

**HM Inspectorate of Constabulary  
London and the East Regional Office**

**Inspection of Chelmsford BCU  
Essex Police  
February 2005**



## Introduction

1. There are over 300 basic command units (BCUs) in England and Wales and no two are alike. They vary in size from over 1000 officers to just under 100; some serve densely populated, ethnically diverse inner cities, while others cover vast tracts of sparsely populated countryside. What they do share are some key aims and objectives, specifically to work with partner agencies in reducing crime and disorder in their areas, and to do so with integrity. Scrutiny of police performance is shifting from aggregate force outcomes to the performance of individual BCUs, recognising that policing is essentially a locally delivered service.
2. The focus on performance in reducing crime and disorder is likely to be relentless. Forces and police authorities, working with local authorities and other community safety partners, will need to raise their game year after year. Indeed, the statutory regime of Best Value demands 'continuous improvement' and an array of sanctions exist if authorities fail to deliver this.
3. In trying to make sense of the variations in operational performance which exist – to differing degrees – in every force, a key ingredient is *focus*. The best performers focus the efforts of their staff through timely, dynamic local briefings that are supported by a well managed intelligence system. They set targets and make sure that staff are aware of them, they communicate results and celebrate success, and they hold individuals to account for how they have used their time. Ministers have decided upon a nationwide rolling programme of BCU Inspections that focus on performance and leadership, intended to help enhance performance and spread good practice (Box A).


### Box A – Aims of BCU Inspections

- **Promoting effective leadership.**
- **Disseminating good practice.**
- **Identifying inefficiencies.**
- **Providing pointers to enhance performance.**
- **Strengthening the capacity for self-improvement.**
- **Leaving behind a BCU management team that has learnt about itself and is even more committed to self-improvement.**

4. An Inspection of Chelmsford BCU in Essex Police was conducted between 7 – 11 February 2005. This report sets out the Inspection findings, highlighting areas of good practice and making recommendations for improvement where appropriate. HM Inspector thanks the officers and staff of Chelmsford BCU for the co-operation and assistance provided to members of the Inspection team.

## Methodology

5. The Inspection of Chelmsford BCU consisted of the following stages:



6. During the Inspection a total of nine structured interviews and 26 focus groups were conducted, involving over 90 individuals. Other staff members and partnership agency representatives were interviewed during the ten visits to workplace settings. The chief executive of the Maldon District Council was also consulted in addition to some key strategic partners that included crime and disorder reduction partnership (CDRP) representatives from both Chelmsford Borough and Maldon District. In addition, the Inspection team was pleased to have been accompanied by a chief inspector from Cambridgeshire Police on a short attachment to HMIC. Two BCU audits were also conducted: the management of forensic science submissions and an audit of staff appraisals.

## Force Overview

7. Essex has a population of just over 1.6m people, of which some 3.2% are from minority ethnic groups. The economy is based on the retail sector and public and financial services. Average earnings for full-time workers in Essex in 2001 were slightly higher than across the Eastern region and slightly lower than the UK average. Over the next ten years significant changes are forecast for Essex, including the regeneration of the Thames and Haven Gateways and expansion of Stansted Airport, which is tied to extensive improvements in the road and rail networks in north-west Essex. Furthermore, Central Government has announced major new housing developments along the M11 and Thames corridors. These are likely to impact heavily on the provision of policing services in the near future.<sup>1</sup>

Listed below are the Force Objectives for 2004/05<sup>2</sup> with Chelmsford targets:

	Projected 2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
<b>Objective 1 – Crime Detection</b>				
Burglary of people's homes detection rate	22.7	22	23	23
Vehicle crime detection rate	9.2	12	14	15
Violent crime detection rate	75.4	64	64	64
Racially aggravated crimes detection rate	50	52	53	54
Robbery detection rate	24.5	30	30	30
<b>Objective 2 – Crime Reduction</b>				
Burglary of people's homes	605	591	585	579
Vehicle crime	1883	1876	1857	1845
Robbery	65	57	54	50
Criminal damage in a public place (inc arson)	1968	1898	1800	1790
<b>Objective 3 – Satisfaction with Service</b>				
Response to emergencies (overall satisfaction rate with police action in response to 999 calls)	61.3	89	90	90
Non-999 callers (satisfaction rate with the service received over the telephone)	65.2	80	82	84
People involved in road traffic collisions (RTCs)	57.7	90	90	90
Victims of all crime	60.7	75	80	85
<b>Objective 4 – Public Reassurance</b>				
Burglary	Action to be taken to contribute towards the Force level target. Outcomes to be through the British Crime Survey			
Vehicle Crime				
Violent Crime				
Perceived Disorder				
<b>Objective 5 – Road Policing</b>				
Reduce the number of RTCs involving death or serious injury	180	164	158	144

<sup>1</sup> Source: Baseline Assessment Report April 2004

<sup>2</sup> Source: Chelmsford 3-year EFQM Plan 2004-07

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<b>Objective 6 –Offences Brought to Justice</b>				
Increase the number of offences that have been brought to justice	Force level target			
Increase the number of persistent offender offences brought to justice	27	109	115	120
<b>Objective 7 –Response to the Public</b>				
% non-emergency calls answered within 30 seconds	87.6	90	90	90
Emergency response incidents attended within published standards (10 mins urban and 20 mins rural)	92.2	90	90	90
<b>Objective 8 –Human Resources</b>				
Reduce the amount of overtime worked by police officers	Force level objective and target			
Maintain the level of police officers by recruiting	Force level objective and target			
Increase the proportion of police officers recruited from ethnic minorities to reflect Essex demographic profile	Force level objective and target			
Working days lost through sickness per police officer	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7
Working days lost through sickness per member of support staff	13.8	10.0	9.5	8.8
Maintain the number of medical retirements per 1000 police officers below the government's target	Force level objective and target			
<b>Objective 9 –Drugs</b>				
Number of offenders referred by drugs arrest referral workers	72	143	214	286
Number of offenders charged, reported for summons or cautioned for supply offences in respect of Class A drugs	21	17	18	19
<b>Objective 10 –Visibility and Accessibility</b>				
Increase the time spent by police on front-line duties	Awaiting Home Office guidance			

## Chelmsford BCU



8. Chelmsford BCU is situated in the centre of the county of Essex and surrounded by four other BCUs, namely Harlow, Braintree, Basildon and Rayleigh. It is a large geographical area with a mixture of both rural and town policing needs. The BCU is divided into three policing sections of Chelmsford, Maldon and South Woodham Ferrers. It is covered by two councils: Chelmsford Borough Council and Maldon District Council.

9. Chelmsford Borough Council area is one of the largest non-unitary authorities in England following the local government reorganisation. The borough contains the County town of Chelmsford which aspires to city status. It is the legal seat of the County with the law courts and the HQ of Essex Police and the County Council all situated there. It has a prosperous and diverse economy. Chelmsford is close to London and many local residents use the road and rail links to commute to London. The town has a major retail centre and pedestrianised High Street with extensive CCTV coverage. The borough plays host to the annual ‘V’ pop concerts in Hylands Park and will also host the international jamboree of the Scout Association in 2007. There are also rural communities around the County town and to the south of the borough the new town of South Woodham Ferrers is located.
10. Maldon District covers an area of 36,000 hectares in East Essex and is dominated by 60 miles of coastline. The district has a rural character ranging from tidal salt marshes to farmland and rolling wooded ridges, with the majority of residents living in small villages. In a recent ‘Quality of Life in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century’ survey undertaken by national consultants, Maldon District was ranked 53<sup>rd</sup> out of 376 English local authorities. This is within the top 15%.

### Demographics<sup>3</sup>

11. The population of Chelmsford BCU as measured by the 2001 Census is 157,072 and for Maldon 59,418. This makes the total population for the BCU 216,490. The latest estimates from the Police Standards Unit (PSU) in October 2004 put the population at 212,893. This equates to 4.6 people per hectare for Chelmsford and 1.7 people per hectare for Maldon compared to the England and Wales average of 3.4.
12. The number of households is 64,564 for Chelmsford and 24,189 for Maldon. This is a total household number of 88,753 for the BCU. Latest PSU estimate for households is 88,893.

Indicator	Chelmsford	Maldon	England & Wales average
Residents under 16 years of age	20.0%	20.5%	20.2%
Residents 75 and over	6.8%	7.0%	7.6%
Households with 2 or more cars/vans	40.4%	47.2%	29.4%
Lone parent households with dependent children	4.9%	4.8%	6.5%
Owner occupied households	78.6%	80.5%	68.9%
All people aged 16 – 74 that are employed	67.1%	65.6%	60.6%
All people aged 16 – 74 that are unemployed	2.1%	2.2%	3.4%
Retired	13.3%	14.2%	13.6%

13. In relation to religion and ethnicity Chelmsford’s largest minority ethnic group is Indian, comprising 0.6% of the population, and in Maldon it is mixed White and Asian, comprising 0.2% of the total population. The largest faith community in both Chelmsford and Maldon is the Christian faith with 74.7% and 75.8% respectively (England and Wales average 71.7%). The next largest is no religion with 16.4% and 16.5% respectively (14.8%).

<sup>3</sup> Source: Office for National Statistics website Neighbourhood Statistics and 2001 Census

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Police Buildings

<b>Station</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>Times</b>
<b>Chelmsford</b>	Daily	24 hours
<b>Melbourne</b>	Monday – Friday	0900 – 1300 & 1400 – 1700
<b>Moulsham</b>	Tuesday – Thursday	0900 – 1300
<b>Maldon</b>	Monday – Friday Weekends	0800 – 2000 0900 – 1700
<b>Southminster</b>	Monday – Friday	0900 – 1300 & 1400 – 1700
<b>South Woodham Ferrers</b>	Monday – Friday	0900 - 1700

14. There is also a mobile police station covering the Maldon and Dengie areas.

## Performance

### ***How successful is the BCU in tackling its principal crime and disorder problems – is performance improving?***

#### CDRPs

15. Partnership arrangements between the BCU and Chelmsford and South Woodham Ferrers Borough and Maldon District are mature and well established. The BCU Commander (BCM) is a member of the local strategic partnership (LSP), both responsible authority groups (RAGs) and both CDRP steering groups. Membership of both CDRPs includes the chief executive officers of both councils, the head of community safety from Essex County Council and various local partners ranging from Essex Fire Fighting Service, primary care trusts, education and various voluntary sector agencies.
16. Chelmsford and South Woodham Ferrers crime and disorder strategy 2002/05 has the following primary objectives:
  - **Domestic Burglary** – reducing the number of reported domestic burglaries (including artifice burglaries) and increasing the number of detections for recorded domestic burglaries in line with BCU policing plan objectives.
  - **Theft of and from Motor Vehicles** – reducing the overall level of motor vehicle crime in line with BCU policing plan objectives.
  - **Criminal Damage** – increasing the reporting of information concerning criminal damage in order to fully evaluate the nature and extent of the problem.
  - **Violent Offences** – encouraging residents to report offences of domestic violence and racial harassment and increasing the detection of violent offences (including domestic violence, racial incidents and those involving other vulnerable people) in line with BCU policing plan objectives.
  - **Retail Crime** – reducing the fear of crime in shopping areas.
  - **Anti-Social Behaviour** – reducing the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour throughout the borough.
  - **Drug and Alcohol Misuse** – targeting the illegal supply of drugs and alcohol.
  - **Young People** – reducing the chances of young people (up to 18 years of age) becoming perpetrators or victims of crime and involving young people in the crime reduction process.
  - **Road Safety** – reducing the number of collisions resulting in death or serious injury across the borough in line with the BCU policing plan.
17. Maldon Community Safety Strategy 2002/05 has the following objectives:
  - **Acquisitive Crime** – reducing the number of burglaries and thefts of and from motor vehicles.



- **Anti-Social Behaviour** – reducing the number of anti-social behaviour incidents in the Maldon District by identifying the causes, locations and offenders and taking appropriate action.
  - **Combating Rural Crime** – establishing and applying good practice in dealing with rural community safety.
  - **Fear of Crime** – reducing fear of crime among residents of Maldon.
  - **Misuse of Drugs and Alcohol** – reducing the level of drugs and alcohol misuse and associated anti-social behaviour in Maldon District. This will be achieved by strengthening the abilities of communities to deal with the drug menace and dealing positively with those who misuse drugs and alcohol.
  - **Offences of Violence** – reducing violent crime by tackling the cause of crime by supporting victims and vulnerable groups in the community.
  - **Road Safety** – reducing the number of road accidents in Maldon District that involve people being killed or seriously injured.
  - **Youth Offending** – reducing the number of young people (10 - 17 years of age) who commit criminal offences within Maldon District.
18. Overall, management of the community safety strategies (CSSs) is the responsibility of the steering groups and decision-making is based on advice from partners and public consultation. Working groups comprising members of various statutory and voluntary agencies across the BCU support both CDRP steering groups. Implementation of the CSS and operational performance delivery is the responsibility of the working groups. The working groups perform against action plans that incorporate targets, clearly indicate accountability for delivery and are congruent with the BCU annual policing plan. The BCU is represented across the working groups and partnership activity at strategic (BCM) and operational (sector inspector) level is enthusiastic and committed.
19. RAG and partnership steering group meetings are quarterly and the working groups are required to meet at least quarterly but in practice meet more frequently, reporting to the steering groups.
20. The Inspection team had the opportunity to meet with members of the strategic groups as well as the working groups and local councillors. It found that the partnerships are well supported and considers that the relationships with the BCU, particularly at operational level, are constructive and responsive to community concerns, deliver results and work hard to provide reassurance. At strategic level, the BCM has made a favourable impact and the CDRPs are anticipating the opportunity to progress the community safety agenda further. Partners appreciate the BCM's enthusiasm and feedback indicated that this was replicated at sector level. The Inspection team verified this and found that there is an obvious and productive commitment to problem solving and reducing anti-social behaviour in particular across the BCU. Other members of the senior management team (SMT) are apparently less visible; the BCM acknowledges this and intends to address it in due course by integrating community safety and partnership activity into SMT portfolios.

Box B - Examples of Partnership Working in the BCU

- **Operation Crackdown**, a burglary initiative.
- **Operation Jacobean**, a vehicle crime initiative.
- **Operation Limestone**, a robbery initiative.
- **Operation Adventure**, an initiative addressing youth nuisance in Maldon.
- Youth diversionary project at Burnham-on-Crouch.
- **Behaviour or be Banned**, an initiative aimed at reducing anti-social behaviour in Chelmsford town centre.
- Co-funding of police community support officers (PCSOs) at Maldon.

Performance against Operational Targets

National and Force level perspective of BCU performance

21. Due to the new most similar groupings of BCUs (MSBCU) instead of BCU families, Chelmsford is now grouped with the following BCUs:

BCU	Force
Aylesbury Vale	Thames Valley
Chelmsford	Essex
Congleton & Vale Royal	Cheshire
Crewe	Cheshire
Dunstable	Bedfordshire
Southern	Lancashire
East	Leicestershire
Maidstone	Kent
North Somerset	Avon & Somerset
North	Staffordshire
Northern Oxfordshire	Thames Valley
South Gloucester	Avon & Somerset
South Worcestershire	West Mercia
Southern	Warwickshire
West	Kent

22. The statistics used in the following section come from the 2001/02 – 2003/04 Annual Data Requirement received from forces by the Home Office, the Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/03 (Crime in England and Wales 2002/03) and iQuanta.

## Crime Data


### Overall Essex Performance last 3 years

Essex	Financial Year	Number of Offences	Number of Detections	Annual Detection Rate	TNOs year on year percentage change	Detections year on year percentage change
<b>Total Notifiable Offences (TNOs)</b>	2001/02	178315	29567	16.6%	-	-
	2002/03	213525	37244	17.4%	<b>+19.7</b>	<b>+26.0</b>
	2003/04	227409	39748	17.5%	<b>+6.5</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
<b>Burglary Dwelling</b>	2001/02	9042	949	10.5%	-	-
	2002/03	11396	1234	10.8%	<b>+26.0</b>	<b>+30.0</b>
	2003/04	11309	1192	10.5%	<b>-0.76</b>	<b>-3.4</b>
<b>Robbery</b>	2001/02	1438	227	15.8%	-	-
	2002/03	2035	285	14.0%	<b>+41.5</b>	<b>+25.6</b>
	2003/04	2147	309	14.4%	<b>+5.5</b>	<b>+8.4</b>
<b>Vehicle Crime</b>	2001/02	32394	2235	6.9%	-	-
	2002/03	33879	2342	6.9%	<b>+4.6</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
	2003/04	33167	2134	6.4%	<b>-21.0</b>	<b>-8.9</b>
<b>Decline</b>						
<b>Improvement</b>						

### Chelmsford BCU Performance last 3 years

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
<b>TNOs</b>	11071	12897	14726
<b>Domestic Burglary</b>	443	499	581
<b>Robbery</b>	45	71	66
<b>Vehicle Crime</b>	1486	1525	1802

23. Chelmsford BCU TNOs have **risen** during 2002/03 by 16.5% and by 14.2% in 2003/04. Between 2001/02 and 2003/04 this is an **overall increase** of 33%. Essex also recorded increases for both years.
24. The numbers of recorded detections have **increased** at the same time, by 23.7% during 2002/03 and by a further 21% in 2003/04. This is an **overall increase** of 49.7% between 2001/02 and 2003/04.




In respect of the priority crimes, vehicle crimes have **risen** between 2001/02 and 2002/03 by 2.6% and by a **further** 18.2% between 2002/03 and 2003/04. The increase between 2002/03 and 2003/04 is in contrast to Essex Police, which recorded a 21% decrease.

25. Domestic burglary has also **risen** by 12.6% between 2001/02 and 2002/03 and **again** between 2002/03 and 2003/04 by 16.4%. Again, this is in contrast to Essex Police which recorded a small decrease between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This is a 31.2% overall **increase**.
26. Robbery offences **increased** by 57.8% between 2001/02 and 2002/03. They then **decreased** by 7% between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This is in contrast with Essex which recorded increases between both periods. It was a 46.7% **overall increase** between 2001/02 and 2003/04.

#### Chelmsford BCU Detections last 3 years

	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04
<b>TNOs</b>	3133 (28.3%)	3875 (30.1%)	4689 (31.8%)
<b>Domestic Burglary</b>	100 (22.6%)	83 (16.6%)	122 (21%)
<b>Robbery</b>	21 (46.7%)	13 (18.3%)	15 (22.7%)
<b>Vehicle Crime</b>	134 (9%)	150 (9.8%)	167 (9.3%)



27. In respect of vehicle crime detections, the BCU recorded an 11.9% **increase** between 2001/02 and 2002/03 and a further 11.3% **increase** between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This is an **overall increase** of 24.6% on 2001/02.
28. Domestic burglary detections **decreased** by 17% between 2001/02 and 2002/03 but **rose** by 47% between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This was an **overall increase** of 22% on 2001/02.
29. Robbery detections **decreased** by 38.1% between 2001/02 and 2002/03 and **increased** by 15.4% between 2002/03 and 2003/04. This was an **overall decrease** of 28.6% on 2001/02.

### Recorded Crime


Crime Performance Table BCU Compared to the New Most Similar BCU Group				
	Performance 2003/04	% Change from 2002/03 to 2003/04	MSBCU group average for 2003/04	BCU's ranked position in MSBCU group 2003/04
Recorded crime per 1000 population	69.5	<b>+14.1</b>	77.5	3
Recorded crime detection rate	31.8%	<b>+1.8 pts</b>	26.5%	3
Domestic burglary per 1000 households	6.5	<b>+16.1</b>	10.8	1
Domestic burglary detection rate	21%	<b>+4.4 pts</b>	18.5%	6
Robberies per 1000 population	0.31	<b>-8.8</b>	0.57	1
Robbery crime detection rate	22.7%	<b>+4.4 pts</b>	27.5%	13
Vehicle crimes per 1000 population	8.5	<b>+18.1</b>	10.6	2
Vehicle crime detection rate	9.3%	<b>-0.5 pts</b>	10.4%	9
Violent crimes per 1000 population	14.2	<b>+23.5</b>	14.3	10
Violent crime detection rate	77.1%	<b>+0.9 pts</b>	56.3%	1

30. The above table shows the BCU performance for the year 2003/04 along with MSBCU group averages and the BCU's rank in the MSBCU group. Of concern is the robbery detection rate

where Chelmsford is ranked 13<sup>th</sup>, vehicle crime detection ranking 9<sup>th</sup> and violent crime per 1000 population where the BCU is ranked 10<sup>th</sup>.

#### Total Crime<sup>4</sup>

31. TNOs per 1000 population equated to 69.5 offences during 2002/03 and 60.9 offences during 2003/04. This is an **increase** of 14.1% on 2002/03 but still **below** the MSBCU group average of 77.5 and ranked the BCU third of its MSBCU group.




32. The latest two quarters data for July – December 2004 shows that the BCU has recorded 7247 total crimes, equating to 34.2 per 1000 population. This is a 1.2% **increase** over July – December 2003; this is **below** the MSBCU group average of 37.9 and ranks the BCU third.

#### Domestic Burglary

33. Domestic burglary per 1000 households equated to 5.6 during 2002/03 and 6.5 during 2003/04. This is an **increase** of 16.1%; it is still **below** the MSBCU group average of 10.8 and Chelmsford BCU is ranked top of the MSBCU group.
34. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) shows the BCU has recorded a total of 208 domestic burglaries; this equates to 2.3 per 1000 households and is 39.5% **reduction** on July – December 2003. This is **below** the MSBCU group average of 4.6 and ranks the BCU top of its MSBCU group.

<sup>4</sup> iQuanta charts only available with November 2004 data.


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35. As can be seen from the above projection chart, domestic burglary should continue to fall.


### Robbery

36. Robbery per 1000 population equated to 0.34 during 2002/03 and to 0.31 during 2003/04. This is a **reduction** of 8.8% and **below** the MSBCU group average of 0.57; Chelmsford is ranked top of its MSBCU group.



37. During July – December 2003 36 robberies were recorded equating to 0.17 per 1000 population. In July – December 2004 the BCU has recorded 65 robberies equating to 0.31 per 1000 population. This is an **increase** of 82.4% and **above** the MSBCU group average of 0.25; the BCU is ranked 12<sup>th</sup>.


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Comparison Chart - Crimes per 1000 Residents Essex - Chelmsford Robbery 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004

### Vehicle Crime

38. Vehicle crime per 1000 population equated to 7.2 during 2002/03 and 8.5 during 2003/04. This is an **increase** of 18.1%. It is **below** the MSBCU group average of 10.6 and Chelmsford was ranked second of the MSBCU group.




Comparison Chart - Crimes per 1000 Residents Essex - Chelmsford Vehicle Crime (excluding Vehicle Interference) 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004

39. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) recorded 803 vehicle crime offences equating to 3.8 per 1000 population. This is a **reduction** of 15.6% for the same period in 2003. It is **below** the MSBCU group average of 4.5 and ranks the BCU third in its group.



## Violent Crime




Comparison Chart - Crimes per 1000 Residents Essex - Chelmsford Violent Crime 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004

40. Violent crime per 1000 population equated to 11.5 offences during 2002/03 and to 14.2 offences during 2003/04. This is an **increase** of 23.5%, just **below** the MSBCU group average of 14.3, and ranks Chelmsford tenth. The latest 2 quarters data (July – December 2004) saw 1596 violent offences, equating to 7.5 per 1000 population. This is an **increase** of 11.9% on 2003. It is **below** the MSBCU group average of 7.9 and ranks the BCU ninth.

## Detections


### Total Crime

41. Chelmsford BCU achieved a 30% detection rate during 2002/03 and a 31.8% detection rate during 2003/04. This was a 1.8 % **increase**. It was **higher** than the MSBCU group average of 26.5% and ranked the BCU third in its MSBCU group.



Comparison Chart - Sanction Detections Per Crime Essex - Chelmsford All Crime 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004


42. The latest 2 quarters data (July – December 2004) shows that Chelmsford BCU has detected 2178 total crimes; this equates to a detection rate of 30.1%, a **decrease** on the 34.1% for the same period in 2003. It is **above** the MSBCU group average of 26.9% and ranks the BCU sixth. The projection chart below shows that detections should increase.



Projection - Sanction Detections per Crime-Essex - Chelmsford-All Crime-01 Jun 02 - 30 Nov 04

### Domestic Burglary

43. The detection rate for 2002/03 was 16.6% and for 2003/04 it was 21%. This was a 4.4 percentage point **increase**. It was **higher** than the MSBCU group average of 18.5% and ranked the BCU sixth.




Comparison Chart - Sanction Detections Per Crime Essex - Chelmsford Domestic Burglary 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov

44. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) shows a detection rate of 20.7%; this is **below** the same period for 2003 where a 25.2% detection rate was achieved. It is also **below** the MSBCU group average detection rate of 21.8% and ranks the BCU seventh.

### Robbery

45. The BCU achieved a detection rate of 18.3% during 2002/03 and 22.7% during 2003/04. This was a 4.4 percentage point **increase**. It was **below** the MSBCU group average of 27.5% and the BCU was ranked 13<sup>th</sup>.




Comparison Chart - Sanction Detections Per Crime Essex - Chelmsford Robbery 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004

46. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) records that Chelmsford BCU has detected 8 robberies. This is a detection rate of 12.3%, which is **below** the 16.7% rate achieved for July – December 2003. It is also **below** the MSBCU group average detection rate of 26% and ranks the BCU 13<sup>th</sup>.

### Vehicle Crime

47. During 2002/03 the BCU achieved a detection rate of 9.8%; this **decreased** by 0.5 percentage points to 9.3% during 2003/04. It was **below** the MSBCU group average of 10.4% and ranked the BCU ninth.




Comparison Chart - Sanction Detections Per Crime Essex - Chelmsford Vehicle Crime (excluding Vehicle Interference) 'Most Similar'

48. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) shows that the BCU has detected 57 vehicle offences, a detection rate of 7.1%. This is **below** the detection rate of the same period in 2003 when 11% was achieved. It is also well **below** the group average of 15.6% and ranks the BCU 12<sup>th</sup>.

### Violent Crime

49. The BCU achieved a detection rate of 76.2% during 2002/03; this **increased** by 0.9 percentage points to 77.1% during 2003/04. This was **above** the MSBCU group average of 56.3% and ranked the BCU top of its MSBCU group.



Comparison Chart - Sanction Detections Per Crime Essex - Chelmsford Violent Crime 'Most Similar' BCUs 01 Dec 2001 - 30 Nov 2004





50. The latest two quarters data (July – December 2004) shows the BCU has achieved a detection rate of 68%; this is **below** the rate for the same period in 2003 when 80.3% was achieved. It is **above** the MSBCU group average detection rate of 53.1% and ranks the BCU third.

### Boston Box

#### 2003/04 performance in comparison to 2002/03

<p>Good – Improving</p> <p>TNO detection rate TNO detected offences Domestic burglary detection rate Robbery per 1000 population Robbery recorded offences Violent crime detected offences</p> <p>↑</p>	<p>Good – Declining</p> <p>TNO per 1000 population TNO recorded offences Domestic burglary recorded offences Domestic burglary per 1000 households Vehicle crime per 1000 population Vehicle crime recorded offences Violent crime per 1000 population Violent crime recorded offences Violent crime detection rate</p> <p>↓</p>
<p>Poor – Improving</p> <p>Robbery detection rate Robbery detected offences Vehicle crime detected offences Domestic burglary detected offences</p> <p>↑</p>	<p>Poor – Declining</p> <p>Vehicle crime detection rate</p> <p>↓</p>

July – December 2004 in comparison to July – December 2003

<p>Good – Improving</p> <p>Domestic burglary recorded Offences</p> <p>Domestic burglary per 1000 households</p> <p>Vehicle crime recorded offences</p> <p>Vehicle crime per 1000 population</p> 	<p>Good – Declining</p> <p>TNO recorded offences</p> <p>TNO detected offences</p> <p>TNO per 1000 population</p> <p>Violent crime recorded offences</p> <p>Violent crime detected offences</p> <p>Violent crime detection rate</p> <p>Violent crime per 1000 population</p> 
<p>Poor – Improving</p> <p>Robbery detected offences</p> 	<p>Poor – Declining</p> <p>TNO detected offences</p> <p>Domestic burglary detected offences</p> <p>Domestic burglary detection rate</p> <p>Robbery recorded offences</p> <p>Robbery detection rate</p> <p>Robbery per 1000 population</p> <p>Vehicle crime detected offences</p> <p>Vehicle crime detection rate</p> 

- Good – improving. Performing better than MSBCU group average and better than the previous year.
- Good – declining. Performing better than MSBCU group average but worse than the previous year.
- Poor – improving. Performing below MSBCU group average but better than the previous year.
- Poor – declining. Performing below MSBCU group average and below the previous year.

RTCs involving Death or Serious Injury

51. During 2003/04 Chelmsford BCU recorded 162 RTCs involving death or serious injury; this equated to 0.6 per 1000 population and is an **increase** on 2002/03 when 158 RTCs equated to 0.5 per 1000 population.

Racially Aggravated Crimes Detected

52. There is no 2003/04 data available. During 2002/03 the BCU achieved a 38.1% detection rate for racially aggravated crime.

Repeat Victimisation

53. **Repeat Domestic Violence.** During 2003/04 there were 1455 domestic violence offences recorded, of which 508 were repeat, equating to a 34.9% repeat victim rate. This is above the MSBCU group average of 29.4%.
54. **Repeat Domestic Burglary.** Of the 581 domestic burglaries recorded during 2003/04, 16 were repeats. This equates to 2.8% repeat rate, which is below the group average of 7.9%.

Accountability Mechanisms and Performance Management

55. Essex Police is working to create a performance management framework that balances the long-term development of organisational learning with short-term performance in terms of achieving results against government and Force performance indicators. The Force has developed a ‘balanced scorecard’ as a means of measuring progress against an ‘enabler’

element of the strategic planning process and is integrating this new process into existing mechanisms for measuring results under the established monthly performance analysis and review process. In effect, each BCU commander meets four times a year with the ACCs Crime and Operations to deal with performance and performance development review (PDR) issues. Command teams also meet twice a year with the DCC to monitor developmental progress against the minimum standards set out in the balanced scorecard in the form of three-year action plans. A monthly discussion with BCU commanders which is conducted by ACC Operations or Crime to review individual BCU contribution to performance underpins the above process. There is also a Force tactical group meeting with all BCU commanders where performance is again reviewed in detail with chief officers.

56. Thus, at Force level there are a number of mechanisms for holding the BCM to account and the Inspection team looked to see whether the BCU operated within a similarly robust performance management regime. It examined the BCU to ascertain that a clear performance management system existed that was applied consistently across the BCU. In particular, the team checked to establish that staff clearly understood their roles and responsibilities, were working towards universally understood targets or goals and were held unequivocally to account for contribution to BCU performance and development. The Inspection team was pleased to find that SMT members considered that they were jointly accountable for performance and evidence was found that each senior leader is aware of specific roles and responsibilities, together with relevant targets.
57. All interviewees and focus groups were asked specific questions as to how they were held to account for personal performance and how they in turn managed performance individually and within respective teams.
58. There are a range of meetings during which performance is discussed and reviewed with individuals on a one-to-one basis or collectively in teams.
59. The BCM chairs weekly SMT meetings and monthly management team meetings. The Inspection team was not able to attend these meetings but reviewed minutes and discussed the agenda and process with relevant individuals. The SMT meeting agenda covers specific areas of BCU business and managers and leaders for the respective business areas report development and progress to the BCM. Performance is discussed generically and does not feature as a specific item whereby a BCU achievement against targets is reviewed and individuals are held to account for performance. When questioned, BCU leaders viewed both meetings as a forum to discuss BCU business and not primarily as a means of performance review.
60. There are a series of tasking and co-ordination meetings described in more detail under 'Intelligence-Led Policing' later in the report. The Inspection team attended sector tasking meetings and reviewed minutes of BCU tasking meetings as well as discussing the process with relevant staff. In terms of reviewing performance, while the BCU position is reviewed, the opportunity is not taken at sector tasking level to specifically review sector contribution in terms of performance against BCU targets and to hold staff to account for contribution. At BCU tasking and co-ordination level, again the BCU position is reviewed via progress reports

illustrating the monthly/year to date position against targets for key performance indicators. Further, updates and results relating to specific BCU operations are also provided and reviewed. However, again the opportunity to robustly hold staff to account is apparently not taken, with most attendees viewing the meeting as a tasking process only with performance providing a backdrop. The National Intelligence Model (NIM) as a business process can also integrate rigorous performance management, and while at BCU tasking meetings a performance overview is provided, it is not reinforced by correspondingly holding staff to account. The Inspection team acknowledges that the BCU development group has identified the issue and that the group is working on overlaying performance management onto the NIM. The Inspection team looks forward to progress being made in this area.

61. The BCM holds informal daily meetings with senior BCU leaders after one of them has 'done the rounds' of the BCU and collected information from relevant personnel regarding overnight arrests, incidents, crimes, intelligence and miscellaneous items. Sector inspectors and duty officers do not attend. The meeting is preceded by daily CID and intelligence meetings, both attended by the detective chief inspector (DCI) who then brings highlights to the above. The Inspection team was not able to review minutes since none are taken for any of these meetings and also queried the performance and critical incident management aspects, looking for NIM compliance.
62. The Inspection team is of the view that the process has some elements of NIM compliance since a daily briefing and a daily intelligence meeting occur. However, opportunities to review performance against monthly and year to date targets, hold leaders to account for critical incident management (eg, MISPER management), manage daily tasking, as well as creating audit trails for decision making and publicly celebrating success are being missed. **The Inspection team suggests that the process could be made into a robust performance management and daily briefing tool by introducing the above. Further, attendance should be widened to include key individuals such as the duty/sector inspectors on a daily or weekly basis, creating the opportunity to hold such individuals to account, directly task or thank them for work as well as providing updates relating to BCU performance.** A management information package should support the meeting, pulled together by the QA inspector against the BCM's specification. The Inspection team acknowledges that business analysis capability is limited and that the BCM will have to prioritise data to be collected and disseminated as fits his purpose. Thus, a consistent daily picture of BCU activity becomes available for review and action by the SMT, precluding the necessity for senior leaders to trawl the BCU for such information.
63. In terms of individual performance accountability, the Inspection team found a number of processes ranging from six-monthly command team PDRs between the BCM and senior leaders and quarterly performance reviews with inspectors conducted by the DCI and chief inspector (operations) to bi-monthly performance meetings at sector level, conducted by sector inspectors with their teams. The Inspection team explored the impact and relevance of these meetings with individual members of the BCU in interviews as well as discussing the issue in focus groups. The team found a varied perspective of the worth and relevance of the processes. The SMT valued the review and found it useful for providing focus and direction. The quarterly reviews with inspectors were a new innovation and the inspectors variously

regarded the process with enthusiasm and scepticism in relation to it being sustained, or creating robust accountability and consistent direction.

64. Quarterly review meetings are not minuted and action plans are also not set; therefore, the opportunity for developing a portfolio of evidence relating to individual performance is missed, as well as militating against consistency. The bi-monthly performance meetings are also a recently introduced innovation and like the above have yet to be embedded. Issues from the SMT and the divisional management team are inserted into the agenda and the aim is to discuss BCU progress and update staff as well as provide opportunities for learning. However, when discussed with sector staff, most felt that while the process was informative, they were not held to account for sector contribution and did not consider the meeting to be a robust, consistent performance management tool.
65. The CID holds daily meetings chaired by the DCI and the detective inspectors (DIs) hold weekly meetings with staff. These meetings are not minuted and apparently deal with general department business rather than having a specific performance focus. CID staff consider that its main area of performance delivery is burglary and detectives have a target of generating two detections a month. The Inspection team did not find any other evidence of performance management within the CID.
66. The Inspection team also examined performance linkage across the BCU during reality checks. Generally, it found evidence of supervision in terms of a 'tray check' culture that at least monitored workloads, providing opportunities for guidance and quality assurance at sergeant level. Some teams had introduced their own performance management systems such as a community patrol team sergeant who had given his team individual targets (arrests, stops, intelligence inputs and summonses) and regularly reviewed progress with his staff. However, few staff stated in reality checks, interviews or focus groups that front-line accountability and performance management were robust. Few could provide evidence of either discussing team performance collectively or individual performance on a one-to-one basis beyond the yearly PDR process. Few (from inspector downwards) knew at even a superficial level BCU or team performance against targets. CID staff (DSs/DCs) were unaware of any crime targets other than burglary and were not clear as to what constituted a sanction detection.
67. The Inspection team found no performance management information on display at any station, although there is an extensive package provided via NMIS, a Force data warehousing system that creates comprehensive performance information down to individual level. The BCU crime analysts conduct this business analysis since there is no QA/IR capability beyond an inspector.
68. The BCM is aware that performance management is an issue that needs to be revitalised. The Inspection team identified some complacency among junior leaders as to BCU performance. The perspective seemed to be that the 'BCU is doing OK', making a vigorous and focused performance culture unnecessary and even undesirable. This is illustrated by the comment made to the Inspection team stating that 'if it's not broken it doesn't need fixing'. At present performance management is piecemeal, inconsistent and is yet to be embedded as a crucial



driver of BCU service delivery. The SMT has begun to implement performance management measures but is not working to a corporate policy, so that junior leaders/managers may or may not undertake performance management, depending on ability or inclination.

69. The Inspection team acknowledges that BCU performance at present is very creditable. It will, however, take a substantial effort to sustain the current level of performance and fully realise BCU potential to deliver continuous improvement. To achieve this, the Inspection team recommends that the BCU designs and implements a performance management framework that cascades down from senior leaders and managers, and is applied consistently across the BCU. This will ensure that BCU performance has a relentless focus at every opportunity, underpinned by rigorous and consistent accountability processes.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 1**

**It is recommended that the BCU designs and implements a performance management framework that cascades down from senior leaders and managers, and is applied consistently across the BCU. This will ensure that BCU performance has a relentless focus at every opportunity, underpinned by rigorous and consistent accountability processes.**

#### **Visibility and Reassurance**

70. The BCU has a number of methods by which it provides visibility and reassurance ranging from uniform response teams, community police teams, Special Constabulary (SC) officers and PCSOs. The BCM is fully aware of the necessity of balancing resources between rural and urban demand.
71. The response teams provide a 24-hour patrol capability and during downtime aspire to direct patrols to priority crime areas or to gather intelligence on specified criminal targets. There are four response teams operating from Chelmsford, Maldon, Southminster and South Woodham Ferrars sector bases. Each is line managed by the sector inspector and falls under the command of the duty inspector when the sector inspectors are not on duty.
72. Community police teams (CPTs) operate from Chelmsford (the town patrol unit (TPU)) and Melbourne, Moulsham, Maldon, Southminster and South Woodham Ferrars. Officers within these teams are allocated to specific parish areas and are expected to deliver a local police service that is accessible and responsive to community issues. The teams are not ring-fenced against abstraction but the BCU endeavours via the resource management unit (RMU) to minimise abstractions so that the optimum amount of time can be dedicated to working on individual beats. The Inspection team found good evidence that CPTs are well resourced, well motivated and committed to community policing. Local knowledge was good, with officers able to cite many examples of problem-solving activity as well as a healthy preoccupation with collecting intelligence and managing local offenders. Comment from partners is also very positive in relation to CPT partnership activities and the support provided to respective communities, urban and rural.

73. The Force has allocated a number of PCSOs to the BCU and four have been jointly funded by Maldon local authority and the BCU to augment the rural policing team at this sector. The Inspection team had the opportunity to interview a group of PCSOs and found them to be a committed and enthusiastic team, who were complimentary about their reception from police officer colleagues and the public. The team displayed knowledge of problem solving and corresponding activity, the importance of intelligence and were aware of local persistent and prolific offenders. The Inspection team acknowledges that the use of a SMART car to transport PCSOs to various rural villages as good practice, together with the youth nuisance vehicle, crewed by a PCSO and a police officer, and the use of PCSOs as automated number plate recognition (ANPR) spotters. The BCU is clearly responsive to staff suggestions on PCSO deployment and consequently the PCSOs have been successfully integrated into the BCU. The PCSOs are also generating some excellent intelligence returns, in some cases more than the CPTs.
74. There are training issues that the BCU has addressed initially, but now needs to consolidate with some continuation training specifically in relation to issuing fixed penalty notices.
75. The BCU has a contingent of SC officers and the Inspection team spoke to some representatives in a focus group. They are deployed with regular officers, supplying details of availability to the RMU one week in advance and the SC divisional officer is a member of the SMT, meeting with the BCM on a quarterly basis. The group felt part of the BCU team and considered that they were well supported, being double crewed with regular officers who provide feedback and assist in providing evidence for the PDR process. Protective vests are on order and the SC has access to BCU IT systems, including the intelligence and crime recording databases. The SC is aware of persistent and prolific offenders and BCU crime hotspots, but did not appear to receive regular tasking, although the BCM acknowledges that a review of all taskable assets across the BCU is necessary. The group also considered they received adequate training, citing Force diversity training as an example. Although enjoying good relations with PCSO colleagues, SC officers fear a blurring of roles and a lack of understanding of the differences by the community which they feel diminishes their status as 'volunteers' with powers equivalent to regular officers. That said, the issue does not appear to generate too much angst and the BCU may wish to highlight SC contribution and function at public arenas such as the police community consultative group meetings.
76. Another vital source of reassurance is the public's ability to visit a police station for advice or to report incidents. The BCU has six police establishments that are open to the public at various times (see earlier section). Only Chelmsford is open on a 24-hour basis, the rest according to demand. All are used as bases for response or CPTs. The BCU is also to purchase a mobile police station from budget underspends. This will provide an opportunity to report crime, pass on intelligence and seek advice in the more rural and isolated parts of the BCU. The BCU recognises that this will also provide an opportunity to promulgate crime reduction advice and market other BCU activity in areas highlighted as requiring a more visible and accessible police service. The Inspection team regards this as good practice and looks forward to its deployment in due course.

## Intelligence-led Policing (ILP)

77. A principal focus of the BCU inspection process is the application of ILP, and looking in particular at the degree to which the NIM is implemented. The divisional intelligence unit (DIU) sits under the remit of the DCI and is led and managed by a DI, who also leads the BCU tactical unit and is the NIM and motor vehicle crime champion. The BCU has a strategic assessment (set by the Force but adapted to fit the BCU profile) supported by a control strategy, reviewed quarterly by the SMT. BCU analysts produce tactical assessments, which inform tasking centrally and ostensibly at sector level.
78. The DIU has effective systems to monitor Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and tasking operations, ANPR input and produces daily briefings on a Monday-Friday basis; there is no capability to provide a weekend or night duty package. Briefings are of a satisfactory standard, although they could be enhanced to provide tasking opportunities around warrants and bail conditions and additional detail in relation to priority patrol area tasking such as modus operandi and possible suspects. The BCU has 66 low and medium sex offenders and eight high risk cases and there is a good system for monitoring and managing such offenders run by the DIU DS, using the field intelligence officers (FIOs). **That said, the FIOs are not aligned to sectors and are not regularly servicing the sector intelligence feed with consequences for sector intelligence management and tasking; the Inspection team suggests that the BCU may wish review this position.**
79. Warrants are also located under the intelligence function and the BCU currently has 847 outstanding. The Inspection team spoke to the warrant officer and reviewed the situation. The BCU lacks a system for prioritising and managing warrants, according to priority and type, making accurate monitoring problematic. Warrant execution does not feature as part of the regular tasking process. Such tasking seems to be an ad hoc practice; individuals are apparently allocated warrants to execute as and when a need arises. Operation Dace is intended to address the situation, although **the Inspection team suggests that the entire system requires a stringent overhaul and reorganisation.** The team considers that there are also opportunities to integrate warrant execution and the management of forensic packages into the tasking process, with progress reviewed on a daily basis via the daily management meeting.
80. BCU analytical capability rests with two analysts who are in reality HQ staff who work to central direction. This has generated difficulties in terms of continuity through centrally driven transfers (three in the last 12 months). There is also potentially a 24-hour delay in obtaining central authorisation for work. The Inspection team examined several analytical products, interviewed the analysts, and noted that while tactical assessments are produced, these are rudimentary in content and other intelligence products are limited. There has been only one problem profile produced in the last 12 months and little predictive or demand/reassurance analysis generated. The team noted the relative inexperience of the analysts and that one individual having been in post for some four months still required training, possibly providing some explanation for the above. There is also a 48-hour delay in entering crime reports onto the Force electronic crime reporting system, since this has to be done manually by the service desk; there is limited direct inputting capability at sectors.

Further, the weekly tactical assessment is driven by STORM<sup>5</sup> and not crime reports, militating against speedy intelligence turnaround and the quality of intelligence product as well as creating potential for leakage from the system.

81. That said, the Inspection team noted that a recent target profile relating to a persistent and prolific offender (PPO) was of good quality, indicative of what can and should be regularly forthcoming. However, the analysts appear to be engaged predominantly in research or business analysis, providing BCU management information, and this exacerbates the situation. There also appears to be a lack of local ownership or awareness of BCU issues, summed up by a comment made to a tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) by an analyst who was of the view that ‘burglary was not a problem’, demonstrating a somewhat naive perspective. In fairness ‘ownership’ and parochialism as regards intelligence and a lack of awareness of the potential benefits of the NIM process were also manifest in other areas of the BCU as described later in this section. **The Inspection team is of the view that the BCU is not receiving an effective analytical service and that work needs to be done to increase analytical capability and expertise.**
82. The DIU has prepared a list of PPOs with a ‘top two’ plus 14 others. Further work is necessary to formalise the process for determining interventions under the catch and convict, prevent and deter and resettlement and rehabilitation strands of the PPO strategy. There are target profiles prepared for all nominated PPOs but only the top two PPOs have co-ordinators or intervention plans. The Inspection team tested staff awareness of PPOs across the BCU and found that this varied from some to total lack (CID officers when questioned could not name any BCU PPOs) and that a further tier of unofficial ‘local offenders’ existed at sector level. The ‘local’ PPO category was also generating intelligence that was being circulated at sector level and not submitted into the BCU intelligence system, on the grounds that ‘it was local business’ and that it would disappear into a black hole or get bounced back for correction and therefore become obsolete due to delay in inputting.
83. The Inspection team identified a general dissatisfaction among operational officers with the quality assurance system that sets a rigorous standard for CID 61 completion<sup>6</sup> before data is input into the intelligence bank. CID 61s containing errors are routinely returned to officers to correct before inputting, resulting in substantial delays and as illustrated above, the leakage of intelligence from the system. The Inspection team checked the level of returned CID 61s and found that there were some 747 returns outstanding over the previous four months, a situation that the Inspection team strongly considers requires urgent action. **The system clearly requires review and reorganisation to improve efficiency of inputting, minimise delay and prevent leakage, although the Inspection team acknowledges that the QA process is a Force system.**
84. Intelligence input rates are generally variable across the BCU; the CID has the lowest levels, while the CPTs are the highest performers. Operational staff when interviewed and during focus group discussion displayed some understanding of intelligence and its significance, but the level of error rate identified above indicates some deficiency. The newly appointed

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<sup>5</sup> The Force command and control system.

<sup>6</sup> Essex Police intelligence submission form.

training officer has already identified that training for operational officers in relation to intelligence is necessary but has so far failed to obtain access to the intelligence system in order to assess need. The Inspection team considers that a training needs analysis is necessary. **The team suggests that the training officer be given access to the intelligence system as a matter of priority in order to assess the type and nature of training required and then tasked to produce the analysis and use it to inform the BCU training programme.**

85. The Inspection team is also of the opinion that the current electronic intelligence submission process is deterring officers from entering intelligence into the system. Further, the lack of intelligence product from the DIU is creating the 'black hole' impression. This is exacerbated by the current tasking system not exercising sufficient 'grip' on local or sector TCG activity and tasking as outlined below.
86. The Inspection team attended two sector TCG meetings and interviewed DIU staff as well as those attending TCG meetings. The Inspection team acknowledges that the structure in place is intended to address issues of geography and the needs of differing communities and crime trends across a large area, notably the often conflicting demands of urban versus rural policing.
87. There is a monthly TCG that the BCM chairs and is attended by the SMT and other pan-BCU units. Weekly operational tasking meetings chaired by sector inspectors and attended by DIU staff, a member of the SMT, CPT sergeants and some external partners, support the monthly TCG. The latter ostensibly addresses local sector and BCU business needs through the tasking process. The tasking meetings follow a set agenda and any tasks arising from the main TCG should link into and drive the local process.
88. The model adopted by the BCU has potential to reconcile issues of geography and autonomy by allowing some flexibility in local tasking and decision making. The Inspection team attended both local TCGs and interviewed DIU staff as well as individuals in attendance. The team found evidence that both local TCG meetings lacked rigour and focus on tasking and performance management. There was little or no discussion of BCU priorities (the focus was largely on anti-social behaviour), or of actionable intelligence or co-ordination of relevant and appropriate tasking. For example, a burglary trend was identified during a discussion at one sector TCG but was not addressed by any firm action. At the same meeting, the analyst stated that 'burglary was not a problem'. The analysts did not present the tactical assessments at either TCG or refer to the BCU control strategy. Further, the tactical assessments were pedestrian in content, lacking in detail such as hotspot analysis, comprehensive tactical options or problem profiles. There were no minutes available from previous TCGs and no updates provided in relation to previous taskings and results. Thus, staff were not held to account for results against tasking. Where minutes are taken, they are apparently circulated only to attendees rather than being accessible to the rest of the BCU. At one meeting the TCG was chaired by a sergeant when both the sector inspector and chief inspector (operations) were present, thus losing the opportunity to performance manage and integrate accountability into the process.

89. The evidence suggests that the BCU tasking process lacks co-ordination and direction. The monthly BCU TCG process does not provide either sufficient drive or impetus to ensure that sector tasking remains focused on BCU business, nor does it provide a consistent performance and accountability backcloth. Both sector TCGs appear parochial and lack robustness. For example, while PPOs were on the agenda as a BCU priority at both TCGs, updates were not provided for all offenders, although there was much discussion in relation to local offenders who did not feature on the BCU PPO list. Neither meeting was tasked with implementing or referred to PPO intervention plans. In reference to the latter, the sector inspectors expressed the view to the Inspection team that these should be managed and implemented by the DIU as opposed to its current co-ordination function. The inspectors did not appear to understand the importance of local ownership and management.
90. In short, the Inspection team is of the view that work needs to be done to drive performance across BCU priorities through the effective use of intelligence and quality analysis. The Inspection team recommends that the BCU reviews its tasking and intelligence management processes in order to improve the quality, range and co-ordination of tasking, the efficiency of intelligence capture and turnaround as well as work to improve the quality and range of intelligence product. The aim should be to ensure that the BCU is fully NIM compliant with the model mainstreamed and driving performance against priorities. The Inspection team acknowledges that the BCU is aware of some of the issues raised above through a recent balanced scorecard review and that discussions on improvement are occurring among the SMT.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

**It is recommended that the BCU reviews its tasking and intelligence management processes in order to improve the quality, range and co-ordination of tasking, the efficiency of intelligence capture and turnaround as well as work to improve the quality and range of intelligence product. The aim should be to ensure that the BCU is fully NIM compliant with the model mainstreamed and driving performance against priorities.**

91. The tactical team is the BCU's main proactive capability. It is line managed by a PS and sits within the BCU intelligence function. The unit is well motivated and when interviewed displayed enthusiasm and commitment. The Inspection team noted that the unit had recently received bonus payments for good performance and that this had a positive impact on morale as has direct praise and thanks from the BCM. The team also found some evidence of performance management. The DI meets with the PS every two weeks to review workloads and the DS maintains monthly performance statistics as well as conducting regular tray checks as a supervisory tool.
92. The Inspection team researched tactical team deployment and tasking and found that the unit's main workload derives from motor vehicle crime investigation and related tasking. Additionally, the unit functions as a prisoner processing unit for all motor vehicle crime

prisoners, including completion of associated paperwork and crime allegations requiring investigation. This is not strictly within the original terms of reference for the unit but as a part of Operation Jacobean, a motor vehicle crime initiative, the unit has been allocated such work since September 2004. Clearly, this affects proactive availability and could compromise surveillance activity. The unit also provides cover for response team abstractions when required, as well as being utilised for public order patrols on Friday and Saturday nights. The PS also performs the custody officer function when required.

93. The Inspection team reviewed overtime expenditure and noted that the unit apparently undertakes many proactive operations on overtime. The Inspection team considers that reducing abstraction from core functions, and thereby increasing opportunities for operational tasking, could enhance tactical team proactivity. For example, the unit is not tasked with actioning outstanding autocrime forensic ‘hits’, an area that the Inspection team suggests could yield detection opportunities. Further, on examination of the tasking process the Inspection team found that not all tactical team activity is generated and managed via the BCU TCG process. A large proportion of tasking also derives from the DIU DS and FIOs and thus lacks clear focus on priorities, illustrated by the fact that the unit also does ‘some class A drugs’ work. Data on how much and results generated were not available, indicating a casual approach to such tasking that requires tightening. The quality and consistency of tasking in common with elsewhere on the BCU also varied, with some clearly well thought out and in line with BCU priorities and others appearing pointless and outdated. For example, a tasking relating to Crimestoppers information was given to the unit some three weeks after initial receipt, rendering the information obsolete and potentially missing a detection opportunity.
94. The Inspection team considers that the tactical team as the BCU’s main source of proactivity should be directly tasked via the BCU TCG process. Tasking outside this process should be the exception rather than the rule, as it appears at present. More proactive capacity will also be derived from refocusing the team onto its terms of reference as outlined above, reducing the necessity for overtime expenditure. The Inspection team acknowledges that resources on a small BCU are always at a premium but nonetheless considers that the tactical team has much valuable performance potential that is being dissipated.

## Intelligence Sources

95. The use of covert human intelligence sources (CHISs) within the provision of the RIPA is an effective tool in crime operations. The Inspection team considers that as many officers as possible on the BCU should receive the necessary training to become involved in this type of work. The team was pleased to note that the BCU has provided training to 30 officers in relation to intelligence debriefing in an attempt to increase the number of CHISs available to the BCU. Staff were positive about the training and the Inspection team will await results with interest, as it views this as potential good practice. The number of CHISs has actually decreased since the introduction of centrally managed source units, although the Inspection team found examples of good quality and actionable intelligence provided by the unit. There is also an excellent system within the DIU for monitoring confidential contacts for text purposes and before handing over to the source unit as CHISs. **The Inspection team**

**suggests that direct tasking of the source unit could also assist matters and increase intelligence opportunities.**

### Crime Investigation Practices

96. The BCU CID is overseen by the DCI and led by a DI. The Inspection team interviewed representatives of the CID at all levels, as well as conducting reality checks by visiting sectors and departments and reviewing detection performance.
97. The CID presents itself as a committed and experienced department, with leaders that are enthusiastic and keen. Burglary detection is at a creditable level and CID officers are very clear that this is a priority crime area. Every detective has a personal target of generating two burglary detections every month as a PDR objective. The DCI holds daily meetings within the department, attended by the DIU DI and sector inspectors and reviews the 24-hour crime and intelligence picture as well as addressing any matters requiring SMT attention or action. The DI holds bi-monthly meetings with DSs when workloads and other BCU/CID matters are discussed. The Inspection team also found evidence of intrusive supervision through consistent tray checks. That said, structured performance management in common with elsewhere on the BCU has yet to be developed.
98. The BCU has several operations running focused on improving detection and reduction rates for burglary and motor vehicle crime. Operations Jacobean and Limestone provided a planned and co-ordinated response to deal with a rise in motor vehicle and robbery trends respectively in the town centre. Both operations involved a scanning process and the application of problem-solving techniques to identify a range of tactics (including a pleasing level of partnership working) best suited to contain the problem. Both operations are beginning to impact positively on trends, although there has been some displacement of robbery to elsewhere within the periphery of the town centre.
99. The Inspection team would also question the nomination of the sergeant running the TPU as the robbery champion. The team accepts that the 'location' aspect of the strategy may rightly be implemented by this individual and notes that reduction in the town centre has occurred. Displacement has occurred, however, and this suggests that the detection and offender aspect of the strategy has been slow to impact. The team notes that the advent of Operation Limestone 2 which implements a more specific detections strategy is imminent and **suggests that overall control and 'champion' responsibility is re-allocated to a senior member of the CID, if not the DCI, since robbery is a priority crime requiring investigative expertise as well as careful victim/witness management.** The Inspection team, however, considers that both operations showed an innovative approach to crime reduction by applying the SARA model to the problem that is good practice and looks forward to seeing the result of sustained activity.
100. Crime is ostensibly allocated as per Force policy. According to the policy, robbery should be investigated by the CID, as should serious sexual and indecent assaults, burglary (dwelling and other), serious violent assaults, complex deception and serious public disorder. Uniform officers should be allocated crimes falling outside these parameters.



101. The Inspection team conducted a crime audit and dip sampled workloads of both CID, CPT and response team officers as well as exploring the issue in interviews and focus groups. The team identified that burglary is in general well investigated by detectives, using minimum investigation standards that officers find useful and that are having a positive effect on the quality of initial investigations.
102. In relation to other crime types, the Inspection team found evidence that response teams which appear least competent due to service profile, have least access to supervision and guidance and arguably have least time to conduct necessary enquiries, are carrying a disproportionate investigative workload. Response team officers felt strongly that too many allegations requiring high levels of investigative expertise were allocated to them, with little or no guidance or support available from CID colleagues, although the Inspection team found a slightly less condemnatory perspective at the rural sector. The Inspection team researched crime allocations and found evidence that a significant number of response officers (including probationer constables) are routinely investigating crimes such as robberies, attempted abductions and violent disorder. There were no published BCU crime allocation policies in place providing local guidance, although the Force policy states that the CID should generally be allocated crimes of this nature. Nor were there any other published minimum standards of investigation except, as stated for burglary, available to assist officers.
103. The rationale for allocating robbery to uniform officers is based on the apparently minor nature of some crimes that in the general view of the CID amount to 'low level, mobile phones stolen from kids'. The Inspection team was left with the unmistakable impression that robbery allegations are not considered a significant part of CID workload unless defined as 'serious' such as armed or commercial robbery. Most robbery allegations were therefore apparently undeserving of CID attention because of their trivial nature and as such provided opportunities for acquiring investigative expertise for uniform colleagues. Given the current BCU robbery detection rate, the fact that robbery is a priority crime whatever the nature of the allegation, and that it has a deleterious impact on public confidence which generates a corresponding need to provide victims with the best service possible, the BCU must act to address this perspective. **The team also suggests that minimum standards of investigation are developed as a matter of priority that will include forensic examination of scenes and victims as a matter of course.**
104. In summary, in relation to crime allocation the BCU should review allocation to response teams as a matter of urgency. The Inspection team is of the view that after reviewing and discussing workloads with the CID and the CPTs, there is capacity within these departments to take on additional investigations. The apparent randomness of allocation also gives cause for concern, since as stated above the Inspection team found a startling range of crime allegations allocated to response team officers which it would normally expect to see investigated by detectives. Officers stated that the allocation of investigations to the CID, other than burglary, serious sexual crime or assault, or indeed support or guidance from the CID was forthcoming only after strenuous lobbying or intervention from team supervisors. The Inspection team dip sampled several examples supplied to it by uniform officers and found only a few with investigation plans provided by CID supervisors. Further, allocation

appeared haphazard and took no account of the skills or level of competence of officers to whom crimes were assigned. For example, the Inspection team identified one investigation involving violent disorder involving six offenders allocated to a probationer to investigate.

105. The Inspection team noted that CID officers were under the impression that there was a healthy and constructive relationship between the department and uniform colleagues and that everyone was aware of the department's 'open door'. However, the team found that uniform perspective was very different with a great deal of resentment displayed by a significant number of response team officers in relation to the perceived unhelpful nature of the CID and the unfairness of crime allocation practices. The DCI alone received positive feedback in relation to his practice of attending sectors and holding surgeries, which were viewed as useful and informative as well as providing SMT visibility and accessibility. Several examples were provided to the Inspection team of problems being addressed and practical advice supplied during these sessions. The Inspection team regards this as good practice. However, the observation was made to the Inspection team that the rest of the department did not generally display the same helpfulness.
106. The Inspection team notes that detection performance for the BCU while creditable is projecting a downward trend in relation to TNOs, violent crime, robbery and vehicle crime, notwithstanding the impact of Operations Jacobean and Limestone and is of the view that in order to sustain the success of 2003/04, swift action is necessary. The team recommends that current BCU crime investigation and allocation practices are reviewed and that a local allocation policy is designed and implemented. Such a policy should take into account response team capability and capacity, spread the investigative burden more equitably across the BCU while ensuring that priority and other serious crime investigations are given the requisite level of investigative expertise as well as ensuring premium service for such victims.

### RECOMMENDATION 3

**It is recommended that current BCU crime investigation and allocation practices are reviewed and that a local allocation policy is designed and implemented. Such a policy should take into account response team capability and capacity, spread the investigative burden more equitably across the BCU while ensuring that priority and other serious crime investigations are given the requisite level of investigative expertise as well as ensuring premium service for such victims.**

107. The Inspection team was pleased to see that in relation to hate crime investigation the BCU is developing the domestic violence unit (DVU) into a community safety unit (CSU). The new unit will incorporate an investigative capability as well as developing partnership working. The Inspection team interviewed DVU staff and found the unit engaged in a six-month trial, piloting prisoner processing (the unit deals with around 50% of domestic violence prisoners) and some related investigative work which will be evaluated in March 2005 as a precursor to creating a CSU. The unit was optimistic as to the outcome and sure of the added value the

increased capability affords to the victims of hate crime and operational officers. Domestic violence liaison officers monitor repeat victims, currently running at 50%, and will intervene to give advice, guidance and support to investigating officers where necessary, implementing a Gold, Silver and Bronze response as appropriate. The Inspection team dip sampled several domestic violence and hate crime investigations and found evidence of robust intervention, intrusive management and supervision. Hate crime investigations are overseen by a sector inspector acting as BCU champion and the team was impressed by the officer's knowledge and commitment to providing a good service to victims and building partnership relationships. The Inspection team also noted that the BCU has third party reporting facilities and a developing community contact network.

108. The BCU operates a service desk that is divided into two distinct functions. Quality assurance of crime reports and the crime management unit (CMU) falls in the DCI's remit and the management of STORM calls, the Helpdesk, property management and initial MISPER enquiries fall in the remit of chief inspector (operations). The Helpdesk directly inputs crime, deals with calls to the front office callers as well as undertaking some telephone reporting, currently running at 23%. Staff are of the view that there is capacity to increase this. There is a 72-hour delay in inputting crimes that has potential as highlighted earlier to cause intelligence leakage and distort daily crime allegations. There is also no fast tracking mechanism for priority crimes and limited inputting capability at sub-stations can exacerbate the situation, since crimes have to be transported to the centre for inputting. The Inspection team suggests that the BCU increases inputting capability at sectors as well as introducing a priority crime fast tracking system, ensuring a better service for victims and enhancing detection potential.
109. Service desk emphasis is on quality customer service and staff are aware of the need to take calls efficiently and deal with the public courteously. The service desk has achieved an 88.7% response to internal calls within a 30-second target and over the last four months has been the best in the Force. The Inspection team also found a pleasing level of intelligence awareness among staff in relation to BCU PPOs, ASBO and ABC nominals. The introduction of STORM managers tasked to grade calls from the public and ensure appropriate deployment has improved timely attendance at incidents and the 'open incident' list has reduced. There is a recognition that customer service needs to improve and call handling quality is also dip sampled and compared to standard operating procedures and linked to PDR objectives by service desk managers. The error rate is currently running at 10% and staff are encouraged to improve by emphasising good practice and giving thanks for good work. The CMU is also efficiently run and provides a good 'housekeeping' service in relation to NCRS compliance and detection opportunities. The two managers liaise regularly and ensure linkage of STORM to crime-related activity such as assessing NCRS compliance. That said, there is no formal performance management framework or qualitative data available on service, albeit there is an emphasis on quality. Staff also expressed a desire for the department to sit under the remit of a single manager since there is no clarity as to whom the supervisors report to. **There is a suggestion that the two functions would work at supervisor level but need to be amalgamated at manager level, a matter for the BCU to consider.**

110. The BCU does not have a criminal justice department; this function is undertaken by the Force and is located at various places within the Constabulary and the destination of case files depends on originating station and file type. The BCU, however, created a file management unit (FMU) 18 months ago. The FMU upgrades all not guilty files with a full disclosure schedule for submission to the CPS. The FMU assesses file quality and timeliness against common standards (TQ1 system) and the presence of a CPS advocate working within the unit has also improved the quality of case files. The FMU identifies training issues and ensures that the information is passed to the BCU training unit. There is no official feedback loop to officers or supervisors and no standardised team-based information on file quality albeit on occasion feedback is given on an individual basis. Once the CPS advocacy scheme has bedded in, the TQ1 process will become obsolete and a useful source of management information will be lost. The BCU may wish to develop an alternative system and continue to monitor this aspect of performance and ensure that the information is more efficiently utilised. The BCU also developed the first charging scheme protocol and the threshold test for evidential sufficiency was viewed by the CPS as a credit to the BCU.
111. There is no CPS direct scheme in place yet, although there are plans for this to occur later in 2005. Seeking advice from the CPS advocate appears bureaucratic since officers are required to prepare advice files and cannot approach the advocate directly. This seems unduly bureaucratic and acts as a deterrent to accessing the advice service. The BCU would also benefit from a case progression unit, although the Inspection team recognises that resourcing such a facility is problematic. **At the very least the Inspection team suggests that an evidence advisor providing a gatekeeper service as well as an in-house quality assurance capability would add value.** A CID member could usefully fulfil this function, encouraging closer working with the department and CPS as well as providing greater investigative expertise to uniform colleagues. There is a prisoner processing unit operating, although this is serviced on an ad hoc basis by the response teams; it is not a core team and does not provide a service to rural sectors, dealing with Chelmsford prisoners only.

#### Use of Forensic, DNA and Other Scientific Techniques

112. HMIC forensic inspection activity supplements other BCU inspection work conducted in January and February 2005. The Inspection concentrated on the scientific investigation into volume crime, specifically, the use of DNA and fingerprint identifications.
113. The Government has made substantial investment in the forensic potential of DNA, including extra funding for crime scene examiners, to undertake DNA and fingerprint examinations in respect of volume crime. The HMIC thematic inspection report 'Under the Microscope' and the follow-up report 'Under the Microscope Re focused' made a number of recommendations pertinent to the management of scientific support services at force and BCU levels. In particular, the collection and monitoring of management information and the use of identifications as intelligence were key issues.
114. The aims of the Inspection were to check the qualitative and quantitative elements of forensic investigation, and tested for the presence of strategies for and/or linkages between the use of forensic investigation and force strategies.

115. The Inspection included the examination of the systems used at Chelmsford BCU, for the management and recording of the three main areas of forensic activity:
- Retrieval and submission;
  - Hits and subsequent investigation; and
  - Criminal justice (CJ) submissions.
116. The Inspection team also examined the procedures to action identifications within the intelligence and crime analysis systems, and involved interviews with managers and staff, along with the sampling of DNA/fingerprint records.

Retrieval and submission

117. The retrieval and submission of crime scene and other forensic evidence is managed within Chelmsford BCU by a DS forensic manager. The sergeant had been in post for several years and is an experienced scenes of crime officer (SOCO).
118. Forensic budgets are held centrally, with no devolution to BCUs. The forensic unit based at Chelmsford is made up of seven DCs who are trained as SOCOS, one police staff SOCO, one police staff volume crime examiner and one office assistant. The BCU also has one additional DC SOCO currently attached to it.
119. Within Essex Police, forensic units are not aligned to BCUs. Within Chelmsford BCU, the area covered by the Chelmsford scenes of crime office includes approximately half of Braintree BCU. Whilst personnel within the units are based on the BCU, all officers within SOCO teams are line managed by the forensic services department at HQ.
120. The team at Chelmsford works a shift system, covering 8am – 10pm. In addition, the BCU operates a nightshift rota enabling 24-hour cover, seven days a week. The team is currently piloting a new 10-hour shift system, and whilst only three months into a six-month trial, feedback to date from the team is very positive.
121. A recent development has been to place two SOCOS at Braintree on a regular basis. These officers publicise specific times when they are available for ‘clinics’, where officers can speak directly to SOCOS for advice and guidance. This initially involved one officer, but due to demand and positive feedback from Braintree has now been increased to two officers.
122. The Force has 100% targets for scenes of crime attendance at all dwelling burglaries, where forensic opportunities are considered to be available. Performance information maintained by HQ and provided to the Inspection team suggested that from 1 December 2003 – 30 November 2004, 89.2% of all domestic burglaries received forensic visits, compared with a Force average of 80%, making the BCU top performers in the Force. In achieving this target, the BCU has introduced systems to ensure that it identifies all dwelling house burglaries, even in the absence of requests from officers initially attending scenes. This involves a daily trawl within the SOCO team of STORM to identify all potential forensic visits.

123. The BCU has also introduced a flow chart when considering the potential benefits for forensic examination of thefts of and from motor vehicles. This chart is used predominantly within the divisional service desk, which takes many of the reports for this category of crime.
124. The BCU has recently seen a rise in the number of robberies in and around Chelmsford town centre. At the time of the Inspection, SOCOs were not, as a matter of routine, attending or considering potential opportunities for such offences.
125. Performance figures for attendance for priority crimes for Chelmsford BCU for the period 1 December 2003 – 30 November 2004 are as follows:

<b>Crime category</b>	<b>Visits</b>	<b>Force average</b>
Burglary dwelling	89.27%	81.98%
Burglary other	36.82%	43.92%
Theft of motor vehicle	42.17%	53.91%
Theft from motor vehicle	26.04%	20.38%

126. Forensic awareness across the BCU was regarded as good. Probationers should spend one day with the SOCO team. Whilst this policy was in place and the department was receiving officers, this matter was not being policed in order to ensure all officers attended as they should.
127. Footprints found at scenes are recovered by SOCOs, and are subject to analysis within the forensic intelligence unit at HQ. The BCU acknowledged that there were no facilities for recording footwear within the custody area; use of this as a tactic/intelligence opportunity was not being exploited and that this was a gap in its processes.
128. The DS (forensic manager) indicated that it had recently been agreed that he would attend both the Chelmsford and Braintree TCG meetings. Due to his unavailability he had not as yet attended a meeting.
129. Intelligence reports submitted by SOCOs, referred to as CID 61s within the Force, were not being monitored by the DS within the SOCO team, who suggested that these were 'few and far between'. He acknowledged that his team was a potentially rich source of intelligence, not being fully exploited or monitored currently.
130. Performance of the SOCO teams is monitored centrally. The Inspection team requested performance information, which was duly provided. Such information has recently become available through computer software held within the forensic science department at HQ. The forensic sergeant stated that he was not currently accessing information on individual performance, but this was now being discussed with his line manager, whom he meets every two months.
131. A DI based at HQ has line management of the DS forensic managers on BCUs. The Inspection team met with this officer, who has responsibility for four divisions, one of which is Chelmsford. He stated that new performance software was providing data on divisional performance, but this had only recently been introduced. Meetings with divisional sergeants had recently been introduced, were taking place every two months, but were still developing.

### DNA and Fingerprint Hits

132. Identified DNA and fingerprint hits are sent through to BCUs from Essex HQ. Within Chelmsford BCU, the DI (intelligence) has overall responsibility for the management of hits. One police staff member has responsibility to monitor and update all forensic identifications. Updates from officers are received on progress of investigations.
133. The Inspection team requested they be provided with up-to-date details of DNA and fingerprint hits, together with those hits that were outstanding at the time of the visit. The DI stated that there were 53 hits outstanding. These were broken down into crime categories, such as burglary, car crime, etc.
134. When the hit is received on the BCU it is forwarded to a supervisor within the department responsible for investigating that crime category, eg burglaries will go to the DI, autocrime is passed to the tactical team. No DNA or fingerprint hits are investigated by response officers.
135. The Force has a policy that all high priority crimes will be dealt with within seven days of receipt. The DI (intelligence) stated that this target was not being met. Similarly, whilst Force policy for 'non-core' is for these to be actioned within 14 days, targets were not being met.
136. At the time of Inspection there was no mechanism for senior managers to discuss the status of DNA and fingerprint hits. The issue was not the subject of any formal updates through TCG meetings.
137. The spreadsheet for hits does not include those offenders circulated on PNC as wanted because the Force forensic allocation system automatically produces such information every six months and the BCU then reviews these. There are no monitoring systems in place on divisions that provide a regular overview of the position in relation to such offenders.

### CJ Submissions

138. Nationally, post-charge DNA error rates give some cause for concern. Research conducted found that BCUs which operate quality control checks, supported by a named individual responsible for the checks, achieved lower than average error rates. The research also highlighted the number of DNA samples unnecessarily taken from persons whose DNA is already confirmed on the PNC.
139. At Chelmsford BCU, there is one main custody centre, based at Chelmsford police station and operating a 24-hour service. An inspector has overall responsibility for custody issues. The Inspection team visited the custody centre, examined the existing arrangements and interviewed custody staff and the inspector. The team also examined 50 custody records, and conducted PNC checks for verification purposes. Of the 50 records, 35 related to persons dealt with for recordable offences. Examination of the 35 records revealed that there was a clear awareness of the need to consider DNA sampling. PNC checks conducted for 15 records

revealed that DNA had been obtained in all cases. Quality assurance of CJ DNA is conducted at HQ.

140. Within the custody area, there is a room where DNA samples are taken. Instructions for the obtaining of DNA samples were not present. There were 13 samples awaiting collection, which occurred twice weekly. The samples were held in an insecure box, with no audit trail process once the samples left the custody area. The inspector acknowledged the gap in the process and stated that this would be rectified.
141. The inspector responsible for custody was unaware of the error rates for DNA rejections once received at HQ or the laboratory, and was unsighted as to whether administration errors were being dealt with and returned as required. No formal information was available to the Inspection team on DNA samples rejected. Findings can be summarised as follows:
  - Within Essex Police forensic budgets and departments are line managed by HQ. The vast majority of forensic staff based at Chelmsford BCU are police officers.
  - Forensic teams on BCUs are not aligned to BCU boundaries. Chelmsford forensic officers have responsibility for parts of Braintree BCU.
  - Recently, officers from the team have been based at Braintree in order to increase attendance performance, visibility and police officer awareness. The initiative has been well received by Braintree BCU.
  - The forensic team at Chelmsford is piloting a ten-hour shift system, which is currently well received.
  - Based on performance information provided by HQ crime department, 89% of domestic burglaries received a forensic visit, compared to an 80% Force average, making the team top performers in the Force.
  - SOCOs are not as a matter of policy attending robberies on the BCU; these have seen a rise recently.
  - The BCU has introduced a flow chart specifically for vehicle crime in order to maximise opportunities. This is used mainly within the service desk when taking reports of vehicle crime offences.
  - The BCU has agreed that the DS forensic manager should be present at the divisional TCG meetings. Whilst agreement has been reached the DS has yet to attend due to his unavailability.
  - Performance monitoring of the forensic team is in its early stages. The forensic DI has recently introduced meetings with the DS scheduled for every two months. IT software is now available in the Force which is able to analyse individual performance of SOCOs but this is not being policed or monitored currently.
  - At the time of Inspection there were 53 outstanding DNA and fingerprint hits on the BCU. The hits are not the subject of formal debate within the TCG process. Once offenders are circulated on PNC, they do not appear on the list and are the subject of review every six months.
  - There is no Livescan facility on the BCU. The nearest equipment is located at Harlow BCU, the only facility currently in the Force.



## Managing Demand

142. In a policing context demand management relates to handling calls and requests for assistance from the public, making the most of all police/public interactions and recognising that internal users and ineffective systems can add to the demand burden. Elements of the police reform agenda, including the drive for greater public access and reassurance, are also directly linked to demand management.
143. The BCU has a number of initiatives in progress designed to manage demand; these are detailed in the following paragraphs.
144. The service desk is beginning to take on some telephone reporting for motor vehicle crime, and reporting levels are currently at 23.1%. Staff report such crimes using standard operating procedures and consider that there is capacity to increase workloads and range of reporting. The BCU needs to develop management information enabling a proper assessment to be made of the extent to which the initiative has reduced demand on operational resources.
145. The Force has introduced STORM managers and the BCU has had such an individual in place since January 2005. The initiative is reducing open incident lists by more efficiently managing incidents and consequent deployments.
146. There is a prisoner processing unit in operation. The unit functions as a facility provided from daily response team strength and is not a permanent team. Whether or not the facility is provided at all is at the discretion of the duty officer, and, depending on operational imperatives, provision is not always made. In any event, the unit provides support to urban (Chelmsford) units only. The advantage of this system is its flexibility and the opportunity it provides all response team officers to practise basic interviewing and investigation skills. However, a permanent team would provide consistency as well as opportunities to develop closer linkage with the FMU as well as develop expertise. Deskillling can be avoided by creating a permanent core team and then rotating additional staff through on an attachment basis, particularly useful for developing probationer constables. The Inspection team suggests that developing the priority progression unit into a case progression unit would have a beneficial impact on demand.
147. The BCU has recently negotiated authority to re-designate (for Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 purposes) a sector base to accommodate prisoner overflow. BCU cell capacity at Chelmsford is regularly exceeded and officers have to transport prisoners to elsewhere in the Constabulary, with all the implications for opportunity costs and waste that the practice entails. Some 4,452 prisoners were processed last year through a cell complex comprising only eight cells. There is a Force project to refurbish, expand and update all custody suites; however, this will take some considerable time to implement. In the interim the re-opened facility will assist to minimise wastage caused by the above. Also intended to assist is the purchase by the BCU of a prisoner transport vehicle, for health and safety as well as efficiency purposes.

148. The BCU deploys four 24-hour response teams operating from Chelmsford, Maldon, Southminster and South Woodham Ferrars on a six-week shift pattern. There is an exercise being conducted investigating an alternative shift pattern instigated by staff disaffection with the present pattern. The BCU has conducted extensive demand analysis in order to take the opportunity to re-orientate resources to best fit the demand profile. Chief inspector (operations) will initiate a vote among staff once satisfactory patterns are agreed, although staff need to be updated regarding progress. Opportunities for variable parade times orientated to accommodate demand could also be considered. Both these possibilities should be accommodated for review as part of the ongoing work around developing the shift pattern and BCU patrol strategies.
149. PCSOs and SC officers are deployed effectively either as additional members on response team or onto problem-solving initiatives. There is potential to more rigorously control deployment through the tasking process.
150. The recently-created RMU is co-ordinating and managing duties across the BCU. However, the unit is hampered by the fact that officers do not routinely book on duty, and line managers do not routinely inform the RMU of staff movements across the BCU, making accurate assessment of officers available for deployment problematic. The unit does not attend tasking and the BCU may wish to reconsider this, since a more accurate picture of BCU resources would inform tasking options. Crown court warnings are also an issue, with a lack of co-operation from the court in terms of providing early and accurate warnings for witnesses and officers. This often leads to wasteful and unplanned absence, impacting on operational effectiveness and officer morale. This is particularly so when rest days are cancelled, since cancellation of rest days can result in officers working in excess of 15 days consecutively, a breach of the European working time directive (WTD). The BCM may wish to consider pursuing this matter via the local criminal justice board. The RMU also conducts a review of BCU 'top earners' as a means of monitoring compliance with the WTD. The list is supplied to the SMT, which acts as appropriate.
151. Essex Police has embraced problem solving as its policing style and there is a correspondingly strong emphasis on problem solving across the BCU. All CPT staff are trained in the SARA technique, although this did not include training with partners. All the sectors provided examples of problem-solving initiatives with varying levels of success. The emphasis is on generating long-term sustainable solutions as opposed to short-term fixes. One such initiative generated by the TPU has resulted in the reduction of anti-social behaviour and robbery during the evenings in the town centre. The TPU has a very strong links with the commercial sector as well as local authority partners that is proving very productive in terms of co-operation and enhanced partnership working.
152. A proactive licensing department supports the work of the TPU. The unit focuses on working with the licensees of 'problem' establishments to reduce anti-social behaviour. For example, it sets up and participates in test purpose operations for underage drinking as well as encouraging licensed premises to establish drug safes which are emptied on a six-week basis by the officers from the unit as well as supplying crime reduction advice. The Inspection team

considers the unit and its activity to be good practice and the BCU may wish to link this valuable tasking option into the TCG process.

153. The Inspection team further recognises that the BCU has a number of productive initiatives as outlined above, demonstrating that it has begun to understand and manage demand. However, the Inspection team considers that a holistic approach is required, reflecting the complex interaction of customer need, resource constraints, public expectation and government priorities. Detailed action plans, with clear accountabilities, should underpin an integrated demand management strategy, so that there is a co-ordinated impact on overall BCU demand. In this way, if demand rises the BCU will be able to control the level of rise or increase capacity to service it in a structured manner rather than an ad hoc response. Further, alternative methods of managing demand can be assessed and implemented as well as properly evaluated in terms of effectiveness, economy and efficiency. The Inspection team recommends that the BCU develops an integrated demand management strategy setting out clear accountabilities and action plans and co-ordinated and managed by a member of the SMT as part of BCU corporate development.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**It is recommended that the BCU develops an integrated demand management strategy setting out clear accountabilities and action plans and co-ordinated and managed by a member of the SMT.**

## Leadership

### ***Does the BCU management team demonstrate effective leadership?***

154. The BCM was appointed in September 2004 and has a varied portfolio of experience in operational uniform and CID roles as well as being a trained and experienced hostage negotiator. Two uniform chief inspectors with responsibility for operations and support respectively and a DCI with responsibility for the CID, volume crime management, the crime service desk and intelligence functions support the BCM. The divisional administration manager (DAM) is also a member of the SMT, having been in post since 1995, as is the SC divisional officer.
155. The Inspection team found that the BCM has a clear vision for the BCU described to the team as the Four Ps strategy. This entails developing professionalism, a robust performance culture, partnership (internally as well as externally) and prosperity in terms of BCU health and success. The BCM introduced the SMT to the strategy via a two-day development programme and with their assistance created the command team development group. Using the BCU balanced scorecard review and the three-year EFQM plan, the command team has created a programme of work with each member of the SMT taking responsibility for various strands of the strategy. The BCM will review progress on a quarterly basis with the SMT reporting on development. The SMT supports and values the process and displayed keenness and a willingness to work hard to deliver results. The Four Ps define the priority issues that require addressing. The BCM considers that quality service delivery and professionalism will impact positively on public confidence and reassurance; this will be further enhanced by a thriving performance management culture and a partnership philosophy that embraces staff teamwork across the BCU as well as external joined-up working. Prosperity will develop as a result of success with good performance positively reinforced, and staff skill and ability maximised.
156. The Inspection team found ample evidence that the SMT was aware and supportive of the Four Ps and also looked for evidence that the ethos had been embedded and was developing among junior managers. The team found evidence that the Force action leadership programme was understood and that staff were clear as to expectations and their responsibilities. However, in terms of the Four Ps, knowledge was scant and understanding limited, with junior leaders and managers unsure as to what the rationale was behind the concept and what expectation the BCM had in terms of their responsibility. The Inspection team considers that the Four Ps as a strategy has potential and that the BCM is right to link it to the Force action leadership programme since it seems a natural corollary. The SMT will have to work hard to communicate the strategy to junior colleagues if it is to develop into an all-encompassing operational culture.
157. There is, however, willingness and openness to new ideas and thinking among staff, engendered by the positive impression the BCM has made in the short period he has been at the BCU. Staff appreciate the swift action he has taken to resolve troublesome issues and the steps taken to make life on the operational front less onerous, and anticipate further constructive development in terms of BCU resourcing, which they see as insufficient.

Therefore, embedding the Four Ps as a working philosophy among an open-minded workforce with an understanding of action leadership should not be difficult. The BCU will need to design and implement a robust media and communications strategy as key to implementing and embedding the strategy and the Inspection team looks forward to seeing developments over time.

158. As stated feedback in relation to the BCM is positive and a good start has clearly been made. Staff anticipate sustained visibility and responsiveness and are willing to work hard while they await development. The rest of the SMT does not share the same level of approbation and the Inspection team encourages the SMT to continue to work on visibility and communication. The team received feedback that staff perceived SMT decision making as slow and hesitant, citing the current shift review as an example. The Inspection team is aware that a great deal of activity and work are going on in relation to this matter, but staff are apparently unaware of progress and uninformed as to developments. Greater involvement and regular consultation with staff associations will assist with this, as well as increasing visibility and linking it to purpose such as publicly acknowledging good work, shared patrol and providing performance overview. With this in mind, the BCM has introduced a visibility strategy intended to ensure that the SMT maximises contact with staff at every opportunity. When out on patrol the SMT collects feedback via a staff satisfaction survey questionnaire, attends sector meetings to communicate BCU business and successes and visits rural stations in order to be more accessible to staff (the DCI's surgeries are an example of this). The Inspection team regards this as good practice that should raise the profile of other members of the SMT. Leadership will also be enhanced by a clear expression of overall aims, explicit definition of policing style that is clearly displayed at all stations and directly and robustly supported by leaders and managers. Corresponding information relating to performance and achievement should also be displayed at all stations.
159. The Inspection team found evidence of SMT commitment and determination to sustain performance and continuous improvement. The leadership demonstrated by the BCM thus far has had a positive impact. The rest of the SMT needs to enhance profile and increase operational grip if the Four Ps philosophy is to become embedded, particularly in relation to the internal partnership and performance management aspects of the strategy. The Inspection team suggests that a review of the SMT structure and workloads would also be beneficial. Chief inspector (operations) appears to carry a disproportionate range of responsibilities and there are anomalies such as the split management of the service desk that may impact adversely on efficiency.

### Self-review and Learning

160. The BCU does not have a written policy or a consistent method for rewarding and recognising effective performance and good work. The BCM has recognised this and developing an effective and consistent system for awarding commendations and bonus payments to staff is a priority area of work for the command team development group. The Inspection team found some evidence of staff receiving recognition for work well done. Staff in focus groups and interviews cited examples of being thanked by letter for good absence records and personal thanks from the BCM for good arrests. Some staff had received bonus

payments and commendations, although this was either self generated (the TU and their bonus payments) or inconsistently awarded, leaving staff unsure as to the quality standard necessary to attract reward. The BCU requires a quality of service policy that identifies line managers' responsibility for ensuring that good work is recognised and rewarded, together with a clearly defined process of review and evaluation of quality of service reports.

161. The BCU has conducted its own self-assessment utilising the EFQM process. The result is a three-year plan that has been linked to the recent balanced scorecard review and integrated into a BCU development strategy, to be implemented by the command team development group. There are a variety of issues, but as stated the Four Ps represent priority areas of work, encompassing quality of service, performance management, internal partnerships and teamwork and BCU health and prosperity. The Inspection team was pleased to note that the strategy is underpinned by a delivery plan and acknowledges its comprehensiveness, specific tasking and accountability framework. It is clear that the BCU is already sighted and working towards some of the issues raised during the Inspection. The Inspection team was reassured by the open and willing attitude expressed by BCU leaders and further noted that the Force balanced scorecard review also complements and supports work in progress. This indicates a constructive relationship between the Force and BCU and a commitment by both to generating ongoing organisational learning.

## Human Resource (HR) Issues

### Staffing

By Role	BCU No of staff (FTE) 2002/03	BCU No of staff (FTE) 2003/04
Police Officers	199.69	209.79
Probationers	39	44.83
Support Staff	59.84	88.91
By Function		
Operational	243.62	269.06
Operational Support	15.29	16.05
Organisational Support	39.62	58.42

162. As of 31 March 2004 there were 209.79 (FTE) police officers at Chelmsford BCU. This was an **increase** of ten police officers. There was an **increase** of 29 police staff and the number of probationers increased slightly.

### Operational Officers

163. Chelmsford BCU achieved a 78.4% operational officer rate for 2003/04. This was slightly **below** the MSBCU group average of 80.8%.

### Female Officers

164. During 2003/04 there were 37.64 new appointments to Chelmsford of which 7.64 were female; this equates to 20.3% of new appointees being female.

### Sickness

165. Personnel and HR management are the responsibility of chief inspector (support), who oversees absence and PDR management, probationers, training provision, staff deployment and postings and quality assurance and inspection. Sickness/attendance management is also the responsibility of line managers and the personnel department monitors sickness/restricted duties and maintains all relevant records. Chief inspector (support) personally monitors absence from work due to sickness or injury and line managers ensure compliance with Force sickness and attendance management policy. Return-to-work interviews are regularly conducted and data is collected and monitored in relation to Force trigger points for intervention. The BCU is working to continue to reduce sickness levels and the Inspection team found evidence that line managers are supportive and consistent in managing absence.

### Attendance Management and Sickness Statistics

	Chelmsford BCU	Essex (Force)
Average number of sick days per police officer 2002/03	14.1	10.3
Average number of sick days per police officer 2003/04	15.5	8.2
Average number of sick days per police staff 2002/03	12.0	11.0
Average number of sick days per police staff 2003/04	8.0	11.1

166. Sickness levels are showing a downward trend. Recent returns for the last quarter are as follows:

	Target	Actual
Police	7.7	8.1
Police Staff	10	9.9

167. However, police officer sickness is **higher** than the Force and MSBCU group average of 12.2 days and 10.1 days for 2002/03 and 2003/04 respectively. Police staff sickness levels have **decreased** and are now **below** the Force and the MSBCU group average of 11.3 days.

	2002/03	2003/04	% change
North Somerset	No data	No data	-
South Gloucester	No data	No data	-
Dunstable	68	57	<b>-16.2</b>
Congleton and Vale Royal	89	78	<b>-12.4</b>
Crewe	41	42	<b>+2.4</b>
<b>Chelmsford</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
Maidstone	71	58	<b>-18.3</b>
West Kent	36	56	<b>+55.6</b>
Lancashire South	88	78	<b>-11.4</b>
East Lincolnshire	100	No data	-
North Staffordshire	75	60	<b>-20</b>
Aylesbury Vale	60	62	<b>+3.3</b>
Northern Oxfordshire	74	66	<b>-10.8</b>
Southern Warwickshire	103	74	<b>-28.2</b>
South Worcestershire	No data	76	-

### Training

168. The BCU has not completed a training needs analysis, although there is a recently appointed training and development officer in post. There is a schedule for mandatory training such as officer safety and first aid. Attendance has been problematic and the training and development officer is keen for senior managers to deal with persistent non-attenders, signalling BCU priority. The SMT has begun to address non-attendance, following the example of the BCM; this is encouraging officers to attend such training but more intervention is necessary to ensure 100% compliance. In relation to other training needs, feedback from staff indicates that there is an appetite for inputs, for example on the new codes of practice, or dynamic risk assessment for health and safety purposes. A large amount of training is conducted using computer-based inputs with which most staff expressed dissatisfaction as time consuming and tedious. There are also training issues relating to supervision, NIM and intelligence management and basic crime investigation that were highlighted to the Inspection team as necessary but not forthcoming. A training needs analysis is required in order to prioritise and redress weaknesses identified in these areas and the SMT may wish to consider conducting such an exercise. However, the training and development officer has little support and is on a temporary contract for a two-year period and so the future is uncertain. Further, opportunities to accommodate additional training into the current shift pattern are limited. That said, where ad hoc training has been delivered, eg the recent intelligence debrief package, it was appreciated and viewed as instructive by staff.

### PDR Management

169. PDRs are completed for all staff on an annual basis and are due for submission in April each year. They are then subject to a six-month review each October. Records of PDRs are maintained on a spreadsheet within the administration department. The chief inspector (support) reviews annual PDRs, and regards this as a quality assurance process, as well as enabling the identification of training and development opportunities. PDR records reveal that compliance rates are very high, with all PDRs submitted as required. The BCU is in the process of chasing via a BCM memorandum approximately 15 six-month PDR reviews due for completion in October 2004 and yet to be submitted.
170. The Inspection team requested PDRs from a variety of ranks and departments including a number of support staff in order to conduct an audit. Details of the inspection findings are as follows:
- Requests from the Inspection team were fully complied with for police officers of all ranks and police staff.
  - All PDRs examined were submitted on time; many had additional documentation showing a six-monthly review of the PDR objectives.
  - Comments within PDRs examined were supported with detailed evidence.
  - There was strong evidence of SMARTER (E = evaluation and R = review) objective setting in all PDRs examined.
  - Development plans were present in many cases, with detailed action plans, reviewed after six months.



- It was apparent that the chief inspector (support) was spending a considerable time examining PDRs. Issues identified within the documents were being dealt with at appropriate levels, including the involvement of the BCM.

#### Probationers

171. A total of ten probationer reports were requested and provided for the Inspection. The format of probationer reports differs from the standard PDR, and is completed on a continuous basis during the officers first two years. Evidenced reporting was apparent in all files examined, including those officers whose level of performance was giving cause for concern.

172. Main Findings/Conclusions

The main findings were as follows:

- There was a rigorous process for the submission of PDRs on the BCU, led by the chief inspector (support). The process was equally rigorous for police officers and police staff.
- The overall quality of PDRs examined was good. Timeliness, development plans, objective setting, and overall QA processes were all in place.
- Probationer reports examined were all of a good standard. Those examined were all timely, well-evidenced documents with development plans in place in all cases.
- Sickness rates within the BCU are below average and have been falling over the last year.

#### Diversity Issues

173. The Inspection team spoke to staff in interviews and in focus groups to gain insight into BCU support for diversity matters. The BCM is committed to promoting diversity and is chair of the local Black Police Association branch and there are ample examples of staff negotiating and working on a part-time or flexible basis. That said, the Inspection team found a lack of engagement by senior managers with staff associations such as the Gay Police Association (GPA), Gender Agenda, Police Federation or unions, evidenced by a lack of knowledge of representation, contacts or liaison officers. There was also a lack of information relating to such matters on display across the BCU and officers when asked were unaware of the role of such associations, with the exception of the Federation. The HMIC team also received a direct complaint in relation to a diversity issue, which the team referred directly to the BCM. The complainant approached the Inspection team because the individual lacked confidence in the ability of the SMT to deal with the matter. There are, however, no other outstanding grievances on the BCU and staff when directly asked generally stated that grievances are managed fairly and robustly, as is unacceptable conduct. Information in relation to fairness of work procedures is available on the intranet and accessible to staff.
174. The Inspection team considers that senior managers should make themselves familiar with and aware of the various staff associations (in particular with the GPA) and create opportunities to consult and engage representatives. This will enable the SMT to avail itself of 'expert' insight and guidance when dealing with diversity matters, as well as displaying a

willingness to engage. The SMT should also demonstrate a commitment to promoting diversity by displaying relevant information and encouraging staff to participate in various association activities or events.

175. Externally, the BCU does not have an independent advisory group, although the BCM intends to develop such a group with the co-operation of the local partnership. Informally, the Inspection team found good evidence of engagement at inspector and sergeant level with groups including the gay community and women's forums. The BCU has a small visible ethnic minority community and again the team found evidence of efforts to connect with and support such groups.

## Financial Management

176. The DAM is responsible for managing a devolved budget of £9,278,515, of which approximately £8,913,193 is payroll. There is a current underspend on payroll because the BCU has not been up to establishment, affording some flexibility for virement purposes. The new prisoner transport vehicles and mobile police station will be paid for from underspend. However, the BCU is approaching full establishment and such opportunities will become limited.
177. The BCU is currently on target against projected spend and the budget is well managed, with the DAM displaying a clear understanding of corporate requirements and processes. Force financial regulation appears to be centrally based, although the budget is ostensibly devolved. Various examples were given to the team demonstrating HQ veto of some BCU spending plans. The Inspection team acknowledges the requirement to ensure consistency and expenditure in line with Force policy. However, it is of the view that given the BCU's limited resources, it should be encouraged and given latitude to develop a more entrepreneurial approach to using the budget, income generation or accessing alternative funding opportunities.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

178. The Inspection team found many positive aspects about the way the BCU serves its community. There are challenges presented to the BCU in terms of demand versus resources and rural versus urban policing. Robust and innovative demand management will be a prerequisite to sustaining a creditable level of performance. The Inspection team was pleased to note that a productive and positive partnership existed between the BCU and community partners, which should make the task easier.
179. The BCM has made a strong start and is creating a favourable impression with partners, staff and the SMT in terms of providing vision and direction. The SMT as a group has some work to do to raise its profile as BCU leaders and to drive performance in order to deliver the BCU's performance potential as well as generate the 'Team C division' vision of the BCM. There is accordingly a busy and demanding programme of work implemented in response to BCU and Force review/development processes and the Inspection team acknowledges the progress already made in relation to developing a performance management framework as well as the current initiatives around demand management. With the number of ongoing initiatives, the SMT will have to ensure that staff are clear about responsibilities and that accountability processes are defined and have rigour.
180. It was apparent to the Inspection team that the SMT is willing and receptive to change, working together in a co-operative and constructive manner and clearly committed to meeting the challenges of policing the BCU. This, coupled with the fact that the Inspection team found that morale among most staff is healthy (there is work to be done with response teams) as well as ample evidence of hard work and dedication, bodes well for the future.
181. There are opportunities for Chelmsford BCU to continue to improve performance. The identification of single success factors is not easy and it is fair to say there is no single enabler that of itself will ensure success. It is with this in mind that the Inspection team has identified four recommendations that, together with various suggestions that the BCU may wish to consider, should assist the BCU to achieve its potential.

## Recommendations

182. It is recommended that:
- i. The BCU designs and implements a performance management framework that cascades down from senior leaders and managers, and is applied consistently across the BCU. This will ensure that BCU performance has a relentless focus at every opportunity, underpinned by rigorous and consistent accountability processes.  
(paragraph 69)
  - ii. The BCU reviews its tasking and intelligence management processes in order to improve the quality, range and co-ordination of tasking, the efficiency of intelligence capture and turnaround as well as work to improve the quality and range of intelligence product. The aim

should be to ensure that the BCU is fully NIM compliant with the model mainstreamed and driving performance against priorities.

(paragraph 90)

- iii. Current BCU crime investigation and allocation practices are reviewed and that a local allocation policy is designed and implemented. Such a policy should take into account response team capability and capacity, spread the investigative burden more equitably across the BCU while ensuring that priority and other serious crime investigations are given the requisite level of investigative expertise as well as ensuring premium service for such victims.  
(paragraph 106)
- iv. The BCU develops an integrated demand management strategy setting out clear accountabilities and action plans and co-ordinated and managed by a member of the SMT.  
(paragraph 153)

### Areas of Potential Good Practice

183. The Inspection team acknowledges the following areas of potential good practice:

- i. The use of a SMART car to transport PCSOs to various rural villages, together with the youth nuisance vehicle, crewed by a PCSO and a police officer and the use of PCSOs as ANPR spotters.  
(paragraph 73)
- ii. Training 30 officers in relation to intelligence debriefing in an attempt to increase the number of CHISs available to the BCU.  
(paragraph 95)
- iii. Operations Jacobean and Limestone, an innovative approach to crime reduction by applying the SARA model to the crime problems.  
(paragraph 98)
- iv. The DCI's practice of attending sectors and holding surgeries, which are viewed as useful and informative by sector officers.  
(paragraph 105)
- iv. The visibility strategy intended to ensure that the SMT maximises contact with staff at every opportunity.  
(paragraph 158)

### Items for Management Consideration

184. Items identified by the Inspection team for management consideration are highlighted in **bold** throughout the report.