

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



HMIC Inspection Report
North Yorkshire Police

Major Crime

July 2008



North Yorkshire Police – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

ISBN: 978-1-84726-730-6

CROWN COPYRIGHT

FIRST PUBLISHED 2008

Contents

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09
Programmed Frameworks
Major Crime
Future Programmed Inspections
The Grading Process
Developing Practice
Force Overview and Context

Findings

Major Crime

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Appendix 2: Developing Practice

Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

North Yorkshire Police (NYP) is the Home Office police force covering the non-metropolitan county of North Yorkshire and the Unitary Authority of York.

NYP was formed on 1 April 1974 under the Local Government Act 1972, and was largely a successor to the York and North East Yorkshire Police, also taking in part of the old West Riding.

Geographical Description of Force Area

NYP is responsible for policing England's largest county, covering 7,770 square kilometres from Selby in the south to Richmond in the north, as well as the Unitary Authority of York. The perimeter is 794 kilometres. At its widest point, west to east, the force area is 154 kilometres, and from north to south it measures 105 kilometres. Two national parks, the North York Moors and the Yorkshire Dales, cover a large area of North Yorkshire. It has 72 kilometres of coastline and shares its boundary with seven other police forces.

NYP headquarters (HQ) is in the village of Newby Wiske, centrally positioned within the county and located within the Eastern area command unit (ACU). The force is structured around ACUs, and these territorial units are coterminous with a number of local government structures and crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) as follows:

- Western ACU, made up of three district authorities, Harrogate Borough, Craven and Richmondshire, with the area HQ in Ripon
- Eastern ACU, made up of three district authorities, Hambleton, Scarborough and Ryedale, with the area HQ in Malton
- Central ACU, made up of one unitary authority, the City of York, and the district authority of Selby. The area HQ is located in York.

Although some specialist resources are co-ordinated centrally, eg firearms, crime scene investigators and child protection, the focus is on front-line, ACU-based staff delivering local solutions.

Demographic Description of Force Area

The economy is based primarily on agriculture and tourism. Earnings are above the regional average and approximately 94% of the national figure. House prices are above the national average. The county has a population of 783,337 and, in terms of demography, North Yorkshire has a lower than average number of young people and a higher than average number of people aged 75 years or over, compared with the national picture. This reflects the movement of younger people out of the area in search of social and economic opportunities and the movement of older people into the area. The significant numbers resident in communal, education and care establishments also influence the proportions, as do the numbers of military personnel and dependents at Catterick Garrison, which constitutes about 20% of the population of Richmondshire.

There are two cities in the county: York, with a population of 191,782, and Ripon. The county's resident black and minority ethnic (BME) communities are currently estimated at 1.36% of the population, with Chinese, Indian and Pakistani being the three largest groups. Recently North Yorkshire has also seen a rise in its Polish community. There are wide variations in the distribution of the population across the force area.

Structural Description of Force including Staff Changes at Chief Officer Level

The ACPO team is based at HQ and consists of the Chief Constable, appointed on 18 April 2007; the deputy chief constable (DCC), appointed on 27 April 2007; the assistant chief constable (ACC) (protective services (PS)); the ACC (strategic development); the assistant chief officer (resources and finance) and the assistant chief officer (people).

The chief officer portfolios are as follows:

- Chief Constable – chief of staff, strategic services directorate including marketing and media
- DCC – territorial policing, safer neighbourhoods, professional standards and legal services
- ACC (PS) – crime directorate, operations directorate and communications directorate
- ACC (strategic development) – information services department, diversity, relationships and business development
- assistant chief officer (resources and finance) – finance, fleet, procurement, property and facilities
- assistant chief officer (people) – personnel, training, health and safety, health and welfare.

The ACU senior management teams (SMTs) consist of a chief superintendent area commander, a superintendent operations and three chief inspectors: detective chief inspector crime, chief inspector NHP and chief inspector operations.

Strategic Priorities

NYP's policing plan is produced on a three-year rolling basis and explains the main priorities for the force. Consideration has been given to national priorities (as identified in the government documents *Cutting Crime – a New Partnership for 2008–11* and the *National Community Safety Plan 2008–11*), the priorities of local partners and the results of consultation with the communities of North Yorkshire and the City of York. From this comprehensive look across policing, NYP has been able to integrate those issues of most concern into the following four priority areas:

- safer neighbourhoods
- safer roads
- stronger partnerships
- safeguarding our communities from terrorism, domestic extremism and serious crime.

NYP is committed to providing a police service in which the public has trust, confidence and satisfaction – a service that is accountable to local communities and that is responsive to their needs and aspirations, but also one that is relentless in its approach to reducing crime and increasing the perception of safety.

Key initiatives to improve performance during 2007/08

In partnership with agencies across the county, NYP has delivered to communities and cut crime by 7.7%. This equates to 4,172 fewer victims of crime in 2007/08 compared with the

previous year. In addition, NYP has delivered a sanction detection rate of 33.3%, which equates to one of the top performing forces in the country.

Listed below are examples of key operations from 2007/08 that contributed to improving operational performance:

- **Operation Helical 2 and Operation Anvil** – county-wide, multi-agency operations aimed at reducing road casualties
- **Grass on skunk initiative** – a local campaign coinciding with the Home Office's National Tackling Drugs Week
- **Operation Larch** – a national operation targeting misrepresented vehicle registration plates and the use of materials and treatments on vehicle registration plates designed or intended to confuse camera systems
- **Operation Impact** – a government-funded regional crime initiative involving all four forces from the Yorkshire and Humber region, focusing on different themes and activity across each of the following areas:
 - local ACU-based initiatives
 - force-level activity
 - themed regional initiatives
 - regionally co-ordinated, cross-border operations.

Key corporate initiatives

As part of the capacity and capability review (CCR) process, NYP was able to re-focus support resources to operational objectives, identifying opportunities for maintaining and/or increasing productivity at a lower cost. As part of ongoing service delivery planning, the combined business processes of human resources and finance are being reviewed so they can be streamlined and decisions can be taken faster, therefore enabling a more flexible and responsive capability to deal with change.

NYP is completely changing the way in which the force looks at estate management to focus on service delivery with partner agencies, which makes all neighbourhood management services more accessible. The revised approach will divide the estate into a number of tiers that have a clear purpose, are situated in the most appropriate places and provide best value for the provision of policing services. These tiers are:

- **Tier 1** – community-based offices focused on neighbourhood management teams and access points for the public
- **Tier 2** – centres for response policing, custody facilities and specialist resources
- **Tier 3** – geographical area bases for local management and administration functions
- **Tier 4** – force HQ with functions for strategy, policy and governance.

Regionally, and in line with national direction, NYP will continue to collaborate on areas of proposed efficiency within support services, such as procurement. NYP will work with regional forces to explore the potential of joining up the functionality and procurement of some information technology (IT) systems.

Collaboration (strategic partnerships)

The Yorkshire and Humber region has demonstration site status (projects that are part funded by the Home Office) in respect of three projects:

- regional fast-time tasking, co-ordinating and resourcing (FTTCR) arrangements to deal quickly with all types of major incidents, such as floods
- regional employment framework to recruit and establish a regional undercover unit and put process and policies in place
- workforce modernisation limited to three areas of the regional intelligence unit (RIU), regional undercover unit and road death and collision investigation process.

In addition, as part of the NYP's regional strategy and safer roads priority area, the force is progressing a regional automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) capability.

There is an established structure for regional collaboration based on a regional Chief Constables group and a regional joint committee of all police authorities in the Yorkshire and Humber region. Together, these bodies are leading the regional response to increasing the capacity and capability of PS, and NYP will look increasingly to these bodies to provide efficiencies, through collaboration, in back office and support services, such as procurement and IT.

Representative workforce (including diversity)

As of 31 March 2008, the proportion of BME police officers is 1.1% (18 people). The proportion of BME police staff is 0.9% (12 people) and 22.9% of police officers are female.

Workforce modernisation

During 2007, NYP undertook the most comprehensive force-wide CCR in its history. Every element of force business was scrutinised to ensure that finances were in place to support force priorities and that there was a sustainable financial plan for 2008/09 and for future years. This review has formed the basis for NYP's service delivery plans.

Protective services (PS)

NYP has been in the vanguard of development of a demand and supply responsive PS action plan. The current PS action plan compares NYP's PS capacity and capability with:

- ACPO PS standards;
- National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) PS-related doctrines; and
- the results of the annual micro-analysis of threats (and assets).

This action plan allows NYP's strategic leadership team to make PS-related business planning decisions on a very well-informed basis.

Force Performance Overview

Force development since 2007 inspections

In Eastern area, the community protection unit (CPU) has deliberately sought to build on the introduction of specialist domestic violence courts last year. The team has trained all magistrates, victim advocates, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and lawyers and partner agencies in handling domestic violence cases. The parallel Making Safe scheme empowers victims over offenders, and disposals through the dedicated court by way of the integrated domestic abuse programme have seen repeat offending at 7.4 % compared with a national average of 45%. An increase in male victims demonstrates an increased confidence in reporting and action by the police.

In Western area, Operation Wren was an investigation into two house burglars who systematically targeted rural premises. These were level 2 offenders living in West Yorkshire and committing their offences in North Yorkshire. Patrol strategies were put in place to locate these individuals while in the North Yorkshire policing area. Both suspects were stopped, when returning to the West Yorkshire area, in possession of items that could be directly linked to crimes that had occurred that same evening and forensic links to other historic crimes. Further specialist techniques involving video imagery and telephony resulted in a conspiracy charge of 42 out of the 51 offences being included in the case. In June 2008, both men were sentenced having pleaded guilty to all 42 offences, none were contested and this impacted directly on crime within our rural communities.

Safer Neighbourhoods

The Safer Neighbourhoods initiative has had a considerable impact on NYP's communities. The public are now less fearful of crime, have fewer crimes committed against them and have told NYP that local issues that matter to them are now understood and actively tackled. Much of this success has been made possible through active, effective local partnerships. Future developments in Safer Neighbourhoods will see NYP engaging even more with partners to deliver high-quality, high-value community services that are tailored to the needs of the community.

Major Crime

GRADE	Fails to meet the standard
-------	----------------------------

Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details North Yorkshire Police’s (NYP) capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those that pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.249	0.206	-17.27%	0.272
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.026	0.000	-100.00%	0.000
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.078	0.039	-50.00%	0.063
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	50.00%	166.67%	+116.67pp*	88.57%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.546	0.052	-90.48%	0.094
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	11.90%	50%	+38.1pp*	54.62%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.117	0.117	0.00%	0.177
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	66.67%	44.44%	-22.23pp*	70.31%

North Yorkshire Police – HMIC Inspection Report

July 2008

Number of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.013	0.000	-100.00%	0.020
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.026	0.039	+50.00%	0.082
% of murders detected/convicted	100.00%	100.00%	0pp*	95.47%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	1.886	1.522	-19.30%	2.061
% of rapes detected/convicted	28.97%	34.19%	+5.22pp*	23.42%

*pp' – percentage points.

**Most similar forces (MSF) for North Yorkshire are Devon & Cornwall, Gloucestershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Warwickshire and Wiltshire.

From the SPI data in the table above, it can be seen that none of the crime types considered under major crime pose a significant threat to NYP. North Yorkshire is below the MSF average for all crime types and in 2007 the only offence to show a rise in levels was murder; all others remained stable or fell.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in North Yorkshire is comparable with that of the rest of the MSF group. NYP is performing at a level above the MSF average in some cases (attempted murder, murder and rape) but below the MSF average in other cases (blackmail and kidnapping). It should be noted that the only sanction detection rate to decrease in 2007 was that for kidnapping.

The NPSAT published in September 2007 indicated that NYP was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences and, as such, no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

Intelligence

The force has insufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has conditionally committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding that is proportionate to the levels of identified risk.

Strengths

- The force conducts a strategic assessment to provide a picture of the long-term issues and future threats affecting the force, taking into account government and local objectives. This assessment seeks to facilitate the review and amendment of the existing force control strategy, providing the focus for policing activity during the next six months, to support business planning and to define the force intelligence requirement.
- The force analytical capacity is basic and, in the past, analysts have suffered from being abstracted to major enquiries, secondments, Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) and other strategic projects. The force has introduced a revised crime strategy that has restricted the abstractions previously experienced by analysts from their core roles. Staff involved in the collection and analysis of intelligence meet quarterly. These development days allow for discussion around identified trends, preventive action and strategies.
- The creation of a dedicated inspector within the force intelligence bureau (FIB) ensures that the strategic priorities are supported by systems and processes to deliver quality intelligence products. The force has recognised the gap in intelligence from partners and the partnership data unit is providing the necessary communication links with partners and other agencies.
- The force supplies information to the national intelligence requirement to satisfy the requirements around the Rich Picture initiative and supplies information from internal processes and open sources to gain intelligence. NYP has produced a thorough RisGen-assisted protective services (PS) action plan and the issues in MC01 have been identified as a specific risk and have been appropriately assessed.

Work in progress

- The head of PS is developing a resourcing service level agreement (SLA) for major investigations, which has been agreed with the territorial areas. An abstraction matrix is currently being enhanced to provide a comprehensive, dynamic record of availability and current deployment of investigative resources in respect of every relevant unit (territorial and headquarters (HQ)) in the force.
- The Senior Leadership Team considered the creation of a partnership data unit (PDU) in the aftermath of the force capacity and capability review (CCR). No funding for the creation of the PDU has been authorised at this time. However, ongoing SNT-related workstreams will be focused upon providing mechanisms for the necessary flow of partnership data at level 1 and level 2.

July 2008

- Analysts are working towards a force strategic meeting in November 2007. The force intends to have strategic assessments throughout the year; however, it is unaware of the NPSAT data that may influence its strategies for identification and actions to deal with identified threats.
- The intelligence review that has been commissioned will be a thorough root and branch review of all intelligence structures and processes within NYP. The review is not merely confined to processes alone. The terms of reference (TOR) for the intelligence review have been agreed by the SLT and the review will commence on 1 June 2008 and conclude on 30 August 2008.
- The force is concentrating on the quality of the intelligence being submitted rather than on quantity. The force recognised that the personal performance indicator based on the quantity being submitted was not delivering the quality to develop into action. In addition, it was leading to multiple submissions around the same incident and poor quality information.

Area(s) for improvement

- There needs to be clarity around the crime strategy and the responsibilities of neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs), area command unit (ACU) based investigators and specialist teams based at the centre. In some areas, investigations are, by default, allocated towards the criminal investigation department (CID) whether appropriate or not. As a consequence, NPTs are becoming deskilled, which is exacerbated by the loss of experienced staff to specialist teams. The force needs to build capacity and fully utilise skilled resources appropriately. The CCR should identify any gaps and make necessary recommendations.
- The date of the strategic assessment review is being changed to September to ensure that it better informs the business planning process. However, the force has not completed neighbourhood profiles and is not fully aware of which threats and risks may be in the community. The force uses a scoring process for assessing risk and harm.
- There are differences apparent between area commanders and HQ regarding tasking and ownership of intelligence resources. There remains an emphasis at ACU level on the improvement of performance in the volume crime areas and, as a consequence, there is limited force overview.
- Field Intelligence Officers are assigned to each area; some have additional functional responsibilities. There are concerns regarding the tasking of their activity and if it is being used at identified risks for the force. There is limited time to deal with tasked issues or building the profiles.
- There is a lack of awareness of ACU-based analysts of the intelligence opportunities available and their ability to secure intelligence. They are mainly concentrating at level 1, which does not allow them to develop their technical skills and innovation.

Developing practice

Micro-analysis risk assessment

- Micro-analysis is a process that was developed in North Yorkshire and has now been accepted and utilised by a number of different forces around the country, including the other forces of the YATH region. The process facilitates the assessment of PS-related threats and assets and the assessment of gaps in capability and capacity of available assets to deal with identified threats. The process then allows for the risk assessment of the gaps that are identified in respect of capability and capacity. NYP now uses micro-analysis as a method of gathering data to inform the RisGen-assisted PS action plan for the force (which assesses gaps in NYP capability and capacity when compared with ACPO PS standards expectations, National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) doctrine expectations, and assessed threats).

The force seeks intelligence about level 2 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be embryonic. The force's community impact assessments (CIAs) to evaluate risk following major crime are adequate.

Strengths

- Within the strategic assessment, the force has identified quality of life issues, killed and serious injury road traffic collisions, supply and distribution of Class A drugs, terrorism, serious and organised crime, recovery of proceeds of crime and violent crime.
- A corporate CIA template is in use and this was effectively utilised post 7/7. CIAs are completed in respect of critical and major incidents. Senior investigating officers (SIOs) can commission target profile analysis, victim profile analysis and crime pattern analysis, dependent on the circumstances of the enquiry. The national domestic risk assessment matrix is circulated and being used.
- The three regional forces, West and South Yorkshire and Humberside, collaborate on the identification of threats and risks to communities. Engagement with the regional intelligence unit (RIU) and regional partners is building a regional intelligence picture of threats, in particular from OCGs from outside the force boundary. Intelligence-sharing agreements (memoranda of understanding (MOU)) exist with the counter-terrorism (CT) unit, security services and those agencies involved in multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) that comply with management of police information (MoPI).
- The RisGen-based Protective Services (PS) action plan informed by an annual micro-analysis of assets and threats is designed to identify all PS-related capacity and capability issues (when compared with assessed threats, ACPO PS standards expectations, and NPIA doctrines expectations). This process describes them in terms of risks and then applies the RisGen management system in order to assist the SLT and police authority decision making in respect of appropriate prioritisation of action and investment, recognising that there are insufficient resources for every need to be addressed at the same time.
- Operations have demonstrated the force's ability to build subject profiles and intelligence profiles of an OCG that had committed cash in transit (CIT) offences. This was a structured operation that had an audit trail of decision and actions, clear levels of accountability structures through recorded actions and decision making. This included an investigative, intelligence and forensics strategy.
- Triggers to identify vulnerable mental health cases come from many sources and are fed into the National Intelligence Model (NIM) system. The objective is to identify a risk and take appropriate action before a situation escalates and involves an individual falling into the criminal justice system. Suitable referrals are brought to MAPPA. PDPs have been identified as a risk and there are agreed information streams that may identify a risk.

Work in progress

- The force intelligence requirement is focused on the control strategy and strategic assessment. The force has recognised that it has an increasing risk because surrounding forces and those where a threat has been identified, are being proactive in their response to major crime and OCGs.

July 2008

- The links with intelligence processes that support FIB intelligence collection and analysis will be strengthened during the review being conducted by the head of crime. A weekly 'crime series' meeting reviews intelligence from detective inspectors, FIOs and NPTs to identify emerging risks to communities and to gather quality intelligence to inform the Rich Picture initiative.
- Some ward profiles have now been completed and it is anticipated that full completion will have been achieved by mid May 2008. There has been some limited use of community profiling, eg the farming community was profiled in relation to large-scale cannabis cultivation involving foreign nationals.
- The new strategic intelligence assessment is currently being compiled and the force has a new set of four strategic objectives (safer neighbourhoods, safer roads, stronger partnerships, and safeguarding our communities from domestic extremism, terrorism and serious crime).

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has a threat to life policy; however, there is no mechanism for identifying the incidence of suicide within the county or the vulnerability of those suffering with mental health problems, which may impact on the policy content or requirements. From January 2008, a matrix containing details of all sudden and unexplained deaths will be maintained. (The matrix provides data from which trends in sudden and unexplained deaths (including suicides) can be identified and analysed.)
- Analysts do identify trends emerging; however, they are often held back and not added to the Tactical Assessment. Sometimes analysts are told to develop the issue because of the unavailability of deployable resources. There is no resource to deal with the problem. This should be rectified with the investment of additional resources into the organised crime unit (OCU) and the leadership of the deputy chief constable (DCC) of the level 2 tasking process.
- The force is missing opportunities to capture intelligence that would alert them to an emerging risk or threat through a lack of guidance, tasking and systems to identify and submit key intelligence/incidents.

The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for Class A drugs and violent crime are satisfactory, with links to force and ACU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- Within the strategic assessment, the force has identified quality of life issues, killed and serious injury road traffic collisions, supply and distribution of Class A drugs, terrorism, serious and organised crime, recovery of proceeds of crime and violent crime. A problem-solving plan has been developed looking at intelligence, enforcement and preventive requirements, together with identified individuals for actions.
- The FSA takes place bi-annually and identifies current and future gaps, trends, threats and risks in relation to criminality. The review facilitates an opportunity to reflect any change in emphasis, based on the risk assessment and the change in identified risks through the intelligence requirement. This document informs the FSA, which in turn identifies the force current priorities.
- The critical incident policy provides guidance on maintaining public confidence when involved in major incidents and provides a menu of tactics including consultation and community involvement at every stage of police activity. The joint, centralised public protection unit (PPU) with the probation service has been further developed. This unit is staffed by a senior probation officer working alongside the police PPU line manager. These resources focus on PPU issues in their entirety and are supported by a dedicated MAPPA administrator and MAPPA co-ordinator, together with analytical capacity.

Work in progress

- The tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) meetings for level 2 are held monthly and are now chaired by the DCC. The DCC conducts regular performance reviews with territorial area senior management teams (SMTs) and the Chief Constable conducts quarterly corporate health checks with all service delivery owners.
- The director of intelligence has the responsibility for supporting the strategic assessment and this is driven from the centre. However, he currently does not have overall control of all assets that support the intelligence collection or analysis because ACU-based assets are tasked locally to deal with volume crime issues. This limits the force's ability to identify corporate risks and threats from level 2 and 3 crime. The review into the intelligence processes will ensure that effective structures support the intelligence requirement around identified force priorities.
- The head of intelligence is planning to implement the Avon and Somerset Cedar model of NIM-based processes. There is some limited level 2 capability within the force and there is a commitment to invest additional resources into the major incident team, OCU and surveillance team. This will reduce the reliance on ACU staff being abstracted to deal with serious and major crime investigations.
- Operation Oak was conducted by NYP prior to the development of the force TCG meeting model and the implementation of robust accountability measures. This area

of activity (and the absence of implementation of Operation Cedar methodology) has been specifically identified as a risk and has been appropriately risk assessed as part of the RisGen-assisted NYP PS action plan.

Area(s) for improvement

- The head of intelligence has initiated a review into the intelligence processes to ensure that the force has the necessary processes and resources to be fully aware of the levels of threat from within communities and from outside the force area. ACUs need to become more engaged in intelligence development and analysis that will inform the strategic assessment and control strategy. Currently the level 2 picture is incomplete and cannot feed the FSA in an efficient manner so that clear decisions can be made commensurate to the risk.

July 2008

Trend analysis and problem profiles are routinely shared with partners and ACUs. There is an emerging trigger plan for hot briefing whenever a significant change in the major crime threat or the nature of the analysis demands a fast-time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and HMRC exist. The force anticipates it will reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- The force has a policy that sets out the objectives and requirements of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) national flagging service. It is integral to the partnership agreements between SOCA and other UK law enforcement agencies. The documentation is used to apply for a flag or interest marker and is also used to provide notification to SOCA of OCGs not currently subject to operational activity.
- The force submits returns to the serious crime analysis section (SCAS). During the period January to December 2007, 17 submissions were made to SCAS; 13 were within 14 days and were mainly for sex-related offences. A periodically updated copy of the homicide index resides within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) SCAS to complement the national analytical service provided to serious crime investigations.
- NYP has had occasion to question the accuracy of previous SCAS statistics. However, the SCAS figures for the last two quarters of 2007 show that NYP has a 100% compliance rate with the national standard.
- RIU attends the force level 2 TCG to observe/assist with any packages that may be put up for consideration by RIU at monthly TCG meetings. A member of RIU sits within the FIB because information technology (IT) issues are currently preventing direct access to the force systems from the RIU office at Wakefield. Bids are submitted to SOCA but, due to the comparatively lower level and seriousness of the offences involved, they have, to date, failed their threshold test.
- Staff working within the intelligence units have participated in an intelligence specialists course. Information sharing between agencies is good, either through liaison or access to systems, albeit not linked into others' premises at this stage.
- The kidnap/extortion database has been consulted once and the NCPE and SOCA/NCIS on three occasions over the last 12 months. During 2007, SIOs have had two inputs by the SOCA kidnap and extortion unit.

Work in progress

- Although there is some access to bordering force intelligence systems in the north and south of the county, this facility is not available at the centre. The collaborative arrangements between the Yorkshire forces and Humberside is providing opportunities for the directors of IT in each of the forces to meet and discuss strategies to develop IT solutions to facilitate exchange of information.
- There are issues around the exchange of information between partners and the impact that MoPI has on any previous arrangements. The template developed by the MoPI team should ensure that there are standardised requirements identified in the exchange of information between the force and partner agencies. SLAs are entered

July 2008

into, which facilitates a timely exchange of information or data that supports both organisations' aims and objectives or joint objectives.

- The force is developing a directorate of information that will have responsibility for all information-sharing protocols. This will accord to MoPI and will assist the force in better managing information sharing within its wide range of partnership working.
- The head of major crime is liaising with SOCA to progress practical exercises for SIOs. A three-day kidnap and extortion relation exercise was conducted in March 2008.
- The force is working with the RIU to achieve an accurate reflection of OCG activity within the force. The force contests that the RIU indicated the existence of OCGs within NYP without being able to adduce any evidence identifying any members of a number of the supposed OCGs. NYP subscribes to the nationally recognised OCG mapping methodology and NYP will improve its capability to map OCGs both resident and impacting upon NYP.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force invested in a team to develop the action plan to deliver MoPI compliance. The team was drawn from across the force and was being led by the principal analyst on a full-time basis. Gradually staff have been drawn away and, at the time of the inspection, the principal analyst was the only member of the team left. The abstraction of specialist skills from their core role impacts directly on the efficiency of the force.
- The OCG mapping was conducted by the RIU on behalf of the four regional forces, Yorkshire and Humberside. During this process, the RIU identified that the partner agencies are too inwardly focused and did not appreciate the business benefits to their own organisation by fully engaging with all partner agencies. Partnership data sharing is not happening in sufficient volume to influence the FSA. There is currently no strategic drive for partnership engagement and most exchanges of information occur locally.

In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- There is a weekly 'crime series' meeting to review intelligence from detective inspectors, FIOs and NPTs, which is starting to 'join up' intelligence around communities and other sources.
- The force has conducted a micro-analysis of the seven protective areas across the force and has identified levels of risk from threats. This process has also been conducted across the Yorkshire and Humberside forces to obtain a regional perspective.
- Quality of life issues, killed and serious injury road traffic collisions, supply and distribution of Class A drugs, terrorism, serious and organised crime, recovery of proceeds of crime and violent crime are contained within the strategic assessment.
- An inspector within FIB has a dedicated responsibility for PPU issues. Individuals subject to level 3 MAPPA are dealt with by HQ PPU and the responsibility for level 2 is devolved to the PPU on each area. Potentially dangerous persons go through a MAPPA-type risk assessment process. This includes liaison with social services and mental health trusts.
- NPTs have identified a network of key individuals who are regularly consulted to obtain a feel for current community tensions and issues. After each ward meeting, all attendees are provided with a community consultation document, which they are invited to complete with issues and concerns. Additionally, NYP undertakes a number of public attitude surveys on various issues, including major crime.

Work in progress

- The force is starting to analyse data from custody systems in order to inform them of the impact that changes in communities may be having on community safety issues. FIB has recently finished a data set to capture the nationality of drivers arrested for driving whilst over the prescribed limit, which the force will use as a benchmark.
- The head of intelligence has initiated a review into the intelligence processes because he believes that the force is not fully aware of the levels of threat from within communities and from outside the force area. Currently, the level 2 picture is incomplete and cannot feed the FSA in an efficient manner so that clear decisions can be made commensurate to the risk.
- The risk or threat to the force of homicide is assessed as a low probability. The force may have to deal with two to three homicides each year and up to 100 complaints of rape. Stranger rapes are put up to HOLMES and the force has only had two occurrences where this has taken place.

Area(s) for improvement

- Geographically, the force is the largest in the country, often with often limited police visibility in the more remote areas. Consequently, criminal activity may take place without intelligence being generated. Due to the isolation of some communities, they become vulnerable targets and susceptible to travelling criminality. The RIU structure actually separates intelligence on the force between the North East and the Yorkshire and Humber forces. The force therefore has to make two distinct considerations around intelligence products.
- Some ward profiles have now been completed and it is anticipated that full completion will be achieved by mid May 2008. There was a lack of awareness, information and intelligence regarding communities within the force, eg what risk they may present or their own vulnerability. Attempting to build an intelligence picture of potential risks is difficult without this data and involvement with partners.
- The SLT considered the creation of a PDU in the aftermath of the force CCR. No funding for the creation of the PDU has been authorised at this time. However, ongoing SNT-related workstreams will be focused upon, providing mechanisms for the necessary flow of partnership data at level 1 and level 2.
- The force intelligence requirement around the level 1 threat is proportionate to what the force has identified as risks. The force is yet to embed an awareness of the threat from level 2, in particular seeking out intelligence that may identify a level 2/3 threat from nominals who may be resident in the area but committing crime elsewhere.
- Areas have analysts/intelligence officers, as well as a detective constable and FIO, but there is evidence of local agendas surpassing the force requirements. All areas have provided three level 2 targets for consideration by HQ, which have gone on to the serious and organised crime database. However, due to the lack of a force proactive resource and the relatively ineffective level 2 tasking process, these target nominals are not being actively pursued.

Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every quarter by the Chief Constable, who oversees the force risk management group. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- The Chief Constable chairs the risk management group, which meets quarterly and includes members of the police authority. The risk management strategy ensures that risk management is embedded within all areas of the organisation. This strategy is available on the intranet. The risk management strategy encompasses the force and authorities' approach to risk management from an operational and business perspective.
- The RisGen-based Protective Services (PS) action plan informed by an annual micro-analysis of assets and threats is designed to identify all PS-related capacity and capability issues (when compared with assessed threats, ACPO PS standards expectations, and NPIA doctrines expectations). This process describes them in terms of risks and then applies the RisGen management system in order to assist the SLT and police authority decision making in respect of appropriate prioritisation of action and investment, recognising that there are insufficient resources for every need to be addressed at the same time
- The risk management unit was set up in 2004. The head of the unit has participated in the micro-analysis of the force and has detailed the risks of threat across the PS areas. Such identified threats have been prioritised and provided with the appropriate level of risk. The head of the unit is supported by two staff and line managed by the head of legal services. ACU's and departments have had presentations at workshops on risk management – producing their own risk registers. Included in this is the PS risk register.
- The force is using RisGen to make assessments of risk and this has also incorporated risks across the Yorkshire and Humber region.
- A risk assessment column has been included in the force action plan. A standard importance/probability model has been adopted for the process, and predetermined importance gradings have been applied to the risk assessment. The importance values reflect how critical the standard is to compliance with MoPI. Although all standards should be complied with, some are more critical to information management processes than others.
- All fraud is dealt with by ACUs, with support from the Force Intelligence Unit detective inspector and financial investigators, where capacity and capability allow. All fraud investigations conducted in the force will be overseen by the head of the economic crime unit.
- A single point of contact (SPOC) is located within the FIB for the development and dissemination of firearms intelligence, which is shared at the SOCA/NCIS national firearms forum. A threat and risk assessment has been completed in accordance with the firearms code of practice and has been used to progress and develop firearms capability to deal with both spontaneous and planned firearms deployments. The threat assessment is reviewed alongside the FSA. Firearms intelligence is reviewed at the regional intelligence group and force tasking meetings.

Work in progress

- The force is reviewing the initial responses, structure and policies, together with resource planning and training around the responses to major crime. An SLA between the centre and ACUs will ensure that incidents are appropriately resourced; protocols will identify when an SIO will take command. Gold reviews of resourcing arrangements will take place after 72 hours and will also incorporate the review of finance arrangements.
- The Chief Constable has commissioned a report in which he proposes a significant increase in the strength of the major crime investigation team (MCIT). In addition, a more flexible use of the current crime support unit (previously principally involved in surveillance) would facilitate augmentation of the strength of the OCU.

Area(s) for improvement

- In discussion with the risk manager for the force, it was apparent that risk is prioritised around system and policy issues. The development of dynamic risks associated with issues arising from the micro-analysis process is beginning to register. There was little appreciation of operational or structural issues with an over-emphasis on insurance. Issues of reputation risk were under-developed and consequently the force appears risk averse in a number of areas.
- The risk or threat to the force from major crime is assessed as a low probability. The force may have to deal with two to three homicides each year and up to 100 complaints of rape. Stranger rapes are put up to HOLMES and the force has only had two occurrences when this has taken place. There were issues over what type of risks were being recorded. Without a full intelligence picture of communities, it is difficult to make an assessment of exactly what risks are developing from adjoining forces.

July 2008

The force is creating ways of collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Some of the operational databases are searchable from co-located terminals and staff. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been partially implemented.

Strengths

- The DCC is the regional lead for automatic number plate recognition (ANPR). The force has dedicated ANPR capacity. The ANPR strategy is embedded within the roads policing strategy and this is aligned to the crime strategy. BOF 2 is used to good effect.
- Missing person reports are subject to the immediate assessment of risk, which has assisted in the development of 'profiles'. This has links to the STORM database and the process has linked directly into the work and intelligence of the child abuse team.
- MAPPA intelligence is supplied to the force intelligence systems. Niche and the Violent and Sex Offenders Register databases are maintained in accordance with data protection and operational requirements, in compliance with policy. The PPU analyst is based within the co-located police and probation PPU.
- MoPI guidance is being managed through a phased approach and the threshold standards and force action plan relate to those systems within the first phase. Phase one business areas are identical to those contained within the IMPACT nominal index.
- The DCC formerly chaired Bichard gold meetings; however, monthly reports are now submitted to the director of intelligence who in turn reports to the crime business area meeting.

Work in progress

- The force is developing a directorate of information with responsibility for all information-sharing protocols. Partnership data sharing takes place locally but there needs to be a strategic drive to encapsulate these links into a corporate strategy.
- There is a regional project to establish a Yorkshire and Humber system and the four IT managers are meeting monthly to progress this. Scoping work is ongoing (led by South Yorkshire Police with the agreement of the Chief Constables) to introduce a Cross-Regional Information Sharing Project (CRISP) type, intelligence-sharing database. This will enable access to each other's intelligence material. There are no timescales in place at the moment.
- The mapping of the county to establish common routes used by targeted nominals has identified OCGs travelling into the force area. ANPR will be tasked to these routes through analysis of crime trends and intelligence data through the RIU.
- The intelligence from HOLMES can be put in a file on the system and NYP is liaising with other forces as to how this can be transferred to force intelligence systems.

- SIOs will write intelligence policies in respect of the major enquiries that they manage to enable the dissemination of specific items of intelligence to general intelligence systems.
- The forensic manager oversees the Socrates system of recording intelligence. Two analysts on each area have been identified and will be provided with access to Socrates.

Area(s) for improvement

- There are a number of standalone confidential systems that are not yet within the MoPI framework. Until there is a confidential network (a force-wide solution is scheduled for 2010), confidential systems will need, for the sake of security, to remain standalone.

The force has a case review policy that is always applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- The force has a major crime review policy that complies with national guidelines. Major crime reviews are conducted in accordance with Murder Investigation Manual. The 72-hour review covers main lines of enquiry, resourcing and finance arrangements. ACPO is aware of its responsibilities to show leadership and support of this process.
- In murder cases, 28-day reviews have been conducted, eg Operation Wain – hostel murder. In this case, the review policy was seen to be effective.
- Developed learning has been exhibited in the recent hostel death – more in terms of initial scene preservation. The structure of reviews is present but needs embedding. It enhances the skills of those doing the review as well as improving SIOs' performance.
- Reviews are done on time and in accordance with the MIM. Peer reviews have taken place and reviews of ongoing investigations have also taken place. ACPO reviews are conducted, with the SIO having accountability for the investigations.
- The force presented a briefing document outlining the work ongoing in relation to a number of operations involving rape and serious sexual assaults, series of linked crimes by DNA with no offender identified, low copy DNA analysis, NYP homicide audit and the NYP crime audit (undetected rapes and serious sexual assaults).
- During 2005/06, the force had to deal with a quadruple murder incident. The learning points from the investigation have been made available to forces nationally, with the SIO attending seminars and conferences to detail the complexities of the investigation with limited resources.

Work in progress

- The creation of a crime directorate will enable the force to centralise the SIO expertise and provide resilience in responding to major and serious organised crime. It also provides the force with an opportunity to build resilience into the review mechanism around historic cases.

July 2008

The force T&C process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals an understanding of current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The Chief Constable has initiated a CCR to support the research carried out during the micro-analysis of the force. The micro-analysis scoped the seven protective areas and apportioned the risk of the threat. This has provided the force with an understanding of predictable demand, which will inform the CCR.
- The DCC has taken control of the level 2 tasking process and set out guidelines for attendance and the supporting functions required to ensure the force has the necessary intelligence picture to identify emerging threats from OCGs, both within the county and from other areas.
- A representative from scientific support attends force level 1 and 2 tasking to provide forensic support for priorities. At that meeting, the crime scene investigation (CSI) representative will agree, by assessing both forensic potential and resource capability, which NIM initiatives will be actively supported by CSI.
- Operation Impact was identified as a joint initiative between the Yorkshire and Humber forces that saw a number of combined operations in all four forces aimed at level 1 and 2 targets.

Work in progress

- A resourcing formula for major crime incidents will be applied via the DCC and he has agreed to sponsor that. Consideration is being given to the viability of using the surveillance team as a 'golden hour task team'. A strong gold commander is required at the point of resource allocation.
- A resourcing SLA for major investigations has been agreed with the territorial areas and has been implemented. An abstraction matrix is currently being enhanced to provide a comprehensive, dynamic record of availability and current deployment of investigative resources in respect of every relevant unit (territorial and HQ) in the force.
- The Chief Constable has commissioned a report in which he proposes a significant increase in the strength of the MCIT. A more flexible use of the current crime support unit (previously principally involved in surveillance) would augment the strength of the OCU.

Area(s) for improvement

- The FIB finds it difficult to get 'action' on targets because the OCU has limited resources. The unit is staffed with experienced officers but is limited because of capacity and location. Awareness needs to be raised at ACU level regarding how intelligence is being used to target and identify emerging issues identified around nominals or locations.
- Detective chief inspectors on areas are being influenced by the operations superintendents with regard to priorities for their CID staff, mainly concentrated

July 2008

around local performance issues. There are instances of detectives working on 'catch and convict' target teams to bolster detection rates, with no capacity for any sustained investigation resources into the likes of Class A drugs supply, human trafficking, homicides and suspicious deaths.

- The crime business area exists as a forum for level 1 and level 2 managers involved in investigation to meet and discuss and share good practice. It does not have primacy for tasking at level 2. In addition, in order to inform all commanders, the minutes of meetings should be distributed.
- A number of vacancies are being maintained on territorial CID units so that detective resources may be used in other specific units (eg catch and convict units). However, there is no cognisance of the impact that missing persons, suicide and other investigations have on the remaining ACU investigative capacity.
- A resourcing SLA for major investigations has been agreed with the territorial areas and has been implemented. An abstraction matrix is currently being enhanced to provide a comprehensive, dynamic record of availability and current deployment of investigative resources in respect of every relevant unit (territorial and HQ) in the force.

Due to appropriate training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent. SIO masterclasses provide a focus on community impact of criminality.

Strengths

- SIO development days are being held and a type of 'masterclass' ensures that SIOs are kept updated by current outcomes of reviews of major crime issues in North Yorkshire and other forces. Seven training days have been held, with outside speakers covering all aspects of a major crime and serious and organised crime investigation.
- The critical incident policy stipulates scenarios when Community Impact Assessments (CIAs) should be conducted. All CIAs are located on a force shared drive under geographical ACUs where the incident occurred. The data provides guidance on maintaining public confidence when involved in major incidents and provides a menu of tactics, including consultation and community involvement at every stage of police activity.
- The force undertakes a number of public attitude surveys in various areas, including major crime. All surveys and consultation documents are reviewed to highlight repetitive and topical issues. Feedback is provided to all participants and action plans implemented.
- Awareness is raised to intelligence issues and the vulnerability of communities through attachments to the intelligence unit of student officers, who are shown how the NIM process works in an operational arena. The force has scheduled training days for all staff, which includes the force response to critical incidents.

Work in progress

- The force CCR being led by the Chief Constable, together with the road map towards 2012, will ensure that the force considers the vulnerability of communities from OCGs and that sufficient resources will be trained and developed to counter the threat. The force subscribes to the nationally recognised OCG mapping methodology and NYP will improve its capability to map OCGs both resident and impacting upon NYP.
- The crime strategy for 2007–12 sets out the force response to all areas of crime and takes into account the PS delivery plan and the ACPO threshold standards. There is a commitment to ensure that the force has sufficiently trained and accredited staff to perform each specialist role and provide resilience, compliance and adherence to the professionalising the investigative process (PIP) programme.
- Staff are currently being re-assessed against the race and diversity learning programme. The intention is to start this programme with the SLT before it is widened to the remainder of the force. This will be role-based learning.
- The training and development of officers appears to be limited, with FIOs attending a basic intelligence officer's course but having no further development after that time. The force intends to provide the PS directorates with a dedicated learning and development manager by April 2008. This appointment will enable a more focused approach to specialist training needs.

Area(s) for improvement

- The SIO development days currently being delivered would benefit from the input of members of the independent advisory group (IAG). The RisGen-assisted PS action plan has identified this issue as a risk and has applied an appropriate risk assessment.

Prevention

The force has an IAG and key individual networks. These are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The force makes use of both the force and locally based IAGs. The IAG is used during the CIA and as a source of knowledge during the investigation. It is also part of the debrief process to ensure lessons learnt are identified.
- A member of the police authority sits on the force-wide IAG board, which looks, at a strategic level, at any force policy changes. Another police authority member sits on a local IAG group in York. The local group looks at local issues with 'real communities/people'. In addition, members have been involved in the recruitment of police community support officers (PCSOs) and their training.
- Consultative arrangements with communities, have been strengthened strategically and tactically. For example, implementing and maximising contributions of race and diversity action groups and IAGs influences the force's citizen focus approach to service delivery.
- The force is a member of the North Yorkshire domestic abuse forum involving other partners and representatives of each of the main agencies. ACUs have set up multi-agency domestic violence forums with key partners, to cover multi-operational requirements and joint training events where applicable.
- A thematic group has recently been formed through the local criminal justice board (LCJB) to bring together criminal justice agencies and partners. The group drives forward joined-up improvements in services to victims and witnesses, monitors victim compliance and undertakes workstreams on behalf of the LCJB, such as the implementation of the witness charter due in April 2008.

Work in progress

- Information management is to be incorporated into the legal services department from April 2008, when structures and resources will be finalised. Previously existing protocols are being migrated into the new MoPI-compliant format.
- There are issues around the exchange of information between partners and the impact that MoPI has on any previous arrangements. The development of partnership exchange protocols has been slow and has required any outstanding protocols to be reviewed to ensure MoPI compliance. The appointment of a head of information management will assist development and implementation of partnership exchange protocols.

Area(s) for improvement

- The IAG could be used as an additional performance scrutiny process. It represents the views of under-represented groups, which is distinct from the police authority scrutiny function. There are opportunities to raise awareness among staff, in

particular specialist staff, of the 'non-visible' vulnerability issues of impaired learning, hearing, speech, etc.

- There remain some gaps in the force's ability to collate and encourage intelligence to be developed and sought from a wide range of partners and other sources. OCG mapping work will assist in the collection of intelligence in this area. The force has a specific section in the Niche intelligence system that concerns incoming communities and tensions between incoming communities. Reviews of ward profiles will also assist this area of intelligence collection.

Embryonic contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force covers the largest county in England and Wales and there are logistical problems as a consequence. Resources are deployed in the three major centres of Harrogate, York and Scarborough. The force has developed a major and serious crime attendance policy that details actions from the initial report, scene preservation and securing evidence through to the responsibilities of the SIO. It fully encapsulates the actions necessary in compliance with the golden hour principles.
- Due to limited resources at the centre to deal with major crime enquiries, resources are often drawn from the areas. The head of PS maintains an abstraction policy to ensure that abstractions impact across the force and are not always drawn from the same source. The progress of investigations is reviewed at chief officer level.
- The Chief Constable has commissioned a report in which he proposes a significant increase in the strength of the MCIT. It is also the case that a more flexible use of the current crime support unit (previously principally involved in surveillance) would augment the strength of the OCU.
- Communications staff have one day every five weeks built in for training. All staff are aware of the golden hour principles and how to access operational plans and resources. Data question sets have been developed to assist the call takers, dispatchers and team leaders. These will set up trigger plans as appropriate, and the systems are regularly tested for reliability, accuracy and resilience.
- Intelligence cover for the force is provided by the central FIB and three satellite intelligence units based at the three ACUs. All provide a daily response between the hours of 7am and 10pm and are resourced by FIOs and intelligence officers. FIOs also provide out of hours communications data as a SPOC.
- As part of the Operation into CIT offences, trigger plans were developed that provided actions to be completed in the event of a CIT offence. The detective superintendent (major crime) is responsible for considering any request for the use of HOLMES.

Work in progress

- The attendance policy and initial response to incidents has now been encapsulated into an SLA between the crime directorate and the areas. It clarifies accountability and responsibility for providing resources.

Area(s) for improvement

- Communications rooms hold data in respect of on-call personnel and key people to be informed in response to a particular incident occurring. The SLA includes information regarding on-call facilities for resources out of hours.
- The force provides night duty CID cover by one detective sergeant and two detective constables. On occasions, the detectives on nights are not accredited or

experienced and this may be a risk to the force. Officers who have been seconded on to major enquiries are required to return to their ACU to complete their tours of night duty and this impacts and disrupts the progress of the investigation.

The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- A strategic assessment is produced annually that identifies current and future gaps, trends, threats and risks in relation to criminality. This is reviewed bi-annually and updated to reflect any change in emphasis. It informs the force control strategy, which in turn identifies the force current priorities.
- The assistant chief constable (ACC) (PS) is responsible for public protection matters. A ten-year threat assessment has been completed and resources have been modelled to reflect the demand for PPU resources.
- A security review group chaired by the ACC (support services) considers terrorist assessments in relation to the military and sensitive assets. Risk and vulnerability assessments are made of significant sites, including key points and other potential terrorist targets. This also includes significant individuals and vulnerable groups.
- Resources in relation to registered sex offender management are linked to the NIM process. This ensures that appropriate risks are identified through generic risk assessment and/or intelligence that informs PPU activity.
- NPTs identify key individuals in the community who are consulted to obtain a feel for current community tensions and issues. The force recognises the growing risk to communities through alcohol-related behaviour and has engaged in a partnership initiative to reduce the increase in alcohol-related offences. The NPT developed a yellow card warning scheme to inform individuals dealt with for alcohol-related offences that they may be banned from licensed premises.
- All cases of domestic violence are reviewed at daily ACU management meetings and are subject to the NIM process. Strategies are adopted to target known and repeat offenders. Linkages between other areas of Protecting Vulnerable People are considered, and appropriately tasked actions are tracked to completion. In addition to domestic violence, the community protection units deal with hate crime and co-ordinate responses to reports of missing persons. This includes multi-agency preventive work.
- Yorkshire and Humber Government Office sets a number of targets and leads a number of initiatives and focus groups in relation to drugs use reduction and action to prevent the wider use of controlled substances. The North Yorkshire drug action team has membership at chief superintendent level and the York unitary drug action team is chaired by the Central area commander. A number of strategies, including an overdose policy, dovetail with local government initiatives.

Work in progress

- The force is examining custody records and collecting data to capture the nationality, location and current address of detained persons and OPL detainees. The force will use data obtained as a benchmark as a comparator for analysis purposes.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has conducted Pentameter 2 operations, but there are some issues around the levels of awareness of the local neighbourhood officers around this particular area of policing. There is a detective sergeant and two detective constables seconded for two years to the UK Border Agency in Leeds, where they work together with West Yorkshire UKBA secondees (formerly their Reflex team). The force should consider using their expertise in SIO masterclasses and neighbourhood policing seminars to raise awareness.

The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi-agency operations are evident.

Strengths

- The Osman policy is being updated and improved. The responses to threats to human life policy (Osman warning) seek to address threats to life that come to police notice as intelligence. The policy is available on the force intranet and can be authorised 24/7. Osman warnings are recorded on the Niche system. Identity changes are recorded on the police national computer.
- There is evidence of the use of ANPR, particularly in Operation Impact. NYP uses fixed and mobile sites. An agreement between forces to share assets to target problems in each area in rotation, once per month, has been formally agreed.
- A single point of contact is located within the FIB for the development and dissemination of firearms intelligence, which is shared at the SOCA/NCIS national firearms forum. A threat and risk assessment has been completed in accordance with the firearms code of practice and has been used to progress and develop firearms capability to deal with both spontaneous and planned firearms deployments.
- During 2007, there were three CIT robberies in the NYP area. Neighbouring forces had also suffered a number of robberies where offenders targeted security industry operatives. Intelligence indicated that OCGs from across the North East and North West regions were engaged in committing these offences. The CIT Operation had a force-wide response to deter and prevent these robberies. The force conducted the investigation in accordance with NIM, together with a proportionate firearms response plan.
- The most recent reported and confirmed incident of kidnap was in 2003 and involved foreign national females being held against their will. More recently, in 2007, there have been incidents of product contamination and blackmail in which there was a threat to a female who had been communicating with someone by email.
- There are identified processes in respect of requesting firearms resources by direct contact with other forces within the region. Mutual aid protocols have been formalised in respect of a dynamic intervention capability and the regional response to the national request for firearms resources. Cross-border firearms incidents are managed in accordance with the ACPO North East regional protocol.
- The force is developing a regional mobilisation project (formerly known as fast-time tasking co-ordinating and resourcing (FTTCR) arrangements). This project was the subject of a demonstrator site bid to the Home Office. The project has been funded by the Home Office and is designed to facilitate the resourcing of the full range of PS-related incidents in fast time (within four hours of the occurrence of an incident), thus obviating the need for the creation of permanent regional units. The mobilisation project will be launched in April 2008.

Work in progress

- During 2007, SIOs have had two inputs by the SOCA kidnap and extortion unit. The force is liaising with SOCA to progress practical exercises for SIOs. A three-day

kidnap and extortion event was held in March 2008, with a particular focus on 'green room' arrangements and relevant skills.

Area(s) for improvement

- The work in RIU needs to feed into the NYP day-to-day business. The appointment of a regional co-ordinator should see some improvement in the intelligence exchange between forces and agencies. Currently a member of RIU is embedded in the FIB at force HQ.
- The force acknowledges that an ANPR policy should exist under the umbrella of the crime intelligence and operations strategies. The force needs to improve its ability to respond to intelligence produced by fixed-site ANPR.

The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to and understood by all dedicated staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- The witness protection policy has recently been reviewed and refreshed and published on the force intranet. The policy and information are provided as part of the SIO masterclasses. The force has trained witness protection operatives. There are protocols signed up with other forces in relation to witness protection. This has recently been tested successfully with another regional force.
- The family liaison unit was established in 2002 and now consists of a comprehensive mix of staff and ranks. There is a family liaison officer (FLO) policy that dictates the distribution of FLOs which provides sufficient resilience for each Area. NYP has established robust family liaison co-ordination arrangements. A temporary full-time family liaison co-ordinator post has been established within the MCIT and it is envisaged that the service delivery plan for 2009/10 will include a proposal for a permanent FLO co-ordinator post.
- The force has reviewed the current level of assets, the predicted demand and the level of risk, and considers that its response to the threat is proportionate and adequate to deal with a requirement to respond to either internal or external requests.
- A witness protection policy provides guidelines for officers who need to place individuals under witness protection. These documents are published on the force intranet. There are a number of witness protection trained officers working in the FIB and special branch. There is an SLA with another force to supply the full range of witness protection measures if required. There is also a further SLA being progressed with another force to provide resilience in this area.

The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventive and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force produces an annual strategic assessment that is reviewed bi-annually. It identifies current and future gaps, trends, threats and risks in relation to criminality. This document informs the force control strategy, which in turn identifies the force current priorities.
- NPTs have identified a network of key individuals in the community. After each ward meeting, all attendees are provided with a community consultation document, which they are invited to complete with issues and concerns. Additionally, public attitude surveys are carried out on various areas, including major crime. All surveys and consultation documents are reviewed to highlight repetitive and topical issues. Feedback is provided to all participants and action plans implemented.
- A public attitude survey is conducted annually involving approximately 2,500 people. These results are reviewed monthly and provide feedback on the issues most prevalent to the communities. The survey covers issues such as which crimes affect/worry people most and what types of Anti Social Behaviour (ASB) worry/affect people most.
- A range of SPIs are monitored on a monthly basis that review harm to communities. SPIs of significant note are life-threatening and gun crime, domestic violence and violent crime. The force collates data in respect of drug seizures on a quarterly basis. As a result, the force is able to determine if drug seizures have increased or decreased based on drug type. ASB and the force strategic priorities are monitored on a monthly basis.
- Intelligence identifying residents appearing to live beyond their means is used to inform ongoing operations. PCSOs are seen as a valuable resource in obtaining and developing intelligence, and an intelligence requirement has been created around human trafficking. The force supports the Dalewatch scheme, which incorporates Farmwatch and other similar watches into an intelligence-gathering, community contact system.

Work in progress

- The development of profiles is progressing, being compiled from voter and other open source information. This information can be accessed through the force intranet, although it is still work in progress.
- The intelligence review that has been commissioned will be a thorough root and branch review of all intelligence structures and processes within NYP. The review is not merely confined to processes alone. The Terms of Reference for the intelligence review have been agreed by the SLT and the review will commence on 1 June 2008 and conclude on 30 August 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- There remains a focus on performance at ACU level around volume crime and

July 2008

sanction detections. The force is developing neighbourhood profiles and these should provide a baseline of the levels of crime and provide an appropriate assessment of risk to communities.

Enforcement

The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a security policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The force has completed a comprehensive strategic intelligence assessment that incorporates an assessment of integrity and vulnerability to corruption. This has been submitted to SOCA/NCIS and a control strategy is in place.
- The strategic risk assessment conducted by the force covers misuse of IT, information security and corrupt practice. The head of C&PSD acts as the focal point to ensure rigorous assessment; resourcing and investigative excellence is achieved.
- The Professional Standards Intelligence Unit has sufficient skills and expertise to manage and develop intelligence surrounding matters referred to it and also to undertake limited surveillance and proactive intelligence gathering, sufficient to make an assessment on 'next steps'. Further levels of covert activity are bought in as required and the force has excellent working relationships with other forces in respect of this. Evidence exists of operations with Cleveland, West Yorkshire and the Metropolitan Police Service.
- The OCU contacts Professional Standards Department and supplies a list of officers involved in operations.
- The PSD proactively tracks IT systems to analyse activity.
- In relation to physical security, the force has effective processes and procedures in place. The PSIU has covert, secure, non-police premises that have effective security arrangements and standalone IT systems.
- The force has applied the vetting policy, which is based upon ACPO vetting policy. Vulnerable posts are identified and are prioritised for the purposes of enhanced vetting.

Area(s) for improvement

- There remain a number of standalone confidential systems that are not yet within the MoPI framework. PSD is working with the MoPI team to integrate these systems and make them part of the wider police information systems as read only, eg Child Abuse Tracking System (CATS) database. Until there is a confidential network (a force-wide solution is scheduled for 2010), confidential systems will need, for the sake of security, to remain standalone.
- Although PSD is consulted around officers who may be working on a sensitive enquiry, it is not involved in the 72-hour review of the investigation. Attendance at the reviews would provide an opportunity to make an assessment of risk and advise on appropriate and proportionate action to minimise risks.

Enforcement

Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The force has a command team comprising a Chief Constable, DCC and two ACCs, plus an assistant chief officer in finance and personnel. One ACC has a responsibility for major and serious crime and meets with the head of crime weekly to discuss ongoing investigations and to make assessments as to progress, blockages, resourcing and cost issues.
- Gold review meetings take place in the event of a serious incident and there is structure to provide a scrutiny of ongoing investigations around the performance of SIOs. The force reports to the police authority on costs associated with any major enquiry or operation and has a contingency fund to support any additional resources that may have to be bought in to the force.
- The police authority has an oversight of the performance of the force via regular updates through its board structure and scrutinises service delivery, which is also overseen by the performance scrutiny committee. In addition, the police authority has a monthly meeting in which the Chief Constable is invited to address the authority on issues that may be pertinent at that time and that will affect the policing of the force.
- The police authority has been engaged with the CCR process in the force and the Chief Constable has given the police authority his initial informal feedback on the emerging findings. This will be put into a more formal context for due consideration. Police authority members are reasonably happy about what they have heard from the Chief Constable to date but await more detailed feedback on the proposals.
- Major crime reviews are conducted in accordance with MIM. The 72-hour review covers main lines of enquiry, resourcing and finance arrangements and ACPO is aware of its responsibilities to show leadership and support of this process.
- The Chief Constable and his deputy conduct structured performance visits to each ACU and department. There is an emphasis on the level of support provided to ACUs from specialist resources. Any issues raised are actioned and reviewed with the departmental head. Any changes to policy take place within agreed timescales. The DCC conducts regular performance reviews and the Chief Constable conducts quarterly corporate health checks.

Work in progress

- The Chief Constable has asked that selected police authority members are vetted to a higher level; this is currently ongoing. This will enable more information to be shared with the police authority on major crime and serious and organised crime issues.

Area(s) for improvement

- The IAG could be used as an additional performance scrutiny process and should be used on the gold group. It represents the views of under-represented groups, which is distinct from the police authority scrutiny function. There are opportunities to raise awareness among staff, in particular specialist staff, of the non-visible vulnerability issues of impaired learning, hearing, speech, etc. There is a willingness of members to contribute to raising awareness of diversity issues through the use of the IAG.

July 2008

The ACPO lead and/or the head of crime are fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. These officers are supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training in critical incident command, CIAs and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACC (PS) and head of crime, together with existing SIOs, have been trained in the management of linked and series crime. The head of major crime and the head of the OCU are trained in serial offenders and series crimes. A further SIO was trained in series and linked crime in 2004.
- The force SIOs make use of ANPR data and key individual networks during investigations. They ensure that a CIA takes place both before and after the investigation to assess the reassurance aspects within communities. Examples were provided of instances where a CIA has been used during investigations into areas with minority communities. A corporate CIA template is in use and this was effectively utilised post 7/7.
- Seven SIO masterclasses have been held and a further five are scheduled. The content includes updates on legislation, updates on knowledge, and case studies on SIO management issues as diverse as honour violence and Operation Chive. The SIO development day concept has been extended to detective sergeants and SNT inspectors.
- There is a good understanding with coroners regarding deaths in care homes, eg investigation with the Health and Safety Executive in December 2005, and there has been joint training on SIO development days. The force has demonstrated its ability to work jointly with the Health and Safety Executive in the investigation of incidents.
- NYP PS Business Intelligence Unit has developed and implemented a matrix that contains details of all sudden and unexplained deaths (from January 2008). The matrix provides data from which trends in sudden and unexplained deaths (including suicides) can be identified and analysed.
- The force also deals expeditiously with the number of incidents arising from having Catterick Garrison and other military/defence establishments within its boundaries. There are several examples of effective policing partnership in this area.

Work in progress

- The force is developing a critical incident policy to ensure that all staff are aware of what constitutes one. This will identify key roles for key staff and be underpinned with mandatory training for them.
- A critical incident policy has been in place for some time. In addition to SIO and detective sergeant development training, there is a planned development day taking place on 27 May 2008, at which SNT inspectors will receive, among other things, a focused input on the identification of critical incidents.

July 2008

- Critical incident training has been delivered to response staff and all control room staff. This is an ongoing schedule of training delivery and is focused on areas to improve performance around priorities contained within the control strategy.
- The force is looking at the major crime issues across the force and how collaboration arrangements can ensure it can manage any potential identified threats or risks.
- A resourcing SLA for major investigations has been agreed with the territorial areas and has been implemented. An abstraction matrix is currently being enhanced to provide a comprehensive, dynamic record of availability and current deployment of investigative resources in respect of every relevant unit (territorial and HQ) in the force.

Area(s) for improvement

- The formation of the crime directorate under the leadership of a chief superintendent provides the force with an opportunity to ensure there is some corporacy of delivery around the support mechanisms to ACUs.
- Some ward profiles have now been completed and it is anticipated that full completion will be achieved by mid May 2008. Progress is being monitored by the safer neighbourhood's board.

The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- Major crime reviews are conducted in accordance with MIM. The 72-hour review covers main lines of enquiry, resourcing and finance arrangements and ACPO is aware of its responsibilities to show leadership and support of this process. This process also includes the financial implications and progress associated with costs of major crime investigations.
- The force is undertaking a structured approach to the reinvestigation of historic undetected major crimes. The progression of such cases is the responsibility of a dedicated SIO who has prepared a briefing document for the cold case review team. Several areas are being re-visited: Operations rape and serious sexual assaults, series of linked crimes by DNA with no offender identified, low copy DNA analysis, NYP homicide audit and the NYP crime audit (undetected rapes and serious sexual assaults).
- The Terms of Reference are agreed for each case, which will be sanctioned by the ACC (support services) (PS) and the SIO identified as having responsibility for the re-investigation. This will also include the provision of re-investigation progress updates from the SIO to the ACC (support services) (PS).
- The regular operational performance reviews conducted by the DCC ensure that each department and ACU is challenged on performance and procedures. This process provides opportunity for an evaluation of the impact of major crime on ACUs and how a corporate approach is being taken on resourcing issues.
- Policies are in place for the review of homicides with two recently being undertaken by outside consultants. The force uses feedback from the review process to review its major incident capacity, skills availability and specialist assets, including technical assets. Any recommendations with actions are incorporated into a corporate action plan to process all organisational review recommendations.
- There is a capability for monitoring costs of each individual enquiry. The unfunded major incidents budget is controlled and monitored by the head of major crime and the head of crime, and the PS business manager provides the capability for financial management for such enquiries.
- SIO development days provide opportunities for the dissemination of 'identified good practice' in the area of major crime investigation. They provide opportunities for the force to deliver awareness of national good practice and advances in the area of forensic investigation.

Work in progress

- The SLT made a decision during the CCR that there would be no specifically dedicated resources for the pursuit of cold case reviews. However, there is a robust cold case methodology and the cold case caseload has been scoped. Arrangements are currently in hand for the prioritisation and allocation of cold case reviews.

Area(s) for improvement

- The costs associated with major crime incidents are calculated on costs of overtime and not total costs. However, associated costs attributable for backfill at districts, which may involve overtime, are not included. In addition, overtime costs may be compounded if there are insufficient numbers of officers dedicated to the enquiry in the initial stages. Without the total costs, the force may find it difficult to achieve an accurate reflection of how each SIO manages the costs of an enquiry.
- There was a view that the forensic support within the force is based on budget rather than demand and that policy is based on the financial resources available rather than a realistic overview of what is needed within the investigative process. Many of the requirements are outsourced, which impacts on the speed a result can be achieved. The force should consider the SLAs in existence and fully review the timeliness and accountability of suppliers.

Performance Management and Resilience

The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and Yorkshire and Humber forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide sufficient protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- SIO development days are being held and a type of 'masterclass' ensures that SIOs are kept updated by current outcomes of reviews of major crime issues in North Yorkshire and other forces. So far, seven training days have been held, with outside speakers covering all aspects of a major crime and serious and organised crime investigation. The SIO development day concept has been extended to detective sergeants and SNT inspectors.
- The head of forensic services provides a 24-hour call-out facility and an MOU is being developed into an SLA with Cleveland Constabulary for his services to be used as a forensic adviser. The regional collaboration opportunities are being explored in respect of the standardisation of level 2 kit and are working with South Yorkshire Police on major crime technical capacity regarding CCTV and other technical opportunities.
- The casualty bureau is one of the responsibilities of the MCIT. Initially the staff working within the crime recording unit would become the casualty bureau, with the force switching to reporting of crime by template.
- There is a HOLMES support team available to immediately support a major crime investigation. There are sufficient staff on areas who are trained, in the main PC indexers as well as some support staff. The force is currently reviewing the provision of HOLMES trained staff to ensure there is an equal distribution across the force. Officers are subject to call-out procedures. Records are kept of the abstractions of staff and this information is used to try and give an equal exposure to individuals and maintain their continuous professional development. All staff receive refresher training, which is delivered by HOLMES supervisors.
- Critical incident training has been delivered to response staff and all control room staff. This is an ongoing schedule of training delivery and focused on areas to improve performance around priorities contained within the control strategy.
- There are four level 5 interview advisers in the force. In addition, one of these is on the national advisers list and there are sufficient advanced suspect interviewers in force.
- NYP has established robust family liaison co-ordination arrangements. A temporary full-time family liaison co-ordinator post has been established within the MCIT and it is envisaged that the service delivery plan for 2009/10 will include a proposal for a permanent family liaison co-ordinator post.

July 2008

- Policy outlines the procedures regarding attendance and investigation of unexplained deaths. All suicides require the attendance of CID. Unexplained deaths in military establishments are covered by the draft sudden and unexplained death investigation policy. Unexplained deaths in prisons/institutes are covered under the auspices of the major and serious crime attendance policy.

Work in progress

- A service delivery board has been initiated and will examine the recommendations and findings emanating from the CCR and will support the road map 2012 and its identified priorities.
- A resourcing SLA for major investigations has been agreed with the territorial areas and has been implemented. An abstraction matrix is currently being enhanced to provide a comprehensive, dynamic record of availability and current deployment of investigative resources in respect of every relevant unit (territorial and HQ) in the force.
- Second sourcing is dealt with by the intelligence cell set up for a specific investigation. Where there is a necessity for additional confidentiality, this can be dealt with by the covert standards unit and other relevant teams through specific nominated individuals. Relationships with SOCA and the regional CT unit are being progressed.
- The acting head of crime is developing a succession planning matrix to identify the gaps in expertise and skills in the next five years. Collaborating with the CCR team and taking cognisance of the Chief Constable's road map to 2012. The acting head of crime will develop processes to identify potential and establish a career path to SIO from the rank of detective sergeant.
- Training of candidates and assessors for PIP accreditation is under way and is expected to be completed by the end of May 2008. The next stage will be to train internal verifiers, which is also envisaged to be completed by the end of May 2008.
- Training is co-ordinated both centrally and on an area basis. Extensive work was done to identify who required PIP and at what level. Some of this training is delivered by the area training unit.
- The PS BIU has developed and implemented a matrix that contains details of all sudden and unexplained deaths (from January 2008). The matrix provides data from which trends in sudden and unexplained deaths (including suicides) can be identified and analysed.
- Consideration has been given to the provision of dedicated analytical support to the OCU. However, such provision would detract from the integration of the OCU into the force as a whole and may lead to a potentially divisive situation where the OCU becomes a self-contained 'firm within a firm'.
- The force has a media and marketing provision and advisers are available to SIOs during the 24-hour period. As staff have recently changed, the force has entered into a collaboration agreement with West Yorkshire that will draw on the expertise and experience of their media and marketing team and will support the force during major crime investigations.

Area(s) for improvement

- The availability of SIOs at detective inspector levels is being reviewed. A consideration is that the third detective inspector on the ACU will be provided with appropriate accreditation through the PIP process, this will increase resilience and availability of specialist skills.
- PIP training is progressing, with seminars being held to explain the process and the responsibilities of supervisors. The force needs to be clear regarding what evidence will be required to meet the competence areas within the development portfolios. Currently the situation is unclear, with differing advice being provided by assessors with differing levels of experience. The force has made a commitment to train assessors by 2008.
- After the CCR, the SLT decided that the position of territorial area detective superintendent should be disestablished. This may impact on the role of the ACU ACU-based detective chief inspector and the force should ensure that its levels of experience and skills enable it to discharge its responsibilities in the area of major crime investigation.
- The force does not have a crime training strategy and the temporary head of training is looking to develop a specific strategy to encompass the areas around PS. The force does not have a dedicated crime training unit and many specialist courses are delivered from external sources. As the training budget is held by the ACUs, it is difficult to deliver a corporate training strategy without full control of the budgets. PS are working towards the establishment of a dedicated training manager post. The post holder will be engaged to conduct a training needs analysis of specialist crime training.
- The ongoing review of the intelligence structures will complement the CCR in determining the levels of resources needed within the departments to provide the necessary support and drive around priorities within the control strategy. It will also provide a baseline for the force to build upon as it develops a more strategic regional overview of the impact of major crime and how the force responds to identified risks and threats.
- The intelligence review that has been commissioned will be a thorough root and branch review of all intelligence structures and processes within NYP. The review is not merely confined to processes alone. The TOR for the intelligence review have been agreed by the SLT and the review will commence on 1 June 2008 and conclude on 30 August 2008.
- The MCIT was formed in June 2006 and is required to resource the specialist skills required if a major crime takes place. The force has a number of exhibits officers based at the three ACUs. The force should consider the use of specialist staff on ongoing major enquiries to ensure that they are provided with opportunities for continuous personal development. In some instances, the same officers with the requisite skills are retained on successive investigations because a 'team' approach is taken. The review being conducted by the DCC should ensure that it identifies personnel and not purely skills sets.

Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through an infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of mutual aid, air support, underwater search and casualty bureau are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements, which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- A covert standards department provides policy and guidance in relation to covert tactics. The department provides a firewall through which a degree of anonymity and protection can be afforded.
- Officers and staff receive an appropriate level of security clearance for the role they are performing. Managers within the FIB and serious and organised crime have attended covert law enforcement managers courses. Specialist officers and staff receive the appropriate level of training in covert tactics for their role. The force has applied the vetting policy, which is based upon ACPO vetting policy. Vulnerable posts are identified and are prioritised for the purposes of enhanced vetting.
- A force operation provided the firearms response to an incident involving CIT offences. This was connected to an ongoing force operation investigation into this type of criminality. This included a Mobile Armed Surveillance Team (MAST) /surveillance operation being carried out as part of the investigation. During Operation Camas, the force utilised forensics and telecoms to gain evidence to identify nominals with a series of CIT offences.
- The force has a dedicated Technical Support Unit facility for the provision of reassurance products around alarms and other recording systems for visual and audio recording. Policy published on the force intranet sets out guidance in respect of technical surveillance governance and the use of Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 authorities with clear lines of accountability. The force relies on SOCA for additional support in respect of covert technical assets.
- There are agreements in place for mutual aid from regional forces if required through Operation Maine (mutual aid in the North East). NYP is compliant with the training standard set for the HOLMES teams in the No.2 region. The HOLMES system is also used where appropriate as a document control system to provide assistance to get a file ready for court.
- The force has agreements in place with other forces for underwater body recovery and air support. The force is part of a seven-force mutual aid group in respect of additional resources required for operating a casualty bureau web application. Although no MOUs exist in relation to the staffing levels for major incidents, the mutual aid arrangements between forces are robust and have proved adequate over recent years.
- There are identified processes in respect of requesting firearms and specialist support service resources by direct contact with other forces within the region. Requests for resources on a national basis are addressed via the police national information co-ordinating centre.
- Operational requirements are reviewed and linked to the threat assessment informing staffing, equipment, weapons systems, policies and procedures. The

July 2008

provision of armed response vehicles, authorised firearms officers, a tactical firearms unit and a CT unit meets current demand. The operational firearms group meets quarterly and reviews capability and capacity.

- North Yorkshire hosts several military sites of national and international strategic importance. Special joint protocols in respect of the deployment of firearms and less lethal weapons have been established and maintained through the CT unit.
- The crime support unit provides a surveillance capability that is tasked for all planned operations through the level 2 TCG meeting.

Work in progress

- The force does not have any formal agreements, SLA or MOU in place with other forces in the region for securing resources to support a major crime or serious and organised crime investigation. However, there is good evidence of assistance given during a number of operations. The head of major crime has visited the heads of crime in the region and has concluded there is no need for formal arrangements.
- The regional mobilisation project (formerly known as FTTCR) was the subject of a demonstrator site bid to the Home Office. The project has been funded by the Home Office and is designed to facilitate the resourcing of the full range of PS-related incidents in fast time (within four hours of the occurrence of an incident), thus obviating the need for the creation of permanent regional units. The mobilisation project was launched in April 2008.
- Arrangements have been made to provide search capability from safer neighbourhood support teams for the period between 8am and 12am seven days a week. The arrangements will be the subject of review.
- The test purchase team is tasked through level 2. With the change in leadership of the level 2 tasking meeting, there is an expectation that the test purchase team will be provided with appropriate targets.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force does not have a confidential unit because interception requirements are not common and there is a reliance on SOCA to do this work and assist as required. This was tried and tested during Operation Harpoon (cannabis factories). It has been acknowledged by HMIC that there would not be a frequent demand for the services of a confidential unit within NYP. As a consequence, investment in such a unit within the force could not be justified. NYP would support the creation of a Yorkshire and Humber region confidential unit.
- The force has used workforce modernisation to enhance the investigative capacity by the employment of civilian investigators. The force should review the impact of such arrangements on the availability of staff to target level 2 activities.
- The force does not appear to have an overview of the skills held within its workforce and the same officers with particular skills are used constantly. Accepting that the force has a large geographical area to cover, there should be some consideration to the dilution of skills amongst specially skilled officers if they are used infrequently.

Developing practice

Through the Yorkshire and Humber collaboration, the force has submitted a demonstrator site bid to identify a 'rapid response' tasking capacity that will identify the risks and threats from level 2 and 3 crime and make an assessment on regional capacity issues. Protocols will be developed, together with written commitments, to resource identified threats within the region and ensure there is clarity of the region's response to the regional threat. The force is currently recruiting an appropriate individual at superintendent rank to undertake the task.

The force has an on-demand case review team that is deployed when current and historic major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is effective.

Strengths

- The force is engaged in the investigation of undetected historic cases and has developed processes to progress the investigation and capture evidence involving scientific support. There is a cold case methodology that clearly outlines the process for the selection and investigation of cold cases. A detective superintendent was appointed in November 2006 to oversee cold case reviews and assist with live reviews.
- The team is currently engaged with Operations into rape and serious sexual assaults, series of linked crimes by DNA with no offender identified, low copy DNA analysis, NYP Homicide homicide audit and the NYP crime audit (undetected rapes and serious sexual assaults).
- The force has identified the issues around DNA technology, low copy and the impact that investigations have on victims. A briefing document for the cold case review team has been developed, which is encapsulated in force policy.
- Roads policing supervisors have undertaken the SIO training programme and been accredited. Fatalities occasioned through traffic incidents are subject to the same levels of scrutiny.

Work in progress

- The cold case review policy is being developed to ensure there is management of identified cases in accordance with national guidance (major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP)). It is intended that a review panel be identified and chaired by the head of scientific support and include heads of major crime and an experienced SIO.
- A business case for a dedicated detective inspector is being pursued. It will be considered within the business planning process and with regard to the CCR being conducted.
- The TOR will be agreed for each case and sanctioned by the ACC (PS) and the SIO identified as having responsibility for the re-investigation. This will also include the provision of re-investigation progress updates from the SIO to the ACC (PS).
- The SLT made a decision during the CCR that there would be no specifically dedicated resources for the pursuit of cold case reviews. However, there is a robust cold case methodology and the cold case caseload has been scoped. Arrangements are currently in hand for the prioritisation and allocation of cold case reviews.
- There is an acknowledgment that the current methodology may be adjusted to become more forensic focused. The bulk of NYP cold cases are of rape. The resourcing of these investigations will be allocated to level 3 qualified investigators. In line with force procedures and in response to the ACPO threshold standards, this has been entered on to the force risk register and will be subject to quarterly review.

The inspection found evidence that the force is fully compliant with relevant ACPO standards of MIM and MIRSAP.

Strengths

- The force has a policy and structure to investigate, manage and review major enquiries that comply with best practice guidelines and MIM. There is scrutiny and oversight from ACPO level on a structured basis, including gold meetings to maintain progress.
- The force draws upon regional and national practice and guidance to review and assess existing practice and make changes. As part of his programme for intelligence development, the director of intelligence has included advice/guidance from NPIA around the Avon and Somerset Cedar model. Relevant documentation is available on the force intranet.
- Because of the extended geographical nature of the force area and the lack of centralised resources during the inspection, the force was seen to take a considered and pragmatic approach to the application of MIRSAP, reviewing activity/actions on an agreed basis.
- Policy files are completed for the investigation into every major crime and this forms part of the scrutiny process. In addition, the review of policy files is subject to peer reviews and reviews from external consultants. Any learning points are progressed through SIO development days and any amendment to policy actioned and progressed. Policy files include rationale around decision making, including not taking a particular course of action in an investigation.

Work in progress

- The force is reviewing the processes surrounding road death investigations to ensure compliance with the ACPO road death investigation manual. This work is to be considered as part of the regional roads policing project and the specific recommendation to introduce a dedicated road death investigative team, which will include quality assurance and review functions.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACU	Area Command Unit
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ARV	armed response vehicle

B

BME	black and minority ethnic
-----	---------------------------

C

CCR	capacity and capability review
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CID	criminal investigation department
CIT	cash in transit
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CPU	community protection unit
CRISP	Cross-Regional Information Sharing Project
CSI	crime scene investigation/investigator
CT	counter-terrorism

D

DC	detective constable
DCC	deputy chief constable
DS	detective sergeant

F

FI	financial investigator
FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIO	field intelligence officer
FIU	financial investigation unit
FLO	family liaison officer
FSA	force strategic assessment
FTTCR	fast-time tasking, co-ordinating and resourcing

H

HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HQ	headquarters

I

IAG	independent advisory group
IT	information technology

L

LCJB	local criminal justice board
------	------------------------------

M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MARAC	multi-agency risk assessment conference
MCIT	major crime investigation team
MIM	murder investigation manual
MIRSAP	major incident room standardised administrative procedures
MoPI	management of police information
MOU	memorandum of understanding

MSF most similar force(s)

N

NCIS National Criminal Intelligence Service

NCPE National Centre for Policing Excellence

NHP neighbourhood policing

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

NPT neighbourhood policing teams

NYP North Yorkshire Police

O

OCG organised crime group

OCU organised crime unit

OPL over the prescribed limit

P

PCSO police community support officer

PDU partnership data unit

PIP professionalising the investigative process

POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

PPU public protection unit

PS protective services

PSD professional standards department

PSIU professional standards intelligence unit

R

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

RIU regional intelligence unit

S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SB	special branch
SCAS	serious crime analysis section
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIA	strategic intelligence assessment
SIO	senior investigating officer
SLA	service level agreement
SLT	senior leadership team
SMT	senior management team
SNT	safet neighbourhood team
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact

T

T&C	tasking and co-ordination
TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
TOR	terms of reference

U

UKBA	UK Border Agency
------	------------------

Appendix 2: Developing Practice

Developing practice 1

Micro-analysis risk assessment

Micro-analysis is a process that was developed in North Yorkshire and has now been accepted and utilised by a number of different forces around the country, including the other forces of the YATH region. The process facilitates the assessment of PS-related threats and assets and the assessment of gaps in capability and capacity of available assets to deal with identified threats. The process then allows for the risk assessment of the gaps that are identified in respect of capability and capacity. NYP now uses micro-analysis as a method of gathering data to inform the RisGen-assisted PS action plan for the force (which assesses gaps in NYP capability and capacity when compared with ACPO PS standards expectations, National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) doctrine expectations, and assessed threats).

Developing practice 2

Through the Yorkshire and Humber collaboration, the force has submitted a demonstrator site bid to identify a 'rapid response' tasking capacity that will identify the risks and threats from level 2 and 3 crime and make an assessment on regional capacity issues. Protocols will be developed, together with written commitments, to resource identified threats within the region and ensure there is clarity of the region's response to the regional threat. The force is currently recruiting an appropriate individual at superintendent rank to undertake the task.