annually. In particular, children in care who go missing from their care placements account for the greatest proportion of the missing person reports received by the police. Many children enter care because they have been abused, neglected or rejected by their families and, although no immediate danger may be identified, such children can be vulnerable to longer-term risk. Every report of a missing person, therefore, regardless of the circumstances, needs to be properly assessed to identify the level of risk.

5.42 The ACPO Guidance identifies three levels of risk which are defined as follows:

- **High risk** – the risk posed is immediate and there are substantial grounds for believing that the subject is in danger through their own vulnerability, or may have been the victim of a serious crime; or the risk posed is immediate and there are substantial grounds for believing that the public is in danger.
- **Medium risk** – either the risk posed is likely to place the subject in danger, or they are a threat to themselves or others.
- **Low risk** – there is no apparent threat of danger to either the subject or the public.

5.43 Risk assessment provides the basis for both priority and lines of enquiry. Although rare, missing persons investigations can quickly turn into critical incidents and it is essential that high-risk cases are identified as soon as possible and drawn to the attention of a supervisor. The ACPO guidance, therefore, emphasises the importance of obtaining detailed information from the outset, followed by continuous ownership of investigations, and robust day-to-day supervision through regular and structured reviews.

- 5.44 Good recording and information management systems are an important element of this process. At the time of the inspection, 37% (16) of forces had adopted the Community Policing and Case Tracking (COMPACT) system and 46% (20) were using facilities within existing IT systems or had developed their own systems in-house. Thirteen per cent (the seven remaining forces) were still using paper-based systems, and although most of these were in the process of developing IT solutions, it was found that lack of, or inefficient, IT support was hindering:
- consistency in recording of information (despite clear recording standards) and, consequently, the quality of risk assessment;
 - the timeliness of reviews;
 - the ability effectively to supervise and audit the quality of investigations and reviews and ensure policy compliance; and
 - the ability to produce management information in order to develop problem profiles.
- 5.45 Conversely, those forces graded as Good or better tended to have effective IT systems in place which allowed:
- ready access to information and intelligence, thereby improving intelligence gathering and the risk-assessment process;
 - clear ownership of investigations and supervisory reviews; and
 - the ability to test policy compliance and identify areas for improvement.
- 5.46 In addition, these forces also tended to demonstrate:
- well-developed intelligence-led approaches to missing persons investigations;
 - the development and use of problem profiles to identify opportunities for preventative work; and
 - well-developed partnership responses in priority areas such as children missing from local authority care placements.



6. Performance management

- 6.1 Performance management has emerged as a key theme that flows throughout this report. Performance management frameworks:
- provide the structure for ownership and accountability;
 - allow for trends in both good and poor performance and practice to be identified;
 - assist in the identification of gaps in service provision and help prioritise areas for improvement; and
 - enable the optimum use of resources.
- 6.2 The 2007 inspection showed that performance management was better developed in the areas of child abuse investigations and domestic abuse, but there were noticeable gaps in relation to public protection and missing persons. Although there is only one statutory performance indicator (SPI) in only one protecting vulnerable people (PVP) area (domestic abuse⁸), the absence of SPIs has not prevented a number of forces from developing a range of comprehensive performance measures. The following example is taken from Northumbria Police, which achieved an Excellent grading in the area of child abuse investigations.

Northumbria Police – child abuse investigation performance measures

- Number of joint visits carried out (percentage investigations)
- Number of initial Case Conferences (percentage attended)
- Number of review Case Conferences (percentage attended)
- Intelligence items submitted
- Detection rates
- Number of children taken into police protection
- Number of Child Concern Notifications received
- Number of requests for disclosure of material in family proceedings
- Number of s47 (child at risk) investigations
- Number of IMPACT Nominal Index (INI) checks carried out (percentage for s47 enquiries)
- Quality of Child Concern Notification
- Quality of assessment of risk posed to child
- Action taken to safeguard and promote child welfare
- Police checks including INI carried out to required standard
- Intelligence placed on criminal intelligence system and correctly rated
- Safeguarding of siblings/other children considered
- Information shared to assess child's needs (eg conference reports)
- Strategy discussion
- Participation in reviewing outcomes to child
- Referral of offender to MAPPA or non-MAPPA considered
- Police protection considered/carried out/correctly reviewed

⁸ SPI 8a, which is linked to domestic abuse: "Of domestic violence incidents, the percentage where an arrest was made related to the incident".

- 6.3 That said, previous thematic inspections have shown that, while a considerable amount of performance data and information can be gathered by forces, the reasons for the data collection are not always clear to those responsible for its collection and the managers to whom they report, and/or the gathering of data is driven by ease of collection as opposed to by its value. At its most extreme, this situation results in the data simply not being used.
- 6.4 These conclusions were echoed in the findings of the 2007 inspection, emphasising again the importance of ensuring that performance management is underpinned by clear lines of accountability and communication, robust internal scrutiny arrangements and sound governance. Two further considerations also emerged:
- The data/information collection process needs to be efficient to ensure that the effort required in data collection is balanced against its usefulness in practice.
 - Where performance indicators are set (for example, sanction detection rates) these need to be supported by:
 - accurate baseline data; and
 - diagnostic indicators to allow an accurate understanding of changes in trend.
- 6.5 Overall, there was a clear link between effective monitoring and effective performance, with the best-performing forces demonstrating a sophisticated understanding of capacity, capability and demand. Although several forces evidenced a considered and soundly implemented approach to performance monitoring and management, one force demonstrated a particularly robust and co-ordinated approach in this area, as outlined below.

Surrey Police – management data and performance monitoring

The force identified that:

- the volume of activity within the specialist units, particularly activity that was not performance-driven, was not being measured;
- there was a need to provide the ability to evidence the competing demands upon staff within the specialist units; and
- there was an opportunity to review and justify resource levels and funding, to verify compliance with force policy and procedures, and to examine the amount of work carried out with partner agencies.

In April 2006, a range of management and performance monitoring requirements was introduced, to be collected on a monthly basis. Where possible, automated data collection systems were used by the force's Corporate Development Department to capture the data. Key elements of the specialist units' data were extracted onto the force's corporate performance regime, within which Basic Command Unit (BCU) Commanders were already accountable to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) leads. Corporate spreadsheets were also developed and maintained within each BCU-based team with the aim of standardising key processes to be followed by specialists and supervisors and identifying resource requirements and productivity. Some of the data is indicative of compliance and performance, while other measures are indicators of volume.

A six-monthly performance assessment is produced which draws together the statistical data, the results of audits, and the outcomes from regular consultation with the specialist units. The assessment analyses all the data and information, presents conclusions and generates recommendations. The resultant product is used as a health check for each BCU-based unit, and its conclusions and recommendations are formally presented to BCU senior management teams by the head of profession and deputy. Further structured discussion then takes place as to BCU compliance with force policy, identified best practice, opportunities for performance improvement and a review of staffing levels.

This process has allowed greater understanding of variations in demand and response, informing caseload management and future resourcing, and has prompted a review of standard operating procedures. It has also generated improved understanding of the volume of work carried out with partner agencies and has led to an improved focus on priorities.

The need to monitor performance and build previously uncollected data in specialist areas, and the value of being able to do so, have been recognised at every level; and the process of reviewing the data required, and the way in which it is collected, in preparation for 2008 was already under way at the time of the inspection in 2007.



7. Training

- 7.1 Protecting the public from risk of harm is the responsibility of all police personnel, and it is important that staff at all levels are sufficiently well trained to equip them for their role. Different levels of skill and engagement, however, are required from different members of staff, and it is essential that those deployed in specialist roles are provided with tailored training to ensure that they can meet both the technical competencies and specialist knowledge requirements of their role.
- 7.2 Training resources are available from a range of national agencies and local providers, and several national training programmes have been developed for delivery locally. Although this means that training provision will vary from force to force, there are a number of specific training requirements that can be identified, particularly in relation to technical skills, within different specialist areas.
- 7.3 For example, investigation staff, including inspectors and sergeants, should undertake the Initial Crime Investigator's Development Programme (ICIDP). In 2003, the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) (then Centrex) also produced a modular training programme for all staff engaged in policing domestic abuse (including specialists) and, more recently, has developed the Specialist Child Abuse Investigation Development Programme (SCAIDP). Although there is currently no national programme available for public protection officers, there are a number of different courses to which forces can subscribe – such as the High Risk Offenders Course developed by Lancashire Constabulary and other specialist courses available through the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. In any event, training in the use of VISOR and Risk Matrix 2000 is essential for the role.
- 7.4 Training issues were frequently highlighted within the areas for improvement across all four protecting vulnerable people areas. Although many related to specific gaps in training provision within individual forces (for example, risk assessment training for domestic abuse officers or missing persons review processes for front-line supervisors), or poor access to training (for example, lack of protected time to complete e-learning packages), there were also a number of recurring themes:
- the establishment of multi-disciplinary units without the support of a co-ordinated training plan across the functions;
 - the absence of training for supervisors on the specialisms within their areas of responsibility;
 - lack of planned refresher training for existing post-holders;
 - reliance on e-learning or self-briefing, without follow-up to ensure the effectiveness of this approach in achieving learning outcomes; and
 - lack of structured training for non-specialist personnel.
- 7.5 Many of the issues highlighted were exacerbated by the absence of effective planning and/or poor co-ordination, resulting in inconsistent or ineffective delivery or difficulties in managing training abstractions. The demand for training across the service is such that competing priorities are stretching **all** forces. The inspection found, however, that forces were better able to balance demand with provision where training was well planned and effectively co-ordinated, and a number of key features were evident within those forces where this was the case:
- Succession planning was considered when projecting longer-term training requirements and demand, and/or an assessment of capability and need had been carried out in order to project priority areas for training provision.

- Mandatory requirements, based on essential training needs, had been set for individual roles, and role-related training was supported by regular training needs analyses.
- Learning from reviews and internal audits was considered in policy development and incorporated into training, and there was regular liaison with specialist training providers when reviewing training requirements.
- Opportunities for joint training with partners were optimised and joint training arrangements with partners were sophisticated, well planned and effectively co-ordinated.





8. Partnership working

- 8.1 Although the development of partnerships and multi-agency working is determined locally by individual forces and their partner agencies, there are specific common requirements or expectations on this issue in each of the four protecting vulnerable people (PVP) areas.
- 8.2 In relation to safeguarding children, the Children Act 2004 requires each local authority to establish a Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB). This is the key statutory mechanism for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will co-operate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in that locality, and for ensuring the effectiveness of what they do. Membership of LSCBs includes representatives of the relevant local authority and its board partners, notably the police and probation services, Youth Offending Teams, strategic health authorities and primary care trusts, NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts, the Connexions service, the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, Secure Training Centres and prisons.
- 8.3 Although there is no similar legislation in relation to domestic abuse partnerships, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a statutory duty on a number of Responsible Authorities, including the police, to work in partnership to reduce crime and disorder. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) are non-statutory, multi-agency bodies that match local authority boundaries and aim to bring together the different parts of the public, private, community and voluntary sectors at a local level. LSPs are essential to tackling multi-faceted problems such as domestic abuse which require a range of responses from different bodies. Community safety strategies have to be produced for each local government district. These strategies are produced by Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships after conducting an audit of the local crime and disorder problems, including domestic abuse.
- 8.4 Domestic abuse forums (or equivalent partnerships), with members drawn from a range of statutory and voluntary organisations, were established locally to assist in the delivery of crime and disorder targets, and their main activities include co-ordinating local services, developing and improving local service delivery, co-ordinating domestic abuse training for agencies, establishing direct services for victims and children, consulting with victims, and public education and prevention projects.
- 8.5 In the area of public protection, the legislation under which the Responsible Authority and the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) were established also requires a range of social care agencies to co-operate with the Responsible Authority in the assessment and management of risk in this area. These agencies include health, housing, education, social services, Youth Offending Teams, Jobcentre Plus and electronic monitoring services. In addition, the legislation requires that the Responsible Authority in each area keeps MAPPA under review with a view to monitoring their effectiveness and making any changes that appear necessary or expedient. Each MAPPA area, therefore, has a Strategic Management Board (SMB) to carry out the reviewing and monitoring functions of MAPPA.
- 8.6 Although it is for the Responsible Authority to determine the precise composition of the SMB, the MAPPA guidance strongly recommends that SMBs should include representatives from the key 'duty to co-operate' bodies, and that representatives should have sufficient seniority to enable them to contribute to developing and maintaining strong and effective inter-agency public protection procedures and protocols on behalf of their agency. For the police service, the appropriate rank for effective SMB membership is generally regarded as Assistant Chief Constable (or equivalent).

- 8.7 In terms of missing persons investigations, there is a range of national statutory and non-governmental organisations that play a role in the prevention and management of missing persons cases, and a large number of organisations offer assistance in matters relating to missing persons. As well as being the primary investigators of missing persons cases, the police are also the primary co-ordinators of the response from these other agencies. The ACPO *Guidance on the Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons* provides information and advice on a range of partnership resources, together with guidance on the establishment of protocols with other agencies. In particular, it commends the establishment of multi-agency partnerships between the police and organisations that run care homes, and the development of multi-agency problem solving.
- 8.8 Overall, the inspection findings showed that the concept of partnership working was well developed throughout the service as a whole and that statutory responsibilities in this area were being met. Some gaps were identified within individual forces, primarily in relation to partnership effectiveness in practice and/or robustness of partnership arrangements. The most frequently highlighted were:
- the need to develop multi-agency strategies to define common objectives and priorities for targeted partnership action;
 - insufficient use of partnership data to identify gaps in performance and service delivery across agencies, and to determine the strategic development of activities and service provision;
 - limited proactivity in identifying preventative opportunities and the need to develop partnership approaches to problem solving; and
 - the need to improve co-ordination of services and responses locally, including co-ordination of partnership service provision across the spectrum of vulnerability.
- 8.9 Although these were the most commonly raised areas for improvement in terms of partnership working within each of the four PVP areas, it is important to note that no single force demonstrated all areas for improvement in all areas. In other words, it was not unusual to find, in the same force, effective partnership arrangements and well-developed multi-agency working in one or more area (such as public protection or child abuse investigations), but a need for improvement in others (such as domestic abuse or missing persons). At times, this was due to lack of full engagement by some key partner agencies locally. On the other hand, the evidence showed that forces and partners were also:
- missing opportunities to learn from existing successful partnerships in their locality; and
 - missing opportunities to identify dependencies at partnership level and connect or link with associated partnerships (for example, domestic abuse and safeguarding children, or persistent missing persons and MAPPA offenders).
- 8.10 Partnerships work at a variety of levels and it is therefore not possible to be prescriptive about what is required to ensure that they result in effective multi-agency working and sustained achievement on the ground. What can be said from the inspection evidence, however, is that the most successful partnerships:
- began by clearly defining their purpose, priorities and objectives;
 - have a clear and shared understanding of different partners' roles and responsibilities;

- demonstrate a co-ordinated approach to problem solving, supported by effective use of partnership data to evaluate outcomes; and
- provide equitable and sustained commitment in terms of representation.

8.11 The following case studies have been drawn from the developing practice highlighted within the individual force reports. Each has a different focus, and while some illustrate the attempt to provide a practical response to a specific problem or issue, others show the development of a more co-ordinated strategic framework within which practical problems can be identified and addressed. Each, however, provides an example of how successful and sustainable outcomes have been achieved through effective partnership working.

Cheshire Constabulary – ‘Talk, Don’t Walk’: young missing persons

In 2002, Cheshire Constabulary data on young missing persons highlighted a growing problem in the Warrington area, with 820 reported incidents in that year alone, at a cost of £2,789,254.⁹

The force engaged with partners across both the statutory and voluntary sectors, as well as with at-risk groups and families, to develop the project. A detective officer with extensive background in the field of child abuse investigations was made available to co-ordinate referral into an engagement and assessment service, a consistent approach was applied to ‘return to home’ interviews, and support workers were provided to family members. This was accompanied by a significant awareness-raising programme, training of professionals, and the development of a 24-hour helpline, working in partnership with the National Runaway Helpline.

The police project workers’ role has become the template for best practice in missing from home co-ordination and has been replicated across the force. Over 390 young missing persons and their families have actively engaged in the preventative work; the number of incidents has fallen by 256 with associated cost savings of £1,064,679.

⁹ This includes the cost of both the missing persons investigations and the investigation of associated crimes committed by and against the missing persons.

Lancashire Constabulary – professionalising the investigation of sudden infant death with a multi-agency perspective

It was identified that there was a lack of consistency across the county and region with regard to working practices. There was no accurate data set for sudden infant death across the region, partnership working was limited and disparate, and only limited prevention work was being undertaken by all agencies.

A multi-agency protocol, owned and updated by the LSCB, was developed. All investigations are now led by the force major investigation team, which nominates a multi-agency investigation team. The force also hosted a multi-agency seminar, and the SUDI (sudden unexplained deaths in infants) prevention project was developed. The project analysed the socio-geographic impact of such deaths and, as a result of targeted prevention work, the project in Burnley saw a fall in infant deaths of approximately 60%.

The prevention project is now to be rolled out across Lancashire, with funding being sought through the hospital primary care trusts. A Lancashire protocol, police investigators' guide and written guidelines for all agencies have been developed, and work is progressing towards a regional protocol and robust audit process.

Merseyside Police – Wirral Family Safety Unit

Research carried out during 2004 highlighted that Wirral Basic Command Unit had a lack of provision in relation to multi-agency intervention and support for victims of domestic abuse and the recording of all incidents across the Wirral area.

The Family Safety Unit was set up to provide a co-located, multi-agency point of access to help victims gain safety and to co-ordinate appropriate agencies to meet individual need. The unit comprises a manager, two caseworkers/independent advisers, two seconded police officers (providing intelligence gathering and investigative support) and an administrative support officer. Two midwives and a general practitioner have been seconded to the unit from Wirral Primary Care Trust. Accommodation for acute cases identified through the risk assessment process is also provided.

Victims of domestic abuse are provided with a care package consisting of advice on a wide range of support and assistance, together with immediate access to a range of services at a single referral point. A web-based inter-agency monitoring database alerts all agencies to high-risk cases that require referral and immediate intervention. Wirral's specialist Domestic Violence Courts ensure that victims receive a premium service while cases are progressed through the criminal justice system.

In the first 16 months of its introduction, more than 420 high-risk victims were supported by the unit and the repeat victimisation rate for those using the service was 6%. At the time of the inspection, the unit had been invited to become the second National Centre of Excellence for Domestic Violence.

Northumbria Police – the Northumberland Tyne and Wear Paediatric Forensic Network Service

Funded by the police and the strategic health authority, this partnership provides a clinical network of paediatric consultants who are available throughout the year between the hours of 9am and 10pm, for the forensic medical examination of children who have been sexually abused, within a dedicated suite at the Royal Victoria Infirmary in Newcastle.

The clinical network has now been enhanced by the introduction of a paediatric forensic nurse examiner for a pilot 12-month period. This initiative is funded and managed by the strategic health authority and may be developed within the local Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC) to extend a similar service to adult victims of sexual assault.

The network ensures the availability of a forensic evidence-gathering service and the provision of appropriate accommodation. Effective management of the scheme is maintained through minuted joint meetings.

West Yorkshire Police – improving partnership working in relation to missing persons

The force identified the need to improve partnership working between statutory and voluntary agencies and to adopt a proactive, problem-solving approach in order to protect and support vulnerable missing persons and change missing person behaviour.

Three strategic action groups were formed – vulnerable adults, children and young people, and child sexual exploitation. Membership, terms of reference and action plans were agreed. Common definitions of 'missing' and 'temporary absence' were adopted and the roles and responsibilities of each agency were defined. Where required, procedural protocols and information-sharing agreements were developed and signed by the relevant partner agencies.

Multi-agency strategy meetings are held in relation to repeat missing persons in order to agree the pre-risk assessment, reporting strategies, enquiries to be conducted (and the agency by which they are to be conducted), return interview strategies, and partnership preventative plans.

An investigation strategy has been developed (subject to consultation at the time of the inspection), aimed at targeting individuals who present a risk to vulnerable missing persons, together with guidance on intervention options. Multi-agency action against child sexual exploitation meetings are held to identify links between missing persons and those who exploit vulnerable young people, in order to determine prosecution opportunities and action to be taken to protect vulnerable young people.

The force has seen a 40% reduction in missing persons reported to the police in the last two years, equating to a saving of 46,300 officer hours or £3,330,000 in the last year. Regular missing behaviour has reduced by at least 90%. The joint protocols have improved consistency and co-ordination of partnership activity across the force area.

- 8.12 At a strategic level, a further consideration for forces in this area relates to the development of Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA). An LAA is an agreement between a single-tier or county council and its partners and central government. It will set out local priorities for improvement, the indicators that will be used to measure progress on priorities, and targets for improvement. In determining priorities, there is an expectation that consideration will be given to inspectorates' assessments (among other sources of information). The intention is that there will be a new LAA in every area of the country by June 2008, covering the period from April 2008 to 2011.
- 8.13 CAA relates to the new assessment framework for councils and their partners in England. The CAA framework is concerned with outcomes delivered by councils working alone or in partnership (including with the private and third sectors), with a particular focus on the needs of those whose circumstances make them vulnerable. As well as council services, its scope encompasses services delivered in partnership, such as health and well-being; community safety and cohesion; sustainable communities; economic development; housing; and children's and older people's services.
- 8.14 The CAA assessments will draw on the new National Indicator Set – the menu of 198 indicators from which LSPs and Government Offices will identify up to 35 designated targets which reflect local priorities. Targets for these indicators will be agreed and included in the LAA. The new national indicators take effect from 1 April 2008.
- 8.15 Police authorities and forces working alone or in partnership will be subject to the new Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) being developed by the Home Office and HMIC. This will replace the current Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF).





Appendix 1

FORCE GRADINGS 2006 AND 2007 – PROTECTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE

| Force | Individual gradings 2007 | | | |
|---------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| | Child abuse investigations | Domestic abuse | Missing persons | Public protection |
| Avon and Somerset | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Bedfordshire | Fair | Poor | Fair | Fair |
| Cambridgeshire | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| Cheshire | Fair | Good | Good | Fair |
| City of London | Fair | Fair | Good | Good |
| Cleveland | Fair | Fair | Good | Good |
| Cumbria | Fair | Fair | Good | Poor |
| Derbyshire | Good | Fair | Good | Fair |
| Devon and Cornwall | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Dorset | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Durham | Good | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Dyfed-Powys | Excellent | Good | Good | Excellent |
| Essex | Good | Poor | Fair | Fair |
| Gloucestershire | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Greater Manchester | Fair | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Gwent | Poor | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Hampshire | Good | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Hertfordshire | Good | Fair | Good | Fair |
| Humberside | Fair | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Kent | Fair | Fair | Good | Fair |
| Lancashire | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| Leicestershire | Good | Fair | Excellent | Poor |
| Lincolnshire | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Merseyside | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| Metropolitan Police | Good | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Norfolk | Good | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Northamptonshire | Fair | Fair | Fair | Good |
| Northumbria | Excellent | Good | Good | Good |
| North Wales | Fair | Good | Good | Fair |
| North Yorkshire | Good | Good | Fair | Good |

Appendix 1

| Force | Individual gradings 2007 | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| | Child abuse investigations | Domestic abuse | Missing persons | Public protection |
| Nottinghamshire | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| South Wales | Fair | Fair | Good | Fair |
| South Yorkshire | Fair | Fair | Good | Good |
| Staffordshire | Good | Good | Fair | Fair |
| Suffolk | Poor | Fair | Good | Fair |
| Surrey | Excellent | Excellent | Good | Excellent |
| Sussex | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Thames Valley | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |
| Warwickshire | Good | Good | Fair | Fair |
| West Mercia | Good | Good | Good | Fair |
| West Midlands | Fair | Fair | Good | Fair |
| West Yorkshire | Good | Good | Good | Good |
| Wiltshire | Fair | Fair | Fair | Fair |

TOTAL NUMBER OF GRADINGS ACHIEVED

| Grading | Overall grading 2006 | Individual gradings 2007 | | | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| | | Child abuse investigations | Domestic abuse | Missing persons | Public protection |
| Excellent/Good | 3 | 20 | 14 | 22 | 18 |
| Fair | 32 | 21 | 27 | 21 | 23 |
| Poor | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 |





Appendix 2

DEVELOPING PRACTICE

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
|---|---|
| <p>AVON AND SOMERSET</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Mark Rolfe, Headquarters Public Protection Unit – 01275 816593</p> | <p>TITLE: Every Child Matters (ECM) officers</p> <p>PROBLEM: The ECM role has been created to support and manage the five key outcomes detailed in the Children Act 2004: be healthy; stay safe; enjoy and achieve; make a positive contribution; and achieve economic well-being. ECM officers identify and manage pre-child protection referral (s47/17) cases where children are either the victims or perpetrators of crime. They respond by jointly managing cases so as to reduce the need for future formal intervention.</p> |
| <p>CHESHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Constable Alison McCausland – 01244 614826</p> | <p>TITLE: 'Talk, Don't Walk' – tackling the issue of young runaways</p> <p>PROBLEM: 'Talk, Don't Walk' is a multi-agency project aimed at preventing and reducing incidents of runaway behaviour. Developed through engagement with partners and at-risk groups and families, it provides an engagement, assessment and support service. A significant awareness-raising programme has also been undertaken.</p> |
| <p>DERBYSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Police Constable Nev Coupe, Community Safety Team, St Mary's Wharf – 01332 613118</p> | <p>TITLE: Bullying/hate crime report form for people with learning difficulties</p> <p>PROBLEM: Known cases of bullying and hate crime suffered by adults with learning difficulties were not being reported to any agency. Working in partnership, a small group of people with learning difficulties designed a form for the initial reporting of bullying or hate crime. Post boxes were also designed and both forms and boxes have been situated in daycare centres and adult learning venues. The forms are collected by an employee of Advocacy, who carries out the initial assessment and signposts further action if necessary.</p> |

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
|--|---|
| <p>DEVON AND CORNWALL</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector RDS Brown – 01392 223709</p> | <p>TITLE: Development of a specialist service to undertake serious case reviews under Chapter 8 of <i>Working Together to Safeguard Children</i>, 2006 and reviews under s.9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004</p> <p>PROBLEM: It was recognised that processes for undertaking multi-agency serious case reviews were far from adequate, with reviews being undertaken in an inconsistent fashion, with overly long timescales and often by staff involved in the initial incident. Standards of reviews were poor. It was also identified that with changes in legislation there was going to be growth in multi-agency reviews, including reviews of domestic violence, mental health and vulnerable adults cases. The specialist service was developed to ensure that the force gains most benefit from reviews in terms of developmental learning and that they are undertaken in a timely, professional and consistent manner.</p> |
| <p>DEVON AND CORNWALL</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Steve Matthews, Director of Intelligence – 01392 452984/ steve.matthews@devonandcornwall.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE: MAPPA Improvement Development Team</p> <p>PROBLEM: The MAPPA Improvement Development Team (MIDT) was established to meet ongoing challenges faced by the MAPPA Strategic Management Board in relation to changes in legislation and the outcomes of a joint inspection and audit of cases by HMIC and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons. The MIDT now drives performance in a series of action-planned recommendations. The work of MIDT is commissioned by the Strategic Management Board, which then monitors progress through a ‘traffic-lighted’ continuous improvement database.</p> |

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
|--|--|
| <p>DEVON AND CORNWALL</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Inspector Ian Fraser-Roe – 01392 223709</p> | <p>TITLE: Introduction of an IT solution (Community Policing and Case Tracking (COMPACT)) to the management, recording and investigation of missing persons</p> <p>PROBLEM: The aims of the project were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to evaluate the business benefits of adopting an IT solution to the management of missing persons; • to identify and deliver structures to ensure effective information sharing between staff in closely related disciplines; • to develop a written accountability framework with clear lines of strategic and operational responsibility from practitioners to chief officer lead; • to create and implement partnership prevention strategies to reduce reports of young people missing from care; and • to devise and implement a central training package to improve staff awareness when dealing with missing persons. |
| <p>DORSET</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant John Merrick, Child Protection Investigation Unit, Police Headquarters – 01202 223887</p> | <p>TITLE: Multi-agency child abuse/vulnerable adult training</p> <p>PROBLEM: Child abuse training within Dorset Police previously lacked structure, co-ordination and agreed training pathways. In addition, due to limited vulnerable adult training opportunities, Dorset experienced a shortfall in trained staff, which had a negative impact upon performance, leading to delays in service provision. Through the appointment of a dedicated protecting vulnerable people (PVP) trainer (detective sergeant) working in parallel with the crime training department, Dorset Police has arranged, devised and delivered structured multi-agency training which includes safeguarding children, child protection matters and sexual abuse foundation training. Dorset Police has also negotiated with a local independent trainer and agreed with partner agencies to deliver a series of vulnerable adult investigator courses, the first of which was delivered in January 2007.</p> |

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
|--|---|
| <p>DORSET</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Ben Hargreaves – 01202 223598/ Ben.hargreaves@dorset.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE: Family justice centre project</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project was designed to address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • high attrition rates for the detection of rape offences; • limited service provision for vulnerable adults and child victims of domestic violence, sexual violence and abuse; • lack of joined-up partnership working providing primary care and aftercare; and • low public confidence in responsible agencies' ability. <p>Dorset Police, Family Matters, Relate, the local authorities and primary care trusts are working in partnership to facilitate the provision of an intimate assault resource centre (IARC) in Dorset. Both preventative and reactive, the IARC will bring together health, criminal justice agencies and the voluntary sector and will be tasked with providing holistic care to adult and child victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence.</p> |
| <p>DORSET</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Ben Hargreaves – 01202 223598/ Ben.hargreaves@dorset.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE: Domestic violence risk management process</p> <p>PROBLEM: The force recognised gaps in the identification and management of risk to domestic violence victims. Risk assessment and management were not an integral part of the investigation process. Where cases of risk were identified, there were no clear mechanisms for managing immediate risk. A process will be developed to generate proactively a skeleton domestic violence/crime record on all domestic violence incidents as part of the command and control log. The aim is to ensure that all domestic violence incidents are captured and flagged as such. The process will be supported by improved record management, supervisory review, and risk assessment processes. It will also incorporate the use of digital pen technology, which will allow data to be transmitted directly from the scene to the force computer, and will provide for early involvement of domestic violence officers in victim care and risk management.</p> |

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
|--|--|
| <p>DURHAM</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Lynne Davidson, Information Officer, Information Compliance Unit – 0191 375 2487</p> | <p>TITLE: Improved vetting procedure – Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service</p> <p>PROBLEM: Due to the high volume of paper research from the Police National Computer (PNC), the force IT systems MEMEX, I2, Disclose, Firearms and Protect, and the large amount of 'hits', it was difficult to keep track of decision making. A process was therefore introduced to improve vetting procedures by using record of research sheets, numbering incidents and placing them in sequential order, and sharing information with the public protection unit (PPU)/ area commands.</p> |
| <p>DYFED-POWYS</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Pam Kelly – 07980 726149 or 01267 226370</p> | <p>TITLE: Public protection staff workshops</p> <p>PROBLEM: Although force audits are undertaken, there was a clear need to allow specialist officers the opportunity to network and raise any policy or procedural concerns. On an annual basis, and in every case prior to implementing a change in policy or procedures, officers attend workshops either to discuss the proposed changes or to address policy concerns.</p> |
| <p>DYFED-POWYS</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Pam Kelly – 07980 726149 or 01267 226370</p> | <p>TITLE: Engagement of forensic medical examiners (FMEs)</p> <p>PROBLEM: Awareness was required as to roles and responsibilities of FMEs and paediatricians and there was a clear need to share good practice and areas of concern. On a quarterly basis FMEs, designated nurses for child protection and paediatricians now meet to discuss forensic medical issues. Dyfed-Powys Police has also held a multi-agency conference on forensic issues to enable practitioners to be updated on procedures and to share good practice.</p> |
| <p>ESSEX</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Ewen Wilson, Public Protection Unit, Headquarters Crime – Ewen.wilson@essex.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE: Domestic abuse – recording and investigation</p> <p>PROBLEM: It had become apparent that the standard of completion of the force domestic abuse form and combined risk assessment was poor and that in many cases the forms were not being completed either at the scene or subsequently. A domestic abuse 'toolkit' was created, containing all the paperwork required to be completed at an incident, whether a crime is identified or not. By completing all the relevant sections of the toolkit, officers would ensure they carried out the minimum standard of investigation/enquiry expected of them, thus providing a consistent level of service across the county.</p> |

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
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| <p>GLOUCESTERSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Simon Atkinson, Child Protection Investigation Unit – 01242 276196</p> | <p>TITLE: Child protection/need referral risk management</p> <p>PROBLEM: There was no consistency of decision making concerning child protection referrals and there was a danger that, through ad hoc application of criteria, risk of harm might be missed. A fundamental change was made to the internal reporting process and a restructuring of associated documents was completed. The process now ensures that supervisors have sight of each referral which is then graded according to defined levels of risk.</p> |
| <p>GLOUCESTERSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Simon Atkinson, Child Protection Investigation Unit – 01242 276196</p> | <p>TITLE: Serious case review roadshows</p> <p>PROBLEM: How to address the learning issues that arose from the examination of serious case reviews and how to communicate that learning to a wider audience. Specific learning opportunities have been identified for numerous agencies as a result of three recent local cases, as well as some national ones. A roadshow will now be delivered across the county, to get to the heart of the issues swiftly and pragmatically.</p> |
| <p>GLOUCESTERSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Steve McCormick – 01452 752200</p> | <p>TITLE: Risk management process for domestic violence</p> <p>PROBLEM: In 2005 it was identified that the force response to domestic violence was lacking a method by which harm reduction measures could be managed across the county. While work within the community protection teams dealt with individual cases perceived to be high risk, there was no mechanism for ensuring that all cases were managed to an appropriate standard and that input from partner agencies was formalised. A risk assessment process was implemented for all domestic violence incidents and a Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) process was instituted to manage the high-risk and very high-risk cases.</p> |
| <p>GLOUCESTERSHIRE</p> <p>(No contact provided)</p> | <p>TITLE: Initial MAPPA Level 2 meeting for all offenders convicted of/cautioned for a qualifying offence and offenders currently subject to notification requirements who move into the county from another area</p> <p>PROBLEM: The force has developed a process to ensure that all newly registered sexual offenders and sexual offenders who move into the county from another area are subject to a structured, multi-agency risk assessment process, to ensure that all available information is shared and an appropriate level of risk management is agreed on a multi-agency basis.</p> |

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| <p>GREATER MANCHESTER</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Jayne Shackleton – 0161 856 6573</p> | <p>TITLE: Domestic abuse information-sharing protocol and assessment threshold MARAC implementation guide and protocol</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project addressed the need to develop a set protocol to define the parameters for sharing information in relation to domestic abuse and to provide guidance on establishing and implementing the MARAC process consistently and corporately throughout the force.</p> |
| <p>HAMPSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Mark Ashthorpe – 01962 814899/Police Sergeant Melani Morgan – 0845 045 4545, ext 725366</p> | <p>TITLE: Hate crime MARAC</p> <p>PROBLEM: MARACs have proven very effective for high-risk victims of domestic abuse. Southampton Operational Command Unit has extended this practice of engaging stakeholders in a multi-agency approach to dealing with problems experienced by hate crime victims. This initiative is led by the City Council and the police but also engages partner agencies.</p> |
| <p>KENT</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Nora Chandler – 01622 650453</p> | <p>TITLE: Realising the potential of ViSOR</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project involved Kent (in the absence of ViSOR National Standards) creating standards for back record conversion and maintenance of ViSOR records at the point of implementation, to ensure a cohesive, corporate approach to creating, maintaining, archiving and transferring ViSOR records both within and outside the Kent Police area.</p> |
| <p>KENT</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Simon Wilson – 01622 652042/Detective Sergeant Louise Hunter – 01322 283067</p> | <p>TITLE: Community engagement project (North Kent Basic Command Unit (BCU)) – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: Limited data was available on the prevalence of domestic abuse within the South Asian community, which makes up 10% of the North Kent population. As a consequence, opportunities to detect and prevent domestic abuse specifically within this community could not be fully exploited. In collaboration with North-West Kent-based mental health charity Rethink and key partner agencies, the force established a steering group to sponsor targeted research within the South Asian community in order to inform and drive activity across a range of service disciplines. Data from a number of sources (including force domestic abuse reports) was combined to provide a problem profile and needs assessment for South Asian women that could then be addressed via a targeted partnership response.</p> |

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| <p>KENT</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Police Constable Dunn, Domestic Violence Co-ordinator – 01622 650454</p> | <p>TITLE: Domestic violence in the workplace</p> <p>PROBLEM: This initiative involved Kent working together with staff associations and UNISON to develop and put in place a comprehensive response to domestic violence in the workplace. The initiative covers a wide range of issues from reporting, information sharing, risk assessment and support to training, guidance and awareness raising.</p> |
| <p>LANCASHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Justin Srivastava, Force Major Investigation Team – 07852 310756</p> | <p>TITLE: Professionalising the investigation of sudden infant death with a multi-agency perspective</p> <p>PROBLEM: The SUDI prevention project and a multi-agency protocol have been developed to address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a lack of consistency across the county and the region with regard to working practices; • the lack of an accurate data set for sudden infant death across the region; • limited and disparate partnership working, particularly with paediatricians; and • limited prevention work being undertaken by all agencies. |
| <p>LANCASHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Conboye – 07903 653867</p> | <p>TITLE: The Awaken Project – child sexual exploitation</p> <p>PROBLEM: Following a major missing persons enquiry in November 2004, the Awaken Project was established with police, social services and health services to jointly finance and resource a specialist team to tackle child sexual exploitation issues from both a reactive and investigative perspective, and also a safeguarding of children perspective.</p> |
| <p>LANCASHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Tony Baxter, Force Major Investigation Team – 01772 416185/ tony.baxter@lancashire.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE: Creating an IT solution for the completion of risk assessments – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: Poor compliance by front-line officers in terms of gathering information about established risk factors from victims of domestic abuse led to the development of an IT solution for the completion of risk assessments.</p> |
| <p>LEICESTERSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Donna Thompson, Child Abuse Investigation Unit – 0116 222 2222</p> | <p>TITLE: Employment of police staff to attend child protection conferences</p> <p>PROBLEM: Due to workload capacity, child abuse investigation unit (CAIU) officers were able to attend only a small proportion of Case Conferences. Chief officers agreed the appointment of four police staff members, to be trained and dedicated to Case Conferences. This initiative outlines staff roles and responsibilities and Leicestershire's approach to Case Conference attendance.</p> |

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| <p>MERSEYSIDE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Dave Stubbs, Public Protection Unit – ext 74525</p> | <p>TITLE: Operation Goodwill – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: Research conducted on Wirral BCU over a two-year period identified a marked increase in domestic violence incidents over Christmas and New Year, when there was also a lack of support available. Operation Goodwill is an annual campaign which uses various methods of publicity, including local radio, television and newspaper coverage and poster messages, and which is adapted according to the target audience. For example, in 2004/05, offenders were informed that they “had no place to hide”. In 2005/06, children were advised “Don’t live in hell – tell”, and a package was developed for use in primary schools across Merseyside. Work on the most recent campaign began in 2006, with the target audience being black and other racial minority groups.</p> |
| <p>MERSEYSIDE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Lisa Mahon, Public Protection Unit – ext 74502</p> | <p>TITLE: Operation Oculate – public protection</p> <p>PROBLEM: Operation Oculate involves the investigation of a dangerous and violent offender who for several decades has targeted, intimidated and sexually abused young males across the North West.</p> |
| <p>MERSEYSIDE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Chief Inspector Holmes, Partnership Development Officer, Wirral BCU – 0151 606 5488</p> | <p>TITLE: Wirral Family Safety Unit – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: The Family Safety Unit was set up to provide a co-located, multi-agency point of access for individuals experiencing domestic abuse and violence and their children, with the following principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to help victims gain safety from domestic abuse and violence; and • to co-ordinate appropriate agencies to meet the need of the individuals. <p>Through the unit, individuals experiencing domestic abuse and violence are provided with an immediate range of support services at a single referral point ('one-stop shop').</p> |
| <p>METROPOLITAN POLICE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Acting Detective Superintendent Sandra Looby, Public Protection – 020 7321 7087</p> | <p>TITLE: Management of deported offenders</p> <p>PROBLEM: This initiative outlines a planned process put in place to address the need for improvement in the system of receiving intelligence on deported offenders, who may be subject to MAPP, landing at Heathrow Airport; and for measures to ensure that potentially dangerous offenders being repatriated into the UK are subject to a formal process of risk assessment, dissemination of intelligence and risk management.</p> |

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| <p>METROPOLITAN POLICE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Gerry Campbell – 020 7321 9127</p> | <p>TITLE: Territorial policing crime, Violent Crime Directorate high-risk interventions and proactive targeting</p> <p>PROBLEM: The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Violent Crime Directorate has a strategic intelligence unit that undertakes National Intelligence Model level 2 subject and problem profiling as one of its core duties. A process has been developed to task and co-ordinate resources centrally so as to ensure that the most dangerous targets are identified and appropriate resources assigned to tackle them.</p> |
| <p>METROPOLITAN POLICE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Acting Detective Superintendent Sandra Looby, Public Protection – 020 7321 7087</p> | <p>TITLE: Protocol with the Joint Border Operations Centre (JBOC) to identify ViSOR subjects</p> <p>PROBLEM: The MPS has agreed a protocol with the JBOC, based at Heathrow Airport, whereby certain passenger manifest lists are compared with the PNC to identify ViSOR subjects. The protocol details actions to be taken in urgent cases, including dealing with any child protection issues identified, whether in the UK or overseas. It also provides the opportunity to alert a foreign authority to any risks or intelligence (depending upon the offender's profile) derived from ViSOR.</p> |
| <p>METROPOLITAN POLICE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Caroline Bates, Child Abuse Investigation Command</p> | <p>TITLE: The MPS Child Abuse Investigation Command training programme</p> <p>PROBLEM: There have been deficiencies in working practices, language, aims and priorities across the discipline of protecting children and investigating abuse of children, as highlighted in the Laming, Kennedy and Bichard reports. This training programme was developed to address the key training challenges of improving standards of child abuse investigation and the sharing of information.</p> |
| <p>NORTH YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector A Carey/ Detective Inspector M Moore</p> | <p>TITLE: Sudden unexpected death in infancy</p> <p>PROBLEM: Lack of awareness and knowledge of Kennedy procedures across all agencies involved in child protection matters necessitated the delivery of a multi-agency training day by police and health. The training was based on two local case studies, presented by practitioners involved, and included a presentation by a paediatric pathologist to explain his role and responsibilities and to highlight his requirements prior to a post-mortem, including gathering of evidence and risk factors.</p> |

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| <p>NORTH YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector A Carey/ Detective Inspector M Moore</p> | <p>TITLE: Checks on the IMPACT Nominal Index (INI)</p> <p>PROBLEM: To improve performance in this area and ensure clarity in relation to who should be checked on INI and when, the force has developed a specific directive on INI checks.</p> |
| <p>NORTH YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector A Carey</p> | <p>TITLE: Development of child protection units (CPUs)</p> <p>PROBLEM: There were no dedicated/specialist officers to deal with domestic violence (domestic violence co-ordinators were in place to identify various levels of concern for victims and to liaise with other agencies, but had no offender focus). Also, there were no links with other vulnerable persons disciplines (missing persons, hate crime, harassment, child protection). This project was the force's response, with the introduction of CPUs on areas to deal with domestic violence offenders, domestic violence victims, vulnerable victims of crime, hate crime and harassment, and management of missing persons.</p> |
| <p>NORTH YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector A Carey</p> | <p>TITLE: Special court for domestic violence</p> <p>PROBLEM: Lack of dedicated provision for domestic violence cases led to Scarborough successfully bidding for Home Office funding to introduce special courts for domestic violence. A trial period commenced in December 2006 and continued until the end of March 2007. Some of the funding has been given to Victim Support to provide a 24/7 call-line advocate who will offer support and advice to victims. The police has provided training and input to partner agencies within the criminal justice system (including magistrates) and the voluntary sector, in order to explain how the process will work.</p> |
| <p>NORTHUMBRIA</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Max Black – 07771 824532</p> | <p>TITLE: The Northumberland Tyne and Wear Paediatric Forensic Network Service</p> <p>PROBLEM: There was a need for provision of forensic examination services for children who have been sexually abused. Funded by the police and the strategic health authority, the Northumberland Tyne and Wear Paediatric Forensic Network Service is a network of paediatric consultants who are available throughout the year between the hours of 9am and 10pm to conduct forensic examinations of children who have been subjected to sexual assault.</p> |

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| <p>NORTHUMBRIA</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Max Black – 07771 824532</p> | <p>TITLE: The End the Silence domestic abuse awareness and enforcement campaign</p> <p>PROBLEM: This campaign was designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • increase the confidence of victims/survivors in reporting incidents; • protect victims/survivors better; • deter offenders; and • increase the arrest rate and positive disposal rate in domestic violence incidents. <p>A training programme is to be rolled out to all front-line staff to ensure that the impetus of the campaign continues; and a quality-assurance programme has been introduced, involving all neighbourhood inspectors, to ensure that performance continues to improve.</p> |
| <p>NORTHUMBRIA</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Max Black – 07771 824532</p> | <p>TITLE: Use of Offender Management Officers in the management of low- and medium-risk sex offenders</p> <p>PROBLEM: To provide resources to ensure the effective management of registered sexual offenders residing in the Northumbria Police area, Offender Management Officers, who are police staff, are now in place at five of the force's six BCUs. Members of staff are directed by management within the BCU PPU and have received Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre sex offender training and Risk Matrix 2000 training. They are also ViSOR-trained. Members of staff carry out home visits on low- and medium-risk sex offenders, ensuring that all offenders are visited every six months, and make sure that ViSOR is accurately updated.</p> |
| <p>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Dave Taylor – 07970 263204</p> | <p>TITLE: Child abuse referral process</p> <p>PROBLEM: An internal review identified a number of problems with the child abuse referral process. In addition, it was recognised that management information did not address case progression or identify blockages sufficiently early to expedite decision making and the resolution of abuse allegations. A detailed process map was prepared to identify key decision points and key process points at which progress could be evaluated, and to provide a point of reference for any officer needing to obtain information on the referral process. The process mapping was conducted as a joint exercise and was subject to considerable checking and validation to ensure that data capture points, key performance indicators and efficiency issues were recorded and understood.</p> |

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| <p>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Jackie Alexander, Head of Public Protection – 07799 656588</p> | <p>TITLE: Nottingham City and Nottinghamshire Safeguarding Children Boards protocol on referral criteria and information sharing relating to concerns of harm arising from sexual activity of young people under the age of 18</p> <p>PROBLEM: While the new national <i>Working Together</i> guidance makes recommendations for information sharing between agencies in respect of under-age sexual activity, there is no national protocol. The force has led on the introduction of a protocol between agencies, launched by the two relevant Local Safeguarding Children Boards. It recognises the balance between giving young people access to safe, confidential health services and promoting and safeguarding their welfare.</p> |
| <p>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Jackie Alexander, Head of Public Protection – 07799 656588</p> | <p>TITLE: Co-working Improvement Group (co-location group) – public protection</p> <p>PROBLEM: A co-located team, initially comprising mostly police and probation staff, was formed in 2005 to identify opportunities for police and probation staff throughout Nottinghamshire to work together more effectively. The remit was then broadened as the group identified that reviewing and sharing the public protection working practices of each agency could achieve more. This resulted in the team being renamed the Co-working Improvement Group in 2006, with membership widened to include representation from the Youth Offending Teams.</p> |
| <p>NOTTINGHAMSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Jackie Alexander, Head of Public Protection – 07799 656588</p> | <p>TITLE: COMPACT compliance/establishment of silver missing persons group</p> <p>PROBLEM: In late 2005, anecdotal evidence suggested that the force database for recording missing persons cases was not being used systematically or in accordance with force policy. An independent, detailed audit was commissioned by the force lead for missing persons to quantify the extent of COMPACT non-compliance. This case study outlines the steps taken by the force to secure improvements, together with achievements and benefits gained.</p> |

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| <p>SOUTH WALES</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Peter Doyle – 01656 305916</p> | <p>TITLE: Protocol on children who display sexually harmful behaviour</p> <p>PROBLEM: There was a failure to recognise that children and young people who commit sexual offences may in fact be victims of abuse themselves. A protocol has been developed between South Wales Police, local authorities in South Wales, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Barnardo’s Taith Project. The protocol triggers a process whereby an accused child/young person is bailed for 28 days (depending on the severity of the offence) pending a psychological assessment into their sexual offending by the Barnardo’s Taith Project. During this 28-day period, strategy meetings are held and the root cause of the offending behaviour is highlighted. This protocol will go on to provide further support and action plans to address the offending behaviour of the child/young person.</p> |
| <p>SOUTH WALES</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Marc Lamerton, Public Protection – 01656 303464</p> | <p>TITLE: Vulnerable missing person training exercise</p> <p>PROBLEM: A training need was identified in relation to the strategic and operational management of high-risk missing persons. Using the force immersive learning HYDRA system, a one-day exercise was developed. The scenario progressed from an initial missing person report to child abduction, with information being fed into the training syndicates in relation to what actions/policies the officers would follow, with debriefs after every session. Some 80 senior officers from inspector to superintendent ranks participated; roles were represented from bronze/silver commanders to senior investigating officers.</p> |
| <p>STAFFORDSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Sergeant Susan Bufton, Child Abuse Investigation Unit – 08453 302010, ext 5231</p> | <p>TITLE: CAIU – bespoke officer personal safety training (OPST)</p> <p>PROBLEM: CAIU officers routinely visit offenders and injured parties at home, or in circumstances where potential conflict can be difficult to assess, and the need for a more bespoke package was identified. The force OPST staff consulted with CAIU staff and have designed a bespoke training course to address the particular issues faced by CAIU officers, whether in people’s homes, workplaces or interview suites, or within multi-agency settings such as Case Conferences.</p> |

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| <p>STAFFORDSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Chief Inspector Adrian Roberts – 01785 233019/Acting Inspector Emma Griffiths – 01785 234790</p> | <p>TITLE: 999 Web Player – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: To improve the investigation of domestic violence and support for the relevant criminal justice processes, a pilot on Trent Valley division has now been rolled out across the force whereby all trained custody officers, domestic violence officers and those with key supervisory roles have access to Web Player. Among the benefits gained, all domestic violence investigations can now include the initial call evidence contained on Web Player before any case decision is reached.</p> |
| <p>STAFFORDSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Constable Mark Blandford, Public Protection Unit – 01785 232032</p> | <p>TITLE:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development of a wider understanding of MAPP 2. Development of a national training strategy for the police service and other agencies <p>PROBLEM:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A single resource was created in the form of a Staffordshire MAPP CD-ROM, offering four levels of access and detailed information on MAPP, according to the needs of the enquirer. 2. Dialogue was established with the Home Office and the National Policing Improvement Agency (formerly Centrex), which led to the creation of a training reference group and the development of a national training programme. Staffordshire's HQ-based PPU is currently working closely with the National Policing Improvement Agency project board, providing ongoing subject expert guidance on the programme. |

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| <p>SUFFOLK</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Debbie Griffiths – 01473 613806/Debbie.Griffith@suffolk.pnn.police.uk</p> | <p>TITLE:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. COMPACT 2. Managing repeat missing persons (Mountains to Molehills) <p>PROBLEM:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. COMPACT was implemented in October 2004 to professionalise the management of the missing persons investigation process. There was a staged implementation throughout the force, and COMPACT has been fully operational in Suffolk since June 2005. At the same time, force procedures were rewritten in accordance with the National Centre for Policing Excellence guidance on the management, recording and investigation of missing persons. 2. A number of joint agency seminars were held to agree a joint protocol, resulting in some important changes in the way that care homes report children as missing. There are now a number of stages to be completed before a child is reported as missing and subsequently recorded on COMPACT. |
| <p>SURREY</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Public Protection Strategy Unit, Surrey Police Headquarters, Guildford – 01483 484807</p> | <p>TITLE: Management data and performance monitoring</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project involved Surrey Police developing and introducing a range of management and performance monitoring requirements for the BCU-based public protection investigation units (PPIUs) to address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • measurement of volume of activity that was not performance-driven; • the need to evidence the competing demands upon the PPIUs; and • the opportunity to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – review and justify resource levels/funding; – verify compliance with force policy and procedures; and – look at the amount of work carried out with partner agencies. |

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| <p>SURREY</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Public Protection Strategy Unit, Surrey Police Headquarters, Guildford – 01483 484807</p> | <p>TITLE: Training</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project involved Surrey Police addressing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the lack of a formalised structure of training across all public protection disciplines; • the need to link in with the training department to produce accredited and standardised training in public protection on a corporate basis; • the need to raise the profile of public protection through specialised training; • the need to quality-assure public protection training against the Centrex learning packages; and • the need for early identification of suitably skilled and trained officers for roles within public protection. |
| <p>SURREY</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Public Protection Strategy Unit, Surrey Police Headquarters, Guildford – 01483 484807</p> | <p>TITLE: Consultation</p> <p>PROBLEM: This project involved Surrey Police developing and introducing customer survey questionnaires for officers to use (with consent) in relation to victims of, and carers of those affected by, child abuse and domestic abuse, and those who have either reported or have been reported as a missing person.</p> |
| <p>THAMES VALLEY</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector T Price, Force Crime Management Unit – 07970 145791/Chief Inspector I Beckett, Access to Services – 07970 145380</p> | <p>TITLE: Introduction of the missing persons database</p> <p>PROBLEM: Missing persons reports were managed using paper records held on the local police area, combined with a sometimes lengthy command and control message holding a list of enquiries and actions. This case study outlines in detail the benefits gained from the introduction across the force of a single computerised database for missing persons. The project was completed at the end of 2006. Each BCU now has a dedicated missing persons co-ordinator to manage reports, and reporting and risk assessment have been incorporated in the force standard operating procedures.</p> |

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| <p>WARWICKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Nigel Jones – 01926 415959</p> | <p>TITLE: PVP Referrals Unit</p> <p>PROBLEM: Officers working in the child protection and domestic abuse units were spending a large part of their time conducting administrative tasks such as receiving referrals, conducting database checks and recording cases on the child protection and domestic abuse case administration tracking system. The child protection central referrals and assessment unit was established in October 2005 to facilitate the provision of a safe, consistent and accessible service for reports of child abuse. The improvement in working practices was a response to the recommendations of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry, and was linked to the Citizen Focus programme in terms of developing service delivery. In May 2007 the unit was relocated to force headquarters and expanded to include domestic abuse and public protection, which together with the former child protection, unit now form a co-located PVP department. The name of the unit has been changed to the PVP Referrals Unit to reflect this expansion of responsibility.</p> |
| <p>WEST MERCIA</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Superintendent Martin Lakeman – 01905 747062</p> | <p>TITLE: Managing risk within communities through local policing teams (LPTs) (the 'jigsaw effect') – public protection</p> <p>PROBLEM: The force needed to integrate PVP issues fully into LPTs. In simple terms, this meant informing LPTs of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • where risk existed in the form of domestic abuse victims and perpetrators; • the identity, location and conditions of registered sex and other dangerous offenders; and • details of priority, prolific and persistent young offenders living within each local policing area. <p>These details needed to be provided in an easily accessible format which also addressed the sensitivity of such information. This case study outlines how the force developed an IT solution which provides information to LPTs through the local policing page on the force intranet, with built-in audit and tracking of access.</p> |

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| <p>WEST MIDLANDS</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Barton, Child and Adult Protection Unit, PO Box 52, Lloyd House, Colmore Circus, Queensway, Birmingham B4 6NQ</p> | <p>TITLE: 999 call protocol – domestic abuse</p> <p>PROBLEM: The problem was how to identify sources of independent, supporting evidence in cases of domestic abuse. To fulfil this aim, the use of 999 calls as evidence was promoted in the force, albeit with a recognition that certain problems needed to be overcome. A service level agreement between Operational Command Units and the force control centre has been agreed, and a protocol established for the supply of 999 call recordings relating to suspects in custody for domestic abuse offences. This provides investigating officers with real-time evidence to use in suspect interviews.</p> |
| <p>WEST MIDLANDS</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Chief Inspector Gary Campbell – 0845 113 5000, ext 7800 2967</p> | <p>TITLE: Pan-Birmingham multi-agency public protection panel (MAPPP)</p> <p>PROBLEM: The West Midlands Mediation and Transformation Service (WMMTS) is a limited company, established in late 2004, that emerged from dialogue between police and the community on the escalation of gun-related violence. It is now an integral part of an overall strategy designed to address gang violence across Birmingham. However, the members of WMMTS became increasingly aware that they needed support from other agencies to meet the needs of their clients. The public protection officer strategy and MAPPA are well established within the force area; when the force was approached by WMMTS for a solution it was able to use lessons learnt from those agencies to establish the Pan-Birmingham MAPPP. The panel is currently managing a small number of individuals who are all potential proactive leaders of gangs involved in gun crime.</p> |
| <p>WEST YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Marianne Huison – 01924 821479</p> | <p>TITLE: Improving the police response to domestic violence</p> <p>PROBLEM: Positive action was not always being taken by officers attending domestic violence incidents, and prosecutions were being lost due to lack of support from the victim. This initiative involved a range of action taken by the force, including training, intrusion supervision, a senior management team review process and the establishment in Bradford South of a vulnerable victims unit and specialist domestic violence offender unit.</p> |

Appendix 2

| Force and contact | Developing practice |
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| <p>WEST YORKSHIRE</p> <p>FORCE CONTACT: Detective Inspector Alan Rhees-Cooper – ext 22346/mobile 07736 087065</p> | <p>TITLE: Missing persons – partnership working</p> <p>PROBLEM: This case study describes how the force has improved partnership working between the statutory and voluntary agencies in West Yorkshire, to protect and support vulnerable missing persons and change missing behaviour using a problem-solving approach. It outlines in detail how the force has developed its partnership approach to missing persons at strategic and operational levels, and the benefits gained.</p> |

The report is available in alternative languages and formats on request.

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