



## HMIC Inspection Report

### North Yorkshire Police

October 2007



*North Yorkshire Police – HMIC Inspection Report*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent both of the Home Office and of the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005 and has thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC then consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking fewer but more probing inspections. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that Neighbourhood Policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence will be gathered, verified and then assessed against an agreed set of national standards, in the form of specific grading criteria (SGC). However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

### Programmed frameworks

This report contains assessments of the first three key areas of policing to be inspected under HMIC's new programme of work:

1. Neighbourhood Policing;
2. performance management; and
3. protecting vulnerable people.

Neighbourhood Policing has been inspected not only because it is a key government priority but also, and more importantly, because it addresses a fundamental need for a style of policing that is rooted in and responds to local concerns. The police service must, of course, offer protection from high-level threats such as terrorism and organised criminality, but it

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also has a key role in tackling the unacceptable behaviour of the minority of people who threaten the quality of life of law-abiding citizens.

Performance management is an activity largely hidden from public view, although members of the public are directly affected by poor performance on the part of their local force. This inspection has focused on the need for forces to maximise the opportunities for performance improvement. It also posed questions as to whether forces have an accurate picture of how they are doing and the capability to respond to changing priorities. This area was selected for inspection because it is a key factor in delivering good performance across the board.

Protecting vulnerable people covers four related areas – child abuse, domestic violence, public protection and missing persons – that address the critically important role of the police in protecting the public from potentially serious harm. In the 2006 baseline assessment this was the worst performing area and raised the most serious concerns for HMIC and others. As a result, this area was prioritised for scrutiny in 2007.

### **Risk-based frameworks**

In addition to its programmed inspection work, HMIC continues to monitor performance across a range of policing activity, notably those areas listed in the table below.

<b>HMIC risk-based frameworks</b>
Fairness and equality in service delivery
Volume crime reduction
Volume crime investigation
Improving forensic performance
Criminal justice processes
Reducing anti-social behaviour
Contact management
Training, development and organisational learning

While these activities will not be subject to routine inspection, evidence of a significant decline in performance would prompt consideration of inspection. For 150 years, HMIC has maintained an ongoing relationship with every force. This allows it to identify and support forces when specific issues of concern arise. On a more formal basis, HMIC participates in the Home Office Police Performance Steering Group and Joint Performance Review Group, which have a role in monitoring and supporting police performance in crime reduction, crime investigation and public confidence.

HMIC conducts inspections of basic command units (BCUs), also on a risk-assessed basis, using the Going Local 3 methodology. Combining these various strands of inspection evidence allows HMIC to form a comprehensive picture of both individual force performance and the wider national picture.

## The grading process

Grades awarded by HMIC are a reflection of the performance delivered by the force over the assessment period April 2006 to July 2007. One of four grades can be awarded, according to performance assessed against the SGC (for the full list of SGC, see <http://inspectors.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/methodologies/baseline-introduction/ba-methodology-06/?version=1>).

### *Excellent*

This grade describes the highest level of performance in service delivery and achieving full compliance with codes of practice or national guidance. It is expected that few forces will achieve this very high standard for a given activity. To achieve Excellent, forces are expected to meet **all** of the criteria set out in the Fair SGC and the vast majority of those set out in Good. In addition, two other factors will attract consideration of an Excellent grade:

- The force should be recognised, or be able to act, as a 'beacon' to others, and be accepted within the service as a source of leading-edge practice. Evidence that other forces have successfully imported practices would demonstrate this.
- HMIC is committed to supporting innovation and we would expect Excellent forces to have introduced and evaluated new ways of delivering or improving performance.

### *Good*

Good is defined in the Collins English Dictionary as 'of a high quality or level' and denotes performance above the minimum standard. To reach this level, forces have to meet in full the criteria set out in Fair and most of the criteria set out in Good.

### *Fair*

Fair is the delivery of an acceptable level of service, which meets national threshold standards where these exist. To achieve a Fair grading, forces must meet all of the significant criteria set out in the Fair SGC. HMIC would expect that, across most activities, the largest number of grades will be awarded at this level.

### *Poor*

A Poor grade represents an unacceptably low level of service. To attract this very critical grade, a force will have fallen well short of a significant number of criteria set out in the SGC for Fair. In some cases, failure to achieve a single critical criterion may alone warrant a Poor grade. Such dominant criteria will always be flagged in the SGC but may also reflect a degree of professional judgement on the level of risk being carried by the force.

## Developing practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected as a strength in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit examples of its good practice. HMIC has selected three or more of these examples to publish in this report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces (each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required). HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

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## Future HMIC inspection activity

Although HMIC will continue to maintain a watching brief on all performance areas, its future inspection activity (see provisional timescales below) will be determined by a risk assessment process. Protective services will be at the core of inspection programmes, tailored to capacity, capability and the likelihood of exposure to threats from organised criminality, terrorism and so on. Until its full implementation in April 2008, Neighbourhood Policing will also demand attention. Conversely, those areas (such as volume crime) where performance is captured by statutory performance indicators (SPIs), iQuanta and other objective evidence will receive scrutiny only where performance is deteriorating, as described above.

The Government has announced that, in real terms, there will be little or no growth in police authority/force budgets over the next three years. Forces will therefore have to maintain, and in some areas improve, performance without additional central support or funding. This in itself creates a risk to police delivery and HMIC has therefore included a strategic resource management assessment for all forces in its future inspection programme.

<b>Planned Inspection areas</b>
Serious and organised crime
Major crime
Neighbourhood Policing
Strategic resource management
Customer service and accessibility
Critical incident management
Professional standards
Public order
Civil contingencies
Information management
Strategic roads policing
Leadership

## Force Overview and Context

North Yorkshire Police (NYP) is the Home Office police force covering the non-metropolitan county of North Yorkshire and the unitary authority of York.

NYP was formed on 1 April 1974 under the Local Government Act 1972, and was largely a successor to the York and North East Yorkshire Police, also taking part of the old West Riding.

### Geographical description of force area

NYP is responsible for policing England's largest county covering 7,770 square kilometres from Selby in the south to Richmond in the north, as well as the unitary authority of York. The perimeter is 794 kilometres, and at its widest point west to east it is 154 kilometres and from north to south it is 105 kilometres. Two national parks, the North York Moors and the Yorkshire Dales, cover a large area of North Yorkshire. It has 72 kilometres of coastline and shares its boundary with seven other police forces.

NYP headquarters (HQ) is in the village of Newby Wiske, centrally positioned within the county and located within the Eastern Area Command Unit (ACU). The force is structured around ACUs, and these territorial units are coterminous with a number of local government structures and crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) as follows:

- Western ACU, made up of three district authorities, Harrogate Borough, Craven and Richmondshire, with the area HQ in Ripon;
- Eastern ACU, made up of three district authorities, Hambleton, Scarborough and Ryedale, with the area HQ in Malton; and
- Central ACU made up of one unitary authority, the City of York, and the district authority of Selby. The area HQ is located in York.

The ACPO team is based at HQ and consists of the Chief Constable, appointed on 18 April 2007; the deputy chief constable (DCC), appointed on 27 April 2007; the assistant chief constable (ACC) (protective services), the ACC (strategic development), the assistant chief officer (resources and finance) and assistant chief officer (people).

As from 5 June 2007 the chief officer portfolios were realigned to cover:

- Chief Constable – chief of staff, Chief Constable's delivery unit;
- DCC – territorial policing, safer neighbourhoods, complaints, professional standards and legal services;
- ACC (protective services) – crime directorate, operations directorate and communications directorate;
- ACC (strategic development) – information services department, corporate development department, marketing and media, business development, community safety, administration of justice and relationships;
- assistant chief officer (resources and finance) – finance, fleet, procurement, property and facilities; and
- assistant chief officer (people) – personnel, training, health and safety, health and welfare.

While some specialist resources are co-ordinated centrally, eg firearms, crime scene investigators and child protection, the focus is on front-line, ACU-based staff delivering local solutions.



## **Demographic profile of force area**

The economy is based primarily on agriculture and tourism. Earnings are above the regional average and approximately 94% of the national figure. House prices are above the national average. The county has a population of 768,721 and, in terms of demography, North Yorkshire compared with the national picture has a lower than average number of young people and a higher than average number of people aged 75 years or over. This reflects the movement of younger people out of the area in search of social and economic opportunities and the movement of older people into the area. The significant numbers resident in communal, education and care establishments also influence the proportions, as do the numbers of military personnel and dependents at Catterick Garrison, which constitutes about 20% of the population of Richmondshire.

There are two cities in the county, York, with a population of 186,762, and Ripon. The county's resident black and minority ethnic communities are currently estimated at 1.38% of the population, with Chinese, Indian and Pakistani being the three largest groups. North Yorkshire has also recently seen a rise in its Polish community. There are wide variations in the distribution of the population across the force area.

## **Strategic priorities**

The NYP/North Yorkshire Police Authority (NYPA) policing plan for 2007 to 2010 (known as <sup>NY</sup>Policing Thrust) is a short, easy to read public document. NYPA members contributed to the development of the plan, which is informed by the National Community Safety Plan, consultation and local priorities.

NYP's vision and mission are currently being revised by the Chief Constable in consultation with the police authority and will be published by the end of June 2007. The policing plan shows there are five core objectives:

- increasing customer satisfaction with NYP services;
- reducing crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB);
- bringing offenders to justice;
- reducing the fear of crime and ASB; and
- reducing serious and fatal road traffic collisions.

The <sup>NY</sup>Policing Thrust focuses on what NYP will deliver and putting the customer first will be at the heart of everything as it strives to fulfil its mission to deliver quality policing for local communities. NYP will deliver this through Neighbourhood Policing and partnership working, supported by excellent customer service.

The quality of service NYP delivers is a high priority and it has made a commitment to the public about the standards of service they can expect. NYP is committed to providing a service that responds professionally and appropriately to people's needs.

The Quality of Service Commitment (QoS) covers the following areas:

- making it easy to contact NYP;
- providing a professional and high-quality service;
- dealing with initial enquiries;
- keeping people informed;
- ensuring the public's voice counts;
- dealing effectively with victims of crime;
- listening and responding to concerns and complaints; and
- dealing with freedom of information requests.

## **Force developments since 2006**

### ***Neighbourhood Policing***

Neighbourhood Policing is on track to become fully embedded in North Yorkshire by March 2008. All neighbourhoods are covered by safer neighbourhood teams, including a full complement of police community safety officers (PCSOs) who have now been appointed within the force. Multi-agency neighbourhood management structures are becoming established, delivering long-term solutions to local community priorities and fully engaging with their communities.

### ***Operational support project***

The implementation of the Niche records management system is affecting structural and business change. The operational support project has adopted an incremental approach rather than a 'big bang' business change. In March 2006 custody and case preparation went live, providing integrated workflow from booking a suspect in to submission of the file and, through interfaces with other systems, facilitating exchange of information with criminal justice partners.

'Go live' of intelligence was achieved, in October 2006, with the introduction of improved templates for the electronic submission of intelligence feeds with more efficient processes for the sanitisation, grading and dissemination of intelligence. The ability to link information in the records management system obviates the need to submit intelligence feeds for arrested persons, bringing efficiencies in the inputting of data.

Work is now progressing towards the 'go live' of recording and management of occurrences, crimes and road traffic collisions; this will include an interface with the command and control systems, thereby providing an end-to-end integration of the occurrence management process from receipt of call in the first instance to final disposal of the case.

### ***Public access***

The public access unit has continued to develop its use of the force command and control system (STORM) with the development of standard operating procedures and question sets in support of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE) good practice guides.

Call-handling performance has improved and targets for both emergency and non-emergency are being achieved. This is supported by a robust call monitoring process, ensuring full compliance with National Call Handling Standards and the QoSC. Compliance with the National Standards of Incident Recording and the National Crime Recording Standards remains good.

A service review meeting structure has been established with ACUs and this has delivered improved incident management and Neighbourhood Policing processes. A comprehensive 'developing people' programme has been established, providing good quality training and development to all staff.

### ***Community protection units***

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The community protection units (CPUs) encompass domestic violence, vulnerable persons and those missing from home. The main role of these units is to provide specialist investigative experience, improving the investigations into domestic abuse and vulnerability.

The target was to reduce repeat victims within domestic violence to below the national average of 45%. NYP has seen a reduction from 47% to below 40%.

The units have carried out multi-agency work, creating such projects as 'Making Safe', which keeps domestic violence victims within their homes and moves the offenders out, as well as working with the probation service with the integrated domestic abuse project. This multi-agency work has shown a reduction in repeat offending from a baseline of 75% down to 10.8% in one of the ACUs.

Specialist domestic violence courts have been started in one of the ACUs; these have reduced the waiting time for trials to as little as four weeks from incident to trial, thereby reducing some of the stress on the victims.

Work has been carried out to ensure that elderly victims, or victims with learning difficulties who require video interviews, have them carried out by an officer who is fully trained in this specialist field. This has been achieved by providing multi-agency training for all agencies and providers, with the police taking the lead. Projects are shared between the three ACUs to ensure best practice is achieved.

The units act as the single point of contact (SPOC) for low-risk missing persons as well as ensuring that investigation standards are met. The units are in place to ensure that information regarding families at risk is shared with other partner agencies.

### ***Protective services microanalysis***

The NYP microanalysis team devised the force microanalysis methodology, which included analysis of the serious and organised and cross-border crime threats, assets, gaps and rules applicable to NYP. From 1 May 2007 NYP is advising the Yorkshire and Humber Region forces in respect of the conduct of a microanalysis of protective services capability and capacity.

### ***Witness/victim care teams***

The North Yorkshire victim and witness information partnership continues to exceed the minimum requirements under 'No Witness No Justice' from point of charge. NYP, in collaboration with public access, is currently building on these principles and working on improving services to victims and witnesses, from the point of the crime report, to provide seamless information and support services.

North Yorkshire is one of three areas participating in a national study, sponsored by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, concerning criminal justice services to child witnesses. This study is taking place over a period of two years and will identify gaps in services and areas of best practice. NYP has very close working links with the victim support and witness service and is working on processes to improve earlier referrals to it for child witnesses.

A thematic group has recently been formed through the local criminal justice board (LCJB) to bring together criminal justice agencies and partners in North Yorkshire to drive forward joined-up improvements in services to victims and witnesses, monitor victim compliance and undertake workstreams on behalf of the LCJB, such as implementation of the witness

charter due in April 2008. Criminal justice and operational representatives from NYP sit on this group.

<sup>NYP</sup>Forward programme stage 6 staff that are responsible for the implementation of Niche crime and general occurrences are to design an automated victim code compliance monitoring process. Further work is being done through the LCJB communications officer and diversity unit to promote and raise awareness of services available to victims and witnesses in North Yorkshire.

## Findings

### National summary of judgements

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
<b>Neighbourhood Policing</b>				
Neighbourhood Policing	6	14	21	2
<b>Performance management</b>				
Performance management	6	29	8	0
<b>Protecting vulnerable people</b>				
Child abuse	3	17	21	2
Domestic violence	1	13	27	2
Public protection	2	16	23	2
Missing persons	1	21	21	0

### Force summary of judgements

<b>Neighbourhood Policing</b>	<b>Grade</b>
Neighbourhood Policing	<b>Fair</b>
<b>Performance management</b>	<b>Grade</b>
Performance management	<b>Fair</b>
<b>Protecting vulnerable people</b>	<b>Grade</b>
Child abuse	<b>Good</b>
Domestic violence	<b>Good</b>
Public protection	<b>Good</b>
Missing persons	<b>Fair</b>

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## Neighbourhood Policing

GRADE	FAIR
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### National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
6	14	21	2

### National contextual factors

The national Neighbourhood Policing programme was launched by ACPO in April 2005 to support the Government's vision of a policing service which is both accessible and responsive to the needs of local people. It was anticipated that, by April 2007, every area across England and Wales would have a Neighbourhood Policing presence appropriate to local needs, with all Neighbourhood Policing teams in place by April 2008. For local communities this means:

- increased numbers of police community support officers (PCSOs) patrolling their streets, addressing ASB and building relationships with local people;
- access both to information about policing in their local area and to a point of contact in their Neighbourhood Policing team; and
- having the opportunity to tell the police about the issues that are causing them concern and helping to shape the response to those issues (Home Office, May 2006).

By focusing on the key areas of resources, familiarity/accessibility, problem identification and joint problem solving, this inspection has identified the extent to which Neighbourhood Policing is being implemented. It has also examined forces' capability and commitment to sustain implementation beyond April 2008.

### Contextual factors

Neighbourhood Policing in North Yorkshire was graded as Good by HMIC in the 2005/06 baseline assessment.

The force continues to adapt the Neighbourhood Policing model to a get best fit for the delivery of Neighbourhood Policing in both the urban and rural areas of the force. As well as the logistical difficulties presented by the geography and the demography of the force, there are differing levels of activity and criminality across the force, with York recognised as carrying almost 50% of the crime burden. Consequently, any Neighbourhood Policing model must recognise this and be tailored to allocate levels of staffing appropriate to a neighbourhood area proportionate to the outcomes required in terms of crime performance, response and reassurance levels.

In 2006, a decision was made to commit a minimum of 399 officers to dedicated Neighbourhood Policing across the county. The pilot district was Central (York) and since the launch of Neighbourhood Policing and its roll-out, the force has faced difficulties in being able to respond to demand for calls from the public while maintaining resource levels dedicated to neighbourhoods. From November 2006, the force underwent a period of significant change at senior ACPO level and for a period of six months left the remaining

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two ACPO officers and chief officers to lead the force and continue to deliver on performance.

During 2006, a review of the resourcing of the Neighbourhood Policing teams and the call-handling policies took place. In January 2007, following agreement with the police authority, the acting DCC announced changes to the Neighbourhood Policing model to facilitate a 'hybrid' approach, with a lesser number of dedicated resources remaining as neighbourhood managers but now supplemented by patrol officers having a geographical response role within neighbourhoods and responding to appropriately graded calls for service. This approach has been adopted by Central BCU. Supported by the incident management unit, the changes have dramatically improved performance in respect of responding to calls from the public. This is a relatively recent change and there has not been an assessment of the impact on the delivery of neighbourhood management or on partnerships.

In May 2007 the appointment of a new Chief Constable and DCC brought a new direction to Neighbourhood Policing development and delivery, along with its associated structures.

NYP remains committed to delivering Neighbourhood Policing throughout the force by March 2008, accepting that this may include delivery by a variety of models but retaining the core principles.

As part of the inspection process a telephone survey of 100 randomly selected residents was carried out, consisting of six questions about their experience and view of how Neighbourhood Policing is being delivered in North Yorkshire. The responses gave a mixed indication in respect of the service given; one of the six indicators was above the national average range with five below the range.

## **Strengths**

The priorities and arrangements for Neighbourhood Policing in North Yorkshire are:

- providing the public with access to local policing;
- enabling local people to set the agenda;
- offering opportunities to influence local priorities;
- working with partners to deliver positive interventions;
- tackling priorities identified by local people; and
- providing answers to the public on what has been done.

Currently, all the identified neighbourhoods are covered by safer neighbourhood teams, albeit in reduced numbers from the original 2006 model. This includes an increasing number of PCSOs who have now been appointed within the force. Multi-agency neighbourhood management structures are becoming established, beginning to deliver longer-term solutions to local community priorities and starting to engage with identifiable communities.

There is a traditional style and approach to policing in the rural areas and there have been some difficulties in adapting the existing Neighbourhood Policing models to the more urban areas such as York and Harrogate. The community, partners and the force regard Neighbourhood Policing in North Yorkshire as being about working alongside other agencies to create confident, safer and secure neighbourhoods and this is evident through responses from partners and in focus groups. Partners and community representatives consistently agreed that it is the strength and commitment of the relevant inspectors which underpin the success or otherwise of Neighbourhood Policing.

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PCSOs have a new dedicated role in the amended pilot model in York and it is now more neighbourhood focused, supported by a dedicated constable and sergeant. A degree of flexibility has been introduced around the shifts for dedicated officers so that they can optimise their hours spent with communities and with PCSOs. The links and relationships within communities have now greatly improved.

People partners (human resource (HR) managers) in BCUs and within the HR centralised function identify issues around staffing and vacancies, ensuring that there are no exaggerated gaps appearing in any of the units. Meetings are held every two weeks with people partners and service deliverers. This ensures that any gaps affecting performance and delivery of corporate strategies are quickly identified and action put in place to rectify the issue.

A workforce development manager has recently been appointed and works within the corporate development department (CDD). Informed by the force microanalysis process, the role is to ensure that resources are aligned to the planning process and that there are sufficient resources with the necessary skills to drive forward corporate priorities, in particular the emphasis on Neighbourhood Policing.

There is a recognition that the resourcing of Neighbourhood Policing models has to be flexible enough to reflect population changes during seasonal variations in activity. In Scarborough, for example, the population increases substantially during the holiday season, with up to 8,000 residents in the three holiday caravan sites plus the many thousands of day visitors throughout the county. A fixed deployment structure would seriously hinder operational performance and discretion exercised by area commanders.

The force has a policy of dedicated officers in Neighbourhood Policing teams and, while amendments to the current models are being tested, the abstractions are monitored through the operational performance support units (OPSUs) and centrally.

The stability of funding for PCSOs has been ensured by profiling them within the financial planning and forecasts with the police authority.

The force policy is for all student officers to be posted directly to Neighbourhood Policing areas and the force has reviewed the amount of supervision time available for the development of student officers, to ensure they are being challenged in a range of incident resolution and problem-solving activities. A further review of the levels of supervisory cover around the Neighbourhood Policing model has ensured that all officers receive a minimum of 33% cover in any 28-day period.

North Yorkshire has recruited 112 special constables over the last three years. The force now has a total of 191, all of whom are aligned to Neighbourhood Policing teams. They are provided with appropriate NIM briefing information, which identifies geographical problems within their allocated neighbourhoods, in particular ASB and offences of criminal damage.

A volunteers' co-ordinator has recently been appointed in Western ACU with a remit to establish and standardise force systems and procedures, which will increase the current numbers of volunteers. Working with the appropriate elements of the HR professionals, best practice nationally has been identified and amended to local circumstances, recognising the limitations on access and transport in the more rural areas. The force currently has a small number of volunteers and the inspection found that there is a strong culture of co-operation and willingness, among the public, to be involved locally with the force.



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The force is well served with buildings, which provide a focal point in key communities. The development of IT links to these premises is part of an ongoing project, including the use of mobile data.

Recognition is given to staff across the organisation, including special constables and volunteer members of staff. There are Chief Constable's and superintendent's commendations, performance development review (PDR) entries and national bravery awards. The force recommends officers for consideration at the annual community police officer awards.

The force has managed the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policing model through a Neighbourhood Policing implementation steering group, held monthly. This meeting is chaired by the DCC and is attended by all commanders, heads of department and relevant partners. The meeting reports on both local and national progress of Neighbourhood Policing and actions are allocated to drive forward the Neighbourhood Policing principles.

The development of Neighbourhood Policing within the context of citizen focus and partnerships is not the sole responsibility of the implementation team. Neighbourhood Policing is the core business of departments within the force, each linking their programmes of work to support the Neighbourhood Policing programme and being delivered through the Neighbourhood Policing implementation steering group. HR; information and communications technology (ICT); estates; finance; training; media and marketing; crime and incident recording; communications; and the intelligence functions all have plans and activity which directly supports Neighbourhood Policing.

The force reports progress to the police authority on the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing through a dedicated action plan. The police authority lead for Neighbourhood Policing has worked with the force in the re-modelling of the resources around Neighbourhood Policing to ensure that performance is maintained. The police authority has oversight of the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policing project by regular updates through its board structure, scrutinising service delivery, which is also overseen by the performance scrutiny committee.

The force monitors the impact of Neighbourhood Policing through opinion surveys, which are used to assess the extent to which members of the community know their local police officer or PCSO; are aware of Neighbourhood Policing in their area; know how to contact their Neighbourhood Policing team; and know how to be involved in community activity. Comparisons are made across divisions and the data forms the basis for target setting.

A monthly customer service meeting involves representatives of call handling and ACUs to debrief incidents and performance and identify good practice. They acknowledge each other's responsibilities and reliance on each other to achieve their own identified performance indicators (PIs). This has led to an improved approach from the ACU and control room staff, with inspectors discussing issues and identifying areas for development.

OPSUs have been established to manage the processes which underpin performance delivery, in particular the quality of service and citizen focus agenda. There is a concentration on increased numerical performance in respect of sanction detections but also in respect of timeliness and accuracy of processes. OPSUs identify all areas of performance at a team and individual level and provide feedback to supervisors on areas of development for their team or individuals.

The force is dealing with the lower priority calls by creating incident management units. These units are staffed by both police and police staff members and deal with slower time

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responses to incidents by way of a phone call or by arranging times for the appointments car to attend. This has significantly reduced the time spent by officers attending incidents and improved the service to callers.

The IT department actively supports the force in managing the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing and response processes. It has provided a business analyst who makes an assessment of the business demands and the impact that IT can have on managing that demand. This can then be mapped against an IT solution.

Members of the police authority are actively engaged with the force in promoting Neighbourhood Policing and assessing its impact on the community. Members attend public meetings to listen to feedback from the public regarding the Neighbourhood Policing project. The force collaborates with the police authority communication processes to ensure there is consistency in the reporting and marketing practices.

The development of Neighbourhood Policing is supported by a recently created central media and marketing team, as well as divisional contacts. Contact details of neighbourhood staff are widely published. This includes phone, mobile phone and email addresses.

There is an extensive network of key individuals within the divisions which enables an informal means of regular communication and feedback with communities. The force also conducts detailed surveys on public confidence and satisfaction issues in partnership with other agencies. There are further opportunities for feedback offered through the force website.

The basis for community engagement is the key individual network (KIN) and joint action group (JAG) structures which run alongside the other embedded contacts in North Yorkshire, such as the existing police authority, local authority, parish councils, residents groups and activities groups such as farmwatch and neighbourhood watch. Neighbourhood Policing officers also attend other public meetings, in particular in the rural areas of the force. Other agencies are visible in being challenged by the public at public meetings and working in partnership with the local neighbourhood teams to resolve issues.

Partners feel valued and involved in managing situations which are wider than the police agenda. This was reality checked at local neighbourhood-level KIN meetings, where there was a high level of public response and where police, councillors and partners provided feedback on agreed priorities. Opportunities are provided in the meetings for new or changing priorities to be agreed and dealt with by the forthcoming scheduled meeting.

The JAG problem-solving meetings of partners take on the wider aspects of problems, arising from the local KINs, through their parent organisations. For example at Monk Fryston KIN, while there was a focus on speeding for the police, the local councillors and planning officers were required to deal with ownership of the A63, access requirements and planning issues.

A further example is the partnership initiative set up to reduce the increase in alcohol-related offences in the Richmondshire area. The Neighbourhood Policing team developed a yellow card warning scheme, so that when a person is dealt with for an alcohol-related offence they are sent a yellow card outlining that any further such behaviour could result in them being banned from all licensed premises in the area. If a person then re-offends within a 12-month period, licensees meet to discuss a ban. If a ban occurs, the person receives a red card letter informing them of it. Since the scheme started in May 2006, 136 yellow cards have been issued with only three red card bans. A reduction in alcohol-related offences has been achieved.

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Members of the independent advisory group (IAG) are involved actively with the force. In addition, members have been involved in the recruitment of PCSOs and their training. The IAG is also active within extended groups in the community. It is recognised that often difficult-to-reach groups have a wealth of intelligence and provide opportunities for the force to obtain feedback on how force policy may be impacting on their quality of life. The IAG members are actively considering, as individuals and as a group, how they could better work with neighbourhood teams and the force to improve the access to communities and volunteer groups.

Members of the community know how to access services and this includes the name and contact details of neighbourhood officers. Details of neighbourhood meetings are available on the website and published in public places.

The development of communications through the force website is progressing and will be further enhanced through a new web design allowing for easy navigation around the site. The development of neighbourhood meetings has helped give the community a real ownership in priority setting. The meetings have an appropriate balance between elected members, relevant agencies and the community. In rural areas parish council meetings are used as community meetings, with the venue being changed throughout the neighbourhood areas.

There is effective partnership working and inter-relationships between agencies at many levels from force level through to delivery within neighbourhoods. This is demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, Neighbourhood Policing officers attend ward committee meetings and residents associations as a matter of course. There is substantial co-ordination with the CDRP on implementation – for example, community rangers' schemes across the City of York.

The Neighbourhood Policing teams work towards strategic objectives for crime reduction and safer communities, as set out in the force crime reduction and safer communities plans. More recently, however, Neighbourhood Policing teams have become more closely attuned to local priorities through representation on JAGs, which are set up to oversee a cluster of wards, to provide partner resources to meet local community identified priorities.

A series of 'action days' has been led by the Neighbourhood Policing team, based on both police intelligence of local crime and anti-social activity and on priorities set by local communities in York. There are two examples within Clifton and Heworth wards, where police dispersal powers have been, or are to be, used in a co-ordinated way to address identified priorities.

During a visit to Scarborough, it was identified from partners that there is little provision from local authority youth services, with no detached youth workers in the town. As a consequence, the headmaster of a local secondary school, together with his senior teachers, organises patrols with the local Neighbourhood Policing team to identify young people causing a nuisance, who are then held to account within the school environment.

The development of Neighbourhood Policing into neighbourhood management is understood by partners and has been welcomed. There is evidence of the active engagement of partners, particularly in York and Selby, in problem-solving activities. A local authority liaison officer works with the unitary authority in York on multi-agency problem-solving partnership initiatives.

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Partners identified that dedicated neighbourhood officers in York work very effectively with their counterparts in council services, notably the locally based estate managers with whom they share information and initiate joint action as part of the shared priority for crime reduction and reducing ASB. There is a strong commitment from all agencies and a high degree of trust and effective use of resources.

Neighbourhood Policing teams have access to a crime analyst and there are dedicated officers also based at the CDRP (Safer York Partnership), who assist the Neighbourhood Policing team in community engagement and identifying funds for crime reduction initiatives. The development of jointly formulated intelligence packages for Neighbourhood Policing teams is beginning to take place.

Neighbourhood Policing teams are undertaking an audit of asset-rich individuals without visible means of support resident in their areas. The accumulation of intelligence provided through area intelligence units is being aggregated for further development at force intelligence level.

As part of their core role around neighbourhoods, Neighbourhood Policing teams are briefed on any issues relating to counter-terrorism according to their location, eg Drax, Menwith Hill etc.

Enforcement officers and other partner agencies were very positive about their relationships with the force, particularly around problem solving, the exchange of information and co-operation which takes place. The licensing officers are working with organisations such as pubwatch to problem solve issues which impact on the levels of violent crime, in particular the night-time economy in York.

Within the existing neighbourhood model, minor problem solving lies with the neighbourhood PCs and sergeants, while more involved work is passed to the problem-solving sergeant who supports the team and liaises with the community safety sergeant and partners to find solutions. This may also involve the area Neighbourhood Policing coach, who works with Neighbourhood Policing teams to develop their problem-solving skills.

In Scarborough, Neighbourhood Policing team officers have linked with the local comprehensive school and regular truancy patrols have been effective in identifying persistent offenders. Parents have been held to account for their children's behaviour, including some individuals being prosecuted.

There is a commitment in the force to joint working with agencies, the awareness of shared priorities and a supportive input by the force to joint initiatives. There is still some inconsistency at this stage of their development, however, which may be attributable to constant changes to Neighbourhood Policing team personnel and methods of operation.

There are numerous examples of how Neighbourhood Policing is being supported by KINs, pubwatch and neighbourhood watch groups, with all partners feeling included in the problem-solving process with feedback on issues raised. The information from such groups, however, is not captured in a formal process to inform local Neighbourhood Policing plans and appropriate resourcing strategies. In Selby, police and fire officers visit schools together in a community fire reduction campaign.

In York, the local authority liaison officer is developing a targeting process by using council officers and staff as eyes and ears. Intelligence on failing licensed premises, whether for fire regulations, health and safety or disorder, leads to them being targeted for action by a multi-agency response. The main aim is to educate licensees and raise standards. If that fails,

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then enforcement can follow. The bonus for good licensees is that, if they can show that they are compliant, it will reduce the numbers of visits, which correspondingly will save their time.

The North Yorkshire victim and witness information partnership continues to exceed the minimum requirements under 'No Witness No Justice' from point of charge. NYP, in collaboration with public access, is currently building on these principles and working on improving services to victims and witnesses, from the point of the crime report, to provide seamless information and support services.

A thematic group has recently been formed through the LCJB to bring together criminal justice agencies and partners in North Yorkshire to drive forward joined-up improvements in services to victims and witnesses, monitor victim compliance and undertake workstreams on behalf of the LCJB, such as implementation of the Witness Charter due in April 2008. Criminal justice and operational representatives from NYP sit on this group.

Regular meetings take place between the superintendent, community safety and the force training manager to discuss training plans for Neighbourhood Policing team staff. Topics are then taken to the training prioritisation meetings at strategic force level to be agreed and delivered. Progress is then monitored against key timescales which are agreed by the Neighbourhood Policing lead and the training manager. The emphasis is on minimising abstractions and that, where appropriate, training and development should be delivered locally. Training managers also sit on the Neighbourhood Policing strategic and tactical groups, and are heavily involved in the workstreams.

During 2006 all officers and PCSOs received *Approaches to Crime Reduction*, which incorporates comprehensive problem-solving techniques. This is now included in the PCSO, student officer and special constable induction programmes. In addition, the force conducted a full training needs analysis at the request of the Neighbourhood Policing team steering group which identified the skills gaps. These were transposed into three policing toolkit days, which were delivered to all officers/PCSOs via staff development training days.

The training department sees itself as supporting the whole ethos of Neighbourhood Policing with dedicated, bespoke training delivered in both student officers courses and dedicated training days for supervisors and staff. Toolkit days were identified as having been delivered on four occasions during the past year.

Joint training days for the public access unit and neighbourhood teams have been organised to provide a greater awareness and understanding of each other's role. This also provided opportunities for identified ACU supervisors to experience the demands in control rooms and to appreciate the mutual difficulties that control room supervisors and ACU supervisors need to resolve.

Supervisors and sergeants have been involved in strategic development days, to review activity on ACUs and assess their impact on quality of life issues. This has been particularly successful in ensuring that officers are considering quality of life issues and not merely concentrating on statistics.

Neighbourhood Policing team coaches are deployed on ACUs. These are tutor constables who have had Neighbourhood Policing skills accreditation. Neighbourhood Policing team coaches work with local Neighbourhood Policing teams in developing problem-solving skills and opportunities for multi-agency, problem-solving initiatives. The force aims to minimise

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abstractions at the front end and the preference is not to run courses but to look at inputs which do not cause abstractions through a form of mentorship and tutoring.

The training for Neighbourhood Policing teams recognises the huge geographical areas to be covered and the unique position Neighbourhood Policing team officers may find themselves in, as the sole emergency service available within a reasonable response time.

For example, in Western area, in the last 12 months, Neighbourhood Policing teams have been engaged in the following training:

- First aid training – delivered by University of York, department of health sciences.
- Defibrillator training – delivered by West Yorkshire ambulance services.
- Racial and cultural awareness – delivered by South Craven community action.
- Approaches to crime reduction – delivered on both staff development days and on the management module – delivered in conjunction with crime reduction partners.
- Domestic violence (for nominated officers) – delivered by SDS in conjunction with the area domestic violence co-ordinators.
- ASB order/criminal ASB order – delivered by SDS on staff development days in conjunction with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) ASB order co-ordinator.
- Various training given to Ripon Neighbourhood Policing team officers by neighbourhood watch, arch mediation (in relation to neighbourhood disputes), women's aid outreach and the fire service.
- Student officers spend a week's attachment with the Harrogate mental health team.

All newly appointed PCSOs receive a nine-week induction and training programme prior to being deployed to operational duties. The training encompasses all aspects of their role and requirements within NYP.

All PCSOs are involved in the multi-agency training provided to Neighbourhood Policing teams as part of their development.

The force works in partnership with West Yorkshire Police in joint recruitment initiatives and assessment. This has produced significant savings. In addition, the force is reviewing the current distribution of PCSOs and developing a deployment protocol and 'modeller' to ensure that PCSOs are having the most impact possible on reassurance through high-visibility patrols.

Each area is involved in various types of multi-agency training, for example:

- In Eastern Area, there is a rolling programme of mentoring training to the Neighbourhood Policing team (Neighbourhood Policing officers and PCSOs) through Grahams School (funding from Connexions). Eleven have been trained so far.
- In Central Area, this has included a multi-agency training day in March 2007 with partner agencies; 96 people attended.
- In Western Area, various training modules were delivered to Ripon Neighbourhood Policing team officers by neighbourhood watch, arch mediation (in relation to neighbourhood disputes), women's aid outreach and the fire service.
- A joint training exercise between all York Neighbourhood Policing dedicated teams and partners took place at the Merchant Tailors Hall in March 2007.
- Selby dedicated Neighbourhood Policing teams participated in a team-training day in April 2007.
- Student officers were attached to partner agencies as part of their development programme, eg housing, street environment, schools, homeless projects etc.

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- Since August 2006, a dedicated PC has been appointed Neighbourhood Policing team coach. One of the principal roles is to train/co-ordinate training for the York Neighbourhood Policing team.
- The team has received specific inputs from community watch and training in school visits, domestic violence, drugs awareness in relation to the three drug schemes in York, Special Branch input and face-to-face mediation.
- One-to-one coaching is also included for members of the Neighbourhood Policing team; this includes visits to partner agencies. This is very much an ongoing process.

The operational and corporate performance reviews, carried out by the ACC (operations) and DCC respectively on a monthly and quarterly basis, include a specific emphasis on Neighbourhood Policing performance, structure and delivery. The developing performance agenda around customer satisfaction and confidence is included in these reviews.

Neighbourhood inspectors have developed a neighbourhood development plan, which is monitored, reviewed and re-assessed on a bi-monthly basis. Neighbourhood Policing teams have a rolling 12-month neighbourhood plan, with key objectives for quality of life improvements and joint working arrangements to achieve success. These are monitored on a quarterly basis at performance briefings and response officers, as well as neighbourhood officers, are expected to include Neighbourhood Policing objectives within their PDRs.

The development of the MI Gateway has enabled a more performance-based focus on individual and team performance. The development of an enhanced performance framework incorporating all activity will identify team PIs with accountability for delivery the responsibility of sergeants. The delivery of specific Neighbourhood Policing team PIs will provide the mechanism for assessing how the Neighbourhood Policing strategy is impacting on crime reduction and ASB, together with how it contributes to the identification of good practice.

Special constables complete a daily tasking document sheet for their duty time, which is used by OPSU to measure their effectiveness.

The force has conducted self-assessments using the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme Training models to inform the Neighbourhood Policing implementation steering group. Following a Going Local 3 inspection in Central ACU, early in 2007, the other ACUs have used the Going Local 3 protocols to assess Neighbourhood Policing within their areas.

The force has regular contact with the field advisor for the National Policing Improvement Agency Neighbourhood Policing project, who recently spent some time in Western ACU reviewing its Neighbourhood Policing development proposals.

### **Work in progress**

To support Neighbourhood Policing development, the force is developing an estates strategy to provide satellite accommodation and to improve more localised access to policing services in key areas.

NYP is working with partners to establish a data warehouse, which each partner agency can populate with information and intelligence. This will examine issues in detail which impact on neighbourhoods and identify local issues. This will provide a 'rich picture' of a neighbourhood and assist in a more corporate and partnership approach to providing solutions. Premises are currently being identified to locate the information team.

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The force is developing a directorate of information, which will have responsibility for ensuring all information and sharing protocols are compliant with management of police information (MoPI) and assist the force in managing overall information sharing within partnerships.

The force recruited a marketing manager, in January 2007, who also has responsibility for activity within the press office. Currently, the force is looking to develop the force webpage and make it more accessible for the public to obtain information on all issues. This will include direct inputting of crime complaints and provide a feedback facility for members of the public.

The force is proactive in ensuring that police news stories are balanced and reflect the force activity in Neighbourhood Policing and protecting vulnerable people (PVP). However, the marketing manager is looking to develop these initiatives further, with a clear 'brand' for the force and a more focused marketing product.

Market research is currently being carried out to gain public perceptions from both internal and external sources. This will be matched against the British Crime Survey data to ensure that police resources are being targeted appropriately on what concerns the public of North Yorkshire. An appropriate marketing strategy will be built around the issues.

An engagement strategy is being developed to ensure that all departments and areas of the force have a corporate, standard approach, as well as ensuring the wide ranges of local linkages are incorporated into a structured feedback system to enable more effective planning.

The force is exploring opportunities with partners for a more cohesive approach to community engagement and communication opportunities. Use of links to partners' websites will expand opportunities for the force to engage with a wide spectrum of communities, particularly hard-to-reach groups.

Local policing summaries have been completed and will be published in October/November 2007. The delay in submission has been agreed with the police authority due to the changes to the Neighbourhood Policing inspector roles within the force.

The head of training has identified the e-learning system, employed by Thames Valley, as a good way to test knowledge levels of Neighbourhood Policing issues but while the business case has been made out, there is not yet an agreement to purchase this equipment by the force.

The chief superintendent, Western ACU is developing the training needs analysis for supervisor training linked to the Centrex Leadership Development Programme modules.

The strategic steering group is utilising the skills of the newly appointed marketing manager to re-brand Neighbourhood Policing both internally and externally and publicise the benefits of the Neighbourhood Policing model.

The force is working towards more effective communications systems and having data terminals in vehicles. This is being extended to hand-held PDAs within Central BCU. This is intended to free up Airwave time and enable a more effective use of the system. This project sits with NYP Forward and is a business change project rather than an IT project.



## Areas for improvement

Partners from the fire and rescue service, civilian enforcement officers, licensing officers and pubwatch Ripon generally accepted that the current levels of information sharing work through personal relationships and not the establishment of any formalised processes. Information sharing tends to be on a personal basis and there is an absence of protocols; this is about to be changed with the new MoPI policy currently circulated within force.

Special constables work with Neighbourhood Policing teams and are engaged fully in tackling local problems which impact on community quality of life issues. They feel that they have not been provided with the training they require in problem-solving skills to enable them to contribute fully to increasing performance and, as a consequence, feel their impact on issues is limited. The force should conduct a skills audit of all special constables and ensure that they have the necessary skills to enable them to carry out the tasks the force has required from them.

Volunteers, where they exist, provide administration support for the force. However, the scope of activities is limited. The force relies on the traditional volunteer networks and is not yet proactive in exploring opportunities for recruiting volunteers, neither do force processes and policies appear to support the initiative. There does not appear to be the corporate drive or willingness from the force to fully extend the use of volunteers, their skills and abilities. One example given surrounded 'speed watch' and the force refusing to approve volunteers carrying out this function, due to health and safety risks. The force should review fully the use of volunteers and ensure that force systems actively support the initiative.

There have been problems and delays experienced in vetting any volunteers through the force systems, taking up to eight weeks on some occasions to process the application. Considering members of the public are volunteering their time freely, this long delay may have an adverse effect on an applicant's enthusiasm. There is also a perception that support systems in force, particularly HR and legal advice, are hindering this initiative in moving forward.

The IAG is a useful forum for increasing access to the numbers of volunteers who could assist the force on a daily basis. Many groups, including those with disabilities, have specialist skills to offer and the IAG could form a useful contact with the community to raise awareness of volunteering for police support duties.

Continuity in role is seen as a major inhibitor to progress. Partners expressed the view that in some instances neighbourhood officers, in particular sergeants and inspectors, move on too frequently with little opportunity for a handover period.

There needs to be a restatement by the Chief Constable and police authority of the vision for Neighbourhood Policing within the force. General perceptions among staff are that the implementation of the most recently changed model had been rushed and ill considered. In addition, this will have been the third model in two years. In Hambleton, for example, response and Neighbourhood Policing team roles are seen to be becoming blurred, with no clearly defined operating procedures, and Neighbourhood Policing team issues are becoming lost in routine responding to calls for service. The feeling among PCSOs is that there is a lack of resources to back them up when out on lone patrols in certain rural areas.

Concerns were expressed by all inspectors that issues of vulnerability are becoming lost in the process of change to the new Neighbourhood Policing structure, with little real time devoted to profiling individuals or groups which may be classed as vulnerable or representing a threat to those who are vulnerable. Examples were given of how quality of

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life issues are still subordinate to the importance of dealing with reported crimes. Examples were given of the difficulties in accessing additional resources through tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) processes to deal with local problems which do not feature prominently in the current crime-focused performance framework.

The force is not taking advantage of collecting available intelligence and patrol officers appear not to be focused on the whole issue of gathering intelligence. The numbers of forms required to be completed, and the lack of consistency in inputting intelligence, results in poor intelligence around youth disorder. Youth action combating ASB forms are poorly completed, if at all, and then stored in a box in community safety. They are not available as a general intelligence link, which would contribute to hotspot identification and community intelligence. Stop and encounter forms, similarly, are on a separate system and are not accessible generally for intelligence purposes. Consequently, intelligence units do not use them when assessing hotspots for ASB, using purely the incident log data, which does not adequately map the problems.

Information is being obtained from local public meetings, JAGs and KINs to assess the particular level of concerns in communities and to inform how the marketing, engagement and communication strategy will be delivered for most effective results. However, there is an apparent gap as to who and where this information should go.

There were some concerns that the force is not maximising the opportunities for intelligence gathering in communities which are changing to adapt to the temporary and permanent settlement of migrant workers. The NIM system should be able to capture this intelligence and if there are significant changes to the diversity profile within communities, it should be reflected in the community profile, which in turn should inform the control strategy.

Some clarification is required regarding the functionality of Niche and its ability to be searched for data. Officers have been told that there is a capacity issue in respect of the database and, as a consequence, not all intelligence is being input onto the system. This has a knock-on impact on officers seeking information on their neighbourhoods.

IT in its current state of development was regarded by officers as a problem, not only in its current transitional state to Niche but in the lack of access to terminals. Increasingly, there is a requirement for officers to input their own intelligence updates and new systems being implemented require increasing levels of access. The force should undertake a review of access to terminals and likely future capacity requirements.

Briefing manager is the standing self-brief system when officers are unavailable to be briefed by supervisors. For response officers it is the mainstay of their world. However, it is often out of date and officers do not have time to trawl the existing systems for themselves.

Reality checks were carried out on morning management meetings and the briefing processes. Briefings work well in Selby because of a lack of volume. In York they are beginning to lose their effectiveness because of the large number of operations always live. Officers are finding difficulty in being able to prioritise their time on problem solving as there is always a live operation to increase detections or reduce signal crimes as a default position. Consequently, neighbourhood priorities are seen to have little value within this process.

The force should consider the skills required to perform the Neighbourhood Policing team role and conduct a training needs analysis. Many Neighbourhood Policing team officers report having received virtually no training in problem solving or managing the media. In particular, those new to the role are unclear how they are expected to deliver.

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Lack of training was identified throughout the inspection, particularly with PCSOs. Sergeants were given the responsibility of managing them, dedicated neighbourhood officers with tasking them, without any awareness of their terms and conditions. Problem-solving training was identified as a gap for officers moving between disciplines in a period of significant changes.

PCSOs are now becoming embedded within the force and are, generally, meaningfully tasked. However, on occasions, the priority to respond to calls leads to PCSOs being asked to provide an initial response to incidents which are beyond their terms of reference. There needs to be reinforcement of the deployment protocols for PCSOs, so that supervisors and area control rooms (ACRs) are reminded of the limitations of their powers and also their conditions of service.

The IAG identified that neighbourhoods within the force were diverse, each with different problems. Training and an awareness of the issues could benefit their role and integration into communities, if this was delivered to PCSOs prior to their posting.

Misuse of Airwave codes has been identified as a barrier to effective demand management and deployment. A process has been introduced in liaison with district supervisors to ensure that the maximum numbers are available for deployment through rigid enforcement of correct codes and that the control room monitors availability, alerting district supervision if demand increases. In particular, the public access unit will work with district supervisors on PDR issues for its staff and identify those who regularly are not available for deployment.

Often the contact centre has great difficulty in assigning specialist resources to calls for assistance. Dispatchers are not always aware of who is available, as CID officers do not always log on to the system. There needs to be a formalised deployment policy for CID attendance at crime scenes and a similar performance monitoring by supervisors, regarding officer availability.

The IAG could be used as an additional performance scrutiny process. It represents the views of under-represented groups, which is distinct from the police authority scrutiny function. There are opportunities to raise the awareness among staff, in particular specialist staff, of the 'non-visible' vulnerability issues of impaired learning, hearing, speech etc. There is a willingness of members to contribute to raising awareness of diversity issues through the use of the IAG.

The marketing manager liaises directly with inspectors on neighbourhoods and has some concerns regarding the capacity to effectively market success within particular neighbourhoods. The force should consider a review of the skills, competence and capacity of neighbourhood teams to make full use of the marketing opportunities with the public. This should be further enhanced with training at student officer level to ensure they have the knowledge of force policy on communicating information to the public.

The head of HR has line management responsibility for the marketing and press office function. The force should consider the location of this line management responsibility, as there may be more opportunities for improving communication links with responsibility passing to the DCC with his wider focus on Neighbourhood Policing.

In Central ACU, Neighbourhood Policing teams have the autonomy to deal with issues at a local level. However, they are very police-focused issues which are negotiated through the local JAGs. KINs are very basic in format and generally only set up when a problem arises, thereafter being used only as a one-way local consultative arrangement.

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In Western Area, the Neighbourhood Policing model is currently held in abeyance pending the arrival of the new force command team. The BCU commander had intended to implement a different Neighbourhood Policing model, based on a demand profile which had been carried out. The profile anticipated that Neighbourhood Policing resources would be appropriately deployed according to the demand and risk assessment of a particular area. PCSOs would be put onto shift bands, which they feel will sever their links with communities further, as their available time to visit and communicate is limited by their new hours of working. There were also concerns expressed at the effect of the changes on partnerships, which had been effectively built up over the 12 months since the previous change.

Abstractions within York Neighbourhood Policing teams are minimal, as only 11 officers are dedicated to Neighbourhood Policing with all other uniformed patrol officers on response or deployed as a hybrid support. PCSOs are developing well but are managed by these 11 officers on a daily basis. The force should consider the appropriateness of this arrangement and whether the 11 officers require supervisory skills training.

Due to the geographical nature of the force, distances to custody facilities are seen as an inhibitor in some parts of the force area and this may be impacting on the outcome of decisions being made by officers on whether to arrest. The seasonal changes in demand, particularly in Eastern Area, could be better managed with the part-time/seasonal designation of existing custody facilities at main stations throughout the Eastern and Western Areas.

All staff are aware of the performance framework and the requirement to deliver both individual and team performance. There was a recognition that they had to exist in a performance-driven organisation but supervisors are concerned at the growth in the number of auditors in OPSUs and the apparent erosions of supervisory skills, use of discretion and decision making accorded to them. This is seen on occasions to militate against spending time on problem solving and, instead, service statistics.

Workloads are high for officers carrying anything from 15 to 20 crime reports. Officers expressed concern that they had insufficient time to properly investigate all crime incidents and, as a consequence, they had to prioritise the time allocated to the investigation dependent on the relative seriousness of the offence rather than its solvability, because of the numbers stacking up.

The force should fully utilise the information captured by the OPSUs to make an assessment of the quality of service being delivered and whether existing workloads are frustrating the delivery of the QoSC. Longer serving officers reported that they had not received specific training for quality of service or customer satisfaction. However, there are elements built into the initial training of PCs and PCSOs.

#### RECOMMENDATION 1

That the force review the intelligence requirements surrounding Neighbourhood Policing and protecting vulnerable people to ensure officers are provided with timely and actionable information to properly support them in service delivery and decision making, particularly with partners.

## *Developing Practice*

**TITLE:** Initiative to address alcohol-related offences

**PROBLEM:**

A partnership initiative was set up to reduce the increase in alcohol-related offences in the Richmondshire area of North Yorkshire. The intention of the initiative was to increase enforcement activity through partnership working.

**SOLUTION:**

Richmondshire Neighbourhood Policing team area has developed a yellow card warning scheme. When a person is dealt with for an alcohol-related offence, they are sent a yellow card outlining that any further such behaviour could result in them being banned from all licensed premises in the area. If a person then re-offends within a 12-month period, licensees meet to discuss a ban. If a ban occurs, the person receives a red card letter informing them of such.

**OUTCOME(S):**

Since the scheme started in May 2006, 136 yellow cards have been issued with only three red card bans. A reduction in alcohol-related offences has been achieved.

**FORCE CONTACT:** Inspector Nick Hunter –0845 6060247, ext 4310

## Performance Management

GRADE	FAIR
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### National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
6	29	8	0

### National contextual factors

There is no single accepted model of performance management across the police service but any such model or framework must be fit for purpose. Ideally, forces should demonstrate that individuals at every level of the organisation understand their contribution to converting resources into agreed delivery, and know how they will be held to account. On a daily basis, first-line supervisors monitor, support and quality assure the performance of their teams. At the other end of the spectrum, chief officer-led performance meetings – often based loosely on the American Compstat model – are a vehicle for accountability and improvement. Robust leadership, a commitment to improvement and reliable, real-time information systems are all critical factors in effective performance management.

There is no mechanistic link between overall force performance and the grade awarded in this framework. The grade is based on the quality of the force’s processes that enable it to identify and react to changes in performance.

### Contextual factors

North Yorkshire has a robust performance framework clearly articulating the priorities of the force. This framework holds staff to account at all levels of the organisation for delivery. It includes what is expected to be delivered against community and organisational priorities and is tailored to individual responsibility through PDRs. To address areas of development, robust chief officer team inspections on ACUs and departments ensure corporacy and compliance in meeting organisational needs and aspirations.

The recent appointment of a new Chief Constable and DCC provides the force with an opportunity to review portfolios and accountability mechanisms to ensure that they adequately embody the renewed energy around public satisfaction, confidence and reassurance. This will bring an element of balance back to the previous keen focus on detection rates, for which the force set itself a target of 40% in 2006/07 and which was not achievable. The unintended consequence was to create, internally, an inordinate focus on systems to deliver this target, rather than on effective investigations, quality outcomes and public satisfaction and confidence.

Notwithstanding this, performance around satisfaction and confidence remains sound and there is a growing acceptance, by the public, of the efforts by the force to deliver good policing services.

### Strengths

The police authority works with the Chief Constable to prepare a three-year strategy for the development of the service and an annual policing plan which sets out the way in which the

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force will police the area, having regard to the Home Secretary's national policing priorities and the local priorities determined by the police authority. This document is called NY Policing Thrust. The annual policing plan incorporates the requirements of communities, partners and national priorities. For 2007/08 it concentrates on:

- ASB;
- alcohol and drugs misuse;
- violence;
- burglary;
- vehicle crime; and
- road safety.

The retiring Chief Constable provided an innovative lead in implementing and chairing the force-wide strategic partnership meeting, the pan-North Yorkshire forum. This supports and drives a shared vision of policing delivered through partnership working, collaboration, influencing policy, improved service delivery and value for money across all agencies. The Chief Constable chaired the North Yorkshire criminal justice board. The ACC (operations) (now strategic development) is a member of both these boards and this provides business continuity in the delivery of local policing services.

To deliver major business change programmes, project management frameworks are in place. These enable the chief officer and nominated business portfolio holders to use the disciplined framework that the PRINCE 2 project management methodology provides to consult and engage with key stakeholders, document options, costs, business benefits and impact and to provide regular updates to cabinet, senior management teams, the police authority and other key stakeholders.

NYP has a comprehensive, joined-up strategic planning process linking the strategic objectives of the force to the finance and resources required to achieve them. The process is driven through robust adherence to an annual planning cycle, which has been agreed between the NYPA and NYP. The process ensures a joined-up approach to planning and achieves full participation of key members of NYP and the NYPA. There are business and HR managers for every area and department, ensuring that similar integration of planning exists throughout the organisation.

The delivery of the NY Forward and Thrust programmes is designed and co-ordinated around the delivery from the support departments of systems, equipment and processes to improve front-line delivery. The integration of partners within this planning process has been against individual elements of the plans.

Finance, ICT and HR strategies are fundamental parts of the North Yorkshire Forward programme. This programme outlines the developments to support delivery of quality policing services over a three-year period and matches the three-year budget forecasting process for the force.

The business planning process has promoted and encouraged the proactive participation of key stakeholders and communities through adopting a 'bottom up' and a 'top down' approach, ensuring that front-line staff, communities and key stakeholders are consulted and involved in shaping the vision of policing services delivered through NY Policing Thrust. This was particularly relevant with the re-shaping of the Neighbourhood Policing models in the force in consultation with partners. Shared targets with CDRPs go some way to ensure that partners are being engaged and accountable for improving performance.

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The chief officer team has recently reviewed the areas in the PVP units. This included the capacity and demand process through microanalysis. Identified risks have been scaled and priorities assessed in regard to the risk. This has resulted in a significant investment in PVP, particularly around the public protection officers (PPOs) in the force.

All business processes have been mapped and any change to a particular process has to be sanctioned by the business change protocols. This ensures that all departments or partners have an opportunity to assess the impact that any change may have on the efficiency of their part/involvement in the process. There is active monitoring of data from individual, team, district, ACU and force levels and use of comparison data whenever possible to inform decision making.

The chief officer team meets weekly to discuss issues affecting strategy or direction. The accountability structures within the team engage heads of departments with ACC leads on a monthly basis, while the ACC (operations) holds operational departments/divisions to account through a monthly review.

Policy meetings involving departments/divisions and representative bodies take place on a monthly (or otherwise scheduled) basis. The various programme boards covering force developments are chaired by the appropriate chief officer and involve the police authority lead member for the project.

There are effective scrutiny committees within the police authority to oversee key aspects of the annual force policing plan and three-year North Yorkshire Forward plan. Members of the police authority have attended community meetings to assess the levels of satisfaction among the public with the force's service delivery. In addition, it has enabled them to have oversight of how Neighbourhood Policing is being delivered operationally.

There is a professional, constructive and challenging relationship between NYPA, the force and other agencies that is achieved through shared proactive participation in force-wide and local strategic partnership working. The Chief Constable has informal bi-monthly meetings (also attended by the director of finance) with the chair of the authority, clerk and treasurer.

The police authority is keen to ensure that trained police resources are not being deployed or engaged in activity which could be delivered by others not holding the office of constable. The police authority is keen to maximise the opportunities presented by workforce modernisation and in ensuring that there is some proportionality in the balance between police officers and police staff.

NYP has actively increased its consultative arrangements with its communities, strategically and tactically. For example, implementing and maximising contributions of race and diversity action groups and IAGs influence its citizen focus approach to service delivery.

Innovative approaches to local and senior leadership development focus on qualitative and quantitative performance, service delivery and outcomes that are aimed at consistently achieving high performance. NYP user satisfaction rates are now part of the performance framework and the robust monitoring of incidents is showing improvements through OPSU and daily management meetings.

Chief officer team inspections provide a framework for reviewing and enhancing performance at BCU level and provide appropriate actions to ensure that policing is joined up. Any problems that are blocking improvements are identified and appropriate actions are then set with owners. People are held to account for their own, team and department's performance and there are effective monitoring systems to address under-performance.



October 2007

The 2006 chief officer team inspection process has been reviewed and a new chief officer review process has been introduced for 2007. This consists of quarterly reviews based on one of the 14 critical areas of policing highlighted by HMIC under baseline. A pre-inspection is conducted using:

- HMIC baseline framework;
- HMIC baseline framework grading criteria;
- HMIC baseline areas for improvement 2006;
- Going Local 3 framework;
- NCPE doctrines;
- external audit and inspection results;
- comparison with MSF; and
- current performance.

The auditors use a variety of inspection and research methodologies to gather evidence from which to make recommendations. These include:

- questionnaires;
- semi-structured interviews;
- focus groups;
- observation; and
- data review.

The results are reported to the chief officer team, ACU commanders and chief superintendent specialist support department (SSD) to enable a draft action plan to be completed before review day.

On review day ACU commanders and chief superintendent SSD present to, and are questioned by, the chief officer team, on their draft action plans. Heads of department attend the ACU review day to aid in action plan setting and may be subject to actions themselves. Action plans are approved on the day.

Departmental inspections are conducted under the same methodology on a six-monthly basis. Departments that are not covered by a baseline framework undergo a pre-inspection under a separate methodology, which is focused on customer first.

Action plans from the review day are progressed and discussed at ACU and departmental performance meetings and progress reported back to the chief officer team. Each ACU and department now has quarterly performance improvement action plans targeting areas of risk.

Meetings are held every two weeks with 'people partners' (ACU based) and service deliverers. This ensures that any gaps affecting performance and delivery of corporate strategies are quickly identified and actions put in place to rectify the issue.

A monthly customer service meeting involves representatives of call handling and ACUs to debrief incidents and performance and identify good practice. They acknowledge each other's responsibilities and reliance on each other to achieve their own identified PIs. This has led to an improved approach from the ACU and control room staff with inspectors discussing issues and identifying areas for development.

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A process of follow-up and assessment regarding performance and professional standards is in place. For example, a quarterly audit and inspection process led by the DCC and attended by chief officer team representatives provides to all area management teams a supportive learning environment and clarity of the personal and professional standards that are expected.

The force has an inspection team which undertakes internal inspections of the force in order to further improve and drive performance. Ad hoc inspections take place in order to drive improvement in areas of particular interest or importance.

OPSUs have been established to manage the processes which underpin performance delivery at ACU level, in particular the quality of service and citizen focus agenda. There is, at this point, a concentration on increased numerical performance in sanction detections and also in respect of timeliness and accuracy of processes.

Area business managers are located within ACUs with a dotted line responsibility to the head of finance. This ensures that there is a corporate overview of financial planning and resource commitments.

The development of the MI Gateway has enabled a more performance-based focus on individual and team performance. The development of an enhanced performance framework incorporating all activity will identify team PIs with accountability for delivery the responsibility of sergeants. The delivery of specific Neighbourhood Policing team PIs will provide the mechanism for assessing how the Neighbourhood Policing strategy is impacting on crime reduction and ASB, together with how it contributes to the identification of good practice.

### **Work in progress**

The force is developing quarterly corporate performance challenge days, where all commanders and heads of departments can discuss performance as a force issue and not merely concentrating on their own particular area of business. This should break down the perceived silo approach to policing which some members of the police authority feel is still prevalent.

The force is considering a variety of ways of knowledge testing among staff and is considering the purchase of the Milltechno system which is employed by Thames Valley and viewed as a good way to test knowledge levels of issues such as Neighbourhood Policing, but it is not as yet agreed for purchase by the force.

The force has put in place finance to support the numbers of PCSOs and is actively testing the market for sponsorship of PCSOs from partners and other agencies. The planned development of non-core income and resource generation activities over three financial years commencing 2007/08 is contained within the *Income and Resource Generation Strategy 2007–2010* published on the NYP intranet.

The force is looking to workforce modernisation to realise savings within the workforce which could assist in supporting Neighbourhood Policing.

The force is looking at other agencies to access services and is joining with other agencies to seek out opportunities for joint location or joint planning for new buildings to save costs.

Resource allocation is still an evolving process within the force, with progress informed by the annual activity-based costing exercise.

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## Areas for improvement

The emphasis on performance management varies from inspector to inspector and the force should re-emphasise the role of the inspector and sergeant rank within the performance framework. There is some concern among supervisors about their diminishing role in the supervision, mentoring and coaching of staff and that all they are carrying out is policing the processes which will secure an increase in numerical performance targets and not delivering a service to the victim.

Intelligence from crime scenes has to be directly input onto the force system without going through the area intelligence unit. There are significant difficulties in doing that from the scene and also due to lack of terminals when officers return to their base. Each intelligence log takes on average ten minutes to input onto the system. There is a view from officers that the intelligence is not being used constructively and that the time engaged in this process is wasted.

All staff are aware of the performance framework and the requirement to deliver both individual and team performance. There was recognition that staff had to exist in a performance driven organisation but there are concerns at varying levels of the numbers of auditors checking systems and numbers and the consequent erosion of supervisory skills and decision making which impacts on time available for problem solving and delivery of reassurance policing activities.

The force should review the policy in respect of the use of penalty notices for disorder (PNDs) and cautions, and satisfy itself that the use of PNDs is appropriate. Fixed penalties and cautions are being used to drive up performance in relation to sanction detections. However, this may be having a detrimental effect on the citizen focus agenda and Victim's Charter, as little consultation with the victim takes place before their use.

In damage cases, this course of action deprives the victim of the opportunity to seek compensation through the courts. One example given was of damage caused to a car windscreen to a value of £300, for which the offender was given a PND which resulted in no opportunity to have compensation awarded. The only recourse the complainant had was to take the claim to county court.

In another example cited, individuals suitable for the drug arrest referral scheme are being targeted for cautions.

Training in respect of force IT systems is viewed as historical, with little refresher training provided for the more recently developed systems. As a consequence, the force may not be achieving the full business benefits of its investment in IT, which could be impacting on improving performance across all areas of the business. The head of training has agreed to undertake a skills audit, identifying exactly which parts of systems are causing problems and to deliver specific training, using perhaps screen shots with accompanying instructions.

As the population the force is policing fluctuates due to seasonal variations, it should review its capacity in respect of prisoner handling and ensure that there is the capacity to provide custody provision locally. Custody numbers are a problem for Scarborough in the tourist season and there is a lack of flexibility in being able to double up or part open Whitby. Consequently, overflows go to York, which severely increases abstractions.

Custody is also seen as an inhibitor to effectiveness generally, because of the distances between the custody centres. Custody officers are also perceived as being too keen to get

rid of prisoners from the cells; this has deteriorated further since numerical targets for disposals were introduced.

Projects which support force initiatives are being financed from reserves; however, these cannot be relied on to deliver due to shrinking budgets and the force should ensure that realistic timescales for all projects are put in place, based on the available finance. NYP has an income generation officer in finance and this person should be given targets to achieve in relation to obtaining financial support from partners and other agencies.

## Developing Practice

### **TITLE: Chief officer team quarterly reviews**

#### **PROBLEM:**

Historically, areas for improvement resulting from baseline were not given a high profile and baseline was seen as a 'once a year' event. In addition, reality checks needed to be carried out in relation to key areas of performance, process, policy and structure.

#### **SOLUTION:**

The 2005 chief officer team inspection process has been reviewed and a new review process introduced for 2007. This consists of quarterly reviews based on one of the 14 critical areas of policing highlighted by HMIC under baseline. A pre-inspection is conducted using:

- HMIC baseline framework;
- HMIC baseline framework grading criteria;
- HMIC baseline areas for improvement 2006;
- Going Local 3 framework;
- NCPE doctrines;
- external audit and inspection results;
- comparison with MSF; and
- current performance.

The auditors use a variety of inspection and research methodologies to gather evidence from which to make recommendations. These include:

- questionnaires;
- semi-structured interviews;
- focus groups;
- observation; and
- data review.

The results are reported to the chief officer team, ACU commanders and the chief superintendent SSD to enable a draft action plan to be completed before review day.

On review day ACU commanders and the chief superintendent SSD present to, and are questioned by, the chief officer team on their draft action plans. Heads of department attend the ACU review day to aid in action plan setting and may be subject to actions themselves. Action plans are approved on the day.

Departmental inspections are conducted under the same methodology on a six-monthly basis. Those departments that are not covered by a baseline framework undergo a pre-inspection under a separate methodology, which is focused on customer first.

Action plans from the review day are progressed and discussed at ACU and department performance meetings and progress reported back to the chief officer team.

**OUTCOME(S):**

For the first time, each ACU and department has quarterly performance improvement action plans targeting areas at risk.

Baseline areas for improvement are updated regularly and any exceptions are reported to cabinet for immediate action.

**FORCE CONTACT:** Lesley Whitehouse, Audit and Inspection Manager

## Protecting Vulnerable People – Overview

### National contextual factors

The assessment framework for Protecting Vulnerable People was first developed in 2006 as part of HMIC's baseline assessment programme. It replaced two existing frameworks – Reducing/Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims – which focussed on hate crimes (predominantly racially motivated), domestic violence and child protection. Following consultation with practitioners and ACPO leads, a single framework was introduced with four components – domestic violence, the investigation and prevention of child abuse, the management of sex and dangerous offenders, and vulnerable missing persons. Although the four areas are discrete, they are also linked and share a common theme – they deal with vulnerable victims where there is a high risk that an incident can quickly become critical, and where a poor police response is both life-threatening and poses severe reputational risks for the force.

This year's inspection has been carried out using similar assessment standards as those in 2006. These highlight the importance of leadership and accountability; policy implementation; information management; staffing, workload and supervision; performance monitoring and management; training; the management of risk; and partnership working.

The work carried out by forces to protect the public, particularly those most vulnerable to risk of serious harm, is complex and challenging. No single agency, including the police, has the capacity to deliver the required response on its own. Success is therefore, dependent on effective multi-agency working and there are a number of established partnerships, involving a wide range of services and professionals, aimed at ensuring that an integrated approach is adopted to protecting those most vulnerable to risk of serious harm.

### Contextual factors overview

The large geographical area causes some problems regarding distribution of specialist PVP resources, with many officers concentrated in the urban areas of the force. This is reflected similarly in the concentration of voluntary groups which, in common with other agency partners, creates an acknowledged risk of leaving the rural populations less well served.

The force has reviewed its approach to the whole area of vulnerability and this has been approved by the chief officer team. An action log has been developed which is reviewed quarterly. This log includes the outcomes of a capability and demand scrutiny through a microanalysis. Identified risks have been scaled and priorities assessed with regard to the risk. This has resulted in a significant investment in PVP, in particular around the public protection unit (PPU) officers in the force.

The joint, centralised PPU with the probation service is being further developed. This unit is staffed by a senior probation officer working alongside the police PPU line management. These resources will focus on PPU issues in their entirety and will be supported by a dedicated multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) administrator and MAPPA co-ordinator, together with analytical capacity.

NYP has recognised the need for all units involved in protecting vulnerable persons to work collaboratively and is developing a monthly meeting structure to ensure that each unit is working with the same corporate aims of reducing the risks to vulnerable members of the community.

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NYP is developing a directorate of information, which will have responsibility for all information sharing protocols. This will accord to MoPI and assist the force in better managing information sharing within its wide range of partnership working.

Domestic violence (DV) is the responsibility of the area-based CPUs and the force is now moving to a position where the CPUs will have a management and co-ordinating role for reports of missing persons.

The force has a number of systems and associated databases which are used to capture and monitor information and intelligence. The case administration tracking system (CATS) captures and records actions from the initial report and throughout the investigation. The investigations of DV incidents are held on Indepol (the force incident logging system); however, this will be turned off at the end of the year and DV investigations will be recorded on Niche. Currently, there are multiple systems being used by the force and there is no dedicated system used for the management of missing from home reports. This causes some frustration to officers, as systems have to be interrogated separately.

As a consequence of abstractions within the chief officer team, some of the portfolio responsibilities and actions surrounding PVP issues have been allocated to area commanders and senior operational staff to develop. The Eastern Area commander is driving initiatives around DV; her operations manager is developing the strategic responses for missing persons. This is regarded as an interim situation until the new chief officer team is embedded.

## **Strengths**

A ten-year threat assessment has been completed and resources have been modelled to reflect the demand for PPU resources. This is based on a workload of 50 registered sex offenders (RSOs) per PPU officer.

Since April 2007, the portfolios for PPU management and intelligence have been reassigned. Previously, the detective inspector (DI) force intelligence unit had responsibility for both intelligence and the PPU. As a consequence of the review, a further DI has been appointed, within HQ SSD, with dedicated ownership of the PPU.

Individuals subject to level 3 MAPPA are dealt with by the HQ PPU and the responsibility for level 2 is devolved to the PPU on each area command and dealt with by a senior probation officer jointly with the force. Potentially dangerous persons (PDPs) who, through a risk assessment, require some form of supervision or monitoring go through a MAPPA-type risk assessment process. This includes liaison with social services and mental health trusts.

PIs are being developed for all areas of vulnerability based on the NCPE guidance.

All staff working in the intelligence units have participated in an intelligence specialists course. Information sharing between agencies is good, either through liaison or access to systems, albeit not linked into others premises at this stage.

The police authority has an identified link member with responsibility for, and oversight of, all vulnerable persons issues within the force. The police authority lead for PVP identified that there were good working relations between the force and its partner agencies, both within the county of North Yorkshire and the unitary authority of York.

PCSOs and student officers within Neighbourhood Policing teams are beginning to grasp issues around PVP and there is much evidence of intelligence being submitted. PCSO



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awareness and involvement are being increased through training sessions run by partner agencies.

NYP is committed to the professional, ethical and compassionate investigation of rape and serious sexual offences and to reducing attrition rates, bringing offenders to justice, providing best evidence to prosecutors and maximising conviction rates. The revised force policy reinforces the commitment by making staff fully aware of their role and by doing so, ensures that the best possible service is delivered. The policy is supported by six principles which are a detailed description of actions relating to the investigation and the supporting mechanisms which must work alongside the investigative process.

The force has recognised the risks associated with PDPs and in each case holds a risk assessment meeting, similar to MAPPA, to discuss and agree strategies. The area tasking and co-ordination systems allocate responsibilities and track progress and/or any changes in risk.

A MAPPA co-ordinator has been appointed with joint funding from police and probation to oversee and manage all of the MAPPA arrangements within the force area. MAPPA arrangements cater for PDPs but they still use category 1, 2 and 3 classifications to respond to the risks presented.

### **Work in progress**

The force is in the process of building relationships with the mental health trusts within the force area. There needs to be an overall raised awareness in the neighbourhood teams of vulnerability issues, which should include mental health and all areas of vulnerability, particularly the elderly. Concerns were also expressed by officers and partner agencies over the resource implications of this growing area of work.

Work is progressing on organising further joint training initiatives to ensure each agency has a clear insight into the processes used by partners and how they can assist each other in minimising duplication and ensuring there is some cross-cutting of processes. The force is beginning to develop the capability to carry out environmental scanning to ensure each agency is prepared and that joint initiatives are developed in adequate time to deal with an emerging problem or new statute.

The detective sergeant (DS) in HQ PPU manages district PPU staff. There are some variations in understanding by senior ACU managers over what issues should be classed as a priority. It has also been identified that TCG meetings focus predominantly on statistics as opposed to vulnerability issues. The DS will work with PPU officers, on ACUs, to develop awareness and processes, offer close supervision, quality check reports and monitor their skills as PPU officers.

### **Areas for improvement**

At this stage, the force has a number of systems and associated databases which are used to capture and monitor information and intelligence on incidents of child protection, DV and missing persons. However, CATS and the force incident logging system (Indepol) will be turned off at the end of the year and there is apprehension among specialist officers that not all information will be searchable simply. The force needs to ensure that all data will be easily accessible to officers, properly trained on the systems, before legacy systems are superseded.

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Surveillance capability is limited and the force should assess the risks associated with having a limited resource for proactive operations around RSOs in particular, as the numbers of RSOs resident within the county is increasing.

Officers are made aware of incidents involving vulnerable persons and other issues through the daily briefing manager, who informs them of priority issues and recent intelligence. However, delays in publishing such information impact on an officer's ability to respond in a timely manner to identified community risks.

Although the force has trained police search of area (POLSA) staff, they are not in one identified unit. This causes difficulties when significant incidents take place and there is a requirement for scene preservation and evidential search processes. The force should consider a review of its POLSA capacity, its training and availability to respond to urgent force priorities.

The history of the transition from the original vulnerable persons units into the current CPUs partially explains the fundamental differences now apparent between the different line management responsibilities and the staffing of elements of the CPU. This occasionally translates through into the force PPU negotiating with area commanders individually for extra equipment, vehicles etc, as the principal budget holders.

Intelligence units across ACUs have little input into developing packages around individuals, locations or emerging trends in key areas of PVP. There is little sharing or processing of partners' intelligence within the ACU intelligence units, this being left to CPU officers who may know the names to look for. Examples were given of failures in intelligence/information leading to offenders being inappropriately released from custody. The force needs to review its intelligence capabilities in this area.

Mental health issues are seen as a suitable area for CPUs, but concerns were expressed at an apparent lack of awareness among senior officers of the need to resource CPUs to deal with this growing problem.

Distance has a major impact on the effectiveness of the CPUs. Often lodged in separate buildings, they are now attempting to design a virtual gate-keeping role to manage the volume and the risks. Even in Central ACU in York, elements of the CPU are housed in separate buildings some miles apart.

Health was identified as a partner which rarely attends multi-agency risk assessment conference (MARAC) meetings and this is becoming a big inhibitor in delivering effective risk assessments.

The management of missing persons incidents requires revisiting. The force has significant gaps in the co-ordination of intelligence surrounding incidents and, unlike those forces which have invested in this area, is unsighted on the potential links to vulnerability, sexual exploitation and partnership involvement.

## Protecting Vulnerable People – Child Abuse

GRADE	GOOD
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### National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
3	17	21	2

### National contextual factors

The Children Act 2004 places a duty on the police to ‘safeguard and promote the welfare of children’; safeguarding children, therefore, is a fundamental part of the duties of all police officers. All police forces, however, also have specialist units which, although they vary in structure, size and remit, normally take primary responsibility for investigating child abuse cases. Officers in these units work closely with other agencies, particularly Social Services, to ensure that co-ordinated action is taken to protect specific children who are suffering, or who are at risk of suffering, significant harm. The Children Act 2004 also requires each local authority to establish a Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB). This is the key statutory mechanism for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will co-operate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in that locality, and for ensuring the effectiveness of what they do.

Membership of LSCBs includes representatives of the relevant local authority and its Board partners, notably the police, probation, youth offending teams, strategic health authorities and primary care trusts, NHS Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts, the Connexions service, Children and Family Courts Advisory and Support Service, Secure Training Centres and prisons.

### Contextual factors

The ACPO lead for child abuse investigation is the ACC (SSD), HQ. There are four teams situated at Clifton Moor York (Central BCU), Northallerton (Eastern BCU), Eastfield Scarborough (Eastern BCU) and Knaresborough (Western BCU). A DS heads each team.

North Yorkshire child abuse investigation team (CAIT) investigators deal with cases in line with the *Working Together to Safeguard Children* document. This advises that child abuse investigators should take primary responsibility for investigating child abuse cases. As a minimum, this should include criminal investigations relating to the following offences:

- occurring within the household (as opposed to a stranger attack);
- committed by a carer or family member against a child where the victim is under 18 years of age;
- children in care when the abuser is alleged to be the carer or an employee of the care organisation (eg, foster carer or children’s home employee). A carer includes:
  - any person visiting the household regularly; and
  - any person having care responsibility at the time of the alleged offence (eg, teacher, health or youth worker, prison staff or babysitter).

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The CAIT also provide advice to investigators in child homicide cases. Officers also deal with information from notifications, referrals, telephone conversations with other agencies, strategy discussions, joint visits, planning for interviews and contact with victims. CAIT officers record any resulting intelligence from these contacts.

Offences against children which fall outside the remit of the CAIT are dealt with by BCU CID teams or in homicide cases, investigations are overseen by a senior investigating officer with appropriate resources from a number of departments. On occasions this involves the secondment of CAIT officers to a particular enquiry, even if just in an advisory capacity.

The force child protection policy sets out the approach and minimum standards of investigation and actions required of all staff in the investigation of allegations of child abuse.

## **Strengths**

The force ACPO lead is the ACC (support services/protective services), who retains this role for all codes of practice projects/work strands. The ACC (protective services) is the programme director and chairs the programme board/steering group. The force has completed a capability assessment against NCPE doctrines and an action plan has identified gaps with associated risks.

Each CAIT unit is headed by a DS. York has four DCs and the other offices have three. All the DSs report to a DI based at HQ with responsibility for child abuse investigation. The DI reports to the detective chief inspector (DCI) HQ SSD.

At the time of the inspection all posts within the units were filled and dedicated to child protection. The CAIT is specific to child abuse investigation and the investigators are not abstracted to other duties.

Staffing levels are based on an assessment of historical demand. The DCI/DI reviewed staffing levels and workloads 12 months ago. They are sufficient to deal with current caseloads in each BCU.

All job descriptions for officers are up to date and identify the skills and role profile. There is no tenure period and officers are subject to an annual PDR process where performance and any development opportunities are raised with supervisors.

Performance data for each of the CAIT units is gathered by the HQ business intelligence unit, which collates the data and presents it in a report format. The type of data gathered is standardised across the force.

Caseloads are monitored by unit DSs utilising the CATS computer system. Each DS is responsible for monitoring individual caseloads of staff. The performance data supplied to the HQ business intelligence unit is not on an individual basis but represents data for the whole team. The HQ DI and DCI oversee the process from a force viewpoint and can access the CATS system to do so, but also hold meetings with DSs on a regular basis. They also review the performance data gathered by the business intelligence unit from each unit.

Either prior to joining the unit or as soon as they join the unit, all officers receive training in the Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme (ICIDP), child abuse, achieving

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best evidence guidance (ABEG), Police National Computer (PNC), sexual offender liaison officer, sex offenders and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP). Some officers are also family liaison officer (FLO) trained. Child abuse investigation staff, including inspectors and sergeants should have undertaken the Centrex (2003) *ICIDP*, or be qualified detectives under previous national accreditation schemes. The DI and DCI have undergone the national senior investigating officer development programme.

Officers from the CAIT units are involved in multi-agency training provided by the local safeguarding children board (LSCB). This provides them with an understanding of the roles of other agencies and their statutory responsibilities. In particular, joint training undertaken with social services staff ensures the impact of investigations on a child is minimised by the co-operation of both organisations. The intention is that officers should be sufficiently trained to have the confidence to challenge the views of other professionals, including doctors where appropriate.

The LSCB has arranged joint training between police and partner agencies in dealing with military personnel. NYP has British Army, Royal Air Force and American military personnel resident within the community. This training also involves military welfare groups in advising professionals of the various protocols in the investigation of military personnel. This has been identified through analysis of increased troop movements in and out of Catterick Garrison and the fluctuating demands, particularly in relation to DV.

Recent audits and case reviews identified that there was a lack of awareness and knowledge of Kennedy procedures across all agencies involved in child protection matters. As a consequence, a joint training day was arranged by police and health to raise awareness. Two studies of local cases were presented by practitioners involved (paediatrician and named nurse for child protection, DS and DI for police). Presentations were also given by a paediatric pathologist, to explain his role and responsibilities and to highlight his needs/requests prior to a post-mortem. This included the gathering of evidence and risk factors. A bereavement counsellor explained the effects on families of such incidents. The outcomes were positive and were seen to translate into more effective management of incidents.

Audits and supervisory reviews identified a lack of clarity on who should be checked on the impact nominal index (INI) and when. A directive has been published to clarify who should be checked during an investigation to ensure there is corporacy of the investigation process and ensure that any intelligence is identified at the earliest possible opportunity. The effect has been an increase in the number of INI checks, which potentially protects more children. Statistically, North Yorkshire conducts a high number of INI checks compared with other forces. Feedback from the regional INI co-ordinator is that NYP performs to an excellent standard in this area.

A new CATS system has been introduced and a total of 19 years of back records have been input onto the system. ACRs can check for any previous information on addresses. CAIT staff now include case conferences and strategy meetings on the intelligence file available to ACR. During the daytime hours, the CAIT DS or staff in each unit act as a back-up system for queries.

Incidents are recorded on the force command and control system (STORM) and on the CATS database; this allows tracking of assessments and the progress of each case. The LSCB teams (child protection) have a risk assessment panel which reviews the circumstances and from that a course of action is agreed between all agencies, each taking responsibility for allocated actions.

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LSCB meetings take place quarterly, attended by the relevant CAIT member of staff. The issue for future development in NYP is around DV incidents and the inclusion of children at risk, identified to CAIT from attendance at DV incidents.

Child protection agencies link in with mental health outreach workers and mental health authorities and by doing so ensure that they are kept informed of potential vulnerability within communities. In addition, the education welfare officers attend risk assessment panels to ensure that as much information and intelligence as possible are considered during proceedings.

CEOP packages are logged and risk assessed and a comprehensive research package is created within the force intelligence bureau (FIB). The DI in the FIB is the force SPOC. The package includes checks undertaken by the PPU of relevant external agencies and forwarded to the ACU CID for attention. The FIB maintains a database of all packages and progress monitored according to risk, with very high action within 24 hours and the remaining within two weeks. This performance is reviewed by the DCI FIB in consultation with BCU DCIs.

### **Work in progress**

CPUs on Eastern and Western ACUs are now filtering requests for ABEG interviews, to ensure that the requests are valid, as there is an increasing tendency to pass unsuitable interviews to the CPUs to save uniform time. This was not the case in Central ACU, where there is pressure on certain individuals to accept all requests and, in the absence of supervision, a lack of options to refuse.

Training has been reviewed and the force is currently in the process of providing completion of outstanding and newly identified training requirements for PVP staff.

Succession planning is being progressed, with a programme of attachments for officers to experience the workings of the CAITs.

### **Areas for improvement**

The force has a number of systems and associated databases, which are used to capture and monitor information and intelligence. DV incidents are held on Indepol; however, this will be turned off at the end of the year and DV information will be held on Niche. Where there are risks to children identified during attendance at DV incidents (and recorded on Indepol or Niche), there are risks and dangers of having connected information on separate systems to the main child protection database (CATS), which are not currently searchable by one search engine and have to rely on the competence of the user to be interrogated separately.

During focus groups, equipment was raised as an issue, exacerbated further by locations of buildings, so that different parts of some units sit in separate locations. It was also identified that as they come under different line management structures and ACU ownership, there is always a difficulty in getting finance as a priority for new equipment and vehicles.

Partners felt that the lack of flexibility of resource deployment was a major inhibitor to performance. Craven is seen as an emerging problem for the LSCB but resources are not

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sufficiently focused there to deal with an increasing demand. The inclusion of other partner intelligence into the NIM process would provide the force with an early indication of developing trends and allow for some flexibility in the deployment of appropriately skilled resources.

Performance is measured on activity and not quality of outcomes or seriousness. Consequently, numbers of ABEG interviews and case conferences take no account of the real workloads or length of some investigations.

Awareness among uniformed officers on vulnerability issues is low and some ABEG interview training has been provided. The local CPUs are to monitor the performance of these officers, as it could be up to six months between interview practice. The force should develop a succession plan and provide training to officers who have been identified as suitable candidates to join the units. In Eastern ACU, attachments are arranged to keep their skills relevant.

Members of CAIT units thought that training was not always delivered quickly enough. However, they have a good relationship with the CID and do not get abstracted for other duties.

Joint ABEG training is being launched to embed joint understanding. However, partners commented that the police appear unable to move a requirement through the training branch and identify someone suitable from the police side to lead on this.

Interviewees identified concerns over the changes following the introduction of LSCBs. There was a perception among investigators that, on occasions, local authority partners may not be apportioning the right category of risk to certain circumstances. This is believed to be attributable to either budgetary or resilience reasons. Instances were given of discussions around reducing vulnerable children to 'in need' rather than 'child protection' status, because of resource limitations.

Issues were raised regarding the requirement for additional reports to be generated for the LSCB, where care proceedings are being considered. Staff felt that administrative support would provide some resilience within the units and ensure that such reports would be delivered in a timelier manner.

Acceptance of cases is based on risk assessment criteria but on occasions CAIT units try to accept all cases. Where this is not possible, they provide handover packages to ensure that there is consistency in the investigations.

Out-of-hours coverage was identified as an issue. Many referrals are made during working hours direct to staff because of the relationships which have developed and the ability to discuss contextual issues. Out of hours they come through the ACR and CPUs have to urge partners to do this to provide an initial response, rather than wait until the following day. There is no experience or expertise in ACRs to handle the initial calls and this is an area for future attention.

Other issues identified were the demands for video interviewing. There are enough trained staff in force but they are generally unwilling or unavailable to carry this out. The requirement therefore generally falls on CPU staff. Exacerbating this demand is the fact that such interviews are not always required and supervisors appear unwilling to make decisions to interview without CPU involvement and ratification.

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## Developing Practice

**TITLE: Sudden unexpected death in infancy**

**PROBLEM:**

Lack of awareness and knowledge of Kennedy procedures across all agencies involved in child protection matters.

**SOLUTION:**

A multi-agency training day was arranged by police and health to raise awareness. Two studies of local cases were presented by practitioners involved (a paediatrician and a named nurse for child protection, DS and DI for police). A presentation was also given by a paediatric pathologist, to explain his role and responsibilities and to highlight his needs/requests prior to a post-mortem, including gathering of evidence and risk factors. A bereavement councillor explained the effects on families.

**OUTCOME(S):**

Feedback received was positive and a commitment made by all agencies to cascade the issues of the day and lessons learned. For example, a week after the training day, a general CID DS (with no child protection background) attended a sudden unexplained death investigation and provided feedback of how he was able to utilise the information provided from the training day and how it had boosted his confidence. Further requests have been received to provide the training.

**FORCE CONTACT:** DCI A Carey/DI M Moore



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**TITLE: Checks on INI**

**PROBLEM:**

Lack of clarity on who should be checked on INI and when.

**SOLUTION:**

A directive was sent out on who should be checked during an investigation:

- Anyone who is a suspect in cases of physical or sexual abuse of a child or neglect.
- Any associates of a suspect who has contact with a victim, who gives rise to concern regarding the safety of a child.
- Anyone who would be the subject of a PNC check as part of an enquiry.
- Anyone who is a subject of checks for other agencies with regards to child protection and gives rise to concern for the safety of a child.
- Anyone who gives rise to concern in child protection.

**OUTCOME(S):**

An increase in the number of INI checks, which potentially protects more children. Statistically, North Yorkshire conducts a high number of INI checks compared with other forces. Feedback from the regional INI co-ordinator is that NYP performs excellently in this area.

**FORCE CONTACT:** DCI A Carey/DI M Moore

**Protecting Vulnerable People – Domestic Violence**

GRADE	GOOD
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**National grade distribution**

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
1	13	27	2

**National contextual factors**

There is no statutory or common law offence as such of ‘domestic violence’; the term is generally used to cover a range of abusive behaviour, not all of which is criminal. The definition of domestic violence adopted by ACPO does, however, take account of the full range of abusive behaviour as well as the different circumstances in which it can occur:

*‘any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults, aged 18 and over, who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality’.*

As with the investigation of child abuse, responding to and investigating domestic violence is the responsibility of all police officers. Again, however, forces have dedicated staff within this area of work, although their roles vary. In some forces staff undertake a support/liason role, generally acting as a single point of contact for victims and signposting and liaising with other agencies and support services; in others, staff have responsibility for carrying out investigations.

Irrespective of who carries out the investigation in domestic violence cases, an integral part of every stage is the identification of risk factors, followed by more detailed risk assessment and management. In 2004, HMIC, together with HMCPSI, published a joint thematic inspection report on the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence. At that time, risk identification, assessment and management were in the early stages of development throughout the service. Since then, there has been considerable progress in developing formal risk identification and assessment processes and - in a number of forces - the implementation of multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs). Other improvements include the introduction of specialist domestic violence courts and the strengthening of joint working arrangements.

**Contextual factors**

The processes for dealing with DV are developing and the staff are now established in post, located in the CPU. A DI oversees DV in the ACU and a DS and five investigators are dedicated to the DV process. In addition, three DV co-ordinators manage the processes and ensure that DV incidents are dealt with appropriately. This includes searching the command and control and other systems to ensure no DV incident has been missed. However, problems with various IT systems do still cause some frustrations.

The force has developed some innovative systems with partners to improve the investigation, prosecution and victim care arrangements. In Eastern ACU, the development of a multi-agency project to effectively improve the different aspects of delivery has seen the police, magistrates, CPS and local authority co-ordinate activities resulting in dedicated

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courts for fast-track prosecutions with a dedicated lawyer. The complementary 'Making Safe' programme has seen victim care improved significantly.

The force is working with a national IT software development company who are currently developing a DV software package which is anticipated to bolt onto Niche or National Strategy for Police Information Systems products. This should enhance the force capacity for capturing and analysing data in respect of DV, in particular the identification of repeat offenders.

## **Strengths**

The ACC (support services/protective services) is responsible for the strategic leadership on DV. Strategy and policy responsibilities for DV are overseen by the DCI HQ SSD and the ACC (protective services).

The force comprises three ACUs and responsibility for oversight of DV has been devolved to the ACU commanders. Each ACU has a CPU (incorporating a vulnerable persons unit which is managed on a day-to-day basis by a CPU DS). The CPUs are line managed by area DIs. Each unit is fully staffed by police investigators with both police and support staff members undertaking a co-ordinating role.

At the time of the inspection the following resources were invested within CPUs on areas:

The DC investigators deal with offenders and investigation of DV. The DV co-ordinators assess levels of risk to victims, engage in multi-agency liaison and attend MARACs.

Priorities for dealing with incidents of DV are contained in policy and require those dealing with such incidents to act in a positive way, supporting the victim and ensuring their safety and any children who may be involved. In doing so, incidents of domestic-related crimes should be reduced by positive intervention and rigorous investigation.

There are robust accountability and performance frameworks for specialist units and officers responding to calls for service. Incidents of DV, in particular repeats, are an agenda item on daily management meetings and are also integral to the NIM process. Any non-adherence to policy is challenged through supervisors. This is further reinforced through the focus on DV within the operational and corporate performance review inspections, conducted by the ACPO team. DV has also been a feature of audit and inspection visits carried out by the CDD audit and inspection team.

There are several examples of where the policies have been implemented successfully at ACU level. In Eastern Area, an audit of services revealed the force and its criminal justice partners lacked dedicated provisions for dealing with DV cases.

Scarborough successfully bid for Home Office funding of £20,000 to introduce special courts for DV. Some £12,000 of the funding has been given to Victim Support to provide a 24/7 call-line advocate who will offer support and advice to victims of DV. Police provided training and input to partner agencies within the criminal justice system (including magistrates) and voluntary sector to explain how the process worked. Feedback indicates that magistrates and partner agencies have welcomed the introduction of the courts, particularly with an increased focus on DV offenders.

There are protocols with the CPS for dealing with DV at Scarborough, with an identified CPS lawyer dedicated to dealing with cases and fast tracking offenders. A PI has been

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introduced to reduce the numbers of repeat offending. Since the initiation of the pilot, partners have identified a 70-80% guilty plea rate.

Awareness of the pilot has raised standards of investigation and victim personal statements are now obtained, 999 tapes are also obtained as a matter of course and photographs taken of the scene and injuries; these factors have contributed to the increased guilty plea rate. The force has identified financial provision, with partners, to take the system force-wide on a rolling programme across the ACUs.

Following a successful business case being prepared, CPUs were recently introduced on areas to deal with DV offenders, DV victims, vulnerable victims of crime, hate crime and harassment, and management of missing persons. This has resulted in a more focused and dedicated approach to dealing with DV incidents, resulting in closer liaison and improved practices between CPS, CAITs and other agencies which support victims. Links have also developed with other vulnerable people, as identified under NCPE documents. Targets have been produced to improve the quality of investigations, reduce repeat victims and increase arrests of offenders.

The CPUs have a performance framework which involves collation of data regarding numbers of arrests, positive disposals, number of cases where no further action is taken, repeat victimisation data, number and type of referrals made to other agencies, if alcohol is an aggravating factor and how efficient officers have been in completion of the Form 174 (DV form completed at the scene). This information is shared with partner agencies in multi-forum meetings to highlight performance and any best practice. Current end-of-year performance shows NYP performing above the MSF average for the percentage of arrests made at incidents. It also shows that the percentage of partner-on-partner violence has reduced significantly to below the MSF average.

All job descriptions for staff are current and are monitored through the PDR process. Officers are aware of 'job drift' and the impact that this could have on the ability to deliver their specialist role. This is subject to review throughout the monitoring of performance within CPUs.

All incidents are recorded on the Indepol system and converted to crimes where appropriate. There is also a DV database system which records all nominal details. The DV database is currently part of the Indepol system. However, this is currently being reviewed by the DCI HQ SSD and NYP Forward in relation to the migration of data into Niche and CATS.

DV incidents are flagged in the ACR on the command and control system, together with any safeguarding and preventative measures which are put in place, eg, cocoon watch, panic alarms etc. Controllers are aware of force policy and direct staff to provide the appropriate grade of response. There is a facility to audit the 'flagged' incidents and this is carried out through the CDD and PPU at HQ to ensure compliance with policies. DV incidents are 'flagged' utilising the National Standards for Incident Recording codes and qualifiers. There are closing codes and qualifiers for domestic incidents and violence. It is the closing codes and qualifiers which can be used to search and analyse incident responses on the command and control system.

Information provided to officers attending incidents is obtained by a manual search of the NYP databases and includes searches for any information relevant to that incident, person or address. This information is then passed to the officer by radio. The searches completed include bail condition and curfew checks.

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The command and control system does have provision to link 'trigger' or 'response' plans to either particular names/addresses or types of incidents. Typically, this would mean that when an incident occurred at a particular address, the command and control system would alert the operator to the fact a specific response plan was in existence. The plan is available to the operator to ensure the correct response is provided.

Officers attending the scene complete a Form 174. The transfer of information from Form 174 is managed onto Indepol and the DV database. Indepol provides a means of managing the investigation/incident, providing updates and flagging information for movement to the force intelligence system. The developments around Niche are intended to replace this with automatic transfer of data in due course.

The initial risk assessment is carried out by the officer attending the DV incident and ratified by the duty inspector. Initial details and risk assessment are recorded on Form 174, which is submitted by the end of duty to the DV co-ordinator. Details of the Form 174 risk assessment are recorded on the DV database. A full range of tactical and partner options is available in responding to DV incidents.

In managing responses, cognisance is taken of the relative isolation of the location and other complicating factors. For example, cocoon watch is reported to be working well in urban areas; however, such safeguarding actions are problematic in rural areas, where premises may be isolated and vulnerable due to long response times.

All cases of DV are reviewed at daily ACU management meetings and are subject to the NIM process. Appropriate strategies are adopted to target known and repeat offenders using the tasking process, which includes preventative tactical options and the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) where appropriate. Linkages between other areas of PVP are considered in the meetings and appropriately tasked actions are tracked to completion.

The CPUs, in addition to DV, deal with hate crime and co-ordinate responses to reports of missing persons. This includes multi-agency preventative work. There is regular liaison and consultation with the CAIT when children are involved in any incident to ensure risk factors are considered and that appropriate linkages with other partners/agencies are made.

Training in missing persons and DV policies and guidance has been run as part of staff development days on areas, with 622 officers attending missing persons training and 31 DV training.

The DV investigators are trained in ICIDP and attend DV training, which is delivered regionally. DV co-ordinators receive appropriate module training.

Vulnerable persons unit staff receive ABEG interview training, as have some of the CPU investigators. Other skills are held within the units, such as PNC trained officers as well as some officers who have had the nationally recognised child protection course, normally just delivered to CAIT officers.

Some officers have also received the LSCB awareness training to recognise signs of child abuse; this enables a more focused management of risks surrounding DV incidents.

It has been recognised that although training is standardised across all three ACUs, a corporate approach to any additional training is required, particularly involving partners.

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There are good working relationships between voluntary support networks. Organisations such as Women's Aid have visited CPUs to ascertain how they identify vulnerability and the various processes which enable the force to support victims and potential victims.

Catterick Garrison is one of the largest garrisons in Europe. The CPU works with the military in identifying vulnerability as battalions move around bases. Through intelligence it has been identified that as certain units are moved around the country, the impact on the host force in respect of DV and missing persons issues is increased. The force therefore works with the military to identify the risks and prepare appropriate strategies.

There are multi-agency mechanisms and action taken to support victims in that the offender is removed from the scene of the offence (the Making Safe policy). Foundation housing assists offenders in being rehabilitated rather than punished and has a good success rate.

Officers have received training in the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) model. The focus is on risk to potential victims and preservation of the right to life (Article 2). The force recognises the importance of correct initial risk assessment. The need to do this is impressed upon staff dealing with victims of DV, in particular response officers who attend initial calls.

The force has an up-to-date policy and guidance for officers attending incidents of DV and their subsequent investigation.

There is a NYP policy relating to police officers who commit DV-related criminal offences. All police employees (particularly those who might take primary intervention or evidence collection roles) are encouraged to consider the application of the aims and principles of this policy. The ACPO definition of DV is applied throughout this document and includes the ACPO definition/best value performance indicator 153 "threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or are family members, regardless of gender".

The DCC is the nominated ACPO officer who will be notified of all allegations of DV-related criminal offences against police officers. The nominated ACPO officer is responsible for the implementation of this policy.

### **Work in progress**

New posts have been created within the DV element of CPUs since April 2007. These posts in area CPUs are district staff working to force policy and procedures. However, there remain gaps in the consistency of intelligence and auditing of information. There are also issues around the relative importance ACUs place on DV as a significant area of their performance framework.

Caseloads for individual officers on each CPU are not monitored corporately from the centre. It is apparent from the three ACU crime profiles that caseloads do vary widely between each ACU. This is currently being reviewed by the DCI HQ SSD with the CPU DSs, following implementation of the CPU model, to give an indication of the workloads and capacity within the units. This piece of work will also influence future staffing levels in the units on each ACU.

The CPUs have a performance framework which involves collation of data regarding numbers of arrests, positive disposals, number of cases where no further action is taken, repeat victimisation data, number and type of referrals made to other agencies, if alcohol is an aggravating factor and how efficient officers have been in completion of the Form 174. At

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the present time, each ACU collates its own figures, which are not in one corporate format. Work is currently ongoing by the DCI HQ SSD to develop one corporate template between ACUs.

### **Areas for improvement**

Problems have been identified in identifying witnesses who may wish to access the services of the witness support scheme. In some instances, officers are asking victims to sign the back of the statement form without explaining fully to the victim the aims and objectives of the Victim Support scheme, the implications of signing and thereby unwittingly preventing access to essential support.

DV has improved considerably and officers are comfortable with the policy. However, in cases where the CPS is unlikely to proceed, custody officers are under instructions to caution offenders to ensure a sanction detection is obtained. This policy appears to be justified, as the caution will operate as an aggravating factor in any future arrest/case involving that individual.

Eastern European immigration is causing some real difficulties for CPU and its partners, regarding DV, because of cultural and communication issues. The provision of interpreters has been identified as a problem because of new languages and delays in obtaining Language Line services.

At the time of the inspection there were six DC vacancies in the CPUs. This breaks down into four vacancies in the Western CPU, two of which have never been filled, one due to a member of staff on long-term sickness and the other due to an officer being abstracted to a long-term enquiry. The other two vacancies are due to one in each of the remaining two ACUs (Eastern and Central) not yet been assigned by ACU command teams.

The CPUs were established in August/September 2006. Initially, each ACU was required and agreed to have a DS and five DCs; however, it is already apparent this is not appropriate and staffing levels must be proportionate to the anticipated volume of work. The post-implementation review process taking place needs to properly assess, including future projections, the numbers of staff required in each ACU.

The CPU is the SPOC for its dedicated role but also long-term missing persons and hate crime offences are referred to the unit. Applicants for the unit who are already FLO trained and have Home Office large major enquiry system skills are not precluded from applying for any post. However, the abstraction of officers (for example to major investigations as FLOs) has the potential to have a significant impact on capacity. One method currently employed to help counter this is the increased use of attachments from uniform officers to the units.

Some officers have received the LSCB awareness training to recognise signs of child abuse. This was seen as beneficial to both police officers and social services staff in being able to identify vulnerability in their own processes. This awareness training should be evaluated and delivered to all staff working within the CPUs.

The current IT system does not send an automatic referral to specialist officers; it requires a manual search of the system. This is unlikely to change in the near future. Officers in focus groups stated that force systems are difficult to interrogate and there appears to be a gap in the skills and knowledge to enable data locked away in systems to be accessed. The force should consider, in conjunction with IT training, conducting a skills audit of staff to ensure that they can properly access systems to deliver the maximum business benefits to the organisation.

When ACRs allocate an officer to attend a DV incident, control room staff conduct all relevant background checks on the NYP databases. The type of checks to be done and databases to be interrogated are detailed in the force DV policy. This policy also outlines the actions the call-taker should take and specific questions for the person reporting the incident. The attending officer is then updated with any relevant information. However, this process relies on the timeliness of data being input/recorded on other systems and cannot always be relied on to be up to date and accurate because of user difficulties identified elsewhere in the report.



## *Developing Practice*

**TITLE: CPUs**

**PROBLEM:**

There are no dedicated/specialist officers to deal with DV (DV co-ordinators are in place to identify various levels of concern for victims and to liaise with other agencies but have no offender focus). Also, there are no links with other vulnerable persons (missing persons, hate crime, harassment, child protection).

**SOLUTION:**

A business case was prepared for ACPO approval for the introduction of CPUs, based on research around other forces, NCPE guidelines/good practice and related documents (HMIC/HMCPSI violence at home inspection). CPUs were introduced on areas to deal with DV offenders, DV victims, vulnerable victims of crime, hate crime and harassment, and management of missing persons.

**OUTCOME(S):**

A more focused and dedicated approach to dealing with DV incidents, resulting in closer liaison and improved practices between the CPS, CAITs and other agencies that support victims. Links were also developed with other vulnerable people, as identified in NCPE documents. Targets were produced to improve the quality of investigation, reduce repeat victims and increase the arrests of offenders.

**FORCE CONTACT: DCI Carey**

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**TITLE: Special court for domestic violence**

**PROBLEM:**

No dedicated provisions for dealing with DV cases.

**SOLUTION:**

Scarborough successfully bid for Home Office funding of £20,000 to introduce Special Courts for DV. A trial period commenced in December 2006 and continued until the end of March 2007. Some £12,000 of the funding has been given to Victim Support to provide a 24/7 call-line advocate who will offer support and advice to victims of DV. The police have provided training and input to partner agencies within the criminal justice system (including magistrates) and the voluntary sector to explain how the process will work.

**OUTCOME(S):**

Verbal feedback indicates that magistrates and partner agencies have welcomed the introduction of the courts, particularly with an increased focus on DV offenders.

**FORCE CONTACT:** DCI A Carey

## Protecting Vulnerable People – Public Protection

GRADE	GOOD
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### National grade distribution

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
2	16	23	2

### National contextual factors

The Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act 2000 led to the formation of the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements, commonly known as MAPPA, requiring the police and probation services to work together as the Responsible Authority in each area of England and Wales to establish and review the arrangements for the assessment and management of sexual and violent offenders. Subsequent legislation brought the Prison Service into the Responsible Authority arrangements and also requires a range of social care agencies to co-operate with the Responsible Authority in the delivery of the assessment and management of risk in this area. These agencies include health, housing, education, social services, youth offending teams, Jobcentre Plus, and electronic monitoring services.

Under MAPPA, there are three categories of offender who are considered to pose a risk of serious harm:

Category 1 – Registered Sex Offenders (RSOs)

Category 2 – violent and other sex offenders

Category 3 – other offenders (with convictions that indicate they are capable of causing, and pose a risk of, serious harm).

To be managed under MAPPA, offenders must have received a conviction or caution. However, there are some people who have not been convicted or cautioned for any offence, and thus fall outside these categories, but whose behaviour nonetheless gives reasonable ground for believing a present likelihood of them committing an offence that will cause serious harm. These people are termed Potentially Dangerous Persons (PDPs).

Following risk assessment, risk management involves the use of strategies by various agencies to reduce the risk, at three levels:

- Level 1 offenders can be managed by one agency;
- Level 2 offenders require the active involvement of more than one agency;
- Level 3 offenders – the ‘critical few’ – are generally deemed to pose a high or very high risk and are managed by a multi-agency public protection panel (MAPPP).

In 2003, the Home Secretary issued MAPPA guidance to consolidate what has already been achieved since the introduction of the MAPPA in 2001 and to address a need for greater consistency in MAPPA practice. The guidance outlines four considerations that are key to the delivery of effective public protection.

- defensible decisions;
- rigorous risk assessment;
- the delivery of risk management plans which match the identified public protection need; and,
- the evaluation of performance to improve delivery.

### **Contextual factors**

MAPPA is managed in North Yorkshire by a strategic management board (SMB). The SMB comprises senior managers from the responsible authorities (police, probation and prison services) and duty to co-operate agencies (youth offending teams, local education authorities, registered social landlords, social services, strategic health authorities, care trusts and NHS trusts, Jobcentre plus and electronic monitoring providers). It also includes two lay advisors appointed by the Secretary of State.

Previous years have seen an increasingly collaborative and joined-up working of criminal justice organisations and key partner agencies and this is evidenced by the increased accountability of MAPPA, in the challenging area of public protection. Protecting the public from the most serious offenders living in communities continues to be the SMB's highest priority.

There is a three-year business plan produced by North Yorkshire and City of York SMB and covers the financial years from April 2006 to March 2009. It has been drawn up in line with guidance issued by the responsible authority national steering group. The key priorities for the coming year can be summarised as:

- ensuring the high quality of MAPPA work (quality audits, shared practice, lessons learnt from best practice etc);
- maintaining public confidence in MAPPA (the production of an annual report, victim awareness etc); and
- demonstrating high performance (monitoring and evaluation and the development of a new database).

The whole area of vulnerability and public protection has been subject to an internal review process and as a consequence investment in the numbers of dedicated staff has increased. The North Yorkshire draft *Protecting the Public* document, a review of force commitment to public protection management (based on ACPO guidance), was undertaken by the DI FIB/PPU. An action plan was formulated which includes a ten-year projected resource review. The force has carried out a relevant threat assessment in respect of public protection and has seen increases in workload of, on average, 8% per year. This is in line with the national picture.

### **Strengths**

North Yorkshire area SMB is chaired in rotation on an annual basis, by the representatives of agencies that make up the responsible authority (police, probation and prison). The current chair is the chief probation officer, North Yorkshire area probation. The police

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representative is the ACC (protective services) and the prison service is represented by the governor of Askham Grange.

The ACC (protective services) is responsible for public protection matters and reviewing progress and performance, which includes any issues pertaining to CPUs within the appropriate DCC or ACC performance meetings on areas and departments. The DCI HQ SSD is responsible for the overview and maintenance of public protection within the force. Reporting directly to the head of SSD, the postholder carries out a range of performance and practice review meetings with inspectors and sergeants from the CPUs, as well as maintaining an overview of organisational capability.

Public protection is an area identified within the force control strategy. PPU officers are BCU staff but work to force policy and guidance. Central supervision and guidance is now provided by a dedicated DI and sergeant who perform the audit and quality control function. However, as officers remain part of the BCU structure there also remains accountability by the ACU commander for all PPU issues within their area of command.

The DI on ACU and HQ PPU DS attend level 3 MAPPAs meetings. This ensures there is a link with the corporate overview of the management of offenders through the MAPPA process and, in addition, the appropriate submission of intelligence to inform a corporate risk assessment.

The DI public protection has the responsibility of ensuring that all MAPPA level 2 (high risk) and level 3 (very high risk) offenders are clearly flagged on the force intelligence database. The flag will state the current MAPPA level and a request for information/contact with PPU staff. If a MAPPA offender is the subject of action under the MAPPA protocol, the resulting action plan may result in a requirement to supply intelligence.

A multi-agency information sharing protocol exists in North Yorkshire regarding MAPPA, which includes identification and referral processes.

For level 1, the owning agency has a responsibility to review the offender. If there are any relevant concerns, the agency should submit a referral so consideration can be given as to whether a MAPPA meeting should be convened. Police referrals are co-ordinated by the DS PPU. All new sex offender registrations and risk assessments are reviewed by the DS PPU. Any offenders who are identified as either high or very high are considered for inclusion at a MAPPA meeting.

A referral to a MAPPA level 2 or 3 meeting by any of the three responsible authorities should take place at the point where it is necessary and realistic to engage the relevant agencies in the community which are required to strengthen the risk management activity. This can and often is while the offender is serving a term of imprisonment. This strengthens the management of risk on release by including:

- the imposition of licence conditions;
- the use of electronic monitoring;
- the use of preventative orders;
- covert management methods; and
- the use of designated accommodation,

The resources invested in the PPU structures are as follows:

- Dedicated DI public protection HQ.
- DS public protection HQ.

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- DC public protection (sexual offence prevention order (SOPO) post).
- HQ public protection intelligence officer.
- HQMAPPA administrator (police post – joint police/probation funded).
- PPU analyst HQ.
- PPU researcher HQ.
- Eight DCs public protection.
- DI intelligence and three on area with public protection responsibilities.

The force has continued to invest resources into its PPU. Three years ago only one PPU covered the entire force area. This has now increased to one PPU in each ACU staffed by three dedicated PPOs with an average caseload of 50 RSOs to supervise. In addition, a DI and sergeant have corporate oversight of the management of offenders and have the capacity to quality assure the processes.

The dedicated PPU DI is a newly established post. This role was previously undertaken by the DI responsible for force intelligence and PPU.

The ratio of managers to offenders has been revised and on average each PPO has a workload of 50 offenders and is viewed as being within manageable limits. PPOs also take on shared offender management as co-managers for offenders in other force areas. This has a workload and capacity implication. The move towards improved management of violent and dangerous offenders will quickly soak up any capacity created by the new officers. This is an area that the force should continue to monitor.

PPOs are ACU staff but are managed by a DI within the central PPU. There are policies in place to ensure that PPOs are not abstracted from their dedicated role. Posts are dedicated entirely to public protection roles and responsibilities. All PPU staff are briefed to refer any requests for abstractions to PPU HQ management and monitoring of this takes place (bi-monthly meetings with dedicated staff).

The newly appointed DC public protection unit (SOPO post) HQ has responsibility for tracking all individuals who are subject to arrest/charge for a sexual crime in North Yorkshire. Any relevant individual who is identified as presenting a risk of serious harm to the public will be the subject of a police MAPPA (offender) or information-sharing (PDP) meeting referral by this officer (or deputy).

Area-based PPOs attend level 2 MAPPA meetings. The ACU DI intelligence oversees proactive actions from level 2 meetings via NIM for their respective ACU.

The force has a policy in respect of the frequency of visits to RSOs based on the identifiable risk criteria. These visits are seen as a minimum requirement, and a proactive increase in visits occurs where relevant, (eg, where a particular offender is causing concern but it may be insufficient to increase the risk level).

The home visit assessments are subject to monthly performance data. The DI and sergeant in the PPU have oversight of workloads; the complexities of managed individuals and risks are undertaken through regular contact with PPU staff and direct supervision. Very high-risk offenders are visited within seven days of the requirement for a home visit.

A monthly home visit requirement is generated for home visit assessments due for each area of the force and submitted to the PPU email address in each respective ACU. The PPU officers have to complete the outstanding visits for that month and submit returns at the end of the month. All visits are completed within the month; any outstanding visits are

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subject to review the following month. All outstanding visits must have been completed by the second review date.

Staff are trained in Risk Matrix 2000 and assess risk of re-offending and also risk of harm. Risk assessment forms completed by PPOs are checked for quality and content, with feedback being given to the officer completing them.

There are good links to surveillance capabilities for high-risk individuals. The NIM is used to capture intelligence and feed it into the MAPPA process.

At the time of the home visit assessment, the PPO records relevant details on a force home visit assessment form. This form is then submitted to the PPU HQ for review and monitoring purposes. Any relevant intelligence is entered onto the force intelligence database (currently Niche) and the Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) by the attending PPO.

All PPOs conducting home visit assessments are aware of the requirement to review risk at the time of a home visit. Any concerns regarding an offender, either during or after a home visit, or at any time, are discussed at the earliest opportunity with the DS PPU and/or the area DI intelligence manager (depending on urgency and availability). Any concerns are recorded on the home visit form, intelligence and ViSOR databases. Any offender, who gives cause for concern to a dedicated PPO, is subject to flagging on ViSOR and referral to the DS PPU.

Resources in relation to RSO management are linked to intelligence and the NIM process. This ensures that appropriate risks through location (eg hostels, available housing) or through generic risk assessment and/or intelligence guide and inform PPU activity. Two-weekly meetings are held with staff from probation who supervise the hostel in Central BCU. This provides an intelligence link to the force and engages the hostel staff in intelligence gathering.

All sex offender registrations are managed by the PPU HQ. Any new very high or high-risk registrations are subject of review by the DS PPU. There are performance management procedures in place to ensure timely home visit assessments and identification of the risk category for RSOs. All new risk assessments are subject to review by the DS PPU and relevant MAPPA referrals are made.

MAPPA category 1 offenders who are on ViSOR and serving a term of imprisonment are subject to ViSOR diary entries to the DS PPU prior to release in order to ensure timely reviews.

Category 2 offenders (as per MAPPA guidance) are predominantly the responsibility of probation. All police-generated MAPPA referrals are co-ordinated by the DS PPU. All external agency MAPPA referrals are submitted to the MAPPA administrator and subject to review by the probation and police public protection managers. A joint decision is made regarding the requirement for a MAPPA meeting. In cases of dispute, the respective senior line manager is consulted.

There are two prisons in the force area and a prison liaison officer is located in the FIB. RSO movements are monitored, including those re-housed in the force area. These arrangements also collect intelligence from the prison establishment, which informs management arrangements on release and the relevant risk assessment.

Legal services attend MAPPA on request to offer advice to all partners in both North Yorkshire County Council and City of York. This is viewed as a valuable contribution to the

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process, particularly around the disclosure issues. North Yorkshire MAPPA area has been innovative in the application of MAPPA legislation and the creation of MAPPA audit inspections; this was highlighted nationally in a recent joint inspection as good working practice.

All RSOs are flagged on the force intelligence system (Niche).

All relevant intelligence pertaining to a ViSOR nominal is transposed onto the force system. However, the RSO flag utilised on Niche requires the enquirer to contact the PPU for further information. In urgent cases, contact can be made out of hours with PPU supervision, by force control room supervision.

The force identified that public protection information may be volunteered to the police from a range of sources, collected as a result of an intelligence requirement or as part of a MAPPA or PDP risk management plan. Routine collection of information from the day-to-day business of policing can include volunteered information and tasked information. When a member of the public provides the police with information, staff are aware of the potential risk of harm and the police duty of care to that person.

Policy dictates that all information pertaining to public protection should be appropriately dealt with in compliance with force policy. All information relating to threats to public safety should be recorded on a 5 x 5 x 5 (information/intelligence report) due to the potential risk to the source and content of the information. Further guidance to staff is available through the intranet and refers to *The Submission of Intelligence and Management of Intelligence Policies and Guidance on the Management of Police Information 2006*.

The development of the CPUs on each ACU, linked to the HQ-based overview and monitoring processes, has been further enhanced with the role of a dedicated force PPU analyst and the dedicated SOPO post. The co-location of staff within CPUs has provided a working environment where, on a daily basis, intelligence meetings and cross-referral of incidents are enabled through the requirement to search linked systems and provide inputs into risk assessment meetings – eg, MARACs, MAPPAs, case conferences. While the IT-integrated solutions are still some way off and the intelligence analysts are being appointed, the supervisory and dedicated staff knowledge sharing provides a degree of force confidence in the current arrangements.

The force has recognised that the PPO management units were not adequately supervised within the BCU in relation to welfare or personal debriefing. In order to rectify this situation, a dedicated DI and sergeant now work from within the PPU at the centre and will visit PPO officers, assess their performance and deal with any welfare issues.

ViSOR is accessible from the BCU but is administered from the centre. In addition, terminals are placed in the control rooms. There are currently 380 RSOs in the force area; they are flagged on Niche.

ViSOR go-live date in North Yorkshire was February 2005. All RSOs subject to entry on the interim solution (both live and weeded nominals) were subject to back-record conversion and this was fully completed by January 2006.

All new offenders are input by the PPU HQ. This office has responsibility for administration of any registrations in force and inputting the relevant data onto ViSOR and the force intelligence system. The nominated owner of the offender is responsible for inputting the outcome of any home visit assessment.



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Relevant dedicated PPU staff members have responsibility for inputting new information onto ViSOR on a case-by-case basis (eg if the DS PPU takes receipt of intelligence from another force, then the DS PPU will make the relevant entry; if the phone call was received by the DC or intelligence officer, then the responsibility is on that individual).

All paper-based files held since 1998 were subject to audit in 2006. Any RSO identified as 'owned' by NYP at any time since 1998 has been the subject of a review and a basic ViSOR entry created (this includes those who are currently serving sentences).

All MAPPA category 1 offenders are recorded on ViSOR.

All MAPPA category 2 offenders who are subject to registration (ie, sex offenders only) are recorded on ViSOR; this is in compliance with initial national ViSOR criteria for inclusion.

All MAPPA category 3 offenders are recorded on ViSOR; this is in compliance with initial national ViSOR criteria for inclusion.

A review of all paper based files held since 1998 have been subject of audit in 2006. Any registered sex offender identified as "owned" by NYP at any time since 1998 has been subject of review and a basic ViSOR entry created (this includes those who are currently serving sentences).

The force has introduced a book for the registration of RSOs which is held at each front enquiry desk of main police stations. This enables an auditing process to be completed and ensures that RSOs are in compliance with their control orders.

All dedicated PPU staff have terminals in their offices and direct access to ViSOR. Force control room inspectors have access to provide for force 24-hour cover but there are still some training requirements that are being actioned. The roll-out to further departments is currently underway.

Mental health issues appear to be adequately covered with the dangerous and severe personality disorder unit, where those referred receive an enhanced level of response and access to treatment. Critical public protection cases are also dealt with. In addition, the probation service has a mental health nurse linked to its unit in York.

Triggers to identify vulnerable mental health cases come from many sources and are fed into the NIM system. The objective is to identify a risk and take appropriate action before a situation escalates and involves an individual falling into the criminal justice systems. Health professionals, community psychiatric nurses, contribute fully and the suitable referrals are brought to a MAPPA. In addition, housing services also contribute fully to identify them.

The force has identified the risks to the public by PDPs and has agreed the information streams which may identify a risk. A PDP will come to police attention through information or intelligence acquired or received by the police, as a result of an arrest or investigation that has not resulted in a charge or prosecution, or as the result of an acquittal.

There are good links between PCSOs and the community safety partnership and processes exist to enable intelligence to be fed into the units regarding targeted nominals or in relation to observable changes in behaviour.

The decision to formally identify a person as a PDP will be made by the DI PPU. Assessment of a PDP is particularly problematic because many of the available risk assessment tools are intended for use with convicted offenders. In assessing the risk, the

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assessor takes into consideration any information available to the police or other agencies which indicates behaviour (either an isolated incident or a pattern of behaviour) which gives reasonable grounds to believe there is a likelihood of them committing an offence or offences that will cause serious harm, or which can reasonably be viewed as a precursor to more serious offending. This includes all relevant medical evidence available, and consideration of whether there is a reasonable explanation for the behaviour displayed.

Any individual identified as a PDP will be subject to a nominal entry on ViSOR and the force intelligence and PPU databases. This is supervised and managed by the DI for each PPU.

The force identifies all National Criminal Intelligence Service/CEOP sex offender courses as mandatory training for PPOs (DIs, DSs and DCs). All PPOs have attended all CEOP training events. A record of dedicated staff training is maintained.

The force facilitated Risk Matrix 2000 training by Professor Don Grubin (2005), attended by all force PPU staff and invited probation staff. Subsequent refresher training at Northumbria (2006) was attended by all PPU staff.

All public protection staff have attended SOPO training provided in force by Nadim Bashir and subsequently at external training events. All public protection staff have attended accredited ViSOR training. A bi-monthly PPU day takes place which involves all public protection staff and for which there is a structured agenda. The event is utilised to provide updates, advice and guidance relating to topical issues and specialist outside speakers are invited to provide input; a minute-taker records the proceedings.

Courses are subject to customer needs as identified through the force Form 189 process. Requests are then prioritised through the strategic learning and development board (formerly known as the training prioritisation group) and go into the annual corporate training plan, which runs from September each year. Items going into the corporate plan are themselves subject to a customer-driven prioritisation process which then drives learning and development activity.

## **Work in progress**

The ViSOR roll-out to more departments is currently underway. The following departments will have direct access to ViSOR (subject to training):

- child protection units;
- intelligence units; and
- PNC.

Training and roll-out is a priority over the next few months and it is anticipated this will be complete by August 2007.

Intelligence analysts are being embedded into all PPUs to assist in managing the workload, identify any developing risks and target individuals who may require intelligence to be developed through the use of RIPA and surveillance. Dedicated PPU analyst and researcher posts are new posts in force and the process for recruitment and selection had taken place. The successful candidates were in post by the summer of 2007.

All RSOs are flagged on the force intelligence system (Niche). The force took receipt of Niche in October 2006 and there have been initial problems with the entire flagging system.

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As a result, the flagging procedure is under review but interim flags are in place. The flag identifies the individual as an RSO and to contact PPU with information or for advice.

Probation and police in North Yorkshire are in the process of progressing central co-ordination of all MAPPA referrals and identification of MAPPA offenders to the HQ police/probation unit for central screening. However, IT issues in the database have caused considerable delay in expeditiously progressing this.

### **Areas for improvement**

The current Niche database allows free searching by all staff, allowing them to be able to identify all ViSOR nominals subject to a flag. There are clear security and confidentiality implications regarding any unrestricted access to this information. Currently, therefore, this specific flag is not in use. This issue has been highlighted at the national user group for Niche and NYP awaits feedback.

There is an issue currently about how the PPU captures information on those who are convicted of a sexual crime requiring registration. The current situation is that there is a reliance on the courts faxing copies of the conviction to PNC. This situation could be rectified by devising a system of notification at the point of arrest/charge to create an intelligence diary, flagging the interest of the PPU on the prosecution file, which would then be subject to confirmation by police staff on the day of hearing/sentence.

**Protecting Vulnerable People – Missing Persons**

GRADE

FAIR

**National grade distribution**

Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
1	21	21	0

**National contextual factors**

Each year, thousands of people are reported to police as missing. Many have done so voluntarily and are safe from harm, whether or not they return home. But a number are vulnerable, because of age or health concerns, and the police service has developed well-honed systems to respond swiftly and effectively to such cases. For obvious reasons, missing children arouse particular concern, and many forces deploy 'Child Rescue Alert' to engage the media in publicising such cases. Key good practice in this framework are early recognition of critical incident potential, effective supervision of enquiries, the use of NIM problem profiles and other intelligence techniques to analyse repeat locations (eg, children's homes), and the use of an IT-based investigation tracking system such as COMPACT.

**Contextual factors**

The force is now moving to a position where the CPUs will have a management and co-ordinating role for reports of missing persons. At present, this is not vested in any one individual role but as a shared responsibility within the CPU.

The force has issued a policy in respect of the management and investigation of persons reported as missing from home.

**Strategic aims**

- To ensure that every report of a missing person is risk assessed so that missing persons who may be vulnerable or represent a high-risk are immediately identified.
- To investigate missing persons.
- To have a clear policy in place which describes roles and responsibilities to respond to reports of missing persons.
- To adopt a multi-agency approach in dealing with missing persons.
- To support the needs of family, those close to missing persons and the community.
- To ensure staff are adequately trained to investigate missing persons cases.
- To preserve evidence where a crime has been committed.

There are clear responsibilities and levels of accountability within the policy guidance for the initial call response, risk assessment, investigation, highlighting through the NIM while still missing, and completion of Form 61 at the scene.

Beyond that, there are less clear responsibilities between the OPSUs, officers attending, supervisors, the ACR, the role of the CPU and the intelligence unit for the management of intelligence and audit of incidents recorded on command and control against completed

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Form 61s and intelligence submissions. The lack of an effective IT system exacerbates the situation.

## Strengths

The force ACPO lead is the ACC (protective services), who will retain this role for all codes of practice projects/work strands.

The missing persons policy is based on the *ACPO Manual of Guidance for the Management, Recording and Investigation of Missing Persons* and outlines the police response. The aim of the policy is to bring consistency to procedures for the management of missing persons and will outline a framework to make sure that the procedures carried out for missing persons follow a systematic structure.

On receipt of a report of a missing person within the ACR, the operator has access to a drop-down menu for assessing the current risk to the individual. This menu has a range of questions for the caller and from their responses, the appropriate risk assessment is made. Any high-risk reports are brought immediately to the attention of the critical incident manager. The incident is then passed to the appropriate area for action. The inspector on duty receiving the report either confirms or reassesses the risk, dependent on other information which may be available. Missing persons are treated as a priority, with some inspectors instructing staff to do nothing else until an individual is found.

The force has also adopted an unauthorised absence procedure with agencies/partners responsible for providing guardianship or care facilities, other than NYCC and City of York for which a separate agreement exists. This has been developed on a risk-based approach conducted for each individual with a standard risk assessment being conducted on each occasion that the young person goes missing.

While the general categories of missing, ie, high, medium and low risk, still apply, it provides a further category for the missing persons policy, namely unauthorised absence. Such cases still undergo a risk assessment, but where there are grounds to believe the absence is careless or deliberate with no apparent risk, this category is considered.

To cover those situations where the person is absent or out beyond an agreed time, a category of unauthorised absence is used, but justified in writing and reviewed in the same way as other categories of missing persons. An assessment of the circumstances is carried out, so that consideration is given to determine what risk factors may be present and the timing of reporting them missing to the police. The person's absence must be kept under review and if he or she has not returned within six hours, serious consideration must be given to reporting them as missing.

The policy states that the responsibility for managing this type of absence lies with the staff of a care home or foster carer and NOT the police. No officer should categorise a missing person as an unauthorised absence or complete a missing persons form to that effect. This process is a guide to care services in their management of missing persons (other than the NYP protocols with NYCC and the City of York). It does not detract from police responsibilities and duty of care that if a person is subsequently categorised as missing a formal report must be taken.

Examples of situations where unauthorised absence will apply are:

- running away after a dispute with a member of staff;

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- failing to return on time; and
- staying at a known location with a friend.

Training sessions covering missing persons and DV have been conducted as part of staff development days on areas. The cases of missing persons are co-ordinated through the CPU with operational responsibility remaining with uniformed staff, unless there are risk factors which heighten the responses required. The review of cases takes place daily until a decision is made either to upgrade enquiries or assess the individual as suitable for further monitoring by the co-ordinator. The co-ordinator highlights any inconsistencies with policy and practice to ACU management teams.

Missing persons workloads and cases are auditable through entries on Indepol. Compliance checking on policy takes place through the OPSUs and through the overview provided from HQ audit and inspection visits. Otherwise, the responsibility remains with the area.

Initial Form 61 completion is audited for policy compliance through OPSUs on each area, but not for intelligence purposes.

Missing persons responses in York appear robust with suitable cases interviewed by partner agencies on age criteria. Under 11s are interviewed on return by the childrens services unit. Up to 16s are interviewed by the education services team. Those over 16 are seen by Connexions. This allows suitable advice and arrangements to be offered.

### **Work in progress**

ACUs recognise that the investigation of missing person reports will routinely be dealt with by response officers, in liaison with the CPU. In order to manage the developing initiatives, areas are looking for one additional member of staff per CPU to cater for the growing requirements of management and intelligence surrounding missing persons.

### **Areas for improvement**

The force does not have a dedicated IT system to record reports of missing persons or subsequent enquiries. All reports are entered on a paper-based record and then transferred onto Indepol before the officer terminates their tour of duty. This is often a time-consuming process with dangers that important information may be omitted for the sake of expediency or not done at all.

Weeding policy is defined and is accessible via the intranet from the policy database. However, due to recent structural changes there is no consistent formal review of incidents across the force. The force is awaiting publication of recommendations from the Bichard report and once this is received, a review of the force weeding policy for applicability to missing persons will take place.

There is little intelligence collected from the investigation of missing persons reports. The main focus appears to be for the Form 61 and data on Indepol to be audited for completeness and not for content by OPSU. Form 61 is not routed through the intelligence units. Consequently, there is a real danger of links/risks being missed at a local level. There is no audit between reported incidents, Indepol, completed Form 61s and intelligence records submitted.

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The current IT system does not accommodate the national reporting form, albeit there are developments being progressed through the command and control system (STORM) for initial reception and risk assessment. Current paper-based systems are not adequate due to the absence of audit trails. The force does not therefore comply with the national standards and the collection and management of data are limited. There is limited formal quality assurance of completed forms.

Information from the force estimates that only 25% of reports are properly recorded, with the remainder either contained in incomplete Form 61 missing persons booklets or as sole entries on STORM which have not been transferred to Indepol. This occurs usually because the individual returns home before enquiries are completed, or officers do not then input the information to Indepol.

There is some confusion over where enquiries and the subsequent results are recorded on the actual form 61 missing persons booklets or on Indepol. This significantly impacts on the intelligence which is available, particularly on vulnerable missing persons that are reported frequently. It leads to gaps in the intelligence, for example on people harbouring, where there may be vulnerability either to the missing person or the harbourer. Without the record being highlighted from Indepol or Form 61, the multi-agency interviewing of repeat missing persons (as in Central ACU) also may not consistently be taking place. The force is missing out on opportunities for identifying and dealing with the core reasons for absences in key categories of missing persons.

The force should revisit the recommendations in its review report on the ownership and management of missing persons. Different processes are used in each of the ACUs to process and investigate missing from home reports. There is no evidence that intelligence units are collating intelligence in respect of vulnerability or identifying common locations which vulnerable children may be frequenting while absent.

There also needs to be some clarity and clear lines of accountability for all issues surrounding vulnerability. The CAIT is part of the SSD, the PPU with area and the CPU with area. There should be one identified person at a senior strategic level having responsibility for 'vulnerability' in the round who incorporates and monitors all aspects including missing persons. By including missing from home within this portfolio focus, the risks to the force and to potential victims should be considerably reduced through more focused monitoring.

The force should alternatively consider a SPOC within each ACU and an identified champion who should ensure there is some corporacy in the processes used in dealing with missing persons.

There is currently no consistent focus on providing officers with training in the investigation of a missing person report.

The intelligence strategy in the force includes missing persons briefing and debriefing requirements. Because of available resource time, these are limited to the daily review of live or high-profile incidents, rather than any in-depth analysis of linked incidents, premises located or vulnerability assessments.

In reality, missing persons are managed on ACUs through normal line management processes. The force does not have a missing persons investigation strategic manager. Duty inspectors on each area take responsibility for ensuring investigations are conducted appropriately. The current force position appears to be that the identification and management of missing persons will be achieved through normal operational business.

Given the evident breakdowns in recording and intelligence systems, it would be appropriate to review this position as a matter of importance.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

That the force create a role within the headquarters public protection unit to proactively monitor the information and processes surrounding missing persons. This role should also co-ordinate and improve partnership approaches in the identification and management of vulnerable individuals and premises.



## Recommendations

### **Recommendation 1**

That the force review the intelligence requirements surrounding Neighbourhood Policing and protecting vulnerable people to ensure officers are provided with timely and actionable information to properly support them in service delivery and decision making, particularly with partners.

### **Recommendation 2**

That the force create a role within the headquarters public protection unit to proactively monitor the information and processes surrounding missing persons. This role should also co-ordinate and improve partnership approaches in the identification and management of vulnerable individuals and premises.

## Appendix: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ABEG	Achieving Best Evidence Guidance
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACR	Area Control Room
ACU	Area Command Unit
APA	Association of Police Authorities
ASB	Anti-social Behaviour

### B

BCU	Basic Command Unit
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### C

CAIT	Child Abuse Investigation Team
CATS	Case Administration Tracking System
CDD	Corporate Development Department
CDRP	Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CEOP	Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CPU	Community Protection Unit

### D

DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
DCI	Detective Chief Inspector
DI	Detective Inspector
DS	Detective Sergeant
DV	Domestic Violence

**F**

FIB Force Intelligence Bureau

FLO Family Liaison Officer

**H**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HQ Headquarters

HR Human Resources

**I**

IAG Independent Advisory Group

ICIDP Initial Crime Investigators' Development Programme

ICT Information and Communications Technology

INI Impact Nominal Index

**J**

JAG Joint Action Group

**K**

KIN Key Individual Network

**L**

LCJB Local Criminal Justice Board

LSCB Local Safeguarding Children Board

**M**

MAPPA Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

MARAC Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference

MoPI Management of Police Information

MSF Most Similar Force(s)

**N**

NCPE National Centre for Policing Excellence

NIM National Intelligence Model

NYP North Yorkshire Police

NYPA North Yorkshire Police Authority

**O**

OPSU Operational Performance Support Unit

**P**

PCSO Police Community Support Officer

PDP Potentially Dangerous Person

PDR Performance Development Review

PI Performance Indicator

PNC Police National Computer

PND Penalty Notice for Disorder

POLSA Police Search of Area

PPO Public Protection Officer

PPU Public Protection Unit

PVP Protecting Vulnerable People

**Q**

QoSC Quality of Service Commitment

**R**

RIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

RSO Registered Sex Offender

**S**

SARA	Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment
SGC	Specific Grading Criteria
SMB	Strategic Management Board
SOPO	Sexual Offence Prevention Order
SPI	Statutory Performance Indicator
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
SSD	Specialist Support Department

**T**

TCG	Tasking and Co-ordination Group
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**V**

ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register
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