Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMIC Inspection Report

Leicestershire Constabulary
Major Crime

July 2008

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Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critcal incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;

- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;

- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and

- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.

- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.

- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative

procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

Failing to meet the standard

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

Developing Practice

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

Force Overview and Context

Geographical description of force area

Leicestershire is a mid-sized county in the East Midlands region that covers an area of approximately 2,084 square kilometres (804 square miles). It has good transport links; it is connected to the motorway network, London is just over an hour away by train and East Midlands International Airport (which is in Leicestershire) services numerous European and worldwide destinations. The M1 motorway runs through Leicester, carrying road traffic from London to Leeds; east to west is served by the M69, which connects to the M6. Local government is administered through Leicestershire County Council along with the two unitary authorities of Rutland County Council and Leicester City Council. There are seven district or borough councils.

Demographic profile of force area

Leicestershire has a population of approximately one million people. The county's economy is varied, with manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade accounting for about 40% of employment. Other significant employment includes business activities and the public service sector. Unemployment in the city is higher than the regional and national average, while the county has lower than average levels. More than 30 million tourists visit the city and county annually. The principal conurbation is Leicester, where more than a third of the population is from the black and minority ethnic community. In total, more than a quarter of the city's population is of Asian/British Asian origin, the largest such community in England and Wales.

Leicester was ranked in the bottom 10% of the Government Index of Local Deprivation as 31st out of the 50 most deprived areas in England. By contrast, Rutland has a large number of very small settlements with low population density and a high standard of living. The largest population centre is Leicester, followed by Loughborough; other major towns include Ashby de la Zouch, Coalville, Hinckley, Market Harborough, Melton Mowbray, Oadby and Wigston. Rutland is the smallest county in the country, having been awarded unitary status in 1997. It consists of two market towns – Oakham and the county town of Uppingham – and 58 parishes.

Strategic priorities

In line with the Home Secretary's key priorities for 2006–09 and targets set by the local criminal justice board (LCJB), crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs), primary care trusts and Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service, the force is working towards priorities set by the community safety board for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland.

The force is represented on three force-wide children and young persons strategic boards that govern the local safeguarding children board (LSCB) and is working proactively to achieve the five recommended outcomes of 'Every Child Matters'.

The force priorities for 2007/08 include:

- complying with quality of service commitments;
- answering 90% of all non-emergency calls within 30 seconds;
- reducing the number of people killed or seriously injured (KSIs) on the roads in line with national targets;
- implementing regional forensic procurement;
- continuing with introducing the national strategy for police information systems (NSPIS) case and custody system;

- achieving compliance with codes of practice for the management of police information;
- achieving 70.4% of police officer time spent on front-line policing duties;
- delivering savings and achieving 3% efficiency savings, in addition to the £25 million savings achieved in the last ten years;
- rolling out the automatic vehicle location system (ORB) force-wide, ensuring timely responses to calls;
- working closely with the East Midlands region forces to identify further collaboration and procurement opportunities;
- contributing to the development of regional level 2 intelligence and investigative assets, and
- introducing level 2 scientific support officers.

HMIC is aware that the force faces a challenging position financially and has reduced its police establishment to manage this situation. HMIC cost comparisons identify relative efficiencies by the force, compared with its most similar forces (MSFs), as delivering some of the lowest costs per head of population, but with a high level of policing presence. The force is currently working with the police authority (PA) on potential plans to reduce posts further over the next two years.

Force developments since 2007

In April 2007, the force restructured from four to three BCUs and realigned local policing units (LPUs) with local authorities.

In June 2007 a forensic science data audit was conducted by HMIC. Overall, the force was awarded Good and Excellent grades for the various components of data quality and data management.

During the Phase1 inspections in the spring and summer of 2007, the force received a Poor grade for Public Protection.

In February 2008 HMIC re-inspected this area and discovered that the force had made significant progress implementing new processes and procedures as well as recruiting additional staff to support and deliver improved performance. The inspection found that the force had comprehensively addressed the critical area for improvement, namely the need to identify a long-term solution for managing home visits to low and medium risk registered sex offenders. As a consequence the HMI regraded the force as Fair in Public Protection which is equivalent to meeting the standard as a grade outlined in this report.

Current developments

The force has taken the primary lead in supporting and co-ordinating the British Government's police response to the disappearance of four-year-old Madeleine McCann (whose family live in Rothley, Leicestershire), from a holiday apartment in Portugal on 3 May 2007. It has committed significant resources and has established an incident room to manage its contribution to the investigation. It has also deployed a number of staff to perform various roles in Portugal. This ongoing enquiry will continue to be a demand on the force until the investigation is resolved.

Structural description of the force area

The Force is one of the most efficient and effective in the country, ranked 5th (The Times 10 October 2007) following the publication of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

(HMIC) Base Line Assessment 2006/07. Inspectors graded the Force's implementation of neighbourhood policing as "excellent".

 In terms of reducing and detecting crime, over the last three years the total number of reported crimes have fallen by 3.8% (5% overall crime reduction for 2007-08), violent crime has fallen by 11.8%. The force solves just over 27% of all crime and nearly 44% of violent crime. HMIC graded as "excellent" our approach to dealing with victims of crime.

In February 2007 the Authority set a budget of £154.7 million. This resulted in a reduction of 30 police officer posts. This was the first reduction in police officer strength for 25 years. We have also held a total of 160 posts vacant to balance the budget.

In 2008 the Authority agreed a budget to allow these posts to be reinstated and the number of officers increased further. This was deemed necessary to maintain neighbourhood policing and respond to new challenges. The Local Government Minister made a statement in the House of Commons on 27 March 2008 indicating the Government may wish to "cap" our budget. If that takes place the force may need to revise its plans.

These challenges include serious organised crime, the threat of terrorism, and how we protect the most vulnerable people in our society. We intend to work closely with our regional partners Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, Derbyshire and Northamptonshire to do this.

A key aim of the Force is the disruption and dismantling of organised criminal groups who present a significant threat to our communities. One such group recently received more that 27 years in Prison. This followed an 18 month operation targeting a gang supplying heroin bound for Leicestershire. The Force will be increasing the size of the Special Operations Unit that undertakes these type of investigations.

The Force actively targets criminals' assets, using the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), to focus on those who live beyond their legitimate means. This demonstrates graphically that crime doesn't pay. In 2007 following hearings in Nottingham and Derby, confiscation orders made under this Act resulted in the largest seizure in Leicestershire History - £2,823,701. Some of this money is returned to the Force. As part of this process £52, 500 was set aside to compensate the victims of this particular crime.

In order to protect the most vulnerable in our society; children, vulnerable adults and victims of domestic abuse we intend to intensify work with partners to develop locally based specialist teams.

The 2007 HMIC inspection identified our performance in investigating crimes of neglect, physical and sexual abuse of children as "Good." But HMIC expressed concern as to the workloads and pressures on officers. To tackle this we intend to increase the number of officers working in this specialist area so that workloads meet recommended national standards. We will also be introducing locally based Public Protection Units (PPUs) to manage low and medium risk sex offenders more effectively.

In February 2008 Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, presented his independent review of the police service to the Home Secretary. The review recognises that bureaucracy can, all too often, hamper our ability to deliver the kind of service the public want. Leicestershire is one of four forces piloting the Flanagan report's recommendations on streamlining crime reporting in order to free up officers to deal with local, public priorities.

This year's budget of £164.7m will ensure that police officer numbers will be increased by 105, this includes the reinstatement of 30 police officer posts which were held vacant last year and growth to tackle serious and organised crime and criminality. Specific areas of

investment include the Child Abuse Investigation Unit, Area based Protecting Vulnerable People teams, the Special Operations Unit and firearms officers.

Financial Management

Leicestershire Constabulary has a proven record of effective financial management. Over the past 12 years the Force has achieved year on year efficiency savings totaling £39.5m and these savings have been re-invested in front line policing. For the third consecutive year, Leicestershire Constabulary is the best overall performer in relation to our Most Similar Group (MSG) of Forces in terms of prudent financial and resource management:

- Leicestershire has the lowest management on-costs of the group (33% compared to MSG average of 36%)

- Leicestershire has below average expenditure on supplies and services (£6.5k compared to MSG average of £7.5k per Full Time Equivalent police officer - FTE)

- Leicestershire has well below average premises related expenses (£1.7k compared to MSG average of £2.5k per FTE police officer)

The Force is committed to delivering a further 9.3% of efficiency savings over the next three years. A number of resource and demand management initiatives have been identified to achieve not only efficiency savings but also productivity gains in key areas of business.

Productivity

Leicestershire Constabulary has volunteered to take forward some creative thinking around the outcomes of Sir Ronnie Flanagan's review of policing. We are one of the national leads working on the reduction of bureaucracy with a clear focus on reinvesting time in front line policing. Through this programme of work we will completely review how we deploy and manage our resources and how we record incidents. We will deliver this through:

Mobile Data - we intend to introduce vehicle and portable hand-held computers which will provide officers with mobile access to our IT systems enabling them to directly input and retrieve information whilst away from the police station thereby significantly reducing bureaucracy and enabling officers to spend more time on patrol.

Duty Management System - this project aims to enhance the way in which our staff officers plan the advanced deployment of our resources identifying at an early stage where there are shortfalls. This, in conjunction with the development of demand profiling software, will better match our resources to demand, enabling enhanced deployment of police officers and staff.

IR3 - in 2008/09 we will roll out a satellite vehicle tracking system across our vehicle fleet. This product allows us to track and map our vehicles in real time therefore enabling us to allocate the most appropriate resources to incidents contributing to faster response times, mileage reduction and the safety of our officers. The software will also enable us to retrospectively access data for analysis so that we can ensure that our patrols have been in line with identified neighbourhood priorities and our patrol strategies.

Stop and Account - in 2008/09 we will be piloting new less bureaucratic arrangements for recording information when we stop and speak to members of the public.

Streamlined Crime Recording - in 2008/09 we will pilot a project which aims to reduce the bureaucracy surrounding the recording of crime, allowing officers to spend more time out on the streets. Officers will utilise more proportionate and victim focused resolutions working with partners to tackle the underlying causes of local crime problems.

Contact management - We want to develop further on our recent success in improving the responsiveness of our call handling service. We will be reviewing our current processes from initial call through to resolution ensuring that we provide an effective, proportionate and personalised service to all callers. This will include increasing the opportunity for members of the public to schedule appointments with local police officers to resolve non emergency calls.

Throughout all of these areas of business we will embed the recommendations of the Bichard enquiry relating to the Management of Police Information (MoPI).

The Environment

We are committed to ensuring that issues relating to the environment are considered when providing our policing service. The Force has commissioned a Strategic Environment Group, chaired by our Finance Director, which ensures that all relevant regulatory and legislative requirements are implemented and monitored and that we achieve continuous improvement regarding environmental performance and management. We ensure that waste, the consumption of natural resources and the release of polluting substances are kept to a minimum.

We undertake activity assessments modifying them based on scientific and technical understanding to minimise the harm caused to the environment. We actively promote the adoption of these principles to companies and contractors, within our supply chain, and where appropriate we encourage and request improvements to their environmental performance.

Our people

With a current establishment of 2288 police officers and 1596 police staff, over 80% of our budget is spent on people and our human resources function plays a critical role in enabling the force to deliver short, medium and long term objectives. This will be achieved through the proactive management of people issues and the professionalisation of key policing activities. We will;

- Have a workforce that reflects, engages and understands our local communities and a working environment in which all staff are treated with dignity and respect

- Proactively manage our workforce to ensure that it remains responsive and flexible enough to meet the changing needs of our communities and organisational risk

- Increase the capability, capacity and efficiency of HR by investing in technology to introduce electronic HR records, a duty management system for workforce planning and an enhanced electronic NSPIS HR capability. This will be supported by a rolling programme of HR staff development.

Our Equality Scheme is the framework covering our three statutory duties on race, disability and gender in addition to issues of age, religion, belief, sexual orientation and compliance with human rights legislation. This scheme is regularly reviewed and consultation events are carried out to bench mark progress, identify community views and inform future direction. Over the next three years we will further seek to ensure that our workforce is truly representative of the communities we serve and that people from all sections of the community can access our services.

Collaboration within the East Midlands

The East Midlands Special Operations Unit is one example of collaboration. It was set up to tackle serious and organised crime in the East Midlands. Another example is the joint air support unit serving Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Chief constables and the chairs of police authorities from Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire are committed to working together in this way to improve efficiency and performance in the future. Collaboration will achieve improved levels of service from within existing resources and/or similar levels of service at reduced cost. Collaboration does this whilst retaining local police forces and local accountability.

Following the HMIC report, 'Closing the Gap', the five East Midlands forces and their police authorities considered how best to identify and address gaps within protective services (serious and organised crime, major crime strategic roads policing, civil contingencies, critical incidents and public order). New emphasis was placed on working collaboratively after the Home Office withdrew its 2005 plans to merge police forces. The East Midlands region has been recognised as being at the forefront of collaborative working.

The five police forces individually and collectively identified those areas where there is the greatest need to increase capacity and capability to address protective service gaps. This assessment drew on local, regional and national data and will be updated periodically. The areas with the most urgency for improvements in protective services across more than one force are the priority for a regional programme and for significant progress by 2009. The current areas of regional protective services work are set out below.

Regional Protective Services Work Programme.

Leicestershire is the lead force or has significant involvement in those area marked with an *.

Witness protection *	Hi-tech crime
Making best use of police officers with specialist operational skills	Ability to tackle cross-regional and national criminality impacting on the region *
Domestic abuse	Live and cold case reviews
Technical support to police operations	Surveillance support teams

Parallel work conducted with support from consultants identified opportunities for greater productivity. Current projects are set out below.

Tape summarising	Forensics and identification *
Managing demand *	Authorisation for specialised surveillance
Managing resources *	Mobile data *
Prisoner processing & file preparation workforce modernisation	Aligning policy and procedure across forces

A collaboration programme team manages the programme of regional work. The Team will cost £1.13m in 2008/09 and £1.2m in 2009/10. It is funded jointly by the five police forces.

Projects are led by chief officers from around the region. The programme is overseen by a collaboration board, comprising chief constables, the chairs and members of police authorities. This board meets approximately every six weeks. It provides the detailed management of the programme. There is further oversight of the work through the East Midlands Joint Police Authorities Committee, which meets quarterly in public.

Detailed information about the programme of regional collaboration on protective services and productivity, including work beyond 2008/09 is set out in the East Midlands Regional Collaboration Plan.

In collaboration with our regional partners we will target serious and organised criminality and the threat of terrorism. The phrase 'protective services' describes the resources and specialists that are required to tackle:

- **terrorism and extremism**

- **serious organised and cross border crime**

- **civil contingencies and emergency planning**

- **critical incident management**

- **homicide and other serious violence**

- **significant public order incidents**

- **strategic roads policing.**

Leicestershire Constabulary and the four other East Midlands police forces and police authorities will continue to lead the way nationally in developing a collaborative approach to the provision of protective services.

Serious Crime

Leicestershire Constabulary's Crime Support Department offers support in tackling organised crime groups and makes a major contribution to public safety through the work of specialist teams.

The Major Crime Investigation Section will continue to provide a cohesive and coordinated response to the investigation of major crime within Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. Major crime includes:

- **murder and attempted murder**

- **kidnapping and extortion**

- **other homicides and manslaughter**

- **serious crime and incidents**

Reducing serious violence continues to be a high priority for the Force particularly offences where firearms and weapons are used. We will review our existing investigative procedures to ensure that the correct level of resources are allocated to the more serious offences balanced against a reduced and proportionate response to lower level reported crimes.

Protection of Vulnerable People

The protection of vulnerable people (PVP) is an area of police activity which seeks to protect those who are the most vulnerable in our society and includes:

- **victims of domestic abuse**

- **safeguarding vulnerable adults**

- **victims of 'Honour-based' violence**

- **overseeing child protection and links to prostitution**

- **management of sexual and dangerous offenders**

The Force will continue to work towards a fully integrated police and partner agency response to the protection of vulnerable people through locally based specialist teams.

The Solace Unit will continue to provide a dedicated response to victims of rape and serious sexual assaults providing support to victims and bringing offenders to justice.

The Paedophile On-Line Investigation team (POLIT) will continue to investigate internet abuse and to work closely with the Child Exploitation and On-line Protection (CEOP) agency, which co-ordinates internet abuse nationally.

The Child Abuse Investigation Unit, working in partnership with other agencies, specialises in investigating crimes of neglect, physical and sexual abuse against children. The department is also the lead for coordinating our response and activity to the 'Every Child Matters' agenda. In October 2007 HMIC assessed our performance in this area as 'Good', however they identified that the workloads and pressures on officers were of concern. As a result we shall be increasing our establishment maintaining our commitment to protecting children and young people and reducing officers' caseloads to the recommended national standards.

In 2008/09 the Force is establishing dedicated locally based Public Protection Units (PPUs) who will manage low and medium risk sex offenders. A HMIC inspection, carried out in April 2007, identified that the Constabulary did not have an appropriate infrastructure in place to fulfil this function and whilst much work has been done to address this in the interim the establishment of BCU based PPUs will secure a long term solution.

Operational Support

Our operations department provides a 24 hour 7 day a week capability to respond to incidents requiring the attendance of firearms officers, specialist search teams, hostage negotiators, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) trained officers and dedicated dog handlers. The department also provides Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), air support, dedicated fast roads policing and a motorcycle capability who through proactive tasking deny criminals the use of the roads and target level 2 criminality and organised crime groups.

Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard.

Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Leicestershire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as the response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.432	0.497	+15.05%	0.352
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.042	0.021	-50.00%	0.001
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	0.00%	0.00%	0pp*	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.063	0.115	+82.54%	0.098
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	116.67%	54.55%	-62.12pp*	84.37%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.619	0.357	-42.33%	0.218
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	15.25%	17.65%	+2.4pp*	30.04%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.451	0.598	+32.59%	0.357
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	30.23%	36.84%	+6.61pp*	47.71%
Number of manslaughters per 10,000 population	0.021	0.021	0.00%	0.023

% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	50.00%	-50pp*	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.115	0.126	+9.57%	0.112
% of murders detected/convicted	45.45%	83.33%	+37.88pp*	99.51%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.315	3.357	+1.27%	2.384
% of rapes detected/convicted	15.19%	13.44%	-1.75pp*	21.00%

'pp' is percentage points.

**Most similar force (MSF) group for Leicestershire is Bedfordshire, Essex, Hampshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire and Thames Valley.*

From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data in the table above it can be seen that the crime types of life-threatening and gun crime, abductions, blackmail, kidnapping and rape offences pose significant threats to Leicestershire Constabulary. Life-threatening and gun crime rose significantly in 2007 and is well above the MSF average. The rates of offences for abductions, blackmail, kidnapping and rape are all above the MSF average and are among the highest in England and Wales (although it should be noted that offences for abductions and blackmail both fell in 2007).

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Leicestershire is less effective than that of the peer forces. Leicestershire is performing at a level below the MSF average for all crime types. In particular there was large drop in the sanction detection rate for attempted murder. However, it can be noted that the sanction detection rate for murder improved significantly in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), released on 25 September 2007, revealed that Leicestershire faces a high level of demand in respect of the policing response to kidnapping offences.

Kidnap (2001/02 to 2006/07), Contribution to Total, Excl. MPS

The rate of kidnapping offences is above both the national and MSF averages and has experienced an increase in 2007.

Leicestershire is bordered by two other forces that also indicate raised demand for this crime type.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Leicestershire Constabulary has sought to make progress by ensuring that analysis of major crime types is initially mapped. It is currently estimated that 18 OCGs impact the force area, across three major crime types.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified OCGs, drugs, firearms and gun crime, immigration crime and terrorism and extremism as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on the identified priorities.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and/or addressed.

The force has invested suitable resources for interventions to maximise the return of harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and inhibit major crime. In particular, Leicestershire Constabulary's role in offering an assistant chief constable (ACC) to chair regional meetings is noteworthy.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a maturing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, collaborative agreements with East Midlands regional forces and the East Midlands special operations unit (EMSOU) are recognised.

Intelligence

Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, to supply dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has fully committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.

Strengths

- The force employs a total of 29 analysts; the operations intelligence bureau (OIB) has five analysts dedicated to level 2, operating a desk structure whereby staff are dedicated to a specific area of work, for example, drugs and firearms desks.

- The major crime investigation section (MCIS) has two dedicated analysts, although one member of staff has been committed virtually full time to Operation Task(the disappearance of Madeleine McCann). The MCIS analysts are primarily focused on evidential analysis as opposed to researching patterns, trends or predictive demands. A further analyst is in post to service protecting vulnerable people. Ample evidence was provided of the regular and routine use of problem and target profiles to support operations. Staff reported the regular use of horizon scanning and the use of open source and out-of-hours intelligence searches. There are sufficient resources in place to prepare the FSA and a range of National Intelligence Model (NIM) products that contain prevention, intelligence and enforcement activity.

Work in progress

- Development of the workforce reform programme will allow the MCIS to recruit an additional analyst, bringing its total to three, the idea being that each major incident room (MIR) has a dedicated analyst. A business plan has been submitted to recruit an additional analyst to supplement the level 2 desk structure, which will provide additional capacity for the OIB. It is also intended to create three senior analyst posts to improve supervision.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force was unable to provide any substantive or consistent evidence of identification of patterns or trends in major crime; such analysis would inform preventative and enforcement activity. This appears to be a capacity problem rather than one of inadequate tasking by senior managers. A key question for the force is whether the two proposed analyst posts create the capacity for effective pattern and trend analysis to inform preventative and enforcement activity.

Summary – The force seeks and shares intelligence about level 2 and level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force's community impact assessments to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.

Strengths

- Memoranda of understanding exist between the force and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to formalise information-sharing agreements. The force also has good working relationships with the drugs intervention programme and EMSOU resulting in the routine and effective exchange of intelligence, significantly improving operations. A robust critical incident procedure allows any officer to declare an incident as 'critical' and instigate the community impact assessment process.

- The force can evidence effective use of gold groups and gold support groups in response to critical incidents; Operation Task (the disappearance on 3 May 2007 of Madeleine McCann in Portugal) is an obvious example. The ACC (crime) chairs a three-monthly review panel that examines all critical incidents to identify learning and good practice. The force engages with minority groups as and when appropriate, and will establish an independent advisory group (IAG) if deemed suitable. It also draws upon contacts developed by staff in the community safety bureau (CSB), for example in the case of a homicide investigation in 2003 where sensitive enquiries in the Hindu community were facilitated by such contacts.

- The force has a very close working relationship with the Border Immigration Agency (BIA). In early 2007 the five East Midlands regional forces agreed to develop the regional foreign national and immigration crime unit. Four of the five forces now have units in place and a superintendent from the force leads the joint teams, which are currently involved in various enforcement operations. For example, two international lorry drivers were arrested in connection with human trafficking and are currently on bail pending charging decisions.

- A policy is in place with a practical guide to manage critical incidents; this directs the completion of a community impact assessment for each incident. Four CSB staff operate a call-out facility and are available to advise SIOs on community issues pertinent to a crime, and can also use the police advisory group on racial issues (PAGRI) if appropriate. Good evidence was provided of the use of a community impact assessment following a murder investigation where the victim was a member of the Kurdish community.

Work in progress

- The force acknowledges that there are few formal information-sharing protocols between the force and external agencies and partners. In response, it has requested that all basic command units (BCUs) and heads of departments provide details of information-sharing agreements, whether informal or formal, by 31 March 2008. There is a commitment to progress all agreements into formal protocols to ensure compliance with the Management of Police Information (MoPI).

Area(s) for improvement

- The force has a joint partnership level 2 strategic assessment, but its main focus is on neighbourhood policing (NP). There would be benefit in developing this joint level 2 assessment to include major and serious crime.

Summary – The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to major crime sufficiently. Consequently, the force control strategy is found to be similarly adequate. Problem profiles for the public protection disciplines are extensive, with links to force and BCU-level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.

Strengths

- The FSA 2007 includes reference to various crime types, one example being kidnap, when the force liaised extensively with the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) to capture real-time data identifying risks. Other priorities include gun crime, human trafficking and violent crime. Precursor offences are referred to explicitly with sections on acquisitive crime, theft from shops and their links into drugs offences. Firearms are contained in the force control strategy, covering both reduction and enforcement; Operation Yeoman began three years ago when funding was secured for an analyst and two intelligence officers who are based on the firearms desk in the OIB. The North and South BCUs each have a dedicated firearms intelligence officer, while the City BCU has two who assess all firearms incidents using the force threat matrix to grade firearms intelligence; if it reaches a threshold limit, a risk assessment must be completed within 48 hours from receipt of the intelligence. An example provided by the force demonstrated that by acting upon intelligence an operation led to the successful recovery of a handgun containing four live rounds of ammunition.

- The force has completed problem profiles for all of the public protection disciplines, namely child abuse, domestic violence, public protection and missing persons.

- Level 2 crimes do feature in BCU tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TTCG) meetings and there is clear structure and process to refer level 2 operations and requests for resources to the force level 2 TTCG.

- Analytical staff in the OIB conduct predictive mapping, specifically around drug deaths and event mapping. Operation Yeoman, tackling firearms criminality, produces a monthly briefing document that identifies current demands and performance data on firearms and their use in the commission of crime. This briefing is used to target armed response vehicle patrols and informs the intelligence requirement.

- The force has a firearms crime control strategy group chaired by the head of crime, driving forward the strands of intelligence, prevention and enforcement with active operations. It has a strategy document *Firearms and gun crime hitting the target*, which includes a section on precursors to gun crime, for example drug-related crime.

- The force has robust processes for managing risk in domestic violence cases. All officers attending incidents must complete a risk assessment form, which is reviewed by specialist domestic violence officers (SDVOs), who then complete a nationally recognised risk identification form. The force homicide prevention strategy clearly articulates the risk factors in domestic violence cases.

Work in progress

- Analysts are in the process of reviewing the homicide prevention strategy to analyse trends or patterns that could inform policing operations or strategies. The homicide prevention strategy (August 2007) identifies the need to develop inter-agency initiatives and identify precursor opportunities. One aspect of this prevention strand currently being delivered is multi-agency work identifying repeat domestic violence victims and putting in place interventions.

Area(s) for improvement

- Some signal crimes are dealt with in the 2007 FSA; for instance, care key burglaries. However, the force needs to develop knowledge and awareness of the full range of precursor offences in the FSA, to better inform its intelligence products and ultimately force and BCU plans.

- Although the force has completed problem profiles for the public protection disciplines, it has yet to complete problem profiles for drugs, firearms and gun crime and immigration crime. The force needs to progress these if it is to fully appreciate and understand the fundamental problems posed by these crime types to help shape its policing responses.

- Although the force is engaged in some proactive analysis and mapping, processes are not yet sufficiently mature or comprehensive effectively to inform key decisions on intelligence requirements or operational activity. The force needs to prioritise this work, to gain an accurate and reliable appreciation of the future demand profile and the ability to successfully identify precursor offences, vulnerable communities and locations.

- At present the force does not formally monitor near-miss offences; for example, attacks on vulnerable victims such as children, women or older persons. Development in this area would allow the force to analyse offences to build in intelligence, prevention or enforcement opportunities.

Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are only recently being shared with partners and BCUs. There is a full trigger plan for 'hot briefing' whenever there is a significant change in the major crime threat, or where the nature of the analysis demands a fast time response. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA), exist. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010.

Strengths

- Protocols for major crime investigation are in place with a range of partners including the Ministry of Defence, local health trusts, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the DWP. Also there are terms of reference for MAPPA, local offender management panels and Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) to contribute to efforts to combat SOC. The force makes effective use of the NPIA and regularly refers appropriate crimes to the serious crime analysis section (SCAS), with the work, which includes research, being managed by the reception desk in the OIB.

- In cases of hot intelligence, the superintendents heading major crime and SOC will direct and control resources and manage any competing demands. Good relationships exist regionally for collaborative arrangements; Operation Task (the disappearance of Madeleine McCann) illustrates how effective the arrangements are during times of excessive demand.

- The force actively reports cases to the kidnap and extortion database at the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Staff were able to provide evidence of effective testing of procedures including a recent abduction in force. The force also manages and deploys kidnap and extortion resources across the region.

- In November 2007 NPIA conducted a MoPI peer review of the force and concluded that there is a strong governance structure in place. They also identified a number of strengths including the carrying out of a periodic internal audit of MoPI progress and the identification of risks associated with records held on vulnerable persons. In addition, NPIA recognised that the force's audit regime focusing on the key high-risk business areas in MoPI is being adopted nationally. In spring 2008 NPIA will assess review, retention and disposal.

- A full-time MoPI co-ordinator is employed who has two full-time compliance auditors to test MoPI. Other staff support the workstreams; for example, three staff have been dedicated to improve intelligence processes. The force has implemented all of the Bichard recommendations other than those concerning the police national computer and penalty notices for disorder. The resources and structures in place indicate that the force will be MoPI compliant by 2010.

Work in progress

- The force is reviewing the range of protocols in place and has requested that all BCUs and heads of departments provide details of information-sharing agreements, whether informal or formal. There is a commitment to progress all agreements into formal protocols and then ensure a wider knowledge of such protocols to achieve MoPI compliance by 2010.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although good relationships exist with partners and some problem profiles in respect of illegal money lending have been shared with trading standards through GAIN, the inspection found limited evidence of the sharing of trend analysis and problem profiles for major crime with partners. There are opportunities to exploit these good relationships and to seek partners' views and support on the findings of the analysis.

Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of OCG activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.

Strengths

- The FSA for 2006 had very limited profiling of communities, particularly vulnerable communities that could assist in assessing the impact of OCGs on these communities to proactively identify future risks and threats. The force, in recognition, has expanded this in the FSA 2007; for instance, reference is now made to potential threats posed to women from Eastern bloc countries. The force has used the commercial Experian mosaic public sector data to map communities; for example, mosaic enables the force to map the location of senior citizens who may be targets for distraction burglaries. It has combined and overlaid this data with the mapping data supplied by ESRI UK, a commercial company.

- The force has also used the ESRI UK ArcGIS (a tool to consolidate data and layer it onto digital maps) system to map multiple networks of criminals, connecting petty thieves at the lower levels of crime with serial burglars and category A drug dealers to develop a better understanding of the crime networks.

- Significant investment has been made in neighbourhood policing teams, and organised crime and counter-terrorism issues are threaded into NP at all levels. The 'prevent' element of the national counter-terrorism strategy is championed by the ACC (operations) at the community safety programme board (CSPB), with tactical operations sitting with the force CSB, under whom the NP project manager sits. Force and BCU-level strategic assessments articulate the links between organised crime and counter-terrorism. Neighbourhood teams have a clear understanding of community intelligence and have identified vulnerable locations, which have become microbeats, with key individual networks (KINs) developed in association.

- The MAPPA arrangements in force include a seconded probations service officer who supports intelligence collection, which is further enhanced by the two immigration officers from BIA working on the regional foreign national and immigration crime unit with police officers in force.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- A specific intelligence requirement for vulnerable communities and locations would also enable the development of prevention and enforcement strategies as appropriate. This work when complete should be incorporated into the FSA.

Summary – Regarding elements of intelligence, the force strategic risk register is reviewed every six months by the deputy chief constable (DCC), who oversees the force risk group. Each identified risk for major crime has a current and effective action plan.

Strengths

- A high-level risk management register was produced in July 2007, which identifies the top ten strategic risks to the force. Some of these relate to major crime such as failure of IT systems and the risk of a major incident stretching the force's financial resilience. The high-level risk register has identified some vulnerability whenever an incident occurs where costs exceed £500,000. Operation Task has already exceeded this, although the force has received special grant funding from the Home Office.

- In November 2007 an electronic risk register with associated management system was introduced. The advantages of this new system include easy entry into the register allowing dynamic entry and updating of risks, with a more efficient day-to-day management of progress and reviews against action plans. For example, the status of action plans is instantly available and the systems provide automated reminders for recipients of email queries and actions sent by the risk register manager (the force business continuity and risk manager).

- An example of risks being taken into consideration involves the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES). Concerns were identified regarding data storage retrieval, potential failure of sites and staff absences through industrial action. Plans are in place to mitigate this; for example, there is a back-up site for data and a back-up system to retrieve data, with a regional site identified as further back up. A number of police officers have been retained in the HOLMES team to provide resilience in the eventuality of strike action by police staff.

Work in progress

- The MCIS and special operations unit (SOU) teams are currently developing their business continuity plans to identify a range of risks and threats. This process is subject to a deadline of April 2008, at which point the risks and threats will be incorporated into the force generic business continuity plan and populate the force risk register.

Area(s) for improvement

- While acknowledging the recent implementation of the electronic risk register, better marketing of the strategic risk register and its importance could bring considerable benefit to the force; some middle managers were unaware of its existence.

- It is apparent that not all potentially serious risks have been identified, and consequently some areas have no plans in place to control or mitigate risk. For example, work is needed on succession plans for key individual staff such as SIOs, or anticipating significant loss of staff in a department.

- Consideration should be given to developing a formal risk matrix to enable all items in the register to be consistently assessed to a standard.

Summary – The force is fully collaborating with all other forces in its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most of the operational databases are searchable from GENIE. The recommendations from the Bichard Inquiry have been fully implemented.

Strengths

- GENIE links a total of nine major systems in force including the crime information system (CIS), missing persons and command and control. Operational staff can search GENIE, which will provide basic details and the data held on a nominal or place.

- Some staff in the OIB have access to HOLMES and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) databases; ANPR back office 2 (BOF2) is also accessible to all staff via the CIS. The OIB has developed a system whereby major crime intelligence officers are tasked to extract HOLMES intelligence on a regular basis and download it into the CIS so that it is accessible and searchable by all staff.

Work in progress

- A regional collaboration project is the development of GENIE 2, which will enable officers to search some 40 systems across the five forces in the East Midlands region. This project is at a more advanced stage between Leicestershire and Lincolnshire with a target date for sharing intelligence systems of April 2008. At present there is no target date for the implementation of GENIE 2 across the East Midland regional forces.

- The force has implemented all of the Bichard recommendations other than those concerning the police national computer and penalty notices for disorder, which are ongoing.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although a process exists to transfer intelligence from HOLMES to CIS, intelligence officers do not have the capacity to manage or complete this task. The force needs to develop a robust and reliable process that guarantees that intelligence is regularly transferred onto the CIS.

- The inspection found evidence that SOU staff were leaving 'footprints' on the CIS connecting them to nominals. The force reports that this footprint information can only be accessed by staff with audit facilities. However, this does present a risk to operations and the force needs to reassure itself that footprints are not being left on any system by staff conducting covert sensitive enquiries.

Summary – The force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidance; the policy is efficient.

Strengths

- The major crime review team comprises a former detective inspector (DI), a police staff member, one detective constable (DC) and an analyst. All 28-day reviews of major crimes are complete. Evidence was provided of how changes have been implemented to improve performance; for example, revisions of how the force deals with DNA stains. Previously, stains that were not up to standard were left in abeyance; the new process ensures that marks are re-submitted to bring them up to standard and thus allow effective searching.

- The review and good practice section (RGPS) provided the inspection with copies of six reviews, including a review of Operation Kalon, a murder investigation. HMIC considers the review to be thorough, with a total of 33 recommendations all pertinent and adding value to Operation Kalon and future investigations. The RGPS operates in accordance with ACPO guidance and is considered to be fully effective.

- A member of the review team attends the regional review meeting, which invites guest speakers and is attended by a member of staff from the NPIA.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The current policy for major crime review is dated 2004 and has not been updated to mirror the *Murder Investigation Manual* (MIM) 2006; therefore the force needs to update this policy.

- The force has limited capacity to conduct cold case reviews and at the time of inspection it was not able to undertake all of the cases on the force's books.

Summary – The force tasking and co-ordination process functions cohesively to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a reasonable understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.

Strengths

- The force has NIM-compliant and regular four-weekly TTCG processes for major crime. Evidence to support this includes Operation Kaross, a cash-in-transit robbery enquiry, which was tasked to the SOU and MCIS via the NIM process. All bids for level 2 resources are routed through the level 2 TTCG meeting and all BCU staff, at a range of levels, were aware of the process to secure level 2 resources. Where appropriate, all BCU TTCG meetings feature a discussion of major crimes.

- The inspection found that the ACC (crime), chair of level 2 TTCG and staff present had a good understanding and appreciation of the threat and risk level connected to intelligence or an operation. Decisions were taken to disrupt offenders for lesser offences such as driving while disqualified for example, cognisance being taken of all associated current and future risks.

- The force has completed problem profiles for all of the public protection disciplines, namely child abuse, domestic violence, public protection and missing persons. Ample evidence was provided of the regular and routine use of problem and target profiles to support operations.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Only a limited amount of work is being conducted by analysts of historical and current criminality to help predict demand. HMIC acknowledges that the force faces capacity constraints and the appointment of two new staff should improve the position. However, the force would undoubtedly benefit from proactive analytical capability to identify predictable demands.

- Although articulated verbally by the TTCG chair, decisions not to resource particular enquiries should be more regularly documented, setting out the rationale for the decision in the TTCG documents.

- The FSA for 2007 sets a large intelligence requirement following a dearth of intelligence requirements in the 2006 FSA. The force is confident that it has sufficient operational and analytical resources to service these requirements, with the first three priorities all linked to SOC by September 2008. However, consideration should be given to prioritising the intelligence requirement, taking cognisance of the threats and risks faced.

Summary – Due to appropriate and comprehensive training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is consistent.

Strengths

- All staff have received diversity training, most of which has been delivered during the last five years.

- The force is confident that a community impact assessment would identify any diversity sensitivities and, where appropriate, it would acquire expert resources to assist an investigation, establishing an IAG if necessary. This occurred recently following a murder investigation where the victim was a member of the Kurdish community.

- Diversity features as a golden thread throughout the national SIO training programme, further emphasising the importance and consideration to be given by the SIO leading an investigation with diversity implications. All SIOs are undergoing professionalising the investigative process (PIP) level 3 training, which includes a diversity element.

- A diversity unit is a resource available to SIOs to brief investigative teams and family liaison officers (FLOs) with guidance bespoke to the individual circumstances of the investigation; for instance, in a homicide enquiry the diversity unit facilitated the transgender community acting as critical friends to the investigation. In addition, FLOs have received specialist training in relation to transgender issues.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Given the ever-changing profile of the communities locally and with the emergence of new and developing communities, the force should consider whether it would be beneficial to deliver bespoke diversity training to its major crime staff.

Prevention

Summary – The force has an IAG, key individuals, support group and these are frequently used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.

Strengths

- The force does not have a standing IAG for major crime incidents; however, an IAG is established whenever senior managers feel that one would bring benefit to the community and an investigation. Robust procedures are in place that enable the relevant community representatives and KINs and groups to be invited onto an IAG formed specifically to meet the needs of the community, investigation and any other related issues.

- In October 2007 the force held an IAG event where relevant individuals from the community were invited to discuss tactics against crime gangs in local communities. From this meeting a group will be formed over the next year to advise on operational activity. In 2006, following the murder of a Kurdish refugee, the force formed an IAG which advised on house-to-house enquiries and cultural issues of some of the witnesses. HMIC considers these measures to be effective, giving the force the ability to react to an incident as and when appropriate.

- Neighbourhood teams have a clear understanding of community intelligence, with KINs developed to support their community. The KINs are a further source for inclusion in an IAG where relevant knowledge and skills can assist an investigation or community.

- IAGs and PAGRI are used to review and assess force practices and procedures. Recent examples have included the 'Dispatches Review' (a television exposé on police culture), the force hate crime policy and critical incident policy.

- Many partnership agreements held by the force are benchmarked against national good practice standards and NPIA guidance. The majority of partnership agreements involving local authorities are subject to member review and oversight.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that 'golden hour' principles were fully understood by call management staff and first responders.

Strengths

- The force has a generic business continuity plan that includes, for example, the requirements associated with a flu pandemic. Senior managers in major crime are invited to take part in force-level major incident exercises; for example, Operation Polar Resilience (December 2007) which was a joint exercise with the military concerning severe weather conditions. Plans also include the location of the kidnap and extortion silver room, which is off site and would still be able to operate following loss of the force control room.

- There are sufficient dedicated on-call resources in place for current and predicted major crime investigation demands. The force has capacity to operate eight MIRs three of which are permanently established.

- The disappearance of Madeleine McCann on 3 May 2007 in Portugal generated massive international media interest and placed considerable demands on Leicestershire, which had no legal jurisdiction in Portugal. The force responded immediately, dedicating staff and resources to create Operation Task. Initially, it deployed to Portugal a DCI, two FLOs and a DI to advise and support the Portuguese authorities. The force also established a MIR in Leicestershire, utilising HOLMES to manage the enquiries. The Metropolitan Police Services Specialist Crime Review Group commented (June 2007), "the volume of information collected during this enquiry can be compared to a Category A murder enquiry". The force also obtained short-term contract support from other East Midlands forces. On 14 May 2007, the force activated the MIRWEB system, which allows remote telephone call centres to be set up in other forces to direct the volume of messages received from members of the public away from the in-force MIR. Derbyshire Constabulary hosted and administered MIRWEB on behalf of the force; up to its closure in June 2007 a total of 3,577 calls had been received. The investigation remains active.

- The CIS has been subject to a successful test recently following identification of risk on access to the system and corruption or loss of data.

- Both control room staff and first responders were able confidently to articulate the 'golden hour' principles concerning critical and major incidents. Supervisors and managers in the control room become quickly engaged with incidents and oversee their management. Staff reported robust call-out procedures for all specialist areas, referring to a reliable IT-based system. The force has electronic procedure sheets for the majority of incidents, and certainly all major and critical incidents. The control room training regime includes conducting table-top exercises at regular intervals. Recently, two members of staff in the control room have been commended for their involvement in the initial management of critical incidents. Responders to incidents confirmed that all vehicles contain early evidence kits, and that the control room provides good intelligence and guidance as a matter of routine before first officers arrive at a scene.

- A comprehensive policy is in place called the Procedure for the Investigation of Deaths in Prison Establishments, which includes a range of potential circumstances,

for example if an incident occurs while a prisoner is being transported. This procedural document complies with the *Prison Related Deaths – A Protocol for Investigators* document, which has been agreed between the Home Office Correctional Services (HOCS), ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).

- An Investigations of Deaths policy is also in place, which identifies the procedures to be followed in a wide range of circumstances, for example, death in the workplace or other establishments.

Work in progress

- The force is developing its business continuity plans in respect of both major crime and SOC. Staff complete business impact forms, working in conjunction with the business continuity manager, to identify critical functions; a business continuity workshop was held in November 2007 and all departmental plans will be complete and incorporated into the force's generic business continuity plan by April 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force does not formally test its call-out procedures. It is essential the force can be confident it has identified any weakness in these arrangements. For example, some staff are on call voluntarily, without any form of compensation; this reliance on goodwill may not provide the force with the resilience it requires.

- Once the business continuity plans have been completed for major crime, the force should satisfy itself that the plans mitigate and control any risks identified, including, for example, succession planning for SIOs.

- While at present some associated major crime policies are being developed such as family liaison and kidnap, there is no policy or standard operating procedures in place for serious sexual offences and the force should introduce these.

Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending are analysed adequately.

Strengths

- Analytical staff in the OIB conduct predictive mapping, specifically around drug deaths and event mapping. Operation Yeoman, tackling firearms criminality, produces a monthly briefing document that identifies current demands and performance data on firearms and their use in the commission of crime. This briefing is used to target armed response vehicle patrols and informs the intelligence requirement.

- The force has a firearms crime control strategy group chaired by the head of crime, driving forward the strands of intelligence, prevention and enforcement with active operations taking place. It has a strategy document *Firearms and gun crime hitting the target*, which includes a section on precursors to gun crime including, for example, drug-related crime.

- The force has completed problem profiles for all of the public protection disciplines, namely child abuse, domestic violence, public protection and missing persons.

- The force has robust processes for managing risk in domestic violence cases. All officers attending incidents must complete a risk assessment form, which is reviewed by SDVOs, who then complete a nationally recognised risk identification form. The force homicide prevention strategy clearly articulates the risk factors in domestic violence cases.

Work in progress

- Analysts are in the process of reviewing the homicide prevention strategy to analyse trends or patterns that could inform policing operations or strategies. The homicide prevention strategy (August 2007) identifies the need to develop inter-agency initiatives and identify precursor opportunities. One aspect of this prevention strand currently being delivered is multi-agency work identifying repeat domestic violence victims and putting in place interventions.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although the force is engaged in some proactive analysis and mapping, processes are not yet sufficiently mature or comprehensive effectively to inform key decisions on intelligence requirements or operational activity. The force needs to prioritise this work, to gain an accurate and reliable appreciation of the future demand profile and the ability to successfully identify precursor offences, vulnerable communities and locations.

- At present the force does not formally monitor near-miss offences; for example, attacks on vulnerable victims such as children, women or older persons. Development in this area would allow the force to analyse offences to build in intelligence, prevention or enforcement opportunities.

- Although a homicide prevention strategy is in place there is neither an action plan nor monitoring group to ensure that the prevention strand of this strategy is delivered.

Summary – The policy covering threats to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of regional and cross-border operations are abundant.

Strengths

- Osman warnings are used regularly by staff as and where appropriate; good knowledge of the process and how and when to invoke Osmans was evident. Good evidence was provided of their appropriate use particularly in domestic violence cases.

- In April 2007 the force introduced its 'Dealing with threats to life and offences of threats to kill' standard operating procedures, which include a full risk assessment process, with review by the BCU chief inspector (crime), and outlines the process for warning intended victims. The document is accessible to all staff via the force intranet.

- In July 2007 the force launched a five-force (East Midlands region) firearms suppression strategy – Operation Devine – with three strands of intelligence, prevention and enforcement. The force lead is the director of intelligence, and includes liaison with the Ministry of Defence, use of the national firearms licensing management system, and conducting intelligence visits to dealers and licence holders. The operation has completed mapping of stolen and recovered firearms. The force also has a firearms gun crime control strategy group with members from youth services which is chaired by the head of major crime; using the OCG firearms mapping intelligence, the group has developed from the force's strategic and tactical responses to major firearms crime.

- The force is actively involved in regional cross-border operations to disrupt major crime. For example, Operation Lucky (2006), involving all East Midlands forces, dismantled an OCG that targeted high-value vehicles and resulted in 17 convictions and the recovery of £2.8-million-worth of property. In Operation Beanbag (2007) the force worked with Derbyshire Constabulary to dismantle an OCG supplying drugs and laundering money, resulting in nine arrests. Operation Topic (2007) was a successful joint operation with West Midlands Police, EMSOU and the SOCA to deal with a kidnap and extortion, resulting in the rescue of the victim and eight offenders being charged.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Staff were confident that all Osman warnings are held on the CIS, but were not confident they would be able to access all records. The force needs to review its 'Dealing with threats to life and offences of threats to kill' standard operating procedures to ensure that they are being fully complied with and to provide reassurance that the procedures are understood.

Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on-demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by all staff. The force is wholly collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.

Strengths

- Witness protection responsibilities have recently moved from the OIB and are now managed by a DI in the SOU, with a detective sergeant and DC to perform the witness protection functions.

- The force policy is available on the intranet and is clearly understood, with two recent examples given of referrals from BCU – one from a SDVO. The person was not accepted into the scheme, but a full risk assessment was conducted, resulting in target-hardening measures to protect the victim.

- The current caseload is one commitment generated within Leicestershire, four cases referred from other forces and one international case. Given the relatively low caseload, staff are not dedicated and are engaged in SOU operations when not performing witness protection duties. HMIC considers this structure to be fit for purpose, with evidence that the current caseload is managed effectively.

- Staff in specialist roles were more aware of witness protection capability, with front-line operation staff having a basic awareness but with the ability to access the policy if required.

- The East Midlands forces region is a government-funded demonstrator site for collaboration work around witness protection arrangements. This work will determine the most effective options to address current and future demands in what has been identified as a high-risk area of business for all East Midlands regional forces.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- None identified.

Summary – The force has limited systems to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are fully used to help understand levels of harm in the community.

Strengths

- The force provided evidence of the effect on communities of test purchase operations and seizing of assets. Local policing unit (LPU) staff have received feedback from some residents about the reduction in visible drugs selling and use following the operations. In September 2007 Operation Bling2 was launched with an associated media campaign to target the asset rich and confiscate assets. The eight-day operation resulted in the arrest of 24 persons for money laundering, drug offences and theft of vehicles; a total of £53,900 cash was recovered, £195,000-worth of vehicles seized, five cannabis factories closed and 1,100 plants destroyed with a potential street value of £1 million. Again, LPU staff reported positive feedback from some residents who lived near or knew of perceived criminal families who did not work and lived well beyond their means.

- Dedicated neighbourhood teams have been in place throughout the 110 identified neighbourhoods, together with all the appropriate infrastructure and support, for some time. Teams maintain the neighbourhood profiles, implemented force-wide at the end of 2006, including those jointly developed with the local authority for the six priority neighbourhoods. Profile information – including crime data, call-handling information, and demographic and socio-economic data – is fed into the BCU strategic assessment process and so available to major crime staff and analysts.

- Neighbourhood teams contribute fully to community impact assessments, which are used effectively in response to any incident, crime, media event or changes in operational policing that might cause concern or tension.

- The force and BCU strategic assessments articulate the links between NP and organised crime. Neighbourhood teams have a clear understanding of community intelligence and have identified vulnerable locations, which have become microbeats, with KINs developed in association.

Area(s) for improvement

- Although there are good processes in place in the OIB to review incidents daily, there is not a focus on all potential risk areas; for example, crimes against vulnerable sections of the community such as older persons who are often the target of distraction burglaries. HMIC acknowledges that the new protecting vulnerable persons desk to be introduced to OIB in spring 2008 will help to address this gap.

- The force needs structures and processes to identify a range of indicators that can reliably measure harm in communities, in order to understand the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. An opportunity may exist to use the confidence, reassurance, accessibility and visibility evaluation (CRAVE) currently used to measure and map community satisfaction levels, as a vehicle for this.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a developing policy in use to ensure that staff are appropriately vetted commensurate with exposure.

Strengths

- The anti-corruption unit in the professional standards department (PSD) comprises a superintendent, DI, detective sergeant, three DCs, an intelligence cell of one detective sergeant, a support investigator and an analyst. Various security policies relating to professional standards are co-ordinated by the information security officer (ISO),; these facilitate proactive integrity work. Evidence was provided of situations where the ISO has closed down a force website when a number of integrity issues were identified.

- The superintendent who heads anti-corruption attends the covert level 2 TTCG meetings in order to have an overview of all force operations.

- The force employs the mystery shopper technique, which was used recently to secure evidence in the case of a member of staff selling Class A drugs. The anti-corruption unit continually audits a range of information systems to identify and review usage by members of staff. It also operates a confidential reporting line, which is available 24/7 to all staff (this will soon be managed by Crimestoppers on behalf of the force). Staff from the PSD are engaged in 75% of final interviews for new recruits to the force. The PSD has produced its own strategic assessment for 2007/08, identifying threats and risk levels, including security and anti-corruption.

Work in progress

- HMIC commends the use of PSD staff in final interviews for new recruits to the force; it should aim for 100% involvement or at least a paper review of candidates it cannot interview, to ensure a consistent approach.

- The PSD is leading a project to implement the ACPO national vetting policy by 2010.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force vetting policy was published in 2004 and is owned by special branch (SB), but it does not cover staff in the MCIS, or other specialist assets staff. The policy effectively leaves it to departmental heads to establish what vetting levels are appropriate for the staff in each department. The lack of a corporate policy leaves departmental heads to make their own judgements with little guidance to aid their decision making; as a consequence, the level of vetting across major crime is both sporadic and inconsistent, with the average standard for staff being 'security cleared'. However, the inspection noted that any staff who joined the organisation before 1997 who had not changed post since that date would not have received any form of security checking. Potentially, this leaves the force vulnerable to officer corruption and it should accelerate its vetting plans, introducing a corporate policy for all staff working in major crime and serious crime areas to mitigate this risk.

Enforcement

Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are wholly effective, with appropriate use made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.

Strengths

- The ACC (crime) briefs the police authority (PA) on matters concerning major crime and the PA receives the quarterly Achieving Performance Excellence (APEX) performance pack, which includes performance data of resources operating in SOC. The ACC has also made a presentation to the PA, identifying gaps in resources for both major and serious crime. The PA reported that these arrangements significantly assist them in their governance of performance.

- The ACC (crime) has performed the role of officer in overall command (OIOC) for Operation Task (the disappearance of Madeleine McCann) and for a shooting at a local university, which required engagement with the local community. The force has a wide range of experienced staff to support gold and ACPO officers during critical incident command. Minutes of gold group meetings examined show that there is a good representation from partners. For instance, in 2006 the force formed an IAG and gold group following the murder of a Kurdish refugee. These structures are considered to be consistently effective.

Work in progress

- The PA is considering expanding the existing performance committee that would be responsible for monitoring both major crime and SOC. It is also considering having dedicated and vetted members, as at present the lack of vetting precludes PA members from receiving information on sensitive operations.

Area(s) for improvement

- Subject to satisfactory vetting arrangements for PA members, it would assist the governance arrangements if a member was invited to sit on a gold group for a critical incident or major investigation.

Summary – The head of crime is fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. The ACC (crime) and head of crime are supported by staff who have undergone comprehensive training in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.

Strengths

- The ACC (crime) has been scheduled on three occasions to attend the serious crime intelligence information technology and resources (SCIMITAR) course, but each time operational demands have prevented this. He has, however, performed the role of OIOC for Operation Task and for a shooting at a local university, which required engagement with the local community. The head of crime is trained in linked series and serial crime.

- The force has a wide range of experienced staff to support gold and ACPO officers during critical incident command. The CSB is engaged in all critical incidents and will initiate IAGs or other community contact to support the community impact process. Minutes of gold group meetings show that there is a good representation from partners.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- Of the nine inspectors in the force control room, only three are trained in critical incident command. Both the superintendent and chief inspector are trained in critical incident command 1, but only the superintendent is trained in critical incident command 2. To provide a consistent and professional approach to critical incidents the force should ensure that all inspectors in the force control room receive an accredited form of critical incident training, and that senior managers in the control room have attended critical incident training levels 1 and 2.

Summary – The force's performance in the investigation of major crime is monitored through a regime that reviews each operation in terms of outcomes, cost, inputs and outputs.

Strengths

- The force invited the Metropolitan Police Specialist Crime Review Group to conduct a thematic review of Operation Task in July 2007. The review made a number of recommendations, one of which was that for Task and other major incidents the force adopts full indexing – the force was only indexing records created for either the subject of the information received (informant, or named suspect) or the main subject of any action. The review also identified that the force was only the second in the country to activate the MIRWEB system to manage calls received for Operation Task. Calls received were filtered directly into the HOLMES account; this facility was hosted by Derbyshire Constabulary and at the height of activity, 27 forces were involved with 100 call takers deployed.

- The force supplied documentary evidence of the review of a homicide – Operation Kalon – which had clear terms of reference set and concluded with 37 recommendations, although none of these directed policy changes.

- A weekly SIO review meeting chaired by the head of crime studies all active investigations, so providing a robust and regular review of resources being used and those required to progress investigations. There is a sufficient budget in place for major crime: at the time of inspection it was underspent, following Home Office approval of a special grant claim for Operation Task. By mid-November six homicides had been recorded for 2007/08 and the force can provide data on how much each homicide enquiry cost on a monthly basis during the course of the investigation. The force does have occasional debriefs of operations with good practice circulated, albeit primarily by word of mouth.

- In January 2007 the force commenced monthly activity analysis of major crime, which is provided to the force APEX process and is constantly in development. This performance information has been used effectively to improve performance such as monitoring the backlog in visiting registered sex offenders and updating the gold group during Operation Task. In addition, the information is used as part of performance management at both the MAPPA senior management board meeting and the local safeguarding children board (LSCB) meetings.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- The activity analysis for the MCIS is currently conducted on a fortnightly basis; moving to monthly completion by staff would minimise the administrative time spent by operational major crime staff on this task.

- The force needs to reinvigorate its debrief process and identify a minimum number of operations to be subject to a structured debrief each year, to share good practice and improve overall performance. Allied to this the review unit has a page on the MCIS website, but this does not detail the unit's work. It could include a library of

cases reviewed and good practice identified as a 24/7 source of information to SIOs and other staff engaged in investigative processes.

- Currently no one is collating good practice from judicial hearings, inquests, appeals, public inquiries or Part 8 reviews and formally disseminating information for the benefit of all staff. This role should be undertaken by the good practice and review section.

Performance management and resilience

Summary – The inspection teams found a sufficient investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands; however, collaborative agreements with SOCA and the East Midlands regional forces exist and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources (HR) provide partial protection for the investigative capability.

Strengths

- The force has three permanent MIRs and a capacity to expand provision to eight if required. Current establishment levels enable staff to deal with current demand, including Operation Task, which is a Category A+ investigation; the Portuguese authorities are the primary investigators, with the force playing a significant role in assisting, guiding and supporting the investigation along with national agencies such as NPIA and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP).

- At the time of inspection only two BCU staff were attached to the MCIS, working on investigations with significant benefits to BCU policing.

- The force does have a sudden and unexpected deaths policy and procedure setting out working practices with other agencies, for example for unexplained deaths in hospitals, care homes and military establishments. This policy is linked to all the other force policies relating to the investigation of deaths. The sudden and unexpected terminology is used throughout the policy, and the policy directs that a sergeant must attend all such deaths and quality assess the investigation, which is recorded on CIS. Although no audit of the forms submitted for sudden or unexpected deaths has taken place it is standard practice for forms to be returned by the coroner's officers to force managers if details are incomplete or incorrect.

- Six detective sergeants on the MCIS are tier-five interview co-ordinators, and the ultimate aim is for all 12 detective sergeants to match this level.

- A skills audit has just been completed for all MCIS staff: apart from the need for all the SIOs to be PIP level 3 accredited, no significant gaps have been identified.

- There are four senior scene of crime officers (SSOCOs) in force who oversee all major and serious crime investigations; all have attended the scene co-ordination and management course at Durham, and all staff have attained, or are working to achieve, the Council of Forensic Practitioners qualification. Scientists and pathologists attend crime scenes as appropriate; one example followed the recent death of a baby, where consultation between the SIO and SSOCO led to the calling of a specialist to the scene to comment on blood distribution and interpret the scene.

- Both call handlers and initial response staff are conversant with the 'golden hour' principles; call takers have electronic prompt lists to guide them and the majority of operational staff have received forensic awareness training.

- A formal written protocol exists with EMSOU concerning the provision of test purchase and undercover support. A further protocol is in place between the five East Midlands regional forces, namely the East Midlands Regional Information and

Co-ordination Centre (EMRICC), to provide co-ordination across the region, thereby providing effective identification and deployment of the necessary resources to a mobilisation event, which will include either a spontaneous incident or a pre-planned event, either in or outside the region. EMRICC has been activated on four occasions, for example, following the disappearance of Madeleine McCann from Portugal in May 2007 and more recently Operation Orca concerning the widening of the MI motorway through the region. An ACPO lead is appointed on each occasion to direct EMRICC.

Work in progress

- An investigative training board, to be chaired by the head of crime and to meet quarterly, is being established to review and identify the training requirements for major and serious crime and specialist assets.

- It is acknowledged that only one SIO in force is PIP accredited, according to the NPIA list. However, there are no trained assessors in force, which suggests that in fact none of the nine SIOs in force is PIP level 3 accredited. There is a plan for all nine SIOs to be PIP level 3 accredited by November 2008.

- MCIS accommodation is generally fit for purpose, with the exception of the MCIS site on North BCU at Loughborough. Here, space is limited and there are not enough telephone lines which, while not posing insuperable problems, does not provide the most conducive working environment.

Area(s) for improvement

- The force was unable to provide any data on the number of unexplained deaths. SSOCOs do not routinely attend unexplained deaths, although there is a service level agreement on attendance and provision of services at the scene if called. The force needs to collate and gather this information, to determine workload and to review whether all deaths are receiving an appropriate level of investigation. The current process is not robust and presents risks to the force.

- The MCIS is operating at full capacity and there is little resilience to cater for exceptional demand. HMIC acknowledges the resource implications on the force but also notes that a workforce reform review of major crime (dated September 2007) recommended an optimum number of posts, compared with the actual number at inspection, which was below the optimum. The force should review its establishment levels and, as a minimum, identify its contingency plans for exceptional demand.

- Knowledge of PIP is largely limited to specialist staff in the MCIS and SOU: many operational front-line staff have limited or no knowledge of PIP. No evidence was presented to suggest that any staff beyond SIO have any form of PIP accreditation. The force needs to establish a programme to deliver PIP to all operational staff, to improve knowledge and force performance in investigation and interviewing.

Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Elements of specialist tactics are delivered through verbal collaborative agreements, which are thoroughly tested. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a widening range of offences.

Strengths

- The force has appropriate specialist assets in place and is able to deliver good levels of service to meet current and predictable operational demand. Resources are largely controlled and directed by the force level 2 meetings. In cases of hot intelligence, the superintendents heading major crime and the SOU direct and control resources and manage any competing demands. Good relationships exist regionally for collaborative arrangements; Operation Task illustrates how effective the arrangements are at times of excessive demand.

- In November 2007 the Interception of Communications Commissioners Office (IOCCO) conducted an inspection of the force. Firstly, this concluded that all of the recommendations from the 2006 inspection had been implemented. Secondly, that, in the main, the force is adhering to the code of practice; the accredited officers and the single point of contact (SPOC) are helping to ensure that communication data is acquired in a lawful and informed manner. Furthermore, the force is making very effective use of the data as a powerful investigative tool to prevent and detect crime. To further improve arrangements a 16-point action plan has been left, which the force estimates it can complete in a two- to three-month timescale.

- In October 2007, the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner inspected the force, concluding that, in terms of compliance with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and Police Act 1997, the force performs to a generally good standard in its authorisation of covert activities. In relation to covert human intelligence source (CHIS) management, it reported that the force performs to a high standard. A total of six recommendations were made to the force to further improve its effectiveness.

Work in progress

- The force recognises a need for more agreed working protocols with partners and agencies to provide greater certainty in accessing specialist resources from regional forces and agencies.

Area(s) for improvement

- At the time of inspection the high-tech crime unit (HTCU) had a data recovery backlog of six to eight months. The forensic department has a recovery plan that uses an external consultant on a six-month contract to reduce the backlog, and outsources some work to an ACPO-approved provider. It is also developing a 'triage system' to prioritise work and will use spare capacity identified by BCU-based CCTV examination officers. It also intends to complete BCU-based telephone recovery data work on BCU rather than submitting such work to the HTCU. Despite these interventions, the backlog has not reduced significantly and there is evidence of BCUs outsourcing work, as well as HTCU, at considerable cost. The force needs to review the cost of outsourcing compared with the cost of recruiting permanent staff, to ensure best value is achieved in providing a sustainable service.

Summary – The force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is generally deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is efficient.

Strengths

- The review team comprises a former DI, a police staff member, a DC and an analyst. All 28-day reviews of major crimes are complete. Evidence was provided on how changes have improved performance; for example, DNA stains that were not up to standard were formerly left in abeyance. The new process requires that marks be resubmitted to bring them up to standard and allow effective searching.

- The review team has, at the direction of the ACC (crime), reviewed two fatal road traffic collisions. All staff have attended the special crime review training course and are HOLMES-trained, being proficient in all of the recognised roles. The team has been involved in limited collaboration but is a member of the East Midlands region review group and would support other forces if requested to do so.

Work in progress

- The existing policy for conducting major crime review is dated 2004 and did not fully comply with the MIM 2006; it is currently being updated with a view to completion by the summer of 2008.

Area(s) for improvement

- There is limited capacity to conduct cold case reviews, and although the team is reviewing some cases, it is not able to complete them all. At the time of inspection only two cold cases were currently being reviewed, with other neglected reviews being put on hold.

Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force is predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the MIM and Major Incident Room Standardised Operating Procedures.

Strengths

- The ACC (crime) is the ACPO lead officer for homicide and major incident investigation. The ACC demonstrated a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of all active homicide investigations in force, especially Operation Task. All SIOs are experienced in major crime investigation, although only one (as far as can be established) is PIP level 3 accredited.

- The force has an effective electronic on-call system, managed by the force control room. There is capacity and capability to link crimes internally and externally; at the time of inspection, the force operated HOLMES version 11C but adopted version 12 in December 2007 and will take version 13 during 2008. An SIO has an overview of HOLMES and the force was able to demonstrate good flexibility over the size and type of MIR deployed. The document registration and document management Arrangements are used to determine the level of indexing that will apply to each investigation. On Operation Task the force became only the second in the country (following Suffolk) to activate MIRWEB, which was hosted by Derbyshire Constabulary.

- All staff assigned to homicide investigation come from the MCIS and HOLMES section and are not abstracted from BCUs. Only in times of exceptional demand will staff be drawn from BCUs and even this is subject to regular review by the head of crime and BCU commanders.

- Current resource levels in the MCIS can manage current demands, with sufficient staff in the MCIS and the HOLMES unit to deploy staff to all of the roles outlined in MIRSAP. The force provided a copy policy file for a recent homicide; the policy file was comprehensive, thorough and fully complied with the MIM, outlining policy and direction around key strategic priorities such as forensics. There was also evident appreciation and identification of fast-track actions; the policy file (decision 16) also identified who completed the community impact assessment and when they did so.

Work in progress

- None identified.

Area(s) for improvement

- A homicide investigation policy file was provided by the force; the quality was good, but the inspection could not identify any evidence of supervision and examination of the file. HMIC acknowledges that as part of the PIP level 3 accreditation scheme, a number of policy decisions will be examined and commented on by the mentor or assessor.

Appendix 1: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A

ACC   assistant chief constable

ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers

ANPR   automatic number plate recognition

B

BCU   basic command unit

BOF2   back office 2

C

CBRN   chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CDRP   crime and disorder reduction partnership

CEOP   Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre

CHIS   covert human intelligence source

CIS   crime information system

CPS   Crown Prosecution Service

CRAVE   confidence, reassurance accessibility and visibility evaluation

CSB   community safety bureau

CSP   community safety partnership

CSPB   community safety programme board

D

DC   detective constable

DCC   deputy chief constable

DCI   detective chief inspector

DI   detective inspector

DWP   Department for Work and Pensions

E

ECU   economic crime unit

EMRICC   East Midlands Regional Information and Co-ordination Centre

EMSOU   East Midlands special operations unit

F

FI   financial investigator

FIO   field intelligence officer

FLO   family liaison officer

FSA   force strategic assessment

FTE   full-time equivalent

G

GENIE   General information enquiry system

GEOM   Government Office East Midlands

H

HMI   Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC   Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOCS   Home Office Correctional Services

HOLMES   Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HR   human resources

HSE   Health and Safety Executive

HTCU   high-tech crime unit

I

IAG   independent advisory group

ICT   information and communications technology

IOCCO	Interception of Communications Commissioners Office
IR3	Vehicle tracking and deployment software
ISO	information security officer
IT	information technology

K

KIN	key individual network
KSI	killed or seriously injured

L

LCJB	local criminal justice board
LPU	local policing unit
LSCB	local safeguarding children board
LSP	local strategic partnership

M

MAPPA	multi-agency public protection arrangements
MAPPOM	multi-agency prolific and priority offender management scheme
MCIS	major crime investigation section
MIM	*Murder Investigation Manual*
MIR	major incident room
MIRSAP	major incident standardised administrative procedures
MIRWEB	major incident room call taking and date entry facility
MoPI	management of police information
MSF	most similar force(s)
MSG	most similar group

N

NP	neighbourhood policing
NIM	National Intelligence Model

| NPIA | National Policing Improvement Agency |
| NSPIS | National Strategy for Police Information Systems |

O

OCG	organised crime group
OIB	operations intelligence bureau
OIOC	officer in overall command
ORB	an automatic vehicle location system

P

PA	police authority
PAGRI	police advisory group on racial issues
PCSO	police community support officer
PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
POLIT	paedophile online investigation team
PPO	prolific and priority offender
PPU	public protection unit
PSD	professional standards department
PVP	protection of vulnerable people

R

RGPG	review and good practice section
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
RTCG	regional tasking and co-ordination group

S

SAR	suspicious activity report
SB	special branch
SCAS	serious crime analysis section

SDVO	specialist domestic violence officer
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SOC	serious and organised crime
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOU	special operations unit
SPI	statutory performance indicator
SPOC	single point of contact
SPP	special priority payment
SSOCO	senior scenes of crime officer

T

TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group
TSG	tactical support group
TSU	technical support unit

W

WPU	witness protection unit