Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMIC Inspection Report

Northamptonshire Police
Major Crime

July 2008

Contents

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critcal incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;

- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;

- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and

- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.

- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.

- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

The county of Northamptonshire is located in the south of the East Midlands region and covers an area of 914 square miles. The largest town is Northampton, with other main towns including Brackley, Corby, Daventry, Kettering, Rushden, Towcester and Wellingborough. Northamptonshire's central location affords easy access, with good road and rail links. The M1, M6 and M40 motorways, together with the A1 and A14 trunk roads, pass through or near the county. Good transport links have led to rapid growth in light industry, particularly in warehousing and distribution, retail and financial services. There has also been an expansion of the smaller, high-tech motor-racing industry, particularly in the south of the county around the world-famous Silverstone racetrack, and also in the north where the Rockingham venue attracts motor-racing enthusiasts.

Demographic profile of force area

Northamptonshire has a population of 670,800 (projection for 2008 estimated in 2004). The black and minority ethnic (BME) proportion of Northamptonshire's population is 6.1% (estimated at June 2004) compared with 10.6% for the East Midlands region as a whole, with the highest percentages living in the Northampton and Wellingborough areas. The employment rate for the county is high at 80%, above the national average of 74.3%, and ranging from 91.8% in South Northamptonshire to 71.5% in Corby. The proportion of the population claiming Jobseeker's Allowance averages 2.1% across the county (2004). The cost of housing is above the regional average (£177,317 compared with £163,688), but low compared with the national average of £184,111.

The county is scheduled for a significant increase in population over the next 25 years as a result of the planned housing growth in the South Midlands sub-region, with the population predicted to rise by 47% by 2031 and an additional 167,000 new homes.

Structural description of the force area

There are two basic command units (BCUs) covering the force area; these are called 'areas' locally. A chief superintendent with a high degree of delegated authority heads each BCU, which are coterminous with local authority boundaries. A neighbourhood policing model operates, with 43 safer community teams whose areas are coterminous with ward and parish boundaries.

In April 2008, the force had 1,285 full-time equivalent (FTE) police officers, 164 FTE police community support officers and 1,187 FTE police staff, supported by 180 special constables.

There is a close working relationship with the police authority, through both formal authority and committee meeting structures and a wide range of other linkages such as planning/budget seminars and police authority membership of major project boards.

Strategic direction

The strategic direction of the force was reviewed in early 2008 and is expressed in a re-launched 'Making the Difference' statement:

"Our vision
To deliver the best possible quality of policing services to the people of Northamptonshire.

Our mission
Policing in partnership to:
* identify and respond to the needs of our communities;
* focus local policing through safer community teams;
* reduce and prevent crime, anti-social behaviour and disorder;
* bring offenders to justice;
* improve public safety;
* build public satisfaction and confidence; and
* help our communities to work together.

Our values
We value people who:
* focus on service improvement;
* care about individuals and our communities;
* act with integrity;
* are honest, open and courteous to the public and to each other;
* display creativity, flexibility, initiative and responsiveness;
* demonstrate commitment and take personal responsibility;
* appreciate and encourage the contribution of others; and
* respect diversity and the talents of individuals."

Strategic priorities

The force's annual budget for 2008/09 is £114.8 million, an increase of 4.1% on 2007/08, which is broadly in line with inflation. However, to meet strategic commitments a significant budget reprioritisation process has been undertaken. Strategic priorities as identified in *Policing Northamptonshire* (which incorporates the strategic plan and local policing and performance plan) are as follows.

The force's strategic aims for the next three years are to:
* increase the public's confidence and satisfaction by addressing local problems and priorities to reduce the fear of crime and disorder, maintain public safety, respond to the threat from terrorism and deliver high standards of service to communities, victims and witnesses;

* drive down crime and anti-social behaviour in communities through focused prevention work and bringing more offenders to justice; and

* develop the force and the police authority for the future through:
  – positive engagement with local communities, developing strengthened partnerships and collaboration with other agencies, and visible policing that actively listens to local people and responds to local concerns;
  – vision and strong leadership, developing the organisation and its people, and valuing diversity, innovation, initiative and creativity; and

– influencing the level of funding available for policing and responding to the growth of the county.

Focus for 2008/09

The force's focus for 2008/09 is to:
- increase the public's satisfaction levels by responding to what is important to them and improving the service it provides to communities, victims and witnesses;
- increase the public's confidence by working to identify and tackle the local issues of crime and anti-social behaviour in neighbourhoods that matter to the public;
- reduce the threat to the public of serious harm by improved management of dangerous offenders, enhanced services for vulnerable people, and seeking actively to prevent major and organised crime, homicide and terrorism; and
- further reduce crime and anti-social behaviour in communities through prevention and detection, with an emphasis on neighbourhoods with particular crime and anti-social behaviour problems and through identifying and tackling emerging issues.

Force developments

Crime in Northamptonshire has gone down for the last four years in succession, with crime volumes for 2007/08 being 19% lower than in 2003/04. The rate of crime reduction in Northamptonshire has outperformed that of the most similar forces (MSF) group. Specific types of crime have also seen significant reductions: vehicle crime is at its lowest rate in 23 years – 37% less than 4 years ago; dwelling burglary is at its lowest in 19 years – 30% less than 4 years ago; criminal damage is 14% less than 4 years ago; and robbery is 28% less than 4 years ago.

During 2007/08 there was a large fall in offences of anti-social behaviour – falling by 21%, or 16,496 fewer incidents. The introduction of safer community teams, which have now been in place for at least a year, has no doubt had a significant impact on this problem.

The effect of the improved performance of the force is now starting to show in increased levels of confidence and satisfaction. Public confidence in Northamptonshire Police has increased according to the British Crime Survey. Keeping victims of crime updated with progress was an area where the force was not performing so well, but changes in the force communications centre and an improving focus on customers are showing results, and satisfaction with the follow-up service provided has increased during the last year. Public satisfaction with ease of contacting the police remains high, as is satisfaction with how the public are treated by staff. The force was graded Excellent when compared with other forces for levels of satisfaction with actions taken by the police.

The latest staff opinion survey carried out in 2007 shows positive trends, with staff opinions largely improved on the previous 2005 survey. Sickness levels are low, and officer sickness is the eighth lowest in England and Wales.

The force has benefited from a chief officer team unchanged since 2004, which has been able to provide stability while leading the force through a period of change.

Key initiatives

Business engineering review team
The force has established a dedicated business engineering review team (BERT), whose work has been recognised as good practice by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and which during 2007/08 has focused on protective services capability. The creation of the protective services command in April 2008 increased resilience to tackle serious and organised crime, homicide, public protection and strategic roads policing, and the ongoing development of this command is a key focus over the next three years. This new approach brings together for the first time the force's specialist resources dedicated to public protection and enhances the structures and resourcing of elements of this work. This includes an emphasis on improving communication and joint working with partner agencies.

Workforce modernisation
Core to the BERT work has been analysis of existing departments and processes, to identify opportunities to change traditional structures and to improve efficiency and performance, as well as financial savings. The force has for some years had a high percentage of police staff, and has thus been leading in the drive for workforce modernisation. This has resulted in a net reduction of 56 police officer posts and a net increase of 109 police staff posts. During 2008/09 the BERT will continue in order to implement far-reaching workforce modernisation in the crime and prisoner investigation units.

Collaboration and partnerships
The force is involved in many cases of innovative partnership activity, for example in relation to the Milton Keynes and South Midlands expansion, and it leads a tri-force project (with Thames Valley and Bedfordshire police forces and authorities) to ensure that crime and disorder issues are an integral part of the regional growth programme. It works closely with developers and the development agencies to ensure that the required policing infrastructure is put in place and to positively influence future funding.

The force is committed to working with partner authorities in the county to shape and deliver the local area agreement (LAA) agenda, and has been a significant contributor in the development of the new LAA2 and in practical delivery through a partnership board.

Senior staff have been seconded to a variety of East Midlands collaboration roles over the last two years as part of the regional collaboration team. The Chief Constable now chairs the regional collaboration board, and examples of collaborative work streams include demand management, transport, policy development and the East Midlands special operations unit.

Good practice
There are a variety of areas of good practice in which Northamptonshire Police is well placed nationally, for example the force's forensic science service leads the field in researching and pioneering techniques for improving the effectiveness of DNA evidence in detecting crime. The force performs well on citizen focus and has been ahead in the introduction of online crime recording and victim services. A pioneering Foundation Degree in policing has been introduced, in partnership with the University of Northampton.

Efficiency planning
Northamptonshire Police has exceeded its efficiency plan targets for the last three years, and in order to achieve its efficiency target during 2008/09 the force will focus on:
  • reducing the opportunities for crime by working with local planners on the design of new developments in the county;

- collaborating with the other forces in the East Midlands region to reduce costs and improve services to the public;
- using technology to improve the efficiency of the force's intelligence, information and administrative systems and their related costs;
- working with local partners to make best use of resources and facilities while providing ready access to services for the public; and
- using risk management techniques, performance management processes and demand-led resource allocation to ensure the highest possible level of output from the resources available.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard

Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Northamptonshire Police's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the force's response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.661	0.620	-6.20%	0.324
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.077	0.092	+19.48%	0.082
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	120.00%	83.33%	-36.67pp*	91.08%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.338	0.184	-45.56%	0.156
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	4.55%	8.33%	+3.78pp*	38.76%
Number of kidnapping crimes per 10,000 population	0.353	0.276	-21.81%	0.265
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	39.13%	44.44%	+5.31pp*	52.61%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.031	0.000	-100.00%	0.015

% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.169	0.153	-9.47%	0.103
% of murders detected/convicted	100.00%	80.00%	-20pp*	99.69%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	2.547	2.378	-6.64%	2.321
% of rapes detected/convicted	21.08%	21.94%	+0.86pp*	22.02%

'pp' is percentage points.

**Most Similar Family (MSF) for Northamptonshire is Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Staffordshire and Warwickshire.*

From the SPI data contained in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of life threatening and gun crime and murder pose a threat to Northamptonshire Police. The rates of offences (per 1,000 population for life threatening and gun crime and per 10,000 population for murder) are above the MSF average and amongst the worst in England and Wales despite improvements being shown in 2007 in both cases.

The SPI data also indicates that Major Crime investigation in Northamptonshire Police is less effective than the rest of the MSF group. Northamptonshire is performing at a level below the MSF average for all crime types considered under Major Crime. It should be noted that the sanction detection rates for attempted murder and murder fell significantly in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT) published in September 2007 indicated that Northamptonshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to Homicide, Rape and Kidnapping offences and as such no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Northamptonshire Police has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 24 OCGs impact the force area, across seven major crime types.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified organised crime and public protection as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on organised crime networks and public protection and violence, specifically sex and dangerous offenders, domestic violence trends, child

protection identification of risk and vulnerability, and the carrying and availability of firearms.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with other East Midlands regional police forces, the East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the UK Border Agency and the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force has a total of 20.5 crime analytical posts. The force intelligence bureau (FIB) has four level 2 analysts dedicated to supporting major crime investigations and the work of the organised crime unit (OCU). An additional level 2 analyst is being recruited (in post on 3 March 2008) to enhance resilience. A senior analyst attends all major crime investigation 72-hour reviews – or earlier in the process if requested by the senior investigating officer (SIO) – to assist the SIO in determining what level of analytical support and products are required. Support for the major crime investigation team (MCIT) – which investigates all homicides, stranger rapes and series or linked serious offences – is prioritised, ensuring that all its identified demands are effectively met, including cell-site analysis, network analysis and CCTV mapping.

- In support of major crime investigation, FIB analysts provide a number of more proactive intelligence products, utilising prevention, intelligence and enforcement activities and a variety of open-source intelligence scanning. Examples include elements of the FSA and major crime problem profiles such as the guns and gangs profile and an analytical overview of public protection linked to homicide. Some trend and pattern analysis is included in these products, for example the identification in the public protection overview of domestic abuse as a factor in a number of homicides. Activity informed by these intelligence products includes disruption targeting of a number of street gangs and (from the trend analysis around public protection) the decision to increase resources for the new centralised public protection unit.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force's community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- Effective working relationships with partners and agencies ensure that SIOs are able to use and share intelligence relating to major crime as appropriate. Tried and tested intelligence sharing takes place with regional forces through the EMSOU, with government agencies such as the SOCA and through the East Midlands government agency intelligence network (GAIN). More recently the force has entered into a partnership with the UK Border Agency, operating a joint intelligence unit to tackle human trafficking more effectively.

- Intelligence on domestic abuse-related homicides and serious assaults has been shared with partnerships, such as the Northamptonshire domestic abuse forum; work with private sector partners includes a joint police/BSIA intelligence unit to combat cash-in-transit robberies.

- The force engages with minority/more diverse communities to gather and share intelligence through its standing independent advisory group (IAG). For instance, in the last three years members of the IAG have helped SIOs to obtain intelligence from within the black and Asian communities while investigating two homicides.

.

- In addition to National Intelligence Model (NIM) problem profiles, target profiles are also used to help understand drivers of homicide (15 were produced during 2007). When preparing NIM intelligence products, analysts use beat profiles, available from the well-established multi-agency community profiling and problem-solving (ComPaSS) database.

- A community impact assessment is completed for all critical incidents and major crimes where an SIO is appointed. This is a robust process initiated by the BCU management and passed through to the daily force briefing for the chief officer group (COG) and part of the weekly generic risk assessment impact document forwarded to the national community tensions team (NCTT). The head of the crime and community department and the director of investigations participate fully in this process.

Work in progress

- The force has access to the faith, language and culture database. In support of a recommendation from the November 2007 FSA to promote the availability of this database, an awareness campaign is ongoing.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles are satisfactory, with links to force and BCU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- Major crime type offences are consistently identified in the November 2007 FSA, specifically in the 'harm reduction protective services' and 'protecting vulnerable people' sections. These sections include trend information and operational activity relating to major crime offences, including homicide. The head of the crime and community department and the director of investigations were fully involved in the critical reading of the FSA and drafting of recommendations before sign-off by the COG.

- Clear links exist between the FSA and the force intelligence requirement and to both the force and BCU control strategies and action plans. Analytical work from the FSA was used to inform the public protection and homicide analytical overview.

- The FSA articulates the force understanding of the threat posed by other life-threatening and serious issues, including dangerous persons, human trafficking, money laundering and jury intimidation.

- The force has contributed to the national Operation Pentameter (the objective of which is to rescue victims of human trafficking from sexual exploitation and prosecute those organising this crime) during 2007.

- Open- and closed-source information is accessible through a variety of sources, including a standalone covert source computer within the FIB, using the prison intelligence network, ComPaSS and enhanced internet access.

- The guns and gangs problem profile (2006) has a prevention strand which includes the identification of low-level street gangs as a precursor to more serious crime offending by such gangs, working with schools on the dangers of firearms and educating the public about securing shotguns against theft.

- Some references are made to precursors in a rape stocktake, completed in December 2007, although primarily this work was to check that investigation standards accorded with practice.

- In December 2007, a problem profile on protecting vulnerable people was produced; analysis of future demands in relation to the management of sex offender and violent offender orders supported a bid for increased multi-agency public protection arrangement (MAPPA) resources, and helped to inform the decision to move to a new centralised public protection unit within the protective services department. Problem profile work on precursor, low-level sexual offences that could lead to more serious offences has already been completed and assists the dangerous persons management unit in proactively targeting offenders.

- The separation, pregnancy, escalation, cultural, sexual assault, stalking (SPECSS) risk assessment model is now fully integrated in the force's operational response to domestic abuse.

Work in progress

- The COG has recently ratified a strategic-level homicide prevention strategy. From 1 March 2008, progress against this strategy will be monitored through a quarterly meeting of a homicide prevention action group. The strategy recognises the need to involve multi-agency partners in the work of this group, to assist in identification of precursors and preventative activity.

Areas for improvement

- The development of the FSA in line with ACPO guidance on the NIM has improved significantly in the last 12 months, for instance the dangerous persons management unit now monitors precursor offences through a business objects search on all incidents with a view to reflecting this is in the FSA. However, the full range of precursor offences for major crime type offences are not routinely identified and considered within the 2007 FSA and force control strategy.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being/ shared with partners and BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for hot briefing whenever a significant change in either the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full management of police information (MoPI) compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- Intelligence, including analysis and profiles, is routinely shared with partners in the prevention and investigation of major crime. Examples include Grapevine (a joint police/Royal Mail intelligence unit), the MAPPA and the multi-agency risk assessment conference for domestic abuse. A Northamptonshire GAIN is currently being developed in line with the regional structure.

- A good 'hot tasking' process is in place that allows the force to mobilise its specialist assets in response to a sudden development or increased threat or risk emerging. This process is led and co-ordinated by the head of the crime and community department or the director of investigations. The force provided evidence of its capability to respond, exemplified by a referral from the SOCA.

- The force has responded effectively to intelligence from partners that demanded a fast-time response, including hot briefing. For instance, intelligence from both the EMSOU and the SOCA about OCGs led to disruption and interception activity involving BCU and specialist staff at very short notice.

- SIOs and analysts use, as appropriate, national intelligence and best practice resources such as the serious crime analysis system GENESIS, the National Centre for Policing Excellence (now part of the NPIA) and the Metropolitan Police Service community and cultural resources unit.

- A MoPI action plan is in place, managed by the head of the information unit, who reports to the force-level MoPI project board, with the assistant chief constable (ACC) (support) as strategic lead. Good progress against the action plan is being made and the force is on track to be MoPI compliant by 2010.

Work in progress

- The force is evaluating its information-sharing agreements to ensure that they are in line with the ACPO guidance on MoPI. At the time of inspection, five had been completed.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is clearly understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- The 2007 FSA identifies, and in some cases profiles, vulnerable communities, with a view to understanding how major crime currently impacts on them, and to assess future risk and threat. Examples include street gangs and traveller communities throughout the county. The number of street robberies committed by a small number of street gangs has been profiled and resources tasked through the level 2 tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) meeting to disrupt them. An increase during 2007 of unauthorised traveller encampments has been profiled and resources tasked at levels 1 and 2 to deal with both the travellers' accommodation needs and their links to distraction burglaries as well as a 'no body' homicide enquiry (Operation Beguile). There is also a limited reference to emerging communities.

- Detailed demographic profiles at BCU level are available through the multi-agency ComPaSS database, completed and updated by safer community teams and county and borough council resources. Information from ComPaSS has been used in compiling the FSA. Additional intelligence around vulnerable communities has also been made available from BCU-level drugs mapping work and used in several level 2 operations.

- Evidence was presented of fast and robust multi-agency action plans being developed and acted on through the MAPPA process when potentially dangerous persons have been referred to the MAPPA by the force.

Work in progress

- Work under the local area agreement, including a review of the partnership strategic assessment process, is already under way to identify further opportunities to align resources and develop a shared view about crime challenges for a specific area.

Areas for improvement

- The FSA has recommended that the force, in conjunction with county-wide partners, develops a better understanding of the profile of the county's communities, specifically emerging communities. A further recommendation articulates the force's commitment to provide a strategic lead for this work. Both recommendations will be progressed by the head of the force's new protective services department from April 2008 (a restructuring and merging of the existing crime and community department and the operational support department, enhanced by growth in posts in critical areas – including major crime investigation). When progressing this, the force should reassure itself that some of this work is not already being conducted in BCUs at level 1, but not being disseminated or identified to the FIB.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every month by the ACC Support, who oversees the force risk board. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The force has a robust structure and process which governs all corporate risks. The programme management board, chaired by the ACC (support), meets monthly and reviews the risks in relation to all ongoing projects being undertaken by the six main process groups. Any risks deemed to be corporate are entered on the corporate risk register, which at the time of inspection had 24. Every six months the risk register is reviewed by the COG.

- The crime and community department risk register identifies a range of strategic-level risks around major crime and serious and organised crime, together with action plans, including timescales and owners, to manage them. The head of the department reviews the risks as part of the monthly management meeting. During the second half of 2007, the identification of risks was significantly enhanced and updated by applying a comprehensive regional risk assessment process for protective services to the force. The microanalysis model used is a nine-part process, starting with defining the constituent elements of each protective service and carrying out a detailed audit of resources, through to conducting a threat assessment, then comparing threat against assets, and finally establishing a gap-bridging option and assessing whether that option reduces the gap and thus the risk.

- Following the review of protective services, a numerical scoring matrix has been used to identify the greatest risks for the force. A business case to address those risks (scores of 4 and above) was finalised during the latter part of 2007 and ratified by the COG in January 2008. In effect, the existing crime and community and operational support departments will merge to realign resources, together with significant new investment, creating a new protective services command from 1 April 2008. Realignment and recruitment of new posts will then continue over the next 12 months, managed through the BERT and following a robust implementation plan. Much of the change is focusing on increasing the number of resources in the MCIT, cold case review team and witness protection team and tackling OCG activity in the supply of Class A drugs.

- Although the crime and community department's risk register does not identify any intelligence risks for the force, the force intelligence requirement for 2007/08, in line with the FSA, has identified major crime areas where further development of intelligence is required to direct preventative and enforcement activity.

Work in progress

- As a result of the review of protective services using the regionally developed risk assessment model, the force strategic risk register has not been the main priority for the force. In January 2008, the management and review of the register passed to the head of the operational support department, who has initiated a process to ensure that it covers all appropriate strategic-level risks. The force should ensure that the risks and threats are addressed with action plans to control, reduce and mitigate them. This work is planned for completion by 31 March 2008.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- The force intelligence system (FIS) is interoperable with other key force systems, specifically command and control, crime recording, and the National Strategy for Police Information Systems custody and missing persons database. Although the FIS is not a search engine, 'flags' appear, with a relevant summary of information, where intelligence is replicated on another main intelligence system or a more specific database such as the Violent and Sex Offenders Register or the child protection unit database.

- The director of investigations has established a robust manual system to exchange intelligence between the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) and the FIS, during and after investigations. Intelligence from HOLMES to the FIS is completed through intelligence logs and forwarded to the relevant BCU intelligence unit for assessment by the supervisor. Input to the FIS is completed, normally within 24 hours, by a team of inputters who are part of the unit. There is evidence that an informal dip-sampling regime is carried out by the unit supervisor.

- Although intelligence regarding some specialist operations (test purchase and undercover) is shared by all forces in the region through the EMSOU, the force is also a partner in the ongoing regional GENIE (search engine) collaboration project – led by Leicestershire and Lincolnshire forces – which will enable forces to identify and share intelligence across their respective FISs. The force also has access to the West Midlands Police FLINT data warehouse and the prison intelligence network, through the FIB.

- Partner agencies support the force in intelligence collection, specifically statutory multi-agency partners in the MAPPA, crime and disorder reduction partnerships and recently the UK Border Agency.

- The force is the regional lead for project Insight (managed by the NPIA), which will enable the retrieval and analysis of intelligence from the automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) system on a regional basis. The project manager is now in post and the director of intelligence sits on the project board. It is envisaged that the infrastructure will be in place by mid 2008; the transfer and analysis of data will commence with Leicestershire Constabulary.

- The head of the information unit retains a record of progress against the relevant recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry. In relation to the Police National Computer data compliance targets and data standards, no significant compliance issues have been identified. The standards relating to the Criminal Records Bureau have been addressed by introducing the quality assurance framework in 2006, and positive feedback was provided to the force following a visit from the standards and compliance unit (part of the Criminal Records Bureau) in 2007.

Work in progress

- The force is working towards compliance with the ACPO guidance on MoPI, including the management of information on 'golden nominals' (a single person record with a unique reference number for use by all systems), an audit trail of changes, and MoPI standard training.

Areas for improvement

- Although 10% of all nominal records on a HOLMES-managed investigation are manually checked against FIS records through an informal process, the force needs to reassure itself that regular and consistent auditing of HOLMES intelligence entered on the FIS takes place, so that all relevant intelligence is available through the FIS. It may benefit the force to incorporate the auditing process in a formal policy, setting out the rigour and frequency of audits.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- The latest investigative and review procedure for homicide and major crime was put in place in April 2007. The procedure is comprehensive and in accordance with national guidelines. It directs reviews of current cases to be carried out after 72 hours and 28 days and/or at the request of the director of investigations or SIO. It also directs the use of a wide range of force expertise to assist in the progress reviews to maximise investigative opportunities, and evidence shows that this happens in practice. The director of investigations leads the 72-hour review. The policy also covers historic cases of murder, stranger rape and other serious undetected crimes.

- One of the MCIT SIOs is the force lead review officer and manages the cold case review team. This SIO attends the regional review working group and ensures that any good practice from this forum, together with lessons learnt from both cold case reviews and current case reviews, is passed to the weekly SIOs meeting, chaired by the director of investigations. In addition, each cold case review report and any recommendations are posted on the force intranet, accessible to SIOs.

- In recent years, only one 28-day review has been required (Operation Beguile in June 2007) and this was carried out at the force's request by an independent force (Derbyshire Constabulary). It concluded that the investigation had been carried out in accordance with national guidelines and made recommendations, duly implemented by the force. Evidence exists that lessons learnt from such reviews are acted on for future investigations, for example the force now ensures that more use is made of the IMPACT nominal index and non-police agencies in 'proof of life' checks.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals an sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The deputy chief constable (DCC) chairs the force-level TTCG, which commissions and receives problem and target profiles as required. The meeting identifies investigative opportunities at levels 1 and 2 and outlines current developments on each major crime investigation – for example, appointing an MCIT SIO and analytical resources in relation to a series of stranger rape offences (Operation Harbour). In addition, the crime and community department tasks major crime and serious and organised crime resources through its own NIM-based overt and covert tasking meetings.

- In February 2007, the force conducted a review of its level 2 strategic assessment process. A total of 17 recommendations were made to improve the process – for example, identifying which key members of staff should be engaged in the process at different stages and identifying critical readers and membership of the critical review meeting. The force routinely invites 20 partners to the strategic tasking and co-ordination group meeting, with 8 partners such as the drug and alcohol action team being regular attendees.

- The inspection team attended a force (level 2) TTCG meeting; it was chaired by the ACC (territorial policing), in the absence of the DCC, and attended by all relevant senior managers and key staff. A level 2 tactical assessment provided the direction for the meeting encompassing the management of all existing, and emerging, major crime and serious and organised crime operations and threats. The chair carried out intrusive questioning of resource deployment, outcomes and options. Where appropriate, force resources were tasked to support existing level 2 investigations and several level 1 operation applications, in line with priorities identified by the FSA. The level 2 TTCG meeting that tasks covert resources was held immediately before, chaired by the ACC (territorial policing).

- Some trend and pattern analysis is included in NIM products – for instance, the identification in the public protection overview of domestic abuse as a factor in a number of homicides. Trend analysis from this overview was also used to inform the decision to increase resources for the new centralised public protection unit. The FSA 2007 outlines current and predicted demand in several categories of major crime, such as street robberies connected with street gangs.

Work in progress
- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- All major crime and serious and organised crime staff have received the force's three-phase diversity training over the last two to five years. Records of who has attended and when are maintained by the training department to ensure that all staff attend. In addition, examples have been provided where bespoke awareness inputs on diversity issues have been provided to major crime investigation staff in relation to specific investigations. For instance, while investigating a death in police custody on behalf of West Midlands Police in 2005, staff received training on cultural issues specific to the victim and relatives. Another example involved additional training in respect of the Muslim community in connection with Operation Goldcrest (where a gold group was set up to respond to the Glasgow airport terrorist attack).

- Investigative staff displayed a good knowledge of the ComPaSS database and its list of key individual networks, and there is evidence of the effective use of IAG members to provide a perspective on community issues relevant to specific homicide investigations.

- All SIOs in-force are undertaking the professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 accreditation which includes a diversity element.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an IAG and key individuals this is frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- A standing force IAG has been in place for the last three to four years, currently consisting of 32 members meeting bi-monthly and supported financially and with other resources by both the force and the police authority. The IAG has a chair and vice-chair and the county council's children's services is a member. A wide range of well-established communities is represented, including Muslim, Somali, Asian, Polish and travellers. All community impact assessments relating to major crime investigations consider whether to establish an IAG to assist with the investigation. IAG members have acted as advisers in several homicides over the last few years and co-ordinated contacts with other key individual networks (for example, in relation to a homophobic homicide in 2006). Another example, in 2007, involved a mixed race homicide investigation where a gold group was established and included IAG members.

- IAG members also advise on operational activity in non-homicide major crime investigations, for example Operation Goldcrest and a series of rapes in 2007 where DNA screening in the black community took place.

- Six members of the IAG have been trained by the force in community impact assessment, with six more to be trained in 2008, so that force policies can be independently assessed for possible impact on a community or communities. The force has benefited from such review, including a policy regarding travellers, where perceptions and terminology amendments were made following advice; and in respect of the force's stop and search policy, where the IAG helped design the forms.

- In addition to the examples of partnership working already provided, during homicide investigations SIOs have also accessed information and support through the force IAG members from the Northampton lesbian, gay and bisexual association and the Bangladeshi association.

Work in progress

- IAG members, with active support from the force and the police authority, are widening community representation to include other emerging Eastern European migrant worker groups, following the recent inclusion of a representative from the Polish community.

- The chair and vice-chair of the IAG have outlined plans to develop a counter-terrorism core group within the IAG during 2008, with appropriately vetted members.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were fully understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- Currently, the MCIT, led by the director of investigations (a detective superintendent and trained SIO), comprises three SIOs (detective chief inspectors), three deputy SIOs and four detective constables responsible for exhibits and disclosures. The OCU (with two detective sergeants, eight detective constables, one detective support officer and administration support) provides dedicated and trained staff for homicide investigations in the first 72 hours and beyond if required, through a service level agreement. Additional staff are requested from BCUs as and when required. At the time of inspection, two BCU staff were committed to the two live homicide enquiries. The force had investigated ten homicides between April and December 2007, a trend in line with the number of homicides for the same period in the previous three to four years.

- Formalised, tried and tested call-out procedures for duty senior detective managers and a duty SIO are in place, operated through the call management centre. Call-out for additional specialist assets is then through the duty senior detective officer. While the majority of specialist staff are not currently on paid call-out rotas, all units operate informal call-out arrangements so that staff are contactable 24/7; there is no evidence to show that these arrangements have resulted in a lack of availability of specialist staff in the initial stages of major crime investigations.

- The ACC (support) is the business continuity lead for the force, working through a business risk manager in the operational support department. A force business continuity plan outlines the critical functions to be maintained through any contingency, one of which is major crime and critical incidents. Accordingly, the major crime and serious and organised crime units have business continuity plans, in line with the force template, to deal with escalation and loss of infrastructure. The facilities manager and the head of the crime and community department's staff officer are the designated business continuity contacts within the crime and community department and both have received appropriate training. Plans outline alternative infrastructure if current major crime facilities and equipment are lost, and identify where additional trained staff can be drawn from, including regional and neighbouring forces. Business continuity plans are also in place for interdependent departments such as the call management centre and forensic investigation.

- Although there are no formal mutual aid agreements, successful mutual aid deployments of staff from East Midlands regional forces to deal with extraordinary demand was tested during 2007, when the force supplied HOLMES and MIRWEB staff to assist Leicestershire Constabulary in the Madeleine McCann enquiry. Specialist functions, such as test purchase and undercover operations, are provided through the EMSOU and therefore the region's forces can direct many resources into one or several forces for specific resource-intensive operations. The force has called on the SOCA for specialist resources in tackling kidnap and extortion enquiries.

- Call management centre staff – specifically, call-takers, dispatchers and supervisors – were aware of the 'golden hour'. Electronic drop-down (and manual) call scripts and action plans are available to these staff to assist their response to a wide range of major crimes and critical incidents, including firearms incidents, distraction burglary, robbery, kidnap, rapes and the death of a child under 18. Staff have access to all the main FISs. The department has its own training resource, and 'golden hour' principles are part of the training for all call management staff to meet core competencies. The head of call management, one of the two chief inspectors, and all six inspectors are trained to either critical incident command level 1 or 2. It was consistently reported during the inspection that call management staff provided first responders with appropriate information before their arrival at critical incident scenes.

Work in progress

- Together with all the force's departments, the major crime and serious and organised crime units are updating their existing business continuity plans to comply more fully with the BS 25999 standard – in effect, providing more detail within the plan. This work, together with testing of the plans, will take place during 2008.

Areas for improvement

- At present, none of the business continuity plans for the major crime and serious and organised crime units cater sufficiently for mass staff absence, as may occur in the case of industrial action by police staff or an influenza pandemic. The force would benefit from including this when upgrading the business continuity plans. HMIC does acknowledge, however, the successful test of business continuity that took place for real recently, when illness reduced the staffing in the Police National Computer bureau to critical levels for several days.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- The guns and gangs problem profile (2006) has a prevention strand which includes the identification of low-level street gangs as a precursor to more serious crime offending by such gangs, working with schools on the dangers of firearms and educating the public about securing shotguns against theft.

- Some references are made to precursors in a rape stocktake, completed in December 2007, although primarily this work was to check that investigation standards accorded with practice.

- In December 2007, a problem profile on protecting vulnerable people was produced; analysis of future demands in relation to the management of sex offender and violent offender orders supported a bid for increased MAPPA resources, and helped to inform the decision to move to a new centralised public protection unit within the protective services department. Problem profile work on precursor, low-level sexual offences that could lead to more serious offences has already been completed and assists the dangerous persons management unit in proactively targeting offenders.

- The SPECSS risk assessment model is now fully integrated in the force's operational response to domestic abuse.

- Both BCUs' daily tasking meetings conducted by the senior management team review all incidents and policing activity in the previous 24 hours, to identify precursor offences and task prevention intelligence and enforcement activity as appropriate.

Work in progress

- The COG has recently ratified a strategic-level homicide prevention strategy. From 1 March 2008, progress against this strategy will be monitored through a quarterly meeting of a homicide prevention action group. The strategy recognises the need to involve multi-agency partners in the work of this group, to assist in identification of precursors and preventative activity.

Areas for improvement

- While acknowledging the work being undertaken by the dangerous persons management unit in relation to precursor offences, key intelligence products – such as the FSA and problem profiles – need to include more consistently an analysis of threats from precursors for major crime offending. This will inform preventative activity more effectively, specifically for identified vulnerable groups.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint/regional/cross-border/multi-agency operations are abundant.

Strengths

- A threat-to-life policy put in place in 2007 was widely understood by operational and specialist investigative staff. It was reported that the policy was user friendly, including reference to an easy-to-use risk assessment process flowchart. An example was given of a person convicted of homicide who was due to be released and who generated concerns about risks to family members of the victim. The subsequent risk assessment designated the family members as being at low risk; nonetheless, a number of control measures were implemented to protect them. Another example concerned a response officer who issued 'Osman' warnings to a drug dealer who had already suffered a serious assault.

- Force policy states that an officer of superintendent rank is the authorising officer for Osman warnings. Out of hours, the on-call senior detective officer is the point of contact to seek approval. In both situations, any link to witness protection will be identified. As a further safeguard, witness protection staff have had comprehensive 'legends' developed in order to ensure that their police identity is not discovered.

- Osman warnings are searchable on VANTAGE, the force command and control system, which can also identify locations of individuals in receipt of warnings, allowing force communication centre staff to alert officers attending those addresses.

- Osman warnings are used by the force in a variety of preventative situations, including homicide enquiries, as directed in the threat-to-life policy. In the ten months prior to inspection, approximately 100 Osman warnings had been entered on the FIS. All Osman warnings, together with a summary of key details, are entered on a specific part of the FIS, with a flag attached to the nominal record so that staff can access the information 24/7. The OCU also holds a separate Osman database for those individuals involved with covert investigations. The head of the FIB audits an average of ten Osman entries a month.

- The force is actively involved in regional cross-border operations to disrupt major crime. For example, Operation Graceland was a cross-border investigation into cash-in-transit robberies, led by Greater Manchester Police and involving five other forces from outside the East Midlands region. Three offenders were arrested and are awaiting trial. Operation Nuzzle was a regional and cross-border investigation into armed robberies which the force investigated together with five other forces. This resulted in five successful prosecutions and the recovery of firearms.

Work in progress

- Part of the intelligence requirement for 2008, following identification in the 2007 FSA, is to develop the intelligence picture around the availability and supply of firearms. This work is being led by FIB level 2 analysts and aims to improve the use of intelligence from firearms licensing and prison intelligence.

- All Osman warnings are accurately recorded on the FIS, enabling it to identify precisely how many warnings have been issued, to whom and when. The force may need to consider developing a search code facility on the FIS to achieve this.

Areas for improvement

- The crime in action capability assessment and action plan is a comprehensive document which, when complete, will position the force well to respond to kidnap and extortion incidents. However, the force needs to build in resilience in terms of SIOs, some of whom will have retired or left the force by the end of 2008. All actions in the plan have target dates for completion by April 2008.

- Risk assessment is conducted by field intelligence officers based in BCUs who are not 24/7, although they can be recalled to duty and it is acknowledged that the frequency of call-out is low. However, the force needs sufficient trained staff to provide 24/7 resilience in conducting risk assessment out of hours.

- Historically, the force has experienced a low incidence of firearms incidents associated with major crime, and no firearms suppression strategy exists. While acknowledging the challenge of analysing small numbers of firearms-related crime to establish any patterns or links to OCGs, there may be benefit in reviewing any such strategies from neighbouring forces to assess the potential value as an addition to the existing preventative work on major crime.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- Although there are no dedicated witness protection resources or full-time unit in place, there are sufficient trained officers within the MCIT. A detective sergeant, manages witness protection, together with a deputy SIO in the MCIT – who is the force lead for witness protection – as the demand arises. In the last two years there have been a low number of referrals.

- A witness protection policy, in line with the ACPO policy, is in place, accessible on the force intranet, and widely understood at both force and BCU levels. The policy outlines a robust referral process and uses the threat-to-life risk assessment process as part of the referral process, prior to any decision about acceptance onto the scheme or alternative management plan. The acceptance criteria focus on risk and threat to the individual, and are discussed at a case meeting involving witness protection staff and the director of investigations, with the ultimate decision resting with the DCC. If a referral does not meet the acceptance criteria, other action will be taken to address real and immediate risk to individuals, in line with the Van Colle judgement – for example, placing a victim in alternative accommodation for a short time.

- The witness protection lead attends the East Midlands regional witness protection meeting and liaises with the central witness bureau and national witness mobility scheme.

- The East Midlands region secured Home Office funding as a demonstrator site for collaborative work on witness protection arrangements. This seeks to determine the most effective options for addressing current and future demands in what has been identified as a high-risk area of business for the five regional forces.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- At present, no succession plan exists to replace the trained witness protection staff, although at least one of the two officers is due to leave the MCIT shortly for a BCU posting. While acknowledging that the existing national training provision finishes shortly, having no succession plan – at least to identify suitably skilled and experienced staff – is a risk, both in terms of continuity and resilience.

Developing practice

- The force is developing the process of recording and managing witness protection referrals and live cases on HOLMES. Practitioners believe this will provide a more effective, auditable record and assist in the handover and

management of cases.

Summary – The force has an adequate system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The crime and community department has developed a dynamic harm indicator process, based on a list of specific harm indicators; this is reviewed monthly at the force tasking and co-ordination group and every six months through the FSA. This assists the force to monitor more effectively the impact of any preventative or enforcement activity. The harm indicators are reviewed daily by the COG and BCU senior managers as part of the existing critical incident briefing process, and this review feeds the weekly NCTT return. The harm indicators also inform the community impact assessment completed for all critical incidents.

- Harm indicators include precursor offences, such as an emerging series of minor offences that may lead to a serious risk of harm, or a drug overdose death that could suggest drug supply contamination. Other indicators include kidnap threat because of a debt following police activity, emerging risks to a community due to a series crime such as cash-in-transit robberies or distraction burglaries, and a number of intelligence-related indicators, especially those relating to human trafficking and firearms.

- Results analysis of some BCU-based crime operations (level 1) takes place. One example (bogus workmen) provided by the force detailed not just the operational outcomes compared with resources used, but also the various ways in which a community had been contacted to assess the impact of the police preventative and enforcement action during the operation.

- The introduction of safer community teams throughout the force and the community profile information (the multi-agency ComPaSS) maintained by the teams provides the force with a useful assessment of its communities. Information includes key individual networks, vulnerable locations and diversity make-up. Specific safer community teams are engaged in prevention and enforcement activity with vulnerable communities, such as the Northampton City safer community team work with partners in relation to sex workers.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- Although results analysis is carried out for some level 1 operations, it is not conducted for major crime investigations. While acknowledging the existing tactical evaluations completed for all operations carried out by the force's OCU, the force should consider using results analysis for all major crime and serious and organised crime operations, to understand better the impact of preventative and enforcement activity on the community.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in use. However not all staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The link between the professional standards department (PSD) and level 2 operational activity is firmly established. A service level agreement between the PSD, the MCIT and the OCU includes a risk assessment process to determine what integrity or anti-corruption activity by the PSD might be required during specific investigations. The head and deputy head of the PSD meet regularly (although not minuted) with both the directors of intelligence and investigations and the head of the OCU. The head of the PSD also sits on the force covert level 2 tasking and co-ordination group meeting.

- The PSD has a comprehensive document that captures integrity standard operating procedures, which references the seven PSD connected policies. Also included in the standard operating procedure is information and direction on a variety of areas of business – for example, level 2 dedicated source unit and service confidence procedures clearly outlining matters to be considered.

- A vetting policy is in place that identifies designated posts and the level to which post holders will be vetted; this process is managed by the information unit. Fundamentally, all staff are security check cleared, the exceptions being those staff in some key sensitive posts who are subject to the higher standard of developed vetting. Good practice is in place to security check all temporary staff and contractors working on police premises or sites.

- The PSD has a dedicated integrity unit managed by the deputy head of the PSD (a detective chief inspector), consisting of one detective constable and one part-time analyst, together with two ex-investigators employed on short-term contracts as required. The unit primarily develops intelligence in line with a corruption and dishonesty prevention strategy, including use of covert sources such as CHISs, and then tasks the whole PSD if a full investigation is required. Both the head and deputy head of the PSD are trained CHIS controllers and there are also two trained CHIS handlers.

- A confidential reporting line is in use and only the head and deputy head of the PSD can access calls made to this line. There is evidence of anti-corruption initiatives taking place; for instance, a recent policy on the misuse of social interaction websites arose from an increase in inappropriate use of such sites in the workplace. In the last two years, ten to twelve integrity investigations (several using force and the SOCA covert resources) have been completed into misuse of intelligence, resulting in a variety of sanctions against staff.

- A portfolio of security policies is in place, with an overarching security policy managed by the head of the information unit (which sits within the PSD). Policies comply with the ACPO policy on information security. The force has provided evidence of a robust approach to the security of intelligence. Physical security of all premises where access can be gained to FISs is controlled by an electronic card entry system that can track users' movements, and additional security measures are installed as part of the risk assessment for level 2 operations. The government protective marking scheme is in operation. Routine checking of key

FISs, such as the force landline and mobile telephone systems, is undertaken and legend building is in place for covert unit staff.

Work in progress

- Currently, the head of the PSD is working on a business continuity plan to deal with any catastrophic leak of intelligence that has the potential to undermine a major or serious crime operation, and thus erode confidence in the force.

Areas for improvement

- A detailed security vetting policy, in line with the ACPO national guidance, is in place for all employees with an appendix outlining which posts are designated as requiring management vetting, security check vetting and developed vetting. However, with the exception of the economic crime unit, no other major crime or serious and organised crime unit is included in the list of designated posts. Consequently, these staff are basic checked only (a procedure to assure identity and reliability as a member of the force, to which all employees are subject). The force needs to review this policy to ensure that all major crime staff are vetted more appropriately at a higher level. The anticipated additional post within the PSD, to be recruited in 2008, will increase the capacity to conduct management vetting checks.

- Although the head of the PSD attends the force-level covert TTCG meeting, he does not attend the overt level 2 tasking and co-ordination group meeting. It would further strengthen the links between the PSD and the operational activity of major crime and serious and organised crime units if the head of the PSD at least received the minutes of this meeting (and preferably attended).

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriateuse made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The police authority performance monitoring committee is responsible for scrutinising the force's major crime and serious and organised crime performance. The chair of the police authority leads this committee, which receives a copy of the crime and community department performance pack and presentations from the head of the crime and community department on specific investigations. The partnership and collaboration committee of the police authority monitors East Midlands forces' collaboration work, specifically around protective services. The DCC, as the COG lead on crime, also provides briefings on level 2 investigations to the chair of the police authority as appropriate.

- The DCC implements gold groups at the earliest opportunity, one example being the investigation into the death of a black male in prison in 2006 (Operation Castle), and another being a homophobic homicide in 2007. At present, members of the police authority do not sit on gold groups, although they receive updates on progress from the DCC.

- A standing force IAG has been in place for the last three to four years, currently consisting of 32 members meeting bi-monthly and supported financially and with other resources by both the force and the police authority. The IAG has a chair and vice-chair. A wide range of well-established communities is represented, including Muslim, Somali, Asian, Polish, travellers and the county council's children's services. All community impact assessments relating to major crime investigations consider whether to establish an IAG to assist with the investigation. IAG members have acted as advisers in several homicides over the last few years and co-ordinated contacts with other key individual networks, for example a homophobic homicide in 2006. Another example, in 2007, involved a mixed race homicide investigation where a gold group was established and IAG members sat on this.

Work in progress

- The chair of the police authority and two other selected members are working with the force to enable the police authority to be represented on any gold groups in the future, and so further strengthen the governance of major crime and serious and organised crime investigation.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The ACPO lead is fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. This officer is supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The DCC was officer-in-overall-charge trained in the management of series and serious crime in 2002. Both ACCs were trained in series and linked crime during 2003 and 2004, and the director of investigations was trained in 2002. One of the ACCs is also serious crime, intelligence, information technology and resources (SCIMITAR) trained.

- Both the critical incident briefing process and the use of community impact assessments is robust. The crime and community department has developed a dynamic harm indicator process, based on a list of specific harm indicators, reviewed monthly at the force tasking and co-ordination group and every six months through the FSA. This assists the force to monitor more effectively the impact of any preventative or enforcement activity. The harm indicators are considered by area as part of the existing critical incident briefing process, reviewed daily by area senior managers and the COG, which in turn feed the weekly NCTT return. The harm indicators also feed into the community impact assessment completed on all critical incidents.

- There is a good range of suitably trained staff to provide support in critical incident command, completing and managing community impact assessments, and policing in partnerships – major crime and serious and organised crime units sit alongside partnership staff in the crime and community department.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The DCC monitors major crime activity through the level 2 TTCG process; issues considered include the number of area staff abstracted to investigations, and the DCC meets with SIOs to discuss investigations and sign policy books as required. The crime and community department's performance indicators are monitored at each force performance meeting, chaired by the Chief Constable or the DCC. A number of these indicators relate to major crime and serious and organised crime, including area abstractions, intelligence outcomes from the levels 1 and 2 dedicated source handling unit activities, OCU operational activity updates, Proceeds of Crime Act target updates and technical support unit (TSU) activity. In addition, all MCIT managers complete monthly activity-based costing returns.

- At the time of inspection, senior managers reported that the budget for major crime investigations was sufficient.

- The director of investigations holds a weekly meeting for all SIOs in the MCIT, at which every ongoing investigation is discussed in terms of costs, number of resources required and lessons to be learnt from both live and cold case investigations. All homicide investigations are subject to a comprehensive 72-hour review, chaired by the head of the crime and community department or the director of investigations, including current and future costs and resource needs. Part of this is managing the forensic costs through a policy that provides SIOs with an initial £25,000 budget, up to £50,000 following review from another SIO, and then spend above this only after consultation with the director of investigations. The inspection found that MCIT senior managers were aware of costs for individual homicide investigations.

- In recent years, only one 28-day review has been required (Operation Beguile in February 2007) and this was carried out at the force's request by an independent force – Derbyshire Constabulary. It concluded that the investigation had been carried out in accordance with national guidelines, but did make some recommendations which were duly carried out by the force.

- All OCU operations are subject to a tactical evaluation signed off by the DCC before the operation is closed. The evaluation focuses on the level of resources deployed and success of the tactics used.

Work in progress
- None identified.

Areas for improvement
- None identified.

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in-force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- Currently, the MCIT, led by the director of investigations (a detective superintendent and trained SIO), has sufficient dedicated staff to deal with current and predicted demand for major crime investigation. The OCU provides dedicated and trained staff for homicide investigations in the first 72 hours and beyond if required, through a service level agreement. Additional staff are requested from BCUs as and when required. At the time of inspection, two BCU staff were committed to the two live homicide enquiries. The force had investigated ten homicides between April and December 2007, a trend in line with the number of homicides for the same period in the previous three to four years.

- A dedicated HOLMES team (a manager, three supervisors, eight indexers and clerical support) provides all the force HOLMES staffing requirements. Varying levels of indexing are used, depending on the nature of the enquiry, including minimal indexing. There are HOLMES suites in the five major incident rooms (MIRs). Collaborative arrangements to respond to extraordinary demand have recently been successfully tested by Leicestershire Constabulary during the Madeleine McCann enquiry.

- A comprehensive range of major crime training is provided in-force by a dedicated crime training team (one sergeant who is PIP assessor trained and three detective constables). Training includes the Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme, exhibits and disclosure and PIP levels 2 and 3. At the time of inspection, there were 17 tier 5 trained interview co-ordinators in-force, sufficient for predictable demands. HOLMES training is also provided in-force through the HOLMES team. The crime training team is fully participating in very advanced collaboration arrangements to deliver the more specialised major crime and organised crime training courses on a formalised regional basis. Currently, plans are on track to start this from April 2008.

- The force has five dedicated MIRs on four sites which are spread geographically around the county. All MIRs have sufficient and appropriate equipment and facilities.

- Casualty bureau call-taking facilities are available in-force, operating on CASWEB through the training department, with 60 trained call-takers available for deployment. The capacity to link the call-taking facility to an MIR (via MIRWEB) is available, using the HOLMES team to set up a messaging unit. Collaborative arrangements for activating this facility during a large-scale enquiry have recently been successfully tested during the Madeleine McCann enquiry by Leicestershire Constabulary.

- Formalised, tried and tested call-out procedures for duty senior detective managers and a duty SIO are in place, operated through the call management centre. Call-out for additional specialist assets is then through the duty senior detective officer. While the majority of specialist staff are not currently on paid call-out rotas, all units operate informal call-out arrangements so they are contactable 24/7; there is no evidence to show that these arrangements have resulted in a lack of availability of specialist staff in the initial stages of major crime investigations.

- The MCIT is supported by effective crime scene investigation. Major crime scene forensic management is conducted by the two nationally trained crime scene managers, supported by level 3 crime scene investigators where required. There is evidence that specialist forensic advice is used appropriately at crime scenes, including blood pattern analysis, a forensic pathologist, and footwear examination. The crime scene manager continues to support the SIO throughout the investigation, attending forensic strategy meetings and liaising with the forensic science service.

- The force provides some dedicated resources to support investigations into crimes of rape. There are two dedicated victim suites in the force area and a fast and effective forensic medical examination service. The MCIT investigates all series or stranger rapes, with the BCUs assuming responsibility for offences falling outside these criteria. A cadre of chaperones (trained area and specialist department staff) is available on a voluntary call-out basis to support rape victims.

- In July 2007, the attendance at sudden deaths policy came into force. This policy is intended to ensure that any report of a death that is assessed as non-suspicious is checked by a response supervisor and, in the event of it being 'unexplained' or then deemed to be of a 'suspicious nature', receives a thorough investigation by at least a criminal investigation supervisor. During the inspection, all staff interviewed understood the policy and the terminology and no examples were found of non-adherence. A policy covering vulnerable adults includes protocols with the county council regarding deaths in care homes. In addition, protocols for the investigation of deaths in hospital premises are being developed with the primary care trust.

Work in progress

- Following a regional risk assessment process to identify the greatest risks and gaps for protective services, a new protective services command will commence work in April 2008. Recruitment of new posts will then occur over a 12-month period. The MCIT complement will increase obviating the need to abstract any BCU resources other than at times of extraordinary demand. The existing collision investigation team (two sergeants and eight investigators), currently part of the operational support department, will merge with the MCIT from 1 April 2008, both to improve its access to SIOs and to provide flexibility in the use of resources in the MCIT.

- While all SIOs and deputy SIOs are experienced in managing investigations, none are formally accredited to PIP level 3. The SIOs will be accredited by 31 March 2008; the deputy SIOs are engaged in a longer accreditation process to meet the portfolio requirements of this level of accreditation, although all are

already PIP level 2 accredited.

- The current complement of indexers to service the HOLMES commitments and support MIRWEB activation offers little resilience. In recognition of this, a plan is in place to train 15 additional indexers in-house by spring 2008.

- The force is currently reviewing its duty call-out rota arrangements for major crime and serious and organised crime roles, in order to better manage the current vulnerability represented by the many informal call-out arrangements which operate largely on goodwill. At the time of inspection, it was reported that the review would report in the very near future.

Areas for improvement

- The force recognises that resilience may become an issue for SIOs in the MCIT, including the director of investigations, during 2008 (through retirement and movement of staff) and this poses a significant risk. At the time of inspection, no succession plan had been decided on; given the level of training and mentoring that new SIOs may require to be effective in this key role, HMIC recommends that a succession plan is implemented urgently.

- Of the 17 tier 5 trained interview co-ordinators, the majority are BCU staff. When the MCIT has recruited its new staff, the force should review the number of such trained staff within the MCIT, to reduce the need to abstract BCU staff for these roles during major crime investigations.

- Although the crime and community department maintains a database of coroners' verdicts and queries, senior managers cannot readily identify how many unexplained deaths have occurred and confirm that all such cases have been investigated in line with the attendance at sudden deaths policy. In addition, no auditing of incidents where sudden deaths are assessed as non-suspicious takes place to ensure that the assessment is being thoroughly checked by a response supervisor, as the policy directs.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are tested. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- A written protocol is in place between the five East Midlands regional forces, namely the East Midlands regional information and co-ordination centre (EMRICC). This collaboration was developed to maintain communication and co-ordination across the region, thereby providing effective identification and deployment of the necessary resources to a mobilisation event, which will include either a spontaneous incident or a pre-planned event, either in or outside the region. The EMRICC has been activated on four occasions, for example the disappearance of Madeleine McCann from Portugal May 2007 and more recently Operation Orca concerning the widening of the M1 motorway through the region. An ACPO lead is appointed on each occasion to direct the EMRICC.

Economic crime investigation, including identity theft
- The economic crime unit is led by a detective sergeant with three component parts: major fraud, which has five investigators, three detective constables and two qualified accountants; a cheque and credit card unit with one detective constable and two police staff; and financial investigation. The detective sergeant who heads the economic crime unit is the force single point of contact for identity theft, which is dealt with by the cheque and credit card unit or referred to BCU level for investigation, according to the complexity of the case.

High-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery
- The high-tech crime unit has three police staff technicians who are line managed by the head of covert operations. It uses a computer examination risk assessment matrix to prioritise referrals; outsourcing is used occasionally. Two part-time staff in the covert authorities bureau are trained to examine mobile telephones to recover data and have a performance indicator to examine all mobile telephones within five days of receipt.

Work in progress

High-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery
- At the time of inspection, the force had no network investigation capability and relied informally on the EMSOU. However, a member of staff completed a covert investigation course at the end of January 2008, although it will take time for full competence to be achieved in this discipline.

- The detective inspector is currently reviewing performance indicators for checking mobile telephones. Revised performance indicators should be in place by April 2008.

Areas for improvement

Financial investigation (asset recovery/money laundering)
- At the time of inspection, there was some doubt in-force about the exact number of money-laundering offences being investigated, apart from those being dealt with by the OCU. The force needs to establish how many money-laundering enquiries are being conducted, by whom and whether opportunities exist to increase the use of powers aimed at money laundering.

High-tech crime, including network investigation and data recovery
- At the time of inspection, 58 computer referrals were backlogged; the force is aware of this problem and it is identified as a risk in the FSA 2007. The protective services strategy group (a sub-group of the National Policing Board) identified in its November 2007 stocktake report that the high-tech crime unit presented a range of risk from high to medium across the East Midlands regional forces around capacity and capability. The force needs to develop a long-term recovery plan to remove the backlogs and provide resources to meet the growing future demand.

- There was a backlog of mobile telephone examinations at the time of inspection. The force needs to establish mechanisms to reduce/eliminate backlogs and prevent their reoccurrence. There is, however, no evidence that level 2 crimes were affected by the backlogs in computer or mobile telephone data recovery. The impact is on level 1 crime, leaving BCUs with the option to fund outsourcing if deemed appropriate.

Summary – The force has a dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- An SIO in the MCIT has lead responsibility for cold case review. A dedicated review team has been in place since April 2007 (two ex-detectives employed on a contract basis until March 2008), carrying out reviews on all undetected rapes and other serious sexual offences that have been recorded over the last 15 years. New forensic capability in one case led to a new investigation and subsequent conviction.

- In line with national guidelines, most undetected homicides are reviewed every two years and, for this purpose, a cold case review matrix is used to identify new investigative opportunities and prioritise them accordingly. Of the ten undetected homicides, three have not been reviewed. At the time of inspection, the review unit was scoping these, ready to apply the matrix.

- Review reports and any recommendations are accessible to SIOs on the force intranet and any good practice for future investigations is communicated to SIOs through the weekly meeting and, as appropriate, incorporated into procedures. An example of this was the identification that precursor and similar offences had not historically always been considered during rape investigations.

Work in progress

- Within the new protective services department, a permanently established and dedicated review team will be set up as part of the department's operational performance group: comprising two detective support officers, it will be led by a chief inspector, reporting through the director of intelligence to ensure independence (this post was advertised in March 2008). The review team will have improved access to the expertise of force road traffic collision investigators as part of the MCIT, to assist with the review into any unsolved fail-to-stop fatal or serious injury road traffic collisions. The force has reported that, over the last two years, there has been no such unsolved road traffic collision requiring review

Areas for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the *Murder Investigation Manual* and major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP).

Strengths

- To inform the inspection, the force provided a copy of a policy file for homicide, together with evidence of an internal review document (Operation Clover – a homicide investigation in 2007). The documents provided evidence of good use and knowledge of both the MIM and MIRSAP, specifically in relation to nominals, telephones, exhibits, vehicles and categories. Policy files are used in all cases of homicide and are recommended for rape investigations.

- The force uses flexible MIRs, applying minimal indexing where appropriate, as decided by the SIO in conjunction with the HOLMES manager. A recent use of HOLMES is management of exhibits and disclosure in an enquiry by the OCU.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Areas for improvement

- At present, the force does not have a policy that mandates the use of policy files other than in the case of homicide. Informally, it recommends their use in the investigation of rape and serious sexual assault. The force should develop a policy and guidance directing when policy files will be used in major crime investigations.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC   assistant chief constable

ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers

ANPR   automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU   basic command unit

BERT   business engineering review team

BME   black and minority ethnic

BSIA   British Security Industry Association

C

CB   casualty bureau

CHIS   covert human intelligence source

COG   chief officer group

ComPaSS   community profiling and shared solutions

D

DCC   deputy chief constable

E

EMRICC   East Midlands regional information and co-ordination centre

EMSOU   East Midlands Special Operations Unit

F

FIB   force intelligence bureau

FIS   force intelligence system

FLO   family liaison officer

FSA   force strategic assessment

FTE   full-time equivalent

G

GAIN   government agency intelligence network

H

HMI   Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HOLMES   Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

I

IAG   independent advisory group

L

LAA   local area agreement

M

MAPPA   multi-agency public protection arrangements

MCIT   major crime investigation team

MIR   major incident room

MIRSAP   major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MoPI   management of police information

MSF   most similar force(s)

N

NCTT   national community tensions team

NIM   National Intelligence Model

NPIA   National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT   National Protective Services Analysis Tool

O

OCG   organised crime group

OCU   organised crime unit

Osman   Osman v UK (1999) 1 FLR 193, where the court established that in certain circumstances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive measures to protect an individual who is at risk from the criminal activities of others

P

PIP   professionalising the investigative process

POCA   Proceeds of Crime Act 2004

PSD   professional standards department

PSIU   professional standards integrity unit

S

SAR   suspicious activity report

SGC   specific grading criteria

SIO   senior investigating officer

SOCA   Serious Organised Crime Agency

SPECSS   separation, pregnancy, escalation, cultural, sexual assault, stalking

SPI   statutory performance indicator

T

TSU   technical support group

TTCG   tactical tasking and co-ordination group

Appendix 2: Developing Practice

TITLE: Harm indicator process
PROBLEM: The issue that this process was designed to address was the lack of a structured approach to the analysis of harm; construction of harm indicators would help to ensure timely and appropriate policing responses to mitigate harm.
SOLUTION: The solution involved the merging of current practices and the development of a new, simple process to deliver this outcome. A three-stage process involved: • identification of indicators; • monitoring and review; and • action on notification. The rationale for this approach was the dearth of available knowledge, and a lack of good practice on which to base a process and formulate a non-bureaucratic process that was complementary to existing force processes. Relevant generic harm indicators were identified by the FIB through the use of current intelligence, crime trends, community intelligence and NCTT community impact returns. This resulted in the construction of a harm indicator list. A review process was then created to review and amend these indicators in two ways: • as part of the level 2 TTCG process, where recommendations for change are made in the tactical assessment; and • as part of the strategic assessment process each six months (full assessment and review), bringing in wider environmental scanning. The identification of incidents or intelligence that may appear on the list of harm indicators generates the following action: • All such incidents are included in the Chief Constable's daily incident report, produced by the force control room. • Such incidents are discussed at the BCU 08.25am daily tasking briefing. • As an additional safeguard, the duty superintendent considers any such incidents as a part of the 09.00am force gold call. One of the existing practices that was incorporated into this system was the weekly BCU community impact assessments, which feed into the weekly NCTT returns from the force. The management of these incidents is supported through a number of standard products that include the: • threat-to-life policy; • Osman warning process;

- critical incident policy and standard operating procedure;
- investigative review policy; and
- domestic abuse risk assessment process.

EVALUATION:

The process has not been evaluated at this stage, as it is still in the process of being embedded, but it does provide a structure not available elsewhere in relation to harm indicators.

EXTERNAL VALIDATION:

None.

OUTCOMES:

- Provision of a structured process that can be compliance checked and leads to defensible decision making.
- Raised awareness of the concept of harm indicators.

FORCE CONTACT:

Temporary Detective Chief Superintendent Paul Fell.