

PEEL 2025–27

Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy

An inspection of Humberside Police

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Overall summary

Our judgments

Our inspection assessed how good Humberside Police is in nine areas of policing. We make graded judgments as follows:

Outstanding	Good	Adequate	Requires improvement	Inadequate
Preventing and deterring crime	Responding to the public	Leadership and force management	Safeguarding children and adults	
		Developing a diverse and inclusive workforce		
		Police powers and public treatment		
		Investigating crime		
		Managing fraud		
		Providing a safe custody environment		

We set out our detailed findings about things the force is doing well and where the force should improve in the rest of this report.

We also assess the force's performance in a range of other areas, and we report on these separately. We make graded judgments for some of these areas.

PEEL 2025–2027

In 2014, we introduced our police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) inspections, which assess the performance of all 43 police forces in England and Wales. Since then, we have been continuously adapting our approach.

We have moved to a more [intelligence](#)-led, continual assessment approach, rather than the annual [PEEL inspections](#) we used in previous years. We assess forces against the [characteristics of good](#) performance, set out in the [PEEL assessment framework 2025–2027](#), and we more clearly link our judgments to [causes of concern](#) and [areas for improvement](#).

It isn't possible to make direct comparisons between the grades awarded in this PEEL inspection and those from the previous cycle of PEEL inspections. This is because we have increased our focus on making sure forces are achieving appropriate outcomes for the public. We have also changed the aspects of policing we inspect and added new areas.

Terminology in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, 'national' definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, 'national' means applying to England or Wales, or England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England, Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom.

For more information on data and analysis in this report, please [see the 'About the data' section of our website](#).

HM Inspector's summary

I am satisfied with most aspects of the performance of Humberside Police in keeping people safe and reducing crime. The force has made improvements since our last inspection regarding outcomes for [victims](#) of crime, and I recognise the workforce's hard work in achieving this. But I have identified that it needs to improve some of its processes, including for example in [safeguarding](#).

The force has strategic plans, with a performance framework in place. Its funding is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. There are some areas of performance that need to improve, which I believe the force should have recognised and acted upon much sooner. The speed of response hasn't been helped by a lack of stability in the [chief officer](#) team and other senior posts. I highlighted my concerns in this regard in [our 2024 inspection report](#). But there is a new permanent leadership team in place in Humberside Police now, and I am pleased to report that the force is making positive changes to improve the service to communities. While some of these improvements are yet to be fully developed, I am confident that the force leadership will continue the positive trajectory noted in my report.

The workforce feels well supported by immediate supervisors, the well-being unit and staff associations. The force has established a promising talent-management process. But some investigation teams are facing high workloads, which negatively affect some individuals' well-being. I was disappointed to hear strong feedback from some trainee investigators that the force didn't always provide effective support throughout their training.

The force has effective oversight of [stop and search](#), including external scrutiny that also examines its use of force. It makes proactive use of stop and search to address local priorities, and has improved its performance in the recording of reasonable grounds. But it needs to address the large backlog of [officers](#) with expired personal and public safety training.

I was pleased to see that the force had maintained outstanding performance in prevention and deterrence. It has a higher number of neighbourhood officers than the average for forces in England and Wales. A strong problem-solving culture is established. The force tackles neighbourhood crime and [antisocial behaviour](#), and has a focus on rural crime prevention. It has incorporated young people into its [integrated offender management](#) programme to help prevent offending.

The force has a good [control room](#) and strong performance in answering calls, with low abandonment rates. The number of emergency calls is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The force consistently assesses the risk and vulnerability of callers to decide the appropriate response. Response times are consistently positive.


I congratulate the force for improving outcomes for victims of crime. The rate of [positive outcomes](#) is now higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales, despite the force having to deal with some significant investigation challenges and demand. I was pleased to see how investigators cared for their work. But the force's investigation model now struggles to cope with demand. And essential processes such as management of [bail](#), [digital forensics](#) and supervision of crime need to improve.

Our inspection activity for safeguarding now includes more audits and a deeper examination of key processes. It was disappointing to find that the force needed to improve governance, how it managed its disclosure schemes, its recording of crime and its [multi-agency risk assessment conference](#) processes. The new force leadership has responded positively to our feedback, but these are important areas that require consistently reliable and effective performance.

The force assesses the threat from fraud and understands how this affects its communities. It has a positive outcome rate for fraud, above the typical range for forces in England and Wales. But it needs to make sure it has the capability and capacity to manage increased fraud demand.

There is effective oversight of the force's custody suites. There are enough [custody officers](#) and [staff](#) available. They treat detainees with dignity and respect and provide appropriate care. The force is open to effective external scrutiny of its custody facilities. I was pleased to see that diverting [children](#) away from custody was a clear priority. The force needs to consistently improve its data and recording practices in relation to the use of force including accurately recording its use of strip searches.

My report sets out the detailed findings of this inspection. There are some areas in which Humberside Police must do better, and we will continue to monitor its progress. But I am optimistic that its new leadership team, together with its committed officers and staff, will continue to support the improvements needed.



Michelle Skeer OBE QPM

His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary

Leadership and force management

Adequate

Humberside Police's leadership and force management are adequate.

Area for improvement

The force needs to respond more effectively to the risks and internal demand pressures it identifies through its force management assessment processes

In our inspection, we found that the force wasn't using its internal demand data to help it allocate resources efficiently and effectively to help it meet demands across the force.

Several departments told us they lacked the resources and capacity they needed to meet their demands. In some cases, this resulted in high workloads or large backlogs of work. This included [domestic abuse safeguarding](#) investigators and supervisors managing a higher level of investigations than they could cope with. And some [protecting vulnerable people](#) teams described their workloads as "unmanageable". We also found the firearms licensing team had a 12-month backlog of applications to process. And the [digital forensic](#) unit had over 1,000 outstanding devices awaiting examination, and was operating 9 months over its service level agreement. Each investigation can have numerous devices to examine, and not all these devices correspond to an individual crime or [victim](#). But such delays could reduce the timeliness of investigations and the service provided to victims of crime.

The force has access to good quality data, and some of these demands were highlighted in its 2025 [force management statement](#). Some of the problems will have been developing over a much longer period before this. The timing of our 2025 inspection did not allow the new leadership team much time to put changes in place. This has resulted in some issues being unresolved. These continue to affect some areas of performance and service to the public on conclusion of our inspection.

The force told us it had started a review of its operating model, with support from external consultants, to address these issues. But it also needs to make sure its governance and strategic planning processes can be more responsive to emerging risks when they are identified. This will allow it to make plans and align resources to operational risks more effectively to meet current and future challenges.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at leadership and force management.

The force uses its data and predictive analysis to help inform its force management statement

During our inspection, we found that the force was using predictive analytics to inform its force management statement. By using historical crime data, call logs, demographic trends and environmental factors, the force is using its data effectively to help it forecast future demand with greater accuracy. This approach draws on data both from its internal systems and from partner organisations. This allows the force to identify patterns such as peak times for incidents, high-risk locations and seasonal fluctuations in crime rates.

The use of predictive analytics to highlight emerging crime trends allows the force to develop targeted interventions and community policing initiatives. When integrated with real-time data systems, these insights can also inform the force's dynamic deployment strategies to help the force deploy [officers](#) and [staff](#) more efficiently to meet the public's needs.

We found that the force management statement was generally well structured, and included strong assessments of workforce and assets. These were supported by some detailed evidence indicating demand. The statement contained good examples of performance assessment, and demonstrated the force understood its external demands.

The force can show some effective use of its demand data to help it operate efficiently and deliver its services to the public

We found that the force was generally using its data to help it meet the public's needs and provide its services efficiently and effectively. It generally has good quality data and provides its workforce with a wide range of analytical tools, including Power BI dashboards. Through Operation Streamline, it gathers workforce views on what needs to change to help people carry out their roles more effectively. The force also produces detailed reports to support its governance boards and allow senior leaders to make informed decisions.

The force combines data insights from incident trends, response times and geographic crime patterns to make sure it deploys resources when and where they are most needed. But there are some areas where improvements are required. For example, we found the visibility of some data was limited in areas such as public and personal safety training compliance, police [bail](#) information and safeguarding. We also found some reliance on local spreadsheets and manual processes, which affected data quality and availability. The force needs to make sure it eliminates manual processes and can integrate data from all sources to support its governance and ability to make informed, timely decisions.

The force is investing in improving its leaders' skills and abilities

The force recognises the importance of its leadership and has taken steps to improve standards. During our inspection, we found local supervisors were viewed positively by the workforce. The [chief officers](#) were also praised for their visibility and regular visits to stations across the force area. We were told they communicated frequently, through various channels, and had shown commitment to being accessible (such as through roadshow events). But officers and staff expressed mixed views about the force's middle management. Some, particularly those working in remote locations, told us these leaders weren't often visible, and that this limited interaction with them and confidence in their support. The force needs to make sure it has a continued focus on visibility and engagement at all management levels.

To improve leadership standards, the force continues to deliver its Humberside LEAD programme. This meets national standards, and has now been accredited by the [College of Policing](#). The leaders we met told us this training had improved their skills and confidence. The force has plans to expand its leadership training through the talent support team. It has also invested in specific initiatives, such as bystander training, to help improve professional standards across the force and foster a positive culture.

The force has digital transformation plans and can show how it is using technology to improve operational efficiency

We found that the force's digital transformation plans were centred on using advanced technologies to enhance operational efficiency and service provision. In [our previous inspection report](#), we noted the force's innovative use of digital technology such as artificial intelligence (AI), cloud storage systems and data analytics. By continuing to integrate these tools into its ways of working, the force is making workflows more efficient, improving decision-making and increasing productivity. This will enhance public safety and trust through more transparent and responsive policing.

The force has made clear investments in digital, data and technology. It has put in place innovative solutions (such as AI tools and a victim portal) that have improved officers' experiences and operational capabilities. Upgrades to the ICT infrastructure have resolved many historical issues with shared systems, and officers and staff report that overall performance and usability have improved. The force has skills within its workforce to support these developments, which is a positive indication for their long-term sustainability.

However, some important operational challenges remain. Ageing [body-worn video](#), technical issues in digital forensics and limited understanding of digital platforms such as My Police Portal mean some tools aren't being used to their full potential. The visibility of bail and [released under investigation](#) data also needs improvement. While progress is evident, the force must make sure that new technologies are fully embedded, supported by adequate training and governance, to get the best possible impact on performance.

The force can show how it aligns finances to its priorities and how it decides if its expenditure offers value for money

The force could show its finances and its priorities are aligned. It clearly links its budget allocations to strategic objectives and operational needs. This involves transparent financial planning that shows how it uses resources in important areas such as neighbourhood policing and technological innovation. The force uses regular performance reviews and audits to help assess whether its spending leads to measurable outcomes and makes sure it is using public funds efficiently.

The force uses [benchmarking](#) and cost-benefit analyses, and adopts best practices in procurement and resource management to further support value for money. By maintaining this alignment and accountability, the force can create public confidence in its financial leadership and operational effectiveness and show that it manages its finances effectively. The forecasts included in its mid-term financial plan are based on realistic assumptions about future income and spending.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force received £268 million in total funding. As with other forces in England and Wales, this is a combination of local revenue generated from the [police precept](#) and a core grant from central government. The precept income to the force that year was £82 million. This is equivalent to £85,000 per 1,000 population, which is towards the lower end of the typical range forces in England and Wales receive from the precept.

For 2025/26, the force received an increase in the police precept (£13.99 per band D property), which was forecast to provide an extra £1.6 million of funding. Despite this, the force estimates it will have a budget deficit of £4.8 million in 2025/26. The force plans to cover this using reserves, as well as by making savings in identified areas. The force has a good track record of making savings and its plans to do this are detailed and realistic.

The force manages its combined reserves wisely and has a clear strategy in place for them, but financial pressures mean it has needed to use them frequently. The force has maintained general reserves of about £7 million. This is forecast to increase in line with predicted increases to the force's net revenue budget. This will keep the level of reserves at about 3 percent of the annual budget, which is considered an adequate amount.

Attracting, developing and retaining the workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace

Adequate

Humberside Police is adequate at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

Promising practice

The force has developed a new talent management programme

The force has invested in a talent management team, whose role includes providing leadership training.

It has a talent strategy that is aligned to the [College of Policing](#)'s national talent development strategy. It includes four stages: identification, fairness and consistency, nurture, and activation.

The programme developed from a pilot scheme carried out in 2024. The force identified new candidates in 2025. It uses its annual performance development review process to select participants, based on a grading system. There is a calibration process to check scores are appropriate and consistent. Participants join as a group. They support each other, with responsibility for their own development.

There is a defined pathway for developing talent, including coaching sessions, development plans and support from senior leaders. Participants are allocated a senior sponsor and given opportunities to work alongside them for experience.

We found there was a clear focus on fairness and transparency, with all [officers](#) and [staff](#) eligible to participate. There is [chief officer](#) support for the programme.

Identifying individuals with talent and providing them with support and opportunities helps them develop professionally – whether in their current roles or by moving to others. It also allows the force to develop the leaders of the future.

Area for improvement

The force needs to improve the training and support it provides for its student investigators

As at 30 September 2025, the force had 329 full-time equivalent [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\)](#) level 2 investigators in post, compared to the 648 it should have. This means 51 percent of PIP 2 investigator posts were filled. The force is working to address the shortfall, and as at 30 September 2025 it had 121 full-time equivalent PIP 2 trainees. But this still represents a shortfall of 198. In a lot of teams we visited, there were many fewer qualified PIP 2 investigators than trainees. This negatively impacts the experience of trainees and the support available to them.

Most of the trainees we spoke to didn't describe a positive experience. We consistently heard of a lack of support, with no tutors or mentors, and high workloads. Trainees stated there was little time to build the work portfolios they are required to complete. They prioritised [victims'](#) investigations over their own portfolio progression, which is admirable. But for some, this has a clear welfare impact.

Trainees told us the force used a formal process to address portfolios that hadn't progressed enough. This is a recognised police process. The force stated it was used appropriately where [officers](#) were significantly behind with completion of their learning portfolios and not showing improvement. It considered this a way of providing additional support. But support would be more effective if provided much earlier in trainees' development. Supervisors didn't agree with the force's use of this process in these circumstances. The force had no accredited investigator tutors, but told us it planned to address this.

For both the force and its trainee investigators to succeed, it needs to have effective tutoring, mentoring and support in place at the right stages of its investigator training.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

The force has open and inclusive recruitment processes

To support recruitment, the force has a flexible working policy that applies to all of its workforce from the start of their employment. This opens roles to a wider range of candidates, because people can apply to work hours that suit their personal circumstances.

The force has a strategy in place to attract people to join the special constabulary. It is working with the University of Hull to develop routes in for special constables. The force also plans to work with local employers and employer organisations to promote the employer supported policing scheme.

The force facilitates a range of routes into policing for uniformed officers and investigators. Its [positive action](#) team carries out a wide range of activity to engage with local communities and support applicants from diverse backgrounds throughout the recruitment process.

As part of a charity-funded programme, the force has worked with a local college to provide opportunities for students with special educational needs to experience work in the force and gain employable skills. The force told us that this had resulted in two students gaining employment with the force.

The force leadership promotes equality, diversity and inclusion in the workplace

In an internal leadership statement, the force's new chief constable has clearly set out the culture and standards expected for the workforce. There is a strategy for equality, diversity and inclusion (EDI). The deputy chief constable leads on this and oversees strategic EDI meetings. The work of staff network forums feeds into EDI governance. The networks told us they were confident that their views, and those of the workforce they represented, would be heard.

The force is providing active bystander training. This is designed to give officers and staff the skills and confidence to intervene in situations where they witness [harassment](#), violence or other forms of [misconduct](#). The force planned to include this as an element in leadership training which, at the time of our inspection, was due to begin imminently. This should bring consistency to the way supervisors deal with these situations and allow them to support their officers and staff appropriately. The force will also provide active bystander training on officer training days and to students before they arrive in policing command areas.

Officers we spoke to stated they would be confident to challenge unacceptable behaviour. They were aware of Bad Apple, the force's confidential reporting process.

For the existing workforce, there has been continued focus on positive action for women, with support for development and promotion. This has worked well. The force would now benefit from developing a programme for other underrepresented groups.

The force provides neighbourhood officers and its volunteers with the right training to carry out specialist work

The force has introduced the College of Policing's [neighbourhood policing programme](#). It was part of the pilot scheme. The College of Policing dashboard shows that, as at 13 November 2025, 89 people had completed the first part of the programme. The force had 325 neighbourhood officers and police community support officers eligible and required to complete the training. The force has planned further courses to provide this training to all of its neighbourhood teams.

We consistently found that neighbourhood officers we spoke to, and their supervisors, had received some other form of training from the force to perform their role. This included training relating to [antisocial behaviour](#) and problem-solving.

The force provides effective training for its volunteers who work in specialist roles. All volunteers complete a mandatory induction course, which covers ethics, equality, managing information and mental health awareness. At the time of our inspection, the force had recently introduced a mounted horse section. It provided volunteers in this section with safe to ride training, assessments and information on rural crime and prevention.

The force provides continuing professional development for its workforce

Most officers have set days in their shift rotas for [continuing professional development](#) training and updates. We saw some of these events taking place, which were well attended. Some teams we spoke to stated they were consulted on the topics they wanted to be covered at these events. Police staff were also positive about continuing professional development. They told us that the force provided support and training opportunities to maintain their professional accreditations.

Professional development reviews take place, but the detail recorded could be better

The force uses a professional development review (PDR) process. It reported that in the year ending 31 March 2025, 85.6 percent of its overall workforce completed a PDR. It has linked this process to promotion and talent identification. The force hopes to be able to upgrade its PDR system soon.

We carried out an audit on 12 officer and 7 staff PDRs. The force provides clear guidance to managers on how to complete these. Of the 19 PDRs we reviewed, 19 included updates from the first line supervisor, but none included endorsements from the second line manager. Only three contained documented feedback to the people being reviewed.

The force could have a clearer understanding of some of its workforce's well-being challenges

The force has a comprehensive well-being plan, which is clearly aligned with the five main areas of the National Police Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2024–2026. The workforce described a good service being provided by the force's well-being unit. The force has invested in a new well-being facility for its workforce. The Police Federation, Unison and the Police Superintendents' Association also provide good accessible support for their members within the force.

The force has clear data for understanding sickness and resourcing issues. Divisional health meetings discuss longer-term absences to support staff to return to work. Supervisors we spoke to showed appropriate concern and care for their teams' welfare.

In 2024, the force carried out an external survey of its whole workforce. It prioritised responding to the leadership issues highlighted in the results, as that was the force's priority at the time. The force was slow to update the wider workforce on other issues identified in the survey: a year after it, most of the workforce we spoke to hadn't received any updates. The force has now made progress with this communication. But it needs to make sure it can promptly respond to workforce well-being challenges identified in future consultation.

Operation Streamline allows the workforce to identify frustrating processes and ideas that need resolving in the workplace. The force told us it had received 287 ideas online between December 2024 and October 2025. The force responds to these and provides ongoing updates. As well as addressing the issues identified, this can make participants feel valued and listened to. We also found effective use of a localised survey in the force [control room](#). Staff we spoke to valued this approach.

The force has made some improvements to reduce workloads. Response officers were busy meeting incident demand but had generally manageable crime workloads. They were frustrated with difficulties taking leave. The force was trying to improve this by allowing some increased flexibility for supervisors to grant more leave. Neighbourhood officers' workloads were manageable.

But some investigation teams, such as [protecting vulnerable people](#) and [domestic abuse](#) investigators, still have high workloads. The force monitors the numbers of crimes allocated to officers, but officers must address these alongside many other tasks and case action plans. Inexperienced investigators are dealing with large numbers of complex crimes. They worry about the risks and consequences of this. Some told us they believed the force didn't recognise the pressure they felt, describing a lack of support and reduced well-being. Some officers in protecting vulnerable people roles weren't sure if they were included in any psychological screening programmes, as this hadn't been made clear to them.

In our workforce survey, 68.2 percent of respondents (750 of 1,100) said that the force took their well-being into account when setting their working pattern, and 72.2 percent of respondents (794 of 1,100) said that their line manager actively checked that their workload was manageable.

The force has processes in place to encourage officers and staff to stay in its workforce

The force checks on the satisfaction of its workforce through surveys and collects workforce data. It uses [stay interviews](#) to identify concerns early and discuss how it can encourage people to stay in its workforce. It has an exit interview process but would benefit from these being held by someone independent of the line management chain.

In our workforce survey, 80.6 percent of respondents (758 of 941) said they wanted to stay working in Humberside Police for at least the next year.

The force identifies the challenges raised by those from underrepresented groups. It offers supportive measures and incentives to overcome these issues. Supervisor training courses include content on EDI. There is effective support from staff networks, and regular communication from chief officers with these networks.

The force is effectively gathering reasons for people leaving the workforce as part of the [National Police Chiefs' Council](#) national leavers' framework, which is designed to improve the data collection on reasons for officers leaving police forces in England and Wales.

Using powers fairly, appropriately and with justification

Adequate

Humberside Police is adequate at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

Areas for improvement

The force should make sure its officers are appropriately trained in public and personal safety training and improve data visibility and risk assessment for expired public and personal safety training

Public and personal safety training (PPST) is nationally required, regular training for [police officers](#) in the correct use of force techniques and first aid. This helps keep the public and officers safe.

During our inspection, we consistently found officers with no valid PPST who were still being deployed. The force told us it had over 900 officers with expired PPST, with over 700 still awaiting allocation of a training course.

The force was aware it had a problem with this. It was prioritising training for front-line roles. It had increased its number of PPST trainers by ten, notified the [College of Policing](#) about the issue and made adjustments to its training programme. The force has promoted the use of [risk assessments](#) by supervisors whose officers have expired PPST. And its leadership has agreed a two-year plan to reduce the backlog.

We found there was a lack of data to support the understanding of PPST training across the force. Supervisors we spoke to had to rely on conversations with officers to understand if they were up to date with training. Risk assessments should be completed for officers without PPST. But we found mixed awareness of this requirement among supervisors, especially those in investigation departments. The force planned to develop a training dashboard to improve this.

The force should provide training for officers on how to safeguard children involved in stop and search or use of force incidents, to ensure compliance with its policy

We found that not all [officers](#) understood the requirement to complete a [safeguarding](#) referral for incidents of [stop and search](#) or use of force on a [child](#). The force recognised this. It was trying to improve its communication about the requirement to officers, and their awareness of it. This was confirmed by some supervisors. The force planned a future update to its PRONTO use of force system to remind officers of safeguarding considerations.

Data provided by the force confirmed the gap in compliance. Submission rates for:

- stop and search between June and September 2025 had a maximum compliance of 37 percent; and
- use of force between June and August 2025 had a maximum compliance of 40 percent.

This gap can reduce understanding of the cumulative effect of children being involved in these incidents. This can result in referrals not being made to partners to help with safeguarding.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

Officers use body-worn video in use of force encounters and stop and search

We found that officers consistently wore and used [body-worn video \(BWV\)](#). The force has a policy which sets out clear guidance for its use in specific situations, including [domestic abuse](#), searches, planned arrests, use of force and Taser ([conducted energy devices](#)).

The force monitors the use of BWV carefully to make sure its officers' interactions with the public are being recorded with transparency and for evidential purposes. BWV isn't issued to individual officers but is a shared resource. According to officers, this approach generally worked but could at times cause some unavailability at shift changeovers. The force is aware of this and is considering options for replacing its BWV system.

The force supports independent external scrutiny processes, and responds to the scrutiny and challenge it receives to improve how officers use stop and search and use of force powers

The force uses an external police powers scrutiny panel convened by the Office of the [Police and Crime Commissioner](#) (OPCC). This has an independent chair.

This panel meets quarterly. It reviews stop and search and use of force incidents, including reviewing BWV. Members can attend online if they aren't able to attend in person.

We observed effective, informed challenge being provided from the panel to the force. Reviews of BWV provided by the force led to probing questions, feedback and subsequent learning actions. The quality of discussion, questioning and scrutiny was high. Members of the panel were knowledgeable.

It is expected that all the incidents viewed will result in feedback to officers. The meetings are attended by a senior officer and force trainers who help explain legislation and training to the panel. Agreed actions are tracked, with the force providing updates.

The force makes changes in response to the panel's feedback. For example, it has adapted its use of powers dashboard to provide clearer data. And it reviewed a tactic highlighted as a possible concern for public perception. This resulted in the trainers adapting it and demonstrating it to the scrutiny panel. This changed the training given to officers.

The OPCC publishes the panel's meeting updates on its website. We checked this and found the record was up to date.

Officers understand how to use stop and search powers fairly and appropriately

During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of 75 [stop and search](#) records from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. Based on this sample, we estimate that 93.3 percent (+/- 4.7 percentage points) of stop and searches the force carried out during this period had reasonable grounds recorded.

This suggests some improvement compared to the findings from our previous review of records from 1 February 2023 to 31 January 2024. In that review, we found that 91.2 percent (+/- 4.1 percentage points) of stop and searches had reasonable grounds recorded. However, as the estimated results are based on a review of a sample of records and the ranges of possible true values overlap, we can't be sure that there has been a real change.

The percentage that had reasonable grounds recorded suggests that officers are suitably trained and they use stop and search powers in a fair and appropriate way.

Supervisors review all stop and search forms and are notified when officers submit them. The force has provided a template for them to use to support the consistency of reviews. The force then carries out further audits on all forms. This quality assurance provides the force with clear information to understand how its officers are using stop and search fairly. As well as reviewing all stop and search forms, supervisors are required to [dip sample](#) the accompanying BWV. The force told us that 1,020 BWV reviews were completed since October 2024.

The force collects accurate data to allow it to understand how fairly stop and search is being used

Good quality data on self-defined ethnicity (how individuals define their ethnicity) allows the force to understand the rate at which it uses stop and search on people from ethnic minority backgrounds in the local resident population.

As part of our review of stop and search records, we asked the force to provide 12 months of stop and search data from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. We found that self-defined ethnicity information was unknown (not recorded, not stated or refused) for 24 percent of these records. In the year ending 31 March 2025, on average, self-defined ethnicity was unknown for 18 percent of stop and searches that forces in England and Wales recorded. The force states that it has improved on this performance further by reducing missing self-defined ethnicity to 17 percent. The force should continue to make progress in reducing this proportion.

Our review of 20 stop and search encounters filmed on BWV found that in 20 of these encounters, officers asked for self-defined ethnicity. This is positive, because when officers ask for this data the force can better understand the demographics of people it stops and searches. With further analysis, this could help the force more accurately identify any [disproportionate](#) use of the power.

The force makes good use of stop and search as a tactic across its policing area to reduce crime

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force carried out 5,213 stop and searches of people. This equals 5.4 stop and searches per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The number of stop and searches the force carried out increased by 5.7 percent compared to the year ending 31 March 2024. This isn't in line with the overall picture for forces in England and Wales in which, on average, the number of stop and searches decreased by 1.3 percent.

We found that the force closely monitored its use of stop and search. Officers we spoke to were confident to use it. We saw good use of stop and search as a tactic to be considered in response to crime in the force's local communities. It is used in problem-solving by neighbourhood teams, and its use is scrutinised in neighbourhood team accountability meetings. We observed senior leadership having effective oversight of stop and search tactics through its tactical tasking and co-ordination group process. This indicates that the force supports stop and search as a valued tool to reduce crime.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force had an overall [find rate](#) of 30.2 percent from stop and search encounters. This was made up of 23.1 percent [linked finds](#) and 7.1 percent not linked finds.

Linked finds are when one or more items, which the officer suspected a person had in their possession, are found and were the reason for the search. Not linked finds are when items are found that a person may have been in unlawful possession of but weren't the reason for the search.

The force's linked find rate was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The linked find rate for the force increased by 1.4 percent compared to the year ending 31 March 2024.

We examined:


- the number of searches the force carried out;
- the number of searches that had reasonable grounds; and
- the percentage of linked finds.

The results of this review show that the force is using its stop and search powers well.

During our inspection we found good evidence confirming this. The force included the use of stop and search tactics to address drugs and nighttime crime in Grimsby. The force carried out 18 stop searches and made 2 arrests (1 for possession of a bladed article and criminal damage, the other for possession with intent to supply and possession of a bladed article). It dealt with two further people for possession of drugs. Another operation, in Hull, included the use of a passive drugs dog, resulting in 25 stop searches for drugs, and 1 arrest for shop theft and possession of drugs. The force dealt with two further people for possession of drugs. We met a local policing team at Goole which had just carried out a search of vehicle occupants in response to [intelligence](#), resulting in arrests and the recovery of controlled drugs.

Our audits found that stop searches were self-generated by officers in 47 percent of cases and were intelligence-led in 8 percent. This indicates that Humberside's officers are being proactive in their communities and using stop and search effectively.

Figure 1: Percentage of stop and search encounters resulting in linked and not linked finds for forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Stop and search open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A stacked column chart showing the percentage of [stop and search](#) encounters where the item found was and wasn't linked to the reason for the search for all forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025. In Humberside Police, 23.1 percent of stop and search encounters resulted in a [linked find](#) and 7.1 percent in a not linked find.

[The accessible data table for figure 1 is available on our website.](#)

Note: In the calculation, we have excluded records where it isn't known whether the item found was linked to the reason for the search. We have also excluded records where it isn't known whether the [officer](#) found any items. If the percentage of linked or not linked finds isn't included in the chart for some forces, it is because they haven't supplied it.

The force understands how it is using stop and search and use of force powers, and is trying to do more to reduce disproportionality

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 2.4 times more likely than White people to be the subject of a stop and search by the force. This is lower than the average rate of 3.7 times more likely in England and Wales overall. In our review of stop and search records of people from an ethnic minority background, we found that 6 of 7 had reasonable grounds. The force carries out analysis of its disproportionate use of stop and search powers to help it understand why it exists.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 2.8 times more likely than White people to be subject to use of force. This is lower than the England and Wales average of 3.0 times more likely. The force carries out analysis to help it understand why this [disproportionality](#) exists.

The force has established governance meetings in place for these powers. The force's leadership can view data on disproportionality on a dashboard. The force created this dashboard to improve the visibility of data and oversight. It is extensive, covering ages, gender, ethnicity and physical and mental health. For stop and search it also includes location mapping and data on the use of BWV. It includes the local authority area where incidents occurred to support understanding of demographics and monitoring for trends. The same data is shared with the OPCC-led police powers scrutiny panel for transparency.

The force isn't consistently recording enough incidents and self-defined ethnicity in its use of force

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force recorded 17,974 use of force incidents. This is an increase of 13.7 percent compared to the previous year. This increase is likely due to better recording practices.

Officers are expected to record every use of force to make sure it is transparent and accountable. This includes recording low-level use of force such as handcuffing a compliant person and higher levels of force such as the use of a baton or [conducted energy device](#) (Taser). Where more than one officer uses force on an individual, each officer must submit their own use of force report.

To determine if the force was recording use of force appropriately, we reviewed two different measures. We firstly examined the number of arrests and compared this to the number of recorded use of force reports. We expect the number of use of force reports to be at least as high as the number of arrests. Most arrests involve the use of handcuffs and multiple officers may have used force during the arrest. In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force made 16,888 arrests and recorded 17,974 use of force reports.


We then reviewed the overall expected number of use of force records compared to the actual recorded number. The expected number is estimated based on the average number of uses of force associated with each recorded arrest. We estimate that, in the year ending 31 March 2025, the force should have recorded 22,483 use of force incidents. It actually recorded 17,974 incidents. This means it likely under-recorded its use of force by 4,509 incidents. This shows an improvement in recording use of force compared to the previous year when, based on this estimation, it didn't record 5,563 use of force incidents. The force needs to build on this improvement.

We found recording practices weren't justifying why compliant handcuffing force was used. The force shared data that shows that for the year ending 30 September 2025, self-defined ethnicity was missing from 38.6 percent of use of force records.

The force has developed some positive governance for the use of force. Inspectors are required to sign off use of force submissions. They also carry out audits, as do PPST trainers, who audit an additional ten forms per month. There are strategic and tactical use of force meetings that examine data and trends. There is analytical support for this. The force monitors injuries to both officers and subjects. It examines repeat users of force and samples officers' submissions. And it considers whether officers need training to support them. Supervisors can also communicate concerns with the force's [professional standards department](#) if they need to.

Feedback and trends emerging from this scrutiny are raised at use of force meetings and shared with command teams to highlight local issues or officers who need support.

Figure 2: Number of use of force incidents that forces in England and Wales recorded and the estimated number that should have been recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Police use of force open data tables](#) and [arrests open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A combination chart showing the number of use of force incidents that all forces in England and Wales recorded (represented by columns) and the estimated number of use of force incidents that should have been recorded (represented by red target lines) in the year ending 31 March 2025. Humberside Police recorded 17,974 use of force incidents. This was lower than the estimated 22,483 use of force incidents it should have recorded.

[The accessible data table for figure 2 is available on our website.](#)

Note: To understand how well forces record their use of force, we compare the number of incidents they recorded with the estimated number they should have recorded. To estimate the number of use of force incidents forces should have recorded, we use the number of recorded arrests and the number of recorded use of force incidents linked to an arrest.

Preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability

Outstanding

Humberside Police is outstanding at preventing and deterring crime and [antisocial behaviour](#), and reducing [vulnerability](#).

Innovative practice

The force has improved the way it manages problem-solving, through a new platform and a portal for partner organisations

The force had been using three different types of problem-solving plans depending on the severity of the issue. These required separate Microsoft Word documents to be attached. Although this process worked, the documents were difficult to search for and could cause some confusion for [officers](#).

At the time of our inspection, the force was in the final stages of setting up a new single problem-solving platform on its [Niche](#) system.

We viewed this. It was well structured, with supporting guidance for completion of each area, hyperlinks to the force's guidance documents and signposts to cost-benefit analysis. The system is searchable, with results displayed on a dashboard – allowing oversight of activity across the force. It highlights where certain aspects are incomplete or overdue, such as a supervisory review.

The force told us it developed the system with input from [personnel](#) to make it as effective as possible.

The platform includes a partnership portal facility. Approved organisations that the force works with can be assigned tasks from Niche. They can log on to the portal to see shared problem-solving plans and relevant information. They can see the problem-solving structure used, records and action updates for partner organisations in a clear format.

This project used national funding. It aimed to bring more consistency, clarity and ease of access for partner organisations to contribute to problem-solving.

The force has incorporated the use of integrated offender management into its youth work, and provides training for its officers to deliver this

The force's youth offending teams handle cases and crime interventions for the majority of matters involving 11–17-year-olds. But for more complex youth cases, the force has introduced high harm reduction officers (HHROs). These specially trained [officers](#) work with young people at the highest risk of harm and provide youth [integrated offender management \(IOM\)](#). This follows integrated IOM principles, which have been carefully adapted to suit the needs of [children](#) and young people. The force's work with young people also includes children under ten.

This youth IOM process focuses on reducing harm and reoffending through a multi-agency approach, providing co-ordinated support and, where necessary, enforcement. Partner organisations meet to assess young people's needs and agree tailored interventions. These are designed to build trusting relationships with the young people and their families. By mirroring adult IOM principles, this supports a smooth handover to adult IOM services at the age of 18 to maintain progress and reduce the risk of reoffending.

HHRO roles were tested successfully in the force's north area and, at the time of our inspection, were soon to be introduced into its southern area.

The HHROs and some neighbourhood officers have been trained through the force's Build a Bridge programme. This focuses on building relationships with young people and how to use behavioural change strategies. It was developed by a supervisor with a PhD in psychology. The force's central learning and development team has now permanently adopted it.

The force has improved its key individual network database and linked this into mapping

Following serious disorder incidents in 2024 and community tensions arising from these, the force recognised a need to improve the accessibility and visibility of its [key individual network](#) contacts (KINs). KINs are active members of local communities who can assist the police. They are essential in helping the force communicate with their communities.

The force has further developed its My Community Alert platform to identify KINs for a wider variety of groups and to record and assign tasks for engagement activity. And it now uses Ordnance Survey data to accurately map associated locations (such as for different faith groups, religious buildings, schools and communities), with the ability to search for specific types. It has added existing KIN data to each site and assigned neighbourhood staff the task of identifying and addressing any gaps.

This means that the force can very quickly map an area, send focused messages and identify relevant KINs to contact for specific issues, with the ability to email, phone or visit as appropriate. The system displays when the last contact with each KIN took place, and highlights when six months have passed so the force can contact them again.

The force is planning an upgrade that will allow it to quickly see when engagement activity took place within a given date range.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability.

The force has established leadership for prevention, deterrence and reducing vulnerability

We found an effective management and governance structure in place. Superintendents have thematic responsibilities, overseen by an assistant chief constable. Together, these leaders are willing to invest funding to try new ideas and use IT to make improvements. Neighbourhood policing and prevention are important priorities and the force understands the value of this work.

The force is continuing to make progress. It has, for example:


- revised its neighbourhood policing strategy;
- developed its focus for policing rural crime, in line with its Police and Crime Plan;
- developed a clear vision for implementing the government's Neighbourhood Guarantee, together with plans to use funding from this initiative for additional neighbourhood officers to problem-solve and reduce future demand;
- ensured a strong focus on retail crime, dealing with offenders and engaging with shop owners to address this issue; and
- made improvements to the systems used for communicating with the public.

The force understands the causes of antisocial behaviour and vulnerability in its communities

During our inspection, we found that the force had a clear understanding of antisocial behaviour and related vulnerability in its communities.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, it recorded 9.5 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

Figure 3: Number of antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population that forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Police-recorded antisocial behaviour incidents data](#) and [population estimates for England and Wales](#) from the Office for National Statistics

Chart description: Column chart showing the number of [antisocial behaviour](#) incidents per 1,000 population that all forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025. Humberside Police recorded 9.5 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population, which was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The typical range, represented by dashed red lines on the chart, is between 7.0 and 22.4 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. The median value of 13.6 per 1,000 population is presented as a solid red line.

[The accessible data table for figure 3 is available on our website.](#)

The force uses this data to help it understand antisocial behaviour and to develop strategies and plans to tackle the causes of the antisocial behaviour. It assigns officers and allocates supporting resources where they are most needed to keep its communities safe.

The force records most crimes that have occurred when [victims](#) report [antisocial behaviour personal](#). In our [quality service review](#), we found that in the cases we examined, the force had recorded 17 of 20 antisocial behaviour personal crimes correctly.

An [area for improvement](#) we identified in [our 2021/22 inspection](#), regarding the recording of crime where antisocial behaviour is reported, has been met. But the force should make sure that it records all crimes reported by victims of antisocial behaviour personal. Improvements the force has made in its [control room](#) help it identify these crimes. It has introduced guidance for call takers and has provided training. It has [risk assessment](#) templates for call takers to follow. During our inspection activity we saw call takers using these. Staff we spoke to were confident in using them.

The force also carries out its own audits to make sure it understands accurate recording of these crimes so it can make further improvements. The force told us that its latest audit found that 23 out of 25 relevant crimes were recorded.

The force is using preventative and protective orders effectively to help it tackle antisocial behaviour

During our inspection, we found that [neighbourhood policing teams](#) worked closely with local authority antisocial behaviour officers, housing providers and other partners, such as Humberside Fire and Rescue Service, to address the root causes of antisocial behaviour in its communities. We found that officers were using antisocial behaviour legislation effectively to prevent community problems from escalating.

The force has a tactical tasking and co-ordination group meeting led by an assistant chief constable. We observed this meeting and saw that leadership had a clear focus on neighbourhood crime and antisocial behaviour. Meeting participants provided updates on action being taken to address antisocial behaviour, which included using appropriate powers to help solve these problems.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force issued 223 preventative and protective orders, which equals 0.23 orders per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

In our quality service review, we examined 20 antisocial behaviour incidents and any crimes recorded from them. We found that the force didn't use antisocial behaviour legislation in four of eight cases where we identified it could have been used to help it tackle the root causes of antisocial behaviour. But the force has invested in training its neighbourhood policing officers to help them deal with antisocial behaviour.

Experienced antisocial behaviour co-ordinators are available to provide advice to neighbourhood teams on using legislation. They attend court cases and liaise with the Crown Prosecution Service to help get the best outcome for victims.

Operation Mastery is a multi-agency initiative which aims to support improvements to Grimsby town centre. It began in March 2024. The force stated that it has used criminal and civil legislation in this operation to secure the prosecution of 80 Public Space Protection Order breaches, and the subsequent issuing of [Criminal Behaviour Orders](#). The force told us the area had seen a 5 percent decrease in overall recorded crime, and a 15 percent decrease in recorded antisocial behaviour incidents. It also recorded a 45 percent increase in recorded drug-related and weapon-related offences. The force considers that this was due to officers carrying out days of action, regular high visibility and covert patrols.

During our inspection, the officers we spoke to told us they were confident in applying for and using tools such as Criminal Behaviour Orders and civil injunctions, particularly in more complex or persistent antisocial behaviour cases. Officers could explain how they had used legislation and powers as part of their problem-solving tactics.

This indicates that officers understand antisocial behaviour legislation and the range of powers available to them. This should help them to tackle the root causes of antisocial behaviour more effectively.

The force has an established problem-solving culture with governance, support and systems in place to carry out problem-solving activity

We found a positive culture for problem-solving in Humberside Police. The force provides training to neighbourhood policing teams, and clear guidance is available to help them with problem-solving.

There is governance over problem-solving. Supervisors review problem-solving plans every 28 days, and there is a force-wide dashboard which provides access to these plans. Team accountability meetings, led by chief inspectors, use these dashboards to track progress. The force also oversees problem-solving through the community safety board meetings, which are led by assistant chief constables.

To support consistency, the force has made improvements to the problem-solving template it uses. At the time of our inspection, these were about to be introduced. We also found that neighbourhood teams were regularly assigned tasks to address crime, vulnerability and antisocial behaviour that affected their communities. The officers and supervisors we spoke to enjoyed their roles, and saw the value and importance of what they did.

Leadership values problem-solving and holds annual awards. The 2025 nominations indicated good problem-solving being used across the force on a range of issues, including:

- town-centre antisocial behaviour in Grimsby;
- rural organised crime thefts;
- digital innovation to improve the victim's journey; and
- tackling [hate crime](#) (by a student officer).

It was pleasing to see examples of problem-solving from teams across the force, not just those working in neighbourhood policing. Our survey supported this, finding that 49.3 percent of all respondents (542 of 1,100) reported that their responsibilities involved carrying out problem-solving. The force plans to provide training for senior detective leadership to encourage wider awareness of problem-solving principles.

The force works with other organisations to prevent crime and reduce persistent offending through early intervention and integrated offender management

The force's early intervention strategy sets out how it works with young people [vulnerable](#) to involvement in crime. Activity includes home visiting programmes, support for vulnerable parents and mentoring schemes. Each local authority in the force area has an embedded early intervention officer. We found that the force understood the importance of early intervention. It showed us evidence of positive results from its work with young people.

The force holds specific events to include and engage with young people. For example, each year the force's [community safety unit](#) organises the Night Challenge, where young people take part in an overnight 12-mile walk with police and partner organisations. The event allows young people to complete challenges that educate them about the potential consequences of their actions. They learn about teamwork, communication and relationship-building skills throughout the event. In 2025, over 100 young people took part. Another initiative is Operation Lifestyle, which is held annually for young people aged between 10 and 16. They work in teams to run projects of their choice over the summer that will improve the communities they live in. They can win prizes based on the results.

The force works well with other organisations to manage offenders

We found the force worked well with its IOM partners, and neighbourhood policing teams shared locally gathered information about IOM offenders. The force holds weekly [intelligence](#)-sharing meetings. It told us it had good working relationships with partner organisations including probation, drug treatment services and criminal justice partners.

While IOM teams had high workloads, the force's approach was working effectively, with local issues and priorities reflected in the activity being carried out. The force had a number of case studies which demonstrated how its IOM activity helped reduce reoffending. But it would benefit from developing its data on, and governance of, its early intervention and IOM performance at a strategic level.

The force has invested in the capacity and capability of its neighbourhood policing teams

In the year ending 31 March 2025, 8.1 percent of the force's officers were in dedicated neighbourhood policing roles. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The force has invested resources in its neighbourhood policing teams. We found these teams had enough officers and staff to make sure they had the time needed for preventative work and problem-solving activity. This means the force's neighbourhood policing teams have the capacity and capability needed to provide a regular, visible and accessible presence in their local communities.

The force has also taken steps to improve the capability of its neighbourhood officers and staff through training and development of essential skills and knowledge. This includes building confidence in community liaison, working with partners, problem-solving and tackling antisocial behaviour. This work makes sure personnel have the right skills and training to work effectively with other organisations to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour and meet local priorities within their communities. It was pleasing to see that the force placed strong importance on neighbourhood policing.

There is a focus on rural crime and prevention. The force has increased the capacity of rural policing teams, and these have additional support from special constables. It has introduced a new mounted horse section using community volunteers. The force reported that its rural team had protectively marked over 1,300 pieces of agricultural equipment and farm assets, using forensic coding to help deter crime. It also uses tracker systems on high-value items. This resulted in arrests and the recovery of property when two of these items were stolen. The force's work with farming communities supports increased confidence in the response to rural crime, which was reported in a local survey.

The force has effective processes in place to monitor how often its neighbourhood teams are abstracted from their communities

Neighbourhood police officers are responsible for building relationships with communities, solving problems and working with partners to prevent crime and antisocial behaviour. This requires local officers to be visible and have meaningful communication with those communities. Sometimes neighbourhood officers are diverted away from their usual work to carry out other duties in the force to meet demand. This is referred to as [abstraction](#). If this happens regularly and isn't effectively monitored by the force, it can affect the ability of neighbourhood officers to carry out their main roles in their local communities.

In our workforce survey, 55 percent of respondents involved in neighbourhood policing (91 of 166) said that they were abstracted from their main neighbourhood policing duties on a quarterly or less frequent basis.

During our inspection, officers told us that abstractions weren't routinely planned. While abstractions did occur, this hadn't affected officers' ability to carry out visible patrols in their communities, communicate with local residents and carry out preventative work. Officers understood that if they were the nearest officer to an ongoing incident, they would initially attend to support response teams. But supervisors would monitor this process and make clear if they considered attendance by these officers to be inappropriate.

The force has an abstraction policy that outlines clear expectations of how much time neighbourhood teams should spend in their communities. The force aims for officers to spend 90 percent of their time on visible patrols or communicating with their local communities. The force told us that between 1 July 2025 and 30 September 2025 it met this target across all neighbourhood policing areas. On average, officers spent 96.94 percent of their time in their communities.

Officers can report when they were abstracted from their main neighbourhood policing duties and are encouraged to report them through an app on their handheld devices. We found that the force closely monitored how often this was happening. This means senior leaders are always aware of the impact on local communities or officer well-being.

The force communicates well with its diverse communities to better understand their needs and help set its local priorities

During our inspection, we found that neighbourhood policing teams were regularly communicating with local people to understand their concerns and help them feel safe. At the time of our inspection, the force had developed a plan to guide local teams in how to build relationships and set local priorities based on community feedback. Officers also complete monthly beat plans. We reviewed one of these. It recorded activity officers had carried out to engage with the community, and address concerns at antisocial behaviour and crime locations. It displayed a good understanding of the issues and action being taken.

We also found that neighbourhood policing teams had made efforts to reach communities that traditionally have less contact with the police or may have lower levels of trust and confidence. Some teams were tailoring their communications to include [seldom-heard groups](#), such as newly settled communities. For example, this happened following the extensive disorder that took place in Hull during 2024. The force used its key individuals network and messaging system to communicate with minority groups and quickly arrange community meetings to reassure their members. The rapid and accurate sharing of information was essential to prevent disinformation spreading and maintain trust and confidence.

We also found other examples of two-way communication methods with the public, such as local meetings and digital platforms. The force website was up to date with details of team members, contact information and local priorities. It showed planned dates and locations for meeting teams in person. The force also now communicates with the public through its media office in a more consistent way by linking media updates to its priorities. Communication practices were consistent across different areas of the force and officers we spoke to were confident to take part in them.

Responding to the public

Good

Humberside Police is good at responding to the public.

Innovative practice

The force has introduced an automated process for searching incoming emails to highlight risks

To enhance service delivery and risk management when handling [Single Online Home](#) reports, the force has introduced an automated system that scans incoming non-crime report emails for specific keywords linked to risk.

This approach helps the force quickly identify potentially high-risk cases, reducing manual triage time and making sure [safeguarding](#) concerns aren't missed. Dedicated digital contact staff are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A dashboard displays prioritised reports, which gives them immediate visibility of volume and urgency and supports timely and informed decision-making.

This approach ensures that the force effectively manages non-crime digital contact. Through a clear, traceable process, it improves responsiveness and operational efficiency and makes auditing easier.

The force is developing the use of an artificial intelligence process to assist with initial risk assessments

Using funding from the [National Police Chiefs' Council](#), the force has been working with a private company to develop artificial intelligence (AI) [risk assessments](#). This work is at the testing and proofing stage.

This capacity isn't intended to replace what call handlers do. It is designed to help with their recording of risk assessments at the point of contact while they interact with the caller. The AI technology automatically risk assesses emergency calls as they take place. At the time of our inspection, it was a standalone system running in the background. Following checks by the call handler, the risk assessments produced by AI can then be added into the incident log created.

The force told us that initial testing indicated 98 percent accuracy for the AI risk assessments.

The force has adopted a cautious approach to implementation, carrying out testing with a support team in place. Further research and testing is progressing. We will follow the progress of this project with interest.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at responding to the public.

The force has an effective management structure to understand performance and ensure the public receives a high-quality service

We found that the force [control room](#) benefited from established and involved leadership. There is clear direction and an ambition to continually improve.

Management receives detailed, high-quality data and analysis covering all aspects of control room performance. This includes information on sickness, predicted demand, seasonal considerations and planned events. It allows the force to make precise, informed decisions on the levels of hourly resources it needs to meet incoming call and digital demand from the public well in advance.

There is strong oversight of daily demand in the control room. The force has a daily pacesetter meeting and can change its staffing levels flexibly to meet demand.

The working environment for control room staff is important. The control room is an impressive, purpose-built space, with good facilities. The force values its control room workforce. Three members of staff had been nominated for the national control room awards in 2025. The force's leadership had worked with the University of Hull, and used a targeted workplace survey to communicate and consult with staff. The force provided essential updates on progress on the issues staff raised. Staff we spoke to thought this was good.

All the control room staff we spoke to cared about what they did and the service they provided to callers. We consistently observed that call takers' interactions with the public were polite and engaging.


The force answers emergency calls quickly enough

In the year ending 30 September 2025, the force received 159 emergency 999 calls per 1,000 population. This was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. It answered 93.7 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds. This was higher than the standard expected of forces in England and Wales of answering 90.0 percent of 999 calls within 10 seconds.

The force has consistently strong performance in this area and closely monitors data to understand this. This suggests that generally the force puts the [victim](#) at the centre of its decision-making, which provides the foundations for an effective response.

We found some cases where people calling 999 for non-emergencies were told to call back on [101](#) to report crimes. This follows the national contact management strategy to reduce inappropriate use of 999. But without a clear process, it can create risk. Crimes committed against [vulnerable](#) victims may go unrecorded if people don't re-call, which could increase risk. The force would benefit from making sure call handlers know and follow a clear process so they can record a vulnerable callers' crime report without the person having to call back.

Figure 4: Percentage of 999 calls that forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 30 September 2025



Source: [999 call answering times from BT](#)

Chart description: Column chart showing the percentage of 999 calls that all forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 30 September 2025. Humberside Police answered 93.7 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds. This is above the expected standard of 90 percent for forces in England and Wales, which is marked with a solid red line on the chart. Eighteen forces were below the expected standard.

[The accessible data table for figure 4 is available on our website.](#)

Note: Call answering time is the time taken for a call to be transferred from BT to a force and then answered by that force.

The force answers non-emergency calls quickly enough

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the force received 333 non-emergency 101 calls per 1,000 population. This was higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The force told us that in the year ending 30 September 2025, 5.6 percent of calls to its non-emergency 101 facility were abandoned. While there is no formal national standard for how non-emergency performance is measured, the force's performance is at an acceptable level.

The force has clear understanding of performance data in this area. This keeps waiting times to a minimum, and low numbers of calls are discontinued.

Processes are in place to monitor and deal with digital demand

The force understands digital demand. Leaders receive performance data as part of the monthly accountability process so they can see the various methods the public uses to make contact. The data includes the use and response times of the live chat facility, where people can communicate with control room staff directly online.

The force monitors incoming digital demand from email and the Single Online Home system 24 hours a day. Control room staff triage all online reports of crime promptly and carry out an initial assessment of risk.

During our inspection, we checked the incoming demand and found it was well managed, with no backlogs. Staff allocated this task are able to manage both digital demand and supporting call handling functions when required. Those we spoke to were competent in both roles, and made sure this demand was dealt with promptly. We found the force had provided a live chat guidance document for staff to refer to.

The force identifies vulnerability at the first point of contact and records a structured triage that determines how it will prioritise the call

Call handlers we spoke to were all trained for their role. All had received training on initial risk assessment processes, and guidance documents were readily available. The control room system highlights previous vulnerable callers. The initial risk assessments then inform the grading of the incidents. We found call handlers were confident in making these assessments. Supervisors were readily accessible to provide guidance.

In our [quality service review](#), we found that call handlers used a structured triage approach to assess risk in 52 out of 54 cases. The triage record was an accurate and meaningful description of the call in 49 out of 51 cases, and the initial prioritisation of the call was appropriate in 64 out of 67 cases.

To provide a prompt service for victims of [domestic abuse](#), the force has developed a [rapid video response \(RVR\)](#) team that works with its domestic abuse co-ordination team within the control room. The RVR team carries out an initial assessment of whether a case is suitable for a rapid response, based on the caller's situation. It sends all non-emergency domestic abuse calls to the domestic abuse co-ordination team for review.

This means that these incidents have a secondary risk assessment informed by specialist research. If a case is assessed suitable, the RVR team can contact the victim to quickly progress the investigation. It can offer some same-day or next-day appointments. The National Police Chiefs' Council, which oversees the implementation of RVR, found that the force had exemplary compliance with the national model.

The force has also taken part in the pilot of Raneem's Law, where independent specialist domestic abuse advisors work in the control room. This aims to make sure victims receive support and assistance when they call for help.

On most occasions the force provides appropriate advice on safeguarding, evidence preservation and crime prevention

Staff we spoke to understood their role in giving common sense advice to callers. They knew how to access force systems to find useable advice. They can use a database called Sergie, which highlights specific considerations for different types of crime. We viewed this and found it was a comprehensive and useful guide to support the work of call handlers and the advice they provide.

In our quality service review, we found call handlers gave appropriate advice on preserving evidence in 18 out of 21 cases and on preventing crime in 18 out of 21 cases. The force could provide more consistent safeguarding advice (this was provided in 25 out of 30 cases). But it does regularly monitor its own performance and progress in this area to help it continually improve.

The force attends calls for service within the agreed timescales

The force has a graded response policy, with published target times for attending incidents. In our quality service review, we found that in 39 of the 41 cases we examined, the time the force took to respond to the incident was within its published attendance time. This was regardless of whether the incident was downgraded or not; sometimes incidents are regraded because of updated information or reassessed risk, which may increase the response time.

The force has clear oversight of this issue. Leaders monitor attendance closely at both local and force-level daily management meetings. This allows them to move resources to meet emergency demand. It means the callers who most need emergency support receive a prompt service.

The force control room has an attendance manager role to oversee this issue. It has a record of strong performance in meeting its response times.

In the year ending 30 September 2025, the force told us its emergency response times were 92.6 percent within target and its priority response times were 96 percent within target.

During our inspection, some response officers said that while driving to incidents, they felt pressured by the control room to meet attendance times. We highlighted this to the force. It has worked to understand this feedback and will monitor the issue.

For scheduled incidents that don't require an immediate or priority attendance, the force may benefit from considering the use of a service level agreement so that reassessments are carried out at fixed intervals. During our visits to the control room, we identified a minority of incidents that highlighted the potential of this approach.

Our quality service review found that the call was subject to an effective reassessment in 19 out of 19 cases.

Investigating crime

Adequate

Humberside Police is adequate at investigating crime.

Areas for improvement

The force should make sure there is supervisory oversight of investigations and that officers take all investigative opportunities

In [our 2024 inspection](#) we highlighted that the force should improve in this area. We also highlighted these issues in [our 2021/22 inspection](#).

This year we found that the force had introduced new templates for recording investigation plans and supervisor reviews. In our [quality service review](#) we found a slight improvement from our previous PEEL inspection: there was evidence of effective supervision in 55 out of 69 cases and all investigative opportunities were taken in 66 out of 85 cases. But evidence we gathered during our other inspection activity indicated that the force could still improve in these areas.

Supervisors don't always review investigations in a meaningful way to help investigators progress cases. There is a focus on compliance over quality. To try to manage demand, supervisors from other units and departments are assigned the task of carrying out reviews. This means reviews aren't always face to face and don't always involve discussion with investigators. Some supervisors in detective teams told us that they weren't able to review investigations within the timescales specified in the force's policy to provide direction to investigators. They told us that this was because of the volume of crimes and their workloads.

[Officers](#) aren't following all investigative opportunities, leading to some investigations being closed prematurely. Our quality service review showed that the force applied the wrong outcome in 12 of 76 cases. In 10 of these 12, not all investigative opportunities had been followed, and the investigation shouldn't have been finalised by a supervisor.

The force should make sure it has effective processes to manage pre-charge bail

We found that the force lacked governance and performance data on the use of [bail](#).

Some investigators and supervisors we spoke to described the force providing inconsistent support for bail management. Some received reminders of due bail dates; others didn't. Some stated that bail can lapse into [released under investigation](#) because of this inconsistency.

The force has a dashboard that includes bail data, but supervisors we spoke to had little confidence in this information. Some were maintaining notice boards to try to keep track of bail dates.

The force couldn't provide evidence that it had performance data to allow it to understand its overall use of bail. This included the important issue of preventing bail lapsing into released under investigation status and knowing how often this occurred. The force told us it was developing this information and its bail dashboard.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at investigating crime.

The force has management structures in place for the governance and oversight of investigations, but is struggling to cope with demand

We recognise that the force has faced and overcome some significant investigation demand since our last inspection in 2024. It has provided positive leadership and support to [victims](#) and their families. For example:

- an intensive investigation following serious disorder in Hull;
- a complex and sensitive investigation concerning a local funeral home; and
- a complicated offshore shipping tanker collision and fatality in the North Sea with international complications.

Throughout this period, the force has worked hard to improve its investigation processes for victims.

The deputy chief constable oversees crime performance at the strategic victim focus meeting. Here, the force uses its data to monitor outcomes and emerging themes. Senior leaders share examples of good practice with each other.

The force has an improving investigations board that looks at themes in crime investigations and how its investigators can make improvements and progress.

Inspectors carry out monthly investigation audits. The force told us that this process could involve 250 audits a month, examining standards and compliance. These audits would be improved by focusing more on the quality of investigations. Local and team accountability meetings include discussion of workloads and crime performance. Investigators at all ranks we spoke to were working hard. They cared and were doing their best to get results for victims.

But we found the force's investigation structure was struggling to cope with the overall crime demand. There is a lack of experienced investigators; trainee investigators need more support; and there are long delays in forensic examinations of devices. It was encouraging to see that the new force leadership was already working with an external organisation to review the operating model. It intends to use this information to plan resourcing with the aim of better meeting demand across the force. The force has a long-term plan for investing in [digital forensics](#), but it needs to make sure it carefully monitors and understands ongoing risks related to delays in this area.

The force generally allocates crimes appropriately, but it faces challenges managing the volume of allocations to some investigation teams

The force has a crime allocation policy. Allocations are made centrally by the [crime management unit](#), which should consider the risks, threat and harm associated with the incident.

Our quality service review found that crimes were allocated promptly to an investigator in 82 out of 85 cases.

During our in-force inspection activity, we spoke to response and neighbourhood officers. Generally, the crimes the force allocated to them were appropriate.

Officers working in Grimsby told us about a rotating role using a crime allocation car. Response officers are nominated to this role for several weeks at a time to investigate each day's crime allocations. During this time, they aren't normally sent to other incidents. Officers we spoke to felt that this approach was working. They said it resulted in the reduction of allocated crimes to the wider response team in this part of the force.

Investigators on the [domestic abuse safeguarding](#) investigation team and [protecting vulnerable people](#) teams had much higher workloads than some other investigators. Some of these teams we visited largely consisted of inexperienced students and trainee investigators. Some were struggling to cope with the complexity and volume of crimes allocated. Supervisors on these teams had to oversee large crime workloads and manage allocations carefully so as not to overwhelm officers and [staff](#). We saw lengthy delays in some domestic abuse victims' crimes being allocated to an investigator to progress. The force needs to monitor this issue.


The force consistently achieves appropriate outcomes for victims

The force has shown a meaningful and sustained improvement in its [positive outcome](#) rates for victims of crime in the past two years.

We recognise the improvement the force has made. We consistently saw evidence of a focus on outcomes for victims through all stages of its governance processes.

In the year ending 30 June 2025, 18 percent of all [outcomes](#) that the force assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were positive outcomes. This is higher than the typical range compared to other forces in England and Wales.

Figure 5: Percentage of positive outcomes that Humberside Police and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes between the year ending 30 September 2023 and the year ending 30 June 2025



Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: Line chart showing the percentage of [positive outcomes](#) that Humberside Police assigned and the median for forces in England and Wales for each year from the year ending 30 September 2023 to the year ending 30 June 2025. The chart shows that 18 percent of [outcomes](#) that Humberside Police assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were positive in the year ending 30 June 2025, compared to the median of 12.2 percent for forces in England and Wales. It also shows that the percentage of positive outcomes that Humberside Police assigned has been slowly increasing since the year ending 30 September 2023. And the median percentage of positive outcomes for forces in England and Wales has been slowly increasing in the same period.

Note: The percentage of positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all outcomes they assign in a given period. Victim-based crimes include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

Figure 6: Percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that Humberside Police and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes in the year ending 30 June 2025

Outcome types	Humberside percentage [%]	Median percentage [%] for forces in England and Wales
<u>Unresolved crime outcomes</u> (Outcomes 11–18)	78.9	84.4
<u>Resolved crime outcomes</u> (Outcomes 5, 9, 10, 20–22)	3.1	3.1
<u>Positive crime outcomes</u> (Outcomes 1–4 and 8), of which:	18.0	12.2
1 – Charged/summonsed	11.0	9.1
2 and 3 – <u>Caution</u> – youths and adults	0.8	0.8
4 – Taken into consideration	0.3	0.1
8 – <u>Community resolution</u>	5.9	2.2

Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Note: The percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all outcomes they assign in a given period. [Victim-based crimes](#) include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

In the year ending 30 June 2025, of all the crime outcomes Humberside Police assigned to victim-based crimes, 5.9 percent were outcome 8 (community resolution). This is higher than the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The force had scrutinised its use of this outcome type and told us that it had issued clear guidance to officers and supervisors on using it. It had started further audits on this outcome type, and additional scrutiny was provided by the OPCC-led out of court resolution panel.

We found that the force routinely audited and scrutinised its use of different outcome types. This means that leaders can be confident they understand what determines the use of specific outcomes, whether the outcomes are appropriate and what improvements might be needed to give victims better justice.

The force needs to record crimes as soon as possible

As part of our quality service review crime recording audit, we found that the force had recorded 70 crimes over the sample period, with 47 of them recorded within 24 hours.

A crime must be recorded as soon as possible after the person receiving the report is satisfied that it is more likely than not that a crime has been committed. Forces are expected to record crimes on their systems without delay. It is important that forces promptly record crime so they can start investigations quickly and don't lose vital lines of enquiry. Most importantly, forces need to make sure victims can access the support they need as soon as possible.

The force should make sure that it records crimes as soon as possible, and in any case within 24 hours.

The force prioritises high harm offenders for arrest, but not all investigators understand processes and policy for outstanding and wanted suspects

Daily tasking meetings, overseen by the force's leadership, assign enquiries to find high harm suspects to be arrested. There is a focus on domestic abuse offenders. The force uses neighbourhood, response and specialist teams to promptly take forward these enquiries. Briefings to teams include outstanding suspects. The force has a wanted dashboard, and has made some improvements to this. But some supervisors and investigators we spoke to weren't confident in using it. And there was confusion over the force's policy, including when to circulate suspects on the [Police National Computer](#). The force would benefit from clarifying its overall processes for outstanding and wanted suspects.

The force has improved how it assesses the initial needs of victims

In [our 2024 report](#), we highlighted that the force needed to improve how it assessed the needs of all victims to make sure it gives them effective support.

The force has adopted the process of recording some victim needs assessments at the point of first contact in the force [control room](#). When a crime is reported over the phone, staff complete the initial needs assessment with the victim as they talk through the circumstances and their vulnerabilities. Responding officers carry out assessments for victims who report crimes in person.

In 58 of 61 relevant cases we reviewed as part of our quality service review, we found that the force had recorded victim needs assessments. This means that investigators had assessed whether those victims needed support and, if so, what type of support they needed and whether they were [vulnerable](#) or intimidated.

We found officers and supervisors had a good focus on keeping victims updated. A crime dashboard shows when updates are due. We found that in 45 of 50 relevant cases in our quality service review, the force had updated victims on the progress of investigations. A victim personal statement was considered in six out of six applicable cases. The force informed the victim of the outcome in 67 out of 67 cases. Being assessed for needs and being updated are two of the rights in [the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime \(the Victims' Code\)](#). It is essential for the force to comply with the Victims' Code to give victims a high-quality service.

The force has also developed its My Police Portal. This allows it to send victims crime prevention advice, officer details and crime numbers at the point of contact. Victims can register with the portal, allowing them to directly receive updates on progress and contact the relevant officer. This is a good development. The force now needs to promote the portal's use with its workforce, as knowledge of it is limited.

We found that senior leaders had set and maintained high investigative standards. However, some force structures don't always allow for detailed scrutiny. The force now needs to focus on quality through its auditing and the performance data it produces.

The force monitors file quality against national file standards to identify common issues. It uses this information to identify good practice and areas of learning and to provide feedback to investigators.

Safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm

Requires improvement

Humberside Police requires improvement at [safeguarding children](#) and [adults at risk of harm](#).

Areas for improvement

The force should make sure its governance processes include the appropriate data and analysis to scrutinise and inform how it safeguards adults and children at risk of harm

We found gaps in oversight for some important elements of [safeguarding](#) governance during our inspection activity. For example:

- Existing procedures weren't resulting in the consistent progression of some safeguarding action plans in accordance with the force's strategy.
- The force wasn't tracking its compliance with statutory [section 47](#) joint visits.
- The force didn't understand the issues it had with applications for and progress on its disclosure schemes ([Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme](#) and [Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme](#)).
- There was no monitoring of [multi-agency risk assessment conference](#) actions.

Senior leaders weren't aware of the issues. The force has governance structures in place through established meetings led by senior [officers](#). But some data considered at these is purely numerical, without enough quality (through context and analysis) to allow the force to understand the issues and drive improvements. The impact of practical problems that teams face wasn't reaching governance meetings for leaders to resolve.

Following our feedback, the force has made some positive changes. These include introducing a new detective chief superintendent post for safeguarding, developing a new safeguarding strategy, improving the process for the Child Sex Offender Disclosure scheme, and developing the capacity to track section 47 visits.

But the force needs to demonstrate sustained improvements throughout this part of its work to prevent these problems recurring. These should include making sure staff are following agreed processes, improving data, and carrying out its own testing to monitor compliance.

The force needs to make sure that all crimes committed against vulnerable victims are recorded correctly

In our [quality service review](#), we examined 50 incidents involving [vulnerable victims](#) reported to the force by partner agencies. Of 31 crimes that should have been recorded, 22 were recorded correctly. The force had a similar [area for improvement](#) in its last inspection. It should improve its recording practices to make sure that all crimes involving vulnerable victims are recorded correctly. Through our inspection activity, we also found that not all crimes were being recorded through the force's vulnerability hub.

Recording crimes accurately helps make sure that crimes are fully investigated, offenders are identified and brought to justice, and crime data is complete.

The force should make sure its use of prevention order and disclosure schemes follows national statutory guidance so potential victims are aware of the risks from offenders

The force's use of the [Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme \(DVDS\)](#) and [Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme \(CSODS\)](#) is required to comply with national statutory guidance, with timely disclosure to applicants. These schemes empower people to make informed decisions about their relationships and personal safety.

Our PEEL 2025–27 inspection process now includes audits on how all forces use disclosure schemes to protect potentially [vulnerable people](#).

CSODS audits showed there was no tracking of applications to the point of disclosure. Record keeping was inconsistent. There was a lack of understanding among [officers](#) about process and extended timescales. Officers told us high workloads were negatively affecting compliance with the need to make disclosures to people at risk of harm. There was a lack of performance data for oversight.

The force has a DVDS tracker to oversee the disclosure process. This is a manual record which, when we reviewed it, was inaccurate. We found a lack of performance data and quality assurance, missing research and practices that weren't in compliance with statutory requirements. Senior leaders were unaware of the compliance issues.

We brought these issues to the attention of the force, and it promptly began to address them. Under oversight from senior leaders, the force has made progress with its use of the CSODS. It has also made some improvements in its use of the DVDS. But our inspection activity still revealed problems. These included not considering the reconciliation of partners, continuing inconsistent use of the revised tracker, and non-disclosure decisions not being tailored to the circumstances.

The force should make sure its multi-agency risk assessment and tasking arrangements are sustainably enhanced to better safeguard vulnerable people

We identified a number of issues relating to [multi-agency risk assessment conference \(MARAC\)](#) meetings:

- The volume of cases created high demand to prepare and pre-read all cases for presentation.
- Cases had inconsistencies in the quality of the research completed. This meant [personnel](#) attending meetings had to check the force's systems during these to provide responses.
- Two of the early cases we heard lacked detail and progress updates (we asked the force to promptly review these due to the potential risks).
- One meeting didn't discuss risk factors, expecting that participants fully pre-read the cases. There was no summarisation of each case to make sure all partner organisations knew what they had to do.

The force promptly responded, sharing learning from the cases we highlighted and introducing a new supervisor post to help with workloads. It provided an updated template for research purposes.

Recognising demand was high, the force had also carried out a trial, Operation Terrestrial, with one local authority to reduce the numbers of cases going to MARAC. It hoped this change of procedure would soon be adopted by the other three local authority areas it works closely in partnership with, but the approach still needs to be evaluated.

We found some inconsistencies between teams in research standards, the use of [Police National Computer](#) and [Police National Database](#) data, crime recording and identifying some MARAC [victims](#) and offenders on police systems. Our [quality service review](#) of [domestic abuse](#) cases found updates and actions from MARAC meetings were recorded on police systems in just 3 out of 11 cases. Appropriate referrals to MARAC arrangements were made in 10 out of 15 cases we reviewed. This means that in five cases, the force and its partner organisations couldn't create a multi-agency plan to reduce the harm to [high-risk domestic abuse](#) victims or their [children](#) and manage the risk from offenders.

A [multi-agency tasking and co-ordination](#) meeting we observed lacked some important attendees from the force and its partners. At the meeting, progress updates and the research provided needed to be clearer on action the force was taking in relation to [intelligence](#) or breach of orders, to manage the risk posed by domestic abuse offenders.

Main findings

In this section we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm.

The force has developed oversight of its statutory safeguarding processes

The force has a vulnerability governance unit that oversees its statutory responsibilities for [serious case reviews](#). The team carries out daily scanning for incidents that may meet the threshold for investigation. It tracks cases to make sure they progress.

The force recognised it needed to improve how it embeds learning from its statutory reviews. It introduced an [organisational learning](#) board in 2025, which it hopes will support this. This is a positive development.

During our inspection we identified that the force didn't have robust oversight of its requirements to attend joint visits and investigations with social care services in response to child safety enquiries. We highlighted this to the force, and it promptly responded. It has introduced a tracker to monitor requests for joint visits and [strategy discussions](#) with social care and its attendance of these. This should improve the [joint investigation](#) of child protection incidents, leading to improved outcomes for children.

The force provides training for safeguarding, but it could do more to develop trainees' knowledge in its protecting vulnerable people teams

We generally found that officers we spoke to had a good understanding of vulnerability. Most could recall receiving training on the subject, including recognition of the [voice of the child](#), domestic abuse and [stalking](#). The force provides officers with scheduled training days, which include safeguarding updates. These training days include response, neighbourhood, criminal investigation and [protecting vulnerable people \(PVP\)](#) teams. This breadth of training is positive. The staff in the vulnerability hub aren't involved in these training days. But the force uses their knowledge to provide updates to these events.

When we spoke to trainee officers in PVP teams, we found they had limited knowledge of their responsibilities for joint visits with social care or their role in child or adult strategy discussions. They had received little training on these topics. PVP teams largely consisted of trainees with limited experience. The force would benefit from making sure all its staff who work in these teams have the training they need to perform their specialist roles.

The force records most crimes committed against victims of domestic abuse, but it doesn't always record rape crimes correctly from reported incidents of rape (N100s), or cancel rape crimes correctly

On 11 August 2025, we examined 46 incidents involving victims of domestic abuse, 45 reported incidents of rape ([N100](#)) and 18 decisions to cancel rape crimes. We found the following:

- Domestic abuse incidents: 30 crimes should have been recorded and 28 crimes were recorded correctly.
- Reported incidents of rape: 4 crimes of rape should have been recorded and 2 crimes were recorded correctly as N100.
- Cancelled crimes of rape: 14 out of 18 crimes were cancelled correctly.

It is especially important that the force accurately records crimes involving domestic abuse victims and rape crimes to make sure that investigations are carried out promptly and effectively. If the force doesn't record crimes correctly then they may not be investigated properly, and victims may not receive the service they expect and deserve from the police. We found that the four crimes of rape which weren't cancelled correctly didn't contain sufficient additional verifiable information which convinced us that a crime hadn't occurred. If the information being provided isn't compelling, then the crime must remain recorded.

The force safeguards children and adults at risk of harm

As part of our quality service review, we reviewed 60 cases to determine how well the force safeguards victims.

We found that in 39 of 43 cases, safeguarding advice was appropriately given to victims. This suggests that [officers](#) are aware of their duty to identify and reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable victims. In 10 of 11 cases we reviewed, officers recorded the voice of the child in referrals, making sure that the child's experiences and needs were considered in safeguarding decisions.

When attending incidents, most officers show [professional curiosity](#) and look beyond the obvious to identify signs of hidden harm, exploitation or vulnerability. In 35 of 38 cases we reviewed, officers completed appropriate [risk assessments](#), which shows they had a clear understanding of the risks that victims face. Officers made relevant referrals to specialist partners in 38 of 40 cases, which shows that they were aware of available support services and the importance of connecting victims with the help they need.

Through the ongoing work of the vulnerability hub, the force is aware it still needs to make sure and continually monitor that all referrals by officers are thorough. This should include linking children to incidents, recording children present and recording the voice of the child.

The force's policy on managing [missing persons](#) makes sure it gives a structured and proactive response. During the missing person triage process, the force assesses risk and gathers important information. In ten of ten cases we reviewed, the initial risk grading had an appropriate supervisory review. In 16 of 16 cases we reviewed, officers attended within the required time frames.

The force carries out thorough investigations to locate missing persons. In eight of eight cases we reviewed, officers followed the investigation plan, made relevant enquiries and recorded updates of their efforts to locate the missing person. In ten of ten missing children's cases we reviewed, social care was notified of the missing episode. This means that children were assessed for the welfare support they may need.

We were pleased to note that the force promoted the use of both the [Herbert](#) and [Philomena](#) protocols through its website to improve the response to missing persons. These protocols allow carers of people with dementia and of children at risk to prepare information to help the police find them. It would help if the force encouraged its call takers to ask whether callers have used these protocols. This would help make sure the force takes every available opportunity to establish whether any additional information is available to help locate a missing child or vulnerable adult.

The force receives most missing persons reports through its [control room](#). A supervisor or sergeant carries out the initial risk assessment. For a child, they then add the case to [Niche](#) as soon as possible and notify the local authority. A duty inspector then reviews the initial risk assessment, and sets the risk level for the missing person enquiry. When a case is deemed high risk, detectives can be involved in the investigation.

The force has locate teams of officers on duty seven days a week, who carry out enquiries for missing people. These teams have built up experience of this, and have working relationships with local authorities. This brings consistency to enquiries and removes some demand from busy response teams. Locate teams do some basic problem-solving, and the force plans to include these teams in future training in this area of work to develop this.

[Child abduction warning notices \(CAWNs\)](#) are useful sources of information for locating some missing children. We found a local spreadsheet of CAWNs in one area and were told that the process relating to CAWNs was changing. The force would benefit from ensuring this information is accessible to all officers.

The force works well with multi-agency partners to safeguard and reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable people

Multi-agency working is an important part of the force's safeguarding strategy. The force has an established vulnerability hub where all referrals are assessed and assigned to a wide range of partner organisations, covering both child and adult safeguarding. This centralised approach brings consistency to information sharing. Part of the hub's work is facilitating a daily pitstop meeting, where the local authority and critical partners discuss cases. This is a positive process, but due to demand the service level agreement for this process has been increased from 48 to 72 hours. The force would benefit from making sure all pitstop cases heard have consistent research on the risks faced and posed by children. For some cases we saw, this could have been clearer.

In 31 of 32 relevant cases we reviewed, the force shared information with appropriate agencies, which allowed for a co-ordinated response to safeguarding. At the time of our inspection the force was processing multi-agency referrals promptly, with no backlogs reported.

The force had improved its oversight of the hub's workload. The specialised operations daily meeting included an overview including secondary risk assessments, DVDS numbers, domestic abuse reports and planned strategy meetings.

The force has systems or processes in place for promptly notifying schools of pupils living with domestic abuse ([Operation Encompass](#)). In 14 of 16 relevant cases we reviewed, officers notified schools about children exposed to domestic abuse. This means children may have received the required support in school.

Managing fraud

Adequate

Humberside Police is adequate at managing fraud.

Area for improvement

The force needs the right capability and capacity to manage fraud demand

The force correctly triages fraud investigations, which are passed to different investigation teams based on the level of complexity. But all triage is carried out by a single detective sergeant with no backup. In our inspection, we found that this role had responsibility for allocating all fraud investigations and setting the investigation plans, as well as reviewing the response to [vulnerable victims](#) involved. If the person in this role isn't present, this may cause delays or a decrease in the level of service and creates a risk to delivery.

At the time of our inspection, the dedicated fraud team had recently taken responsibility from [safeguarding](#) teams for all frauds with vulnerable victims, without an increase in staff. This is a large increase in demand.

The force doesn't have a separate fraud protect officer role. The force confirmed it does work with partner organisations to help prevent the risk of fraud. It has developed promising initiatives, for example, with isolated elderly victims and the deaf community. A dedicated resource would allow the force to consistently support all vulnerable groups and would help to identify groups at the most risk through fraud threat and trend analysis.

Promising practice

The force uses volunteers to give fraud advice to victims

The force uses Fraud Watch volunteers to respond to non-urgent fraud calls. Fraud Watch gives members of the public fraud advice and helps them report fraud cases to Action Fraud (Report Fraud). This process makes sure that everyone who calls the force to report a fraud gets help and that all fraud allegations are logged with the national service.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at managing fraud.

The force has effective accountability for fraud, and it understands and manages the threat of fraud in its communities

During our inspection, we found that the force had assessed the threat from fraud and understood how this affects its communities. This assessment shows the local and national threat picture for fraud. But fraud isn't a strategic priority for the force. The force's fraud policy is clear and consistently gives direction for allocating fraud investigations and safeguarding victims.

The force has a named fraud lead and has clear governance at both a strategic and an operational level. At the time of our inspection, this was relatively new at the strategic level (local accountability meetings), but more established at the operational level (local team accountability meetings).

The force doesn't have enough capacity and capability to manage fraud in its communities and provide support to victims

During our inspection, we found that the force didn't have the right capacity or capability to manage fraud. It has a dedicated [4P plan](#) for fraud and additional 4P plans for high-threat fraud (for example, [courier fraud](#)). It reviews these at a strategic level.

We found there wasn't enough relevant training in place for [officers](#) and [staff](#) in the [control room](#) and those that carry out investigations.

In our staff survey, 72.5 percent of respondents involved in managing fraud (121 of 167) reported that they hadn't received any training on managing, responding to and investigating fraud cases. In our inspection, we found that although fraud was included in the [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\)](#) level 2 training course, there was no rolling programme of fraud training or CPD, and training levels weren't monitored.

In our audit activity, we found that the force applied the [fraud investigation model](#) in only 6 out of 12 fraud cases we reviewed. But it has a positive judicial outcome rate for fraud of 26.4 percent for the two years ending 31 March 2025. This is above the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

Providing a safe and lawful custody environment

Adequate

Humberside Police is adequate at providing a safe and lawful custody environment.

Areas for improvement

The force needs to consistently improve its data and recording practices on the use of force

We found that the force was working outside of [authorised professional practice](#) when force was recorded as being used against one person in a custody environment by numerous [police officers](#). In this instance, force policy stated that only one officer was required to submit a use of force report. Guidance states that all officers involved in using force should have recorded the force they used.

In our audit work, we identified 110 use of force instances, but only 22 use of force forms had been submitted. The forms that were submitted lacked relevant detail that accurately reflected the nature of the incidents. This means the force can't always show that when force is used in custody, it is necessary, justified and proportionate.

Positively, the force's new leadership team has changed the former policy which allowed the under-recording of the use of force in custody. But at the time of our inspection there wasn't yet a new published policy document.

We found that 83 percent of [custody officers](#) and [staff](#) were up to date with their officer safety training, and 95 percent were up to date with first aid training. This highlights that there are some officers who may have to use force in custody who don't have up to date training to do so.

We also found that wider recording practices weren't justifying why handcuffs are used on people who are compliant. Officers aren't expected to record their justification for doing this. There is no formal policy stating this, but it is accepted practice within the force. Force data also shows that for the year ending 30 September 2025, self-defined ethnicity was missing from 38.6 percent of use of force records.

The force needs to comply with the College of Policing's authorised professional practice when recording strip searches

We reviewed ten cases that involved strip searches authorised under [section 54 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984](#), and 12 cases where clothing was removed for safety reasons. Of the ten cases involving strip searches for an article, five didn't comply with the [College of Policing's authorised professional practice](#) as the location, time, officers involved, and result of the search weren't recorded. Of the 12 cases where detainees had clothing removed for safety reasons, none were recorded as authorised, and the grounds were insufficient. In addition, frontline officers and detention officers told us they were confused about the difference between the two different types of strip searches. They couldn't recall receiving any specific training in the past two years to assist their understanding.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the force is at providing a safe and lawful custody environment.

The force has effective governance and quality assurance processes to manage the safety and well-being of detainees

The force has effective monthly and quarterly performance meetings to make sure its custody service is safe and lawful. It can show it has a structured approach to oversight of its custody service with quantitative and qualitative performance measures in place. There are enough trained officers and staff to provide custody services, and the force monitors staffing levels and their capacity to meet demand.

Initial training for permanent and temporary custody officers and staff is comprehensive, and follows the national courses developed by the College of Policing. Custody officers and staff spend time shadowing more experienced colleagues and complete a workplace assessment before carrying out duties on their own. The force doesn't provide regular training days each year to all custody officers and staff for their [continuing professional development](#). This limits their ability to respond to [organisational learning](#) or legislative updates.

The force understands its responsibilities under the [public sector equality duty](#). It monitors custody data to identify [disproportionality](#). Custody officers and staff told us that they had received training in supporting detainees with mental health difficulties and/or neurodivergent conditions.

The force is open to effective external scrutiny. It could show that external bodies regularly visit the custody suites and work with custody officers and staff. The force was able to show how it documents and responds to feedback from external bodies such as the [Independent Custody Visiting Association](#), the [independent advisory group](#) and scrutiny panel.

The force protects detainees from neglect and harm

We visited the custody suites and found that they were clean and the physical environment provided enough privacy for detainees. There are few potential [ligature points](#), and these are due to the design of the toilets. Custody officers and staff carry out daily cell checks as per authorised professional practice and deal with repairs quickly. The custody environment is generally safe.

Custody officers and staff treat detainees with dignity and respect and provide appropriate care. Detainees' individual needs are met. For example, there are adaptations for detainees with mobility issues or hearing or sight difficulties, and religious materials are available for detainees to practise their faith. Food to meet most dietary needs is available, and the force generally considers the specific needs of female detainees. But the shower doors are too low at the Clough Road custody suite, which reduces dignity for women.

The force only arrests [children](#) as a last resort. Children spend as little time as possible in police custody. Decisions to detain children overnight are appropriate and are clearly recorded. Custody officers request suitable [alternative accommodation](#), but the local authority isn't always able to provide this. The force and partner agencies provide oversight of children. Both male and female children are allocated a member of staff to oversee their care.

There are [safeguarding](#) measures in place to protect [vulnerable adults](#) and children. Provision of an [appropriate adult](#) for children and vulnerable adults is available, but not provided consistently across the force.

Detainees can exercise their legal rights

Custody officers appropriately authorise detention. Both custody officers and detention officers book in detainees. They explain the booking-in process, ask relevant questions and build a good rapport with detainees. They clearly explain rights and entitlements and provide written notices setting these out. Both suites have easy read versions of these notices. For detainees who don't speak English, custody officers provide translated documents and arrange interpreters.

Detainees can speak with their legal representatives in private, either in person or on the phone. If detainees waive their right to legal advice, custody officers explore the reasons why.

The force carries out reviews in the best interests of detainees, and reviewing officers consider the needs of children and vulnerable adults.

However, the force doesn't always follow the [Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984](#) and its codes of practice when carrying out reviews of detention. For example, custody officers don't always inform detainees of reviews carried out while they are asleep. This negatively affects the detainees' ability to exercise their right to make representations about the decision to authorise their continued detention.

And not all reviewing officers make detailed records of reviews that reflect each detainee's circumstances. They sometimes rely on generic templates without adding or removing text. This can lead to confusing or contradictory entries that don't reflect the detainee's circumstances. And if reviews are late, officers don't always record the reasons why.

The force effectively assesses, manages and regularly reviews risk throughout detention and on release. But it needs to improve its prisoner handover process

The force has an effective booking-in procedure that helps custody officers to identify and manage risk. However, some detention officers are also carrying out the booking-in procedure, although they haven't all been formally trained to do this.

Custody officers clearly explain their [risk assessments](#) and consider all relevant information about the detainee. Custody officers put in place appropriate care plans and observation levels to safeguard the detainee. The removal of clothing or other items isn't always based on an individual risk assessment. Custody officers regularly revisit the detainee and reassess their risk to make sure all risks are reduced.

The force doesn't have an effective handover process for officers and staff; relevant information isn't always shared with healthcare professionals. When a detainee is ready to be released, custody officers don't always carry out a thorough pre-release risk assessment in the presence of the detainee. Some custody officers make sure an accurate person escort record is completed for detainees who are transferring to court.

There is effective healthcare provision for detainees with sufficient oversight from the force and NHS England

The force has a contract with an external provider to make sure detainees' healthcare needs are met. The force and NHS England effectively monitor the contract for all health provision for detainees. Health staff are available in the custody suite and carry out timely assessments of detainees' healthcare needs. Health staff treat detainees in an appropriate clinical space that protects their privacy and dignity. Health staff gain appropriate consent from detainees to access medical records and make onward referrals for ongoing support. Detainees have access to appropriate medicines while in custody, including those to manage withdrawal from substances.

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