

PEEL 2025–27

Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy

An inspection of West Yorkshire Police

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Overall summary

Our judgments

Our inspection assessed how good West Yorkshire Police is in eight areas of policing. We make graded judgments as follows:

Outstanding	Good	Adequate	Requires improvement	Inadequate
		Police powers and public treatment	Leadership and force management	
		Preventing and deterring crime	Developing a diverse and inclusive workforce	
		Responding to the public	Investigating crime	
			Safeguarding children and adults	
			Managing fraud	

We set out our detailed findings about things the force is doing well and where the force should improve in the rest of this report.

We also assess the force's performance in a range of other areas, and we report on these separately. We make graded judgments for some of these areas.

PEEL 2025–2027

In 2014, we introduced our police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) inspections, which assess the performance of all 43 police forces in England and Wales. Since then, we have been continuously adapting our approach.

We have moved to a more [intelligence](#)-led, continual assessment approach, rather than the annual [PEEL inspections](#) we used in previous years. We assess forces against the [characteristics of good](#) performance, set out in the [PEEL assessment framework 2025–2027](#), and we more clearly link our judgments to [causes of concern](#) and [areas for improvement](#).

It isn't possible to make direct comparisons between the grades awarded in this PEEL inspection and those from the previous cycle of PEEL inspections. This is because we have increased our focus on making sure forces are achieving appropriate outcomes for the public. We have also changed the aspects of policing we inspect and added new areas.

Terminology in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, 'national' definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, 'national' means applying to England or Wales, or England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England, Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom.

About the data

For more information on data and analysis in this report, please [see the 'About the data' section of our website](#).

HM Inspector's summary

I am satisfied with some aspects of the performance of West Yorkshire Police in keeping people safe, reducing crime and providing an effective service to [victims](#).

The force has made improvements since our last inspection, particularly in its use of police powers, performance data and personal development review processes. The force also demonstrates good financial management and understanding.

However, I have concerns about how it is managing demand, investigating crime, and [safeguarding children](#) and [adults at risk](#) of harm. We found that some governance meetings weren't taking place or were ineffective. We also found some examples of poor leadership.

The force has strategic plans and a performance framework in place. Its funding is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

[Since our last inspection](#), the force has promoted one of its experienced senior leaders to the role of deputy chief constable and has made other significant appointments at [chief officer](#) level to work with the chief constable.

During our inspection, we gave the force feedback, which it acted on at pace. This has included putting in place appropriate performance measures and scrutiny. We saw some positive improvements but was too early for us to say if they would lead to sustained performance improvement. I am confident that the current force leadership will continue in this positive direction.

The force needs to further improve how the wider leadership team promotes cultural change and works with and supports its workforce. It should use data more effectively to inform its decision-making.

The workforce feels supported by immediate supervisors, but not always by senior leaders. Some investigation teams are facing high workloads, which is affecting some people's well-being. It was disappointing to hear that the force isn't always providing trainee investigators with effective support throughout their training. However, I was pleased to see that the force has responded promptly to rectify this.

The force has effective internal and external oversight of [stop and search](#) and use of force powers. It has also further improved how it records the grounds for using these powers. But the force should focus on improving [officers'](#) understanding of how to safeguard children involved in stop and search and use of force incidents. And it should address the backlog of officers with expired personal and public safety training.

[Neighbourhood policing teams](#) are well resourced. However, officers told us the force regularly [abstracted](#) them over the summer period to cover other areas of policing. This affected their ability to provide a visible presence and carry out work in their communities. The force has since introduced new processes to record abstractions so that it can better manage and understand their impact. During our inspection, we saw some improvement in the way the force used problem-solving plans. This is positive, but there is more work to do.

The force shows consistently strong performance in answering emergency and non-emergency calls. The rate of abandoned calls is low. In addition, it accurately assesses risk and the vulnerability of the caller to decide the appropriate response. In 2025, it introduced Operation Rapid to improve its response to [domestic abuse](#) calls. This was challenging for the [control room](#) and significantly affected attendance times. The force responded quickly to feedback and made improvements. The force should continue its focus on improving how quickly its officers attend incidents.

The force is achieving better outcomes for victims of crime. These are now just within the typical range in England and Wales. But the force needs to improve further. During our inspection, we found many officers had high workloads and were struggling to cope with the demand. In October 2025, the force introduced a new crime allocation policy, which has improved this. The force should make sure that officers have the right skills and experience to investigate crimes they are allocated. It also needs to make sure that supervisors effectively oversee investigations and that all investigative opportunities are progressed. This will help to make sure victims get the service they deserve.


Disappointingly, we found that there had been little progress in some safeguarding [areas identified for improvement](#) during our last inspection. The force has started to make improvements in secondary [risk assessments](#). It has begun to introduce processes to share information more consistently with partner agencies in its [multi-agency safeguarding hubs](#). If the force sustains this improvement, it will help keep children safe.

The force needs to make further improvements in how it shares the learning from statutory reviews and how it manages the disclosure of information to [Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme](#) applicants to better safeguard people who may be vulnerable.

The force also isn't always following its policy for [missing people](#), and completing risk assessments and [Niche](#) records when appropriate. The force should review this policy and its processes to make sure it provides the right response when people are reported missing from home.

The force assesses the threat from fraud and understands how this affects its communities. It should make sure that it has the capability and capacity to manage fraud demand and improve how it allocates fraud investigations and trains its workforce.

My report sets out the more detailed findings of this inspection. But I am optimistic that the leadership team, together with its committed officers and [staff](#), will continue to make progress on the areas for improvement identified during this inspection. I will continue to monitor this progress.



Michelle Skeer OBE QPM

His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Leadership and force management

Requires
improvement

West Yorkshire Police's leadership and force management require improvement.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to make sure that governance arrangements appropriately identify and resolve areas of risk and underperformance

Since [our 2023–25 police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspection of West Yorkshire Police](#), the force has improved its governance structure.

We observed performance meetings where it held leaders to account. It has improved access to detailed performance and management data to support this.

For example, a strategic daily management meeting reviews performance against force priorities. This same performance data is used in district meetings to make sure their approach and understanding is consistent. Each district also holds a weekly threat meeting to discuss progress against priorities.

The force has plans to maintain this improvement in the future, including reviewing the strategic workforce plan and the governance that underpins it.

This is positive, but we also found the force still wasn't detecting some areas of risk.

For example, we found the force placed crimes in lists known as 'hoppers' for supervisors to review and allocate to investigators, including in patrol teams. But we found hundreds of crimes in these queues that weren't allocated promptly to [officers](#) to investigate. And some teams created additional hoppers to hold crimes for a period of time before allocation.

The performance meetings didn't effectively oversee how long the crimes were unallocated or identify that some teams had their own lists.

We also found delays in the force [crime management unit](#) allocating crimes for investigation. The unit makes sure crimes are recorded correctly and allocated to the right teams based on the force's policy. But during our inspection we found significant delays in crimes being allocated to the right team. The force didn't understand or mitigate this enough.

The force's governance arrangements failed to identify and address challenges from its introduction of Operation Rapid, an initiative to improve the response to incidents of [domestic abuse](#). Under the initiative, the force made these a priority, requiring a response within an hour. But this had the unintended consequence of creating a huge backlog of incidents, including reports of sexual offences and [child](#) abuse, that the force was unable to respond to, sometimes for weeks.

In October 2025, the force introduced a revised crime allocation policy. Before then, we found districts allocating crime in different ways. The revised crime allocation policy resolved this, but we continued to find examples of geographic variation. For example, we found some districts didn't follow force policy on deploying recruited officers. We also found districts stored and shared [safeguarding](#) information differently.

Sometimes demographics and geography influence how a policy is implemented operationally. But it isn't clear if all the different ways of working were intended or if the force was aware of them through its governance arrangements.

The force should make sure that it uses its governance and performance structures to appropriately identify and resolve areas of risk and underperformance. It should also make sure the service it provides is in line with its policies.

The force needs to demonstrate how it understands and addresses the impact of change on its workforce

The force communicates its strategic priorities to its workforce in a number of ways, so [officers](#) and [staff](#) can understand how their work contributes towards them. It has a plan to communicate priorities to frontline teams, and the deputy chief constable is increasing the messaging on the priorities.

The force uses the professional development review process to communicate its priorities to officers and staff, including its [Plan on a Page](#). It sets objectives in line with those priorities.

The force is increasing its efforts to make sure senior leaders are visible to the workforce. There is now a diary showing their visits to officers and staff. Senior leaders told us they want to be visible and accessible. But many officers and staff told us they didn't see leaders at senior or middle ranks, and many felt remote from them.

The force has introduced 'Op Capture', a pathway for the workforce to report ideas for improvement. And we found examples of the force responding to feedback from officers and staff. One good example was its response to officers and staff reporting that the process to apply for a [Domestic Violence Prevention Notice](#) was too bureaucratic and repetitive. The force piloted an application (app) designed to streamline the process.

Despite this, we found a significant disconnect between senior leaders and frontline officers and staff. Officer and staff awareness of priorities varied significantly depending on location and role. Some didn't understand how their work linked to priorities and felt the force sometimes changed what they considered a priority at short notice.

Officers and staff frequently told us that they didn't feel consulted on change. For example, officers and staff described communication about Operation Rapid, an initiative to improve the force's response to [domestic abuse](#) incidents. Some told us they were unaware of the changes until weeks after the launch of the operation. They didn't feel consulted on the changes or how they might cause problems.

This was reinforced by our workforce survey, open to all officers and staff, carried out between Monday 29 September and Friday 24 October 2025. We received 2,134 responses, which we estimate to be 19.7 percent of the workforce at the time of the survey. Only 39.7 percent of respondents (848 of 2,134) agreed that the force managed change well. And only 52.7 percent of respondents (1,124 of 2,134) agreed that senior leaders consider the needs of the police workforce when making strategic decisions.

The force should do more to make sure officers and staff feel consulted and supported at all stages of the change management process.

The force needs to make sure that its operating model can address current and future demand

In [our last inspection](#), we stated that the force needed to make sure it is effective at managing demand and can demonstrate it has the right resources, processes and plans in place to meet current demand.

Since then, the force has improved its access to data on workloads. It has revised its operating model to balance workloads more equally. The force also identifies and makes changes to the expected numbers of [officers](#) and [staff](#) in its operating model based on the assumptions of its [priority-based budgeting](#) process. This makes sure the force aligns resources with strategic priorities and it can address current and future demand.

But we still found teams with high demand or skills shortfalls that prevent the force having the right number of people in the right place at the right time to address future and current demand.

The force has responded to some of these issues. It has reviewed functions, moved officers and staff and introduced a new crime allocation policy to better distribute investigative demand. This is positive. But these solutions were introduced shortly before our inspection, so their long-term impact is untested.

For example, we found that workloads in the district investigation teams and [domestic abuse](#) teams remained high. The teams told us they didn't have enough resources. We found a skills shortfall in other investigation teams. Response teams reported high levels of demand that affected the quality of service to [victims](#). The force has also identified variations in staffing levels across districts that affect how it meets demand.

We also found that while the force can use data to identify and target productivity improvements and opportunities to increase or decrease staffing, it had carried out limited forecasting and preparation for summer demand.

During our last inspection, we found that summer demand led to the force redeploying [neighbourhood officers](#) to support patrol teams. We found that the force wasn't effectively recording these [abstractions](#) and, as a result, didn't understand the impact.

During this inspection, we found neighbourhood officers being routinely used for patrol duties. However, since December 2025, the force has improved the way it records abstraction levels to better understand its impact. The force should use this data to help better plan for future predicted increases in demand.

From March 2026, the force planned to carry out a wider review of core functions to better address current and future demand. It should make sure changes are sustainable.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at leadership and force management.

The force has a clear performance framework linked to its business planning cycle

The force has a clear business planning cycle underpinned by its [force management statement \(FMS\)](#). This is linked to its main strategies, including the workforce plan and risk register, but we found it was rarely mentioned in strategic meetings. The force is introducing a twice-yearly review of the FMS that will require all proposed changes to the workforce, new initiatives or changes in demand to be considered alongside the priorities of the FMS to identify gaps and risks.

The force's priority-based budgeting has matured, which helps it align resources to priorities. The force is pursuing changes to its policies, procedures and operating model that should result in increased productivity. And we found that the force was far more able to explain interdependencies that might result in unintended outcomes from changes it made. The force is also committed to cost benefit evaluation when starting projects or programmes of work.

The force is using predictive analysis to inform its force management statement, and improve operational planning and resource allocation

During our inspection, we found that the force was using predictive analytics to inform its FMS. By using historical crime data, call logs, demographic trends and environmental factors, the force is creating predictive models to forecast future demand with greater accuracy. These models identify patterns such as peak times for incidents, high-risk locations and seasonal fluctuations in crime rates. This proactive approach should help the force to distribute officers, staff and resources more efficiently.

The force uses predictive analytics to highlight emerging crime trends and support its strategic planning. This allows it to develop targeted interventions and community policing initiatives. When integrated with real-time data systems, these insights can also inform the force's dynamic deployment strategies. It can make sure police presence aligns with actual demand.

The force should do more to increase the range of real-time data it uses and increase the level of planning for future demand. And the force should continue to review resource allocation to make sure it can meet current demand as effectively as possible.

The force has effective systems to gather intelligence to make sure it can anticipate and respond to current and future demand

During our inspection, we found that the force had an effective [intelligence](#) gathering function that makes sure it can assign the appropriate resources. This means that the force can meet its strategic priorities and both current and future demand. The force is using real-time data, predictive analytics and collaborative information-sharing networks. These help it to proactively identify emerging threats, allocate resources efficiently and prioritise operations based on risk and impact. This intelligence-led approach makes sure that the force's decision-making is based on evidence and is responsive. This helps it to anticipate criminal trends and community needs.

The force also makes use of a partnership intelligence portal to gather information and intelligence from partners and members of the community.

The force has reviewed intelligence consistency and compliance and saw a significant variation in practice. The force should make sure that this doesn't impede the effective collection and analysis of intelligence that could assist force planning.

The force has improved access to performance data and how it is used

In our last inspection, we highlighted the force's use of data to improve and productivity was an [area for improvement](#). Since then, the force has improved the accessibility and use of data. It better understands demand, officer and staff workloads and where it might improve productivity.

The use of Microsoft Power BI live-data dashboards is more widespread and better supported. The dashboards give districts, teams and individuals detailed performance data. Examples of how they used dashboards included:

- detective inspectors understanding case-file acceptance rates and investigative outcomes;
- response teams determining attendance times; and
- outstanding suspect data and stop-search dashboards directing prevention activity.

The force is also able to use data to understand where it might need to change the allocation of work or resources. The force reports data on the different areas and teams' workload in performance boards.

Some officers and staff distrusted the dashboards, and some used local spreadsheets to track performance and management information. For example, some response staff told us attendance data wasn't the same on every dashboard.

We also found there was limited use of partnership data in dashboards. For example, the central safeguarding unit had limited access to partnership performance data. At the time of our inspection, the force was developing a [child sexual exploitation problem profile](#). It had set up a working group of force analysts and partner organisation staff to determine how access to combined data could add value to the profile.

We also found some performance data was incomplete. For example, [Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme](#) dashboards didn't clearly state if a disclosure had been made to the applicant. This is the most important piece of data, and it wasn't provided in the performance overview.

The force should continue to improve the range and quality of data it uses to understand performance.

The force should make sure it understands how its workforce perceives leadership behaviours

The force continues to offer a comprehensive leadership and management training plan. This includes a senior leadership development programme, a Hydra immersive training course based on everyday policing scenarios, that we commented on favourably in our last inspection. The force offers [first-line leadership](#) training and has a talent development programme. It carries out succession planning for leadership posts. It is beginning to identify its critical roles and develop plans to help officers and staff progress into them.

Positively, in our workforce survey 83.6 percent of respondents (1,784 of 2,134) agreed that their manager modelled high standards of behaviour. This suggests the force has been successful in encouraging leaders to embody the behaviours it wishes its workforce to aspire to.

However, the percentage of respondents that agreed that senior leaders demonstrated the standards, behaviours and culture expected was lower, at 69.0 percent of respondents (1,472 of 2,134). Some officers and staff we spoke to described a transactional leadership style from senior leaders that focused on short-term performance.

The force should make sure it better understands how leadership behaviours are perceived and received by its workforce.

The force has digital transformation plans that show how it uses technology to improve operational efficiency

We found that the force's digital transformation plans were centred on using advanced technologies to enhance operational efficiency and service provision. By integrating tools such as artificial intelligence, cloud storage systems and data analytics, the force is making workflows more efficient, improving decision-making and increasing productivity. This will enhance public safety and trust through more transparent and responsive policing.

At the time of our inspection, the force didn't have a digital, data, and technology strategy, but it was developing one. And it closely scrutinises the development of digital services.

During our last inspection, we found that the force had vacancies in the IT department delaying some programmes of work. Since then, the force has managed to increase staffing. This includes recruiting data architects to support the use of reliable data to better understand the force's capability and capacity to address strategic priorities.

The force is pursuing a large number of IT projects. It has clearly reviewed and prioritised them. It has completed several significant IT projects, including a new call management system in the force [control room](#). There were disruptions to service, but the force was able to identify and overcome the issues.

Some systems don't work together, notably finance, duties and HR. They are unable to provide a singular overview of resourcing. This has caused issues with staff having to manually input or extract data. At the time of our inspection, the force project to improve this had taken four years. It was expecting to implement it in full towards the end of 2026.

The force is actively exploring the use of artificial intelligence. One example is the use of a digital 'bot' to complete an initial file quality review on first submission by a supervisor. The force is also working with an external company on a system analysing all calls within a 24-hour period to create a daily performance dashboard identifying themes, trends and repeat callers. This means the force can better understand threat, harm and risk posed to callers.

The force can show how it aligns finances to its priorities and how it decides if its expenditure offers value for money

The force could show it has aligned its finances with its priorities. It clearly links its budget allocations to strategic objectives and operational needs. This involves transparent financial planning that shows how it uses resources in important areas such as investigations, neighbourhood policing and technological innovation.

The force uses regular performance reviews and external audits to help assess whether its spending leads to measurable outcomes and makes sure it is using public funds efficiently.

The force uses [benchmarking](#), cost-benefit analyses and adopts best practices in procurement and resource management to further support value for money. By maintaining this alignment and accountability, the force can create public confidence in its financial leadership and operational effectiveness.

The forecasts included in its mid-term financial plan are based on realistic assumptions about future income and spending.

In the year 2024/25, the force received around £696 million in total funding. As for other forces in England and Wales, this figure includes partnership funding and other contributions. The force's net revenue budget was £577 million. The [precept](#) income was worth around £170 million to the force that year. This is equivalent to £69,912 per 1,000 population, which is just below the average amount most other forces receive from precept.

For 2025/26, the force received an increase in the precept of £14 per band D property. Despite this, the force estimates it will use £9.6 million of reserves in 2025/26 to cover the shortfall in the funding gap. It has also identified savings, backed by a realistic and detailed plan to achieve them. The force is able to identify productivity changes and amendments to staffing levels that support maintaining levels of service while providing financial savings.

The force manages its combined reserves well and has a clear strategy in place for them. The use of reserves is sensible and means the force doesn't have to rely on external borrowing to meet costs. The force has maintained its total general reserves of around £15 million. This will keep the general reserve at around 2.5 percent of the budget requirement and is considered an adequate amount.

Attracting, developing and retaining the workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace

Requires
improvement

West Yorkshire Police requires improvement at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to make sure that effective systems are in place to monitor workloads and provide support to officers

In [our last inspection](#), we concluded that the force needed to do more to understand its workforce's well-being needs and tailor its support accordingly. It has made progress in this area, but our inspection highlighted that some teams still experience unmanageable workloads and don't feel well supported by the force. This remains an [area for improvement](#).

The force has a well-being plan, which is aligned to the five main areas of the [National Police Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2024–2026](#) – mind health, physical health, leadership, financial health and workplace well-being.

The force encourages [officers](#) and [staff](#) to complete well-being surveys. But it is aware it needs to communicate better with its workforce and act on feedback to improve the well-being support it offers.

At the time of our inspection, the force had recently introduced new ways to engage the workforce, including:

- a monthly email update following the force performance meeting;
- important messages from the deputy chief constable sent to all officers and staff across the force and placed on the front page of the intranet; and
- a Viva Engage channel as an internal communication system between members of the workforce.

In our workforce survey, 50.5 percent of respondents (1,077 of 2,134) said that the force took their well-being into account when setting their working pattern, and 67.7 percent of respondents (1,444 of 2,134) said that their line manager actively checked that their workload was manageable.

During our inspection, officers and staff raised concerns about unmanageable workloads, working hours and being unable to take meal breaks. We were repeatedly told that some senior officers and supervisors were more focused on operational priorities than officer well-being.

The force has comprehensive well-being measures in place that officers and staff can be signposted to. But officers and staff felt that the force wasn't tackling the underlying root cause of what was causing the most stress – unmanageable workloads and officer and supervisor inexperience.

The force has introduced systems and processes to identify officers with high workloads. But we still found officers with high workloads. Some supervisors told us they had delayed allocating crimes to officers with high workloads as they were concerned that they would go off sick. We also found supervisors with unmanageable workloads. Some supervisors told us that they were unable to complete meaningful investigative plans and crime reviews. Other supervisors of various ranks told us that they regularly took work home to help manage their workload. They didn't claim overtime for this.

The force introduced a new crime allocation policy in October 2025 and following a review, placed additional officers in some investigation teams to better distribute crime workloads. This appears to have improved the position with workloads across investigation teams, but the force should continue to focus on this area.

The force needs to make sure that it creates an inclusive culture where staff feel a sense of belonging and are able to speak out

We found that the force's equality, diversity and inclusion strategy had limited content and no updates. The force has now included it in its new people strategy.

The force told us that as at 28 July 2025, 54 percent of the workforce had received cultural awareness training, 42 percent had received [Code of Ethics](#) training, and 79 percent had received training on the expected standards of behaviour. As a result of this training, generally the workforce felt more confident to challenge unacceptable behaviour.

In our workforce survey, 16.9 percent of respondents (361 of 2,134) reported feeling bullied or harassed by colleagues in the last 12 months. Of those respondents who experienced bullying or [harassment](#), 45.4 percent (164 of 361) didn't report the incident. During our inspection, some [officers](#) expressed similar concerns.

Also in our workforce survey, 20.2 percent of respondents (432 of 2,134) reported feeling discriminated against by colleagues in the last 12 months. Of these, 59.5 percent (257 of 432) didn't report the incident. Of those who reported the incident, 64.0 percent (112 of 175) said the force took no action.

In March 2025, the force carried out a misogyny, sexism and improper behaviour survey of its workforce. It received 852 responses. Of these, 20.2 percent said that they had experienced at least one of the 13 misogyny, sexism or improper behaviours within the last 12 months. Of these, 56.8 percent didn't report the incident. Of the respondents, 16.3 percent had experienced some form of sexism, 25.0 percent had experienced sexualised language or behaviour, and 22.0 percent had been touched inappropriately during their policing career. Of the respondents, 17.7 percent had lost confidence in either themselves or the force, and 13.3 percent didn't want to come into work or had considered leaving the force.

It is positive that the force carried out this survey. It has given useful insight into how officers and [staff](#) are feeling. As a result, the force launched an internal campaign, 'It's Not Okay', to address the issues raised and clarify its expectations on standards of behaviour.

During our inspection, some officers and staff told us they were struggling to access equipment to do their jobs, including laptops, workstations and chairs. We also found a backlog of around 719 officers and staff who were waiting for a workplace needs assessment. Some had been waiting for two years.

We made the force aware, and it responded quickly and began work to understand and reduce the backlog. As of December 2025, the force was organising assessments for 198 officers and staff, and it had contacted 473 officers and staff to check if they needed an assessment or equipment.

The force needs to improve the training and support it provides for trainee investigators

As at 25 January 2026, the force had 631 [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\) 2](#) investigators in post compared to 889 who should be in post. This is a shortfall of 258 detectives, which means the force had filled 71 percent of PIP 2 investigator posts. There were 178 PIP 2 trainees including direct entry detective constables, of which many were student [officers](#). But this is still a shortfall of 80. In many teams that we visited, including CID and [safeguarding](#), we found a much lower ratio of PIP 2 investigators to trainees. This affects their experience, and the support available for trainees. It also places greater pressure on the supervisors.

Most trainees we spoke to weren't having a positive experience. They consistently told us of a lack of support, with no tutors or mentors, long hours and high workloads. They stated they had little time to work on the learning portfolios they are required to complete or to study for the national investigators' exam.

Trainee detectives told us the force used a formal process if their portfolios hadn't progressed enough, and concerns were raised around how this process was used. The force told us the process was intended to provide additional support. Supervisors didn't agree with how the process was being used and felt that greater consideration should be given to officers' high workloads and their repeated overtime. They felt the officers should be provided with additional support much earlier in their development.

We also found student officers and PIP 2 trainees carrying out night detective roles with little support in place. This was clearly affecting some officers' well-being.

In response to our feedback, the force has set up a [gold group](#) and made changes to the portfolio assessment process. It has begun to improve its communications with trainee detectives and the support in place for them.

The force should make sure that it has enough trained officers in specialist posts to give the public a good level of service.

The force should review the processes and procedures in place in relation to officers in high-risk roles who are identified as requiring additional support to make sure that appropriate action and support is in place

In [our last inspection](#), we concluded that the force should improve the processes it had in place to understand the welfare needs of its [officers](#) and [staff](#) who were in high-risk roles. We said the force should make sure that it had the right support in place for officers and staff identified as needing it.

Since then, the force has reduced the number of officers and staff identified as being in high-risk roles requiring psychological assessment screening from around 3,000 to 1,200 by aligning its policy with national guidance.

In 2025, it introduced new processes to make sure officers and staff identified as needing additional support receive it. This progress is positive, but the force could do more to communicate the new processes to its workforce as some officers and staff seemed reluctant to engage. The force should continue to focus on this issue.

The force should make sure that it has an effective occupational health unit with suitably trained staff, and reduce the time from referral to appointment

In [our last inspection](#), we noted that the force had reduced the average time from referral to appointment with the [occupational health](#) unit from 38.9 days as at 31 March 2023 to within the service level agreement of within 5 days as at January 2024. We said the force should continue its efforts to sustain this improvement.

In March 2025, the force commissioned an independent review of its occupational health unit. It highlighted several areas of concern, including waiting times for appointments, resourcing and the quality of reports.

In December 2025, the recommendations were presented to [chief officers](#). At that time, people referred were waiting seven weeks for an appointment.

In January 2026, the force told us it had reduced this to 20 days by bringing in appropriately trained agency staff to provide additional capacity and specialist support. This isn't a sustainable approach. The force should make sure that it implements the findings of its review.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

The force is working hard to provide training for officers and staff in specialist neighbourhood policing roles

The force has introduced the [College of Policing's neighbourhood policing programme](#). The [College of Policing](#) dashboard shows that as at 17 February 2026, 507 individuals from the force had completed the first part of the programme. The force had 1,052 neighbourhood officers and police community support officers eligible and required to complete the training.

The force provides training to its special constables, but we were told that there was little training for other volunteers.

The workforce understands, uses and values the professional development review process

Since our last inspection, the force has made significant progress with its professional development review (PDR) process. All officers and staff we spoke to said the system was easier to navigate and they recognised that the force had responded to feedback.

The force now emphasises that the PDR is about documenting well-being needs, career aspirations and training objectives, as well as force objectives linked to its [Plan on a Page](#). The force makes clear that it expects line managers to hold quarterly individual development meetings with their teams and these are documented.

The force told us that in the year ending 31 December 2025, compliance with the individual development meetings was at 99 percent. And 95 percent of officers had objectives documented in their PDR.

We reviewed 20 PDRs. We found that 19 out of 20 included discussion about well-being and a record of the support offered or provided. All of the PDRs we audited had four force objectives and at least one personal objective recorded. Some had additional team objectives. Generally, objectives were meaningful.

All the officer PDRs contained discussions about learning and development opportunities, and objectives. Where required, additional learning or development requirements were recorded. However, some staff PDRs didn't have a record of discussions around learning and development opportunities or objectives. The force is aware of this and is planning to make further improvements.

The force is taking positive action to be more representative of the community it serves

The force has a [positive action](#) plan, aligned to its equality, diversity and inclusion strategy, for the recruitment, retention, development and progression of its workforce.

It has positive action workstreams including attending public events to attract new recruits, and offering support, coaching and mentoring through the recruitment process.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, 99 of 798 people who joined the force (excluding transfers) were from an ethnic minority background (12.4 percent). As at 31 March 2025, 8.8 percent of force [personnel](#) were from an ethnic minority background, compared to the 23.4 percent of the population. The force told us that in the year ending 1 November 2025, 115 out of 944 new recruits were from an ethnic minority background (12.2 percent).

Some officers, including some from ethnic minority backgrounds, expressed concerns that recruitment processes were unfair and could be seen as positive discrimination rather than positive action. The force should make sure that it clearly communicates its recruitment initiatives to its workforce.

The force should make sure it provides regular continuing professional development opportunities to all its workforce

During our inspection, we found that [continuing professional development \(CPD\)](#) opportunities varied across the force. Some teams had scheduled training days built into their shift pattern, which is positive, but this wasn't the same for all officers and staff. And we were told that district training quality was sometimes poor and provided by inexperienced officers with limited subject matter knowledge. We also spoke to officers and staff in specialist teams, for example [domestic abuse](#) and [multi-agency safeguarding hub](#) teams, who hadn't received training relevant to their role.

The training schedule is set by the learning and development unit, and officers aren't able to influence its content. We were also told that the force didn't monitor attendance at CPD training, so it wasn't able to say what training officers and staff had received. In response to our feedback, the force addressed this and officers can now ask for training to include specific subjects.

The force accepts that it needs to make sure all officers and staff can access CPD, that it provides bespoke training for specialist teams and that it should monitor attendance.

The force creates some opportunities for the workforce to progress including those from underrepresented groups

The force has created 'grey roles' to fill staff vacancies with experienced officers to save money. This has affected opportunities for progression for some of the workforce. In addition, many officers told us that they had been successful at interview but waited for months, some over a year, to move to their new role due to resourcing challenges and demand. This affected their morale and well-being.

The inclusion of a talent management tool in the PDR process has meant the force can identify and support officers from [under-represented groups](#). It can make sure they have access to higher-level development pathways through the talent development programme. This includes a bespoke development plan based on career objectives. Officers from under-represented groups receive coaching and mentoring and the force invites them to team-building days. They can also attend the College of Policing Aspire leadership development programme. The force pays for the officers' promotion examination books.

This is positive, but it can cause tension with other officers. As a result, some officers from ethnic minority backgrounds don't want to be seen as receiving special treatment. If they are promoted, they want to feel that they have earned it fairly. The force should make sure that it clearly communicates to the workforce what measures are in place and the reasons why. It should also evaluate its programmes of support.

The force doesn't do enough to encourage officers and staff to stay in its workforce, or to understand why officers are leaving

The force sometimes uses [stay interviews](#) to identify concerns early and discuss how it can encourage people to stay in its workforce. Unfortunately, it only uses stay interviews for student officers and officers and staff from ethnic minority backgrounds. The digital forensic unit has introduced its own stay interview process to avoid losing staff.

During our inspection, we spoke to two people planning to leave as a result of difficulties that they were facing and lack of support from the force. Neither fitted the criteria for a stay interview. We told the force and it put support in place. Both people are now staying.

In our workforce survey, 15.1 percent of respondents (278 of 1,836) said that they wanted to leave the force as soon as possible.

The force has some understanding of why people leave its workforce. However, it needs to improve this understanding so that it can put effective actions in place to improve retention. Although it has an exit interview process, including interviews and surveys, we were told that the force doesn't use this information to promote improvements. During our inspection, we were told of examples of exit interviews being cancelled and not rescheduled. The force was unable to produce any meaningful data from exit interviews.

The force acknowledges that this is something that it needs to improve. The force should review its processes for early intervention where officers and staff may be considering leaving the force, and for when officers and staff decide to leave.

Using powers fairly, appropriately and with justification

Adequate

West Yorkshire Police is adequate at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to make sure all officers have up-to-date public and personal safety training and that it has consistent processes in place to identify officers whose training has expired

Regular public and personal safety training (PPST) in conflict management and use of force techniques is mandatory for [officers](#). This helps to keep the public and officers safe.

During our inspection, we found the force was deploying officers to incidents whose PPST had expired. In January 2026, the force told us it had 1,294 officers with expired PPST. The force had a further 855 officers assessed as 'off-line', meaning that the officers had expired PPST. But they couldn't complete the training due to being on [restricted duties](#). The force told us that 4,054 officers (65 percent) had valid PPST training.

The force has prioritised training for frontline roles. However, it had wrongly presumed that officers in investigative teams weren't considered as frontline officers for the purpose of PPST training. The force is working with line managers to prioritise PPST compliance during their performance discussions and it has begun an awareness campaign.

The force has also introduced a single point of contact in each district to make sure it is recording all limitations or restricted duties correctly and to manage PPST cancellation requests.

We found that data is readily available to show compliance with PPST. However, supervisors didn't have direct access to data that showed when an officer's PPST expired. They had to request it from people services.

The force should provide training for officers on how to safeguard children involved in stop and search or use of force incidents

We found that not all [officers](#) understood the requirement to complete a [safeguarding](#) referral for incidents of [stop and search](#) or use of force on a [child](#).

The force's stop and search policy states that officers must submit a [public protection notification \(PPN\)](#) when:

- it uses stop and search powers on a child under 10 years;
- a child under 18 years is subject to an intimate parts search; and
- where there is a safeguarding risk to the child.

This policy is open to officer interpretation. As a result, we found that officers weren't completing PPNs when they should do. And the quality of completed PPNs was poor. They lacked detail. The force is missing the cumulative risk to children and isn't sharing information with social services when it should.

The force recognises this. It has directed that early action team officers review stop and search incidents involving children and check that the officer has completed a PPN when appropriate. The early action team contacts officers if they haven't completed a PPN. At the time of our inspection, this process was new. The force wasn't reviewing all stop and search records involving children and where it identified the need for a PPN, they were still not always being completed.

The force doesn't have a specific policy on the completion of a PPN after use of force incidents involving children. However, the guidance for officers is that a PPN should be completed when a child is taken into police custody or where a child is experiencing significant harm or is likely to do so. The force told us that it estimated officers were only completing PPNs for 30 percent of children taken into police custody.

We reviewed [body-worn video](#) for five use of force incidents involving children. In all five, officers failed to take safeguarding action or complete a PPN.

Innovative practice

The force supported the creation of an innovative community group to improve its relationship with the Black community

In 2024, the force supported the launch of community group Scrutiny for Police Action on Race in Kirklees (SPARK). The group aims to improve community and police relations in line with the [Police Race Action Plan](#).

The SPARK panel specifically examines police use of [stop and search](#) and use of force powers, and [hate crimes](#) against Black people.

It meets every two months and is made up of representatives of the Black community. A local businessman is an independent chair. The panel offers direct feedback to officers as well as providing valuable learning for the force. It also discusses police training, resourcing and ways to work with the community. At the time of our inspection, the group was creating a lived experienced video to help officers better understand the effect the use of stop and search powers has on the Black community.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

Officers use body-worn video in use of force and stop and search encounters

We found officers consistently used body-worn video (BWV). The force has a policy which sets out clear guidance for its use, such as during emergency responses, use of police powers, interactions with the public, property handling and during safeguarding situations.

The force monitors its use carefully to make sure it records officer interactions with the public for transparency and for evidential purposes. BWV isn't issued to individual officers but is a shared resource. Officers told us that on occasions BWV wasn't available at shift changeovers or at large-scale events where many officers were working at the same time. Officers also told us about problems with the equipment, including poor quality footage, poor battery life and broken clips. However, the force told us it expected to complete its roll out of a new BWV system by 22 May 2026.

The force supports independent external scrutiny processes and uses the feedback to improve how officers use stop and search and use of force powers

The force has improved the external scrutiny of its use of police powers. It now has an effective external scrutiny panel, which meets every two months and is headed by an independent chair in each of its five districts. These online panel meetings examine the force's use of stop and search and use of force powers.

The force provides members with relevant documents in advance and shows the corresponding BWV footage during the meeting. We observed some of the meetings and saw detailed discussions taking place with appropriate and considered challenge. We found the questioning and scrutiny to be strong. The panel graded each case. The force obtained the feedback and shared it directly with the officers concerned. Where appropriate, it shared learning with the wider force.

A chief inspector and a member of the force's central governance team facilitated the meeting. Their positive approach encouraged debate, and they answered questions about legislation and force policy. The force tracks actions from the meeting and provides updates to the panel.

The force provides training to scrutiny panel members through an online package and in-person [continuing professional development](#). Panel members also attend a PPST training session and observe a foundation training role-play session so that they can understand the training the force provides for officers. Many panel members have taken advantage of the force ride along scheme.

In February 2025, the force launched a youth scrutiny panel in the Bradford district. This panel reviews stop and search encounters of children and young people. The force is planning to develop youth scrutiny panels in all its districts.

Officers understand how to use stop and search powers fairly and appropriately

During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of 54 stop and search records from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025. Based on this sample, we estimate that 96.3 percent (+/- 4.2 percentage points) of stop and searches the force carried out during this period had reasonable grounds recorded.

This suggests a minor improvement compared to the findings from our previous review of records from 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2022. In that review, we found that 95.7 percent (+/- 4.1 percentage points) of stop and searches had reasonable grounds recorded. However, as the estimated results are based on a review of a sample of records and the ranges of possible true values overlap, we can't be sure that there has been a real change.

The percentage that had reasonable grounds recorded suggests that officers are suitably trained and they use stop and search powers in a fair and appropriate way. Officers told us that they felt confident to use their stop and search powers and had enough training.

The force collects accurate data to allow it to understand how fairly it uses stop and search

Good quality data on self-defined ethnicity (how individuals define their ethnicity) allows the force to understand the rate at which it uses stop and search on people from ethnic minority backgrounds in the local resident population.

As part of our review of stop and search records, we asked the force to provide 12 months of stop and search data from 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025. We found that self-defined ethnicity information was unknown (not recorded, not stated or refused) for 3 percent of these records. In the year ending 31 March 2025, self-defined ethnicity was unknown for 18.0 percent of stop and searches that forces in England and Wales recorded.

Our review of 20 stop and search encounters filmed on BWV found that in all but 3 of the 23 people searched, officers asked for their self-defined ethnicity. When officers ask for this data, the force can more accurately identify any [disproportionate](#) use of the power.

The force makes good use of stop and search

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force carried out 17,178 stop and searches of people. This equals 7.1 stop and searches per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The number of stop and searches the force carried out decreased by 6.3 percent compared to the year ending 31 March 2024. This is in line with the overall picture for forces in England and Wales in which, on average, the number of stop and searches decreased by 1.3 percent.

We found that the force closely monitors its use of stop and search. Officers we spoke to were confident to use it. We saw good use of stop and search as a tactic in response to crime in its communities. We also observed senior leaders overseeing stop and search tactics through the force's governance processes.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force had an overall [find rate](#) of 30.7 percent from stop and search encounters. This was made up of 28 percent [linked finds](#) and 2.7 percent not linked finds.

Linked finds are when one or more items, which the officer suspected a person had in their possession, are found and were the reason for the search. Not linked finds are when items are found that a person may have been in unlawful possession of but weren't the reason for the search.

The force's linked find rate was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales but above the England and Wales average of 26.2 percent. The linked find rate for the force increased by 2.3 percentage points compared to the year ending 31 March 2024.

We examined:

- the number of searches the force carried out;
- the number of searches that had reasonable grounds; and
- the percentage of linked finds.


The results of this review show that the force is using its stop and search powers well.

During our inspection, we saw that stop and search is an important tactic for officers when targeting hotspot areas for serious violence, knife crime and [antisocial behaviour](#).

The force told us Operation Jemlock, its initiative aimed at reducing violent crime, especially knife crime, accounts for around 10–15 percent of its stop and search activity. During 2025, Operation Jemlock resulted in the force recovering 666 weapons, carrying out 1,619 stop and searches with a 41 percent positive find rate for weapons, and making 2,474 arrests. In addition, the operation saw 7,500 [intelligence](#) submissions recorded to support wider problem solving and mapping of [organised crime groups](#).

This shows that officers are being proactive in their communities and using stop and search effectively.

Figure 1: Percentage of stop and search encounters resulting in linked and not linked finds for forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Stop and search open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A stacked column chart showing the percentage of [stop and search](#) encounters where the item found was and wasn't linked to the reason for the search for all forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025. In West Yorkshire Police, 28.0 percent of stop and search encounters resulted in a [linked find](#) and 2.7 percent in a not linked find.

[The accessible data table for figure 1 is available on our website.](#)

Note: In the calculation, we have excluded records where it isn't known whether the item found was linked to the reason for the search. We have also excluded records where it isn't known whether the [officer](#) found any items. If the percentage of linked or not linked finds isn't included in the chart for some forces, it is because they haven't supplied it.

The force understands how it is using stop and search and use of force powers and is trying to do more to reduce disproportionality

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 2.7 times more likely than White people to be the subject of a stop and search by the force. This is lower than the England and Wales rate of 3.7 times more likely.

In our review of stop and search records of people from an ethnic minority background, we found that 23 of 24 had reasonable grounds. The force carries out analysis of its disproportionate use of stop and search powers to help it understand why this exists.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 3.1 times more likely than White people to be subject to use of force compared to the England and Wales average of 3.0 times more likely.

The force publishes its disproportionality data for both stop and search and use of force on its website.

The force isn't recording enough use of force incidents

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force recorded 42,486 use of force incidents. This is a decrease of 6.2 percent compared to the previous year. This decrease is likely due to the force not recording all use of force incidents.

Officers are expected to record every use of force to make sure it is transparent and accountable. This includes recording low-level use of force such as handcuffing a compliant person and higher levels of force such as the use of a baton or [conducted energy device](#) (Taser). Where more than one officer uses force on an individual, each officer must submit their own use of force report.


To determine if the force was recording use of force appropriately, we reviewed two different measures. We firstly examined the number of arrests and compared this to the number of recorded use of force reports. We expect the number of use of force reports to be at least as high as the number of arrests. Most arrests involve the use of handcuffs and multiple officers may have used force during the arrest. In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force carried out 40,951 arrests and recorded 42,486 use of force reports.

We then reviewed the overall expected number of use of force records compared to the actual recorded number. The expected number is estimated based on the average number of uses of force associated with each recorded arrest. We estimate that, in the year ending 31 March 2025, the force should have recorded 54,568 use of force incidents. It actually recorded 42,486 incidents. This means it likely under-recorded its use of force by 12,082 incidents.

This shows a deterioration in recording use of force compared to the previous year when, based on this estimation, it didn't record 9,096 use of force incidents.

The force needs to make sure all officers are accurately recording the use of force with adequate checks in place to help identify missing records.

Figure 2: Number of use of force incidents that forces in England and Wales recorded and the estimated number that should have been recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Police use of force open data tables](#) and [arrests open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A combination chart showing the number of use of force incidents that all forces in England and Wales recorded (represented by columns) and the estimated number of use of force incidents that should have been recorded (represented by red target lines) in the year ending 31 March 2025. West Yorkshire Police recorded 42,486 use of force incidents. This was lower than the estimated 54,568 use of force incidents it should have recorded.

[The accessible data table for figure 2 is available on our website.](#)

Note: To understand how well forces record their use of force, we compare the number of incidents they recorded with the estimated number they should have recorded. To estimate the number of use of force incidents forces should have recorded, we use the number of recorded arrests and the number of recorded use of force incidents linked to an arrest.

Preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability

Adequate

West Yorkshire Police is adequate at preventing and deterring crime and [antisocial behaviour](#), and reducing [vulnerability](#).

Areas for improvement

The force should make sure its leadership and governance processes support a consistent approach to prevention activity

The force has governance structures and processes in place to oversee its approach to prevention, [vulnerability](#), [antisocial behaviour](#) and crime. However, the approach is inconsistent in some districts.

During our inspection, we found that in one district, the force hadn't held a chief inspector-chaired neighbourhood team governance meeting for two years. In September 2025, the force told us the new chief inspector would restart the meetings. They did this in November 2025. We were told that in another district, these meetings could be sporadic.

The force's governance processes haven't adequately identified the lack of performance management in some districts and the areas of underperformance we identified during our inspection. The force should strengthen its governance processes and focus on establishing effective performance measures.

The force also has meetings on solving problems in neighbourhoods (SPIN meetings) and [People and Place](#) ward meetings. Both include police and partner organisations, using shared data analysis to identify and respond to high demand or vulnerable residential and business locations.

The neighbourhood policing framework outlines what [neighbourhood policing teams](#) are accountable for. Power BI dashboards are available to show neighbourhood crime, repeat crime and antisocial behaviour. However, the use of Power BI dashboards by neighbourhood [officers](#) is inconsistent. Mainly inspectors use it.

Other than in the Leeds district, the force has limited and inconsistent access to data from partner organisations to inform its prevention and problem-solving approaches.

The force should do more to develop, quality assure and evaluate its problem-solving activity

In [our last inspection](#), we told the force that it should improve the quality and consistency of its problem-solving plans.

During this inspection, we saw some good improvements. Our audit was mainly positive. The force used the [objective, scanning, analysis, response and assessment model](#) to identify and find solutions to community problems. We saw evidence of regular supervisory oversight and finalisation of plans. However, the force didn't always use data from partnership organisations, and we saw no evidence of cost benefit analysis.

We saw some good problem-solving plans across the force, in particular in Bradford. But some plans we saw were just a list of activities. Supervisors told us that some teams used problem-solving plans to keep a record of activity related to a community issue in case they were questioned about it. Supervisors also told us that gaining the support of partner organisations for problem-solving could be a challenge.

The force had 63 problem-solving plans in place. This is low for a force this size. We also saw evidence of community problems that the force hadn't recorded on problem-solving plans. This suggests that the force may be missing opportunities to work with partner organisations to tackle the root causes of some community problems.

The force should make sure that [officers](#) and teams across the force are aware of the existence of problem-solving plans so that there are no missed opportunities for joint working, for example with the patrol team.

We observed the force's 'What Works Library' and found it to be a good tool for officers to see how others had addressed problems. But we saw little evidence it was being widely used.

While there have been improvements since the last inspection, the force needs to do more to develop a culture of problem-solving more widely.

Innovative practice

The Junior Detectives programme is an impressive multi-agency initiative to help educate young people and raise awareness

We found the Junior Detectives programme in Leeds to be an impressive multi-agency initiative designed to educate and inspire young people while raising awareness of knife crime and misogyny.

The force provides the immersive week-long programme in partnership with A&E consultants, the University of Leeds, mental health specialists and legal professionals.

The scenario explores misogyny on social media and its escalation into a non-fatal stabbing incident. Throughout the week, students work directly with professionals, gaining first-hand insight into [victim](#) support, crime scene management, suspect interviewing and the criminal justice process.

Highlights include medical information from senior paediatric specialists, guidance from mental health practitioners, a tour of Leeds Crown Court and participation in a mock trial led by the senior recorder.

Students also learn about the national Crimestoppers initiative 'Fearless' before working with University of Leeds mentors to prepare and present their learning to parents and school leaders. Their work is then subsequently cascaded to their peers within their own schools, which makes sure important messages reach a wide audience.

Main findings


In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability.

The force understands the causes of antisocial behaviour and vulnerability in its communities

During our inspection, we found the force had a clear understanding of antisocial behaviour and related vulnerability in its communities.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, it recorded 11.4 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

Figure 3: Number of antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population that forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025.



Source: [Police-recorded antisocial behaviour incidents data](#) and [population estimates for England and Wales](#) from the Office for National Statistics

Chart description: Column chart showing the number of [antisocial behaviour](#) incidents per 1,000 population that all forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025. West Yorkshire Police recorded 11.4 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population, which was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The typical range, represented by dashed red lines on the chart, is between 7.0 and 22.4 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. The median value of 13.6 per 1,000 population is presented as a solid red line.

[The accessible data table for figure 3 is available on our website.](#)

The force records nearly all crimes that have occurred when victims report [antisocial behaviour personal](#). In our [quality service review](#), we found that in the cases we examined, the force had recorded 10 of 11 antisocial behaviour crimes correctly, and of these 7 of 8 [harassment](#) crimes were recorded correctly.

The force isn't consistently working with partners to use preventative and protective orders effectively to help it tackle antisocial behaviour

In our last inspection, we highlighted the antisocial behaviour team's effective work with partner organisations and use of legislation.

During this inspection, we found that the force had dedicated antisocial behaviour teams in each district except for Leeds. In Leeds, the force had disbanded the team and placed the officers in the neighbourhood policing team.

The role of the dedicated teams is to focus on tackling antisocial behaviour through problem-solving work and to make effective use of preventative orders to do this. Officers told us that in Leeds, this dedicated focus had gone and as a result antisocial behaviour problem-solving work in the district was limited.

The antisocial behaviour teams on the other four districts work more closely with local authority antisocial behaviour officers, housing providers and other partner organisations including safer travel teams, business improvement teams, environmental health and licensing to address the root causes of antisocial behaviour in its communities.

We found that these officers were using antisocial behaviour legislation to prevent community problems from escalating. In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force issued 673 preventative and protective orders, which equals 0.28 orders per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The force showed us some examples where it had used antisocial behaviour legislation to good effect.

In our quality service review, we examined 20 antisocial behaviour incidents and any crimes recorded from them. We found that the force didn't consider the use of antisocial behaviour legislation in two of seven cases where it could have.

During our inspection, antisocial behaviour team officers told us they were confident in applying for and using tools such as [Criminal Behaviour Orders](#) and civil injunctions, particularly in more complex or persistent antisocial behaviour cases. However, many of the officers hadn't received any formal training on the legislation but learned from their colleagues. Officers in neighbourhood policing teams and on patrol were less confident in using the legislation and hadn't received training. We were told this knowledge gap was a more significant issue in Leeds where the antisocial behaviour team had been disbanded.

This force needs to provide additional training to make sure that teams have a better understanding of antisocial behaviour legislation and the range of powers available. This approach should help more officers other than the antisocial behaviour teams to tackle the root causes more effectively.

The force uses the antisocial behaviour and vulnerability analytical tool to review all incidents of antisocial behaviour, vulnerability and to identify repeat incidents. We identified this as good practice in our [PEEL inspection in 2021/22](#) and the force is still using it effectively. Every caller reporting antisocial behaviour is contacted by officers who use the tool to provide reassurance that the report is being taken seriously and to try to obtain additional information.

The force doesn't consistently communicate well with its communities to better understand their needs and help set its local priorities

During our inspection, we found that neighbourhood policing teams weren't regularly communicating consistently with local people to understand their concerns and help them feel safe. We were told that work to involve the community was ad hoc and mainly done by police community support officers.

At the time of our inspection, the force had developed a strategic engagement plan. The force told us that each district had its own local engagement plan to provide guidance to local neighbourhood teams. But officers on neighbourhood teams that we spoke to were unaware of these plans and weren't using them to improve the way they worked with communities.

We also found that neighbourhood teams weren't using the force engagement tracker to record activity. This means the force wasn't able to quantify what activity had been completed. Neighbourhood officers told us that throughout 2025, work with their communities was significantly affected by the requirement for neighbourhood officers to cover patrol and other responsibilities, such as detention duties.

The Bradford district, however, didn't [abstract](#) its neighbourhood officers and their neighbourhood teams maintained their work with their communities throughout 2025.

In December 2025, the force introduced Operation Impact, an initiative which gave neighbourhood officers an easier way to record their work with communities. In January 2026, we found that they had increased their work with communities and the recording of it. The force needs to make sure that this focus continues as it enters peak demand periods.

We also found that some neighbourhood policing teams had made efforts to reach communities that traditionally have less contact with the police or may have lower levels of trust and confidence. But this wasn't consistent across the force.

In Bradford, we saw neighbourhood teams tailoring their communication and activity for [seldom-heard groups](#), such as Muslim women's groups. We also found in Bradford some examples of two-way communication channels with the public. These included a dedicated youth officer working with young people under the age of 18 from harder-to-reach groups and establishing communication through its Community Alert messaging system.

Communication practices vary across different areas of the force. In some locations, officers are proactive in contacting diverse communities. In others, there is less focus on building trust with communities who aren't communicating with their local policing teams.

The force told us it has increased the number of residents signed up to Community Alert by 17 percent, and at the time of our inspection it had 35,000 members. This is still a relatively low number for the size of the population of West Yorkshire. The force should continue its efforts to improve this reach.

We were told that some districts had started to use the survey function as an engagement tool with the community, but this isn't yet consistent practice. The force should make better use of these surveys to gain a greater understanding of its communities' views and concerns.

We also found examples of two-way communication with the public on the force website in the form of 'You said, we did' community updates.

The force continues to use its partnership [intelligence](#) portal where partner organisations, such as local authorities, can submit information to it directly.

The force has made improvements in this area since our last inspection but there is further work to do.

The force doesn't have effective processes in place to monitor how often its neighbourhood teams are abstracted from their core role

Neighbourhood police officers are responsible for building relationships with communities, solving problems and working with partner organisations, such as local authorities, to prevent crime and antisocial behaviour. This requires local officers to be visible and have meaningful communication with those communities.

Sometimes neighbourhood officers are diverted away from their usual work to carry out other duties in the force to meet demand. This is referred to as [abstraction](#). If this happens regularly and isn't monitored by the force, it can affect the ability of neighbourhood officers to carry out their main roles in their communities.

In our workforce survey, 51.0 percent of respondents involved in neighbourhood policing (213 of 418) said that they were abstracted from their main neighbourhood policing duties on a monthly or more frequent basis. Of these 40.7 percent (170 of 418 respondents) reported this was happening weekly.

During our inspection, neighbourhood officers told us they were regularly abstracted to support areas of policing such as patrol, detention and crime investigations. This has affected their ability to carry out visible patrols in their communities, communicate with residents and carry out preventative work. It has also resulted in cancellations of planned meetings and other activities. Officers also told us that they were not consistently recording these abstractions.

In November 2025, the force revised its abstraction policy. The policy sets out clear expectations of how much time neighbourhood teams should spend in their communities. Taking into account annual leave, training and attendance at court, the force aims for officers to spend 63 percent of their time on visible patrols or working with their communities.

The force told us that in 2025, levels of abstraction rose because of increases in protest activity and high call demand during the summer. For the year ending 31 December 2025, it didn't hold data to accurately show the level of abstractions across its neighbourhood policing areas. This in part was due to some officers not accurately recording abstractions. The force didn't monitor how often it was happening. This means that senior leaders weren't always aware of the impact on communities or officer well-being.

In November 2025, the force introduced Operation Impact to address the issues abstractions were causing for the neighbourhood teams. The force now requires neighbourhood officers to complete an activity tracker, an engagement tracker and an abstraction tracker. These recording processes are still new but early indications are that officers are now recording their abstractions. The force should make sure that it has adequate plans to cover patrol during periods of high demand, and that there is robust governance around abstraction levels as it enters peak demand periods.

The force has invested in the capacity and capability of its neighbourhood policing teams

In the year ending 31 March 2025, West Yorkshire had a total of 6,138 police officers with 417 police officers, 6.8 percent of the force's officers, working in dedicated neighbourhood policing roles. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

Despite this commitment, at times the force's neighbourhood policing teams don't have the capacity and capability to provide a regular and visible presence that is accessible to their local communities because they are regularly redeployed to other areas.

The force has, however, invested in the training of its neighbourhood officers. As of 17 February 2026, 507 of 1,052 neighbourhood officers (48 percent) had completed the first part of the [College of Policing's neighbourhood policing programme](#).

The force needs to improve the supervision and governance of its integrated offender management teams, and provide them with relevant training

The force has an [integrated offender management \(IOM\)](#) team in each of its five districts. In one district, the team is co-located with the probation service. This has helped to develop stronger working relationships. IOM officers and staff work collaboratively with partner agencies to identify, manage and reduce reoffending by high-risk or prolific offenders through a balance of support and enforcement.

Police and probation services meet regularly with agencies such as health and housing to review the progress of individual offenders. We found these multi-agency case conferences to be well attended and chaired appropriately. They tracked actions and made timely updates to police systems.

However, in our inspection, we identified issues with resourcing and capacity in one of the districts. The force had permanently moved two IOM officers into the [domestic abuse](#) team. And 50 domestic abuse crimes had been allocated to the IOM team for investigation. In addition, we saw multiple other regular abstractions to support both the domestic abuse team and the [safeguarding](#) team.

In another district, the force had permanently moved four IOM officers to the investigation team. We were told the reduction in resources for the IOM teams had affected their ability to be proactive.

Some officers felt senior leaders were more focused on crime detection rates and didn't fully appreciate the value of their IOM work.

We found IOM officers to be very positive and enthusiastic. They hadn't received training in relation to IOM, although they had received training on safeguarding and [stalking](#). The force required IOM officers to investigate domestic abuse cases and deal with people arrested for suspected domestic abuse. But the officers told us that they hadn't received any domestic abuse training. Many hadn't investigated crimes and compiled prosecution files for a significant number of years. As a result, they didn't feel suitably skilled or trained to carry out their role.

The force told us it provided annual training for IOM teams. But at the time of our inspection, the last session it was due to hold had been postponed pending publication of national guidance.

The force needs to further improve its approach to IOM through stronger supervisory oversight and governance processes. It should make sure that the teams have enough resources to operate effectively and that it provides more regular and bespoke training to officers and staff.

The force works with partner organisations to prevent crime and divert young people away from committing crime through early intervention programmes

The force has an early intervention strategy, and each district has an early action team. The force holds weekly and/or daily referral meetings with partners to consider young people suitable for interventions.

We were told that during 2025, there was a strong shift in what senior leaders wanted early action teams to focus on – achieving [positive crime outcomes](#) rather than preventing young people from offending.

In addition, the force directed the early action teams to review every [stop and search](#) of a [child](#) to check whether the officer needed to submit a [public protection notice](#). Officers told us this limited the early action teams' ability to do their role.

In addition, some early action teams also review [missing children](#) cases and domestic abuse incidents where children were present. Officers said that this also diverted them from their core roles.

The force should be clear about its expectations for early action teams and policy for submitting public protection notices. Early action teams' workloads should be more consistent.

The force should make sure that governance processes are in place to track the progress of young people involved in early intervention programmes. It should also reassure itself that its early action teams have enough capacity to carry out their core role.

The force has recently begun work with an external agency to professionalise the out-of-court [restorative justice](#) programmes to help prevent young people from entering the [criminal justice system](#).

We found the OnTrak project in Bradford to be an effective diversionary programme. Young people are taught how to work on pedal cycles and go karts at a garage. At the end of the programme, they can take home a bike that they have repaired themselves. Alongside this, young people are taught the consequences of poor decisions and the force covers topics such as gun and knife crime, and [county lines](#) drug trafficking.

Responding to the public

Adequate

West Yorkshire Police is adequate at responding to the public.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to attend calls for service in line with its published attendance times, update callers about delays and effectively supervise deployment decisions

The force has a graded response policy with published targets for incident attendance times. In our [quality service review](#), we found that in 40 of the 64 cases we examined, the time to respond to the incident was within the required attendance time. This delayed response can potentially lead to the force missing opportunities to [safeguard victims](#) or collect evidence. We found that the force updated the caller in 17 of 29 cases, and there was effective supervision in 28 of 34 cases.

The force provided data to show that in the year ending 31 October 2025, it responded to 84.1 percent of emergency calls within the required time of 15 minutes. It responded to 71.3 percent of priority calls within the required time of 60 minutes.

In February 2025, the force introduced Operation Rapid to improve its response to [domestic abuse](#).

Under Operation Rapid, the force treated all domestic abuse reports as priority incidents. This caused substantial backlogs in the force [control room](#). [Officers](#) and [staff](#) were unable to manage the queues of incidents. This had a significant negative impact on attendance times.

The force responded swiftly to our feedback. In September 2025, it stopped some elements of Operation Rapid. Since then, the force has seen improvements in its response times.

The force should make sure that it has the right levels of oversight in place to further improve the way it prioritises and responds to incidents.

It also needs to make sure that attendance times are ethically recorded.

The force needs to make sure that there is consistent and effective management of risk within its RE-THRIVE process

The force has continued to improve the way it identifies [vulnerability](#) at the initial point of contact. But it needs to do more.

In [our last inspection](#), we found that the force didn't consistently reapply threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement (THRIVE) [risk assessments](#) when the response was delayed. We identified this as an [area for improvement](#). Despite this, in this inspection we found that the force was still not using RE-THRIVE consistently and effectively.

In 23 of the 35 cases that we reviewed, the force used RE-THRIVE effectively on calls. In its last audit in April 2025, the force found that [control room officers](#) and [staff](#) used RE-THRIVE in 69.8 percent of all call logs, and in 84.8 percent of [domestic abuse](#) call logs.

In response to our feedback, the force started to provide control room officers and staff with additional training and information on RE-THRIVE. In December 2025, it launched a digital THRIVE/RE-THRIVE application (app) that it had developed.

We found the app has the potential to be very effective. But officers and staff weren't using it appropriately. As a result, the RE-THRIVE process wasn't safe or effective. Officers and staff were failing to consider new and additional information when making assessments about risk.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at responding to the public.

The force should make sure that its management and governance structures examine both qualitative and quantitative performance

The force has a contact management strategy and a demand management policy. It discusses control room performance at operational pacesetter meetings twice a day and at a force pacesetter meeting. It has a monthly contact management local performance meeting and a contact board.

But we found that the force didn't discuss in sufficient detail the significant backlogs and risk in the control room incident queues. Discussion was largely led by data and didn't focus on risk or vulnerability.

The force uses an operational delivery plan to help manage peaks in demand. During our inspection, we regularly saw control room officers and staff being moved to meet changes in demand. The force also has high quality data for the control room available on its Power BI dashboards.

The force control room is split over two sites. We found that officers, staff and supervisors in both control rooms had very strong views about Operation Rapid. They felt it wasn't safe, victims were being failed, and officers and staff were unable to cope with the volume of incidents in open queues. We didn't see evidence that the force discussed these concerns during governance meetings.

During our inspection, we referred several incidents to the force that were significantly and inappropriately delayed. We did this to highlight the different levels of risk and vulnerability in the queues.

The force responded swiftly and in September 2025, it stopped elements of Operation Rapid. As a result, there are no longer significant backlogs in the incident queues and risk is being better managed. The force should continue to focus on this.

The working environment for control room staff is important. The force should make sure that its officers and staff have access to appropriate equipment that is in good working order, including equipment required for reasonable adjustments. The force should also consider how senior leaders can be more visible in both control rooms.


All the control room staff we spoke to cared deeply about their work and the service they provided to the public. We consistently observed call handlers' polite and engaging interactions with the public.

The force answers emergency calls quickly enough

In the year ending 31 January 2026, the force received 205 emergency 999 calls per 1,000 population. This was higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales. It answered 91.7 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds. This was higher than the standard expected of forces in England and Wales of answering 90.0 percent of 999 calls within 10 seconds.

This suggests that the force puts the victim at the centre of its decision-making, which provides the foundations for an effective response.

Figure 4: Percentage of 999 calls that forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 31 January 2026



Source: [999 call answering times from BT](#)

Chart description: Column chart showing the percentage of 999 calls that all forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 31 January 2026. West Yorkshire Police answered 91.7 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds. This is above the expected standard of 90 percent for forces in England and Wales, which is marked with a solid red line on the chart. 15 forces were below the expected standard.

[The accessible data table for figure 4 is available on our website.](#)

Note: Call answering time is the time taken for a call to be transferred from BT to a force and then answered by that force.

The force answers non-emergency calls quickly enough

In the year ending 30 September 2025, the force received 244 non-emergency [101](#) calls per 1,000 population. This was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The force told us that in the same period, 7.7 percent of calls to its non-emergency 101 facility were abandoned. While there is no formal national standard for how non-emergency performance is measured, the force's performance is at an acceptable level. The force doesn't have a clear understanding of whether callers hang up due to long wait times or because they choose to use an online option. It needs to analyse why callers hang up to help inform how it can improve.

The force identifies vulnerability at the first point of contact and records a structured triage that determines how it will prioritise the call

The force had trained all the call handlers that we spoke to for their role. All had received training on the initial risk assessment, THRIVE, and guidance documents were readily available.

In 76 of the 77 cases we reviewed, we found an effective triage process. In 51 of 62 cases, call handlers checked if the caller was a repeat victim. In 57 of 66 cases, the call taker checked if the victim was vulnerable. In 70 of 80 cases, we found the initial prioritisation of calls appropriate.

We found that the force control room has a strong focus on the initial THRIVE process and has regular audit and quality assurance processes in place. The force should make sure that call handlers always make appropriate checks for repeat victims and vulnerable victims, so their initial prioritisation is correct.

We also found that there was a lack of confidence about using [Right Care, Right Person](#) guidance to assess whether police are the correct service to respond to a person with mental health difficulties. Officers and staff told us the force hadn't provided them with enough training. And officers and staff had no confidence in the force's Right Care, Right Person toolkit, which it had introduced to help them reach a decision on deployment. As a result, they weren't using the toolkit. We were told the force had daily disagreements with partner organisations, such as the ambulance service and hospitals, over attendance at incidents and escalation processes were ineffective.

In response to our feedback, in December 2025, the force amended the toolkit and began providing in-person training on Right Care, Right Person. In January 2026, we could see improvements. We saw some logs where the force dealt with the incident effectively using the Right Care, Right Person guidance.

The force should consistently provide safeguarding, evidence preservation and crime prevention advice at the first point of contact

The force should increase the advice that it gives to members of the public at the first point of contact to safeguard, prevent further offences and to preserve evidence.

We found that the force gave crime prevention advice at the first point of contact in 8 out of 15 cases we examined. In 12 out of 27 relevant cases, call handlers gave evidence preservation advice. And in 13 out of 23 relevant cases, they provided safeguarding advice.

In response to our feedback, in December 2025, the force introduced a new digital application (app) that helps call handlers to give appropriate advice in all cases. It was too early to judge its success, but call handlers were using it and it appears to be working well.

The force should make sure that where deployment is delayed, risk is reassessed and the victim or caller updated

During June, July and August 2025, we found significant backlogs of incidents in the control room as a result of Operation Rapid. These were mainly domestic abuse priority logs but also included other logs involving [children](#), vulnerable adults and sexual offences.

In an attempt to manage the risk, the force had directed control room officers and staff to reassess each open incident overnight using the RE-THRIVE model. We found that due to the large volume of open incidents, this wasn't always done. And some of the risk assessments completed were poor. Staff didn't contact the victim or caller to explain the delay, or update them, or to check on the current situation or risk level.

The force addressed this in September 2025 and by January 2026 we could see significant improvement.

The force should make sure that where deployment is delayed, it always accurately re-assesses risk and contacts the victim or caller.

Investigating crime

Requires
improvement

West Yorkshire Police requires improvement at investigating crime.

Areas for improvement

The force doesn't consistently achieve appropriate outcomes for victims

The force isn't always achieving acceptable [outcomes](#) for [victims](#) of crime. The number of crimes it solves following investigations is low. It needs to understand the issue and work to achieve better outcomes for victims.

In the year ending 30 September 2025, 10 percent of all outcomes that the force assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were [positive outcomes](#). This is an increase from the year ending 30 September 2023, where 8 percent of the outcomes assigned to victim-based crimes were positive outcomes.

During our inspection, we found delays in the allocation of crimes to investigation teams and patrol. In September 2025, we found over 900 crimes unallocated in district queues. Some dated back to May 2025. This mainly related to two districts.


We also found backlogs in the force [crime management unit](#). In August 2025, it had 5,200 crimes in the review and allocation queue and 11,240 crimes in the crime finalisation queue.

In October 2025, we found crimes waiting for review by the [force crime registrar](#). These included 412 rape finalisations or reclassifications. The oldest had been in the queue since December 2024. In addition, a further 1,300 crimes were waiting for review by dedicated decision-makers. The oldest had been in the queue since August 2024.

In response to our feedback, the force has worked hard to reduce these queues using overtime and external support. By January 2026, the force had reduced the queues significantly. The force needs to maintain its focus on this area to make sure it sustains this improvement.

During our inspection, we also found that crimes that had potential lines of enquiry were being closed by the force crime management unit on initial review without being allocated for investigation.

Figure 5: Percentage of positive outcomes that West Yorkshire Police force and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes between the year ending 31 December 2023 and the year ending 30 September 2025



Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: Line chart showing the percentage of [positive outcomes](#) that West Yorkshire Police assigned and the median for forces in England and Wales for each year from the year ending 31 December 2023 to the year ending 30 September 2025. The chart shows that 10 percent of outcomes that West Yorkshire Police assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were positive in the year ending 30 September 2025, compared to the median of 12.2 percent for forces in England and Wales. It also shows that the percentage of positive outcomes that West Yorkshire Police assigned has been slowly increasing since the year ending 31 December 2023. And the median percentage of positive outcomes for forces in England and Wales has been slowly increasing in the same period.

Note: The percentage of positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all outcomes they assign in a given period. Victim-based crimes include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

Figure 6: Percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that West Yorkshire Police and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes in the year ending 30 September 2025

Outcome types	West Yorkshire percentage [%]	Median percentage [%] for forces in England and Wales
Unresolved crime outcomes (Outcomes 11–18)	86.7	84.2
Resolved crime outcomes (Outcomes 5, 9, 10, 20–22)	3.3	3.3
Positive crime outcomes (Outcomes 1–4 and 8), of which:	10.0	12.2
1 – Charged/summonsed	8.4	9.0
2 and 3 – Caution – youths and adults	0.5	0.8
4 – Taken into consideration	0.0	0.1
8 – Community resolution	1.0	2.1

Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Note: The percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all outcomes they assign in a given period. [Victim-based crimes](#) include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

In the year ending 30 September 2025, of all the crime outcomes the force assigned to victim-based crimes, 0.5 percent were outcome 14: evidential difficulties (suspect not identified, victim doesn't support further action). This is lower than the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The force says it has reviewed the use of this outcome type to make sure it is using it in line with Home Office Counting Rules. The force is satisfied that it uses this outcome only when a victim could tell the police the identity of the suspect but refuses to do so. In other circumstances, such as when a victim doesn't support a prosecution or the offender isn't known, the force told us it uses [outcome 16](#) (suspect identified, victims doesn't support action) or outcome 18 (investigation complete, suspect not identified).

In the year ending 30 September 2025, 23.2 percent of crimes were finalised as [outcome 15](#): evidential difficulties (suspect identified, victim supports action). This is higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

We reviewed 24 records where the force used outcome 15. In 10 of them the force had used outcome 15 incorrectly. The force told us it had carried out several audits of its use of outcome 15 and outcome 18. It found that some investigations were being finalised with lines of enquiry outstanding and before [officers](#) interviewed suspects. The force provided feedback to the officers and their supervisors and is carrying out further audits of outcome use.

In the year ending 30 September 2025, 1.2 percent of crimes were finalised as outcome 22: referral to diversionary or educational activity. This is higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

Since the year ending 31 December 2023, the force has seen an increase in the use of outcome 22. In February 2025, its audits identified officers were incorrectly using this outcome. It increased the scrutiny of crimes being finalised as outcome 22 in the crime management unit and provided force-wide communication to improve officer knowledge.

In summer 2025, the force launched an intervention hub in conjunction with Red Snapper, an organisation that provides offender rehabilitation and [out-of-court resolution](#) interventions. The hub provides a library of diversionary online courses available to people dealt with by way of a community resolution or caution. These online courses are in addition to existing in-person courses.

The force should make sure that crimes are allocated to appropriately skilled officers to achieve the outcomes victims deserve

In [our last inspection](#), we found that the force had five different crime allocation policies, which led to daily disagreements regarding crime allocation and a lack of consistency in the allocation of crimes. We found this continued between June and September 2025.

In October 2025, the force introduced its force-wide crime allocation policy. This has resolved the disputes between investigation teams and has created greater consistency in crime allocation.

Some district investigation teams, including [child](#) and adult [safeguarding](#) teams and CID, largely consist of [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\) 1](#) officers, with a small number of PIP 2 officers.

As of 26 January 2026, the force told us it had a shortage of 258 detectives. It also had 86 fully qualified detectives in non-detective roles. It had 178 officers in training to become a detective. If all of the officers qualify, it would leave the force with a shortfall of 80 detectives.

As of 26 January 2026, the force had 24 officers trained on the [specialist child abuse investigation development programme \(SCAIDP\)](#) across the five districts, with a further 24 undergoing training. It had 19 SCAIDP-trained permanent and temporary sergeants. Some child safeguarding teams didn't have any SCAIDP-trained officers.

Many of the PIP 1 officers that we spoke to were young in service and inexperienced. We found they were managing complex crimes without the appropriate skills or experience to do so. For example, we found rape investigations, section 18 assaults, non-fatal strangulation, complex fraud, and robbery crimes allocated to inexperienced PIP 1 officers. We referred some of these cases to the force to review to make sure appropriate action had been taken. Our workforce survey found that 32.2 percent of respondents (193 of 600) were allocated investigations outside their level of accreditation or training on a quarterly or more frequent basis.

The force should review the more complex investigations that its PIP 1 officers are currently managing to provide support to the officers and to make sure that the investigation is effective and that all investigative opportunities are being followed.

The force should make sure there is supervisory oversight of investigations and that officers pursue all investigative opportunities

In [our last inspection](#), we highlighted that the force needed to improve supervisory oversight of investigations.

In this inspection, in 56 of 78 relevant cases we reviewed, the force supervised the investigation effectively. In 56 of 85 relevant cases, it took all investigative opportunities. This is a decline in performance from the previous inspection.

We spoke to [officers](#) and reviewed some of their investigations. The quality of investigations was mixed. We found that supervisory reviews were sometimes inconsistent and of poor quality. They did little to direct officers on what to do, or to support them. As a result, we found inexperienced officers and supervisors struggling to manage workloads, prisoners, Crown Prosecution Service action plans and [bail](#).

We spoke to investigation supervisors. We found that their crime reviews didn't always support investigators in progressing cases because of a focus on compliance rather than quality. Some supervisors told us that they weren't able to review investigations within the expected timescales because of their very high workloads.

Many supervisors were young in service and inexperienced. Many were working excessive hours to try to manage their workload. The force should support supervisors and make sure that they have manageable workloads.

Our [quality service review](#) showed that the force used the wrong outcome in 16 of 72 cases. In some cases, the force had applied [outcome 15](#) incorrectly and should have applied a different 'evidential difficulties' outcome.

We found that officers weren't always pursuing all investigative opportunities, and some investigations were being closed down prematurely.

The force told us that as at 25 September 2025, an average of 61 percent of crime investigations had an investigation plan recorded. In October, this increased to 75 percent. However, a force audit in November found only 48 percent of supervisor reviews of investigations were of good quality.

The force should continue its focus on improving crime investigation outcomes for [victims](#), making sure that it doesn't miss evidential opportunities.

The force needs to make sure that it complies with the requirements of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime

In [our last inspection](#), the force told us that in 6,900 cases, the [victim](#) hadn't received an update for more than 42 days. During this inspection, the force told us that as at 17 December 2025, the victim hadn't received an update for more than 28 days (the force's expectation) in 1,561 cases.

This is an improvement, but the force needs to do more. It should continue to improve the quality of its interactions with victims in line with [the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime \('the Victims' Code'\)](#).

In 67 of 75 relevant cases we reviewed, we found that the force had recorded victim needs assessments. This means that investigators had assessed whether those victims needed support and if so, what type of support they needed and whether they were [vulnerable](#) or intimidated.

We also found that in 15 of 23 cases, the force identified and recorded a victim's entitlement to an enhanced service. In 42 of 49 relevant cases, we found that the force had updated victims on the progress of investigations. Needs assessments and updates are two of the rights in the Victims' Code. It is essential for the force to comply with the code to give victims a high-quality service.

We found the force focused on compliance with the Victims' Code as opposed to the quality of [officer](#) interactions with victims. Officers and supervisors told us that victim updates were often by text message or email and shared only general information such as that the investigation was 'ongoing'. We were told that on some teams, one officer would complete all updates despite having no knowledge of the cases. However, we found that in the [safeguarding](#) investigation teams, some officers provided regular and very detailed updates to their victims, either on the phone or in person.

The force should continue its efforts to improve the quality of its assessments, updates and interactions with victims, making sure that victims receive an enhanced level of service where appropriate.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at investigating crime.

The force records crime accurately to make sure that it meets the standard national crime recording standard

Our quality service review found that the force recorded 60 of the 65 crimes we reviewed correctly. Furthermore, it recorded 50 of the 60 correctly recorded crimes within 24 hours.

The force should make sure that it has processes that support officers to improve the quality of investigations

The force has specific policies for key crime types. It has an investigations action plan to support progress against specific [areas for improvement](#) identified during our previous inspection. The force has also introduced systems and processes to better manage officer workloads.

The force now holds its performance meeting monthly. It focuses on datasets to examine investigation quality and performance in tracing and arresting wanted people.

However, in June, July and August 2025, we still found unmanageable workloads in some investigation teams. As a result, the quality of some investigations was poor.

In October 2025, the force completed a review of the district investigation teams and [domestic abuse](#) teams. It moved officers into investigation teams to try to balance workloads and meet demand. The same month, the force introduced a new crime allocation policy. This has helped the force to allocate crimes more evenly across investigation teams. Some district leaders have moved large numbers of crimes to officers in non-investigation teams to maintain lower workloads. The force doesn't yet fully understand the impact of the review and the new crime allocation policy. However, early indications are that it appears to be reducing officer workloads.

The force needs to continue to focus on this to make sure it sustains this improvement.

The force has an internal crime audit process. It also completes quality assurance thematic testing, but the force told us that the sample size isn't large enough yet to identify any themes. The force needs to make sure that it provides good quality feedback to officers in each district in a consistent and supportive way to improve the quality of investigations.

The force monitors file quality against national standards to highlight common issues. It uses this information to identify good practice and areas of learning and to provide feedback to investigators.

A force decision-maker unit checks the quality of files before the force submits them to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The force told us that in October 2025, the CPS accepted 96.7 percent of files at first submission. This is an improvement from our last inspection, when the CPS accepted 87.7 percent of files at first submission.

The force has processes to make sure that it promptly deals with outstanding suspects and wanted people to progress investigations and reduce harm to the public

We found that in 31 out of 46 relevant cases, the force arrested or interviewed the suspect. And in 26 of 31 cases, the force made an arrest at the earliest opportunity. At the time of our review, the force hadn't yet arrested 15 suspects.

However, during the last six months the force has focused on identified suspects and those circulated as wanted. The force uses 'be on the look-out for' cars daily to locate and arrest wanted individuals. This is a priority for each district, and the force discusses progress at daily governance meetings.

The force should make sure that deploying investigation team officers to the 'be on the look-out for' car doesn't adversely affect the teams' performance.

The force monitors pre-charge bail and suspects' release under investigation but it should improve its governance processes for the use of voluntary attendance

In September 2025, the force introduced a new policy to promote the appropriate use of bail and to reduce officer reliance on suspects being [released under investigation](#) as an alternative.

The force also has a new bail management policy being developed by districts to better manage and monitor bail and the use of release under investigation locally through the suspect management meeting.

The force has comprehensive data available on Power BI dashboards to help it manage bail. It had reduced overdue bails from 914 in January 2024 to 314 in January 2026.

In summary, the force has improved its approach to bail but needs to make sure it maintains this improvement.

Supervisors told us that there wasn't a governance process for [voluntary attendance interviews](#). The force should improve the management of these investigations.

Safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm

Requires improvement

West Yorkshire Police requires improvement at [safeguarding children](#) and [adults at risk of harm](#).

Areas for improvement

The force should make sure that it complies with statutory safeguarding processes to improve its response to children and adults at risk of harm

The force needs to improve its governance and processes around [organisational learning](#) from statutory reviews.

In the last year, the force has allocated a detective inspector to the [serious case review](#) team. But we were told that the force hasn't focused on statutory reviews and that the learning is only shared in the district reviewed, not force wide.

In December 2025, the force set up an organisational learning board and it discussed statutory reviews. The force told us it would continue with this. While this is a positive step, it was too early for us to record sustained improvement. The force didn't provide any evidence to demonstrate how learning from safeguarding reviews was being shared across the force.

At the time of our inspection, the force wasn't meeting its statutory obligation to directly notify schools of a [child](#) living in a house where there is [domestic abuse](#), in line with [Operation Encompass](#). The force isn't making referrals directly to schools and processes for information sharing vary across the districts.

Information contained in domestic abuse reports completed by response [officers](#) is automatically shared with local authorities so they can share the information with schools. But we were told that sometimes officers didn't record the details of a child or their school. As a result, information wasn't shared. There are no workarounds in place to deal with these cases to make sure the information is shared.

In addition, some local authorities had introduced circumstances when information wouldn't be shared with a school to better manage the demand. This means that the force wasn't aware the local authority hadn't informed the school because of workload demands.

During our [quality service review](#), we found that seven of seven relevant cases were recorded for Operation Encompass, however only two were documented as having been sent to the relevant school. This means children may not have received appropriate support in school.

Many patrol officers we spoke to were unaware of Operation Encompass, so may not understand the importance of recording the child's details and school correctly.

The force told us that in April 2026, the [Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment](#) would be live. It includes Operation Encompass requirements. The force was rolling out training on the risk assessment.

District commanders attend child and adult safeguarding boards. Some don't have a background in safeguarding. They should make sure they are supported by someone with relevant specialist knowledge when attending safeguarding boards.

The force should make sure supervisors comply with its missing from home policy to make sure that missing people are identified and safeguarded

During our inspection, we found that call handlers created logs in response to calls about [missing people](#), but district supervisors often directed that no formal entry was recorded on the [Niche](#) record management system.

The force's missing from home policy states when a missing report should be recorded on Niche and outlines specific circumstances when a report wouldn't need to be formally recorded.

The policy states that “a person will not be recorded as missing on Niche until the carer or reporting person has undertaken reasonable actions to ascertain the whereabouts of the person unless there is a real, immediate risk of harm that justifies immediate police intervention. The police must complete a [risk assessment](#) and consider whether there is critical concern that justifies immediate police involvement. If there is no critical concern, the police must consider whether the parent or carer has conducted reasonable actions to establish the whereabouts of the [child](#). If the level of risk does not justify immediate police intervention and the parent or carer has not conducted reasonable actions to establish the whereabouts of the child and has not allowed the child a reasonable time to return of their own accord, the district inspector can delay the police response pending the parent or carer completing those reasonable actions”.

We found that where decisions were made and recorded using the [national decision model](#), these reports were generally comprehensive and appropriate. However, in many cases, we found that the force didn't comply with its own policy.

Risk assessments weren't always completed or were significantly delayed. Additional information wasn't considered when assessing levels of risk, with no rationale recorded.

This included involvement in [county lines](#), [children at risk of criminal exploitation](#), children linked to gangs and children at risk of [child sexual exploitation](#).

We saw logs where the reporting person had completed extensive enquiries to locate the person, but the force still delayed recording a missing report and recorded no rationale for this decision.

There was also a lack of recorded decision-making to justify repeated delays placed on missing reports until the person returned and the force finalised the incident log as 'not missing, located'. As a result, the force hasn't recorded a large number of missing children and adults on Niche. On some occasions, the force may have deployed a patrol to complete minor enquires but didn't record a report.

This doesn't comply with force policy. It means the force isn't carrying out [return home interviews](#) and misses opportunities to gather information. It also means the force doesn't complete a [public protection notice](#) to share information with children's social services and as a result there is no [safeguarding](#) activity.

The force carried out its own audit of missing person reports in 2025. It found that in 15 percent of cases, it hadn't recorded formal missing reports where it should have. And five children had come to harm while reported missing.

In 2025, the force didn't formally record missing from home reports for 4,098 children and 2,777 adults reported missing from home. These incident logs were finalised as 'not missing, located'. There is no way of knowing how many of these people were repeatedly reported missing. And if the child or adult is reported missing again in future, the person making an assessment would have no knowledge of any previous reports as there are no records on Niche.

When the force correctly records missing people on the Niche system, it assesses risk and gathers important information. In our [quality service review](#), in 20 of 20 recorded missing reports, the initial risk grade was appropriate. In 15 of the 20 cases we reviewed, [officers](#) attended within the required time frames.

The force carries out thorough investigations to locate missing people when it records a formal missing report. In 11 of 12 cases we reviewed, officers followed the investigation plan, made relevant enquiries and recorded updates of their efforts to locate the missing person.

In nine of nine recorded missing children's cases we reviewed, the force notified social services. This means that children were assessed for any welfare support they may need.

The force needs to make sure it has a consistent approach to recording and managing missing reports in line with its policy, that risk is correctly managed and people who go missing are safeguarded.

The force should apply consistent secondary risk assessment processes across all districts and provide a full picture, including cumulative risk, when sharing information about vulnerable children with children's social care

During our last two inspections, we told the force that it should share more comprehensive information about [children](#) with social services. The force has made improvements but still needs to do more.

The force has five [multi-agency safeguarding hubs \(MASHs\)](#), one in each district. All are co-located with partner organisations in either council or police buildings. In some districts, the adult and [child](#) MASH teams are in different buildings.

In our [quality service review](#), we found that 19 of the 28 relevant cases we examined had a specialist secondary review by the MASH. In 17 of these 19 cases, the force had completed the secondary review promptly.

[Officers](#) and [staff](#) made the relevant referrals to specialist partner organisations in 32 of 40 cases. This may indicate that not all officers and staff are aware of support services available for [victims](#), and the importance of connecting victims with the help they need.

We found that the quality of some [domestic abuse, stalking, harassment and honour-based violence \(DASH\) risk assessments](#) and [public protection notices \(PPNs\)](#) was poor. Important information on the incident log wasn't always recorded on the PPN or DASH report.

Risk assessments lack detail. We saw cases where the history of the people involved wasn't checked, and children weren't recorded or weren't spoken to.

The force has taken some steps to improve PPN quality by introducing a feedback portal for when MASH officers and staff identify concerns. This means the force can give feedback to officers' supervisors. This is a positive step, but the force should continue to focus on this area.

We found some joint triage processes for child safeguarding PPNs with social services were ineffective. They didn't identify and act on cumulative risk.

In addition, we found that force processes for secondary risk assessments and sharing information with partner organisations, such as children's social services, were inconsistent across the five districts. One district only reviewed [high-risk domestic abuse](#) incidents. This means the force could miss children involved in medium and standard-risk cases. Two districts reviewed all domestic abuse cases regardless of risk level. Another assessed domestic abuse cases where children were recorded as linked to the incident, regardless of risk level.

In response to our feedback, in January 2026 the force introduced processes to make sure that all domestic abuse cases and incidents involving concern for a child had secondary risk assessments by MASH officers and staff.

These processes were new at the time of our inspection so we were unable to assess if they would lead to sustained improvement. The force should continue to focus on this area and make sure that processes are working effectively. It should also make sure that it has provided all officers and staff with relevant training and they understand the [statutory guidance on safeguarding children](#).

The force needs to make sure that it has sufficient staffing, processes and governance for the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme and the Child Sex Offence Disclosure Scheme to ensure compliance with legislative process and required timescales

Our PEEL 2025/27 inspections now include audits of how all forces use [disclosure](#) schemes, such as the [Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme \(DVDS\)](#) and the [Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme \(CSODS\)](#), to protect potentially [vulnerable people](#).

In [our last inspection](#), we identified this as an [area for improvement](#) for the force. Since then, the force has improved its focus on the management of DVDS and CSODS applications. It now has some data on DVDS and CSODS applications through the Power BI dashboard. But the force focuses on compliance in dealing with applications within 28 days rather than delivering disclosures to [safeguard](#) those who are vulnerable.

We found very limited enquiries were completed to speak to applicants about the decision or to make the disclosures. The force often closes applications within days as ‘victim not engaging’ after two attempts to contact them by phone. We saw this in all five districts. We saw little evidence of [officers](#) leaving the police station to locate or speak to the applicant, or use other officers, such as neighbourhood officers, or partner agencies to help deliver the disclosure.

When it closed these applications, the force didn’t put a marker on the IT system to show it should make a disclosure if the applicant came to the attention of police at some point in the future. In the cases we audited, we saw examples of applicants coming to the attention of police on multiple occasions, but the force didn’t deliver a DVDS disclosure.

The DVDS cases we reviewed were high-risk cases where the force should have provided the disclosure so the applicant could protect themselves.

The force has no accurate data on the number of DVDS applications in which a disclosure has been authorised but not delivered. The safeguarding governance unit has introduced a finalisation template to try to obtain outcome information. This data isn’t accurate as the force hasn’t recorded every outcome. But it showed that in 2025, at least 567 DVDS applications were finalised as ‘victim not engaging’. We were told that this finalisation was used when the force hadn’t made contact with the victim.

Despite having safeguarding governance processes in place, the force hadn’t identified that this was happening.

In our audit of CSODS applications, we found the force had improved its governance arrangements since our last inspection. But the force was also unable to provide accurate data on these applications. Supervisors told us that a request had been submitted to IT for more detailed data for both DVDS and CSODS applications but that it hadn't been progressed due to the volume of other requests.

In our CSODS audit, we also identified delays in allocating applications and difficulties meeting the 28-day expectation for a disclosure to be made. This was notably where district safeguarding teams were managing the applications, because of their workload. Some districts had moved CSODS applications to the MASH for closer scrutiny and management.

Main findings

In this section we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm.

The force records crimes committed against vulnerable victims effectively

The force records almost all crimes committed against vulnerable victims. In our quality service review, we examined 50 records involving referrals made to the force about vulnerable adults and child protection cases, 45 incidents involving victims of domestic abuse, 50 reported incidents of rape ([N100s](#)) and 20 decisions to cancel crimes of rape. We found the following:

- Vulnerable adult and child protection cases: 23 crimes should have been recorded and 22 were recorded correctly.
- Domestic abuse incidents: 26 crimes should have been recorded, and all 26 crimes were recorded correctly.
- Reported incidents of rape: 4 crimes of rape should have been recorded, and 2 crimes were recorded correctly.
- Cancelled crimes of rape: 20 out of 20 crimes were cancelled correctly.

It is especially important that the force accurately records crimes involving vulnerable victims. It is equally important to cancel crimes only when it is certain that no crime was committed. Recording and cancelling crimes correctly helps to make sure victims receive the service and support they expect and deserve from the police. If the force doesn't record or cancel crimes correctly, offenders may go on to commit further crimes against their victims or against other vulnerable victims.

The force doesn't always safeguard children and adults at risk of harm

As part of our quality service review, we reviewed 60 cases to determine how well the force safeguards victims.

We found that in 26 of 35 relevant cases, the force gave appropriate safeguarding advice to victims. This suggests that officers aren't always aware of their duty to identify and reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable victims. In 6 of 13 cases we reviewed, officers recorded the [voice of the child](#) in referrals.

During our inspection, we also found some poor-quality DASH reports, and cases where responders didn't speak to children at the scene of domestic incidents. This suggests that the force doesn't always treat children affected by domestic abuse as victims and doesn't consider their experiences and needs in safeguarding decisions.

When attending incidents, officers don't consistently show [professional curiosity](#) and look beyond the obvious to identify signs of hidden harm, exploitation or vulnerability. In 34 of 40 cases we reviewed, officers completed appropriate risk assessments. However, they often failed to identify risks to the victim. This indicates that they didn't have a clear understanding of the risks faced by victims or they didn't complete the risk assessment in enough detail. This means victims might not be referred to partner agencies for support.

The force should do more to develop officers and staff in its safeguarding and domestic abuse teams, MASHs and patrol

Generally, officers we spoke to had a good understanding of vulnerability. They spoke very positively of in-person training they had received, including [DA Matters](#) and child safeguarding training. We were told that the force has also provided [stalking](#) training.

The force provides officers in every district with scheduled training days, which include safeguarding. But some officers told us that some district training officers didn't have enough knowledge about vulnerability and safeguarding and were unable to answer specific questions.

We found that MASH officers and staff hadn't received any training on the CSODS and the DVDS. Some had no knowledge of the statutory guidance [Working Together to Safeguard Children 2023](#) and hadn't received any formal training for their role.

Safeguarding teams largely consisted of trainees with limited experience. The force would benefit from making sure all the officers who work in these teams have the training needed to carry out their specialist role.

Many officers that we spoke to in the domestic abuse teams were trainees with limited experience. We found that they had very limited knowledge of prevention orders and how they could use them to safeguard vulnerable people and manage the risk posed by offenders.

When working with partner agencies, the force considers additional ways to safeguard and protect vulnerable people and challenge offenders

When working with partners, the force considers other appropriate ways to safeguard vulnerable people and challenge offenders. In four of seven cases we reviewed, the force appropriately referred the case to the [multi-agency risk assessment conference \(MARAC\)](#) and made [multi-agency tasking and co-ordination](#) arrangements.

This means that the force and partners could create a multi-agency plan to reduce the harm to high-risk domestic abuse victims or their children and manage the risk from offenders. We found that the force referred cases to the MARAC in a timely manner and there were no delays or backlogs of cases.

In the year ending 30 September 2025, MARAC meetings in West Yorkshire discussed 4,617 cases. This is higher than the level expected by the domestic abuse charity [SafeLives](#).

The force doesn't always use appropriate measures to safeguard vulnerable people and reduce any risk from offenders

The force doesn't always use preventative orders and schemes to manage risk and protect vulnerable people. In five of nine cases we reviewed, the force considered preventative orders to reduce the risk of further harm to victims. These include [Domestic Violence Protection Notices \(DVPNs\)](#), [Domestic Violence Protection Orders \(DVPOs\)](#), and [Stalking Protection Orders](#). This shows that the force isn't always using all available tools to safeguard victims. The force needs to improve its processes for monitoring and enforcing orders.

We found that the number of applications for DVPNs and DVPOs had increased since the last inspection.

The resourcing of the central team is still a problem, resulting in district officers having to attend court themselves to make an application for an order. This discourages officers from submitting applications. Many don't feel properly trained to present applications at court. In addition, officers told us that their applications were sometimes rejected by the central team, and as a result they were reluctant to submit further applications. We also identified some cultural challenges regarding officers' perceptions of the value of DVPNs and DVPOs in safeguarding victims.

Managing fraud

Requires
improvement

West Yorkshire Police requires improvement at managing fraud.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to make sure it reviews fraud crimes so it allocates the most complex to experienced investigators and that investigators use the fraud investigation model

The force allocates fraud investigations by the value of loss rather than by the complexity of the investigation. This could lead to [officers](#) without the right training managing complex investigations while specialist investigators manage simple investigations.

We also found the fraud investigations were allocated without a [fraud investigation model](#) investigation plan or specialist guidance. Work backlogs were causing delays to the allocation of crimes. Only 8 out of 17 fraud cases we reviewed were allocated promptly to an investigator.

The force needs to adequately train investigators and call handlers

In our inspection, we found that fraud training for investigators and call handlers was inadequate.

During interviews and [reality testing](#), frontline investigators told us they didn't feel adequately trained to investigate fraud. In our workforce survey, 70.8 percent of respondents who had investigated fraud (243 of 343) said they hadn't received fraud training.

Our audit showed that this was having an impact on the quality of fraud investigation. The force wasn't consistently using the [fraud investigation model](#). In our audit, only 2 of the 16 cases we reviewed had used the model.

The force needs to identify and respond to vulnerable victims of fraud

The force isn't consistently identifying [vulnerable victims](#) and putting measures in place to protect them from the first point of contact.

We found that in 7 out of 12 cases, the force didn't make appropriate checks to identify vulnerable victims. And in 8 of the 20 cases we reviewed, vulnerable victims weren't provided with adequate fraud [safeguarding](#) advice.

The force does have an effective multi-agency meeting to address vulnerability, and it has protect officers to manage its approach to all vulnerable victims. They work effectively in the community and have developed initiatives such as educational videos for [children](#).

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at managing fraud.

The force has effective accountability for fraud, and it understands and manages the threat of fraud in its communities

During our inspection, we found that the force had assessed the threat from fraud and understood how it affects its communities. This assessment shows the local and national threat picture for fraud. The force has included fraud in its [force management statement](#). The force has a named fraud lead and has clear governance at both a strategic and an operational level. It effectively monitors performance in relation to fraud at a force-level performance board. The force has included fraud in its economic crime unit threat delivery group.

The force doesn't have enough capacity and capability to manage fraud in its communities and provide support to victims

During our inspection, we found that the force didn't have the right capacity or capability to manage fraud. The force has a dedicated [4P approach](#) to manage its fraud response and has specific operation plans for high-harm fraud.

At the time of our inspection, the force had recently disbanded its district fraud hubs. This leaves the fraud assessment hub as the force's only dedicated resource. The force manages most fraud investigations in non-specialist departments. The support it gives these investigators isn't adequate or effective. Escalation processes aren't used.

The force does use specialist investigators from the economic crime unit to support call handlers and provide advice to frontline officers. And it uses police community support officers trained as fraud ambassadors to give advice to victims.

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