

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



## HMIC Inspection Report

### Hertfordshire Constabulary Major Crime

July 2008



*Hertfordshire Constabulary – HMIC Inspection Report*

*July 2008*

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## Introduction to HMIC Inspections

For a century and a half, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales, with the first HM Inspectors (HMIs) being appointed under the provisions of the County and Borough Police Act 1856. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged HMIC's contribution to policing.

HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is the Home Secretary's principal professional policing adviser and is independent of both the Home Office and the police service. HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996. For more information, please visit HMIC's website at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/>.

In 2006, HMIC conducted a broad assessment of all 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales, examining 23 areas of activity. This baseline assessment had followed a similar process in 2005, and thus created a rich evidence base of strengths and weaknesses across the country. However, it is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk both to the public and to the service's reputation – pointed inexorably to a focus on what are known collectively as 'protective services'. In addition, there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a more rounded assessment is appropriate.

Having reached this view internally, HMIC consulted key stakeholders, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). A consensus emerged that HMIC could add greater value by undertaking more probing inspections of fewer topics. Stakeholders concurred with the emphasis on protective services but requested that neighbourhood policing remain a priority for inspection until there is evidence that it has been embedded in everyday police work.

HMIC uses a rigorous and transparent methodology to conduct its inspections and reach conclusions and judgements. All evidence is gathered, verified and then assessed against specific grading criteria (SGC) drawn from an agreed set of national (ACPO-developed) standards. However, the main purpose of inspection is not to make judgements but to drive improvements in policing. Both professional and lay readers are urged, therefore, to focus not on the headline grades but on the opportunities for improvement identified within the text of this report.

## HMIC Business Plan for 2008/09

HMIC's business plan (available at <http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/business-plan/>) reflects our continued focus on:

- protective services – including the management of public order, civil contingencies and critical incidents phase 3 of the programme in autumn 2008/spring 2009;
- counter-terrorism – including all elements of the national CONTEST strategy;
- strategic services – such as information management and professional standards; and
- the embedding of neighbourhood policing.

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In addition, we are currently developing a scrutiny of strategic resource leverage, and are liaising with the Audit Commission on a methodology for the anticipated inspection of police authorities.

HMIC's priorities for the coming year are set in the context of the wide range of strategic challenges that face both the police service and HMIC, including the need to increase service delivery against a backdrop of reduced resources. With this in mind, the business plan for 2008/09 includes for the first time a 'value for money' plan that relates to the current Comprehensive Spending Review period (2008–11).

Our intention is to move to a default position where we do not routinely carry out all-force inspections, except in exceptional circumstances; we expect to use a greater degree of risk assessment to target activity on those issues and areas where the most severe vulnerabilities exist, where most improvement is required or where the greatest benefit to the service can be gained through the identification of best practice.

## Programmed Frameworks

During phase 2 of HMIC's inspection programme, we examined force responses to major crime, serious and organised crime and neighbourhood policing in each of the 44 forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

While this document includes the full graded report for the major crime inspection, the inspection relating to serious and organised crime is detailed in a separate thematic report.

## Major Crime

This framework covers the force effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with homicide and other major crimes that will normally require a force to set up a major incident room. There is only one statutory performance indicator at present, although other indicators shown in the report facilitate appropriate comparisons of performance between forces; the indicators suggested give some context regarding the volume of such crimes, success in detections and trends over time, but they need to be interpreted with care. The assessment is primarily qualitative, with a judgement as to the extent to which the force predicts and prevents major crime as opposed to solely discovering and reacting to such crime. Major crime includes any investigation that requires the deployment of a senior investigating officer and specialist assets.

The grading system has changed this year to allow for a single ACPO threshold standard against which forces will be assessed as compliant, not compliant or exceeding compliance. It is recognised that collaborative arrangements can be used where appropriate. At a high level, the ACPO lead summarises the threshold standard as set out below:

- Intelligence – Compliance with the 2005 ACPO National Intelligence Model guidance on the shared understanding of and response to the risks and demands of the major crime threat, with effective intelligence and data sharing internally, with neighbouring forces and with key partners.
- Prevention – Effective proactive partnerships to prevent major crime in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights; this includes precursor offending and options such as Osman warnings.
- Enforcement – Compliance with the 2006 ACPO *Murder Investigation Manual* and guidance in the 2005 ACPO major incident room standardised administrative procedures, having sufficient resources to meet and manage the predicted demand and contingency to meet extraordinary demand from major crime investigation and review.

- Performance management and resilience – Efficiency through robust performance measures linking costs/resources, inputs and outputs to goals (ie the outcomes of reduction and prevention, detection and conviction work).

## Future Programmed Inspections

Following these serious and organised crime and major crime assessments, HMIC plans work in the following areas:

Inspection area	Dates
Neighbourhood policing	April 2008 – September 2008
Developing citizen focus	April 2008 – September 2008
Civil contingencies	September 2008 – May 2009
Public order	September 2008 – May 2009
Critical incidents	September 2008 – May 2009
Professional standards	June 2009 – December 2009
Information management	June 2009 – December 2009
Leadership	June 2009 – December 2009

## The Grading Process

HMIC has moved to a new grading system based on the national standards; forces will be deemed to meet the standard, exceed the standard or fail to meet the standard.

### Meeting the standard

HMIC uses the ACPO agreed standards as the starting point for its SGC. The standards against which forces are measured are communicated to all forces and police authorities some time before the inspection starts. The standards are set at a level that ensures that risk to the public is identified, managed and mitigated as far as is feasible; all forces should find the standards achievable.

### Exceeding the standard

Where a force can demonstrate capacity and capability that exceed the agreed national standards, it is expected that risk assessment and business cases justify the availability of 'additional' resources, and that they are deployed appropriately. For example, some forces require a higher level of capacity/capability to counter extraordinary threat levels or to discharge a regional or lead force remit. Without such a rationale, an over-investment would almost certainly represent poor value for money and thus attract criticism.

## **Failing to meet the standard**

This assessment is appropriate when a force cannot provide evidence that it meets a number of significant criteria that correlate with the ACPO national standards. Where evidence is provided to confirm that the particular issue has been properly risk assessed and the risk is being managed, then the report may not necessarily draw an adverse conclusion. The assessment may also give some credit in situations where a force has the ability to remedy any deficiencies promptly, in terms of time and investment levels needed.

## **Developing Practice**

In addition to assessing force performance, one of HMIC's key roles is to identify and share good practice across the police service. Much good practice is identified as HMIC conducts its assessments and is reflected (described as a 'strength') in the body of the report. In addition, each force is given the opportunity to submit more detailed examples of its good practice. HMIC has therefore, in some reports, selected suitable examples and included them in the report. The key criteria for each example are that the work has been evaluated by the force and the good practice is easily transferable to other forces; each force has provided a contact name and telephone number or email address, should further information be required. HMIC has not conducted any independent evaluation of the examples of good practice provided.

## Force Overview and Context

### Geographical description of force area

Hertfordshire Constabulary's boundaries are congruent with those of the County of Hertfordshire, covering an area of 1,643 square kilometres, with a resident population of well over a million. In addition there is also a considerable commuting population that passes through the county every weekday by road and rail, to and from London.

The county comprises a mix of large urban areas, new towns, market towns and villages, and has some of the busiest strategic roads in Europe. Most of the southern areas of the county share characteristics with their neighbouring parts of North London. On the northern and eastern edges of the county, the nature of the area is countryside, and its policing dimensions are therefore similar to the rural context of southern Cambridgeshire and western Essex.

The county continues to grow rapidly, both economically and demographically. Further major housing developments are targeted in the coming years, both to the west of Stevenage and in the south east of the county on the Essex border.

There are two international airports less than a mile outside the county's borders (Luton and Stansted), and all of London's airports are easily accessible. The motorway and trunk road network of the M1, M25, M10, A1(M), A41, A10 and A5 provide significant strategic road coverage and policing challenges. There are three mainline rail links (Midlands, East Coast and West Coast) and easy access to the east coast sea ports. This level of infrastructure provides excellent transport links and characterises a highly mobile community.

These features, together with the proximity to London, shape the community who live, work, travel or spend their leisure time in the county. Rail crashes at Watford, Hatfield and Potters Bar in recent years are reminders of the vulnerability to natural, accidental or terrorist incidents that are caused by such a concentration of transport infrastructure in one place and the Buncefield oil depot explosion in December 2005 reinforced the appreciation of the potential for major incidents in an area of densely populated residential and light and heavy industrial enterprises.

Many of the county's towns feature a vibrant night life that needs policing, and championship football is a regular feature of policing on the Western Area. A long history of film production in the county has traditionally had little impact on policing. However, the arrival of the 'Big Brother' house at Elstree has attracted considerable media interest and, on occasions extra demands on the force's operational and support services.

The proximity to London, together with a number of key Parliamentary seats, leads to extensive and numerous VIP visits and impacts on police resourcing, particularly at General Election time. The impact of the high cost of living and difficulty in finding affordable housing for staff directly impacts on resourcing, recruitment and retention.

### Demographic description of force area

With a population of 1,051,000 in 1,643 square kilometres, Hertfordshire contains 19% of the people in the east of England in only 8.6% of the land mass. Some 20.5% of the population is under 16 years of age, while there is an 81% employment rate for those of employable age.

The proportion of the population that is from black and minority ethnic (BME) communities is 9%, which is lower than the national average. The largest sector of this group (2.1%) is



Indian. The more concentrated minority communities are predominantly situated in the Western Area, with some notable exceptions – for example, in Hitchin, in the north east of the county and St Albans.

The education and health indices demonstrate that the county as a whole is on a par with or ahead of the region, and well ahead of the national figures. However, in the areas where poor health and education are evident, this level of deprivation is felt all the more keenly when compared with the relative comfort of the rest of the county.

Economically the county performs well, with a £20 billion Gross Added Value assessment. This represents 25.6% of the gross figure for the six counties in the East of England region.

### **Structural description of the Force**

Local policing is delivered through three basic command units (BCUs): Western, Central and Eastern. These are divided into ten CDRPs which are co-terminus with the ten Local Councils in the county.

Policing in each CDRP is managed and co-ordinated by a dedicated Chief Inspector. These are further sub-divided into 75 Neighbourhoods each with their own Neighbourhood Team.

### **Strategic priorities**

The force has six strategic priorities with the first five setting out what the force wants to achieve and the sixth priority providing objectives and targets for the use and development of the Constabulary's resources.

#### **Provide a Citizen Focused Police Service**

Improve public confidence and satisfaction in the service provided by the police

#### **Reduce Crime**

Reduce total crime particularly serious violent crime

#### **Investigate Crime**

Bring more offences and offenders to justice

Tackle Class A drug supply and its impact on criminality

Combat serious and organised crime and protect the county from terrorism and domestic extremism

#### **Promote Public Safety**

Reduce anti-social behaviour and disorder

Increase visibility, accessibility and reassurance in all our communities

Improve safety on our roads

#### **Provide Assistance**

Improve the police response to calls for assistance

#### **Manage Resources**

Recruit, retain and develop a skilled and representative workforce to deliver excellent policing to all communities in Hertfordshire

Work in collaboration where this will deliver tangible benefits and efficiencies

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## **Key Initiatives to Improve Performance during 2007/08**

### **Provide a Citizen Focused Police Service**

Area Service Desks – changing roles and processes  
Re-launch of Victim Charter  
Front Enquiry Office review  
Fast time surveys of new initiatives e.g. vehicle scene visits, violent crime  
Daily review of service to VEM victims

### **Reduce Crime**

Partnership working in the Night time economy  
Targeted “No Cold Calling” zones  
Launch of Business Crime Partnerships  
Increased youth diversionary activities (e.g. Army outreach programme)  
Launch of Choices & Consequences Project (C2) focusing on the detection and long term reduction of acquisitive crime

### **Investigate Crime**

Herts & Beds Major Crime Unit  
Volume crime and Workforce modernisation (Operation Pioneer)  
CJSSS and Criminal Justice Review Project  
Vehicle Crime Attendance  
Introduction of Volume Crime Car  
Area PPO Units

### **Promote Public Safety**

Growing number of Special Constables and volunteers  
Revised Force website – access to Safer Neighbourhoods Teams  
Youth Support Pathfinder initiative  
Continuing Road Safety Campaigns

### **Provide Assistance**

Introduction of Victim Pack  
Working with the deaf community  
Advice to Eastern European Communities  
Enhanced Technology in control room  
Website Improvement

### **Manage Resources**

Wider collaboration  
Bureaucracy (Informants (CHIS) Review)  
Scanning of ‘Stops’ forms  
Procurement Processes, eg contract savings on FMEs, Forensics, Insurance and Catering  
Internal Fleet Review - reduction in fleet size  
Increased use of Computer Based Training  
Overtime Reductions

## Force Performance Overview

### Force development since 2007 inspections

**Collaboration** – In November 2007 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Major Crime Unit went live, with the set up costs partially off set by the Demonstrator Site funding that was secured from the Home Office. The unit has 145 police Officers and Police Staff from both forces. Additionally Hertfordshire joined the Chiltern Fleet Consortium, (currently serving Bedfordshire and Thames Valley Police) in April 2008 with efficiencies expected through economies of scale, standardisation and procurement opportunities.

Following a number of meetings between the Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire ACPO teams it has been agreed that a number of further opportunities exist for collaboration between the two Forces. A joint project team has been formed to carry out a detailed assessment of the opportunities for collaboration on the following functions:

- Counter Terrorism / Domestic Extremism
- Firearms / Dogs
- Civil Contingency / Operational Planning
- Strategic Roads Policing
- Professional Standards.

Further opportunities are being pursued at a Regional level looking at ICT, Scientific Services, Serious & Organised Crime, and Air Support.

**Representative Workforce** – Hertfordshire Constabulary needs to employ a workforce that is representative of the community it polices and ensure continuing support from that community. The Policing Plan has a target of 10% of recruits from minority ethnic communities for both officers and staff and the Force achieved this target for minority ethnic officer recruits by end March 2008.

The Home Office Dismantling Barriers targets give Forces until 2010 to achieve a representative workforce. The force had at year end 3% officers, approximately 3.6% police staff and 5.8% Specials from minority ethnic groups.

At the end of September 2007 Hertfordshire had the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest proportion of female officers in the country at 28%. Since then this has increased further to 29%.

**Workforce Modernisation** – The National Agenda to move the Police Service workforce forward has led to Hertfordshire winning a bid to become a demonstration site in relation to the investigation of volume crime across the Force and this is now being carried forward as “Operation Pioneer”. This represents a significant programme of work to re-shape the business and will look to re-engineer the process for investigating volume crime and generate improvements in both capacity and capability.

The three major change projects (Volume Crime, Neighbourhood Policing and CJSSS) have the potential to change the functioning of service delivery. This project is also addressing the requirement for staffing arrangements to more effectively manage volume crime activity at weekends.

If the current recommendations are implemented it will re-shape the approach to managing volume crime on Areas and will incorporate CJSSS principles. The project will be evaluated over a 12 months period by Home Office consultants with a view to determining whether objectives to improve policing performance and quality of service are achieved.

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**Protective Services** – Hertfordshire Constabulary has undertaken a review of its Protective Services provision and considered how effectively this complements the regional provision. The Force is already engaged in significant collaborative work, both at a regional level and working more specifically with Bedfordshire Police. This year some £0.4m has been allocated to develop this further. The six Eastern Region police forces signed a Memorandum of Understanding in September 2007 confirming their joint commitment to tackling serious and organised crime across the region by sharing resources and expertise for individual operations. Since that time the number of cross-border policing operations has increased substantially. Future developments to increase capacity and resilience against serious and organised crime will be overseen by the six counties' Chief Constables and Authority Chairs.

**Protecting Vulnerable People** – There is an acknowledgement that there needs to be better co-ordination across the different elements of Protecting Vulnerable People, which includes tackling child abuse, domestic violence, serious sexual offences, and undertaking missing person enquiries. To this end, Harm Reduction Units, with appropriate specialist training and increased resilience will be introduced in each Area as soon as possible. The Constabulary is working closely with partners across the county to specifically improve the response provided to those who suffer from domestic violence and serious sexual assault.

**Estates Development** – The development of the Police Estate to meet changing policing demands and expected growth in population of the County is a long-term and complex issue. The redevelopment of the Estate is being undertaken as part of the Public Access and Visibility (PAV) Strategy approved by the Police Authority in 2002 and to date has committed expenditure in excess of £33m. The Custody project at Hoddesdon completed in June 2007 delivered a 16-cell custody suite. The major projects at Hatfield and Stevenage are within the agreed budget and on schedule for delivery in 2008.

**Improving Police Performance (IPP)** – IPP is of key importance to our ability to improve our overall service delivery. A significant component of overall police performance is the effective management of individual performance. During the 07/08 business year, a number of business areas have had IPP frameworks constructed to gather qualitative and quantitative data concerning the performance of staff. These included Intervention, Neighbourhood, Crime Investigation and Roads Policing Teams. This data is used within the Force PDR process to assist line managers in judging overall performance and in identifying good performance or areas where development activity needs to be put in place. The collection of such data allows comparison between teams with same business areas across the force area. A wider roll-out of IPP to other teams and roles will be phased over the coming year.

**Force Contact Centre Review** – Work continues to identify how to capture real-time customer satisfaction and thereby enable early “service recovery”. Provision of feedback is increasing and again systems are being enhanced to support this. Process improvement work continues in order to ensure performance targets continue to be achieved while releasing substantial efficiency gains over the coming year. These improvements to business processes are being linked to deliver the objectives under the ‘Beyond the Call’ action plan.

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**Hertfordshire Area Review Programme** – This is an extensive Change Management Programme that will bring together several significant projects which have elements of shared dependencies and synergy. This will include the reviews of Criminal Justice and Intelligence and look at the developments within Workforce Modernisation, “Intelligence Hubs” and Custody processes. It will also include elements of Roads Policing, Front Enquiry Counters, VIPER and Critical Incidents and will look at the use of Mobile Data in its widest sense, encompassing both the use of technology and the ease of access to and inputting of, intelligence and information.

**County Prolific Offender Team (CPOT)** – In April 2008, the County Prolific Offender Team was established with the objective to target the county's most prolific acquisitive offenders. The new unit has evolved from the Specialist Interview Unit (SIU) which was established in June 2006 and provided both an investigative function (particularly for forensic IDs) and also a training function whereby all trainee investigators completed an attachment to the SIU to learn key skills. This SIU function has now been devolved back to each of the BCUs and CPOT now concentrate on acquisitive criminals offending in more than one BCU or force area. One of the first investigations taken on by the new unit involved a collaborative working arrangement with Bedfordshire and Thames Valley Police resulting in a group of 5 offenders resident in Bedfordshire being charged with a conspiracy to commit in excess of 90 dwelling burglaries across the three force areas.

**Records Management** – Following the appointment of a Records Manager in March 2007 significant progress has been made in Records Management which has been monitored externally through the MoPI peer reviews in September '07 and May '08. This work will ensure that we have formal records management processes of Retention, Review and Disposal which can be monitored by a structured audit programme. There will also be significant improvements in data quality ensuring that all relevant records can be linked and information is readily available across all types of records, physical and electronic. Further to this in April 2008 a successful Business Case was presented to the Police Authority which identified suitable premises to house a permanent centralised Records Registry which will ultimately revolutionise the way the Constabulary uses and shares information.

## Major Crime

GRADE	Meets the standard
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### Contextual factors

This element of the inspection report details Hertfordshire Constabulary's capacity and capability to identify and assess the risks from major crime, as well as its response in preventing and investigating these crime types, prioritising those which pose the greatest threat to individuals or communities.

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	2006	2007	Change	MSF** group mean
Life-threatening and gun crime per 1,000 population	0.426	0.293	-31.22%	0.345
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.057	0.019	-66.67%	0.002
% of abduction crimes detected/convicted	0.00%	0.00%	0pp*	Not applicable
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.057	0.095	+66.67%	0.083
% of attempted murder crimes detected/convicted	100.00%	70.00%	-30pp*	96.21%
Number of blackmail offences per 10,000 population	0.964	0.210	-78.22%	0.158
% of blackmail offences detected/convicted	4.95%	40.91%	+35.96pp*	33.18%
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.248	0.172	-30.65%	0.274
% of kidnapping crimes detected/convicted	53.85%	33.33%	-20.52pp*	43.63%
Number of manslaughter crimes per 10,000 population	0.000	0.000	0.00%	0.013
% of manslaughter crimes detected/convicted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.086	0.086	0.00%	0.097
% of murders detected/convicted	77.78%	133.33%	+55.55pp*	102.48%
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	1.727	1.765	+2.20%	1.979
% of rapes detected/convicted	35.36%	16.76%	-18.6pp*	22.20%

\*'pp' is percentage points.

\*\*Most similar forces for Hertfordshire are: Avon and Somerset; Cheshire; Essex; Kent; Northamptonshire; Thames Valley; and Warwickshire.

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From the statutory performance indicator (SPI) data contained in the table above it can be seen that Hertfordshire Constabulary is under a potential threat from abduction offences. In 2007 Hertfordshire was one of only three forces to suffer an abduction offence. The force is also under a potential threat from blackmail offences; the rate of offences (per 10,000 population) is higher than the MSF and among the higher rates in England and Wales, although it should be noted that there was a significant reduction in 2007.

The SPI data also indicates that major crime investigation in Hertfordshire Constabulary is comparable with the rest of the peer group. Hertfordshire is performing above the MSF average in some areas (blackmail and murder) but below the MSF average in other areas (attempted murder, kidnapping and rape). There has also been a variety of trends, with some areas improving and some deteriorating in 2007.

The National Protective Services Analysis Tool (NPSAT), published in September 2007, indicated that Hertfordshire was facing either a low or medium demand with regard to homicide, rape and kidnapping offences. As such, no NPSAT charts have been included in this report.

While organised crime group (OCG) mapping is in its infancy as a technique nationally, Hertfordshire Constabulary has sought to make progress by ensuring that major crime types are analysed and mapped. It is currently estimated that 56 OCGs impact the force area, across a broad range of crime types, notably involving class A drugs supply, firearms offences, and burglary.

The force strategic assessment (FSA) demonstrates a clear understanding of the historical, current, predicted and emerging trends in major crime and the interventions required to tackle these.

The force has identified Individuals and Networks linked to Serious Violent Crime and Firearms Possession as its major crime priorities within the force control strategy. The force strategic intelligence requirement has a clear focus on the continuous search for information on Serious Violent Attacks, Kidnap and Murder.

Within the documentation overall, the issues have broadly been identified and addressed.

The force has invested substantial resources to allow for intervention activity to maximise harm reduction, to minimise risks to the public and to inhibit major crime.

This inspection assessment reveals that the force demonstrates a developing process in its approach to managing major crime. In making this judgement, significant collaborative agreements with Bedfordshire Police in the form of the joint staffed and co-located Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Major Crime Unit (BHMCU) is recognised.



## Intelligence

**Summary – The force has sufficient dedicated analytical resources to meet the identified demands from major crime, supplying dynamic intelligence products that drive the energies of the force. The force has conditionally committed to major crime investigation with the requisite staff, accommodation, equipment and funding.**

### Strengths

- The Bedfordshire/Hertfordshire major crime unit (BHMCU) has an establishment of four analysts dedicated to major crime work. Each analyst sits within a small intelligence unit aligned to each of the four investigative teams.
- Prior to the formation of the combined unit, Hertfordshire Constabulary had one analyst in its major investigation team and the same applied to Bedfordshire. An immediate benefit of the combined unit has been the introduction of resilience to this critical function. (See 'Work in progress'.)
- Hertfordshire force intelligence bureau (FIB) analysts produce and provide analysis for the FSA, for multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) and for the violent crime strategy, with BHMCU analysts providing direct support for major crime.
- Open source intelligence scanning assists to shape and develop analytical products.
- A 24-hour intelligence cell capability is embedded within the county control room (CCR).

### Work in progress

- The process to recruit two additional analysts for the BHMCU is well under way. The first position is expected to be filled in March 2008 and the second by May. However, the combined effectiveness of analysts within the unit will be dependent on the experience of the new persons recruited. Although the unit is currently under strength, the analytical demand within the BHMCU is below predicted levels.

### Areas for improvement

- There is a need to ensure that analysts are introduced into all major enquiries at an early enough stage.
- Not all investigators within the BHMCU are entirely clear about what products analysts can provide.

**Summary – The force seeks (and shares) intelligence about Level 2 and Level 3 major crime types through partnerships. This work is assessed to be effective. The force assessments of community impact to evaluate risk following major crime are extensive.**

### Strengths

- The BHMCU uses the specialist assets of both Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, with access to these services being directed to the lead of the relevant department for the crime concerned. The structure of the intelligence team is a standard set-up within major incident teams. (See also 'Areas for improvement'.)

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- Intelligence was shared through MAPPA with health and probation partners in prevention activity in respect of an extremely high-risk sex offender. This was escalated to the Home Secretary and resulted in the individual being placed in secure accommodation (Operation Microtone).
- Information-sharing protocols are in place with key partners, including the Probation Service, the Prison Service, drug action teams (DATs), local safeguarding children's boards, the UK Border Agency, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
- Hertfordshire makes full use of CIAs. Senior investigating officers (SIOs) and basic command unit (BCU) commanders work together in the development of the CIA. The BCU commander is responsible for delivering appropriate interventions to maintain or restore community confidence. The critical incident log that has been developed for early management of these events provides signposts to the completion of CIAs, as do SIO decision logs. CIA training is provided to all probationary constables (COMPASS students), new neighbourhood policing staff and within ongoing critical incident training. Examples were provided of comprehensive CIAs, with good evidence of consultation and assessments to assist in the evaluation of risk following the commission of major crime.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary staff recently visited Kent to give a presentation to around 100 staff on the use of CIAs.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary experiences an average of around ten homicides a year. There is no one clear causation.

### **Work in progress**

- None Identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Each force has its own memorandums of understanding (MOUs) in place with partners, such as health services. This needs to be reviewed, to ensure harmonisation of processes leading to effective intelligence sharing.
- The BHMCU requires common processes and templates for CIAs.
- The Hertfordshire FIB is led by a senior analyst and staffed with five analysts when at full complement. The development of strategic problem profiles linked to major crime must compete within the FIB against the daily business of developing wider control strategy products, and indeed strategic products linked to serious and organised crime. Limited evidence was found of these major crime-linked products having been produced and maintained, with the exception of immigration crime, firearms use and availability, and serious sexual offences.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary has not developed an understanding of the drivers of homicide within the county through the production of a specific homicide problem profile. In 2006 some limited statistical analysis was carried out, together with the provision of some geographic profiles. The force should commission and maintain a homicide problem profile.

**Summary - The FSA has analysed the trends in relation to its major crime to some extent. Consequently, the Force Control Strategy is found to be adequate. Problem profiles for rape, firearms (threat assessment) and Class A drugs supply are satisfactory with links to force, departmental and BCU level plans. There is sufficient evidence that the force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues.**

### **Strengths**

- Homicide and murder featured in the Hertfordshire FSA for the first time in September 2007 under the heading of 'violent crime'. Other aspects with a clear major crime focus within the document included protecting vulnerable people, sexual violence, domestic violence, firearms, and the night-time economy.
- The force understands the threat posed by other life-threatening issues, such as paedophile offenders, dangerous offenders and kidnap. The serious and organised crime unit (SOCU) covert investigation unit (CIU) is committed to providing at least one day's surveillance activity against Violent and Sex Offenders Register (ViSOR) subjects each month, tasked through the force tactical tasking and co-ordination group (FTTCG).
- National Intelligence Model (NIM) profiles reliably assess organised criminality.
- Information is sought from MAPPA with partner agencies, e.g. the Probation Service, and examples exist of intelligence activity and enforcement around gun crime. The force maintains a current firearms threat assessment (problem profile), and through its neighbourhood policing arrangements and use of commercial software has developed a good understanding of neighbourhood demographic profiles.

### **Work in progress**

- None Identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- There is no evident link between themes identified within the homicide reduction strategy and the force strategic intelligence requirement. The force did not produce an intelligence, prevention and enforcement priority plan in support of the October 2007 – March 2008 control strategy.
- BCU-based strategic assessments give no meaningful treatment to major crime. The August 2007 assessment for central area recognises serious and organised crime, and organised criminals and networks, though the treatment is superficial. Alcohol-related crime receives a more in-depth analysis. However, no explicit or implied link is made between this and major crime.
- The force has produced a single strategic intelligence requirement (SIR), by drawing together three separate documents: intelligence requirements from Special Branch, SOCU and the FIB. It is acknowledged that the SIR was developed in isolation from the intelligence priorities within the control strategy. At a force level there is no activity to drive and track the collection of intelligence within the SIR. As a result, linkages to the routine development of appropriate intelligence at level 1 are weak. The force should link the development of its SIR to strategic NIM processes underpinned by a robust and monitored collection plan.

## Recommendation 1

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force reviews the linkages between BCU and force strategic intelligence products and control strategies to ensure that appropriate and explicit linkages are made in their development. In particular, intelligence requirements at BCU and force level should be clearly expressed and appropriately linked, with plan owners identified at each level and held to account for their delivery.**

**Summary – Trend analysis and problem profiles are shared with a limited number of partners and BCUs. There are no formal trigger plans for 'hot briefing' when there is a significant change in the major crime threat, however when the nature of the analysis points to a need for a fast time response appropriate actions have taken place. Information-sharing protocols with key partners, such as Trading Standards and SOCA are well developed. The force can demonstrate that it is on track to reach full MOPI compliance by 2010.**

### Strengths

- A series of examples were provided to demonstrate how intelligence had been shared in a timely way to prevent or disrupt major crimes. These included Operation Malm (a high-risk sex offender) and Operation Saltus (a series of retail robberies).
- Between 9 January and 31 December 2007 the force reported details of 31 offences to the serious crime analysis system. Notably, the force submissions were assessed as being 97% compliant with serious crime analysis system codes of practice. In the same period, the force made 162 serious crime analysis system enquiries.
- The kidnap and extortion database has been used for blackmail offences during Operation Bart, Operation Leven and Operation Fervent.
- Routine use is made of the GENESIS database.
- The force is aware of the existence of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) community and cultural resource unit and the service it can provide. No evidence was found of the force having sought expertise from the skills and diversity web, although the force had sought advice from influential members of emerging communities with strong contacts, e.g. Polish priests.
- Specialist advisers are regularly consulted in support of investigations, for example: use of a behavioural investigative adviser in Operation Vehement (rape); a forensic telephone examination in Operation Matte (homicide); and advice from the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre in Operation Muse (internet paedophilia).

### Work in progress

- Hertfordshire Constabulary is on track to reach full MoPI compliance by 2010. A peer review in October 2007 demonstrated continued good progress. The deputy chief constable is the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead. The organisational intelligence development department (OIDD) owns, manages and tracks progress on a day-to-day basis through a dedicated project manager post.

- The force has commenced a mapping project to identify the diversity and life skills of its workforce. This will augment the skills that may be accessed through the MPS Community and Cultural Resource Unit (CCRU).

#### **Area for Improvement**

- None Identified.

**Summary – In respect of major crime, the force profiling of vulnerable locations and communities is developing, with evidence that the impact of major crime activity is partially understood. As a result, future risks and threats across the force area are identified in a timely way.**

#### **Strengths**

- The force has well-established processes for the completion of CIAs. Community tension levels are tracked at BCU level as part of a continuing process.
- The force has a broad understanding of its vulnerable communities through: its neighbourhood profiles; its strategic profile of emerging eastern European communities; profiling of trafficked women (through Operation Pentameter); and identification of communities susceptible to radicalisation.
- The force maintains a current firearms threat assessment (problem profile), and through its neighbourhood policing arrangements and use of commercial software has developed a good understanding of neighbourhood demographic profiles. Vulnerability and deprivation indexes were used as part of the modelling for police constable and police community support officer deployment.
- Demographic profiles are maintained at BCU level, with the FSA presenting a strategic-level picture of the force.
- MAPP arrangements are considered to be adequate, with evidence provided of proactive work having been carried out in close co-operation with the Probation Service. One day per month is routinely set aside from the force surveillance team and dedicated to this area of business.

#### **Work in progress**

- Analysis of OCG networks is beginning to yield information related to vulnerable locations, such as specific pubs, clubs and other premises as well as specific neighbourhoods. In its most recent FSA, the link is made between OCG activity, particularly Class A drug supply, and homicide. The identification of vulnerable locations and neighbourhoods is leading to neighbourhood policing level briefings and direct operational activity.
- The force has responded to vulnerabilities identified within its arrangements for protecting vulnerable people through a range of measures, including: the creation of harm reduction units on each area; the appointment of dedicated supervision; and improved training. Outstanding visits and delayed visits still persist; however, the position is improved and continues to be addressed.

#### **Area for Improvement**

- None Identified.

**Summary – The Force maintains a Strategic Risk Register which is reviewed quarterly by the Director of Resources, who oversees the Force Risk Management Board. Each risk within the register has a Chief Officer Lead and a risk owner. Progress in managing risk is systematically monitored.**

### **Strengths**

- Hertfordshire Constabulary has a robust risk management regime. The director of resources is the owner of the strategic risk register, which is managed within the OIDD.
- The force requirement is that the register will be updated at least quarterly, with entries and progress being subject to scrutiny through three separate processes: quarterly through the risk management board meeting; biannually through the chief officers' meeting, which aligns to the strategic planning process; and biannually through the Hertfordshire Police Authority (HPA) audit committee.
- A number of defined risks within the register impact upon major crime. These are: retention of officers; maintenance of a sufficiency of experienced detectives; infiltration and corruption; vetting; and MoPI compliance.
- Business risks cross-link between the risk register and the intelligence-led planning process. In this way wider risks are considered and assessed across a spectrum that can include resource loss to other forces, costs to manage mobile phone data, computer examination, etc.
- At the time of the HMIC field visit, the crime management departmental plan had 23 areas of business improvement/risk that were actively being managed.
- As part of the overall BHMCU project, external consultants were employed to identify risks to the initiative on behalf of both forces. Overall progress, including the management of risks, was formally reported on a monthly basis to the project board. This particular board has now ceased to function, having been replaced by the major crime board now that the unit is operational. The major crime board will continue to manage residual risks.

### **Work in progress**

- None Identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- A physical examination of the risk register by HMIC staff led to the identification of an erroneous entry, which suggested that the position in respect of one particular risk was better than it was. While this may have been an isolated case, the force must review its process to ensure that the probity of updates is routinely assured.
- The force needs to develop clarity around the relationship between risks that can be managed within the governance arrangements of the BHMCU and those that should be tracked in one or both force risk registers.

**Summary – The Force is actively creating ways of collaborating with some forces within and outside its region to provide the same level of access and interrogation of intelligence systems across the region. Most operational databases are searchable through the RIU. The force currently works most closely with Bedfordshire, sharing both intelligence and data.**

### **Strengths**

- Interoperability of Hertfordshire Constabulary databases is currently limited. A multi-intelligence search system (MISS), developed in-house, provides for some integration, enabling the identification of records held within the command and control system (OASys), crime database and community safety suite. Access to MISS has been offered to key partners, including the Fire and Rescue Service and the Office of Fair Trading, which have reciprocated by providing the force with access to their systems.
- The CCR's 24-hour intelligence cell provides access to MISS, ViSOR, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and other systems.
- It is evident that intelligence collection takes place across the entirety of the organisation, with intelligence submissions coming from staff at all levels, including specialists.
- The Chief Constable is the ACPO lead for ANPR and has been well supported by the HPA in developing a robust infrastructure of mobile and static cameras, with plans in place for further expansion in 2008/09. Local and national ANPR products are routinely utilised during the course of operational and intelligence development activity, including the proactive use of mobile deployments.
- Partner agencies support the collection of intelligence, including MAPPA, crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs), DATs, SOCA, HMRC, HM Prison Service and the UK Border Agency. For example, in November 2007 the Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust provided an analysis of homicides committed by patients under its care.
- The force manages data protection compliance through the role of data protection officer within the force's information compliance unit.
- At the time of the HMIC field visit, HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) version 11C was in operation.
- At the commencement of each enquiry there is a process requirement for the establishment of an intelligence record created for each nominal within the relevant force intelligence system. This is managed by the enquiries intelligence cell. (See also 'Areas for improvement'.)
- A technical solution (CITRIX) has been established to enable staff from BHMCU to access a number of critical databases in either force. Staff can also access HOLMES from any point within the two forces.
- The MoPI project has responsibility for the implementation of the recommendations of the Bichard Report. Under the direction of the deputy chief constable, a project manager works within the OIDD. The OIDD is responsible for driving MoPI compliance by 2010 and actively tracks progress. It is anticipated that MISS, which is currently being tested, will allow ready access to all six 'Bichard' databases.

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### Work in progress

- The force is in the process of purchasing the iBase system, which would allow the further integration of intelligence databases, custody records and ANPR. The system is currently on trial in a number of force units, including the FIB. Funding is in place, with the expectation that the system will be delivered by May 2008.
- The force has a substantial border with the MPS and can demonstrate OCG links. Access to MPS intelligence systems is seen as essential and is actively being pursued by the assistant chief constable (special operations) (the ACC (SO)). It is anticipated that delivery of the MPS's CRIMINT Plus system will be made by the end of March 2008. This will provide access to City of London Police and British Transport Police intelligence records as well as those of the MPS itself.

### Areas for improvement

- Although there is a technical process in Bedfordshire to transfer intelligence from HOLMES onto the force intelligence system, there was a lack of confidence by staff that all relevant intelligence is captured. The default position of SIOs, as a result of custom and practice, is to deny access to intelligence on HOLMES to protect operational security.
- No similar technical process exists for the transfer of intelligence from HOLMES into Hertfordshire based systems. Hertfordshire's approach to bridging this gap in its discrete IT infrastructure is through a requirement that records should be flagged to indicate the existence of further information elsewhere. However, this is inevitably subject to the vagaries of human practice.
- Intelligence from other force databases (other than between Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire) cannot be electronically accessed. Any interrogation has to be addressed through a single point of contact within each force.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary should work with other regional forces to improve sharing of intelligence databases beyond the regional intelligence unit and into FIBs.
- While it is evident that partners are contributing to the collection of intelligence, the force would benefit from the development of shared intelligence requirements underpinned by managed collection plans. This is particularly applicable to CDRPs, which have access to a raft of non-law enforcement data and are already engaging in the development of joint strategic assessments with police at BCU level.

**Summary – The Force has a case review policy that is generally applied, ensuring that current major crime cases are reviewed in accordance with ACPO guidance; the policy is efficient. (This refers to organisational learning)**

### Strengths

- A comprehensive review policy was published in November 2007 for rape and homicide investigations carried out by the BHMCU. Essentially, the policy describes an incremental process of reviews to be completed at 48 hours, seven days and 21 days, ahead of a 28-day ACPO-commissioned review. The 48-hour review should be carried out by the BHMCU Detective Superintendent or in that person's absence by the team 5 'review team' detective chief inspector. HOLMES account reviews are required at seven days and thereafter every three months. The team 5 detective



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chief inspector is made responsible for ensuring that the policy in respect of frequency and timeliness of reviews is complied with. Investigative reviews follow a template format. In recent history, no homicide has reached the 28-day stage.

- Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire fully utilise expertise from the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and have for some years held joint SIO development days. The most recent was held in 2007, and a number of speakers with specialist knowledge covered areas such as decision logs and technical support details. The next training day will be held in June 2008, with speakers delivering updates on honour-based violence.
- National best practice guides are circulated to SIOs, and the force has historically sent representatives to the national SIO conference.

### **Work in progress**

- An intranet site has been established within which to record organisational learning, and it was intended to augment this with a newsletter in the near future. Both the intranet site and the draft newsletter were examined. It was noted that the intranet site was structured by operation rather than by theme areas, which would lead to future difficulty in retrieving good practice in the longer term.

### **Areas for improvement**

- The seven-day HOLMES review for Operation Monitor (a murder that had been detected within seven days) commenced on 5 January 2008 but did not report on findings until some seven weeks later. Reasons of competing demands on the HOLMES reviewer and time taken to understand Bedfordshire HOLMES room processes were cited as justification for this unacceptable delay. The review itself was thorough in that many issues were identified that need resolving, the majority of which surround the difference in processes used by each force within the major crime field.
- A process should be implemented to ensure that learning arising from live case and cold case reviews is managed and disseminated as appropriate within the organisation and to relevant partners, and used to identify and address systemic learning needs.

**Summary – The Force Tasking and Co-ordination process operates satisfactorily to deliver suitable responses to manage major crime threats. Documentation examined reveals a sound understanding of historical, current and predicted demand.**

### **Strengths**

- Detailed analytical work was carried out by both forces during the scoping phase of the BHMCU. Consequently the level of threat is particularly well understood.
- The force operates structured tasking and co-ordination processes at both level 1 and level 2. Force strategic tasking follows the publication of the FSA and its six-monthly review. The FTTCG is a monthly process chaired by the assistant chief constable (territorial operations) (ACC (TO)).
- The FTTCG is held in two parts: a closed first session, where confidential matters are addressed with the chair, BCU commanders and other relevant persons; followed by an open session involving a wider force attendance.

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- Operations linked to preventative activity, for example cross-force campaigns against domestic violence, and overarching violent crime (alcohol-fuelled violence and single-punch homicides), have been commissioned through this process.
- The minutes of the FTTCG track activity and results from meeting to meeting.

### **Work in Progress**

- None Identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Minutes of force-level strategic and tactical tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) meetings are substantially limited in detail by being predominantly formatted as action lists. In particular, the closed session is reduced to a bullet point summary. Minutes of the SOCU TCG are likewise recorded as action lists. These prove difficult to follow without having been present at the meeting in question. Rationales supporting decisions not to resource activity against any particular threat are not recorded within the minutes of those meetings, nor, in the case of SOCU activity, within the electronic decision log. The force should adopt a standardised process for ensuring that the rationale for taking, modifying or rejecting operational activity is systematically recorded.
- The force needs to ensure that BCU-level NIM processes are strengthened, as it was evident that strategic TCGs are not currently being held.
- The core NIM document detailing the intelligence prevention and enforcement priorities for the force is not being used to drive these areas of business.

### **Recommendation 2**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force reviews its application of NIM processes to ensure that agreed products are consistently produced to an agreed standard and that ownership, accountability and the rationale for decisions regarding force level issues conform to an agreed standard.**

**Summary – Due to inadequate training, the force's awareness of diverse community needs during major crime investigations is limited.**

### **Strengths**

- All Hertfordshire Constabulary staff have performance development review objectives for 2007/08 which require the completion of three National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies diversity modules. Staff within the BHMCU have each been provided with the *Faces of Britain* diversity handbook. (See also 'Areas for improvement'.)

### **Work in progress**

- A two-hour training session is planned to be delivered to BHMCU officers and staff in May 2008, to raise their awareness in dealing with witnesses who are hard of hearing.

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### Areas for improvement

- The crime management department's (CMDs) diversity action plan was provided to the HMIC inspection team at the time of the field visit in February 2008. This detailed 24 internal issues and six external issues that required attention. Progress reports were not dated to assist in tracking activity. Progress, particularly in addressing the external issues, appeared limited and superficial, eg 'Reducing the impact of CMD upon faith groups and other minority communities by **ensuring** staff have the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding particular to their role'. In response to this particular issue, the *Faces of Britain* booklet had been circulated.
- BHMCU staff were unable to identify particular examples of how their own diversity learning had been applied during the course of major crime investigations.
- Staff other than SIOs within the BHMCU have not received any diversity training specifically tailored to major crime investigations.

### Recommendation 3

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends the force introduce bespoke diversity training for officers and staff working within the BHMCU.**

### Prevention

**Summary – The Force has an Independent Advisory Group but this is rarely used to maximise the contribution of partners in the management of major crime investigations.**

#### Strengths

- The Hertfordshire county IAG was established in 2001 and continues to develop to date. Under existing arrangements, the county IAG meets six times a year.
- Some limited training has been provided to Hertfordshire IAG members in respect of critical incidents, debriefing, counselling, etc.

#### Work in progress

- The role of the IAG and its membership was thoroughly reviewed in December 2007, in a joint process involving both the IAG membership and the force, through the force diversity board. This has led to a number of recommendations, which will be finalised on 3 March 2008 through that board for implementation in the new policing year. Recommendations are far-reaching, including on: a BCU-based structure with a central executive; training; finance; communication; role; tenure; vetting; and recruitment.
- Draft IAG terms of reference prepared in December 2007 are clearly reflected in a number of the recommendations. All new IAG members now receive an induction pack comprising a series of useful documents, though this also appears to be in the course of development.
- None of the IAG members have received any recent presentations on challenges faced by the force or on processes around the investigation of major crime or serious and organised crime. Plans are in place to brief the respective IAGs on the work of the BHMCU. This will raise the level of awareness and understanding of members.

### **Area for improvement**

- Both forces can demonstrate the involvement of IAGs and other community contacts in developing CIAs. However, there is little evidence of SIOs actively consulting IAGs in the management of investigations. There is no formal process (save CIAs) for recording tabled questions to IAGs or their response.

**Summary – Effective contingency plans are in place to minimise the impact of any escalation of a major crime incident. The inspection teams found that ‘golden hour’ principles were fully understood and sufficiently understood by call management staff and first responders.**

### **Strengths**

- Written procedures provide clear guidance on when specialist resources are to be contacted for advice and deployment in the event of major crime.
- Guidance on this subject is provided within the BHMCU. As a general principle, if the offence occurs in Hertfordshire, specialist assets are in the first instance called upon through Hertfordshire’s standing arrangements; the converse is true for Bedfordshire-based offences. Terms of reference have been agreed as part of the BHMCU for the deployment of teams.
- Criteria for contacting SIOs and setting up major incident rooms (MIRs) have been established, as have arrangements for the call-out of all specialist support, including scientific support, kidnap SIOs, ‘red’ trained negotiators, tactical advisers, etc. Call-out arrangements within Hertfordshire for staff that may be required to assist with a major crime are considered to be robust.
- The force control room provides 24-hour silver cover for firearms incidents, and each BCU has a duty inspector 24 hours a day. Night-duty detective cover is provided at least at constable level on each BCU.
- Call-handling staff have immediate access to informative drop-down menus which guide action in response to a range of major and critical incidents. The force is currently engaged in a programme of holistic training and development of the critical incident response under the leadership of the ACC (TO).

### **Work in progress**

- None Identified.

### **Area for Improvement**

- None Identified.

**Summary – The threats from precursors to major crime offending were found to be analysed adequately.**

### **Strengths**

- There is a good understanding of: dangerous and sex offenders resident in communities; the night-time economy; firearms; and risks posed by drugs markets.

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Specific problem profiles exist, addressing rape in adults over 16, Class A drugs and firearms (threat analysis).

- A homicide reduction strategy was developed and launched in February 2006. The strategy focuses on four key homicide drivers: domestic violence; alcohol-fuelled violence; knife crime (on the street); and criminal-on-criminal violence. The launch of the strategy was accompanied by a series of themed workshops, the most recent being a domestic violence workshop in April 2007.
- The force does not have specific reduction strategies for victims, vulnerable people and locations, with the exception of the homicide reduction strategy. This includes vulnerable victims of domestic violence and locations affected by night-time economy issues. Despite the lack of formal documentation, the force has been proactive in developing initiatives. These include: the alternative of attendance on a responsible drinking course to the issue of a penalty notice for disorder; the 'no means no' campaign against acquaintance rape; and campaigns targeting domestic violence at known peak periods, such as Christmas and throughout high-profile football competitions.
- The force has invested significant energy in raising the profile of domestic violence, training staff on each area as domestic violence emergency response officers. The SPECSS Plus risk assessment model has been meaningfully in place since early 2007, when it replaced an earlier incarnation of the SPECSS model.
- The force has a good understanding of current and predicted major crime demand. This was well considered ahead of and throughout the establishment of the BHMCU.

### **Work in progress**

- None Identified.

### **Areas for improvement**

- While the rape problem profile was detailed, it contained no evident consideration of near-miss offences or precursor offending. No other evidence was found to suggest that near-miss offences against vulnerable persons, including those from black and other minority backgrounds, children and women, were routinely tracked.
- A rape reduction or prevention strategy has not been developed, despite the existence of the problem profile since April 2007.
- Although a number of initiatives linked to the homicide reduction strategy have now clearly been implemented, no evidence was provided to demonstrate that further work was actively being driven, or that the impact of the strategy itself had been assessed. The force should review its current homicide strategy in the light of refreshed analysis and the impact of previous actions. Meaningful action plans should be developed, to drive and track implementation of the strategy.

**Summary – The policy covering threat to life is fully accessible to staff and reasonably understood and implemented. Examples of joint, regional, cross-border and multi agency operations are abundant.**

### **Strengths**

- Hertfordshire Constabulary has a well-developed threat-to-life policy, which has recently been updated. This is supplemented by well-considered bespoke decision

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logs, which lead the user through the identification of risk factors and the management of that risk. Irrespective of whether action is taken or not in relation to a threat-to-life issue, a record is created within the intelligence management system (IMS), which carries all relevant information. Written decision logs bear a unique reference number (URN), which is likewise recorded within the IMS system, thereby allowing tracking of written documents.

- Where a threat-to-life issue arises, firearms commanders and other tactical advisers develop response plans to those threats. 'Sig' markers are used within the OASys system to alert CCR staff swiftly to the existence and nature of the threat, together with the location of the plan to be implemented.
- All CCR inspectors have recently received training in threat-to-life issues as part of the training roll-out.
- In practice, proactive activity in response to kidnap and extortion is managed by the SOCU, while the investigation per se is led by a BHMCU SIO working in tandem.
- Numerous examples of joint action against gun crime were offered. Operation Meticulous engaged SOCA, Hertfordshire Constabulary and the MPS in the neutralisation of an MPS-based armed OCG threat to a Hertfordshire-based individual.

### **Work in progress**

- At the time of the initial HMIC field visit, a training programme for force delivery was being written by the witness protection lead, with roll-out anticipated before the end of 2007. Since November, student officers have received an input on Osman issues as part of a 16-week rolling programme.

### **Area for improvement**

- While the force has taken steps to ensure that information relating to Osman warnings can be retrieved when required, identification of historical cases could only be achieved through manual searching.

**Summary – The force has a witness protection capability that is supported by on demand covert resources. The force operates a policy that is promulgated to, and understood by dedicated staff, although training to raise BCU level awareness is taking place. The force is collaborating with other forces and partners in this area.**

### **Strengths**

- Hertfordshire Constabulary has a very small, dedicated witness protection team, theoretically comprising two permanent members of staff, although one post has remained vacant for a substantial period. In practice, the witness protection response is configured through the use of staff who fulfil other core roles, providing a team totalling nine tier 1 trained officers.
- Individuals who are the subject of witness protection and their addresses are 'sig' flagged within the OASys command and control system, enabling the rapid identification of 'trigger' plans and operational orders that are owned and reviewed by the CIU.

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- The force has recently completed training for SIOs in order to raise awareness of witness protection issues.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary assesses that generally less than 10% of overall witness protection workload can be attributed to other forces.

### **Work in progress**

- Awareness training has recently been added to the syllabus for student officers. The first awareness training has been given to 18 student officers. This will be repeated every 16 weeks with different groups of student officers.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Awareness of witness protection issues was found to be vested largely within specialist teams and criminal investigation department managers at BCU level. Although some training is now being provided to junior officers, the profile of this area of specialism needs to be raised at BCU level through further work.
- Witness protection issues arising from Operations have recently tested the force response and demonstrated the need to further build capacity. Scoping of collaborative opportunities with Essex and Bedfordshire is taking place. However, no timescales have been agreed. Progress in identifying the way forward should be expedited.

**Summary – The force has a limited system to monitor the impact of preventative and enforcement activity. There is evidence that the broad range of community policing assets are partially used to help understand levels of harm in the community.**

### **Strengths**

- Results analysis is applied to the majority of operations targeting OCG activity. As stated above, the force has acknowledged the link between OCGs, homicide and other violent crime, particularly where Class A drugs supply is involved.
- The force does not have a developed mechanism for monitoring harm in communities. In respect of OCG activity, the force has extended the use of its threat analysis tool, so that assessments can be made both before and after operational activity.
- Tension indicators are monitored on a BCU-by-BCU basis and commented on within force-level tasking meetings.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary was graded Good for neighbourhood policing in 2007. Considerable engagement is taking place routinely at a local level, with many good examples of joint service delivery through joint action groups and other arrangements. The force, county and district councils jointly fund and support the multi-agency information and data access system (MIDAS). Housed at county hall, this hub is populated with data from partners, including the police, the Fire and Rescue Service, the county council and the Department for Children, Schools and Families. In addition to contributing data that may be mined through this vehicle on request, partners readily contribute through existing information-sharing arrangements to support the evaluation of targeted policing activity.

### **Work in progress**

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- The force is currently negotiating the second local area agreement with partners. Through the office of the Chief Constable, it is also seeking to focus activity through target setting towards vulnerable groups – including victims of domestic violence and their children; the minority and emerging communities; and the victims of serious sexual assault – and the management of dangerous offenders.

#### **Area for improvement**

- The force needs to increase the range of harm indicators and supporting processes that it has in place to assess the impact of prevention and enforcement activity.

**Summary – The inspection found evidence that the force always considers relevant professional standards issues in the operational planning for major crime work. There is a comprehensive security policy in place however gaps in its application were evident with regard to the vetting of staff commensurate with exposure.**

#### **Strengths**

- The force demonstrates a proactive approach to the management of operational security (OPSY). An OPSY officer, supported by a small team, scans all SOCU operations as a matter of routine and maps potential compromise issues. (See 'Areas for improvement'.)
- All high-risk posts, eg undercover, firearms and Test Purchase (TP), are flagged within the professional standards department (PSD) intelligence system. This ensures that where issues are raised through any medium – such as the internal confidential PSD telephone line, email facility or source information – fast-time responses are initiated.
- All intelligence systems are auditable, and they make use of specialist user groups, which provide a hierarchy of access levels. The OPSY officer has super-user access to the majority of the system and can undertake wholly covert audits.
- Internal systems are routinely monitored for misuse and, where intelligence dictates, proactive interventions are made. The OPSY officer has specific responsibility for monitoring activity within source units and the identification of potential handler compromise. Covert human intelligence source (CHIS)/handler integrity dip sampling is a regular activity.
- Where intelligence presents a cogent case for the censure of an individual but disciplinary or criminal sanction is not an option, the force operates a clear service confidence policy. This provides a framework for managing the risks presented by the individual concerned and bespoke to the circumstances. The force has developed policy for staff drugs and alcohol testing, and during 2007 commenced random testing of vulnerable posts.
- The PSD undertakes anti-corruption initiatives and has protocols in place with other forces in the region to provide covert support, the use of which was evidenced. Results of initiatives are publicised within the force to educate and deter staff members from engaging in inappropriate activity.
- Legend-building is in place for special branch and witness protection officers as well as covert operatives.



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- BHMCU accommodation was fit for purpose, displaying the use of appropriate levels of physical security and access protocols.

### **Work in progress**

- The force has an established vetting policy and is introducing a new 'management vetting' standard that is more in keeping with the needs of the police service as opposed to the security service.
- Records of the current vetting levels of staff are poor, particularly in respect of longer-standing staff members. This has a direct bearing on both the SOCU and the MCU. Management vetting will commence from 1 March 2008, with the PSD demonstrating leadership by being the first group to undergo the process. The SOCU and the MCU will follow. This exercise is anticipated to be complete on 1 May 2008, and the whole force is intended to be compliant by January 2009. (See 'Areas for improvement'.)

### **Areas for improvement**

- The overall security management of major crime investigations within the combined unit is totally dependent on the robustness of vetting and operational security applied by each force. Weaknesses in vetting have been identified in the Hertfordshire Constabulary process and consequently this raises issues over the potential integrity of the combined unit.
- All major crime operations should be routinely scanned by the OPSY officer for potential compromise issues.
- Both forces have limited capacity to undertake proactive anti-corruption initiatives.
- The majority of documents supplied to HMIC were compliant with the Government Protective Marking Scheme. However, appropriate markings were absent or incomplete in a small number of cases.

### **Recommendation 4**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force take urgent steps to ensure that gaps in vetting are addressed in a timely fashion and that robust processes are implemented to ensure organisational security in this regard is assured in the longer term.**

### **Enforcement**

**Summary – Governance arrangements for major crime investigations are effective, however inadequate use is made of IAGs and community membership of gold command support groups.**

#### **Strengths**

- The ACC (SO) is the force lead for the BHMCU, while the ACC (TO) takes responsibility for whole-force performance.
- For the BHMCU, two performance meetings have been established. The first is an operational review meeting held bi-monthly, attended by the respective ACPO leads and the head of unit. The second is a management group meeting, held bi-monthly

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and chaired by the head of unit and attended by the chief superintendents responsible for major crime from each force. The ACPO-led meeting receives a document outlining every operation being managed by the unit and by exception, the chief officers from both forces probe progress against current investigations.

- The HPA has dedicated link members for serious and organised crime and major crime. These members are visible to staff, taking an active interest in these areas of business. HPA members are briefed periodically, both in respect of proposed developments where funding is potentially required and in respect of ongoing developments.
- Gold groups are set up when required, eg Operation Trochal and Operation Reweigh. Gold groups predominantly comprise police officers, staff and statutory partners, with IAGs being the forum for engaging communities on matters of major crime.

### **Work in progress**

- Work has just started to identify an overarching performance management framework for the unit that will be suitable for the needs of both forces. This will include a reporting mechanism to dovetail with the differing types of governance arrangements for both forces.

### **Area for improvement**

- All HPA members receive non-police personnel vetting plus an additional IMPACT Nominal Index check. The force should review the vetting status of HPA members and, as a minimum standard, raise the vetting status of the serious and organised crime link member and HPA chair, such that fuller briefings may be safely given in appropriate cases.

**Summary – The Head of the Crime Department is fully trained and competent in the management of linked and series crime. This officer is supported by staff that have undergone adequate training and testing in critical incident command, community impact assessments and policing in partnership.**

### **Strengths**

- Hertfordshire has one chief superintendent and Bedfordshire two detective chief superintendents trained in the management of linked and series crimes.
- As mentioned earlier in this report, both forces follow the principles of major incident room standardised administrative procedures (MIRSAP) guidance, which includes the appointment of an officer in overall charge in the event of a multi-force investigation.
- The force has adequate numbers of gold- and silver-trained senior officers who have received accredited training for critical incident command.
- The force is well versed in the compilation and completion of meaningful CIAs.

### **Work in progress**

- Although ACPO roles and the linking of crime is understood by chief officers, neither force has an ACPO officer who is trained in the management of linked and series crimes. The deputy chief constable in Bedfordshire is scheduled to attend a course

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on the management of linked and series crime in April 2008 and the detective superintendent head of BHMCU in September 2008.

- The head of BHMCU is also attending an accredited national course on the review of major investigations in May 2008.

#### **Area for improvement**

- A gap currently exists in the provision of adequately trained ACPO officers in the management of linked and series crime.

**Summary – The force’s performance regime for monitoring the investigation of major crime is currently under development. Although some data is routinely captured, understanding of the relationship between cost, inputs, outputs and results is less well understood.**

#### **Strengths**

- The establishment of the BHMCU was driven by – and demonstrates – a force-level understanding of the major crime threat facing Hertfordshire and the potential efficiencies and additional capacity that can be realised through collaborative working. Linkages relating to cost, inputs, outputs and goals were evident.
- Policy dictates that a series of reviews should be conducted at 48 hours, 7 days, 21 days and 28 days. These will include management reviews, HOLMES reviews and, in the case of a Category A+, an external review.
- Evidence was found of where the force had learnt lessons from major investigations, leading to changes in processes.
- A critical incident log was developed and published in October, following a review of major crime scene management.
- A review of Operation Miscal led to control room and crime management staff receiving training in kidnap- and extortion-related issues. This training was recently and positively operationally tested in a similar situation.
- Learning from judicial hearings, inquests, appeals, etc is also harvested by virtue of case debriefs by the SIO. Operation Alpha, a murder appeal case which reached the House of Lords, led to practice change in historical case management.

#### **Work in progress**

- Software has recently been purchased to capture debrief points from major incidents anonymously. This will be used for the first time on 3 March during the debrief of a recent operation.

#### **Areas for improvement**

- Although debriefs are encouraged at the conclusion of BHMCU enquiries, there is no guidance or structure on processes to be followed. As a result, debriefs are not routinely taking place and learning is not fully captured or shared across the two forces on major crime.
- There is a shared web page aimed at informing major crime staff of learning arising from debriefs and reviews. The site contains four entries, which are limited and

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categorised by operational name – the consequence being that learning cannot be searched by theme.

- The monitoring of costs for homicide and major investigations can only be described as basic. Since the inception of the BHMCU, records have been kept of overtime and forensic costs.

## **Recommendation 5**

**Her Majesty’s Inspector recommends that the force establish a mechanism whereby learning arising from debriefing and review processes is systematically disseminated within the organisation and where appropriate to external partners; ensuring that policy amendments, and identified training requirements etc. are actively progressed.**

## **Performance management and resilience**

**Summary – The inspection teams found a strong investigative capability in force to meet the predictable major crime investigation demands. Collaborative agreements are in place with the Serious Organised Crime Agency and are deployed as appropriate. These are considered adequate to counter normal and extraordinary levels of need. Force procedures to manage human resources provide extensive protection for the investigative capability.**

### **Strengths**

- Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire have introduced a ground-breaking piece of work in the creation of the jointly staffed and co-located MCU. The BHMCU has already been deployed on three investigations since its inception in November 2007.
- In the course of establishing the BHMCU, the forces mapped the predicted major crime demand that the unit would have to meet and resourced the unit accordingly.
- The force has policies and procedures to respond to unexplained deaths. This includes informing the duty SIO of any unexplained death. Documented protocols exist for working with the Health and Safety Executive and in response to investigations involving the National Health Service.
- Crime scene investigators and scientists/pathologists are appropriately tasked during homicide and major crime investigations.
- CCR staff receive adequate training on major crime-related topics, including critical incident training. The level of supervision within the CCR is good. As mentioned earlier, the force is engaged in wide-ranging critical incident training activity, which is being led by the ACC (TO).
- Contingency plans are easily accessible through the force intranet, and call-handling staff have access to drop-down menus covering a wide range of incidents – from domestic abuse through to major incidents. Call-out systems are effective, with the BHMCU providing improved resilience. One team will always be available to be called out.

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- Each BCU retains overnight detective cover in the form of at least one detective constable, who reports to the critical incident inspector.
- The force has a comprehensive professionalising the investigative process (PIP) plan, with trained and accredited staff within the BHMCU and throughout the force at all levels. Appropriate numbers of staff are being trained as tier 5 tactical interview advisers.
- The force HR department has in place detailed succession planning policy and processes, including the identification of post 'risk' levels in respect of both criticality of role and challenge in recruitment. The HR strategic assessment and TCG meetings provide the mechanism through which these issues are regularly reviewed and managed. At the time of the HMIC field visit, the BHMCU carried a small number of vacancies, notably in respect of analysts and intelligence support
- Hertfordshire Constabulary had an existing major crime task force before the development of the BHMCU, which has served to further bolster overall capacity and capability. The resources dedicated to major crime investigation are undoubtedly sufficient for predictable demand. The BHMCU has already been deployed on three investigations since its inception in November 2007.
- In common with other regions there is no standing regional team to be deployed against threats identified in regional intelligence assessments. However, by its very nature the BHMCU is a deployable resource between the two counties of Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire.
- The regional tasking process, together with its underpinning memorandum of understanding (MOU), clearly facilitates the management of high-profile crimes, such as serial rape or gun crime, within the region, and identifies and apports investigative assets. This arrangement is already well tested in managing OCG threats that operate over a number of forces.

### **Work in progress**

- There are no formal arrangements for regional collaboration in times of exceptional demand. The BHMCU has largely negated this risk.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Records are not kept by the force of the percentage of unexplained/sudden deaths undertaken as an enquiry or investigation.
- The force does not have a formal process in place to quality-assure the result of investigations into unexplained/sudden deaths.
- While the force has a detailed succession planning process in place, this needs to be further developed in agreement with Bedfordshire, to account for SIOs on the BHMCU.

**Summary – Specialist and covert investigations are resourced through a robust infrastructure that is proven to be effective. Significant elements of covert investigation are delivered through written and verbal collaborative agreements which are sound. The inspection found evidence of proactive and reactive use of these assets across a wide range of offences.**

### **Strengths**

- The BHMCU is led by a detective superintendent (currently a Hertfordshire officer) and comprises four investigation teams along with one review team. Each team is headed by a Detective Chief Inspector.
- Below this level, investigation teams are led by a detective inspector each supported by a MIR team, an intelligence team and an outside enquiry team. Numbering 30 in total, these individuals are a mix of police officers and staff.
- The review team provides the facility for operational reviews and cold case reviews and comprises 14 staff.
- The total number of staff for the BHMCU is 145 (95 in Hertfordshire and 50 in Bedfordshire).
- On receipt of information identifying an incident requiring a major incident team, both forces work to their own procedures (through the duty senior detective), which in turn leads to the call-out of the on-call BHMCU SIO.
- Owing to the agreed differing level of investment, the remit of the BHMCU varies for each force. The unit will investigate:
  - in Hertfordshire: murder/manslaughter/other serious enquiries (no more than two at a time), stranger rape/fail to stop fatal collisions/work-related death/product contamination/kidnap and extortion; and
  - in Bedfordshire: murder and manslaughter and other serious enquiries (no more than two at a time).
- Crimes fitting the above criteria will result in a MIR-based investigation.
- The BHMCU has access to the specialist resources of both forces and in respect of Hertfordshire specifically as detailed below.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary has in place robust systems for calling out and deploying specialist staff. These have been regularly operationally tested.
- The SOCU CIU fulfils two core roles: as serious and organised crime investigators; and as the force's surveillance team. Sufficient staff are available to configure as two separate teams when required, and this enables surveillance to be sustained for an extended period when required. When firearm deployments are required, a 'bolt on' configuration is utilised. Team skills include Covert Rural Observation Post (CROPS), mobile, foot and technical surveillance. Additionally, small teams of staff at BCU level have been trained in foot surveillance, in order to reduce the demand on the CIU for surveillance assets.
- A covert deployment team exists within the SOCU, to concentrate on and develop excellence in the specialist skills associated with technical surveillance. The force is in a position to make use of a number of cutting-edge techniques.

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- Dedicated source units operate at force and BCU level. The force OPSY officer has a specific role in continuous oversight of these units. Processes for the tasking of CHIS are NIM-compliant and managed through the secure performance improvement meeting system.
- The force provides substantial evidence of the use of undercover techniques, particularly test purchase operations, all of which are co-ordinated through a dedicated specialist operations unit. Other regional forces, particularly Essex and the MPS, have provided skilled resources where other covert assets have been required.
- The force is highly proactive in respect of its use of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and money laundering legislation. The force's commitment is self-evident, with substantial resources being deployed throughout the organisation.
- The ANPR infrastructure includes substantial and developing fixed-site coverage, augmented by a large number of routinely deployed mobile assets, together with the ability to deploy stand-alone equipment in response to intelligence requirements. ANPR is routinely used in the development of intelligence and in support of both proactive and reactive investigations.
- Hertfordshire Constabulary has sufficient forensic investigative capability, including for covert retrieval.
- SOCU investigators prepare their own case files and deal with the disclosure matters in accordance with doctrine.
- The force response to kidnap is configured across both the SOCU and the MCU, with the former providing the proactive response and the latter the SIO and ongoing investigative assets. Hertfordshire Constabulary provides the chair of the regional kidnap and extortion forum and represents the region on the National Practitioners' Forum. Regional scoping has taken place to identify the complete picture of available assets. Substantial training has taken place at all levels within the force, including: Operation Code, which was SOCA-led and involved over 70 staff in October 2007; and to call handlers in November 2007. The force response to crimes in action has been tested on a number of occasions recently, including where SOCA support was involved. Operation Miscal and Operation Modification were provided as evidence.
- In all, over 115 dedicated staff are committed to the SOCU, representing approximately 3% of the force total.
- Conflicts of priority have been evidenced, specifically in respect of the MCU's call upon disciplines such as surveillance. These tensions are managed through in-force tasking arrangements. In the case of Hertfordshire, targeted activity against OCGs by surveillance assets (due to their dual role as investigators) has of necessity largely been suspended if a substantial commitment to surveillance is required.

### **Work in progress**

- The force is proactive in the development of ANPR technologies. It is currently developing system links between key force systems and the Back Office Facility through iBase, enabling the automated pictorial mapping of OCG activity.
- The force is to increase to ten its number of 'red' trained negotiators during 2008, in order to better fit the on-call arrangements and ensure that within the duty team there will always be one officer who is 'red' trained.

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- The force has an ongoing programme of kidnap-linked training during 2008, including: to negotiators and firearms team leaders in the first week of February 2008; to inspectors, sergeants and call handlers as part of critical incident training in the second week of February 2008; to half of the combined MCU in March 2008; and to the kidnap-based mobile armed surveillance team in April 2008.
- Despite a recent recruitment campaign, including mentoring, the force has been unsuccessful in recruiting staff for undercover work. The force should continue its efforts in this area.

### **Areas for improvement**

- A conscious decision was made by chief officers to advance the project quickly, which has resulted in the BHMCU being a co-located facility for both forces but with limited integration of staff or harmonisation of policies and procedures.
- The structure of MIR teams varies, with Hertfordshire teams more closely following MIRSAP- defined roles but Bedfordshire continuing with hybrid roles such as that of MIR officer. MIR officers are multi-skilled: indexing, receiving, statement taking and exhibit handling.
- Teams are still predominantly from Bedfordshire or Hertfordshire and label themselves as such. In the event of exceptional demand, e.g. a Category A+ investigation, there would be a realistic expectation that teams would combine to provide extra resilience to the investigation. However, the risk is that staff will be brought together who are unfamiliar with each other's working practices and policies.
- Demands for surveillance at a force level in support of homicide investigations, the management of sex offenders and indeed other force-level operations come at a cost to the CIU. Due to the dual role of the unit's staff, these deployments impact heavily on the role of the CIU. The force should review the pure surveillance requirement for the force and ensure that this can be met without undue impact on SOCU operations.
- At the time of the HMIC field visit, the computer crime unit had a backlog for digital retrieval stretching back four months. A two-tier threshold screening and prioritisation process had been implemented in April 2007 to reduce the overall number of submissions and ensure that jobs with evident high risk and SOCU investigations received a premium service. The unit has only very limited local storage, which adds the unnecessary requirement to manage retrieval of digital media from BCU stores as required. Although examination lead times are now stable, the force should invest in the short term to reduce the backlog to an acceptable level. Further, the force should examine property-handling processes for digital media and the requirements of the computer crime unit for access to local storage facilities.
- A small number of SOCU staff are part-trained in covert method of entry techniques. However, this appears to have stalled. The force should either progress the development of these individuals or strengthen the arrangements for access-trained staff through an MOU.



**Summary – The Force has a full-time and dedicated case review team that is always deployed when current and historical major crime cases are reviewed, in accordance with ACPO guidance. Case review work is in development. (Refers to impact on cases)**

### **Strengths**

- The review team provides the facility for operational reviews and unsolved (cold) case reviews. It comprises 14 staff.
- The BHMCU has a resource dedicated to cold cases. The cold case review team (CCRT) is headed by a retired detective inspector, who has a team of four detectives working to him. These detectives are on long-term secondment, by rotation one from each investigative team. Three officers are from Hertfordshire and one is from Bedfordshire. Seventy-nine undetected Hertfordshire rapes have been identified, dating back to 1970, together with 14 homicides dating back to 1956. Initial work has identified 13 Bedfordshire homicides dating back to 1956.
- All cases will initially be forensically reviewed, a process that is under way. At the conclusion of the forensic review, a HOLMES account is opened and an action pended for an agreed future date to trigger a second-stage review of lines of enquiry, etc. (See 'Area for improvement'.)
- It is intended that cases should be reviewed biannually, once the initial review is complete.
- The CCRT terms of reference allow for the examination of homicides and stranger rapes for Hertfordshire and for homicides only for Bedfordshire.

### **Work in progress**

- The CCRT is at an early stage of development, with cases for Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire being scoped and assessed. Work has started with the submission of DNA on a number of historical cases including Operation Retired.

### **Areas for improvement**

- Consideration has not yet been given as to the process to be followed to quality-assure the work of the CCRT. Potential collaboration opportunities exist to fulfil this aspect.
- Both forces need to be satisfied that there is an appropriate level of experience and adequate support within the CCRT to ensure that the desired level of scrutiny is provided on cold case reviews.
- The terms of reference and other documentation for the CCRT, while produced only in 2007, is now dated, failing to acknowledge the existence of the BHMCU and its relationship to the process. Review processes are clearly capable of generating individual, organisational and partner learning. Terms of reference should identify this role and its link with other force processes.
- Progress in reviewing outstanding cases is at a relatively early stage and is at present open-ended. A meaningful timeframe should be established for the completion of the review process, and additional resources applied to the task if this timeframe necessitates.

**Summary – The inspection found that the force was predominantly compliant with relevant ACPO standards of the Murder Investigation Manual and major incident room standardised operating procedures.**

**Strengths**

- Chief officers from each force review the initial response and resourcing of critical incidents, including homicides. CIAs are also reviewed. During weekends, SIOs or their representative (from both Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire) attend the Hertfordshire daily management meeting and report on current deployments, risks and incidents for which they have assumed responsibility. In the case of Bedfordshire, the on-call chief officer will consider the case with the SIO.
- Bi-monthly meetings are in place – held by the two ACPO leads and the head of the BHMCU – where all cases and workstreams are reviewed. A monthly meeting also takes place between the respective heads of the criminal investigation department for each force and the head of the BHMCU.
- Both forces have SIOs trained in the management of linked crime and series crime. SIOs are well informed about and familiar with the *Murder Investigation Manual*.
- Relevant doctrinal documents are referred to and used during the investigation of major crime.
- Decision logs are completed for every major crime.
- A number of decision logs examined during the inspection were found to contain decisions about not pursuing lines of enquiry. Separate logs were created for sensitive decisions. (See also 'Areas for improvement'.)

**Work in progress**

- Major crime policy and supporting documents are being updated to fully reflect the introduction of the BHMCU. The reporting of necessary changes will be complete by 22 April 2008, but this is five months after the inception of the MCU.

**Areas for improvement**

- There is no evidence of the flexible use of MIRSAP, although this is to be expected given the early stage of development of the BHMCU.
- Both forces need to ensure that there is adequate formal scrutiny of SIO decision logs, to ensure quality of rationales and consistency of practice.

## **Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force reviews the linkages between BCU and force strategic intelligence products and control strategies to ensure that appropriate and explicit linkages are made in their development. In particular, intelligence requirements at BCU and force level should be clearly expressed and appropriately linked, with plan owners identified at each level and held to account for their delivery.**

### **Recommendation 2**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force reviews its application of NIM processes to ensure that agreed products are consistently produced to an agreed standard and that ownership, accountability and the rationale for decisions regarding force level issues conform to an agreed standard.**

### **Recommendation 3**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends the force introduce bespoke diversity training for officers and staff working within the BHMCU.**

### **Recommendation 4**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force take urgent steps to ensure that gaps in vetting are addressed in a timely fashion and that robust processes are implemented to ensure organisational security in this regard is assured in the longer term.**

### **Recommendation 5**

**Her Majesty's Inspector recommends that the force establish a mechanism whereby learning arising from debriefing and review processes is systematically disseminated within the organisation and where appropriate to external partners; ensuring that policy amendments, and identified training requirements etc. are actively progressed.**

## Appendix: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

### A

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACC (SO)	assistant chief constable (special operations)
ACC (TO)	assistant chief constable (territorial operations)
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition

### B

BCU	basic command unit
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### C

CCR	county control room
CCRT	cold case review team
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CHIS	covert human intelligence source
CIA	community impact assessment
CIU	covert investigation unit
CMD	crime management department
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

### D

DAT	drug action team
DI	detective inspector

### F

FIB	force intelligence bureau
FIG	force intelligence group
FSA	force strategic assessment

FTTCG force tactical tasking and co-ordination group

**H**

HMI Her Majesty's Inspector

HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HMRC Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

HOLMES Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HPA Hertfordshire Police Authority

HR human resources

**I**

IAG independent advisory group

IMS intelligence management system

**M**

MAPPA multi-agency public protection arrangements

MCU major crime unit

MIR major incident room

MIRSAP major incident room standardised administrative procedures

MISS multi-intelligence search system

MoPI management of police information

MOU memorandum of understanding

MPS Metropolitan Police Service

MSF most similar force(s)

**N**

NIM National Intelligence Model

NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency

NPSAT National Protective Services Analysis Tool

**O**

OCG	organised crime group
OIDD	organisational intelligence development department
OPSY	operational security

**P**

PIP	professionalising the investigative process
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
PSD	professional standards department

**R**

RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RIU	regional intelligence unit

**S**

SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SIR	strategic intelligence requirement
SOCA	Serious Organised Crime Agency
SOCU	serious and organised crime unit
SPI	statutory performance indicator

**T**

TCG	tasking and co-ordination group
TTCG	tactical tasking and co-ordination group

**V**

ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register
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