

An inspection of the Yorkshire and Humber regional response to serious and organised crime

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Introduction

About our inspection

As part of our overall police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspections, we inspected how well police forces tackle [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#). In 2022, we changed how we inspect this aspect of policing, to incorporate inspections of the ten regions, as well as the nine [regional organised crime units \(ROCU\)](#) throughout England and Wales, and the 43 police forces. This improves our understanding of how well forces and ROCUs work together to tackle SOC.

About us

His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, to make communities safer. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that the public would ask, and publish the answers in an accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

About our report

This report includes the following sections.

Regional findings

We provide a summary of inspection evidence that identifies good or poor performance within the region; in other words, involving or relating to the ROCU and its constituent forces. The performance of the region isn't given a graded judgment. Instead, we highlight [areas for improvement](#), [causes of concern](#) and [innovative](#) and [promising practice](#) in this section, where applicable.

The ROCU and individual forces

We give the ROCU and each individual force a graded judgment. This includes a summary of the findings from our inspection and highlighted sections for areas for improvement, causes of concern and innovative and promising practice.

Terminology used in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England and Wales and Scotland or the whole of the United Kingdom.

About ROCUs

Each ROCU serves between three and seven constituent forces (see map in [Annex A](#)).

The [Strategic Policing Requirement](#) defines ROCUs as:

“collaboration arrangements between forces that deliver specialist policing capabilities” and “the primary interface between the NCA [National Crime Agency] and forces”.

It sets out that:

“The ROCU network mission is to protect communities by disrupting organised crime groups, individual criminals and those who enable them.”

The Government’s [Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 2023–2028](#) states:

“ROCUs are the operational and intelligence link between the NCA and police forces in England and Wales and lead the law enforcement response to serious and organised crime in their regions.”

ROCUs provide a range of [specialist capabilities](#) to forces. These include the [regional organised crime threat assessment units](#), surveillance, undercover policing, [sensitive intelligence units](#), regional asset recovery teams, cybercrime teams, the [Government Agency Intelligence Network](#), [prison intelligence units](#) and others.

ROCUs are set up under collaboration agreements (made under section 22A of the Police Act 1996) between the chief constables and [police and crime commissioners](#) in each region. ROCUs aren’t statutory bodies. They rely on forces to supply the administrative and support functions they need, including human resources, finance and IT. As a result, each ROCU is set up differently, under different terms of collaboration.

Chief constables and police and crime commissioners provide most of the funding for ROCUs and additional funding is provided by the Home Office. In each region, forces negotiate their financial contribution to the ROCU.

Changes to how SOC threats are managed nationally

In our previous police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspection reports, we have referred to how well forces have managed and mapped or assessed [organised crime groups](#).

In this report, we refer to SOC threats, which encompass organised crime groups, [SOC priority individuals](#) and [SOC vulnerabilities](#).

This reflects changes introduced nationally to provide a “single picture of demand”. This has been achieved by setting up a national database of SOC threats called the SOC master list, which is held on the [agency and partner management information system \(APMIS\)](#). This is used to assess which SOC threat is a priority for each agency or force. It holds information from the National Crime Agency (NCA), ROCUs, police forces and government agencies that tackle SOC. APMIS is also where forces, ROCUs and other agencies record their [disruption activity](#) against SOC threats.

In June 2024, the NCA produced national guidance to standardise how all SOC partners should record SOC unmet demand on APMIS. It includes the following definition:

“Unmet demand occurs when a SOC threat cannot be appropriately tackled due to a shortfall in capacity or capability.”

Regional findings

The Yorkshire and Humber region consists of four forces (Humberside Police, North Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police) and the Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) (YHROCU).

Area for improvement: The Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit and its constituent forces should improve how they work together to tackle serious and organised crime

The Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) (YHROCU), and its constituent forces, should improve:

- the quality and consistency of [4P](#) plans;
- how they record [disruption activity](#) on the [agency and partner management information system \(APMIS\)](#); and
- the recording of unmet demand on APMIS.

YHROCU and several forces in the region need to improve the quality and consistency of their 4P plans. During our inspection in this region, we reviewed several 4P plans. We found weaknesses including actions that hadn't been completed or updated. We also found that, in some forces, leaders weren't reviewing progress on the plans.

In the year ending 30 June 2024, the forces in the Yorkshire and Humber region recorded higher proportions of pursue disruption activity than the average across all forces in England and Wales. This is where a force pursues offenders involved in serious and organised criminal activity, to disrupt or prosecute them.

Figure 1: Percentage of recorded pursue disruptions within the Yorkshire and Humber region in APMIS for the year ending 30 June 2024

Force	Percentage of pursue disruptions
England and Wales average	54%
Humberside Police	78%
North Yorkshire Police	67%
South Yorkshire Police	74%
West Yorkshire Police	80%

Source: APMIS

Higher proportions of pursue disruptions mean that forces in this region might not be recording all their other activities in the 4P plans. These include disruption aimed at protecting [victims](#) or those aimed at preventing [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#) from happening in the first place. We heard that some forces in the region were sometimes finding it difficult to obtain information from [SOC partners](#) about the types of disruptions the partners may have carried out. This may have contributed to the lower levels of other disruption activities recorded.

In contrast, YHROCU recorded 39 percent of disruptions as pursue activity. YHROCU is therefore recording a higher proportion of SOC disruptions that prevent SOC from happening or that protect victims.

But we found that for the year ending 30 June 2024, YHROCU recorded the lowest number of total disruptions compared to other regional organised crime units. We heard during interviews and focus groups with some of its teams that not all disruption activity was being recorded. Some regional organised crime threat assessment [personnel](#) told us that a lack of software licences for APMIS was affecting the recording of disruptions.

We heard that the [regional organised crime threat assessment unit](#) had reviewed how YHROCU was recording disruptions. As a result of this review, it circulated additional guidance to all personnel explaining how and what to record as disruption activities.

We also found that forces in the Yorkshire and Humber region were recording SOC unmet demand in different ways. For example, Humberside Police told us it wasn't recording unmet demand routinely on APMIS. While South Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police told us that they recorded unmet demand on local force systems, but not on APMIS.

During our inspection, YHROCU told us it had set up a working group to improve how the region records SOC unmet demand. It also told us that it was developing regional guidance to assist with the recording of unmet demand on APMIS. Some regional forces we inspected told us that they were waiting for the guidance from YHROCU before they changed how they recorded unmet demand.

Area for improvement: The Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit and its constituent forces should improve how the region procures and uses technical surveillance equipment

Technical surveillance units provide specialist surveillance equipment to support organised crime investigations. The Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) and some regional forces have retained their own technical surveillance units.

We have found that most other [serious and organised crime](#) policing regions have collaborated on the provision of technical surveillance equipment. This aims to make sure that equipment is compatible and can be shared throughout the region. In this region we found that forces were buying some technical equipment, which is often expensive, independently of the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit.

Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit

Good

The Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) (YHROCU) is good at tackling [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#).

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

YHROCU manages its response to SOC

YHROCU has a [strategic threat assessment](#) and a [control strategy](#) that set out the priorities for the region. It considers National Crime Agency priorities and uses [management of risk in law enforcement risk assessment](#) to decide on these regional priorities.

YHROCU has identified 11 priority threats and has established thematic threat co-ordination groups to manage its response. These groups meet quarterly and representatives from [regional SOC partners](#) attend. In addition, YHROCU prepares [intelligence](#) products for regional police forces and maintains strong links with other regional organised crime units (ROCU).

YHROCU holds a multi-agency regional tasking operational meeting attended by regional forces and [SOC partners](#) such as Border Force. During this meeting, attendees provide updates on the top ten regional SOC investigations.

The deputy head of YHROCU meets monthly with SOC leaders from the four regional forces. Together, they review the effectiveness of YHROCU support for their ongoing investigations.

YHROCU has an effective process to manage requests for support

YHROCU has a [gateway function](#) to deal with requests for operational support. [Personnel](#) research every request the gateway receives, including sensitive intelligence. The gateway uses this information to decide how to respond to the requests.

Representatives from forces in the region also attend the YHROCU covert strategy and commissioning services meeting. This meeting allows forces to request specialist assistance from YHROCU. Attendees at this meeting decide whether YHROCU should adopt the case fully or support it with advice or specialist assistance.

Resources and skills

YHROCU's surveillance capacity is sometimes limited

We found that YHROCU had a wide range of specialist capabilities but only one operational team. Personnel from the operational team carry out investigative activities and surveillance. Some members of that team told us that [officers](#) were frequently having to do other research tasks that took them away from their core duties. Some team members described surveillance capacity as limited and sometimes unable to meet demand. For example, economic crime team personnel told us that they believed they could do more if they had additional surveillance support from the operational team.

Some surveillance officers told us that their equipment was good, including a new fleet of vehicles, and that they received appropriate training.

YHROCU is targeting illicit money laundering involving cryptocurrency

YHROCU has a cyber pursue team that targets criminal activity on the internet. It has identified some [organised crime groups](#) potentially using [cryptocurrency wallets](#). The team carries out additional research before passing the intelligence to SOC investigation teams.

The team told us about a fraud investigation where it identified that large sums of money were being moved through crypto wallets. At the conclusion of the investigation the team seized £4.5 million.

YHROCU supports the lead responsible officers it appoints to investigations

We found that YHROCU [senior investigating officers](#) often took the role of [lead responsible officers \(LROs\)](#) for mapped organised crime groups. For some investigations, YHROCU may only be responsible for the pursue element. In these cases, the host force appoints an LRO to manage the [4P plans](#).

We heard that the SOC co-ordinator in YHROCU provided some training for LROs from YHROCU, as well as LROs in regional forces. This training includes guidance about the development of 4P plans, helping them to access LRO immersive learning and promoting what YHROCU can do to support local investigations.

YHROCU is developing talent in technical specialist roles

The ROCU runs an internship programme where suitably skilled computer science graduates are chosen through an annual competition. Interns are attached to the Technical Development Unit (TDU) to work alongside permanent personnel and encouraged to use cutting-edge technology in tackling SOC. TDU personnel told us about a programme they had designed that was being used to tackle SOC in a covert manner.

The ROCU reported that 56 percent of interns had gone on to full-time employment within the ROCU and the TDU was now fully staffed. Managers told us that prior to the internship programme, it was a challenge to recruit into the role.

The internship programme is restricted by the fact it is only funded for 12 months at a time. We were told that this funding model limited how much the ROCU could plan opportunities with universities to identify new talent.

YHROCU is trying to improve how it learns from operations

YHROCU personnel told us that they were introducing a new process to improve how they identified and shared [organisational learning](#) throughout the region. This included recognising best practice, identifying any learning, carrying out operational debriefs and completing a closure report.

YHROCU provides personnel with specific training time, as well as knowledge and guidance on the intranet and regular leadership forums.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

Innovative practice: The Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit responds early to disrupt courier fraud

The Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) developed an innovative approach to tackling [courier fraud](#) through its proactive economic crime team (PECT). Courier fraud is a high-harm offence in which suspects impersonate trusted officials. This is to deceive [victims](#) into handing over money or personal information.

The PECT recognised delays in the national reporting pathway via Action Fraud. So the PECT began proactively monitoring calls for service to identify early opportunities to disrupt courier fraud. In January 2023, this work was formalised under Operation Restorable, an overarching approach to disrupting courier fraud across the region.

The operation has led to multiple arrests of suspects operating outside Yorkshire and Humber, particularly in London. The approach was shared with the City of London Police. This London force has since adopted the tactic in its role as the national lead for economic crime and fraud.

To date, the Yorkshire and Humber PECT has carried out 13 investigations under Operation Restorable, deploying the tactic in six operations. Five of these operations resulted in arrests. The team has seized £45,000, frozen £2,000, intercepted £4,000 in transit, executed 15 search warrants and safeguarded 143 victims. Additionally, the PECT has secured £103,000 in victim reimbursements under the version of the [Contingent Reimbursement Model](#) which was applicable at the time.

The Yorkshire and Humber PECT has also supported constituent forces by sharing learning, upskilling teams and co-ordinating joint operational responses. While Operation Restorable has proven highly effective, its continued success depends on timely prioritisation by force-level units and cross-regional co-operation. This is due to the borderless nature of fraud offending.

YHROCU should improve the quality of its 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the first [area for improvement](#) described in [our section on regional findings](#).

YHROCU uses the national template to record its 4P plans. We reviewed several of these 4P plans and found that, generally, they concentrated on pursue activities with less detail about preventing SOC from happening or protecting [victims](#). Some representatives from SOC partners told us that, on occasions, LROs hadn't consulted with them when preparing 4P plans.

YHROCU works to protect victims and communities from SOC

During our inspection we found that the regional cybercrime unit was working to educate the public about crime. The aim of this was to help protect individuals and communities. YHROCU cyber protect officers have developed a cyber spotlight virtual reality tool with a local university. They use this to raise awareness of the risks of cybercrime. For instance, they use it to show parents an example of a young person's bedroom that highlights signs of possible [county lines](#) drug dealing. The team recently presented this approach at a national conference.

The [College of Policing](#) has recorded in the practice bank some of the work done by the YHROCU cyber team. This includes the [Cyber Switch Up](#) programme. This programme is a competition for students aged 11–18 across the region. It aims to promote lawful online behaviour, raise awareness of [the Computer Misuse Act](#) and showcase cyber career pathways.

The College of Policing has also recorded in the practice bank some of YHROCU's work using the [cyber blue line](#) van. The van is equipped with technology to advise communities on cyber security and online safety.

YHROCU has SOC community and vulnerability co-ordinators. These co-ordinators work with police forces and SOC partners to protect people [vulnerable](#) to SOC activity. For example, they have worked to reduce the incidence of [cuckooing](#) linked to county lines. The co-ordinators are also providing some training to police personnel and SOC partners. They were also integral during planning for the region's [Clear, Hold, Build](#) sites.

The economic crime protect co-ordinator had presented information at a conference for taxi drivers. This was to highlight the signs of fraud if vulnerable passengers are using taxis to take them to withdraw money from cash machines.

YHROCU works well with SOC partners

YHROCU has personnel from other agencies working within its offices, including His Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the Security Industry Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). We heard from YHROCU and partner agency personnel that intelligence was frequently shared and that partners attended YHROCU operational meetings.

We heard of examples of YHROCU working with DWP staff to disrupt SOC offenders. For example, the DWP stopped making benefit payments to SOC offenders who were in custody. DWP staff also reported to us that they often worked with YHROCU to identify and [safeguard](#) victims of cuckooing who were reluctant to communicate with the police.

We heard that His Majesty's Revenue and Customs staff and DWP staff both shared information with YHROCU officers to help identify suspects in online investigations. In addition, these partner agency staff told us they frequently assisted with YHROCU and regional force operations. For example, assisting with searches in the homes of suspected criminals.

YHROCU has also developed good relationships with other partnership organisations, including international law enforcement agencies. We were told that following some local incidents of disorder in 2024, YHROCU worked with Romanian [police officers](#) to assist in monitoring community tension and identifying suspects from the local community.

YHROCU's regional disruptions team works closely with the [Government Agency Intelligence Network](#). The team exchanges information with SOC partners to identify opportunities to use all available powers to disrupt SOC criminals. The regional Government Agency Intelligence Network co-ordinator has provided training to personnel from YHROCU, regional forces and partner agencies.

YHROCU is responsible for managing prison intelligence

In September 2024, YHROCU took responsibility from Counter Terrorism Policing North East for the [regional prison intelligence unit](#). YHROCU was still finalising this transfer when we visited the region.

Some interviewees told us that the regional prison intelligence unit didn't have enough personnel to fully understand the SOC threat in the regional prisons. YHROCU told us that it was in the process of recruiting an intelligence analyst to improve its understanding of the threat of SOC in prisons.

Humberside Police

Good

Humberside Police is good at tackling [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#).

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force manages its approach to SOC

The force uses the name Operation Kinetic as its brand for tackling SOC with [partner agencies](#). The force has established processes to manage its approach to SOC. The force has a [strategic threat assessment](#) and [control strategy](#). These documents assess the threat from SOC and other types of crime. The force appoints chief inspectors as threat leads for each identified SOC threat. These threat leads complete [intelligence](#) collection plans for the SOC threats.

The force uses [management of risk in law enforcement risk assessment](#) to assess the risk from its identified SOC threats. [Personnel](#) from the force intelligence bureau (FIB) carry out the initial assessment. [Lead responsible officers \(LROs\)](#) are then responsible for completing these assessments.

The force has several meetings to manage how it responds to SOC including: an executive board; force and local tasking and co-ordination meetings; and partnership boards.

At the time of our inspection, the force had prepared five [SOC local profiles](#). One profile covered the whole force area and the others related to the four local policing areas. We found they were consistently of good quality; each was comprehensive and contained relevant local data.

The force doesn't have enough analytical capacity

During focus groups with analytical teams, we heard that the FIB didn't have enough capacity to scan and identify new emerging SOC threats. The force told us that it was planning to recruit four additional analysts. We also heard that, at the time of our inspection, many force intelligence personnel weren't [Intelligence Professionalisation Programme](#) certified.

Intelligence personnel are located centrally in the FIB and some in local policing areas. These personnel hold regular meetings to share and discuss matters relating to intelligence.

The force shares intelligence with partners

The force uses an SOC evaluation form to share intelligence and information about SOC threats with SOC partners. The force has also introduced an IT system that allows SOC partners to directly submit intelligence to the force. The force told us that this had increased the number of intelligence reports submitted by SOC partners.

We heard that, because of IT problems, the force was no longer able to automatically share intelligence with Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) (YHROCU). The force has introduced a short-term manual solution to resolve this problem. However, it should identify a permanent solution as soon as it can.

Resources and skills

The force may need to address issues of under-resourcing in SOC resulting from the creation of a new team

The force has several teams that focus on tackling SOC, including:

- the serious organised crime unit;
- two local Kinetic intervention teams;
- two surveillance teams; and
- a rural crime team.

The rural crime team prioritises reducing the threat from [organised crime groups \(OCGs\)](#) involved in the large-scale theft of machinery and GPS devices. The team works with SOC partners and has secured investment and sponsorship from rural communities.

The force has created the [domestic abuse](#) investigation team consisting of 70 personnel. However, we heard from some [officers](#) in specialist SOC units that the loss of personnel to this new team had left them under-resourced.

The force has improved its approach to appointing LROs

We heard that, just before our inspection, the force had decided to appoint inspectors from [neighbourhood policing](#) as LROs for some OCGs. Previously, managers from the Kinetic teams took the LRO role for all OCGs. The force told us that the reason for this change was to increase LRO capacity. While this process is new, we did hear from some interviewees that this was a positive development.

The force told us that it provided training and support for its LROs. This includes a one-day training course, and advice and support from regional SOC advisors. However, some LROs we spoke to told us that they hadn't yet received any formal training.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

Area for improvement: Humberside Police should improve how it manages serious crime prevention orders

At the time of our inspection, Humberside Police told us that it had six [serious crime prevention orders \(SCPOs\)](#). Four of these related to people who were in prison. The other two related to people who were living in the community.

The force allocates management of these SCPOs to the [integrated offender management team](#). Some [personnel](#) from the team told us that they didn't have enough capacity or the required skills to effectively manage high-risk serious organised crime offenders. One force senior leader told us that while the force did pursue applications for new SCPOs, it could still do more.

4P plans are inconsistent in quality and management

This part of the report is relevant to the first [area for improvement](#) described in [our section on regional findings](#).

We found that the force had [4P plans](#) for all its SOC investigations. We examined several of these plans. We found some were comprehensive but the objectives on others seemed generalised. However, we also found evidence of these plans being reviewed regularly by managers, often during meetings.

The force works well with its SOC partners

We heard from several partners that the force worked well with them to tackle SOC in the community. The force provides information about SOC and any [intelligence requirements](#) to local SOC partners such as the Local Authority and healthcare providers.

In January 2023, the then Home Secretary requested all police forces in England and Wales implement [Clear, Hold, Build](#) by 31 March 2024. The force has introduced several Clear, Hold, Build initiatives in three of its four local policing areas. These schemes are managed by [Community Safety Partnerships](#) and [local policing teams](#).

The force and its SOC partners use a community alert system to keep communities up to date on local problems including SOC and Clear, Hold, Build initiatives.

The force has introduced several initiatives to reduce the impact of SOC

We heard that the force's cyber and digital media investigation teams had worked with schools, colleges and local businesses to provide advice about cyber security.

The Office of the [Police and Crime Commissioner](#) has funded a campaign called Not in Our Community. This includes an online information portal to raise awareness of the threat of SOC. The force told us more than 50 percent of local schools had started using this system. We also heard that the force worked with young people, parents and teachers to raise awareness of [child](#) exploitation, both [criminal](#) and [sexual](#).

We also heard that the force fraud team had provided 39 fraud prevent initiatives to different events and organisations. This included a specific campaign targeting university students. The aim of this was to raise awareness of the risk of criminals using them to launder money through their bank accounts.

The force has also purchased specialist sonar equipment to use when searching underwater for hidden concealments on boats.

The force has improved frontline teams' knowledge of SOC

The force told us that it had increased its efforts to improve the knowledge of SOC throughout the force. This included force analysts preparing SOC briefing pages for circulation to frontline officers and [staff](#). We were pleased to find that most frontline personnel we spoke to were aware of local SOC issues and the force Kinetic branding.

North Yorkshire Police

Adequate

North Yorkshire Police is adequate at tackling [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#).

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

Area for improvement: North Yorkshire Police should improve how it accesses serious and organised crime data from partners

Some force analysts told us that accessing [serious and organised crime \(SOC\) partnership](#) data could be challenging.

We found that the force wasn't routinely able to access all partnership data. This limited how extensively the force incorporated SOC partner information in certain strategic documents, including [SOC local profiles](#). Some partners operated their own information systems that the force couldn't access.

The force informed us that it consulted with partner agencies on what data these agencies could contribute to SOC local profiles. But several partners told us the force hadn't consulted them when preparing the SOC local profiles.

We also heard that the force had arranged information sharing agreements (ISAs) with some SOC partners. However, representatives from partner agencies we interviewed stated that the ISAs didn't include some SOC partners. This was leading to some partners being confused about what data could be shared. The force may wish to review the ISA and brief partners to improve their confidence in sharing information.

In contrast, some analysts explained that leads from [Community Safety Partnerships](#) in the two [Clear, Hold, Build](#) areas had helped the force to access partnership information.

The force is improving how it manages its response to SOC

The force has produced a [strategic assessment](#) and a [control strategy](#) that identify its SOC threats. The force uses [management of risk in law enforcement](#) to assess the risks these threats present.

The force has a meeting structure in place to oversee SOC, including an SOC Partnership Board. This is chaired by the head of SOC. Representatives from local [SOC partners](#), including health and social services, attend the meeting. This meeting aims to strengthen the collective response to SOC. However, some partners told us they felt the meetings were more focused on the police presenting information, and they were unsure how to contribute meaningfully. The force has made efforts to encourage partners to contribute more fully to these meetings.

The force has also created a new chief inspector post. This role is responsible for co-ordinating the approach to SOC, raising the profile and making it everybody's responsibility. [Personnel](#) from a range of roles and ranks told us that introducing this post was essential to achieving planned improvements in SOC management. This is in addition to new developments including the introduction of the Sentry team, new [lead responsible officer \(LRO\)](#) model and improved training for [intelligence](#) personnel.

Since April 2024, the force has carried out monthly Operation Tornado days of action, rotating across the force area. All available resources, including [chief officers](#), take part in these operations. The operations aim to disrupt SOC activity.

The force is improving how it identifies SOC threats

We were told that the force reviewed intelligence to identify new SOC threats. During our inspection, some intelligence personnel told us that the capacity of the force's analytical resources limited how effectively new threats were identified. We were told that the force had lost three experienced analysts in relatively quick succession. While the analyst posts had been filled, the new recruits were inexperienced. We found that a restructure of the force's intelligence capability was addressing some of these limitations. We were reassured that the evaluation of SOC risks was improving.

The force needs to raise awareness of its SOC local profiles

The force has produced an SOC local profile for each of its three local policing areas. All three profiles were dated 2023. We examined these documents and found that they lacked data from partners. We found little evidence of how actions from SOC local profiles would be governed and assigned. The force shares its SOC local profiles with partners through its SOC Partnership Board. But we found limited awareness of the profiles during a focus group with some partner agencies. During [reality testing](#), we also found that frontline teams had limited awareness of these profiles.

The force SOC dashboard is underused

In August 2024, the force introduced an SOC intelligence dashboard to improve its understanding of SOC. The dashboard draws data from various force systems. It displays [organised crime groups](#) information and other relevant SOC data on the force intranet. It refreshes every 24 hours, and frontline officers can access it via mobile devices, with the option to view information on a map.

While we found that the dashboard had been generally well received, use of the dashboard varied across the force. While some personnel actively used the system, others, including some intelligence officers and staff, didn't. We found some personnel preferred an older system and others hadn't received training in the new one.

Resources and skills

The force has specialist resources tackling SOC

The force has an organised crime unit that leads complex SOC investigations. The unit is well equipped and maintains a strong working relationship with the Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#). For example, the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit supported an operation that resulted in the arrest of several suspects believed to be involved in supplying cannabis.

The force also operates an SOC disruption team, known as the Sentry team. The personnel on the team support LROs, manage SOC offenders, lead youth diversion efforts and record SOC disruptions.

We also found that the force's economic crime unit was well resourced. It was able to allocate a financial investigator to every SOC threat. The focus of this was on identifying pursue opportunities linked to illicit finance.

The force has changed how it appoints LROs and widened training provision for the role

The force has moved LRO responsibilities from its intelligence department to neighbourhood inspectors. It provides all LROs with a briefing on the role, guidance on completing [4P](#) plans, and allocates an intelligence [officer](#) to support them.

One LRO told us they had the skills and experience required for the role but were responsible for six operations and struggled to balance LRO duties with other responsibilities. We also heard that [neighbourhood policing teams](#) were under resourced in some areas. We were told that this limited how much work the LRO could allocate to local officers. We also found that neighbourhood LROs didn't manage all aspects of organised crime groups investigations.

The SOC chief inspector met with every LRO across the force. In September 2024, they ran a series of training events. These sessions included a case study and guidance on completing 4P plans. The force has also developed a digital training package for LROs that includes national documents and guidance. In addition, the regional SOC co-ordinator holds a clinic for LROs every six weeks.

The force is improving training for intelligence personnel

The force told us that some of its intelligence personnel hadn't received relevant training for several years. This had led to some personnel not being suitably qualified. The force has introduced training and development opportunities for intelligence personnel, including the implementation of the [Intelligence Professionalisation Programme](#).

The force promotes SOC as being everyone's responsibility

The force has introduced training for frontline personnel to raise awareness of SOC. Between September and October 2024, it ran a series of neighbourhood SOC roadshows. The force also uses a briefing tool that helps supervisors to inform their teams about SOC priorities.

During our reality testing in police stations, we were pleased to find SOC materials available and clearly displayed for frontline teams. We also found that personnel from various frontline roles, including detectives, understood their responsibilities for tackling SOC.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

Area for improvement: North Yorkshire Police should improve how it manages serious and organised crime offenders

We found that the force had [integrated offender management](#) teams in each of its three policing districts. His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service referred [organised crime group](#) members released from prison to these teams.

At the time of our inspection, the force told us that it had seven [serious crime prevention orders \(SCPOs\)](#). Five of these related to people who were in prison. The other two related to people who were living in the community. However, we heard that the integrated offender management teams didn't have enough capacity to manage these SCPOs.

The force recognised it needed to improve SCPO management so it allocated management to its Sentry team. The team is supported by a subject-matter expert in offender management. At the time of our inspection, it was too early to assess whether this was effective.

The force should improve how it manages 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the first [area for improvement](#) described in [our section on regional findings](#).

We found that the force was using the national template for its 4P plans. However, it stored 4P plans and [disruption activity](#) across multiple systems. Some neighbourhood LROs recorded activity on the force's case management system, while other departments didn't use this system.

When we examined several 4P plans, we also found that some contained no updates on completed activity and personnel in the force were recording disruptions inconsistently.

As a result, it is likely that the force isn't aware of every disruption activity that has taken place.

The force works with SOC partners to prevent SOC and protect victims

The force and its SOC partners have access to several schemes designed to divert individuals away from SOC activity. These include:

- the [Stepping Up Project](#) that provides sports mentoring for over 500 people in the region;
- [Operation Choice](#) that aims to divert [children](#) and young people from drug use;
- outreach work in schools and youth clubs; and
- a schools-based initiative to reduce knife carrying and involvement in [county lines](#).

Frontline personnel we spoke to recognised the signs of exploitation and [cuckooing](#). We found examples of the force using court orders, such as [closure orders](#) and [slavery and trafficking risk orders](#), to protect [vulnerable](#) people. We also heard that frontline policing teams used social media and leaflets to raise community awareness about the risks of cuckooing.

South Yorkshire Police

Good

South Yorkshire Police is good at tackling [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#).

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force manages its response to SOC

The force uses the name Fortify as its brand for tackling SOC with [partner](#) agencies. It has produced several management documents including a [force management statement](#), strategic assessment, SOC strategy and [control strategy](#). All of these documents include sections on SOC.

The force manages its response to SOC through a series of structured meetings

At a strategic level, there is a community safety forum chaired by a representative of the South Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority. The forum includes senior representatives from partner agencies and meets every six months. The response to SOC is discussed at these meetings.

The force holds quarterly performance review meetings. At these meetings, the head of SOC and local policing leaders are held to account for their performance against the [organised crime groups \(OCGs\)](#) and SOC threats they manage. The force prepares accurate and up-to-date performance data to support these meetings.

It also holds a series of Fortify meetings at both force and local levels. These meetings review SOC threats, high-risk OCGs and SOC suspects due for prison release, and identify learning from operations. SOC partners attend these meetings. The force also uses tasking and co-ordination meetings to allocate resources to tackle SOC threats.

The force has completed an SOC local profile

The force completed a new [SOC local profile](#) in 2024. This was based on the [national guidance](#) provided by the Home Office. SOC partners confirmed that the force had shared the profile with them and that they had contributed to its development.

During [reality testing](#) in local policing areas, we found limited awareness of the SOC local profile among frontline [personnel](#) and [lead responsible officers \(LROs\)](#).

The force identifies new SOC threats

The force's SOC [threat desk](#) is responsible for identifying SOC threats and developing local [intelligence](#). The force uses this information to help prioritise its SOC threats. In one example, analysts developed intelligence shared by another agency that led to the identification of an OCG involved in online fraud.

The force has four local policing areas. In two of these areas, SOC partners can directly submit information through an IT system. However, in the other two areas, partners must rely on email to share information.

The force keeps frontline personnel updated on SOC threats

The force's serious and organised crime intelligence team (SOCIT) produces intelligence documents on each identified OCG. When we visited the force, we found that these documents were widely accessible to frontline personnel. Supervisors used them during briefings, and they were displayed in police stations. [Officers](#) and [staff](#) could also access them on their handheld devices.

We also heard that the SOCIT regularly asked [local policing teams](#) to gather SOC intelligence to improve the force's understanding of local threats. However, we found that the force often had a backlog of reports waiting to be processed. The team responsible for processing these reports prioritises high-risk submissions but other reports can face delays.

Resources and skills

The force has several specialist units to tackle SOC

The force's serious organised crime unit (SOCU) leads many of its SOC investigations. In addition to carrying out investigations, the SOCU provides surveillance capabilities. It should be able to deploy two surveillance teams but we found that its workload meant it was sometimes limited to one team. The SOCU receives specialist support from Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#) when required.

Each of the force's four local policing areas has a Fortify team. These teams work alongside local policing teams to address SOC in their communities. They can request surveillance support from the SOCU. However, some Fortify team members told us that they were sometimes assigned to other duties that reduced their ability to focus on SOC.

The armed crime team investigates firearms offences. It uses forensic evidence and intelligence to disrupt OCGs suspected of using firearms. The force reported that the armed crime team helped reduce incidents of firearms discharges from 86 in year ending October 2021 to 16 in the year ending October 2024.

The Office for the Mayor of South Yorkshire funds four locally based serious organised crime co-ordinators.

The force has well-resourced analytical teams

During focus groups and reality testing with intelligence teams, we were pleased to find that the force's analytical teams were generally well resourced. The force increased the number of analytical posts and established a SOCIT. It also used funding from the Home Office [Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme](#) to fill previously vacant financial investigator roles.

The force should improve how it supports lead responsible officers

The force appoints a lead responsible officer to each identified OCG. These LROs are usually sergeants, supported at times by constables acting as deputy. LROs manage and co-ordinate the force's response to the SOC threats assigned to them.

The force told us it had run training events for LROs. We also heard that the SOC co-ordinator provided guidance and support to newly appointed LROs. The force has introduced LRO drop-in sessions every eight weeks, where relevant experts attend and share experiences with LROs. The force is also developing a dedicated training package for the role.

However, some LROs told us they hadn't received enough training. They also said they struggled to fulfil the role effectively due to competing priorities and limited resources.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

This part of the report is relevant to the first [area for improvement](#) described in [our section on regional findings](#).

The force is adopting the national template to record its [4P](#) plans and stores them on a shared team drive. Relevant personnel can access these plans. The force also told us that it was trialling a new IT system to manage its 4P plans.

During our inspection, we reviewed several 4P plans and found inconsistencies in their quality. Some investigations led by the SOCU had no 4P plans in place and others had no appointed LRO. Reality testing with the SOCU confirmed that some investigations were operating without a 4P plan.

The force works well with SOC partners

The force has established partnership groups in every local policing area. Each area has a three-year plan outlining their priorities.

We heard several examples of the force working effectively with SOC partners, including:

- giving presentations in all secondary schools to raise awareness of the risks associated with SOC;
- the modern slavery team working with partners to prevent exploitation in car washes and barber shops;
- working with young people at risk of SOC involvement to support their return to education;
- collaborating with local council trading standards officers to implement [closure orders](#) and evictions through the Fortify teams; and
- working with the [Lifewise Centre](#) in Rotherham to provide education on community safety issues including knife crime and online safety.

We heard that nearly all schools in the area had attended the sessions at the Lifewise Centre.

Force analysts use intelligence to identify individuals at risk of being drawn into SOC. In one case, the force worked with SOC partners to [safeguard](#) families [vulnerable](#) to [child criminal exploitation](#). They did this by rehousing the families and providing diversionary activities.

The force has also collaborated with Sheffield Hallam University and the University of Leeds to better understand SOC threats such as [cuckooing](#) and illegal drug markets.

The force has successfully introduced Clear, Hold, Build

In January 2023, the then Home Secretary directed all police forces in England and Wales to implement the [Clear, Hold, Build](#) approach by 31 March 2024. South Yorkshire Police introduced the model in the Barnsley area as part of the national pilot. The force worked with its SOC partners to provide local initiatives, including:

- giving CV-writing training to residents;
- working with young people at risk of SOC involvement; and
- organising community clean-up activities.

We were told that several other forces were considering adopting this model.

The force and its SOC partners have identified two additional locations for Clear, Hold, Build initiatives. Most partner representatives we spoke to supported the approach. However, some said that funding constraints required them to move resources from other areas.

The force works effectively to disrupt SOC in prison

The force prison team leads SOC and corruption investigations in prison. It worked with His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service to introduce an operation to tackle the use of drones by criminals to take illegal drugs into prison. This operation included a collaboration with a forensic provider to accelerate the examination and identification of recovered drugs. The team also investigated a corrupt prison officer who was later convicted in court.

The force should make sure SOC offenders are managed effectively

The force told us it was managing approximately 40 [serious crime prevention orders \(SCPOs\)](#). A designated plan owner and local policing teams should oversee individuals subject to SCPOs following their release from prison. The force monitors progress through monthly Fortify meetings.

But we found that this process wasn't always followed. For example, the Fortify team in Doncaster told us that it didn't manage SCPOs as it was the responsibility of the [integrated offender management](#) team in the Doncaster area. We also heard from the Sheffield integrated offender management team that the national probation team should be managing the SCPOs for the Sheffield area. But some interviewees in the Sheffield team weren't confident that the national probation team were managing them.

West Yorkshire Police

Outstanding

West Yorkshire Police is outstanding at tackling [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#).

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force manages its response to SOC

The force uses the name Programme Precision as its brand for tackling SOC with [partner](#) agencies. It has prioritised SOC in both its [force management statement](#) and its strategic plan to reduce crime.

The force holds a quarterly crime board that receives reports from its threat delivery groups. The force has a designated threat delivery group for each of its priorities. It also runs several other SOC-related meetings to co-ordinate its response. The weekly Programme Precision tasking meeting considers requests for SOC resources. Local policing areas also hold tactical tasking and co-ordination meetings every six weeks. These meetings report to the force tasking meeting that an assistant chief constable chairs.

The force also works closely with SOC partners through a series of meetings designed to strengthen their joint response to SOC.

The force takes an innovative approach to SOC local profiles

In our previous inspection of West Yorkshire Police, we found that the force took an innovative approach to using [SOC local profiles](#). The Home Office recognised this innovation in its [SOC local profile guidance](#), published in February 2025.

During this inspection, we found that each of the five local policing areas maintained an SOC local profile and reviewed it every six months. The force also maintained a force-wide profile that it reviewed annually. It used these profiles to identify potential [Clear, Hold, Build](#) sites.

The force also shared these local profiles with its SOC partners. We were pleased to find that most [personnel](#) in SOC roles that we spoke to knew how to access these profiles.

The force briefs frontline personnel about SOC threats

During [reality testing](#), we found that frontline [officers](#) and [staff](#) could access information about SOC. Force SOC analysts produced daily [intelligence](#) briefings that frontline personnel could view on computers and handheld devices. These briefing pages remained available for 30 days.

For example, personnel in the Killingbeck neighbourhood area told us they could access detailed SOC information, including tactical [4P](#) plans, directly on their handheld devices. They also knew how to contact specialist teams for advice. However, we found that some response teams and local investigation teams didn't routinely access this information.

Resources and skills

The force has significant resources available to tackle SOC

The force's protective services crime command manages its specialist SOC resources. These include:

- two SOC investigation teams;
- enough surveillance officers;
- an SOC development team;
- a firearms prevent team;
- a [modern slavery and human trafficking](#) team; and
- an economic crime unit.

We were pleased to find that the force didn't struggle to recruit or retain personnel in these teams. We also found that the teams had good access to modern technical equipment, including vehicles and drones.

Force leaders told us they rarely requested support from the Yorkshire and Humber [Regional Organised Crime Unit](#), due to the strength of their in-force SOC resources. They believe this means other regional forces can make better use of support from the Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit.

Each of the force's five local policing areas has a Precision team responsible for managing local SOC investigations. We found that these teams were staffed with personnel who had the skills needed to tackle SOC. Those we spoke to understood the SOC threats in their local areas.

We were also pleased to find that most [neighbourhood officers](#) we spoke to saw tackling SOC as a core part of their role. However, some said they found it challenging to balance this with other demands, such as being allocated to public order duties.

The force has created a team dedicated to tackling county lines

At the time of our inspection, the force had identified 250 [county lines](#) operating within its area. Some of these lines had been active for a considerable period. For example, one based in the Bradford area had been operating since 2009.

The force relied on its modern slavery and human trafficking unit to manage its response to county lines. However, since our inspection, the force told us that it had created a county lines investigation team.

The force has good analytical capability

We were pleased to find that the force had sufficient analytical capability to support its response to SOC. The protective services crime command includes 23 operational analysts. Smaller analytical teams are based in each local policing area.

This level of resourcing helps the force to meet all requests for analytical support. [Lead responsible officers \(LROs\)](#) and [senior investigating officers](#) we spoke to told us that analysts provided strong support for their operations.

There is training and support for LROs in the force

The force appoints officers of at least inspector rank as LROs. Alongside plan owners, they implement 4P plans. In some cases, the plan owner comes from an SOC partner agency.

We found that the force generally provided good support to LROs. The SOC co-ordinator has introduced training materials, such as an online induction pack. This pack includes links to useful information such as best practice and guidance on completing 4P plans. The SOC co-ordinator has also been involved in offering LROs and SOC partners access to an immersive learning environment.

Some LROs told us that many of the LROs were new to the role for several reasons. This meant levels of experience varied and some had limited experience in managing 4P plans before taking on the role. To address this, the force has appointed an experienced LRO as a champion in each policing area. These champions are available to support and advise new LROs.

The force carries out effective debriefs to identify what works well

The force has developed Operation Capture. This is an online platform designed to record and share learning across the organisation. It includes information about SOC investigations. The [College of Policing](#) has published information about this platform on its [practice bank](#).

Interviewees told us that the force routinely debriefed most operations and shared the findings across the organisation. All operations and firearms deployments from the SOC investigation unit are formally debriefed. We also found evidence that operational teams informally gathered learning from their activities.

The force has introduced a debrief questionnaire that LROs and senior investigating officers complete at the conclusion of an operation. The force shares the learning from these questionnaires with personnel across the organisation.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

Innovative practice: The force effectively manages serious and organised crime offenders

The force has a [lifetime offender management](#) team. At the time of our inspection, the team was managing 140 offenders, 48 of whom were subject to [serious crime prevention orders](#). The team had developed a prioritisation process to manage these offenders effectively.

The lifetime offender management team provides guidance and support to [officers](#) applying for serious crime prevention orders. It helps officers decide when to apply for an order and supports them in developing appropriate conditions. The team also provides briefings on the evidence required to support breach proceedings. In addition, it tasks frontline teams with gathering [intelligence](#) on serious and organised crime offenders.

We were pleased to find that [lead responsible officers](#), investigators and [neighbourhood officers](#) across the force were using ancillary orders. For example:

- In Wakefield, officers worked with the Wakefield Council [antisocial behaviour](#) officer to prepare orders.
- Officers used evidence from members of the public to strengthen applications for a range of orders.
- The [child vulnerability](#) exploitation team considered using orders to reduce serious and organised crime-related vulnerability, including [closure orders](#) and [child abduction warning notices](#).

The force has established Clear, Hold, Build across multiple sites

The force has established Clear, Hold, Build sites in Bradford, Harehills, Kirklees and Calderdale. It introduced the first site in Bradford in 2020. The College of Policing has recognised the work at this site as [smarter practice](#).

During reality testing in Harehills, personnel told us that Clear, Hold, Build had produced positive results. The force told us that, between March 2023 and September 2024, overall recorded crime in the area had reduced by 40 percent, including a 60 percent reduction in serious violence.

The force has up-to-date 4P plans

LROs maintain 4P plans for all mapped SOC threats. At the time of our inspection, the force had begun using the national 4P plan template and had circulated guidance to make sure personnel completed it correctly.

We reviewed a selection of 4P plans and found that they were up to date and shared with SOC partner agencies. The force stores most 4P plans electronically on a virtual platform.

However, we found that a small number of plans hadn't been reviewed. We also found that some frontline officers we spoke to weren't aware of the 4P plans.

The force has developed good relationships with partner agencies

The force works closely with its SOC partners and shares information with them regularly. We observed several meetings that many SOC partners attended. It was clear that the partners understood their role in tackling SOC. However, some partners expressed frustration about the frequent movement of senior officers within the force.

During our inspection, force personnel mentioned several initiatives that we or other professional policing bodies have recognised as effective practice. One of these was the POL-Ed education programme, which we highlighted in our 2023–25 police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspection as [promising practice](#). The aim of this programme is to help teachers educate schoolchildren about the risks associated with SOC.

The College of Policing recognised another of the force's initiatives with partners. This was the use of a [focused deterrence car](#). A plain-clothes officer and a youth worker use this to attend violent crime scenes and communicate with young people at risk of committing or being [victims](#) of violent crime.

We also heard examples of the force working with SOC partners to reduce the impact of SOC, including:

- a partnership with the Leeds-based charity [Community Action to Create Hope](#) that provides space for sports and activities, and a centre offering advice and guidance to support young people; we heard that over 1,400 people regularly attended;
- the Violence Reduction Partnership, a collaboration between health services, local authorities, education providers and police that applies a public-health approach to prevention;

- joint efforts with SOC partners to prevent young people from becoming involved in gang-related activity; and
- the [Breaking the Cycle](#) initiative in Bradford that works with 10-to-16-year-olds in the community to divert them from SOC involvement.

Frontline teams understand how to tackle vulnerability


The force has a process in place to identify and manage [vulnerable](#) people. The child vulnerability exploitation team receives notifications about individuals at risk of criminal exploitation. This team assesses referrals and designs appropriate interventions.

During reality testing, we were pleased to find that most neighbourhood officers understood how to identify and respond to vulnerability. They were also aware of the referral process.

Annex A: Map of regional organised crime units

There are ten regions in England and Wales containing nine [regional organised crime units \(ROCU\)](#)s:

1. The North East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria.
2. The Yorkshire and Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.
3. The North West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside and North Wales.
4. Tarian covers Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and South Wales.
5. The Regional Organised Crime Unit for the West Midlands Region covers Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands and Staffordshire.
6. The East Midlands Special Operations Unit covers Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire.
7. The Eastern Region Special Operations Unit covers Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Norfolk and Suffolk.
8. The South West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.
9. The Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police work collaboratively in the London region.
10. The South East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Thames Valley.



There is a separate collaborative arrangement for the London region, incorporating the constituent forces of the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police. The forces share some ROCU capabilities.

Annex B: Data methodology and caveats

The data used in this report was extracted from the national database: the [Agency and Partners Management Information System \(APMIS\)](#).

APMIS contains data that is recorded by police forces throughout England and Wales, ROCUs, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and other organisations (such as His Majesty's Revenue and Customs, and Home Office Immigration Enforcement).

This data includes:

- The [serious and organised crime \(SOC\)](#) master list, which contains all [MoRILE](#) assessments for the SOC threats identified by forces and organisations.
- Event-based disruption data ('disruption data') that is recorded following national minimum standards. At the time of our inspection, minimum standards stipulated that disruption data should only be recorded against [organised crime groups](#), and not [priority individuals](#) or [SOC vulnerabilities](#).

MoRILE assessment data was extracted from APMIS on 1 June 2022 and therefore any changes made to assessments since that date will not be accounted for in the analysis. The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Type is Tactical, Moderation status is Moderated, SOC is SOC, Tier is not Tier 5 and Phase is not contains closed.

Disruption data was extracted from APMIS in June 2024 and includes all disruptions made after 1 June 2024. The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Disruption type is Lead Disruption, Record data is greater than 1 June 2024 and Assessment Category is Major, Minor and Moderate.

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