

PEEL 2025–27

Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy

An inspection of Gloucestershire Constabulary

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Overall summary

Our judgments

Our inspection assessed how good Gloucestershire Constabulary is in eight areas of policing. We make graded judgments as follows:

Outstanding	Good	Adequate	Requires improvement	Inadequate
		Police powers and public treatment	Developing a diverse and inclusive workforce	Leadership and force management
			Preventing and deterring crime	Investigating crime
			Responding to the public	
			Safeguarding children and adults	
			Managing fraud	

We set out our detailed findings about things the constabulary is doing well and where the constabulary should improve in the rest of this report.

We also assess the constabulary’s performance in a range of other areas, and we report on these separately. We make graded judgments for some of these areas.

PEEL 2025–2027

In 2014, we introduced our police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) inspections, which assess the performance of all 43 police forces in England and Wales. Since then, we have been continuously adapting our approach.

We have moved to a more [intelligence](#)-led, continual assessment approach, rather than the annual [PEEL inspections](#) we used in previous years. We assess forces against the [characteristics of good](#) performance, set out in the [PEEL assessment framework 2025–2027](#), and we more clearly link our judgments to [causes of concern](#) and [areas for improvement](#).

It isn't possible to make direct comparisons between the grades awarded in this PEEL inspection and those from the previous cycle of PEEL inspections. This is because we have increased our focus on making sure forces are achieving appropriate outcomes for the public. We have also changed the aspects of policing we inspect and added new areas.

Terminology in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, 'national' definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, 'national' means applying to England or Wales, or England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England, Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom.

About the data

For more information on data and analysis in this report, please [see the 'About the data' section of our website](#).

HM Inspector's summary

I have concerns about the performance of Gloucestershire Constabulary in keeping people safe, reducing crime and giving [victims](#) an effective service. The constabulary had improved in only one area since [our PEEL 2023–25 inspection](#). And I have particular concerns about how the constabulary is managed and how well it investigates crime.

The constabulary's senior leadership team has changed substantially since our last inspection. The new team has put in place plans to make improvements, including the provision of adequate IT for its [officers](#) and [staff](#), and changes to its operating model and the overall culture. These issues have endured since our last inspection. Progress to improve in these areas and in the constabulary's overall performance has, to an extent, been hampered by insufficient funding and resources. However, the people of Gloucestershire deserve to have a constabulary that can adequately respond to their needs.

I was disappointed to find that the impact of change in the constabulary has adversely affected the morale and well-being of its workforce. This is despite many measures being in place to look after its officers and staff. We found officers in particular were in understaffed teams with extremely high workloads, often unable to take leave or time off when requested. The majority of officers and staff stated they wouldn't recommend Gloucestershire Constabulary as a great place to work.

The constabulary has improved how well its officers use [stop and search](#) powers. The use of these powers, as well as those governing use of force, is overseen by internal meetings and external scrutiny panels. However, our inspectors found that the internal scrutiny would benefit from access to better data and that [children](#) subject to these powers could be better [safeguarded](#).

The constabulary has new plans in place to help it oversee how it provides neighbourhood policing and crime prevention. However, these have yet to lead to improvements. We found that effective management is disadvantaged by low-quality data. We also found that the constabulary has been unable to improve how it uses problem-solving since our last inspection. Most worryingly, we found that [neighbourhood teams](#) are overworked and often taken away from their core preventative role to help other teams.

One area in which the constabulary has made some improvement is that of responding to the public. Although still slightly below standard, the measures we assess for emergency and non-emergency call handling have improved since our last inspection. Response times to incidents have also improved, although these still need to improve further. The constabulary also needs to better manage the incidents awaiting attendance.


An area of particular concern is that of investigating crime. In many of the areas we measure around investigation quality, the constabulary's performance has got worse. These enduring issues are now a [cause of concern](#). The number of offenders brought to justice is also too low.

The way the constabulary protects [vulnerable](#) people hasn't improved since our last inspection. It needs to improve how it measures its safeguarding performance, how it manages its backlogs of safeguarding referrals and the information held in those referrals, and how it polices preventative orders issued to domestic violence perpetrators.

Lastly, the constabulary needs to improve how it responds to people reporting fraud and how it investigates fraud crimes. It should also take steps to better understand the demands of fraud investigations and train its officers and staff to do so.

Since our last inspection, the constabulary has improved in only one area of performance, and many areas have seen a decline.

I fully acknowledge the challenges faced by Gloucestershire Constabulary's leadership team and its workforce. The constabulary is also going through many changes, and these will understandably take some time to put in place. However, my concern on behalf of the public is about the performance of the constabulary. I have given Gloucestershire Constabulary specific recommendations that set out the areas it needs to focus on, and I will continue to monitor performance.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'K. Stone', written on a light blue background.

Kathryn Stone OBE

His Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary

Leadership and force management

Inadequate

Gloucestershire Constabulary's leadership and force management are inadequate.

Cause of concern

The constabulary's operating model and its ability to respond to current and future demand are restricted by financial constraints and poor IT infrastructure

In [our 2023–25 PEEL report for Gloucestershire Constabulary](#), we issued three [areas for improvement](#) in leadership and force management:

- The constabulary should make sure its operating model and workforce plan help it to respond to current and future demand.
- The constabulary should do more to make the most of the productivity of its resources and assets.
- The constabulary needs to improve its productivity through digital, data and technology solutions.

All three of these issues remain and are now a [cause of concern](#). In addition, we found a number of areas for improvement that have persisted since our last visit. And we have issued causes of concern in our 2025 inspections for [serious and organised crime](#) and [child protection](#).

We saw the effects of these enduring issues throughout this latest inspection. For example, we found:

- a lack of resources to manage daily demand on response teams, and only slowly improving incident response times;
- a reliance on overtime to meet daily demand;
- not enough [officers](#) with the right skills in the right teams to effectively and efficiently investigate [volume](#) and serious crime on behalf of [victims](#); and
- a considerable number of [police staff](#) roles lost through redundancy, mutually agreed resignation and the deletion of posts, resulting in police officers backfilling some of these roles, alongside a limited workforce planning capability.

The constabulary is aware of these issues and has developed plans to address them. It has also obtained external consultancy and support. For example, it is using an external company to support its Whole Constabulary Review and is planning to bring in a new operating model before the end of 2026.

Despite this, the constabulary's extremely challenging financial circumstances and inadequate infrastructure have hindered attempts to implement much-needed solutions quickly enough.

The constabulary has made some productivity savings, and, through its efficiencies programme, it is taking steps to meet future budgets. However, revenue overspending is still evident, and it is using capital reserves to balance spending.

In 2025/26, the constabulary identified budget pressures of £22.4 million, balanced by £10.0 million of funding increases and £12.3 million of savings. The budget included a use of £2.3 million of revenue reserves and £2.0 million of capital reserves.

The final outturn for the 2025/26 financial year showed it had achieved its £12.3 million savings target alongside a revenue underspend of £1.8 million (including overachievement of overtime savings of £0.2 million). This resulted in a reduction in use of revenue reserves from £2.3 million to £0.6 million.

The constabulary has also recognised the limits of its IT but can't implement solutions as quickly as needed to improve its operating model and manage demand. During our inspection, we heard that the constabulary had been struggling with inadequate computer systems for some time. And, despite some improvements, officers and staff were still tackling many of the same issues we saw during our last inspection. The constabulary's rostering system wasn't yet fully functioning, which meant that it was hard to know how many of its officers were on duty.

Since our last inspection, the constabulary has recruited a chief digital information officer who has led on a wide-ranging programme of change, including the introduction of the [Niche](#) records management system in February 2026. As our inspection was concluding, the constabulary was introducing Windows 11 computers with a target completion date in November 2026. The constabulary expected a new performance dashboard to be functioning in late 2026.

The plans the [chief officer](#) group has put into place demonstrate the constabulary's commitment to improvement. However, it must make sure that it makes and monitors progress against enduring performance issues in the context of its financial and infrastructure challenges.

Recommendations

Within six months, Gloucestershire Constabulary should:

- demonstrate that it understands where officers and staff should be deployed to best address current and future demand;
- put processes in place to make sure it uses its available resources to address enduring underperformance; and
- implement an operating model that improves how effectively its officers and staff can deal with the operational demands.

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to make sure it has reliable data so it can better manage resources according to demand and risk

During our inspection, we found that the data available to the constabulary's leaders doesn't allow them to effectively scrutinise performance or determine the most effective deployment of resources.

We found that the way performance data is recorded, processed and presented to senior leaders varies in quality. Some of this is due to the constraints of outdated IT infrastructure. Without accurate performance data, leaders can't determine how the efforts of their [officers](#) and [staff](#) are making a difference to communities.

At daily management meetings we observed, leaders were unable to tell how many response officers were on duty. We heard of officers having their shifts changed at very short notice, often by text message while they were off work. And we saw that overtime was used daily to fill gaps in minimum staff levels. The constabulary's duty planning unit was overwhelmed with demands on its time and was working with a computer system that wasn't fully functional.

The constabulary told us its new workforce planning function had started in January 2026. However, the team managing this has limited data at its disposal. Information about where officers and staff are posted, their skills and training levels and the staffing costs of separate departments isn't readily available.

A fuller understanding of operational and workforce data would allow the constabulary to better align its resources to demand. The constabulary should make sure it improves the quality and provision of its data to better manage the resources available.

The constabulary's leaders need to take steps to better understand and address the impact of change on the workforce

At the time of our inspection, it was clear that the constabulary was going through several significant change programmes. All of these were necessary to resolve the underlying issues affecting the service it provided to the public.

However, we found that [officers](#) and [staff](#) didn't always fully understand or feel involved with the leadership team's attempts to improve the constabulary's strategic direction.

During our inspection, we carried out a workforce survey open to all officers and staff between 16 February and 20 March 2026. We received 1,198 responses, which we estimate to be 42.3 percent of the workforce at the time of the survey.

Only 29.7 percent of respondents (356 of 1,198) felt that when the constabulary's senior leaders make strategic decisions, they consider the needs of the workforce. And only 17.1 percent of respondents (205 of 1,198) agreed that change is managed well in Gloucestershire Constabulary.

Our visits to the constabulary supported these findings. We heard from:

- frontline officers who were only aware of planned changes to the operating model through rumours or conversations with colleagues and who told us they had received no consultation or official communications;
- officers in the reactive investigation team who were told in a group email to the whole team that their unit would be disbanded due to operating model changes;
- officers who told us that they were unprepared and untrained for the implementation of [Niche](#);
- police community support officers who told us that a process to reduce their numbers left them feeling unsupported and vulnerable about their job security; and
- frontline officers and staff who told us that it was unclear which of the large number of priorities they should be focusing on.

We did see evidence of the constabulary's senior leaders focusing on cultural change, with specific senior-level meetings set up to address this. However, our survey and discussions with officers and staff in multiple commands and teams found that more work was needed to gain the workforce's trust.

Although 86.6 percent of respondents (1,038 of 1,198) agreed that their managers modelled high standards of behaviour, only 34.9 percent of respondents (418 of 1,198) agreed that Gloucestershire Constabulary's senior leaders demonstrate the standards, behaviours and culture expected from the police. And 47.2 percent (566 of 1,198 respondents) agreed that they make an effort to improve these standards, behaviours and culture.

We saw examples of when the constabulary's leaders had communicated well with the workforce. For example, the Gloucestershire rapid improvement plan and the more recent strategic plan simplified the priorities in sections called 'what this means for you', which were aimed at the whole workforce. The workforce can use QR codes, displayed in police buildings, to communicate quickly and easily with leaders. There are also recognition events in the crime command team where people are nominated and receive awards for their hard work. But our findings suggest the workforce is yet to feel the full benefit of these efforts.

The constabulary's leaders should build on this work to communicate better with its workforce to fully understand the impact of its strategic changes on them.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at leadership and force management.

The constabulary doesn't have effective systems to gather intelligence to make sure it can anticipate and respond to current and future demand

During our inspection, we found that the constabulary lacked effective [intelligence](#) and functions to assign appropriate resources. This means that it struggles to anticipate and respond to both current and future demand. Without real-time data, predictive analytics and collaborative information-sharing networks, the constabulary can't proactively identify emerging threats, allocate resources efficiently and prioritise operations based on risk and impact. Instead, its operations become reactive and poorly targeted. This leads to inefficient resource use and an inability to address both current challenges and emerging threats.

Our assessment of the [force management statement](#) was positive. In it, we saw high-quality assessments of the main risks the constabulary faces. However, we were told it was difficult to obtain the data and information needed to properly compile the document. Operational data quality for the 2026 force management statement was understandably affected by the implementation of Niche in February 2026. Workforce data was generally unavailable at the required level for detailed analysis.

The constabulary should be using historical crime data, call logs, demographic trends and environmental factors to create predictive models to forecast future demand with greater accuracy. Without this modelling, the constabulary will be unable to identify patterns such as peak times for incidents, high-risk locations and seasonal fluctuations in crime rates. The constabulary needs to be more proactive in its approach to help it distribute officers, staff and resources more efficiently.

During our inspection, we also observed many management, tasking and performance meetings. Almost all of these would have been improved by more detailed performance, demand and workforce data and analysis to allow leaders to understand their current and future demand and hold their teams to account for their performance.

The constabulary can show how it aligns finances to its priorities, how it evaluates value for money, and an understanding of future budgeting needs

The constabulary could show its finances and its priorities were aligned. It clearly links its budget allocations to strategic objectives and operational needs. The budget gold meeting had oversight of various efforts to make sure that the budget was balanced, and spending was aligned to the constabulary's priorities. This included the service choice review process, where leaders were asked to align the services provided by their teams to resourcing requirements. This aimed to make sure services were linked to organisational aims, and that the required resources were in place to provide these.

In the year ending 31 March 2026, the constabulary received around £170 million in total funding. As with other forces in England and Wales, this is a combination of local revenue generated from the [police precept](#) and a core grant from central government. The precept income to the constabulary that year was around £80 million. This is equivalent to around £119,000 per 1,000 population, which is within the typical range forces in England and Wales receive from the precept.

For the year ending 31 March 2026, the constabulary received an increase of £14 in the police precept per band D property, which was forecast to provide an extra £5.1 million of funding.

In May 2025, the chief constable wrote to the Minister for Policing and Crime asking for £10.5 million in additional grant funding to make much-needed improvements to IT infrastructure, stabilise performance and improve long-term financial sustainability. This request was denied.

Against considerable constraints, the constabulary is using this and other processes to better understand its financial position and is considering all available options to reduce future shortfalls, predicted to be a cumulative figure of £19.8 million by the end of the 2029/30 financial year, including both identified savings of £14.6 million and unidentified savings of £5.2 million.

The constabulary can demonstrate the benefits of collaboration with other agencies and police forces

During our inspection, we saw evidence of collaboration with other organisations. For example, the Crown Prosecution Service is involved in strategic meetings and scrutiny groups. Representatives are also present in constabulary buildings to advise investigators to help improve investigative standards and [positive outcome](#) rates.

The constabulary has started a collaboration with Avon and Somerset Constabulary to jointly maintain, repair and procure vehicles. This has already led to savings due to the ability to buy in quantity and pool resources and facilities.

In early 2026, the constabulary volunteered to be subject to a review by the new [College of Policing](#) performance improvement pilot, also known as the turnaround team. This team has been set up to assist police forces deemed to require guidance on operational processes and governance. The constabulary implemented the recommendations from this review quickly and these have begun to lead to improvements. For example, it has introduced performance dashboards at daily management meetings. Another change was the temporary addition of experienced officers in the reactive investigation team, which led to a reduction in crime investigation backlogs.

Attracting, developing and retaining the workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace

Requires improvement

Gloucestershire Constabulary requires improvement at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to develop its understanding of the well-being needs of its workforce

The constabulary has a comprehensive health and well-being strategy which is clearly aligned with the five main areas of the '[National Police Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2024–2026](#)'. Well-being meetings also take place in individual departments to allow [personnel](#) to discuss issues affecting their welfare. In 2025, the constabulary encouraged its [officers](#) and [staff](#) to take part in the National Police Wellbeing Survey.

We also saw examples of the constabulary's efforts to promote healthy lifestyle choices and personal resilience, and how officers and staff are supported following traumatic incidents. Suicide prevention material and trauma toolkits are also available to the workforce.

In our workforce survey, only 51.9 percent of respondents (622 of 1,198) agreed that Gloucestershire Constabulary takes their individual well-being into account when setting their working pattern. And 65.9 percent of respondents (789 of 1,198) agreed that their line manager actively checks their workload is manageable.

During our inspection, we found that frontline personnel, including response officers, [neighbourhood](#) and investigation teams, are over-worked and understaffed. Officers and staff told our inspectors that they felt senior leaders didn't appreciate the pressures on them. We learned of high crime allocations and workloads, and of officers being unable to take leave and having their shifts changed at very short notice due to low staffing. We also heard accounts of officers wanting to leave policing altogether due to the pressures of work.

We found there was no central oversight of time off in lieu (TOIL) owed to officers and staff for working extra hours. There was also no centralised data available to help the constabulary's leaders understand the well-being challenges associated with working excessive hours. TOIL is managed on paper-based systems, with officers building up TOIL and not using it.

In our survey, just 37.2 percent of respondents (446 of 1,198) stated that they would recommend Gloucestershire Constabulary as a great place to work. During the inspection we found that morale was low across many areas of the constabulary.

In the year ending 31 March 2026, only 22.2 percent of rest days in lieu accrued by the overall workforce were taken. This is below the typical proportion of rest days taken to those accrued across forces in England and Wales. This means that officers and staff are struggling to take the days off that they are owed and so don't have enough opportunity to rest and recover.

The constabulary should develop a comprehensive understanding of the reasons for the well-being challenges experienced by its workforce and take effective action to tackle them.

The constabulary needs to develop an effective evaluation process to understand how continuing professional development supports its workforce

The constabulary provides some of its workforce with structured [continuing professional development \(CPD\)](#) linked to their role. Response [officers](#) have regular development days that include bespoke training. [Staff](#) working in the constabulary's [control room](#) also benefit from regular training.

However, in our workforce survey, only 31.2 percent of respondents (374 of 1,198) agreed that time for training and development was protected and not regularly cancelled or postponed when operational demands increased.

During our inspection, we found that members of the workforce had access to CPD material. However, this was often difficult for [personnel](#) to keep track of among other constabulary communications. We were also told that, due to operational demands, frontline officers seldom had the time available to complete online CPD training.

Although the constabulary makes CPD available to the workforce, there is no central record of what training is provided, nor any evaluation data about its effectiveness. There is a similar lack of clarity about the provision of formal training courses for specialist roles and for supervisors.

The constabulary should better co-ordinate its overall CPD process to quality assure how it is provided, and who to, and test whether officers and staff have understood the training and can put it into practice for the benefit of the public.

The constabulary needs to develop and promote its professional development review process so that its workforce understands the value of recording personal development

In [our 2023–25 PEEL inspection](#), we identified an [area for improvement](#) that the constabulary should improve how it manages individual performance so that it can understand, monitor and prioritise its workforce's development needs.

The constabulary's established professional development review (PDR) process is an electronic system intended to support the personal development of its workforce. The system requires all [personnel](#) to enter objectives linked to constabulary, team and personal goals to be achieved in the calendar year.

During this inspection, we found that too many members of the workforce didn't value the process. Supervisors told us they didn't have the time to hold regular development meetings with their [officers](#) and [staff](#), or to complete PDRs.

Officers and staff stated that PDRs were only used properly for those looking for promotion or development, or for those where PDR completion was mandatory to progress to the next pay grade.

In our workforce survey, of those respondents who had a formal PDR in the last 12 months, only 48.4 percent (280 of 579) agreed that they were valuable for their development.

The constabulary told us that it monitors PDR completion and if individual objectives have been set. In the year ending 31 March 2026, 74.2 percent of the workforce had completed the PDR process. However, in our workforce survey, of those respondents eligible for the PDR process only 49.6 percent (579 of 1,167) stated that they had had a formal PDR in the last 12 months. In addition, only 40.9 percent of all survey respondents (490 of 1,198) agreed that there were opportunities for them to develop their career in Gloucestershire Constabulary.

Our audit of 20 PDR records showed that development discussions weren't always being recorded. In the records we viewed, development discussions were recorded for six of ten constables, one of two sergeants and two of eight police staff.

The constabulary should make sure that its workforce understands and values the PDR process and that the process is linked to career development.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at attracting, developing and retaining its workforce and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace.

The constabulary doesn't provide officers and staff with the right training to carry out specialist work

Investigators told us that they didn't always feel they had received the right training to carry out their role.

As at 31 March 2026, the constabulary had 102 full-time equivalent [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\) 2](#) investigators in post compared to 127 who should be in post. This means 80.3 percent of PIP 2 investigator posts were filled. The constabulary was working to address the shortfall and, as at 31 March 2026, had 17 full-time equivalent PIP 2 trainees.

However, during our inspection we found that some investigation teams had a much lower proportion of accredited investigators. In April 2026 we were told that the constabulary's criminal investigation department had 13 of its 68 constables trained to the PIP 2 level. We were told that the number of accredited investigators was increasing at a slow pace.

The constabulary is starting to work with the [College of Policing \(CoP\)](#) to align its neighbourhood policing programme with the [CoP's neighbourhood policing programme](#). The CoP dashboard shows that as at 23 June 2026, 237 individuals had completed the first part of the programme. The constabulary had 223 neighbourhood officers and police community support officers eligible and required to complete the training. The constabulary has started to implement the next stages of this programme.

The constabulary doesn't provide effective training for volunteers in specialist roles. Although initial training is provided for special constables, further training and CPD are less well-organised.

The constabulary doesn't have effective processes in place to encourage officers and staff to stay in its workforce

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary's officer leaver rate (not including transfers to other forces or constabularies) was 7.7 percent, which was higher than the England and Wales average over the same period of 6.0 percent.

The constabulary needs to improve its understanding of why people leave its workforce so that it can put effective actions in place to improve retention. Although it has an exit interview process and processes to intervene if officers or staff are thinking about leaving, the outcomes of these could be used more effectively.

The constabulary carries out regular surveys and collects a range of workforce data. However, it doesn't use this data to identify early intervention opportunities to encourage people to stay or to identify patterns and trends in why those from [under-represented groups](#) leave the constabulary.

In our workforce survey, 19.0 percent of respondents (192 of 1,010) said that they wanted to leave the constabulary as soon as possible. And only 29.4 percent of respondents (297 of 1,010) stated that they saw their future career continuing in the constabulary beyond the next three years.

The constabulary should make sure that it better understands why its officers and staff may wish to leave. And it should put in place measures to minimise this, where appropriate.

The constabulary needs to make sure its recruitment activity helps it create a workforce that is more representative of the communities it serves

The constabulary has recruitment processes governed by a number of strategic meetings. However, there is no recruitment strategy to provide clarity and direction for its recruitment activity.

The Better Together team promotes diversity, equality and inclusion, by working with and supporting communities that are under-represented in the constabulary's workforce. Working towards the aims of the constabulary's diversity, equality and inclusion strategy, the team organises or attends community events and provides an outreach service for the constabulary.

The constabulary's staff association networks are less involved in recruitment processes. These voluntary organisations are made up of police officers and staff who help and support members of the workforce with certain [protected characteristics](#), for example, people from minority ethnic backgrounds or who have neurodivergent conditions. Using these networks' expertise and publicising the support they provide could help the constabulary to attract recruits from under-represented communities.

As at 31 March 2025, the proportion of police officers from an ethnic minority background in the constabulary was 3.1 percent. This is lower than the average across all forces in England and Wales, which is 8.5 percent. It is also lower than the proportion of individuals from an ethnic minority background in the Gloucestershire population, which was 6.9 percent. The constabulary told us that in the period between December 2024 and December 2025, just 2 of 122 recruits were from a Black ethnic background.

The constabulary should take steps to better co-ordinate its recruitment efforts to create a workforce representative of the public it serves.

The constabulary is working to create a more inclusive and supportive workplace culture

In 2026, the constabulary set up a trust, confidence and legitimacy board. At the time of our inspection, the constabulary was implementing several initiatives aimed at improving workplace culture. These included a refreshed reverse mentoring scheme and encouraging 'courageous conversations' through training and monthly videos explaining how to discuss difficult topics. It also planned to introduce internal focus groups to better understand the thoughts and ideas of the workforce.

We found that the constabulary had moved towards a more performance-focused leadership model, meaning that officers and staff are held to account for their performance.

However, our workforce survey results suggested that there was room for development in this area.

For example, 18.6 percent of respondents (223 of 1,198) reported feeling bullied or harassed by members of Gloucestershire Constabulary in the last 12 months. Of those respondents who had experienced bullying or [harassment](#), 43.5 percent (97 of 223) didn't report the incident. And of those respondents who reported the bullying or harassment incident, 63.5 percent (80 of 126) stated that no action was taken.

In addition, 20.5 percent of respondents (246 of 1,198) reported feeling discriminated against by members of Gloucestershire Constabulary in the last 12 months. Of those respondents who had felt discriminated against, 56.5 percent (139 of 246) didn't report the incident. And of those respondents who reported the discrimination incident, 61.7 percent (66 of 107) stated that no action was taken.

Gloucestershire Constabulary should tackle all forms of bullying, harassment or discrimination effectively and put suitable measures in place to prevent any recurrence.

Using powers fairly, appropriately and with justification

Adequate

Gloucestershire Constabulary is adequate at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to make sure that officers submit safeguarding referrals when they identify concerns about children who have been stopped and searched or had force used against them

The constabulary doesn't require [officers](#) to complete a [public protection notice](#) each time a [child](#) has been stopped and searched or had force used against them. It expects officers to use their professional judgment to decide if one is needed, ask for supervisory guidance and consider other [safeguarding](#) policies.

The constabulary also doesn't check that officers who [stop and search](#) or use force against children complete public protection notices. This means that it can't be confident that officers always complete safeguarding referrals for children when necessary. Officers had made a safeguarding referral in only one of the five cases we reviewed of [body-worn video](#) where a child was subject to stop and search. In three of the other cases, we found no evidence of safeguarding having taken place and in one case a referral wasn't appropriate. Officers had made a safeguarding referral in four of the six cases we reviewed of body-worn video where a child was subject to use of force. In the other two cases, we found no evidence of safeguarding having taken place.

During our inspection, we found that supervisory oversight of these cases needed to improve. Supervisors didn't always check that officers had completed a referral where needed. There was no expectation for officers to record their rationale as to why they hadn't made a referral, and supervisors didn't record their reviews of stop and search or use of force records involving children. The constabulary needs to make sure that officers always submit safeguarding referrals for children when they identify safeguarding concerns during stop and search or use of force encounters.

The constabulary needs to make sure it has effective internal governance and oversight of its use and supervision of the use of police powers

During our inspection, supervisors told us that they didn't always have the time to carry out reviews of [stop and search](#) or use of force incidents. Some were unaware that they had a responsibility to do so, and we found that there was confusion about processes in the months following the rollout of a new IT system.

While the constabulary requires supervisors to review stop and search, it doesn't have a policy specifically governing the use of force. As a result, it wasn't clear how supervisors were expected to oversee their [officers'](#) use of force.

In our workforce survey, only 24.7 percent of respondents (70 of 283) reported supervisory reviews of stop and search taking place regularly and only 13.4 percent (38 of 283 respondents) reported having received feedback from these reviews. For use of force, only 17.1 percent (59 of 345 respondents) reported supervisory reviews taking place regularly and only 10.7 percent (37 of 345 respondents) reported having received feedback.

Additionally, due to IT limitations, the constabulary can't view the records of any supervisory reviews that do take place. This means that it can't check that good quality reviews are completed or identify any learning from them. We reviewed 20 stop and search encounters and 20 use of force records. None of these records had any additional narrative comments from a supervisor.

Performance data is scrutinised at regular internal governance meetings. However, we found that the data available to senior leaders for review was limited. This could be improved by including additional data about:

- injuries to officers;
- injuries to people being stopped and searched or subjected to use of force;
- officers who regularly use higher levels of force;
- self-defined ethnicity data; and
- [safeguarding](#) and supervisory review compliance.

Internal governance meetings should also carry out audits of emerging themes from supervisory reviews.

The constabulary has a trust, confidence and legitimacy board to help improve trust internally and externally. Alongside improved internal governance arrangements, this should provide a better understanding of how officers use their powers and how fairly the public are treated.

The constabulary is aware of these issues and is carrying out a survey with sergeants to better understand the factors which mean that reviews don't take place regularly or comprehensively.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at using its powers fairly, appropriately and with justification.

The constabulary has increased the number of officers with up-to-date public and personal safety training

Regular public and personal safety training (PPST) in conflict management and use of force techniques is mandatory for officers. This helps to keep the public and officers safe.

In December 2025, the constabulary told us it had 70 officers with expired PPST. In April 2026, this had increased to 223 officers. At the end of our inspection in June 2026, the constabulary told us it had reduced this number to 68 officers with expired PPST. Of these 68 officers, 42 were expired due to an acceptable and valid justification, for example, due to [occupational health](#) advice or being on long-term leave.

During our inspection, we found there was an inconsistent understanding of officers whose PPST had expired. The constabulary is improving its data on officers' training after initial issues with a new police system. Where appropriate, officers who have expired PPST training are placed in roles that make sure they are productive but not operational to be deployed, which is in line with national guidance.

Officers understand how to use stop and search powers fairly and appropriately

During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of 129 stop and search records from 1 February 2025 to 31 January 2026. Based on this sample, we estimate that 98.4 percent (+/- 1.8 percentage points) of stop and searches the constabulary carried out during this period had reasonable grounds recorded.

This is a statistically significant improvement compared to the findings from our previous review of records from 1 January to 31 December 2022. In that review, we found that 80.2 percent (+/- 5.4 percentage points) of stop and searches had reasonable grounds recorded.

The percentage that had reasonable grounds recorded suggests that officers are suitably trained and they use stop and search powers in a fair and appropriate way. Officers told us that they felt confident to use their stop and search powers and felt the training they received was beneficial.

The constabulary doesn't consider stop and search as an intelligence-led tactic in problem-solving plans

The constabulary isn't making use of [intelligence](#)-led stop and search to support a problem-solving approach in neighbourhoods. Officers aren't always using stop and search as a tactic in local problem-solving plans and the constabulary isn't using intelligence from stop and search to help better understand and analyse existing problem-solving plans.

Considering all tactics, such as stop and search, in problem-solving approaches will help the constabulary prevent and detect crime and keep people safe.

The constabulary needs to make sure it collects accurate data to allow it to understand how fairly stop and search is being used

Good quality data on self-defined ethnicity (how individuals define their ethnicity) allows the constabulary to understand the rate at which it uses stop and search on people from ethnic minority backgrounds in the local resident population.

As part of our review of stop and search records, we asked the constabulary to provide 12 months of stop and search data from 1 February 2025 to 31 January 2026. We found that self-defined ethnicity information was unknown (not recorded, not stated, or refused) for 12.9 percent of these records. In the year ending 31 March 2025, on average, self-defined ethnicity was unknown for 18.0 percent of stop and searches that forces in England and Wales recorded.

However, in our review of 20 stop and search encounters filmed on body-worn video, we found that in 16 of these encounters, officers didn't ask for self-defined ethnicity. In 14 of these cases, the self-defined ethnicity was recorded in varying categories. And in two cases the officer recorded self-defined ethnicity as 'not stated – declined'. This means that officers may be assuming the ethnicity of the person being searched and recording it without making sure the information is correct. Therefore, the analysis the constabulary carries out to understand [disproportionality](#) may be based on inaccurate data.

Officers should make sure they ask for this data to allow the constabulary to more accurately identify any disproportionate use of the power.

The constabulary uses stop and search sufficiently

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary carried out 2,461 stop and searches of people. This equals 3.7 stop and searches per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales.

The number of stop and searches the constabulary carried out increased by 21.7 percent compared to the year ending 31 March 2024. This isn't in line with the overall picture for forces in England and Wales in which, on average, the number of stop and searches decreased by 1.3 percent. The constabulary told us that this could be due to better scenario-based training for stop and search, local performance management and officers feeling confident to use their powers.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary had an overall [find rate](#) of 33.3 percent from stop and search encounters. This was made up of 27.8 percent [linked finds](#) and 5.5 percent not linked finds.

Linked finds are when one or more items, which the officer suspected a person had in their possession, are found and were the reason for the search. Not linked finds are when items are found that a person may have been in unlawful possession of but weren't the reason for the search.


The constabulary's linked find rate is above the England and Wales median of 26.2 percent, but within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The linked find rate for the constabulary increased by 3.1 percentage points compared to the year ending 31 March 2024.

We examined:

- the number of searches the constabulary carried out;
- the number of searches that had reasonable grounds; and
- the percentage of linked finds.

The results of this review show that the constabulary is using its stop and search powers well. The total number of stop and searches and the linked find rate have increased, which suggests officers are fairly stopping more people and finding the items for which they are searching.

Figure 1: Percentage of stop and search encounters resulting in linked and not linked finds for forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Stop and search open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A stacked column chart showing the percentage of [stop and search](#) encounters where the item found was and wasn't linked to the reason for the search for all forces in England and Wales in the year ending 31 March 2025. In Gloucestershire Constabulary, 27.8 percent of stop and search encounters resulted in a [linked find](#) and 5.5 percent in a not linked find.

[The accessible data table for figure 1 is available on our website.](#)

Note: In the calculation, we have excluded records where it isn't known whether the item found was linked to the reason for the search. We have also excluded records where it isn't known whether the [officer](#) found any items. If the percentage of linked or not linked finds isn't included in the chart for some forces, it is because they haven't supplied it.

The constabulary understands how it is using stop and search and use of force powers and is trying to do more to reduce disproportionality

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 5.0 times more likely than White people to be the subject of a stop and search by the constabulary. In our review of stop and search records of people from an ethnic minority background, we found that 21 of 21 had reasonable grounds.

The constabulary carries out analysis of its disproportionate use of stop and search powers to help it understand why this exists. The constabulary is also working with the London School of Economics on a research project to identify the causal impact of stop and search on deterrence versus displacement effects for knife crime, and it is refreshing its police powers governance and scrutiny panels. In addition, the stop and search tactical lead routinely [dip samples](#) stop searches of Black people and people from other ethnic minority backgrounds to test the searches for lawfulness and fairness.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, people from a Black ethnic minority background were 6.9 times more likely than White people to be subject to use of force. This suggests that force is used disproportionately on people from ethnic minority backgrounds. The constabulary carries out analysis into its disproportionate use of force to help it understand why it exists. However, it needs to better understand and explain its disproportionate use of force and take action to reduce it.

The constabulary isn't recording enough use of force incidents


In the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary recorded 8,594 use of force incidents. This is an increase of 33.0 percent compared to the previous year. This isn't in line with the overall picture for forces in England and Wales in which, on average, the number of use of force incidents increased by 9.4 percent. Our data suggests this increase is because of better recording practices and not because more force is being used on the public. We found a marked improvement in the constabulary's estimated under-recording over the last three to four years.

Officers are expected to record every use of force to make sure it is transparent and accountable. This includes recording low-level use of force such as handcuffing a compliant person and higher levels of force such as the use of a baton or [conducted energy device](#) (Taser). Where more than one officer uses force on an individual, each officer must submit their own use of force report.

To determine if the constabulary was recording use of force appropriately, we reviewed two different measures. We firstly examined the number of arrests and compared this to the number of recorded use of force reports. We expect the number of use of force reports to be at least as high as the number of arrests. Most arrests involve the use of handcuffs and multiple officers may have used force during the arrest. In the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary carried out 6,936 arrests and recorded 8,594 use of force reports. This suggests the constabulary is recording at least as many use of force incidents as arrests, which is what is expected.

We then reviewed the overall expected number of use of force records compared to the actual recorded number. The expected number is estimated based on the average number of uses of force associated with each recorded arrest. We estimate that, in the year ending 31 March 2025, the constabulary should have recorded 9,429 use of force incidents. It actually recorded 8,594 incidents. This means it likely under-recorded its use of force by 835 incidents. This shows an improvement in recording use of force compared to the previous year when, based on this estimation, it didn't record 2,503 use of force incidents. The constabulary should continue to improve the recording of all use of force incidents. During our inspection, we found there may be inconsistent completion of use of force forms, for example, a use of force form may be missed when multiple officers are involved in an incident or when lower levels of force are used, such as compliant handcuffing.

Figure 2: Number of use of force incidents that forces in England and Wales recorded and the estimated number that should have been recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Police use of force open data tables](#) and [arrests open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: A combination chart showing the number of use of force incidents that all forces in England and Wales recorded (represented by columns) and the estimated number of use of force incidents that should have been recorded (represented by red target lines) in the year ending 31 March 2025. Gloucestershire Constabulary recorded 8,594 use of force incidents. This was lower than the estimated 9,429 use of force incidents it should have recorded.

[The accessible data table for figure 2 is available on our website.](#)

Note: To understand how well forces record their use of force, we compare the number of incidents they recorded with the estimated number they should have recorded. To estimate the number of use of force incidents forces should have recorded, we use the number of recorded arrests and the number of recorded use of force incidents linked to an arrest.

Officers use body-worn video in use of force encounters and stop and search

We found that officers consistently wore and used body-worn video.

The constabulary's policy provides clear guidance for its use in specific situations.

The constabulary also has a default position that, if in doubt, body-worn video should be used and that recording should start as early as possible during incidents.

The constabulary monitors the use of body-worn video carefully to make sure its officers' interactions with the public are being recorded openly and for evidential purposes, where necessary. The constabulary is trialling live streaming using body-worn video. This allows specialist officers or supervisors to view a live incident via the attending officer's body-worn video and provide the most appropriate support or deployment of resources. The new body-worn video supplier will also make sure that if an officer uses a Taser, this will automatically activate all body-worn video devices in the immediate vicinity.

The constabulary supports independent external scrutiny processes

The constabulary has an external police powers scrutiny panel with a recently recruited independent chair. In late 2025 and early 2026 the constabulary used social media channels, community outreach and its website to recruit local residents to join the panel. The panel reviews stop and search and use of force incidents, including reviewing body-worn video. We observed the panel providing effective and informed challenge to the constabulary.

A senior officer and force trainers attend the meetings to help explain legislation and training to the panel. Actions are tracked and the constabulary provides updates on these.

For example, panel members raised the difference in the way armed police officers interacted with members of the public compared to unarmed police officers. In response, two [authorised firearm officers](#) attended the next external scrutiny panel and gave a presentation on their different tactics and considerations.

The constabulary told us that all the incidents reviewed should result in feedback being given to the officers involved. During our inspection, officers told us they had received feedback from the external scrutiny panel. The chair of the external scrutiny panel also attends the internal governance panel for continuity purposes.

The constabulary should, however, publish more information on stop and search and use of force scrutiny on its website. During our inspection, we found that the data wasn't updated regularly. Publishing this more often should help to build public trust and confidence.

Preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability

Requires improvement

Gloucestershire Constabulary requires improvement at preventing and deterring crime and [antisocial behaviour](#), and reducing [vulnerability](#).

Areas for improvement

The constabulary's management and systems should help it to identify and tackle vulnerability, repeat volume and neighbourhood crime and antisocial behaviour

We found that the constabulary couldn't easily access all available data, information and [intelligence](#) from police systems and partners to help it provide effective prevention and deterrence activity. It relies mainly on police data about [antisocial behaviour](#) without routinely considering data from partners, such as health and education, which could add vital context.

[Neighbourhood policing teams](#) are provided with 'health check' data and analysis packs to assist them in their work and to manage performance. Health check packs are used during local 'on my patch' and connectivity meetings across the constabulary. However, the data is limited and focuses on neighbourhood [police officers](#)' crime investigation performance. We also found no evidence of constabulary-wide performance oversight of the areas neighbourhood policing teams should be focusing on.

Since [our PEEL 2023–25 inspection](#), the constabulary has changed its management structure and appointed a new head of neighbourhood policing and crime prevention.

It has created new plans for neighbourhood policing, antisocial behaviour and crime prevention activity. The constabulary also has plans for a fortnightly tasking and co-ordination meeting covering the work of neighbourhood teams.

With richer data and in-depth analysis, these plans and structures should be used to focus governance and performance management on [vulnerability](#), repeat [volume crime](#), neighbourhood crime and antisocial behaviour. The constabulary needs to make sure that it fully implements and evaluates its plans.

The constabulary needs an established problem-solving culture and to make sure its problem-solving activity is effectively managed, monitored and evaluated

In [our 2023–25 PEEL report](#), we said that the constabulary should further develop its systems and processes to make sure problem-solving plans are stored, managed and shared effectively.

In February 2026, the constabulary implemented a new records management system ([Niche](#)), on which it can manage its problem-solving plans. Although this is progress, in our audit of problem-solving plans we found the quality and formats were inconsistent and they were stored on different systems.

In our workforce survey, only 30.7 percent of respondents (220 of 717) agreed that senior leaders valued and promoted problem-solving activity.

The survey results also showed that the constabulary wasn't providing problem-solving training to enough of the workforce. Only 15.8 percent of respondents (113 of 717) reported that they had received training.

[Neighbourhood personnel](#) told us that, due to other demands, they had little time to focus on problem-solving. At the time of our inspection, the constabulary had 13 active problem-solving plans in place.

The constabulary has plans to create a new team to oversee all problem-solving activity and provide advice and guidance to neighbourhood teams. These plans are at an early stage.

The constabulary should make sure that this planned work helps its neighbourhood teams to effectively deal with problems in its communities.

The constabulary needs to effectively manage how often its neighbourhood policing officers are taken away from their duties

In our inspection, we found that the constabulary too often diverted neighbourhood [police officers](#) and police community support officers from their main duties to support other areas of the constabulary. When neighbourhood officers are diverted away from their usual work to perform other duties to help the constabulary to meet demand, this is referred to as [abstraction](#).

Neighbourhood teams are responsible for building relationships with communities, solving problems and collaborating with partners (such as local authority antisocial behaviour officers) to prevent crime and [antisocial behaviour](#). This requires local police officers and police community support officers to be visible and have meaningful communication with those communities.

During our inspection, we heard that neighbourhood officers were frequently abstracted from their core roles to cover vacancies in response teams. We also found they were often required by the [control room](#) to attend incidents during periods of high demand when no response officers were available.

In our workforce survey, just 27.4 percent of respondents working within neighbourhood policing (61 of 223) said they had never been abstracted from their main neighbourhood policing duties. However, 46.6 percent of respondents (104 of 223) reported being abstracted from their main duties on a monthly or more frequent basis. And 28.3 percent of respondents (63 of 223) reported that this happened weekly.

Abstractions reduce how visible neighbourhood officers are in their communities and make effective neighbourhood policing difficult. This means that senior leaders aren't always aware of the impact [neighbourhood policing teams](#) can have on the quality of life and confidence of their communities.

The constabulary told us it now has an abstraction policy that sets out its aim for officers to spend 85.0 percent of their time on visible patrols or communicating with their local communities. In times of peak demand, such as summer and Christmas, this expectation is reduced to 75.0 percent.

The constabulary should make sure the policy is fully adhered to and that senior leaders oversee it. The constabulary needs to be able to scrutinise reliable abstraction data to make sure that neighbourhood policing teams can effectively fulfil their roles.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at preventing and deterring crime and antisocial behaviour, and reducing vulnerability.

The constabulary doesn't understand the causes of antisocial behaviour and vulnerability in its communities

During our inspection, we found that the constabulary didn't have a clear understanding of antisocial behaviour and related vulnerability in its communities. The constabulary hasn't taken steps to understand trends in its antisocial behaviour reporting and the underlying causes.


For example, it hasn't explored why it records differing levels of antisocial behaviour depending on the type – personal, nuisance or environmental.

In the year ending 31 March 2025, it recorded 16.5 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. However, the figures for antisocial behaviour nuisance and [antisocial behaviour personal](#) are very different.

During the same period, 60.0 percent of the constabulary's 11,060 recorded antisocial behaviour incidents were recorded as antisocial behaviour nuisance and 31.1 percent were recorded as antisocial behaviour personal. Although both figures are within the normal range, the constabulary has one of the lowest rates of antisocial behaviour nuisance and one of the highest rates of antisocial behaviour personal in England and Wales over that period.

The constabulary doesn't always record crimes that have occurred when [victims](#) report antisocial behaviour personal. In our [quality service review](#), we found that in the cases we examined, the constabulary had recorded 15 of 21 antisocial behaviour personal crimes correctly.

Figure 3: Number of antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population that forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025



Source: [Police-recorded antisocial behaviour incidents data](#) and [population estimates for England and Wales](#) from the Office for National Statistics

Chart description: Column chart showing the number of [antisocial behaviour](#) incidents per 1,000 population that all forces in England and Wales recorded in the year ending 31 March 2025. Gloucestershire Constabulary recorded 16.5 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population, which was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The typical range, represented by dashed red lines on the chart, is between 7.0 and 22.4 antisocial behaviour incidents per 1,000 population. The median value of 13.6 per 1,000 population is presented as a solid red line.

[The accessible data table for figure 3 is available on our website.](#)

The constabulary needs to improve its understanding of this antisocial behaviour demand. This will help it to tackle the underlying causes, help it to reduce it, allocate resources where they are most needed, and to keep its communities safe.

The constabulary isn't using preventative and protective orders effectively to help it tackle antisocial behaviour

During our inspection, we found that neighbourhood policing teams worked closely with local authority antisocial behaviour officers, housing providers and other partners to address the underlying causes of antisocial behaviour in their communities.

In the year ending 31 March 2026, the constabulary issued 223 preventative and protective orders, which equals 0.3 orders per 1,000 population. This is within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The constabulary also issued 57 civil injunctions, which equals 0.1 injunctions per 1,000 population. This is the highest use of such orders in any police force in England and Wales.

However, we still found that officers weren't using antisocial behaviour legislation effectively to prevent community problems from escalating.

For example, during our inspection we heard that the constabulary doesn't use community protection warnings or community protection notices; instead, it uses injunctions. However, it was unclear as to why these other useful antisocial behaviour powers weren't used as well.

In our quality service review, we examined 20 antisocial behaviour incidents and any crimes recorded from them. We found that in four of these records, the constabulary didn't use or consider legislation to help it tackle the underlying causes of antisocial behaviour.

During our inspection, officers told us they were confident in applying for and using tools such as [Criminal Behaviour Orders](#) and civil injunctions, particularly in more complex or persistent antisocial behaviour cases. They were able to provide examples of when such powers had been used and how the multi-agency Operation Solace antisocial behaviour team, staffed by council and police team members, could help.

This indicates that officers have some understanding of antisocial behaviour legislation, though not the full range of powers available to them. The constabulary should improve its governance and co-ordination as well as its performance management process. This would help it make better use of legislation to tackle the underlying causes of antisocial behaviour more effectively.

The constabulary could co-ordinate how it communicates with its diverse communities to better understand their needs and help set its local priorities

During our inspection, we heard that neighbourhood policing teams were regularly communicating with local people to understand their concerns and help them feel safe. They attend local meetings and use social media to share messages. The communication and engagement team has also provided training to neighbourhood teams.

We also heard that the communication and engagement team uses various methods to send messages to different communities. For example, it uses the 'Your Community Alert' digital platform, which we were told reaches over 22,000 people spread across the county. The constabulary's Better Together team also works with [under-represented communities](#), and we heard specific examples promoting recruitment to Nigerian and Sri Lankan communities.

However, during our inspection, we found little evidence of any central co-ordination of this activity, or any evaluation of its outcomes. Communication practices varied across different areas of the constabulary. In some locations, officers were more confident and proactive in contacting diverse communities. In others, there wasn't a clear understanding of how to build trust with communities who weren't communicating with their local policing teams.

The constabulary should develop a detailed engagement plan and oversight process. This would guide how the constabulary and its local teams communicate with communities. It would also make sure that local priorities are based on community feedback and consistently carried out.

The constabulary works with partner organisations to prevent crime, divert young people away from crime and to reduce reoffending

During our inspection, we found that the constabulary worked well with partner agencies at a local and county-wide level to prevent young people being drawn into criminality, and to target those already persistently offending.

Dedicated youth support team officers work with colleagues in local policing teams to identify young people at risk of being involved in crime before their offending starts. They then work with these young people and consider what diversionary activities may help them move away from a life of crime. These activities include education and physical activities, such as gym memberships.

The team also works with young people who have been arrested but not charged with an offence. Similar diversionary activity then takes place to prevent young people from becoming criminalised. The team provided several examples of how its work had benefited the young people involved and the communities they live in.

In addition, the constabulary has an established [integrated offender management](#) process. This consists of a series of meetings with other policing teams and partner agencies such as the Probation Service. These meetings discuss the most prolific and highest-risk offenders who are committing the most crimes within the category of serious and acquisitive crime, such as shoplifting.

As part of the [multi-agency tasking and co-ordination](#) process, the integrated offender management team also manages the intervention and monitoring of [domestic abuse](#) offenders who are most at risk of reoffending. The team provided examples of its successes in reducing the crimes committed by those offenders being monitored. It uses a series of performance indicators to assess its success with offenders, including levels of engagement, compliance with requirements placed on them and efforts made towards rehabilitation.

Responding to the public

Requires improvement

Gloucestershire Constabulary requires improvement at responding to the public.

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to attend calls for service in line with its published target attendance times

We found that the constabulary correctly prioritised calls at the initial point of contact based on risk, although other factors, such as the availability of response [officers](#), sometimes adversely affected how promptly officers attended incidents.

The constabulary aims to attend emergency incidents within 15 or 20 minutes from the time of incident creation, depending on whether the address is in an urban or rural area. Priority incidents should be attended within 60 minutes.

The constabulary told us that in the year ending 30 June 2026, it met its target for attending emergency incidents in 74.8 percent of cases, and for priority incidents in 62.3 percent of cases.

In our [quality service review](#), we found that, in 37 of 50 cases we reviewed, the constabulary met its overall attendance targets.

The constabulary is working to improve the promptness of its incident attendance and has performance management processes to help it do this. Although there has been some improvement since we raised this as an [area for improvement](#) in [our 2023–25 PEEL inspection](#), it must do more to achieve the targets it has set.

If officers don't attend incidents promptly enough, they may miss opportunities to [safeguard victims](#) and collect evidence. The constabulary should have the right levels of oversight in place to improve the way it responds to incidents. It needs to improve the way it prioritises its response to incidents and how quickly it attends them.

The constabulary needs to make sure it can effectively supervise and manage ongoing incidents

Routine incidents are those which the constabulary should attend within 24 hours of them being recorded on its command-and-control system. These incidents are less urgent than those graded as emergency or priority incidents but still need to be attended within the constabulary's published time frames.

During our inspection, we found that large numbers of routine-graded incidents were held in queues in the constabulary's [control room](#).

In our audit, we found that effective re-assessment had taken place in 19 of 22 relevant cases across all incident types.

However, we also found examples of incidents in the routine queue which needed further ongoing assessment of risk and the decision to deploy [officers](#).

These incidents included [domestic abuse](#) with ongoing risk to safety, and a robbery where potential evidential opportunities were available.

During our inspection, we also found further queues of incidents where no police attendance was required, although some action may be needed. These queues had typically been allocated to [neighbourhood policing teams](#) and were managed without supervision, sometimes by police community support officers.

The constabulary should make sure that it has the policy, processes, resources and supervision to manage ongoing incident demand falling outside the emergency and priority categories.

The constabulary needs to improve the quality of the advice it provides to callers at the first point of contact

In our [quality service review](#), we found that call handlers gave appropriate crime prevention advice in 19 of 26 cases and [safeguarding](#) advice in 33 of 37 relevant cases. However, advice on the preservation of evidence was only given in 21 of 30 relevant cases.

The constabulary supports contact management [personnel](#) through effective initial training and ongoing [dip sampling](#) of incidents by supervisors.

In our workforce survey, 82.9 percent of respondents working in contact management (102 of 123) stated that they had received [threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement \(THRIVE\)](#) training. Of those, between 88.0 and 91.0 percent of respondents (between 90 and 93 out of 102) stated that they had confidence in providing advice about crime prevention, safeguarding and the preservation of evidence.

However, the findings of our quality service review indicate that the training and dip sampling the constabulary has in place hasn't yet led to effective performance.

The constabulary should continue its efforts to provide appropriate advice to callers, specifically about preservation of evidence. This would increase the likelihood of offenders being identified and brought to justice.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at responding to the public.


The constabulary doesn't answer emergency calls quickly enough

In the year ending 31 May 2026, the constabulary received 94,088 emergency 999 calls. This is equivalent to 141 calls per 1,000 population. This was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. It answered 89.9 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds.

This was slightly lower than the standard expected of forces in England and Wales of answering 90.0 percent of 999 calls within 10 seconds. However, this is a considerable improvement since our last inspection, when in the year ending 30 June 2023 just 59.2 percent of 999 calls were answered within 10 seconds.

If a force fails to answer calls quickly enough, it can mean losing both public confidence and investigative opportunities.

Figure 4: Percentage of 999 calls that forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 31 May 2026



Source: [999 call answering times from BT](#)

Chart description: Column chart showing the percentage of 999 calls that all forces in England and Wales answered within 10 seconds in the year ending 31 May 2026. Gloucestershire Constabulary answered 89.9 percent of the 999 calls it received within 10 seconds. This is below the expected standard of 90.0 percent for forces in England and Wales, which is marked with a solid red line on the chart. Fourteen forces were below the expected standard.

[The accessible data table for figure 4 is available on our website.](#)

Note: Call answering time is the time taken for a call to be transferred from BT to a force and then answered by that force.

The constabulary needs to reduce the number of non-emergency calls that callers abandon because they aren't answered

In the year ending 31 March 2026, the constabulary received 209 non-emergency [101](#) calls per 1,000 population. This was within the typical range for forces in England and Wales. The constabulary told us that in the same period, 11.8 percent of calls to its non-emergency 101 facility were abandoned. Although there is no formal national standard for measuring non-emergency call handling performance, an abandonment rate of 11.8 percent is too high. However, it has improved considerably since our last inspection, when the abandonment rate was 41.3 percent in the year ending 31 March 2023.

The constabulary doesn't yet have a clear understanding of whether callers hang up due to long waiting times or because they choose to use an online option. Understanding this would help the constabulary to decide how to reduce its rate of abandonment.

The constabulary has an effective management structure in its control room, which could provide added benefit by addressing demand issues

We found that the constabulary's [control room](#) was operating effectively overall and performance had improved since our 2023–25 PEEL inspection, particularly in answering 999 and 101 calls.

However, we have issued an area for improvement that the constabulary needs to make sure it deals with effectively and scrutinises routine incident queues. We also found that overtime was regularly used to cover shifts at times of peak demand.

The constabulary needs to have a better understanding of its control room demand. In addition, it should explore more fully the benefits of the [Right Care, Right Person](#) model of resource allocation with partner agencies. This would help it make sure that it provides [vulnerable](#) people with the most appropriate response and that officers are only deployed to incidents where necessary.

The constabulary should also continue to develop its [rapid video response](#) option for initial contact with victims of domestic abuse. The [College of Policing](#) performance improvement team, who visited the constabulary in early 2026, highlighted this as an area for development.

The constabulary identifies vulnerability at the first point of contact and correctly prioritises the urgency of response

In our quality service review, we found that in 64 of 69 relevant cases call handlers completed structured [risk assessments](#). Of those, 63 were accurate and meaningful reflections of the circumstances of the call. In 67 of 71 relevant cases the initial prioritisation of the call was appropriate.

In 43 of 49 cases, call handlers also checked whether callers were repeat victims and in 11 of 11 relevant cases, this information was correctly assessed.

In 51 of 55 cases, call handlers also checked for the presence of vulnerable victims. However, we found that they only recorded this information correctly in 31 of 37 appropriate cases and used it to grade the call in 32 of 37 cases.

Improved scrutiny of the work carried out by call handlers should make sure that they record the vulnerability of callers and consider it more often when grading incidents.

The constabulary carries out appropriate risk assessments at the point of first contact, but needs to make sure these are effectively communicated to officers

In our quality service review audit, we found that call handlers carried out the majority of risk assessments at the point calls were received. However, in our workforce survey, only 66.6 percent of respondents (275 of 413) agreed that, when attending calls for service, they received the necessary information and [intelligence](#) on risk and vulnerability to be able to provide an appropriate response to the public.

During our inspection, officers told us that the information they received from control room dispatchers was often incomplete. They said that, on occasion, they needed to prompt the dispatchers to provide information about risk and vulnerability while they were travelling, often at speed, to incidents.

Officers attending incidents should be given appropriate risk and vulnerability information to allow them to make better decisions about their own safety and that of the public, as well as to provide a better service to victims of crime.

The constabulary allows members of the public to contact it online

The constabulary allows members of the public to make contact and report incidents via the [Single Online Home](#) platform.

During our inspection, we found that the demand arising from this method of contact was well managed on a 24-hour basis. [Staff](#) members working on enquiry counters at police stations across the constabulary work on the messages received during their working hours, typically during the day. And dedicated staff in the control room would work on the same queue of messages during the evenings and overnight.

We found that the demand and risk in these incidents was well managed, and that there were no backlogs.

Investigating crime

Inadequate

Gloucestershire Constabulary is inadequate at investigating crime.

Cause of concern

The constabulary hasn't made enough progress in improving the standard of its investigations

We found the constabulary hadn't made enough progress in improving the standard of its investigations since [our 2023–25 PEEL inspection](#). As a result, it still isn't bringing enough offenders to justice. We acknowledge that the constabulary has made changes and that it is changing its operating model. However, more work is needed.

During our inspection, we found that crime investigations were regularly dealt with by teams and individuals who didn't have the capacity or skills to investigate those crimes. We found serious criminal investigations which had been allocated to [officers](#) who hadn't received the [professionalising investigations programme \(PIP\) 2](#) investigator training. We also heard that supervisors often didn't have the time available to carry out meaningful reviews of their officers' investigations.

In our [quality service review](#), we found that, in 79 of 85 cases, crimes were allocated promptly to investigators. And in 75 of 85 cases, investigations were carried out without unnecessary delays. In 66 of 85 cases, all appropriate investigative opportunities were taken. But investigations were effective in only 62 of 85 cases. We also found that, for 50 of 62 crimes, investigation plans were in place, that these were followed in 44 of 50 cases and that the investigation was effectively supervised in 68 of 83 cases. All these results show a decline since our last inspection.

In our workforce survey, 39.1 percent of respondents (129 of 330) reported they were allocated investigations outside their level of accreditation or training on a quarterly or more frequent basis.

Recommendations

Within six months, Gloucestershire Constabulary should:

- make sure crimes are allocated to appropriately skilled officers and [staff](#) to achieve an appropriate outcome for [victims](#);
- consistently carry out thorough and timely investigations that lead to appropriate outcomes for victims; and
- improve supervisory oversight of investigations.


Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to consistently achieve appropriate outcomes for victims

The constabulary isn't always achieving acceptable outcomes for [victims](#) of crime.

In the year ending 31 December 2025, 12.0 percent of all outcomes the constabulary assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were [positive](#). This is within the typical range compared to other forces in England and Wales and was an improvement since [our PEEL 2023–25 inspection](#).

Figure 5: Percentage of positive outcomes that Gloucestershire Constabulary and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes between the year ending 31 March 2024 and the year ending 31 December 2025



Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Chart description: Line chart showing the percentage of [positive outcomes](#) that Gloucestershire Constabulary assigned and the median for forces in England and Wales for each year from the year ending 31 March 2024 to the year ending 31 December 2025. The chart shows that 12.0 percent of [outcomes](#) that Gloucestershire Constabulary assigned to [victim-based crimes](#) were positive in the year ending 31 December 2025, compared to the median of 12.7 percent for forces in England and Wales. It also shows that the percentage of positive outcomes that Gloucestershire Constabulary assigned has been slowly increasing since the year ending 31 March 2024. And the median percentage of positive outcomes for forces in England and Wales has been slowly increasing in the same period.

Note: The percentage of positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all outcomes they assign in a given period. Victim-based crimes include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

Figure 6: Percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that Gloucestershire Constabulary and all forces in England and Wales assigned to victim-based crimes in the year ending 31 December 2025

Outcome types	Gloucestershire percentage [%]	Median percentage [%] for forces in England and Wales
Unresolved crime outcomes (Outcomes 11–18)	84.7	83.9
Resolved crime outcomes (Outcomes 5, 9, 10, 20–22)	3.3	3.2
Positive crime outcomes (Outcomes 1–4 and 8), of which:	12.0	12.7
1 – Charged/summonsed	6.3	9.3
2 and 3 – Caution – youths and adults	0.5	0.8
4 – Taken into consideration	1.5	0.1
8 – Community resolution	3.6	2.4

Source: [Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables](#) from the Home Office

Note: The percentage of unresolved, resolved and positive outcomes that forces assign is calculated from all [outcomes](#) they assign in a given period. [Victim-based crimes](#) include all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct [victim](#), such as an individual, an organisation or a corporate body. For a detailed description of crime and outcome types, please see the [Home Office statistics](#).

However, within the overall positive outcome figure, 6.3 percent of all outcomes assigned to victim-based offences were Outcome 1 – Charged/summonsed in the year ending 31 December 2025, which was lower than the typical range compared to other forces in England and Wales. The constabulary's use of youth [cautions](#) was also lower than the typical range compared to other forces in England and Wales, at 0.02 percent. For the same period, the proportion of crimes that were closed with the offence having been taken into consideration was 1.5 percent, which is higher than the typical range and made Gloucestershire Constabulary the highest user of this outcome in England and Wales.

[Outcome 16](#) is used when investigators have sufficient information to identify a suspect, but the case can't progress because the victim refuses to support a prosecution. In the year ending 31 December 2025, of all the crime outcomes the constabulary assigned to victim-based crimes, 27.6 percent were assigned Outcome 16. This is higher than the typical range compared to other forces in England and Wales. The constabulary needs to understand the reasons for high levels of victim withdrawal.

These figures show that although positive outcomes have improved overall, the actual proportion of victims for which court-based justice is served remains lower than expected. The constabulary isn't always achieving acceptable outcomes for victims of crime. The number of crimes it solves following investigations is low. It needs to understand the issue and work to achieve better outcomes for victims.

The constabulary is working to improve outcomes for victims and can audit and scrutinise the specific use of different outcome types. However, its improvements have yet to lead to consistently appropriate results. It should do more to understand how individual outcomes contribute to its overall positive outcome rate so that, when appropriate, more offenders are brought to justice on behalf of victims.

The constabulary needs to make sure it promptly deals with outstanding suspected offenders

In our [quality service review](#), we found that in 30 of 39 cases we examined, suspects were arrested and/or interviewed where appropriate and in 28 of 30 cases this was done at the earliest opportunity.

During our inspection, we found that teams and supervisors worked to make sure that wanted suspects linked to criminal investigations were apprehended and dealt with as soon as practicable.

During daily management meetings, in which daily operational matters and resources were discussed, we saw evidence that the constabulary could improve the process for managing attempts to arrest wanted offenders. Information available to direct operational activity was incomplete and out of date, and those attending the meetings couldn't provide updates about high-risk wanted individuals.

We found examples of suspected offenders who had escaped justice by not being arrested sooner. We also saw examples of offenders being arrested and brought into custody and not being investigated for other offences that they were also suspected of having committed. And in the [control room](#), we saw examples of incidents that could have been prioritised to arrest offenders sooner.

Outstanding and wanted suspected offenders present a risk to the public and to their victims. The constabulary should develop its understanding and processes to manage the risks posed by these offenders.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at investigating crime.

The constabulary's leadership and oversight of investigation quality haven't improved performance

Senior leaders oversee performance data and analysis relating to criminal investigations on a regular basis, at strategic and tactical levels. The force performance group analyses performance data linked to strategic planning and improvement objectives. The crime and vulnerability performance board also scrutinises the results of monthly supervisor [dip samples](#) of criminal investigations to improve the quality of investigation plans and supervisory reviews.

The constabulary told us that data available to its governance and performance meetings showed that as at October 2025, up to 1,300 crimes were awaiting closure. And it also told us that as at December 2025, over 500 crimes were awaiting allocation, with 92 of these being 22 or more days old.

At the time of our inspection, the constabulary told us that as at June 2025 it had 7,940 open crimes, and as at June 2026 this number was 9,619. Although the implementation of the [Niche](#) system in February 2026 may have inflated this figure, the constabulary's data shows that it isn't yet able to reduce the number of investigations it is carrying out on behalf of victims. This means that investigators' workloads and the pressure they are under are continuing to increase.

In some units there has been positive change. The constabulary told us that, since early 2025, the number of crimes per officer in the reactive investigation team has reduced. In early 2026, this number reduced further when officers from the neighbourhood support team were temporarily seconded to the reactive investigation team to help with their investigations. This temporary change was due to a recommendation from the [College of Policing](#) turnaround team. Although this led to some improvements, it wasn't a sustainable measure to improve the quality of [volume crime](#) investigations.

The constabulary has also recognised that it doesn't have enough investigators accredited to investigate serious crime. In April 2026, the constabulary told us that the criminal investigation department had just 13 of its 68 constables accredited to the appropriate PIP 2 level. It is taking steps to increase this number with specialist recruitment and additional training. However, it acknowledges this will take some time to achieve.

When the constabulary overcomes the challenges of replacing out-of-date technology and implements an operating model that allows it to operate effectively, it should be able to take steps to improve investigative standards on behalf of victims of crime.

The constabulary has processes to manage the use of bail and released under investigation, although it could improve oversight of voluntary attendance

During our inspection, we found that policies and processes were in place to deal with the management of suspects who were [bailed](#) or [released under investigation](#) after being arrested for a crime by the constabulary's officers.

Decisions as to whether a suspect should be bailed with conditions to protect victims or to prevent crime were made appropriately at a local level and adequately supervised. Automated processes then reminded investigating officers when bail dates were upcoming so that these weren't missed.

We also found that the constabulary could measure the numbers of suspects on bail and released under investigation, and that it monitored this. It planned to move this oversight to the control of the offender management working group.

The use of [voluntary attendance](#) is less well governed. Some teams managed the process well, making appropriate decisions to arrest or use voluntary attendance based on risk and the needs of the investigation. Others were less clear about the process. For example, we heard that in rural areas voluntary attendance was used for convenience. We also found that there was little governance as to its use or performance data to measure this or its effectiveness.

Greater scrutiny of the voluntary attendance process would give leaders confidence about how well the process is used and would improve this aspect of the investigative process for victims of crime.

The constabulary maintains victim confidence by making sure victims receive their entitlements, as set out in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime

It is essential for police forces to comply with the [Code of Practice for Victims of Crime \('the Victims' Code'\)](#) to give victims a high-quality service.

Victims' needs being assessed and victims being updated are two of the rights in the Victims' Code. In 53 of 59 relevant cases we reviewed, we found that the constabulary had recorded victim needs assessments. This means that investigators had assessed whether those victims needed support and, if so, what type of support they needed and whether they were [vulnerable](#) or intimidated.

In 68 of 71 relevant cases, we found that the constabulary had updated victims on the outcome of investigations.

In 55 of 64 cases we reviewed, a victim contract was recorded and in 50 of these 55 cases it was adhered to.

Overall, we found that the constabulary is meeting the requirements of the Victims' Code. This gives victims confidence in the constabulary's ability to carry out effective investigations.

During our inspection, we heard that this service is well managed for those crimes where victim contact is the responsibility of the constabulary's Victim Hub. These crimes include [domestic abuse](#) and [hate crime](#).

We also found evidence showing that victim contact is measured at performance boards. And we saw that the constabulary was working to further improve the service provided to victims with processes such as a VCOP (Victims' Code) Scrutiny Panel, during which partner agencies examine individual cases to identify ways to improve.

Safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm

Requires improvement

Gloucestershire Constabulary requires improvement at [safeguarding children](#) and [adults at risk of harm](#).

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to improve its governance arrangements to allow it to effectively safeguard children and adults at risk of harm

In this inspection, we found that the constabulary's governance structure helped it oversee how [officers](#) and [staff](#) deal with [safeguarding](#) and [vulnerability](#). The force performance group and the crime and vulnerability performance board provide strategic oversight. The boards' priorities are set by safeguarding partnerships, agreed at the executive level of the constabulary and its partner organisations.

Strategic meetings manage the constabulary's response to violence against women and girls, which follows the [4P approach](#) (prevent, pursue, protect, prepare). The constabulary's response includes night-time economy patrolling under Operation Vigilant and an established [stalking](#) clinic, providing advice to officers investigating these often complex crimes.

However, the constabulary's governance and performance arrangements aren't supported by high-quality data and analysis to help it understand its demand and manage performance.

We found that the constabulary's public protection team lacked effective performance data to help manage their daily work. Other teams, including the [multi-agency safeguarding hub](#), were relying on data manually entered onto spreadsheets to report on their performance. We also saw that the demands facing these teams couldn't be demonstrated in daily management meetings and therefore the wider workforce didn't fully understand them.

In our [2025 National child protection inspection of Gloucestershire Constabulary](#), we issued a [cause of concern](#) that the constabulary's leadership and governance arrangements for child protection weren't effective.

The constabulary is undergoing a significant period of change in its use of technology and software that can assist with its oversight of performance. The constabulary should use this technology to improve how it measures and governs safeguarding and vulnerability performance.

The constabulary should make sure its systems, processes and personnel help it to comprehensively assess safeguarding referrals and manage demand

Multi-agency working is an important part of the constabulary's [safeguarding](#) strategy. The [multi-agency safeguarding hub \(MASH\)](#) involves a wide range of child and adult [safeguarding partners](#).

In 24 of 29 relevant cases we reviewed, the constabulary shared information with appropriate partner agencies, which allowed for a co-ordinated response to safeguarding.

However, we found backlogs of safeguarding referrals from other agencies and other police forces. These were held on different systems. It wasn't clear if these were routinely searched when new referrals were received to assess overall risks based on all available information.

In February 2026, the constabulary put the [Niche](#) system in place. We found 13,947 safeguarding referrals that had been received prior to this still stored on the Pronto system. These lower-risk referrals had been assessed when they were initially received and had remained on the Pronto system when Niche was introduced. This made it harder for reporting [officers](#) to research all indicators of previous vulnerability when making a new referral. It also wasn't clear whether the MASH was assessing this older information when receiving referrals to inform the action required to support [vulnerable people](#).

We also found that, since the implementation of Niche, 153 referrals from other police forces had been stored as attachments on emails, meaning reporting officers making new referrals couldn't search them. Again, it wasn't clear if the MASH searched these referrals when it received new referrals. We found an additional workload of 257 referrals awaiting processing in the MASH inbox. Although these referrals had been assessed when they were received, this meant that some historic safeguarding information wasn't readily available to the constabulary to assess the ongoing needs of vulnerable people.

Since we told the constabulary about these findings, it has put in place measures to make sure that all previous safeguarding referrals are checked when a new referral is made. It has also made additional [staff](#) available to reduce the backlogs of newer referrals and has plans to increase staffing to prevent this happening again.

The constabulary should have long-term sustainable plans to make sure its processes allow safeguarding referrals and subsequent decisions to be made based on all available information. It should also make sure that safeguarding information is accessible to all staff and officers to inform [risk assessment](#). And the constabulary needs to make sure it has enough staff in place to process and record incoming information.

The constabulary needs to effectively manage its policing of preventative orders

In [our 2023–25 PEEL inspection](#), we identified that the constabulary should increase its consideration and use of preventative orders and have systems to monitor and prioritise breaches of such orders to better [safeguard vulnerable people](#).

The constabulary has improved its application processes for preventative orders such as [Domestic Violence Protection Notices \(DVPNs\)](#) and [Domestic Violence Protection Orders \(DVPOs\)](#).

In six of seven relevant cases that we reviewed, the constabulary considered preventative orders to reduce the risk of further harm to [victims](#). These included DVPNs, DVPOs, [Domestic Abuse Protection Orders](#) and [Stalking Protection Orders](#).

However, we found that it needed to improve the enforcement of these orders once they have been issued. The existence of orders relating to specific individuals is mentioned in the constabulary's daily management meetings. However, we found that the checks of such orders were inconsistent. And it wasn't clear who should be responsible for carrying out the checks or the necessary research of the case beforehand.

We found examples of offenders wanted for breaching a DVPO remaining outstanding for up to five days without a clear plan to arrest them. We were told about checks being made on a vulnerable victim without any consideration given to their disabilities. And we saw records of repeated calls at the addresses of vulnerable victims simply stating that there had been no answer at the door without any further enquiries to find out why.

This shows that the constabulary isn't using all available tools to safeguard victims. It needs to establish processes for monitoring and enforcing these orders.

Main findings

In this section we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at safeguarding children and adults at risk of harm.

The constabulary doesn't always record crimes committed against vulnerable victims effectively

The constabulary doesn't always record crimes committed against vulnerable victims. In our [quality service review](#), we examined 50 records involving referrals made to the constabulary about vulnerable adults and child protection cases, 50 incidents involving victims of [domestic abuse](#), 50 reported incidents of rape and 10 decisions to cancel crimes of rape. We found the following:

- Vulnerable adult and child protection cases: 15 crimes should have been recorded and 11 were recorded correctly.
- Domestic abuse incidents: 33 crimes should have been recorded and 32 crimes were recorded correctly.
- Reported incidents of rape: 9 crimes of rape should have been recorded and 4 crimes were recorded correctly.
- Cancelled crimes of rape: 10 of 10 crimes were cancelled correctly.

It is especially important that the constabulary accurately records crimes involving vulnerable victims. It is equally important to cancel crimes only when it is certain that no crime was committed. Recording and cancelling crimes correctly helps to make sure victims receive the service and support they expect and deserve from the police. If the constabulary doesn't record or cancel crimes correctly, offenders may go on to commit further or more serious crimes against their victims or against other vulnerable victims.

The constabulary is improving how it safeguards children and adults at risk of harm

As part of our quality service review, we found that in 39 of 42 cases, safeguarding advice was appropriately given to victims. This suggests that officers are aware of their duty to identify and reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable victims. In 11 of 12 cases we reviewed, officers recorded the [voice of the child](#) in referrals, making sure that the child's experiences and needs were considered in safeguarding decisions.

When attending incidents, officers regularly show [professional curiosity](#) and look for less obvious signs of hidden harm, exploitation or vulnerability. In 31 of 40 cases we reviewed, officers completed appropriate risk assessments, which shows they mostly had a clear understanding of the risks that victims face. Officers made relevant referrals to specialist partners in 25 of 30 cases, which shows that they were aware of available support services and the importance of connecting victims with the help they need.

The constabulary's policy on managing [missing persons](#) makes sure it gives a structured and proactive response. During the missing person triage process, the constabulary assesses risk and gathers important information. In 20 of 20 cases we reviewed, the risk grade was appropriate for the information known at the time. In 16 of 19 cases we reviewed, officers attended within the required time frames.

The constabulary carries out thorough investigations to locate missing persons. In 17 of 17 cases we reviewed, officers followed the investigation plan, made relevant enquiries and recorded updates of their efforts to locate the missing person.

In five of five missing children cases we reviewed, social care was notified of the missing episode. This means that children were assessed for the welfare support they may need.

This is an improvement on the findings in this area during our 2023–25 PEEL inspection and our 2025 National child protection inspection.

In our workforce survey, of [personnel](#) who stated they were involved with safeguarding vulnerable people, 80.5 percent of respondents (446 of 554) stated they had received safeguarding training in the last two years. Of these:

- 81.4 percent of respondents (363 of 446) agreed the training helped them be confident and effective in relation to their current safeguarding role.
- 84.3 percent of respondents (376 of 446) agreed the training helped them understand what action to take when risk or vulnerability is identified.
- 83.2 percent of respondents (371 of 446) agreed the training helped them understand the process for submitting a safeguarding referral for an adult.
- 84.1 percent of respondents (375 of 446) agreed the training helped them understand the process for submitting a safeguarding referral for a child.

Although the constabulary has made improvements, we found that it could do more to co-ordinate vulnerability and safeguarding training and evaluate this. We were told that although the constabulary provides safeguarding training, it lacks the data to properly understand who has or hasn't been trained and the benefits of this.

The constabulary appropriately uses the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme and the Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme to safeguard vulnerable people

The constabulary operates [disclosure](#) schemes such as the [Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme](#) and the [Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme](#) in compliance with national statutory guidance, with timely disclosure to applicants. This empowers individuals to make informed decisions about their relationships and personal safety.

This was an [area for improvement](#) in our 2023–25 PEEL inspection. During this inspection, we found that the constabulary had clear processes for identifying cases where disclosure schemes might be appropriate.

The constabulary also tracks applications made under these schemes to make sure they are processed within required time scales and that, when appropriate, disclosures are made to individuals in a timely manner. Our [dip sampling](#) of these records showed that the constabulary considered all relevant information when making decisions about whether disclosures should be made.

The constabulary works well with multi-agency partners to safeguard and reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable people

We found that the constabulary's multi-agency safeguarding arrangements work well. Processes are in place to assess and manage the risk held within vulnerability referrals daily.

In our quality service review, we found that, in 24 of 29 relevant cases, information was shared with appropriate agencies. The constabulary requested strategy meetings when appropriate in 8 of 11 cases, and made appropriate [multi-agency risk assessment conference](#) referrals in 6 of 6 cases.

Since the implementation of the Niche system in February 2026, the constabulary has better systems and processes in place for promptly notifying schools of pupils living with domestic abuse ([Operation Encompass](#)).

The constabulary told us that the number of referrals to schools has increased from 176 referrals in February 2026 to 284 referrals in May 2026, and that dip sampling of referrals has shown that 100.0 percent of the expected Operation Encompass notifications are taking place.

The constabulary works well with statutory safeguarding partner agencies to improve how it responds to children and adults at risk of harm

The constabulary plays an active part in the local safeguarding partnership at a strategic level. This leads to better working relationships and shared working practices.

For example, the Gloucestershire Threshold of Intervention agreement is a framework for professionals from relevant agencies to follow, which provides guidance and policies for safeguarding and protection of children.

The constabulary also has processes to share learning from statutory processes such as [domestic abuse related death reviews](#). Recommendations from such reviews are fed into appropriate meetings, such as the constabulary's domestic abuse steering group, or the Safer Gloucestershire Partnership meeting, which oversees the local community safety partnerships.

The constabulary provided examples of when recommendations and feedback from such reviews led to improved working practices. This included setting up a violence against women and girls scrutiny panel. This multi-agency group dip samples cases where a prosecution didn't take place, looking for opportunities to improve decision-making and the use of evidence-led prosecutions, and to make sure no lines of enquiry were missed.

When working with partners, the constabulary considers additional ways to safeguard and protect vulnerable people and challenge offenders

We found that when working with partners, such as the Gloucestershire Domestic Abuse Support Service, the constabulary considers all appropriate ways to safeguard vulnerable people and challenge offenders. In six of six cases we reviewed, the constabulary referred the case to the multi-agency risk assessment conference and made [multi-agency tasking and co-ordination](#) arrangements. This means that the constabulary and partners could create a multi-agency plan to reduce the harm to [high-risk domestic abuse](#) victims or their children and manage the risk from offenders.

Managing fraud

Requires
improvement

Gloucestershire Constabulary requires improvement at managing fraud.

Areas for improvement

The constabulary needs to understand its demand and performance relating to fraud and use this to improve outcomes

During our inspection, we found that fraud wasn't reported in detail in strategic performance boards to help the constabulary direct resources and improve outcomes. The constabulary doesn't monitor the number of fraud investigations it has or who is investigating them. It also doesn't measure the work it does to protect the public from fraud or monitor its effectiveness. And it doesn't monitor how it responds to fraud calls from the public to make sure it provides the correct response.

Fraud doesn't feature in the constabulary's crime management framework, and the specialist fraud team doesn't have criteria for work to be allocated to it. This team is managed by the constabulary's [intelligence](#) portfolio rather than investigations, which may cause a disconnect between the teams.

The constabulary has identified the risk in this area and has an improvement plan to address the issue. It has implemented new acceptance criteria for fraud and is reviewing policies. However, at the time of our inspection, the constabulary had a substantial backlog in allocating fraud investigations.

The constabulary needs to understand its fraud demand so that it can provide a better service to [victims](#).

The constabulary needs to provide effective fraud training for all investigators and contact staff

The constabulary has a small, dedicated specialist fraud team, however, investigators outside this team aren't sufficiently trained. In our workforce survey, only 16.8 percent of respondents who indicated that responding to fraud was part of their role (37 of 220) said they had received fraud training. This has resulted in less effective standards of investigation. The constabulary doesn't train [officers](#) and [staff](#) in protecting the public from fraud.

Contact management staff do receive some fraud training on joining the organisation, however, this isn't formal content and so may differ between each intake. The specialist department does provide some [continuing professional development](#) training for contact staff. However, we found that call handlers didn't understand how to respond to fraud calls.

The constabulary has plans to increase the number of officers who are accredited fraud investigators. It should make sure these are put in place at the earliest opportunity.

The constabulary needs to effectively identify and respond to fraud calls for service

We found that the constabulary didn't always respond effectively to calls from the public about fraud. In our audit, we identified that call handlers were unsure when to refer an allegation to [Report Fraud](#) and when to respond locally. In six of the seven contacts we reviewed that required a local response, the constabulary didn't identify this. This means that evidential opportunities could be lost and suspects might not be apprehended.

Our audit also highlighted that call handlers couldn't provide advice on the preservation of evidence in any of the contacts we reviewed, and it provided [safeguarding](#) and fraud prevention advice in only two of the seven cases. This leaves the public at risk of repeat victimisation.

The constabulary should take steps to improve how it deals with callers reporting fraud incidents.

The constabulary needs the capacity to investigate fraud and provide outcomes for the public

We found that the constabulary's fraud investigation standards weren't effective. None of the six investigations we reviewed followed all investigative opportunities, and overall, we judged these investigations weren't effective. In our audit, we also found that investigators only used the [fraud investigation model](#) in four of ten investigations.

The constabulary has a small, dedicated specialist fraud team that has limited capacity, which means the majority of fraud investigations were being investigated by [officers](#) and [staff](#) with little fraud training. The constabulary had identified this risk and moved a large quantity of these investigations into the specialist team. However, due to capacity, these investigations were unable to be allocated promptly for further investigation.

The constabulary should increase its fraud investigation capacity so that it can provide better outcomes for the public.

Main findings

In this section, we set out our main findings that relate to how good the constabulary is at managing fraud.

The constabulary doesn't have effective accountability for fraud, or a management structure which helps it manage the threat of fraud in its communities

During our inspection, we found that the constabulary had assessed the threat from fraud and understood how this affects its communities. However, it doesn't have a dedicated policy that gives adequate direction for allocating fraud investigations or an effective management structure for safeguarding victims. The constabulary doesn't effectively monitor performance in relation to fraud at a constabulary or department level.

The constabulary doesn't have enough capacity and capability to manage fraud in its communities and provide support to victims

During our inspection, we found that the constabulary didn't have the right capacity or capability to manage fraud. It doesn't use the [4P approach](#) to manage its fraud response or target high-threat fraud types. The constabulary's specialist fraud department doesn't have the capacity to investigate all fraud, and other investigative teams aren't sufficiently trained to do so.

Though the constabulary does work with its communities to protect them from the risk of fraud and it works with multi-agency partners such as local councils, this work is limited due to capacity. The constabulary relies on police community support officers to visit victims of fraud and provide advice. Due to capacity constraints, these visits aren't always made in a timely manner.

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