

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary



Baseline Assessment Cambridgeshire Constabulary

October 2005

Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005

ISBN 1-84473-678-4

CROWN COPYRIGHT

FIRST PUBLISHED 2005

Contents

Introduction to Baseline Assessment

Force Overview and Context

Findings

Summary of Judgements

- 1 Citizen Focus (Domain A)**
 - Fairness and Equality
 - Neighbourhood Policing and Community Engagement
 - Customer Service and Accessibility
 - Professional Standards

- 2 Reducing Crime (Domain 1)**
 - Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims
 - Volume Crime Reduction
 - Working with Partners to Reduce Crime

- 3 Investigating Crime (Domain 2)**
 - Investigating Major and Serious Crime
 - Tackling Level 2 Criminality
 - Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims
 - Volume Crime Investigation
 - Forensic Management
 - Criminal Justice Processes

- 4 Promoting Safety (Domain 3)**
 - Reassurance
 - Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour and Promoting Public Safety

- 5 Providing Assistance (Domain 4)**
 - Call Management
 - Providing Specialist Operational Support
 - Roads Policing

- 6 Resource Use (Domain B)**
 - Human Resource Management
 - Training and Development
 - Race and Diversity
 - Resource Management
 - Science and Technology Management
 - National Intelligence Model

- 7 Leadership and Direction**
 - Leadership
 - Strategic Management
 - Performance Management and Continuous Improvement

Appendix 1 Performance Tables

Appendix 2 Glossary

Introduction to Baseline Assessment

This report is the outcome of HMIC's assessment of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's performance during 2004/05, measuring, where appropriate, the force's progress since the initial baseline assessment published in June 2004, and, where such comparison has not been feasible, gauging performance against agreed standards and known good practice.

Baseline assessment has been developed by HMIC to reflect a dynamic performance environment in which the Police Reform Act and the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) have had a significant impact. Baseline assessment makes considerable use of self-assessment and grading criteria to produce one of four delivery grades – *Excellent, Good, Fair* or *Poor* – across a broad range of policing activities. In many cases, a 'direction of travel' grade – *Improved, Stable* or *Deteriorated* – is also noted. Baseline assessment is a diagnostic assessment that generates a tailored programme of inspection activity for each force – ie, future inspection activity will be intelligence-led and will reflect the overall performance of the force.

A number of changes were made to the evidence-gathering frameworks for 2004/05, but the core of the assessment is intact. The changes have:

- absorbed some less substantive issues such as prisoner handling into more comprehensive frameworks;
- enhanced coverage of citizen focus/neighbourhood policing issues; and
- differentiated internal diversity issues such as recruitment from outward-facing service quality and fairness policies.

In 2003/04 we used generic criteria to underpin the various grades, but, with the help of Association of Chief Police Officer (ACPO) business area leads and expert practitioners, specific grading criteria were developed to ensure a more reliable and robust approach to grading this year. Last year's gradings sought to reflect and give credit for improvement – and the converse for declining trends – whereas in 2004/05 the delivery grade is essentially a comparison with peers and performance over time is denoted by the direction of travel grade. Where the framework has changed significantly from last year, as is the case with the two diversity frameworks, it is inappropriate to denote the direction of travel. These frameworks will have a direction of travel assessment in future years. Professional Standards is the subject of a full inspection in all 43 forces in autumn 2005 and therefore has not been graded in this report.

Forces and authorities will be aware of work led by HM Inspector Denis O'Connor, in response to a commission from the Home Secretary to advise him on structural issues, which reviewed forces' capability to deliver 'protective services'. These reviews overlapped with baseline assessments in several areas, notably Tackling Level 2 Criminality and Major Crime Investigation, and HMI determined that the baseline grade should reflect the full body of evidence available. In other areas, such as implementation of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), HMIC is working closely with colleagues in the National Centre for Policing Excellence to arrive at consistent assessments of performance.

The delivery grades for each activity are derived from a combination of objective, quantitative evidence and qualitative assessments that seek to contextualise performance. Judgements are based on available evidence of performance in the year 2004/05, but unfortunately, in a small number of areas, end-of-year data was not available at the point (mid-September) when gradings had to be finalised. The main activities affected are

Criminal Justice (absence of COMPASS data on file quality, etc) and Fairness and Equality, where information on stop and search activity is not available. In these cases, the most up-to-date information available is used.

The baseline assessment reports for each force will be publicly available on HMIC's website but, for the first time, the summary results (ie, the delivery gradings and direction of travel gradings) will be combined with forces' results against statutory performance indicators (SPIs) to produce a combined assessment. This combined assessment shows performance for each baseline framework and SPI, then combines the results to produce a headline grading for each of the seven domains in the PPAF. So, for example, performance for the Reducing Crime domain might be expressed as *Good* and *Improved*.

The Local Policing domain is intended to show the impact of deploying police resources to meet local (either force or basic command unit (BCU)-level) priorities. HMIC will assess whether these priorities have been derived appropriately and will gauge success in meeting the relevant objectives. Until the Association of Police Authorities has issued guidance to ensure consistent and robust methods of setting local priorities, an interim approach has been agreed. The tripartite PPAF Steering Group has therefore agreed that, for this year and for 2005/06, the Local Policing domain will consist of HMIC's Neighbourhood Policing framework and SPI 1c – the British Crime Survey-based measure of confidence in the force concerned.

The police service is committed to continuous improvement in the quality of services it delivers to local communities. HMIC shares this commitment and sees its activities as a catalyst for improvement. The response of individual forces to last year's assessment has been highly commendable, and tangible improvement is evident in areas such as call handling and volume crime reduction. But because the comparison in performance terms is with the force's peers (using the most similar force (MSF) groupings), it is possible to improve over time and yet still receive a *Fair* or even *Poor* grade. This is notable in the grades for volume crime reduction and reflects the fact that expectations on forces are high, and that the performance of similar forces is the benchmark. Increasingly, the service is setting itself – or is being set by Ministers – demanding targets for the quality of services it provides; wherever such standards and targets have been set, HMIC will inspect against them.

The Future Development and Application of Baseline Assessment

As the name implies, this assessment represents a baseline against which the force's future performance will be gauged. Using NIM-type risk assessment, HMIC will use the results set out in this report to shape the extent and nature of inspection activity in the coming year. A number of forces will benefit from 'inspection breaks', with only a light-touch validation of their self-assessment in 2006 and an HMI-led assessment of leadership and corporate governance.

While seeking to minimise changes to the structure and content of the baseline frameworks, we will take expert advice on how to tighten them and make them absolutely 'fit for purpose'. Incorporating some of the 'protective services' issues is an important development. An ACPO lead has been identified for each framework area and will have a key role in agreeing the content and specific grading criteria (SGC), and will subsequently be involved in moderating the gradings in summer 2006. The revised frameworks and SGC will be issued together by December 2005.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

Conclusion

This assessment is the result of on-site work conducted by HMIC staff officers, on behalf of HM Inspector Sir Ronnie Flanagan, GBE, MA, in spring 2005. It takes account of a wide range of documentary evidence, structured interviews at headquarters and in BCUs, and the results of consultation with many of the force's partner agencies and other stakeholders. Performance data has been examined to identify recent trends and to make comparisons with other forces using financial year performance data.

The following forces have been identified as being most similar to Cambridgeshire in terms of demography, policing environment and other socio-economic factors: Warwickshire, Gloucestershire, West Mercia, Staffordshire, Thames Valley, Suffolk and Northamptonshire. When making comparisons in this report, the average performance in this group, known as the MSF group, will be used.

HM Inspector wishes to thank the members of the force and police authority for their assistance in supplying information, conducting self-assessment and setting aside time to speak to HMIC staff. The assessment would not have been possible without their assistance and contribution.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005

Baseline Assessment 2005 Frameworks			
1 Citizen Focus (PPAF domain A)			
1A Fairness and Equality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equality of service delivery • Community cohesion • Engaging with minority groups 	1B Neighbourhood Policing and Community Engagement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective mechanisms for obtaining community views • Responding to local priorities • Effective interventions and problem solving with partners and communities • Community involvement with police 	1C Customer Service and Accessibility <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality of service to victims and witnesses • Customer care • Responding to customer needs • Accessibility of policing services 	1D Professional Standards <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigation of public complaints • Improving professional standards • Combating corruption and promoting ethical behaviour • Reducing complaints and learning lessons
2 Reducing Crime (PPAF domain 1)			
2A Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnerships on child protection, reducing race crime, domestic violence (DV) and homophobic crime • Performance in reducing these crimes • Multi-agency police protection arrangements (MAPP) and sex offenders 	2B Volume Crime Reduction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime strategy • Performance in reducing volume crime • Problem solving • National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) compliance 	2C Working with Partners to Reduce Crime <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic command unit (BCU) support for crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) • Drugs prevention/harm reduction • CDRP crime reduction performance 	
3 Investigating Crime (PPAF domain 2)			
3A Investigating Major and Serious Crime <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detection rates for murder, rape and other serious crime • Integration with overall crime strategy • Compliance with Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) murder manual • Early identification of critical incidents that may escalate into major inquiries 	3B Tackling Level 2 Criminality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime that crosses BCU and/or force boundaries • Support for regional intelligence and operations • Asset recovery (Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)) • Effective targeted operations • Quality packages to National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 	3C Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigation/detection of child abuse, race crime, DV and homophobic crime • Integration with overall crime strategy • Joint training (eg with social workers) and investigation 	
3D Volume Crime Investigation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime strategy • Crime recording • Investigative skills, eg interviewing • Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) • Detection performance 	3E Forensic Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specialist scientific support • Use of National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS), DNA, etc • Integrated management of processes • Performance in forensic identification and detection 	3F Criminal Justice Processes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality and timeliness of case files • Custody management/prisoner handling • Youth justice • Police National Computer (PNC) compliance 	

Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005

4 Promoting Safety (PPAF domain 3)		
4A Reassurance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational activity to reassure communities Use of media to market success Uniformed patrol and visibility Extended police family Performance in reducing fear of crime 	4B Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and Promoting Public Safety <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Non-crime activities of CDRPs and other partnerships Use of ASB legislation, tools, etc Road safety partnerships Emergency planning 	
5 Providing Assistance (PPAF domain 4)		
5A Call Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> All aspects of call handling and call management Initial incident response Early identification of critical incidents Performance in answering and responding to public calls 	5B Providing Specialist Operational Support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management of central operational support Police use of firearms Capability for policing major events/incidents 	5C Roads Policing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of arrangements for roads policing Integration/support for other operational activity
6 Resource Use (PPAF domain B)		
6A Human Resource (HR) Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HR strategy and costed plan Key HR issues not covered in 6B or 6C Health and safety Performance in key HR indicators 	6B Training and Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Costed training strategy and delivery plan Key training and development issues 	6C Race and Diversity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Action to promote fairness in relation to race, gender, faith, age, sexual orientation and disability Performance in meeting key targets
6D Resource Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resource availability Effective use of resources to support front-line activity Devolved budgets Finance, estates, procurement and fleet management functions 	6E Science and Technology Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information systems/ information technology (IS/IT) strategy and its implementation Programme and project management Customer service Adequacy of key systems Business continuity/disaster recovery 	6F National Intelligence Model (NIM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which structures, processes and products meet NIM standards Integration of NIM with force planning and performance management Use of community intelligence Application of NIM to non-crime areas
7 Leadership and Direction		
7A Leadership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which the chief officer team is visible and dynamic, sets and upholds a vision, values and standards, promotes a learning culture, and sustains a well-motivated workforce Effectiveness of succession planning Promotion of corporacy 	7B Strategic Management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrated strategic planning framework External communication/ consultation Relationship with local police authority (PA) Police reform implementation Internal communication/ consultation Programme and project management Management of reputation/ public expectations 	7C Performance Management and Continuous Improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective performance management structures and processes at all levels Quality and timeliness of performance/management information Internal inspection/audit/quality assurance (QA) systems Effectiveness of joint force/PA best value reviews (BVRs)

Force Overview and Context

Cambridgeshire occupies a strategically significant location at the junction of the East Midlands and East Anglia. The A1 and M11 run through the county, acting as principal north-south routes, while the A14 links North Sea ports to the Midlands and the North. The East Coast mainline allows rapid transit from Cambridgeshire to London and the South East; this has turned parts of the county into commuter belt territory for London. This is one of the contributing factors predicting Cambridgeshire will be the fastest growing county in England over the next decade.

The two main conurbations are Peterborough and Cambridge, with several smaller key towns and a host of rural villages; indeed, 13% of households in the county are situated in rural areas. Peterborough is a significant regional city with a host of attractions, including shopping centres and a thriving evening economy. However, Peterborough has some of the most socially and economically deprived wards in the region, and faces significant challenges in terms of cultural integration, owing to recently expanded and sometimes isolated immigrant communities. Cambridge City is internationally renowned as a tourist destination and cultural centre, and for its academic institutions. These have been important factors in attracting new research and development and hi-tech industries to the areas around Cambridge, further enhancing the city's international profile.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary HQ is at Hinchingsbrooke, on the outskirts of Huntingdon. The force area is divided into three basic command units (BCUs) or geographical commands. These comprise three main stations – in Peterborough, Huntingdon and Cambridge – with an array of other police buildings around the county providing service to communities.

The chief officer team consists of a chief constable, deputy chief constable (DCC) and assistant chief constable (ACC). Due to the unexpected resignation of the appointed Chief Constable in June 2005, the substantive DCC and ACC have since each assumed the duties of the higher rank. The ACC's post was filled by a chief superintendent graduate of the Strategic Command Course who also has previous experience of senior command. References to the chief officers in this report relate to those roles and activities they carried out prior to the Chief Constable's resignation. It has to be said that team have been required to 'act up' in unusual and difficult circumstances and that they have done so in a superb manner.

Resourcing was a major issue for the force during 2004/05, owing to fears that the central grant would be capped and the council tax precept would be unable to generate the funds required for growth. This prompted the force to set up a budget gold group to manage the effective budget shrinkage and flex posts to deliver services within a more restrictive budget. In the event, the central grant was greater than expected, but a period of uncertainty had unsettled parts of the workforce. The 2005/06 overall budget is £125 million, with a £728,000 surplus from the previous year to augment reserves.

Over the past year the force has continued to develop a performance management culture, following a culmination of events that highlighted deficient management systems in the force in 2003. This triggered police standards unit (PSU) involvement in the force to raise and sustain performance through a series of interventionist measures.

In March 2005 the PSU, supported by HMIC, judged that performance had sufficiently improved and was likely to be maintained, and so formally disengaged from the force. The challenge for Cambridgeshire Constabulary now is to maintain and improve performance and

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

service delivery without the extra support and resources supplied by the PSU. This will be a key theme running through future HMIC baseline assessments.

Looking to the future, the force is planning to change its style of policing delivery to reflect the current government agenda for neighbourhood policing and ongoing police reform. To this end the force is about to implement redrawn policing boundaries to achieve coterminosity with local administrative boundaries, to enable effective partnership working. Operation Civitas on Southern Division has been a pilot for ward and parish aligned community policing, based on dedicated teams of officers, police community support officers (PCSOs) and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) neighbourhood investigation teams. This exercise is perceived as a success and is due to be adopted force-wide during 2005/06.

Certain aspects of the force's performance are captured in the main body of this report. There they are categorised as either strengths or areas for improvement, and they should be considered in conjunction with the accompanying qualitative evidence. The data used is extracted from statutory performance indicators (SPIs) within the police performance assessment framework (PPAF) domains. For those wishing to examine specific areas in more depth, the appendices at the end of this report fully reproduce comprehensive data across a wide range of measures.

The data reveals some encouraging developments in areas such as scientific support and reducing violent crime, which actually bucks the national trend. However, customer satisfaction levels are poor, as are aspects of volume crime investigation. These areas are being addressed by concerted programmes; an ambitious customer relations programme should raise satisfaction levels this year and a drive to increase detections through Operation San Diego has already commenced.

The force is forging ever stronger links with neighbouring forces through fleet collaboration, major investigations, procurement and the potentially benchmark-setting collaborative private finance initiative (PFI) to deliver custody and criminal justice estate facilities with Norfolk and Suffolk. This is in contrast to the joint police authority (PA) clerking arrangements with Norfolk, which may separate in the near future as Cambridgeshire Constabulary works towards ever closer working arrangements with the Cambridgeshire PA. This is exemplified by the authority taking up residence in specially provided offices at HQ and the appointment of a dedicated treasurer.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

Summary of Judgements	Grade	Direction of Travel
1 Citizen Focus		
1A Fairness and Equality	Fair	
1B Neighbourhood Policing and Community Engagement	Fair	Improved
1C Customer Service and Accessibility	Poor	Improved
1D Professional Standards		
2 Reducing Crime		
2A Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims	Fair	Improved
2B Volume Crime Reduction	Fair	Stable
2C Working with Partners to Reduce Crime	Fair	Stable
3 Investigating Crime		
3A Investigating Major and Serious Crime	Fair	
3B Tackling Level 2 Criminality	Fair	
3C Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims	Fair	Improved
3D Volume Crime Investigation	Fair	Stable
3E Forensic Management	Good	Stable
3F Criminal Justice Processes	Excellent	Stable
4 Promoting Safety		
4A Reassurance	Fair	Stable
4B Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour and Promoting Public Safety	Good	Improved
5 Providing Assistance		
5A Call Management	Fair	Stable
5B Providing Specialist Operational Support	Fair	Stable
5C Roads Policing	Good	Stable
6 Resource Use		
6A Human Resource Management	Poor	Deteriorated
6B Training and Development	Fair	Improving
6C Race and Diversity	Fair	
6D Resource Management	Poor	Deteriorated
6E Science and Technology Management	Fair	Stable
6F National Intelligence Model	Good	Stable
7 Leadership and Direction		
7A Leadership	Fair	
7B Strategic Management	Fair	Stable
7C Performance Management and Continuous Improvement	Fair	Improved

1 Citizen Focus (Domain A)

Cambridgeshire Constabulary has adopted a citizen-focused approach to service delivery, which has evolved over the last 12 months. There have been several major developments that have yet to reach maturity and yield full benefits. Projects of especial note are the diversity unit, which has made numerous high level advances and is poised to dramatically affect service delivery and the customer relations management (CRM) programme. The CRM programme will revolutionise the police/public interface by transforming channels of communication. However, the historical nature of baseline assessment means that the report reflects poor indicator measures. This is balanced by acknowledgement of the potential for improvement inherent in this workstream. The force has enthusiastically engaged with the community policing agenda through the successful pilot of Operation Civitas. This, again, is a project that promises great advances in citizen focused policing, and improved grades are expected in future baseline assessments. Finally, professional standards have not been assessed in this round, because several reports of national significance emerged during the assessment process. A dedicated inspection process during autumn 2005 will paint a full picture of the constabulary's capabilities.

1A Fairness and Equality

Fair

Strengths

- The ACC is the force lead on diversity issues; his main vehicle for this is the diversity integrity steering group (DISG), which also benefits from PA involvement. The DCC demonstrates firm commitment to diversity matters through her leadership style and specific involvement in the Gender Agenda.
- The DISG ensures that diversity issues are propagated beyond the sphere of HQ by including BCU commanders as permanent members.
- A diversity directorate was created in September 2004. This transformed the force's emphasis from internal equal opportunities to include an outward facing community focused diversity programme.
- A new diversity strategy has been written and is currently being implemented. The diversity directorate is keen to move the diversity debate on from narrowly focusing on race relations. Accordingly, the policy focuses on seven important diversity streams, including travellers and disability. This policy encapsulates the race equality scheme (RES) six strands of diversity.
- The force has taken a broader view of Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 compliance by introducing measures to assist dyslexic members of the public and staff. This approach is acknowledged as highly progressive among police forces.
- As part of its wider diversity engagement the force has hosted several seminars and conferences, most notably in relation to youth issues and women in public service.
- Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 stop and search activity is monitored within the investigations directorate at a meeting called 'All Stops', where stop and search quality and proportionality performance across the force are monitored.
- The force is well represented on the national diversity stage through the DCC's presidency of the British Association of Women Police and the head of diversity's involvement in the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) race and diversity group.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has taken action to address findings in national

reports, specifically the 'Open Out' third party reporting scheme arising from Macpherson and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister guidance on traveller encampments. Implementation of recommendations from the HMIC thematic inspection *Winning the Race* had stalled during 2004. However, the diversity strategy now incorporates many aspects of the report and progress is being made.

- Minority liaison officers (MLOs) are the force's main link to minority and hard-to-reach groups. These officers have been in place for some considerable time and have forged effective community links. They review and advise on hate crime, and act as a barometer for community tension.
- Central Division has produced a DVD aimed at fostering positive relations and confidence with the traveller community. This was met with disapproval by some sections of the static community, but illustrates the force's determination to build bridges and adopt a positive approach with hard-to-reach groups despite populist pressure.
- There are good examples of localised initiatives to foster greater police and community understanding. For example, Northern Division holds monthly consultative groups with community leaders. This provides an opportunity for the community safety inspector and MLOs to gauge community tension.
- Northern Division also carries out community impact assessments after incidents, to ensure that it is able to adapt policing measures to community need. This tactic reflects the emphasis that Northern Division places on maintaining peace and stability rather than just dealing with crime.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 54.4% of racially or religiously aggravated offences. This fell 2.4 percentage points to 52.0% in 2004/05, but was still better than the 2004/05 MSF average of 44.3%, placing the force third out of eight in its group.

Areas for Improvement

- Demonstrable chief officer support for diversity issues can cause lack of clarity on occasions when either the Chief Constable or DCC takes the initiative over a diversity issue of which they feel ownership. However, there is no doubt that all senior staff are fully committed to the promotion of diversity issues.
- There are still no formal independent advisory groups in the force. The PA is attempting to recruit people to fulfil this function; however, the force is satisfied with local informal provisions, and this does not lend impetus to the PA's endeavours.
- Obvious high level policy activity has been taking place since the formation of the diversity directorate; however, engagement with hard-to-reach and minority groups is still instigated locally and is not yet led or driven by the directorate. This is expected to change following complete implementation of the diversity strategy.
- There are no formal partnerships between the force and external groups or agencies; rectifying this is central to the diversity strategy and some groups have already been identified as potential partners.
- The force does not have a community cohesion policy; however, sector inspectors and community beat managers (CBMs) demonstrate a high level of community awareness and at BCU level there are instinctive tactics to address community tension. Community impact assessments are carried out in accordance with critical incident policy.
- National Intelligence Model (NIM) processes do not promote local responsiveness to

community tension. Community intelligence and quality of life issues are not addressed in the control strategy or strategic assessment. Officers and PCSOs do not receive community intelligence in tasking and briefing products.

- The RES is within the remit of the ACC and the DISG. To date, no reviews or impact assessments have been carried out. However, the diversity strategy gives the RES prominence, further reinforced with an inspector now dedicated to its development. In addition, the force executive board (FEB) monitors performance against national timescales for compliance.
- The 'All Stops' group scrutinises police use of stop and search powers under PACE but at all levels of the organisation there is still a lack of data concerning disproportionate or unethical application of powers. The redeployment of BCU performance analysts to HQ will further diminish the capacity to provide this locally. Redesigned stop and search forms aimed at improving the quality of data have been distributed for consultation.
- A more robust strategic approach is required for the recruitment, retention and progression of black and minority ethnic (BME) officers. A strategy was created in January 2004 to address these shortcomings, but there has been little recruitment during the intervening period so the effects are hard to gauge. It is forecast that there will be volume recruiting of police officers during 2005/06; this should show the benefits.
- Resources for ensuring that the entire constabulary estate is DDA compliant are limited. Consequently, the force has concentrated efforts on ensuring that public access areas of police buildings are upgraded first. One achievement has been the installation of lifts and ramps affording access to station offices. Some office areas have been adapted and enhanced; of especial note are assisted access measures around the force control room (FCR).
- During 2004/05, 28.9% of victims of racial incidents were very or completely satisfied with the overall service provided. This placed the force eighth of eight in the MSF group, where the average satisfaction rating of victims very or completely satisfied was 47.7%. During the same period 64.5% were satisfied, compared with a 73.1% MSF average. This placed the force eighth of eight.
- During 2004/05, 47.4% of white users were very or completely satisfied in respect of the overall service provided. This placed the force eighth of eight in the MSF group, where the average satisfaction rating of victims was 55.7%. During the same period 35.8% of users from BME groups were very or completely satisfied with the overall service. The MSF group average was 46.6%. This placed the force eighth of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2004/05 72.4% of white users were satisfied with the overall level of service. The MSF group average was 77.6%. This placed the force eighth of eight in the MSF group. During the same period 62.9% of users from BME groups were satisfied with the overall level of service. The MSF group average was 72.9%. This placed the force eighth out of eight in the MSF group.

1B Neighbourhood Policing and Community Engagement

Fair	Improved
------	----------

Strengths

- Operation Civitas has been successfully piloted on Southern Division. This has seen a change in policing style in that services are delivered via community based policing teams. The model extends further than the provision of uniform policing as neighbourhood CID investigation teams investigate crimes. This style of policing is set to be established force-wide.
- Southern Division has piloted a system called ‘e-cops’, whereby email subscribers receive crime and community safety information for their area. In recent months the number of message recipients has grown to 800. It is planned to roll this initiative out force-wide.
- Neighbourhood Watch groups receive information and newsletters from the force. Community contact officers across the force co-ordinate this activity under central direction and are supported by a best practice database.
- Ambiguities within the force about who is the lead on community policing and consultation have been resolved, thanks to force restructuring in 2003/04. The director of the safer communities directorate is the strategic lead, with responsibility for operational delivery residing clearly with BCU commanders.
- The media and marketing department utilises numerous channels to target individuals and groups about policing issues. Messages are transmitted via local papers, radio, TV, cinema and static advertising.
- The Cambridgeshire Constabulary website enables access to a wealth of information, including a postcode crime search, which is apparently a favourite interface for local newspapers. *Blueprint*, the force newspaper, is distributed to selected partner organisations.
- A dedicated sergeant in the safer communities directorate carries out community profiling. Community tension indicators are submitted to ACPO for national monitoring.
- The force has made use of dispersal orders to deal with rowdy and disorderly behaviour. Effective utilisation of this power has been monitored through the local priority initiatives in the 2004/05 efficiency plan.
- BCU commanders are able to cite specific instances where local communities have raised issues that BCUs have then adopted as local policing priorities. Good examples are crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) on Southern Division highlighting raves, and landowners on Central Division highlighting illegal hunting with dogs. However, there is no centralised framework or protocol for such interfaces; instead, local mechanisms (intelligence processes) capture issues.
- The force works with numerous community groups to deliver policing services and initiatives, notably the county executive groups of Neighbourhood and Countryside Watch. There have been force-led training initiatives to equip Neighbourhood Watch members for environmental auditing and reporting anti-social behaviour (ASB).
- During 2003/04 the force operated an in-house system for customer and user satisfaction surveys. In 2004/05 it discontinued this in favour of gathering the data via external service providers, to increase the integrity of the data.

- Both the force and the PA initiate further ad hoc and bespoke consultation exercises in relation to specific attitudinal surveys and single issues such as stop and search.

Areas for Improvement

- There is no force policy for engagement with hard-to-reach groups; local sector teams directly interfacing with communities manage such activity. Shortcomings are being addressed by the forthcoming consultation strategy, which is influenced by the NHS experience of engaging with hard-to-reach groups. In addition, the force uses customer surveys carried out by Peterborough Unitary Authority and Cambridge County Council. However, the questions these surveys pose to respondents are not necessarily specifically related to policing.
- The contract for customer surveys during 2004/05 was awarded on a one-year interim basis. From 2005/06 onwards a new company will carry out surveys and data gathering as part of a collaborative arrangement forming part of the Three Counties Collaboration Project. This should provide the force with more comprehensive and responsive data to feed planning and performance management.
- While survey data has been produced under the current contract, there is little evidence that the findings have been shared outside corporate management circles.
- The force has committed to delivering coterminosity between BCU and local authority administrative areas through Operation Hadrian. Realisation of this project has been deferred and is now forecast for October 2005, with adjustments to iQuanta data expected in April 2006.
- Community safety accreditation schemes are still in the incubation phase; however, noteworthy progress has been made to replace the Peterborough Unitary Authority warden scheme with PCSOs.

1C Customer Service and Accessibility

Poor	Improved
------	----------

Strengths

- The DCC is the force lead on customer relations management and chairs the CRM programme board. The DCC also chairs the constabulary performance challenge; through this meeting senior managers are held accountable for customer service performance.
- The force has recognised that significant improvements can be made in citizen focus and has embarked on a CRM programme to address these issues. The drive behind this programme is to deal with issues comprehensively at the earliest opportunity, to avert further demands for service.
- The Points of Presence project allows BCU commanders considerable discretion in where they locate officers, staff and accommodation to best serve their communities. This allows local latitude in deploying human and capital resources tactically to meet demand.
- The multitude of public telephone numbers affording access to the force have been rationalised into a single non-emergency number, which will make routing calls via the customer service centre more efficient. There has been extensive advertising of this new number.
- Standards contained in the Victim's Charter are fully mainstreamed into criminal justice procedures and now link into the developments instigated by No Witness, No Justice.
- The force has seven mobile police stations, all of which are under the direct control of BCUs for deployment as required. Some BCUs operate a rota to ensure that rural villages get regular visits from a mobile police station. Additionally, there is a converted double-decker bus that can be borrowed from HQ when a reinforced presence is required.
- Citizen focus is a central component of the force-wide Way Ahead programme, which is driven by the DCC and delivered to all members of the constabulary. The ethos has been further developed by measures to instigate cultural and organisational change placing citizen focus at the heart of activity.
- Best practice in relation to citizen and customer focus has been garnered from partnership agencies with specific expertise applicable to the constabulary's objectives. These bodies include the Office for Public Management, the Work Foundation and Beyond Philosophy.
- All sections of the force have defined internal and external customers with ascribed service levels in support of the Making Performance Meaningful programme.
- The force website has been designed to deliver a range of facilities and services that obviate the need to attend or telephone a station. Site visitors can download forms for such things as applications for shotgun licences or jobs with the force. The site also contains frequent watch group updates and sector crime information.

Areas for Improvement

- A customer service centre is being created at Thorpewood police station to provide an enhanced response to callers. Once fully operational, non-emergency calls will be diverted from the FCR to the customer service centre, which will provide a single point of contact for crime reporting. This will liberate crime management

investigation units on BCUs to deal with follow-up enquiries. This integrated system will be fully implemented by December 2005.

- The force is clearly committed to CRM. However, the customer service centre project was devised as a result of internal analysis of problems and did not involve any market research activity or discernible stakeholder participation.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary is a fully participating member of the Cambridgeshire criminal justice board. This enables the force to deliver customer service programmes such as No Witness, No Justice, facilitating witness involvement in trials and court proceedings. There is a pilot witness care unit in place in the central criminal justice unit (CJU) and the trials unit; once fully embedded across all the BCUs, results of a consistent and sustainable high standard are predicted.
- The CRM project requires a significant refocusing of priorities for officers and staff in the force. To support this, a 'walk through' training programme is planned. This will introduce all officers and staff to the concept of customer expectations and requirements.
- When the customer service centre is fully operational the new service will be publicised via a media, marketing and communications strategy. This should both ensure enthusiastic uptake of the service and enhance customer confidence in the force's response to calls.
- The ethos of customer service and focus is to be delivered via force-wide training, but in particular it will be concentrated on customer service centre staff, with the aim of delivering a gold standard to all callers.
- An external consultancy has been instructed to capture customer service data generated by the service centre. It is expected that this information will help refine service delivery and go some way towards bolstering efforts to improve public consultation.
- The three counties project on call handling aims to foster best practice, efficiency and systems congruence among the participants. This project is well supported but has yet to produce tangible operational change, owing to the influence of national projects on the future direction of call handling.
- Levels of satisfaction with customer service are not collected. Targeting service improvements therefore relies on internal observations and interpretations. The ACPO team recognises this situation, and the citizen focus team is conducting a gap analysis to ensure that this aspect of CRM is bolstered.
- Some 53.4% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and road traffic collisions (RTCs) were very or completely satisfied with regard to making contact with police in 2004/05. The MSF group average for the same period was 67.2%. This placed the force eighth out of eight in its group. Again, during the same period 84.8% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were satisfied with regard to making contact with the police. The MSF group average was 88.3%. This placed the force eighth out of eight.
- A total of 41.3% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were very or completely satisfied with the action taken by police in 2004/05. The MSF group average was 54.1% during this period. The force was placed eighth out of eight in its group. Some 69.2% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were satisfied with the action taken by police in 2004/05. The MSF group average was 74.2%. This placed the force eighth out of eight.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- During 2004/05 31.2% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were very or completely satisfied with the way they were kept informed of progress. For the same period the MSF average was 36.8%. This placed the force eighth out of eight. The percentage of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with the way they were kept informed of progress in 2004/05 was 56.1%. The MSF group average was 55.6%. This placed the force fourth out of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2004/05 58.3% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were very or completely satisfied with their treatment by staff. The MSF average was 68.9%. This placed the force eighth out of eight. During 2004/05 87.0% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were satisfied with their treatment by staff. The MSF group average was 87.3%. This placed the force sixth out of eight in the group.
- During 2004/05 46.6% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were very or completely satisfied with the overall service provided by police. The MSF group average was 55.1%. This placed the force eighth out of eight. During 2004/05 71.6% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs were satisfied with the overall service provided by police. The MSF group average was 77.3%. This placed the force eighth out of eight.
- According to the British Crime Survey (BCS), in 2004/05 47.1% of people surveyed thought their local police (Cambridgeshire Constabulary) did a good job. The MSF average was 48.8%, placing the force sixth out of eight in its MSF group. The national average was 48.6%, placing the force 25th out of 42.

1D Professional Standards

HMIC has a statutory responsibility to remain fully informed as to the effectiveness of forces' handling of complaints. Following the transition to baseline assessment, and the high-profile outcomes of three separate national inquiries, HMIs identified the need for a focused inspection of professional standards (including complaints) in each force to provide a robust comparative baseline for ongoing assessments of progress.

In October/November 2005, every force will undergo a focused inspection of professional standards. The programme has been designed in conjunction with ACPO, the Association of Police Authorities, the Home Office and the Independent Police Complaints Commission to ensure that the respective interests of each are addressed and that duplicative inspection activity can be avoided.

The programme of inspections will produce separate public reports and gradings for each force and, in addition, a national thematic inspection report that will consolidate themes, trends and transferable good practice. In view of the scale and timing of the full programme of inspections, the 2004/05 grading for professional standards has been deferred to 2006. As a result, there is no professional standards framework content within this report.

2 Reducing Crime (Domain 1)

Performance across the three functional areas constituting this domain is consistent and promises great progress in the near future. BCU commanders uniformly show great determination to make an impact on hate crime and crimes committed against vulnerable people. This resolve is further supported by the corporate lead offered by the directorate of investigations. The major detractor at this time is the mixed performance in volume crime reduction. The force shows advances in many areas compared with peer forces, but lags behind other members of its MSF group in relation to robberies, violent crime and vehicle crime. BCU commanders also engage constructively in partnerships and in CDRP activity. However, an issue of concern is that there appears to be a need for greater pan-agency orchestration of targets and performance monitoring.

2A Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims

Fair	Improved
------	----------

Strengths

- The reorganisation of crime investigation led to a dedicated victim-centred crime unit headed by a detective superintendent. Within this investigation portfolio is a detective inspector specifically appointed as force lead on hate crime.
- Historically, there has been an inconsistent approach to hate crime across the three BCUs. This has been addressed by creating a model hate crime investigation team on each BCU and bringing them directly under the control of the detective superintendent to ensure corporacy.
- The top ten repeat victims of domestic violence (DV) are always discussed at level 1 tasking meetings to ensure that appropriate preventative measures are taken.
- Whenever a pregnant woman or a child under five is present during an incidence of DV, a referral is made to the community nurse to raise the level of health surveillance.
- The force is fully involved in multi-agency crime reduction efforts. A good example is established joint working with health, education and social services on both the Peterborough and Cambridgeshire area child protection committees.
- On a monthly basis, local community tension assessments are carried out and sent to the ACPO National Community Assessment Team.
- The Open Out scheme has provided more avenues for victims of hate crime to make allegations via third parties. This has seen a 9% increase in allegations. The force regards this as a positive step towards greater confidence in the police.
- Hate crime is a permanent agenda item on both force and BCU tasking and co-ordination group (TCG) meetings. Daily management meetings (DMMs) monitor hate crime reports.
- A central referral unit has been established in the investigations directorate to ensure that referrals regarding children at risk or victims of crime are dealt with consistently and do not get overlooked, as happened when referrals were routed to local stations. This measure is designed to make the process of referral handling more professional.
- The DCC demonstrates a strong lead on DV issues. To this end, reducing DV offences is an objective in the control strategy and a prosecution service level

agreement (SLA) has been signed with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Protocols and working relationships have been established with a host of external agencies such as the NHS, social services, Women's Aid, Outreach and Sure Start to ensure a multi-faceted approach to reducing DV.

- Divisional DV co-ordinators meet regularly with the four DV forums in the force area. One BCU has established a DV advocacy worker post through external funding.
- Northern BCU has received recognition for work to quell and avert racial and community tension between Pakistani and Iraqi Kurdish communities through Operation Pomegranate. These efforts prevented public disorder and promoted community cohesion during a period of heightened unrest.

Areas for Improvement

- The force is not yet actively involved in environmental scanning or forecasting of demographic trends to prepare contingencies for future forms of hate crime. Specifically, there is little appreciation of the likelihood of increased elder abuse in an ageing population. However, the force has entered into discussions with governmental bodies and Cambridge University to find solutions to a problem it is finding difficult to address.
- A new hate crime policy was written in 2004. This policy is now in the early stages of implementation and so its full impact is difficult to assess. However, it is apparent that there is no specific hate crime reduction policy, as the emphasis is on increased reporting and achieving a 65% sanction detection rate.
- The county-wide Preventing Hate Crime group is a sub-group of the local criminal justice board (LCJB), and has been working closely with the diversity unit and divisional hate crime co-ordinators to redefine the partnership approach to reducing hate crime. The force expects significant benefits from revised multi-agency operating procedures.
- Officers dealing with child abuse cases tend to function without reference to other related policing disciplines. This situation has been acknowledged, and it is intended that a realignment of units will establish a paedophile and internet team to cover child abuse issues.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.53 racially or religiously aggravated offences per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this increased to 0.55 offences. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.52 offences per 1000. This places the force fifth out of eight.

2B Volume Crime Reduction

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The DCC is the force lead for volume crime reduction. She has driven volume crime performance to the top of the agenda via the new force crime strategy.
- Crime reporting packs called Beating Burglary Together and Beating Robbery Together have been introduced. These contain standard crime reporting sections, which the officer removes from the pack, plus pages of report references and crime prevention advice, which the officer leaves with the victim.
- There is strong evidence that BCUs use the TCG as the main vehicle to address volume crime reduction. Each BCU can provide examples of how NIM processes support specific operations. For instance, Southern Division has addressed robberies, burglaries and cycle thefts connected to the start of college term.
- The community safety unit oversees all force activity in volume crime reduction, to ensure a corporate approach. This unit also maintains an outward looking perspective to ensure that force efforts are consistent with those of regional partners, with multi-agency methods and with Home Office guidance.
- CBMs at sector, ward and parish level mainly deliver volume crime reduction measures. These officers are trained according to problem-solving models in conjunction with community problem-solving groups.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary enlists the support of numerous agencies in volume crime reduction. Of particular note are the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough distraction burglary and rogue trader taskforce and the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough vehicle crime reduction partnership.
- There is good evidence that the force mounts proactive operations to deal with alcohol-related crimes. These place emphasis on swift intervention to prevent escalation, and target market towns, isolated villages, city centres, the evening economy and seasonal drinking.
- In 2003/04 there were 14.1 domestic burglaries per 1000 households. In 2004/05 this fell to 10.0 per 1000 households. This placed the force third out of eight in its MSF group, where the 2004/05 average was 11.6 burglaries per 1000 households.
- In 2003/04 there were 4.3 violent crimes committed by a stranger per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 3.8 violent crimes committed by a stranger per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 6.0 offences. This placed the force third out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 there were 6.7 violent crimes committed in a public place per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 6.5 violent crimes committed in a public place per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 9.4 offences. This placed the force second out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 there were 1.2 violent crimes committed under the influence of intoxicating substances per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this increased to 1.9 offences per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 4.0. This placed the force first out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 and 2004/05 there were 1.0 violent crimes committed in connection with licensed premises per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 1.4 offences. This placed the force second out of eight in its group.

Areas for Improvement

- Force level targets are set for volume crime reduction, but these are not cascaded to specific BCU or sector level reduction targets. Without differentiated targets it is very difficult to measure the impact of BCUs' policing efforts on overall performance.
- In 2003/04 there were 20.8 violent crimes per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 20.2 violent crimes per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 18.7. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 there were 1.1 robberies per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 0.9 robberies per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.8. This placed the force sixth out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 there were 14.6 vehicle crimes per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 12.6 vehicle crimes per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 12.3. This placed the force fifth out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.48 life threatening and gun crimes per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 0.44 offences per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.36 offences per 1000 population. This placed the force sixth out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 total crime recorded was 109.6 offences per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 100.9 offences per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 93.3 offences. This placed the force seventh out of eight in its group.

2C Working with Partners to Reduce Crime

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- Relationships with CDRPs are managed at BCU level, with good evidence that BCU commanders and their deputies are engaging at a strategic level while sector inspectors and CBMs are delivering services driven by CDRP objectives.
- The DCC is the force lead on CDRPs; strategic direction and delivery is effected via the safer communities directorate, which provides policy lead and support to BCUs and CDRPs on behalf of the force.
- Policing partners such as the drug action team, the youth offending scheme, GO-East, and district, county and unitary authorities contribute to setting CDRP targets. Targets and objectives tend to complement national policing plan and force targets. CDRPs have performance groups to set and monitor these targets; senior officers attend and often chair meetings.
- There is a county-wide information sharing protocol operating between the police and governmental and other policing partners. These organisations attend BCU TCGs on an ad hoc basis and are consulted during the strategic assessment cycle, to ensure that control strategies represent wider crime and disorder issues.

Areas for Improvement

- Operation Civitas has been trialled on Southern Division, aligning delivery of local policing to CDRPs and ward boundaries through neighbourhood policing teams and neighbourhood enquiry teams. Civitas is to be adopted force-wide and will reconcile some boundary peculiarities through force, local authority and political zone coterminosity.
- While CDRP targets are compatible with national and force objectives, CDRPs tend to set their targets without reference to the force as the force does not fully engage CDRPs in planning and priority setting. Complementary target setting could be achieved through better management of the various planning processes.
- There is concern among community safety managers and crime reduction partners about police officers occupying key community policing and partnership roles on a transitory basis, thus hampering the development of effective long-term partnerships.

3 Investigating Crime (Domain 2)

Crime investigation has benefited from a reorganisation of responsibilities and resources via the investigations directorate. This system has become fully embedded over the past 12 months, and has created units of considerable efficiency and effectiveness. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the resilience and expertise that the units have demonstrated in handling a considerable number of major investigations. This indicates that the force has internalised the difficult lessons learnt over the past few years, and has extensively changed investigation practices. There have been positive moves in hate crime and level 2 investigations; these augur well for future high grades from baseline assessment. However, some aspects of performance do need attention – especially in relation to volume crime, where the performance of other forces in the MSF group is overshadowing that of Cambridgeshire Constabulary. The drive to boost sanction detection performance through Operation San Diego and maximised forensic opportunities should ensure that the force achieves a leading position in the MSF group by the end of 2005/06. The force has maintained an excellent record in criminal justice processes, and is given full credit for its efforts with partners to deliver joint programmes aimed at increasing victim and witness confidence and better all-round criminal justice system (CJS) performance. The force accomplished this while still delivering a first rate service to internal customers.

3A Investigating Major and Serious Crime

Fair

Strengths

- In September 2004 crime investigation was restructured to form the investigations directorate. This created several investigation disciplines, each headed by a detective superintendent.
- There is a major investigation team (MIT), which relieves BCUs of murder investigations. In order to form the team BCUs had to donate officers, thus reducing their capacity. A number of murder investigations in 2004/05 have amply demonstrated the value of the MIT by managing investigations without the need to draw resources from BCUs. The MIT is further supported by three new divisional HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) teams.
- Gold groups are routinely used to support the senior investigating officer (SIO) in major investigations.
- The force conducts murder enquiries in accordance with the ACPO murder manual. This includes peer reviews, which can be carried out through the three counties collaboration on major crime project. The practice of bringing a CPS lawyer into murder investigations is now established, adding a further dimension to the review process.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has learnt lessons from recent major enquiries and has devised stringent measures to make sure that SIOs are readily available. For instance, there is a rota ensuring there will always be one of five detective superintendent SIOs on call. The force is seeking to increase the number of SIOs on this rota to further increase resilience.
- Detective superintendents from the specialist departments in the investigations directorate can pass murders they deal with whilst on call to the detective superintendent MIT. However, they often choose to retain ownership to maintain their currency and to balance the workload of the directorate.
- The economic crime unit deals with fraud, asset seizures and computer crime.

During 2004/05 it seized proceeds worth £2.9 million. This will yield a sizeable rebate from the Exchequer under the incentivisation scheme.

- Officers involved in specialist crime have access to further training, specifically the initial management of serious crime and management of linked and series crime courses.
- To augment major crime investigation teams, the PA has made funds available to recruit up to six major investigation administration staff.
- Building upon the restructure of major investigation, the force has carried out a skills gap analysis to ensure resilience and succession planning to support investigative capability in the future. The director of investigations is particularly mindful of the need to develop the next generation of SIOs and major incident room staff.
- Community impact assessments are carried out for all major investigations by sector inspectors on BCUs in accordance with the ACPO murder manual.
- Murders and serious crimes in general are subject to review at every force performance group, with fast-time monitoring conducted at the Chief Constable's weekly management team meeting.
- During 2003/04 the force detected 9.1% of abductions. In 2004/05 this increased to 50%. The MSF average abduction detection rate for 2004/05 was 57.1%. However, the force was still second out of eight in its MSF group.
- During 2003/04 there were 0.3 blackmail offences per 1000 population. During 2004/05 this fell to 0.1. During 2004/05 the MSF average was 0.2 blackmail offences per 1000 population. This ranked the force second out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the force detected 31.8% of blackmail offences. During 2004/05 this rose to 44.4%. The MSF average of blackmail offences detected in 2004/05 was 29.4%. This placed the force third out of eight in its MSF group.
- During 2003/04 there were 0.4 kidnappings per 10,000 population. During 2004/05 the number of kidnappings remained at 0.4 offences per 10,000 population, the same as the MSF average. This placed the force third out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the force detected 43.3% of kidnappings. This rose to 55.2% in 2004/05. During 2004/05 the MSF average was 45.4% of kidnap offences detected. This placed the force joint second out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the force detected 100% of crimes of manslaughter. During 2004/05 this fell to 85.7%. The MSF average for detecting crimes of manslaughter during 2004/05 was 76.0%. This placed the force second out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the force detected 87.5% of murders. During 2004/05 this rose to 100%. The MSF average for murder detection in 2004/05 was 108.8%. This placed the force equal third out of eight.

Areas for Improvement

- The MIT does not have all the trained staff required to operate a murder incident room in strict compliance with murder incident room standard administrative procedures. Certain functions have to be combined at the discretion of the SIO. A business case to acquire more staff to fill the skills gap has been written, but in the meantime if extra staff are needed they can be drawn from the divisional HOLMES teams.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- HOLMES has become the standard method of managing major enquires; however, a recent straightforward domestic murder was managed using the card indexing system. The force readily acknowledges that guidelines for adopting a full HOLMES system have not yet been created. This is desirable in order to justify the rare occasions when another system is chosen.
- There are no tier 5 investigative interviewers in the force. There are a number of detective sergeants qualified at tier 3 who carry out the tier 5 role if necessary.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.15 abductions per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this fell to 0.03. The MSF average for 2004/05 was 0.01 abductions per 1000 population. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.29 attempted murders per 10,000 population. In 2004/05 this rose to 0.33 offences per 10,000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.11 offences per 10,000 population, placing the force last in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 38.1% of attempted murders. In 2004/05 it detected 70.8%. The 2004/05 MSF average detection rate was 80.0%. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the group.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.01 offences of manslaughter per 10,000 population. In 2004/05 this rose to 0.10 offences per 10,000. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.03. This placed the force last in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.11 offences of murder per 10,000 population. During 2004/05 this fell to 0.08 murders per 10,000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.08, placing the force sixth out of eight in the group.
- In 2003/04 there were 3.2 offences of rape per 10,000 population. In 2004/05 also, there were 3.2 offences of rape per 10,000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 2.2. The force was placed eighth out of eight in its MSF group.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 14.7% of rapes. In 2004/05 it detected 21.2%. The 2004/05 MSF average was 26.4%. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the MSF group.

3B Tackling Level 2 Criminality

Fair

Strengths

- Cross-border support in major investigations is formalised via a series of agreements and protocols covering activities such as surveillance, covert operations, test purchasing and financial investigation.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has arrangements in place with Norfolk and Suffolk for mutual aid in major investigations. During the past year the force has received support in relation to murders and has supplied a police search adviser to manage crime scenes in Norfolk.
- Operation Arctic is a joint operation between Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Essex and Suffolk, addressing the shared problem of organised gangs stealing cash machines. Each of the forces provides surveillance resources as the lead force on the operation one week in four. The operation is chaired by the Chief Constable and the SIO is also a Cambridgeshire officer.
- There is substantial evidence of Cambridgeshire Constabulary's involvement in regional meetings and crime groups, most notably the regional TCG, the heads of crime group, regional intelligence group and eastern region computer crime group.
- Surveillance resources are assigned via the level 2 TCG and are directed mainly towards priority crime issues. However, there is a strong commitment to regional collaboration, as illustrated by the undertaking to dedicate the surveillance team to Operation Arctic every fourth week.
- The force collaborates both on a regional basis and even further afield for operations requiring test purchase and undercover deployments. In order to fully reciprocate, the force maintains a pool of test purchase and undercover officers.
- The force has taken a strong lead on illegal hare coursing and hunting with dogs. A senior officer leads on rural crime and works closely with the ACPO rural affairs lead to raise the profile of conflicts between landowners and urban coursers.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary mounts inter-agency operations. One example is Operation Ismene, run jointly with HM Revenue and Customs and the National Crime Squad and directed at internet-coordinated drug trafficking. In addition, the force is the national lead in the area of animal rights extremism. This necessitates close co-operation with other forces and crime agencies.
- The force is able to supply comprehensive data about how it has disrupted organised crime. This data focuses on seizures of drugs, cash, land and various other physical assets. This further illustrates the effectiveness of the force's asset confiscation team and its contribution to level 2 activity.
- In 2003/04 there were 0.42 controlled drug trafficking offences per 1000 population. In 2004/05 this decreased to 0.28 offences per 1000 population. The 2004/05 MSF average was 0.37. This placed the force second out of eight in its MSF group.
- During 2003/04 the force obtained 38 confiscation orders with a total yield of £672,654. In 2004/05 it obtained 24 orders and increased its yield to £2,279,924. This compares with the 2004/05 MSF average performance of 12 orders with an average total confiscation value of £326,770.
- During 2003/04 the force obtained 25 forfeiture orders with a total value of £17,483. During 2004/05 it obtained nine orders with a total value of £8,026. In 2004/05 the

average number of forfeiture orders in the MSF group was 5.9 with an average total value of £6,223.

Areas for Improvement

- The force engages in regular intelligence exchanges with other enforcement agencies such as the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. However, specific data or protocols in support of this have not been produced, which suggests that there needs to be stricter management of inter-agency relationships.
- The force continues to develop its response against cross border/level 2 crime structures. Operation Morpheus has yielded significant results in relation to drug supply. However, operations directed at non-drug-related organised crime are mounted as and when needed, rather than through a structured risk/threat process.
- The force has recognised an operational gap in the provision of witness protection services in organised crime cases. Concerted efforts are under way to rectify the lack of service in this area.
- The force level strategic assessment is in a developmental state and as such only covers level 2 activity beyond the force area superficially. Level 2 intelligence products could be further improved with the application of sufficient resources such as dedicated level 2 analysts.
- Level 2 operations are not conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures or security and integrity policies which govern the handling and use of intelligence.
- There is limited interoperability with neighbouring forces and agencies. However, the Three Counties Collaboration Project seeks to address these issues and it is expected that enhanced functionality will be achieved in 2006. This is especially evident through cross-force communications.
- The percentage of controlled drug trafficking offences detected was 92.2% in 2003/04. This fell to 65.2% in 2004/05. The MSF group average detection rate in 2004/05 was 91.5%, placing the force eighth out of eight. The 2004/05 national average was 91.7%, ranking the force 43rd out of 43.

3C Investigating Hate Crime and Crimes against Vulnerable Victims

Fair	Improved
------	----------

Strengths

- The DCC is the force lead on hate crime. This ensures that hate crime is accorded appropriate importance both at the DCC's performance challenge meeting and in level 2 tasking and co-ordinating.
- Under the restructure of investigations in 2004, hate crime and vulnerable person crime were given a distinct priority with the formation of the victim-centred investigations unit headed by a detective superintendent.
- In the past, each BCU managed its own hate crime investigations. This led to inconsistency, as the victim-centred investigations unit did not directly manage the staff involved. From 1 February 2005 divisional staff have come under the direct professional lead of the investigations directorate, instilling corporacy into the management of hate crime.
- A central referral unit has been established so that cases coming to light via social services can be dealt with in one place. This move is specifically intended to ensure that important cases do not get overlooked and is a good example of the force learning lessons from high profile national cases.
- ACPO guidance on investigating race and homophobic crime is available through the force intranet, along with a force policy on the minimum standards of investigation for these crimes.
- The DCC is the force lead on child abuse investigations. The force displays considerable commitment to the subject, and gives generous funding to the two area child protection committees. A best value review (BVR) of child protection has been carried out and this will lead to a reorganisation to improve service delivery.
- The force has a Missing from Home policy, ensuring that all reported cases are supervised and risk assessed. Inspectors regularly carry out reviews of cases and further monitoring is delivered via the DMM.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 54.4% of racially or religiously aggravated offences. This fell 2.4 points to 52.0% in 2004/05, but was still better than the 2004/05 MSF average of 44.3%, and placed the force third out of eight in the group.

Areas for Improvement

- Each of the three BCUs practises different standards for recording allegations of hate crime. This makes it difficult to gather meaningful data and manage performance across the force. The victim-centred crime unit has introduced a monthly pro forma to standardise returns.
- The new hate crime policy awaits ratification by the force policy compliance board. When the policy goes live it will put in place a force-wide hate crime performance management structure that addresses the inconsistencies of the current locally devised practices.
- Properly equipping staff to investigate hate crime is largely a matter of ensuring that individuals familiarise themselves with published policies. Certain elements of probationer training and investigative interviewing incorporate hate crime, but there is no specific training delivered at this time.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- Vulnerable witnesses and victims are dealt with through the wider criminal justice processes based on No Witness, No Justice. This regime is in its very early stages, so there is not widespread familiarity in the force with the measures available. The force acknowledges this and will address the issue during the implementation of No Witness, No Justice.
- The force has a comprehensive suite of performance indicators relating to detection of child abuse. These have not yet been implemented, as the monitoring tool cannot be used until the force intranet is updated. Once embedded, the data will contribute to a regional performance indicator table.
- A new DV policy has been produced, as promised in the 2003 baseline assessment. However, this still awaits ratification by the force policy compliance committee and so has yet to be implemented.
- Reporting officers have not received any specific training in dealing with DV allegations. Apart from inputs in probationer training, officers and staff are relied upon to self teach by keeping abreast of policy published on the intranet. Specific measures are only applied if the reporting officer includes a 'flag' on the crime report, alerting the volume crime sergeant. However, specialist DV co-ordinators do ensure a quality investigation by monitoring minimum standards.

3D Volume Crime Investigation

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The detective superintendent volume crime is the force lead for professionalising the investigative process (PIP). The force is working through a programme to ensure that all officers and relevant staff are accredited.
- To increase sanction detections the force has devised a new sanction detection policy, which has been published and has now been implemented. The drive to increase both the quality and quantity of sanction detections has been launched under Operation San Diego. This policy is intended to maximise detections and accordingly features a 'taken into consideration' policy devised with the CPS.
- Operation San Diego is enforced by a performance management framework. The DCC holds a weekly performance meeting, which must be attended by the divisional crime manager or higher, to ensure that key decision makers are able to implement policy decisions immediately upon return to their BCUs.
- Furthermore, there is a San Diego database, which is updated on a daily basis. Each division has to report its recorded crime at the end of the day, and the following morning the crime analyst calculates each division's detection rate based on the most recent data. This is published on the web page and shows performance against the 25% detection rate target.
- Volume crime performance is scrutinised at the force performance challenge meeting. At the meeting, BCU commanders are held accountable by the DCC. The investigations directorate volume crime team does not have direct control over the performance of BCUs; instead, it provides the corporate and policy lead. The main means of communication in this capacity is a formal meeting with BCU crime managers.
- To maintain quality control of detections, the force ensures that all aspects of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) have been complied with before a detection is finalised. To this end, an NCRS monitoring checklist is included on every crime report. In addition, the crime registrar carries out regular audits.
- Detective constables are all trained on the initial crime development programme. Additionally, owing to a recognised supervision gap, uniform sergeants have received PIP-based training in crime supervision.
- The force has recognised the connection between sanctioned detections and narrowing the justice gap. In support of this it now has a detections strategy sitting beneath the overall force crime strategy.
- Asset seizures and awareness of proceeds of crime opportunities permeates to front-line officers and staff, who are encouraged to complete initial financial information forms. This is supported by automatic referrals for certain offences generated by the custody computer.
- Volume crime investigation is supplemented on divisions by police staff investigators working alongside detective teams.
- There is a performance management structure whereby BCU commanders hold divisional crime managers to account through performance/TCG meetings. At force level, the DCC holds performance challenge meetings where BCU commanders account for performance. These meetings are heavily supported by iQuanta and historical performance analysis.

- BCUs can bid for specialist resources such as surveillance, technical support and analytical products for volume crime through the level 2 TCG. However, no activity analysis or records are kept of such deployments.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has a specific automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) strategy aimed at denying criminals use of the roads. Performance is monitored via a suite of performance indicators demonstrating that ANPR is deployed on volume crime on a daily basis.
- Under Operation Buchanan, ANPR is deployed via level 2 TCG on operations directed at volume crime. The ANPR team is well resourced, with a total strength of 20 officers deployed in Spectrum vans. Traffic units also have ANPR fitted.
- An SLA operates between scientific support and BCUs, delineating all aspects of service delivery for scenes of crime, fingerprint and photographic departments. BCU commanders and crime managers feel well served by these departments and feel satisfied that they are involved via NIM processes in volume crime matters.
- In 2003/04 24.8% of domestic burglaries were detected. In 2004/05 this fell 1.5 points to 23.3%. However, the force performed better than the 2004/05 MSF group detection average of 19.1% and was placed third out of eight.
- In 2003/04 13.0% of vehicle crimes were detected. In 2004/05 this increased to 13.4%. The 2004/05 MSF average detection rate for vehicle crime was 13.5%. This placed the force fifth out of eight in its MSF group.

Areas for Improvement

- A volume crime investigation strategy is being prepared, although it is some way from being finalised and implemented. It is based on the cradle-to-grave ethos of investigation and will support neighbourhood investigation teams that are the centrepiece of community policing under Operation Civitas.
- The creation of the MIT took detectives from divisions and created an experience gap in local volume crime investigation. This has been recognised, and there is a concerted effort to train officers to level 1 and 2 of PIP to ensure that a quality service can be delivered.
- Standard force-wide targets are devised centrally for volume crime. Hence bespoke targets for detections, designed to generate maximum leverage from BCUs that are able to make the biggest contribution to targets in particular crime categories, are not used. The force appreciates this and intends to introduce differentiated targets for 2005/06. Despite this lack of clarity there is good evidence that BCU commanders hold divisional crime managers to account.
- Under Operation San Diego the force target for sanction detections is 25%. This is cascaded to BCUs, each of which has a local target of 25%. This uniform contribution target does not encourage BCUs to leverage maximum performance in areas where they may be able to exceed the generic target.
- The two main policies affecting the investigation of volume crime are the new detections policy and the investigation policy. The investigation policy is currently out of date and the new head of volume crime is in the process of updating it. It is expected that the policy will cover all crime, but the document will be 90% focused on the conduct of volume crime investigation. The investigation strategy is being developed bearing in mind the provisions of the customer service centre and crime management units which are an integral part of the customer service centre.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- The newly formed quality assurance (QA) team will be directed to inspect and review volume crime management systems to ensure ethical standards and integrity in support of the force's NCRS Green grade and to further improve sanction detections.
- The percentage of notifiable/recorded offences that resulted in a charge, summons or caution or were taken into consideration at court was 14.6% in 2003/04 and rose 3.2 points to 17.8% in 2004/05. However, the MSF average was 23.6%, placing the force last in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 48.9% of violent crime. This fell 0.2 points to 48.7% in 2004/05, worse than the 2004/05 MSF group average of 57.8%. This placed the force last in the MSF group. The national violent crime detection rate for 2004/05 was 49.5%. This rate was higher than the force's and accordingly the force was ranked 34th out of 43 nationally.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 18.7% of robberies. In 2004/05 this increased to 23.5%, a rise of 4.8 points. However, this was still below the MSF group average detection rate of 26.6%, ranking the force seventh out of eight in the group. The force was 27th out of 43 forces nationally, as the national average detection rate in 2004/05 was 19.9%.
- The percentage of vehicle crimes detected in 2003/04 was 13.0%; this rose by 0.4 points to 13.4% in 2004/05, just below the 2004/05 MSF average of 13.5%. Consequently, the force was fifth out of eight in the MSF group. However, the national vehicle crime detection rate was 10.1%; consequently, the force was ranked 16th of 43 nationally.
- The 2003/04 detection rate for all crime was 23.0%. In 2004/05 this rose by 0.4 points to 23.4%. However, the MSF group overall detection rate for 2004/05 was 29.0%, ranking the force eighth of eight in the MSF group. The national detection rate was 25.7% in 2004/05, positioning the force 36th out of 43 nationally.
- In 2003/04 the force detected 48.9% of violent crime. In 2004/05 this decreased to 48.7%. The MSF average violent crime detection rate in 2004/05 was 57.8%. This placed the force eighth out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 18.7% of robberies were detected. This increased to 23.5% in 2004/05. The 2004/05 MSF average detection rate for robbery was 26.6%. This placed the force seventh out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the total crime detected was 23.0%. This increased to 23.4% in 2004/05. However, the 2004/05 average total detection rate was 29.0%. This placed the force last in its MSF group.

3E Forensic Management

Good	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The DCC is the force forensic champion and demonstrates commitment through the forensic steering group and certain items in the force performance challenge group. As part of her ongoing drive to increase performance, the DCC is about to revive a 'maximising forensic opportunities' meeting.
- The importance of forensic science is emphasised by the investigations directorate organisational structure. Scientific services are placed alongside the other investigation portfolios, giving the forensic science services manager parity with detective superintendents and direct accountability to the head of the investigations directorate.
- Contained within the overall crime strategy is the forensic science strategy. This will soon be supplemented by a separate forensic intelligence strategy.
- All scenes of crime officers (SOCOs) are centrally controlled, which means divisional SOCOs can be redeployed if necessary without detriment to the services required by divisions.
- There is an on-call rota for divisional SOCOs, ensuring that BCUs always have out-of-hours cover. In addition, senior SOCOs are on call for major incidents.
- Forensic performance is given prominence at the DCC's performance meeting, where BCU commanders are accountable for dealing with forensic allocations. The forensic science services manager also attends the meeting.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has seven officers funded by the DNA expansion programme.
- The National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) is widely used for identification of impressions along with 'palm track'. There has been a 5% year-on-year increase in the use of NAFIS. However, access to the database tends to limit the use the force can make of the system.
- Forensic awareness and scene management training is given to probationers, detective constables, sergeants and custody sergeants. All officers are provided with an aide-memoire and can contact SOCOs for advice via radio or mobile phone. To reinforce this, scene preservation feedback is supplied to officers and their supervisors on email.
- The forensic science service provides data to BCUs and senior SOCOs in order to maintain high quality in submissions from scenes, criminal justice samples of DNA, and fingerprints. Scene preservation feedback is sent to officers via email. If an officer fails to acknowledge constructive criticism the matter is referred to their line manager.
- The provision of forensic science services by HQ to BCUs and other units is subject to an SLA. This ensures the effective and equitable distribution of resources among BCUs, appropriate staffing of major enquiries, and provision of out-of-hours support. Senior SOCOs have a degree of accountability to BCU commanders through level 1 TCG.
- Identifications and detections generated through forensic investigation are monitored as a permanent agenda item at DMMs. Divisional intelligence units (DIUs) have responsibility for day-to-day management of identifications. Each SOCO and

fingerprint officer is subject to continuous performance monitoring with a range of documents and templates depicting an array of performance indicators.

- During 2003/04 81% of burglary dwelling scenes were examined. During 2004/05 this increased to 89.7%. The 2004/05 MSF average was 88.2% of burglary dwelling scenes examined. This placed the force fourth out of eight in its MSF group.
- During 2003/04 fingerprints were recovered from 33% of burglary dwelling scenes examined. This increased to 45.7% in 2004/05. The 2004/05 MSF average was 41.7% fingerprint recovery from burglary dwelling scenes examined. This placed the force third out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 fingerprints were recovered from 45.0% of theft of motor vehicle scenes examined. This increased to 62.8% in 2004/05, compared with the MSF average of 54.9% for 2004/05. This placed the force second in the MSF group.
- During 2003/04 and 2004/05 DNA was recovered from 27.0% of theft from motor vehicle scenes examined. The 2004/05 MSF average was 21.6%. This placed the force second out of eight.
- During 2003/04 the identification rate from fingerprints recovered at the scene of a dwelling burglary was 27%. This fell to 19.1% in 2004/05, but was still higher than the 2004/05 MSF average of 15.2%. This placed the force second out of eight in its group.
- During 2004/05 36.4% of DNA recoveries from dwelling burglary scenes resulted in a DNA match. The MSF average was 24.1%. This placed the force second out of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2004/05 36.0% of DNA recoveries from a theft of motor vehicle scene resulted in a DNA match. The MSF average was 31.0%. This placed the force third out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 the identification rate from fingerprints recovered from theft of motor vehicle scenes was 27%. This decreased in 2004/05 to 24.8%. The 2004/05 MSF average was 21.6%. This placed the force third out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 59% of fingerprint identifications were converted to primary detections. This decreased to 52.1% in 2004/05. The 2004/05 MSF average was 47.1%, placing the force fourth out of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2003/04, including secondary detections, the total conversion rate of fingerprint identifications to detections was 159.0%. This decreased to 107.8% in 2004/05, compared with the MSF average conversion rate of 100.0%. This placed the force second out of eight in the group.
- In 2003/04 the primary detection rate per DNA match was 68.0%. In 2004/05 this fell to 55.0%. The 2004/05 MSF average was 52.3%, placing the force third in the MSF group.
- In 2003/04 the total detection rate, including secondary detections, per DNA match was 238.0%. In 2004/05 this decreased to 132.1%. The MSF average for 2004/05 was 118.3%. This placed the force second out of eight.

Areas for Improvement

- Although funding is in place for Livescan, purchase of the system has been delayed while a national procurement plan is decided.
- Police officers are generally competent at taking criminal justice DNA samples and

fingerprints. However, a disproportionate amount are rejected due to incorrect paperwork. The arrest documents database should rectify these errors.

- Police officers receive forensic training through designated training programmes such as initial detective courses and probationer training. There is no ongoing, interim or catch-up training for officers otherwise. Good or bad performance is captured on an exception-only basis and fed back to the individual officer or supervisor. Again, the onus is on officers to ensure that they are conversant with policy.
- During 2003/04 42% of theft of motor vehicle crime scenes were examined. This increased to 42.7% in 2004/05. However, the MSF average for examination of motor vehicle crime scenes was 52.1% for 2004/05. This placed the force seventh out of eight in its group.
- During 2003/04 DNA was recovered from 8% of burglary scenes examined. This increased to 9.1% in 2004/05, compared with the MSF average for recovering DNA from burglary scenes of 10.8%. This placed the force fifth out of eight.

3F Criminal Justice Processes

Excellent	Stable
-----------	--------

Strengths

- The chief officer group is fully engaged with criminal justice issues. The Chief Constable sits on the LCJB and the DCC is the force lead on youth justice.
- The force has employed civilian custody detention officers to ensure greater efficiency in custody suites and free up police officer time. In the area of criminal justice DNA submissions these civilian officers are far more accurate and efficient, and have a much lower submission error rate, than police colleagues.
- A CJU central services unit at Thorpewood police station prepares statements and tape transcripts for trials on behalf of officers. The system involves scanned originals being sent to file builders, who type a statement and return it via email to the officer. This greatly simplifies the process.
- Full file building and post-charge enquiries are also carried out centrally, further reducing the burden on front-line staff and reducing delays by process streamlining. There have even been instances of pre-charge support to further enhance case progression.
- CPS shadow charging has been introduced on all three BCUs. The perception of this is that it has improved relations between the force and the CPS, introduced transparency into decision making and encouraged a 'get it right first time' mentality.
- Within the force CJU, performance is managed via the monthly CJU senior management team meeting, which follows the effective trial management programme. All services are mapped against this to identify areas where improvements can be made. The CJU has a hit list of actions arising from its adherence to this regime.
- The force is fully committed to No Witness, No Justice and bringing offenders to justice. It has been assessed as ready to proceed with the pilot case progression unit in May 2005, with case file workers and witness care officers already in place.
- In recognition of the abundance of changes in criminal justice procedures, front-line sergeants have been trained in contemporary supervisory issues, including case file building.
- Each BCU holds a bi-monthly performance management meeting. These address CJS joint performance issues and the police's contribution to LCJB targets, as well as process matters such as cracked and ineffective trials.
- There are monthly cracked and ineffective trials meetings for Peterborough and Cambridge court areas. Owing to the very small number of such cases, each is thoroughly examined and learning is captured.
- The force has forged effective relationships with CJS partners. In one case a court user group recognised that young offender disposal targets were being missed. The group identified a trend in granting extended bail from court, forcing cases beyond the 71-day target. This was fed back to the bench and corrective action was taken.
- The force has established a seamless relationship with the CPS in preparation for mandatory charging. Communication is expedited by a disciplined approach to completing and monitoring form TQ1, and the eradication of handwritten memos from solicitors in favour of emails. This has alleviated communication delays.
- Police National Computer (PNC) operations are subject to a stringent performance

management regime due to the ACC having the ACPO portfolio for the PNC. He chairs the monthly PNC steering group, which deals with performance targets and changes in the PNC. Additionally, there is a quarterly PNC user group, which disseminates good practice and discusses contemporary issues.

- There is a range of policies governing the use of the PNC, which incorporate national guidelines and findings from thematic reports. However, the most impressive document is a PNC marketing plan, which promotes the system's facilities to officers and staff. Each BCU has specific objectives in the marketing plan, and it is via this that vehicle online descriptive searches and property index searches are presented as an aid to investigation.
- Performance in relation to updating the PNC with arrest summons numbers within one day, entering magistrates' court results within ten days and entering crown court results within two days are strictly monitored. An appropriate number of staff are dedicated to data handling, and an efficient information technology (IT) system enables staff to work from the PNC on one computer screen while updating court results from Equis on another screen.
- There is an audit of court results to ensure quality of records; 100% of bail records are reviewed, one in ten arrest summons dockets, 100% of crown court results and 20% of magistrates' court results. In addition, there are ongoing exercises in back record conversion, specifically at the moment to include postcodes on records.
- The force gives offender projects considerable support and assistance in the form of financial grants and seconded staff. Examples of this are the Nene project, Port scheme and drug intervention projects.
- The force is acutely aware that its custody facilities are inadequate for current demand. It has managed to create some extra capacity and use resources to best effect, but in the long term the situation will only be alleviated by the realisation of the three counties joint custody project.
- There is an active force-wide custody user group, which allows wide involvement in the management and development of the custody suites and is an important influence on the three counties work. Internal mechanisms exist for custody staff to share and debate issues.
- Each BCU has a prisoner handling team, which assists in managing demand, acts as a tutoring tool for new officers, ensures file building consistency and – most importantly – contributes to greater efficiency and faster communication in criminal justice processes.
- The target for entering arrest/summons details onto the PNC is 90% within one day. In 2003/04 the force entered 91.8% within one day. In 2004/05 it achieved 90.4%, compared with the MSF average of 78.9%. This placed the force first in the MSF group.

Areas for Improvement

- The three counties joint PFI initiative for the provision of custody suites still has commitment and impetus from the forces concerned, but progress is slow owing to essential scrutiny through central government.
- At the moment custody suites are directly managed by the BCUs where they are situated. Staffing matters and operational activity are accordingly subject to local policy. The custody user group exercises centralised policy making powers, and the plan is to bring the management of all custody facilities under the central control of

the CJU to ensure synchronicity with other criminal justice initiatives. This will ensure alignment when the custody PFI project moves forward.

- Criminal justice and custody functions are split between the safer communities directorate and the investigations directorate. This separates two interdependent branches of the criminal justice process. A unification of the two functions under a superintendent head of criminal justice is expected, but this organisational change appears to have stalled.
- During 2003/04 the force entered 19.9% of court results onto the PNC within ten days. This increased to 38.8% in 2004/05. However, the 2004/05 MSF average for entering court results within ten days was 61.7%. This placed the force sixth out of eight in its MSF group.

4 Promoting Safety (Domain 3)

Baseline assessment identified some good examples of reassurance policing by BCUs; however, the British Crime Survey (BCS) indicates that communities have significant levels of anxiety about crime, which overshadows the good work being done. Notably the force has pursued community-based policing measures through CBMs and PCSOs. There is clear commitment to developing this style and, in conjunction with NIM products, more effectively handling community intelligence and quality of life issues; favourable public opinion data will follow. On a more positive note, Cambridgeshire Constabulary working with partners has driven forward on ASB issues, and this is reflected positively in this domain.

4A Reassurance

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The DCC, holding the force operations portfolio, is the chief officer lead on reassurance. Strategic and operational implementation is the responsibility of the safer communities directorate, with BCUs providing tactical delivery and interface with community groups and partners.
- Local policing priorities drive reassurance activity. Areas of specific emphasis are rural reassurance connected to illegal hare coursing, and fear of crime among the elderly regarding rogue traders and distraction burglary.
- The force has a reassurance strategy, which recognises the value of effective media and marketing in delivering reassurance to communities. The media and marketing department aligns its efforts to the direction laid out in the force control strategy.
- PCSOs are now fully embedded into the operational structure of the force. They work routinely on assigned beats, either alongside police officers or patrolling independently. They are considered as a tactical option in TCG and via daily tasking and briefing. There is widespread appreciation of their value within the force and among policing partners. A strategic board oversees the entire PCSO programme.
- The force has a customer relations project dedicated to enhancing response to demands for service from the public. This illustrates the high priority placed on the effects of accessibility on public reassurance.
- There are specific examples of good practice to promote community reassurance in Peterborough, where the BCU commander holds a monthly consultative group with community members. This group is informed by the community safety inspector and MLOs.
- Northern Division has adopted the ethos of maintaining order and not just simply dealing with crime. It carries out community impact assessments following specific incidents and crimes, in order to respond effectively to local concerns.
- CBMs are utilised according to local policing priorities and are not subject to a force level policy. This allows BCUs flexibility and discretion in resource deployments congruent with devolution to BCU level. However, it does leave an important aspect of reassurance policing outside the reassurance policy.
- Uniformed officers are routinely tasked via the briefing and tasking system, which is updated before the start of each tour of duty. The DMM reviews events and occurrences each morning so that emergent issues can be acted upon and reassurance patrols directed accordingly.

- In 2003/04 28.1% of reported DV incidents involved victims who had reported a DV incident in the previous 12 months. In 2004/05 this fell to 27.7%, which was lower than the MSF group average of 34.3%. This placed the force fourth out of eight in the MSF group.

Areas for Improvement

- While PCSOs are an accepted and valued addition to the policing family, there is a lack of clarity about precisely what incidents they can be deployed to. This causes some frustrations among PCSOs, who feel they could be better utilised and free up police officers.
- The customer relations project has already centralised some customer contact functions, streamlining channels of communication. Once this is fully implemented, callers should experience a single telephonic point of contact for non-emergency calls and a much better service from local stations freed up to manage ongoing demand.
- There is a force policy on uniform patrol, which provides for double crewing of patrols. This policy will need to be reviewed to ascertain whether it complements community-based policing post Operation Civitas.
- Community safety accreditation schemes have not been developed by the force; the main focus of building an extended police family has centred on the expansion of PCSOs.
- There is a large and active Special Constabulary, with a dedicated recruiting officer who has built up a waiting list of new recruits. Members of the Special Constabulary feel that they are overlooked and undervalued since PCSOs joined the force. This has manifested itself in the Special Constabulary being last to get new equipment and training.
- During 2003/04 11.1% of respondents in the BCS said they were very worried about burglary. This fell to 10.2% in 2004/05, which was above the MSF average of 9.6%. This placed the force sixth out of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2003/04 15.2% of respondents in the BCS said they had high levels of worry about vehicle crime. This increased to 15.5% in 2004/05, which was above the MSF average of 11.3%. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the group.
- During 2003/04 23.8% of respondents in the BCS said they had high levels of worry about violent crime. During 2004/05 this decreased to 19.8%, which was above the MSF average of 14.1%. This placed the force seventh in the MSF group.
- During 2003/04 17.0% of respondents in the BCS said they perceived high levels of disorder. This fell to 16.4% in 2004/05, which was above the MSF average of 13.7%. This placed the force sixth out of eight in its group.
- In 2003/04 9.2% of domestic burglaries were of properties that had been burgled within the previous 12 months. In 2004/05 this fell to 7.7%. However, the MSF average was 6.9%, placing the force sixth out of eight in its group.

4B Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour and Promoting Public Safety

Good

Improved

Strengths

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary is engaged with partners to promote public safety. At the highest level this is demonstrated by the Chief Constable's and PA's contribution to the county-wide community safety group, which oversees all CDRPs.
- There is considerable input from the force into the ASB implementation team (ASBIT), a multi-agency group consisting of police, probation service, CDRPs, CPS and youth offending scheme.
- All three BCUs have problem-solving groups focusing on ASB and are accountable to CDRPs. However, problem-solving models and techniques appear to be aimed solely at ASB and do not include wider crime and disorder problems.
- ASB performance is a standing agenda item at both level 1 and level 2 TCGs. BCUs hold performance meetings with sector inspectors, who are held to account for Acceptable Behaviour Contracts and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs).
- The force has comprehensive and embedded ASB policies, which are fully supported by partnership groups. There is a high level ASB strategy covering 19 specific strands. Beneath that is a multi-agency ASB protocol, an ASBO application protocol and an ASBIT protocol.
- Each BCU has an officer in charge of ASB and ASBO applications. Dealing with these issues is solely the responsibility of the BCU, and it manages the process of identifying and targeting ASB through the level 1 TCG. However, the force ASB lead at HQ is readily available to offer policy support and advice to officers on BCUs.
- Performance in relation to ASBOs is measured via the ASBIT. This team meets every five weeks and is chaired by the CPS. It monitors each ASBO and looks for barriers in the application process. The ASBIT is a good illustration of partnership commitment to dealing with ASB; members include six local authorities, the county council, the CPS, the youth offending scheme, the drug action team, CDRPs and the police.
- Each of the CDRPs has an ASB team working closely with BCUs. To enable the CDRP to effectively manage ASBOs, the force has made facilities available for the CDRP ASB team to do certain intelligence searches via the force intranet. The objective is to allow the CDRPs to have access via dedicated terminals once associated security issues have been addressed.
- Roads policing has been devolved to BCUs, with traffic cars being tasked via the TCG. This is in accordance with the current roads policing strategy, which preserves collision investigation as a separate HQ function reflecting the serious and specialist nature of accidents resulting in death or serious injury.
- Roads policing policy is heavily influenced by policing partners, such as the NHS and ambulance trusts, county, district and unitary authorities, the fire brigade and criminal justice agencies. The most notable collaboration effort is the Cambridgeshire camera safety partnership.

Areas for Improvement

- There is no standard force-wide approach to managing ASB through the TCG. ASB issues are incorporated directly into the TCG on Northern Division through CDRP and ASB officer input, while on Southern Division DIU staff highlight issues in the meeting without partnership input.
- When an ASBO is granted the story is given to local newspapers. The force and its partners could find more channels to herald successes and stimulate public interest.
- Roads policing has been devolved to BCUs and this ensures local accountability for road safety matters, in accordance with CDRP objectives. However, it is apparent that traffic patrols are routinely being deployed to other crime calls. This diverts them from their specialist function and seriously diminishes the force's ability to respond to incidents on fast roads.
- Inherent weaknesses in radio communication technology mean that traffic patrols are often unaware of incidents close by on neighbouring divisions that they could deal with. This situation means traffic resources are not maximised in an area where they could offer enhanced public service.

5 Providing Assistance (Domain 4)

While the grades in this domain appear unremarkable, credit must be given to the force for lifting the call management grade from the Poor awarded in the last report. While aspects of performance may still not be class leading, great strides have been made in the internal management of the FCR, leading to a more efficient operation. When the customer relations project is considered, it becomes apparent that a seismic shift is under way in this sphere of activity. Specialist support and roads policing are provided through a combination of HQ units and devolved services supplied by BCUs. Senior officers provide command level leadership through cadres and on-call rosters in such critical areas as firearms operations, public order and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) issues. The force maintains satisfactory firearms capability, but a focused inspection revealed the need to address certain issues to achieve optimum efficiency.

5A Call Management

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- Call handling training is provided in accordance with the HMIC thematic inspection report *On the Record*.
- The DCC is a highly effective lead for call management. She is the chair of the CRM project board, which is a significant piece of work for the constabulary, and has instigated other improvement measures such as external consultants to explore customer satisfaction.
- The force has a call handling strategy based on process mapping and including all forms of communication and access to force services.
- National standards in call handling have been adopted, but measures relating to call handling outside the FCR have yet to be introduced. Performance against 999 and non-999 calls into the FCR are evaluated at the force performance challenge meeting.
- Targets have been set for attendance at the scene of incidents. In order to plug a performance gap, the graded responses A – D were modified to include a B+ category, effectively introducing a sense of urgency into sub-emergency calls and subsequently lifting arrival times and performance.
- There is evidence that front-line officers are able to recognise potential critical incidents, thanks to the mainstreaming of the critical incident definition via the intranet and briefings by supervisors.
- All BCUs review critical incidents and major incidents at DMMs to ensure quality control. Such an approach moves the force closer to being a learning organisation.
- The CRM project has necessitated a thorough examination of services and a reappraisal of how guidance contained in ACPO manuals and HMIC thematics is delivered. However, new systems and methods will be dependent on new ACPO call handling guidelines.

Areas for Improvement

- Deficiencies in call handling and contact management are being addressed by the customer relations project. This will route non-emergency calls away from the FCR by means of a single public number. This will enable the FCR to respond far more effectively to emergency calls.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- A new single force-wide customer service centre is being created at Thorpewood. This will provide a single point of contact for crime and incident reports that can be resolved in the first instance. This will prevent callers being routed around the force to local crime management units that may be unable to cope with workloads. These measures will ensure that the force complies with national standards of incident recording.
- Local crime incident management units will be created to complement the customer service centre. These units will deal exclusively with issues that require further investigation or are otherwise unsuitable for the immediate cradle-to-grave resolution of the customer service centre.
- There is a culture of upward delegation by front-line officers for supervisors, usually inspectors and above, to 'declare' a critical incident. Despite the appreciation of the full range of incidents that can be critical, it tends to be major or resource intensive incidents that are so declared. This denies constables and sergeants the freedom to identify and resolve critical incidents quickly, and acts as a barrier for using critical incidents as a reassurance mechanism.
- For both 2003/04 and 2004/05 Cambridgeshire Constabulary's target time for answering 999 calls was 12 seconds. For 2004/05 the MSF average target was 10.88 seconds. In 2003/04 the force answered 98,065 999 calls within target. This rose to 107,029 in 2004/05, compared with the MSF average of 131,128. During 2003/04 the force answered 85.3% of 999 calls within the locally-set target time. This fell to 84.3% in 2004/05, compared with the MSF average of 89.1%. This placed the force last in the MSF group.

5B Providing Specialist Operational Support

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The DCC is the force lead on firearms and specialist weapons operations. An inspector has the dedicated role of lead practitioner.
- There is an effective on-call rota for SIOs, gold and silver firearms incident commanders, public order officers, police search advisers and hostage negotiators.
- All specialist support for pre-planned operations is directed via TCG mechanisms. Needs identified at level 1 are fed into the fortnightly force level TCG and resources are assigned according to priorities and the control strategy. In addition, both the investigations directorate and the safer communities directorate have annual delivery plans and performance improvement plans to ensure that specialist resources are properly applied.
- Spontaneous operations are co-ordinated by the FCR and out-of-hours coverage is maintained by on-call rosters for specialist firearms, public order and various senior officers qualified in firearms, negotiation, public order, CBRN, etc.
- ACPO guidance on the operational use of firearms is complied with. This is very evident in the gold and silver firearms incident roster, which seeks to give commanders one week in seven on call, striking a balance between regular exposure and workload. Furthermore, the constabulary manages firearm response levels according to a regionally agreed threat assessment template.
- To ensure maximum resilience and to groom senior staff for full on-call duties, chief inspectors act as silver commanders for pre-planned firearms operations.
- There is a holistic approach to learning from experience regarding firearms operations. Debriefing is standard practice; there are regular in-force seminars to spread good practice and share experience, as well as visits to events in other forces to glean new tactics and methods.
- There is a tri-force agreement in place to supply mutual firearms aid. This is governed by an SLA, which requires a commitment from donor forces within one hour.
- The force operates an SLA providing 24-hour cover from two armed response vehicles (ARVs). A commitment to a permanent armed static post will soon expire, and it is hoped that a third 24-hour ARV will be deployed to meet increased demand since the policy change to deploy firearms for officer protection.
- ARVs can be deployed on other non-armed duties via the TCG process. In addition to firearms calls, they also answer A grade calls, receive specific taskings and act in support of ANPR.
- HQ specialist units are not subject to stringent performance reviews. The level 2 TCG does maintain records of deployments, but this does not help in making judgements about unit effectiveness. The new QA team and the centralisation of performance analysts who could carry out specialist unit activity analysis should rectify this situation.
- The operational planning unit manages operations with force-wide ramifications. This unit plays a pivotal role in ongoing operations for hare coursing and animal rights extremism at various locations. Abstractions from divisions are managed on an equitable basis, but it is acknowledged that in a small force operational

contingencies often have to be met with some sacrifices.

- There are good procedures in place to select and train officers for gold and silver firearms commander roles, in accordance with the national police firearms training curriculum and the ACPO manual of guidance on police use of firearms. Officers designated to perform in these roles have regular operational exposure.
- All incidents are debriefed and logs are forwarded for quality approval by the chief firearms instructor and the tactical firearms unit inspector. Identified issues are forwarded to the director of safer communities, for the attention of the DCC. The force is currently producing a good practice policy to cover this area.

Areas for Improvement

- Tactical firearms unit training commitments are of necessity quite heavy, and the quality of training facilities at HQ is deteriorating. Furthermore, vacant industrial areas that have provided useful training environments are due for development and will no longer be available.
- There are clearly defined relationships with external agencies for emergency and contingency planning, but no arrangements or protocols for assistance in the event of critical incidents.
- The force has carried out a threat and risk assessment of firearms use, but there is no clear correlation between the number and deployments of authorised firearms officers, tactical firearms unit officers and firearms incident commanders and the threats and risks identified.
- Procedures for assigning bronze firearms incident commanders and tactical advisers are poor. This was highlighted by a Police Complaints Authority review of police use of firearms between 1998 and 2001. The force has not yet taken steps to address this. There are also weaknesses around the reaccreditation of commanders and tactical advisers, but this is partly due to a lack of national level advice regarding training courses.
- The force conducts community impact assessments on the use of firearms. However, these are not conducted on a regular basis.
- The force is in the process of forming a firearms steering group chaired by the DCC and attended by all gold commanders. This group is to be responsible for force threat assessment, establishment levels, weapons and equipment, training objectives and mutual aid.
- The force has an informal procedure for the reporting of results of formal investigations or reviews to ACPO and the National Centre for Policing Excellence via the chief firearms instructor. Good practice identified in force is also reported in this way. The force is currently working towards a good practice policy, which will formalise the requirement.

5C Roads Policing

Good	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- A roads policing strategy document lays out priorities in a rudimentary form. It clearly states the activities traffic units will engage in, but leaves scope for them to be deployed on other duties.
- A dedicated accident investigation unit operating from HQ deals with fatal and potentially fatal collisions. This unit has its own SIOs and family liaison officers.
- There is good evidence of a multi-agency approach to roads policing. The force works jointly with the Highways Agency and the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency, especially regarding heavy goods vehicles. Six times a year the force engages with Revenue and Customs, the Benefits Agency, the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency and the Highways Agency during Operation Mermaid.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary demonstrates high commitment to the use of ANPR and tasking traffic units through NIM processes to effectively 'deny criminals use of the roads'.
- The DCC is the force ACPO lead on roads policing by virtue of her operational command portfolio. However, the Chief Constable has embarked upon a personal mission to improve safety on the A14. Central traffic functions are within the remit of the director of safer communities, while geographical roads policing is devolved to the three BCUs.

Areas for Improvement

- Roads policing is devolved to BCUs. Frequently traffic units are directed from roads policing duties to deal with other calls for service. While this means that resources are deployable to high priority calls, it also means that traffic units are often unable to respond to incidents on fast roads.
- There are no SLAs that define the core duties of traffic units and establish what services they should provide. This lack of clarity causes frustration for officers deployed on roads policing duties.
- There is no clearly defined set of performance measures to gauge the impact of traffic units on road safety. There is, however, a very strong emphasis on the use of safety camera data.
- There is limited external activity to identify customer needs in respect of roads policing.

6 Resource Use (Domain B)

Resource use presents challenges for the force in two principal areas: resource management and human resources (HR). Both these areas have been assessed through the baseline process and subjected to specialist scrutiny. Toward the end of the assessment cycle it became apparent that measures set in motion promised to recover the situation. With this end in mind, HMIC expects long overdue recruitment of professional finance staff to have a significant and rapid impact on the force and on an HR recovery plan to arrest declining performance. Other areas of resource use are subject to restrictions encountered because of competing demands for funds across the organisation and the inevitable prioritisation that entails. On a positive note, management of resources through NIM products is developing and appropriate systems are well established. Further expansion of NIM methods across broader business areas will produce even greater rewards.

6A HR Management

Poor	Deteriorated
------	--------------

Strengths

- The head of HR and the head of training and development are both members of the FEB. This allows them to participate in high level management decisions.
- In 2004 the PA set up the human resources and training panel. The heads of HR and training and development attend this PA body and provide papers and briefings. The panel supports the dedicated PA lead member on HR issues.
- The head of personnel has regular informal meetings with the PA HR lead as part of the information sharing and consultative ethos of the force and authority.
- During the restructuring of occupational health, staff associations and unions were involved to ensure that changes in the organisation were not detrimental to officers and staff. Most notably, they were able to argue against outsourcing and reducing down to a single welfare officer.
- The ACC has overall responsibility for performance development reviews (PDRs). PDRs are set to coincide with the planning year to ensure that all officers and staff complete them in a timely fashion.
- Attendance management policy consists of BCU/directorate level management of individual sickness/absences with measures such as fast track consultant appointments, operations and physiotherapy to promote a return to fitness. There are a range of preventative initiatives such as occupational health surgeries, flu inoculations and gym facilities.
- The attendance management policy is common to police officers and police staff. It contains clear targets to reduce the amount of sick leave taken. During a period of sickness there are milestones and trigger points at which a supervisor must make contact with the sick person or complete administrative tasks.
- There is a dedicated Special Constabulary support officer. There are a large number of active special constables and more awaiting training. It is estimated that Special Constabulary deployments bring the force £1 million in savings each year.
- Compliance with PDR deadlines is monitored at the DCC's performance challenge meeting. This reinforces the force's stated intention of driving performance and objectives via the PDR process.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has to recruit staff in a competitive regional labour

market. Accordingly, to secure high calibre people, the force has applied enhanced rates and market supplements to some posts and roles. While this may be justifiable, it has created some tensions and disparity between police staff.

- The ACC is the force health and safety lead; his role is complemented by a PA lead member. Health and safety is a PDR activity in all roles and ranks, which keeps it in the mainstream. There are generic force and BCU level risk assessments, which are backed up by an audit and inspection regime. All functions and activities are contained within the corporate health and safety plan.
- During 2003/04 there were 2.1 medical retirements per 1000 officers. This increased to 2.8 per 1000 during 2004/05. The MSF average was 3.1, placing the force fifth out of eight in the MSF group.
- During 2003/04 there were 3.6 medical retirements per 1000 police staff. This decreased to 1.9 per 1000 during 2004/05. The MSF average was 2.3. This placed the force fourth out of eight in the group.

Areas for Improvement

- HR management is separated into two functional areas: personnel, and training and development. (The diversity unit could be seen as a third.) Although these units co-operate, they are essentially independent of each other and report directly to the ACC. This effectively makes the ACC HR director.
- HR management underwent a BVR in 2003. The recommendations from this review have yet to be fully implemented.
- As well as addressing the need to make financial cuts, the HR BVR restructured the provision of services by moving personnel managers from BCUs to HQ. The managers are still linked to BCUs, but BCU commanders no longer have them directly accessible as part of their staff. In order to lessen the impact of losing these key staff, an HR helpdesk has been created and more information is available on the intranet.
- A project is under way to make the HR function more responsive by introducing the equivalent of daily management meetings and tasking and co-ordinating into HR.
- The mechanism for posting senior officers is similar to the historical workforce planning group. This practice ostensibly operates according to negotiation and consensus. However, it lacks transparency – particularly in relation to deciding acting ranks.
- The occupational health unit was restructured in 2004 and as a result the number of welfare officers was cut from three to two. This led to a reduction in support staff in the unit. Since then further staff have left the unit for other reasons, reducing the capacity even further. This may impair the occupational health service to the force.
- The current personnel information system is due to be replaced by the National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) HR during 2005. This will provide better functionality and enable new applications such as the duty management system and the training administration system. A project manager is in place to oversee this transition.
- The force does not yet have a single integrated competency framework (ICF) document for role profiles and job descriptions. However, all police staff posts have an ICF role profile and ICF is incorporated into selection processes. Full implementation of ICF into processes was expected by the end of 2004.

- Officers and staff have the opportunity to seek flexible working practices and career breaks by agreement with their commanders. While there are lots of applications for this, it is thought that few officers use the opportunity.
- The resources board deals with flexible working and career break policies, but does not have access to comprehensive management data. Attitudes to these facilities will be canvassed in the staff survey of April 2005. These facilities are utilised as part of the force's staff retention strategy.
- Arrangement and implementation of flexible working practices are decided by BCU commanders, subject to central guidance. While BCUs are essentially receptive to applications, in reality applicants find that they end up cramming the same workload into fewer hours. This creates a situation where flexible working requires greater productivity for lower remuneration.
- There is confusion between the diversity unit and HR about who deals with positive action and the recruitment of minority group staff.
- In the past the force has made a commitment to achieve Investors in People (IIP) accreditation. There has been a slight change of emphasis because the force no longer has a definite time by which it hopes to be assessed. Instead, it is using IIP as a business process, particularly in relation to PDRs. IIP may also be a consideration when assessing the force for earned autonomy.
- Compliance with the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) is not monitored centrally by the HR department – it is waiting for the duty management system IT solution to provide this facility. The EWTD should be monitored at a local level and there is therefore no corporate lead.
- Over the past few years officers eligible for medical retirement have been retained, creating a situation where police officers on restrictive duties work for extended periods alongside police staff, but for more money. This anomaly is seen as divisive, unfairly favouring police officers over police staff. However, it should be noted that the force is currently assessing options to manage staff and officers whose career trajectory has shifted. Ultimately this may necessitate medical retirements.
- Special priority payments are given to police permanent custody officers, while custody detention officers doing comparable work are not eligible for similar rewards. BCUs do administer local bonus payment schemes but these do not reflect the nature of roles, which are identical across the force. This again highlights disparity between comparable police staff and police officer roles.
- Members of the Special Constabulary feel they are not supported by the force and are an under-used resource. The fact that special constables are the last to be issued with new equipment and receive training illustrates this.
- The force produced a draft workforce plan and workforce planning strategy in 2004. These documents have yet to be approved. Their eventual implementation will improve arrangements for skills and succession planning. Stakeholders feel there is minimal consultation when formulating HR plans.
- There is no costed HR plan, and no single document can be identified as an overall HR strategy or plan.
- There are considerable inefficiencies in HR data handling methods. IT systems are not integrated, and in areas such as absence management there is duplicate and triplicate recording of data on separate systems. This gives rise to opportunities for data inaccuracy.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- The force needs to undertake workforce planning in order to meet future policing needs. There is no corporate knowledge about what skills or qualifications are vested in staff and how these might be matched to future demand.
- HR performance data should be accessible to managers through the force intranet. In practice, managers have limited access to data and the quality of the available data is variable.
- Diversity issues are seen as the responsibility of the diversity unit and are not incorporated into HR processes. This may be due to the diversity unit cherishing its independence by reporting to the ACC, or avoidance of diversity issues within HR. What it does illustrate is lack of diversity mainstreaming.
- The force is concentrating its efforts on ensuring that the PDR system is implemented, and not necessarily on the quality of finished products. Accordingly, while objectives are set according to force priorities, PDRs are still not viewed as a serious vehicle for organisational improvement. However, a concerted effort has been made over the past year to clear the backlog of appraisals: in some cases officers and staff had outstanding reports dating back six years.
- In 2003/04 the average time lost per year through sickness was 92.4 hours per officer. In 2004/05 this increased to 98.3 hours per officer. The MSF average for 2004/05 was 75.2 hours. This placed the force last in its MSF group.
- In 2003/04 the average time lost per year through sickness was 93.9 hours per member of police staff. In 2004/05 this decreased to 77.7 hours per staff member. The MSF average was 63.0 hours. This placed the force seventh out of eight in the MSF group.

6B Training and Development

Fair	Improving
------	-----------

Strengths

- There is a training strategy in place that conforms to Home Office Circular 53/2003. The links with the HR plan, the force and the operational objectives are clearly defined.
- The costed training plan (CTP) plan supports the National Costing Model methodology and requirements and also reflects the cost of external training. All new training bids must now be costed. The performance improvement programme clearly identifies the priority areas for improvement that reflect force, regional and national developments.
- The plan is reviewed monthly by the training planning co-ordinating group, which is the tactical implementation group, quarterly by the PA resource panel and the force resources board, and six-monthly by the FEB. Variations are monitored by the training planning co-ordinating group.
- The performance improvement programme clearly and comprehensively pulls together the priority areas for improvement that reflect force, regional and national developments.
- Revised monitoring arrangements that involve the chief officer level as well as the PA have now been developed. The continuous improvement board will act as programme board and the HR resources board will provide a QA check to ensure that the programme board has taken account of all key issues, and to assist in any re-prioritisation of work. The head of training reports to these groups on a monthly basis.
- There is sound evidence that collaborative arrangements are in place across public and private sector organisations. For example, Peterborough City Council assists with the design of ASBO training and there is joint training with the fire service for scenes of crime.
- There is a good exchange of information at regional level around training needs analysis, design and evaluation, and the Foundations for Change are being managed across the region. There are many examples of shared training with other forces and police organisations. There is also some evidence of intra-force collaboration. For example, the NIM implementation project is linked to the lead trainer for the subject within the force training centre.
- There is good and consistent evidence of effective and efficient PDR completion, with targets being met. The force was planning to migrate fully to the ICF system by December 2004. Role profiles and objectives have now been set and formalised throughout the force, and skill profiling is planned to inform priorities.
- There is a strategic prioritisation model for training that engages both the client and contractor sides, with a weighting attached to the key force objectives. This enables decisions to be made in support of force priorities.

Areas for Improvement

- The training budget has been fixed for the past three years and has not been set as a result of the training planning process.
- Most areas of training are included in the CTP but divisional training across the force has not been included. Next year's plan will aim to capture all training in force.

- There is a developing client/contractor structure in place within the force. Although still embryonic in nature, the head of training, who is a member of the FEB, has clear plans to develop the structure further. The prioritisation board manages decisions, and constant challenge is carried out at ACPO level, adding independence to the decision making and prioritisation process.
- The head of training has responsibility for most of the training conducted within the Force. However, divisional training remains outside her professional management, with divisional staff having 'professional accessibility' to her when needed.
- Tutor units operate across the BCUs, but there are concerns that tutor unit staff are not being provided with the skills necessary to carry out their role. Furthermore, it is felt that there is now an opportunity for tutor units to encompass all staff development.
- There exists formalised, clear and evidenced progress of the recommendations from *Managing Learning* and *Diversity Matters* within the training department. However, there is no evidence of progress of recommendations from *Training Matters* being similarly developed.
- There is little evidence of the above action plans being communicated to all staff.
- The force has made moves to develop some Foundations for Change elements and is leading in marketing and communication. However, lower management is not confident about articulating or identifying the strategic direction in which the training department is heading. They have no apparent knowledge of other strategic departmental issues. This raises the question of the effectiveness of communication among middle and senior management.
- QA processes are developing rapidly, but until recently there has been a lack of application. The force is aiming to introduce a rigorous training QA system. There is a QA and training support team that has the knowledge and skills to achieve the required results.
- Staff development processes are inconsistently applied. There are no performance indicators to assist managers to monitor the process effectively. There are not enough training development officers within the training department to fulfil this function adequately.
- Courses are planned to be evaluated to level 1 and 2. There is a developing level 1 database but little evidence of regular, consistent and formal level 2 evaluations. Level 3 evaluation at the most basic level is carried out via the PDR process. This area is still a source of difficulty for the force. There is currently no obvious level 4 evaluation activity. A structure is being developed.
- The area of community consultation and involvement is one that the force acknowledges requires further development. An independent advisory group administered by the PA is in the process of creation. However, there is broad community involvement across training delivery. With regard to diversity training, for example, a community focus group was set up to assist in the design of half-day stop and search workshops.
- The force has not yet implemented Centrex's *Models for Learning and Development* as part of the developing QA process, but plans to incorporate them into the new system and communicate them to trainers. This is acknowledged as work in progress.

- The 4Cs (compare, consult, compete, challenge) were robustly applied in the original BVR and there is some evidence that the Best Value regime is currently practised, especially in challenging new and existing training. There is a need to improve the approach to consultation and comparison within the training management functions.
- The business planning cycle is not synchronised and does not assist in the effective training planning process. In particular, because of the cycle timing the final CTP is published too late to inform the budget setting process and the force operates on a fixed budget for training. Consideration is now being given to splitting the budget into maintenance and growth sections, allowing more scope for the transfer of unused potential resources.

6C Race and Diversity

Fair

Strengths

- In order to raise the profile of the diversity strategy the head of diversity led a half day seminar for middle and senior managers in the 'Chief's Challenge'. This heralded a departure from the historical approach to diversity in Cambridgeshire Constabulary because it concentrated on disability. The force keeps compliance with the DDA at the forefront of its thinking and enlists the support of external bodies such as the Papworth Trust to drive programmes.
- The diversity unit has been established in its current form since September 2004. The unit is appropriately staffed, with dedicated officers and staff assigned to each of the seven strands of the diversity strategy. The unit is now configured to address both internal and external diversity issues.
- The head of diversity reports to the ACC as force diversity lead and is a member of the FEB, ensuring that diversity issues are represented at the highest levels in the force.
- The DISG is attended by BCU commanders and directorate heads. This ensures that diversity issues are transmitted to senior managers who can appropriately influence local policies and practice.
- The policy compliance group, ACPO and the PA scrutiny panel have subjected the diversity strategy to scrutiny. Among other things, this has ensured adherence to national equality legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights.
- The ACC commissioned a pamphlet on standards of behaviour and conduct, which has been distributed to all officers and staff. This document places significant emphasis on issues of equality and diversity.
- Members of diversity groups sit on the policy compliance group and are an integral part of gateway processes. This ensures that all policies and projects are fully scrutinised from the perspective of diverse sections of the workforce.
- In addition to ACPO members, the diversity unit also maintains close relationships with members of the Black Police Association and Gay Police Association. Officers of these associations are granted duty time to tend to association business and meetings.
- In 2003/04 63.9% of police staff were female. This fell to 63.6% in 2004/05. The 2004/05 MSF average was 63.4%, placing the force fourth out of eight in the MSF group.

Areas for Improvement

- In the past, officers and staff have benefited from community and race relations training. However, there has recently been a paucity of training, and little evidence that the diversity strategy has been effectively implemented for front-line officers and staff. All members of staff are currently undergoing training needs analysis, which will identify individuals who will benefit from diversity related training. Race and diversity have since been included in the DCC's Way Ahead programme.
- The RES is currently under review following Commission for Racial Equality inspections. The force intends to make all policies compliant with the Race Relations Amendment Act by May 2005. This work has been incorporated into the diversity strategy via the race action plan.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- BCU commanders and department heads have been told to delay policies and activities relating to internal equal opportunities and diversity pending implementation of the force diversity strategy. This may inhibit local initiatives and progress and does introduce a feeling of uncertainty around the policy.
- In 2003/04 19.7% of officers were female. This rose to 20.9% in 2004/05. However, the 2004/05 MSF average was 21.9%. This placed the force seventh out of eight in its MSF group.

6D Resource Management

Poor	Deteriorated
------	--------------

Strengths

- While the director of finance is not of chief officer status, he does participate in internal senior management forums as a permanent member of the FEB and a regular attendee at the Chief Constable's management team meeting.
- To enhance budget preparation the finance department is carrying out a full zero base budgeting exercise every three years, rather than perpetually making incremental adjustments to budgets.
- Internal audit reports that the force is good at managing internal and external demands on resources and that general reserves should be equivalent to 4% of net revenue expenditure. In addition, the provisional out-turn position for 2004/05 shows an underspend of £728,000.
- The force is highly committed to regional collaboration. This is especially apparent in the three counties proposal to provide new custody and prisoner processing facilities, procurement and fleet collaboration with the Three Counties Collaboration Project and Essex Police.
- Fleet services maintain a progressive perspective by exploring IT systems congruence with Essex Police, installation of IDR black box recorders in vehicles, vehicle exchange options to meet user needs and a push for diesel-powered cars.
- The ACC chaired a budget gold group with senior staff, the PA and staff associations to manage post reductions predicted because of central grant strictures. This process yielded a definitive establishment figure for police staff contained in the Blue Book. The police staff establishment has since been exceeded.
- During 2003/04 Cambridgeshire Constabulary's spend per 1000 population was £135,900. This increased in 2004/05 to £145,300, which was less than the MSF average of £147,700.

Areas for Improvement

- The director of finance still does not have organisational status equivalent to that of a chief officer. This is an anomaly that makes Cambridgeshire Constabulary one of only two forces in England and Wales that do not confer ACPO status on the director of finance. This prevents the force's effective participation and representation on the national stage.
- For several years the finance department has been under-resourced, with numerous vacancies for professional finance and accountancy staff. This was recognised and the PA released extra funds for recruitment. Despite this there was little progress for over a year, owing to internal machinations.
- The shortage of suitably qualified staff has meant that certain statutory and regulatory functions can only be carried out by a very limited number of staff. This has placed certain staff members under great pressure for a considerable period. This situation is unsustainable.
- With key staff being forced to backfill functions and deliver reactive services to meet obligations, other important work such as budgetary support to BCUs and departments has been given low priority status. Therefore large sections of the force do not receive adequate support from the central finance function. This is

exemplified by 2005/06 departmental budgets still not being fully delivered by June 2005.

- In June 2005 there were 14 accountancy posts in the finance department. Of these, seven posts were vacant, five were filled by temporary staff and only two were occupied by permanent staff. At the end of June 2005, 16 months after the recruiting was agreed, advertisements were placed in national professional journals for these vacancies. Completion of this recruiting exercise will enable the finance unit to deliver across the full range of finance functions.
- Certain budgets are devolved to BCUs. BCU commanders receive support in managing budgetary processes from business support managers on their own staff. However, they do not get sufficient training, management information or accountancy support from the central finance function to maximise the benefits of devolution.
- Audit and data management processes are not always sufficiently maintained. This was evident when in-year virements of cashable efficiency gains could not be satisfactorily proven to satisfy the audit of the 2004/05 efficiency plan.
- Finance information is supplied to the PA scrutiny and audit and finance and resources committees. However, this information tends to be overly technical, voluminous and made available only shortly before the relevant authority meeting. This makes effective scrutiny difficult.
- Financial data is provided by the Integra system, which does not provide complete functionality for users. A supplementary package called Crystal has been introduced to enhance service, but the entire package proves difficult to use, a problem exacerbated by a shortage of training for users.
- The CSS runs a programme developed in-house to provide the management information required, as Integra does not fulfil its requirements. A partial migration to Integra by converting fleet services has left the fleet manager without a budget management facility.
- Due to the lack of staff in the finance department there is not enough capacity to provide value-added services such as activity analysis and activity-based costing. There is insufficient information available to enable optimum deployment of officers to BCUs via the resource allocation model.
- Progress with e-procurement has been slow owing to reluctance on the part of suppliers and fears concerning IT security. However, the force is committed to e-commerce and significant advances are expected.
- There is an appreciation within estate management of the need to embark on an extensive strategic estate modernisation programme, which will support policing in the long term. Progress in this vital area is inhibited, as senior officers have not articulated a long-term vision of operational policing requirements from which the estate management team can develop options. However, an external consultant has reviewed the force's estate requirements in order to position it for future planning.
- There are deficiencies in local management and supervision of the vehicle fleet. This includes unreported vehicle damage and abuse, lack of usage and mileage supervision, and failure to carry out basic user maintenance procedures. This demands an extraordinary maintenance regime by fleet services to keep vehicles safe and serviceable.
- It has been an intention of the force to devolve police vehicle accident budgets and

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

repair charges to BCUs and departments since 2003 in order to reduce costs. This has not yet been done.

- There is no corporate lead on the EWTD. Compliance is the responsibility of individual BCUs and departments. Part of the reason monitoring is not carried out is that there is no adequate system to record hours worked. This capability should be provided by the duty management system, which is a module of NSPIS HR.
- During 2003/04 Cambridgeshire Constabulary spent £70,200 per police officer. This increased to £74,800 in 2004/05, which was more than the MSF group average spend of £72,500 per officer.

6E Science and Technology Management

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- The ACPO IT benchmarking toolkit was completed in 2003. Problems discovered during the exercise have been absorbed into an implementation plan.
- The introduction of any new IT into the force has to form part of a wider business case. Where business process re-engineering calls for an IT solution, a supporting IT project is set up as a complementary sub-project.
- Regular user audits of IT systems are carried out. PNC is audited every eight hours (a technological solution to optimise this exercise is being explored). Unusual and high usage of the internet and external email traffic is also monitored to ensure legal and ethical compliance. System abuse has been detected and rapid remedial action taken. IT security is directed toward compliance with the community security project.
- Information systems/information technology is encompassed by a five-year information management strategy, which is due to run until 2006. A new policy is being written to coincide with the commencement of planning for 2006/07. The current strategy is cognisant of long-term spending plans, but has struggled to incorporate the rapid development of national IT projects.
- Steps to curtail authorised user misuse are complemented by regular IT security audits to identify vulnerabilities to unauthorised access. Other forces and consultants assist in this.
- Procedures for vetting for internal positions, contractors and other employees are in place, with reports going directly to the professional standards department director. HR carries out vetting for new recruits.
- All IT projects are exposed to a gateway review process from the programme/project support office, which reviews the linkages between perceived project benefits and superior force objectives.
- The Chief Constable is the force lead on IT issues, a role he assumed due to its compatibility with his ACPO IT management portfolio.
- A back-up facility situated at Thorpewood police station, which forms part of the customer service centre, caters for business continuity. There are systems in place to ensure that data is not lost during a catastrophic system failure, and detailed plans covering staff roles in the event of a disaster recovery scenario.
- The force does not have fully integrated computer systems because integrated systems limit the adaptability of IT; at this time new applications can be introduced easily. However, to ensure that systems are user friendly they are web enabled so that they can run through the Camnet (the force intranet) single access portal.
- The force operates its own in-house IT department with suitably qualified technical staff who are able to deliver tailor-made IT solutions and provide ongoing support.

Areas for Improvement

- There is widespread dissatisfaction with the functionality of the Intrepid intelligence system. This centres on the levels of accessibility granted to users, which are defined by the system owner; in the case of Intrepid this is the investigations directorate.
- A function of the programme/project support office is post-implementation evaluation

of technology projects. This does not take place and the unit appears to lack the necessary technical expertise to carry out this function.

- Cambridgeshire Constabulary operates around 160 computer applications. These have user-managers who run the systems on a day-to-day basis. The force has vacancies for eight system managers, which impairs effective operation.
- Within the force, IT priorities are decided on the basis of bids made during the budget planning process. However, budgetary planning processes are not transparent and there does not appear to be any rationale for the selection of bids to be carried forward.
- Other technology programmes such as NSPIS and the customer service centre have budgetary primacy over the resolution of intelligence systems shortcomings. However, provision has been made in the 2005/06 budget to address problems with Intrepid.
- The Intrepid intelligence system does not fall within the remit of the IT security department. Instead, it has its own systems manager. However, this post is currently vacant, exposing a potential systems management and security weakness.
- Over the past year there has been a reduction in suitably qualified engineers and managers within the IT sphere. Those in place are appropriately qualified but subject to increasing demands as new IT projects emerge. Staffing resilience could become an issue. Approval for recruitment of new staff to meet needs has been given.

6F National Intelligence Model

Good	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- BCU commanders or their deputies chair divisional level 1 tasking meetings on either a weekly or a bi-weekly basis. BCU commanders then attend the force level 2 tasking meeting, where they can bid for HQ support and funds.
- The force control strategy is reviewed quarterly, with every second review serving as a full redraft. BCUs adopt the main thrust of the force control strategy within their BCU strategies. However, they are also able to include local issues such as rural reassurance, which falls outside of the force control strategy.
- All officers have access to the intelligence database via Camnet, the force intranet.
- Each BCU has a senior analyst, four analysts and a researcher in the DIU. Analysts are also attached to four HQ units. This enables the force to produce NIM products and provide appropriate support to officers and staff.
- The force fully participates in regional intelligence activities: the director of intelligence attends the quarterly directors of intelligence meetings, the DCC chairs the half-yearly regional TCG, and the director of intelligence or deputy attends the monthly regional TCG.
- There is consistency of approach to Regulation of Investigative Powers Act applications, as they are all dealt with by the intelligence detective superintendent. He is deliberately kept off the SIO call-out roster so that he can deal with out-of-hours applications.

Areas for Improvement

- There is limited evidence of community intelligence or quality of life issues being incorporated into NIM products. Strategic assessments and control strategies focus predominantly on crime and criminal intelligence. This is especially pertinent as quality of life issues are fed into the force through policing partners, but do not get transformed into directed tasking unless they amount to ASB.
- Intelligence is managed via the Intrepid system. Users complain that the system is slow and does not expedite intelligence searches, which makes the production of intelligence products laborious.
- Only specific people can input intelligence directly on to Intrepid; patrol officers submit an intelligence pro forma via Camnet, which is processed by an authorised user. This process discourages officers from submitting intelligence.
- When 5x5x5 intelligence assessments were introduced, no formal training was provided. Officers learn through trial and error and this leads to information being rejected through DIU quality control, which further discourages intelligence gathering.
- There is inconsistency in the quality and relevance of daily briefings. Rural officers feel that DIUs produce intelligence focused on urban areas, and most officers agree that community intelligence is a low priority. Officers working at remote stations and those working irregular hours routinely self-brief and go for extended periods without receiving a briefing from a supervisor.
- There is limited involvement of partners in BCU/level 1 tasking and co-ordinating; they usually attend if a salient matter is due to arise. However, on a half-yearly basis

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

when the BCU control strategy is set or reviewed there is far wider consultation and involvement.

7 Leadership and Direction

Throughout 2004/05, Cambridgeshire Constabulary experienced stable and consistent senior management. This contributed significantly to the force's recovery from the challenges brought about by intense media scrutiny and the ramifications of underperformance and major investigations. Indeed, the year ended on a particularly high note as performance was adjudged to have improved so much and be so sustainable that the PSU could disengage from the force. The legacy of this period is an emphasis on performance management, which has seen the implementation of new scrutiny and accountability processes. The net effect is that performance indicators are beginning to display positive bias in many areas. Strategic leadership is undergoing a transformation, which will certainly position the force to better meet future challenges. Cambridgeshire PA and Cambridgeshire Constabulary have jointly agreed measures to ensure a closer and more productive relationship. This involves authority staff being sited at HQ and greater involvement of the PA treasurer. At the same time, the joint clerkship arrangement with Norfolk appears to be coming to an end. While this presents opportunities for Cambridgeshire, an important facet of regional collaboration may end.

7A Leadership

Fair

Strengths

- The Chief Constable, ACC and head of diversity have all recently been trained in the management of critical incidents.
- The force had to reconcile the need for growth posts with an expected smaller central grant settlement than desired. In order to manage this situation the ACC chaired a budget gold group to identify posts that were at risk. 'Budget gold' included the ACPO team, PA, senior managers and staff groups. This led to the issue of the Blue Book, which defined the budgeted establishment.
- Chief officers have undergone several group exercises to develop team spirit and leadership. These include chief officer awaydays and externally facilitated 'blue sky' sessions to encourage creativity. ACPO officers training for SIO and gold firearms commander roles have developed practical skills.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary holds three commendation ceremonies each year in recognition of outstanding work within the force. The DCC invites officers and staff to the performance challenge meeting for recognition of good work. This will soon be supported by a recognition strategy.
- Chief officer visibility is good; the Chief Constable holds 15:1 breakfasts, and the DCC has a programme of leadership seminars and a schedule of unannounced visits to stations for which she sets aside one day a week.
- There is a bonus payment scheme that awards payments of £250 for good work. Staff associations sit on the scheme panel. For exceptional work the Chief Constable can award £500 in the 'above and beyond' scheme.
- The force carried out a full staff/employee survey in April 2005 as a consultation and inclusivity measure to shape future policies.
- Relations between the ACPO team and trade unions appear to be healthy and constructive. Unison representatives have regular formal meetings with the Chief Constable and were involved with the ACC during redundancy discussions in 2004/05.
- The Police Federation has timetabled six weekly meetings with chief officers. The

Federation has also agreed with the Chief Constable that it will be consulted on and allowed scrutiny of all new policies.

- The chief officers, along with selected other senior personnel, meet on a weekly basis in the Chief Constable's management team to review contemporary issues. This promotes cohesiveness among the chief officers, but does create uncertainty around the status and contribution of BCU commanders and department heads involved at board level.
- A policy compliance group has been established to assist in the development of policy making and review. The programme/project support office adds corporacy to the implementation and review of new systems and acts as a focal point for continuous improvement in line with the learning organisation ethos.
- Several mechanisms are used to gauge staff morale. These include feedback through the Chief Constable's confidential line, chief officer surgeries, and regular dialogue with staff associations and unions. A full staff survey will take place during spring 2005.

Areas for Improvement

- A review of the meeting structure resulted in a revised schedule of management meetings. Previously, the force executive group had included BCU commanders and directorate heads. The business of that group is now divided between the FEB and the Chief Constable's management team, which does not include BCU commanders and directorate heads. Members of the FEB regard this new meeting as extraneous, preferring instead to feed their opinions into the Chief Constable's management team via the operations board.
- Many senior staff are members of the FEB, resources board and operations board. This requires considerable time commitments from people, some of whom may have to travel long distances to HQ. Often the business of these three boards overlaps, and there is scope for rationalisation to truncate the business between the boards and make more efficient use of time.
- The discontinuance of the workforce planning group removed the possibility of lack of transparency in the deployment of some senior officers. There is now a tendency to award temporary promotions and postings outside formal selection processes, which undermines staff confidence in appointments. This could be a contributory factor to the preponderance of acting ranks in middle management.
- Officers and PCSOs are routinely briefed and posted together. However, sergeants and inspectors have not been trained in how to supervise PCSOs and are unsure exactly how they can be utilised. This creates frustrations for both PCSOs and supervisors.

7B Strategic Management

Fair	Stable
------	--------

Strengths

- PA members no longer sit on all the force management boards in order that they can maintain a distance from operational matters. However, the authority does maintain its own independent panels and committees and does still attend the force's continuous improvement board, where joint best value matters are dealt with.
- The Cambridgeshire policing plan has been disseminated to the wider community and stakeholder groups through both the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough strategic partnership boards and the Cambridgeshire LCJB. Additionally, publications and policy documents are freely available through the force internet site. The general ethos of the force, 'Helping People and Catching Criminals', is widely articulated and understood.
- Planning is led by the Chief Constable through a programme board, and the director of strategic co-ordination manages force-wide planning issues by means of the project/programme support office. All programmes and projects are scrutinised by the continuous improvement board. The FEB holds regular planning days to support the planning cycle.
- NIM strategic assessments and the control strategy cycle are timed to coincide with the writing of the local policing plan, which is itself derived from the national policing plan. This process tends to be undermined by problems in harmonising BCU plans with CDRP targets. The force is aware of this, and the safer communities director is actively engaging with CDRPs county-wide to find a resolution.
- The force has pursued bureaucracy reduction measures, which have contributed to the 2004/05 efficiency plan. However, whether these have had a substantial impact on operational efficiency is unknown.
- Police reform is led by the ACC and project work is monitored through the continuous improvement board.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has been instrumental in the progression of regional issues and collaboration by establishing the six counties forum. Cambridgeshire Constabulary chairs this body, which acts as a programme board for the eastern region ACPO.
- The force now has an embedded corporate governance structure, which has been audited twice and has shown improvement from the initial assessment of 'limited assurance' to a more recent finding of 'satisfactory assurance.' This progress has been supported by co-operation from external agencies and specifically by tool kits and systems from the Office of Government Commerce.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary has been successful in progressing issues of county and regional importance with central government in areas such as the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister's sustainable communities, police involvement in local planning, and community safety with GO-East.

Areas for Improvement

- While the PA joint clerking arrangements with Norfolk PA work well, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and Cambridgeshire PA have stated the desirability of more daily and routine contact between force and authority. Office space has been allocated at HQ to accommodate permanent staff, to facilitate more efficient communication. This

may signal a separation of clerking arrangements, which will require open and honest debate to execute without detrimental effects and exploit potential opportunities.

- Resourcing deficiencies and the quality and timeliness of information from the finance department casts doubt over the force's ability to work up budgetary plans, which is a clear inhibitor to effective strategic planning.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary is a partner in the three counties project, along with Norfolk and Suffolk. This group aims to collaborate on shared custody facilities (via the PFI project), procurement, call handling and resourcing of major investigations. While progress has been made, there is a need to constantly reaffirm commitment, as the scope of the endeavour makes progress appear slow.
- The force and authority expected workforce reduction owing to a predicted reduction of central grant and inability to raise the precept. Accordingly, they managed this situation with a budget gold process. This, coupled with a better settlement than expected, proved successful. In other areas essential growth posts have been funded, but where extra money has been made available to shore up vital services the force has been slow to maximise opportunities, specifically in recruiting professional financial services.
- The chief officers have recognised that organisational communication channels need to be improved. To this end they have used a BVR of media and marketing to act as the basis for creating high quality internal and external communications. Recommendations from the review are expected to be implemented and delivering improved services by late 2005.
- Cambridgeshire Constabulary is certainly aware of long-term issues such as government plans for regional housing growth. However, there are no formal organs within the force practising strategic environmental scanning. NIM strategic assessments focus heavily on crime matters, failing to identify macro-environmental developments. The force does benefit from some environmental scanning carried out by other forces and shared via collaborative arrangements.

7C Performance Management and Continuous Improvement

Fair	Improved
------	----------

Strengths

- PDRs are being developed as a performance tool for all ranks and roles, with appropriate objectives being set. It is expected that during the forthcoming PDR cycle all personal objectives will be congruent with force objectives.
- The DCC is the force lead on performance management. She has established a robust performance management regime executed through the DCC's performance challenge meeting, where all BCU commanders and operational department heads are held to account. This meeting is based on iQuanta data.
- BVRs are now carried out with an overriding emphasis on areas that can benefit from collaborative approaches, and on functions susceptible to greater service delivery improvements. The Best Value programme is now implemented in a more focused way by a pared-down unit.
- Each of the new corporate governance boards contains a performance management framework for delivery against the respective PPAF domains as standard practice. This helps attendees to make relevant connections and focus achievement of objectives on PSA targets.

Areas for Improvement

- A QA team has been created to sit within the performance management framework. Extra staff are being recruited for the team. Its aim is to quickly assess areas of business that are underperforming or at risk, in line with inspection and review methodologies. A separate unit is then responsible for implementing measures to rectify performance deficiencies. This measure is design to support the force's efforts to achieve objective self-assessment and establish a local level audit and review tool kit.
- Performance analysts have been extracted from BCUs to work at headquarters. While in principle they will still be working on BCU tasks, there is concern that performance monitoring and analysis will suffer on divisions if management teams do not have direct control over dedicated analysts.
- The force performance challenge group is seen as one of the principal mechanisms through which the DCC can demonstrate her operational/performance lead. Recently, the DCC has dealt with the performance aspect of this meeting while the Chief Constable chairs. This has created some confusion among attendees as to who leads on performance.
- There is a clear high-level performance structure in Cambridgeshire Constabulary. However, at BCU level performance management is decided by the BCU commander and senior management team. This leads to a lack of corporacy and makes meaningful intra-force performance comparisons difficult. This is evident in such areas as recording hate and race crime, where the BCUs have different reporting criteria and there are no standard BCU level performance reports.
- Force level performance data is freely available and drives the DCC's performance regime. However, while overall crime figures are available to BCU commanders and indeed used at DMMs and level 1 TCGs, there is no data or management information isolating the performance of teams or individuals and their contributions to higher order targets.

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

- The key performance processes in strategic planning, performance review and NIM functions are not synchronous, in the same way that force, BCU and CDRP plans are not entirely complementary. The chief officers recognise this situation and are fully committed to achieving process alignment. However, this will involve robust process and systems re-engineering and will need long-term commitment.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005

Appendix 1: Performance Tables

1A: Fairness and Equality							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of victims of racist incidents very/completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3a)	N/A	28.9%	N/A	47.7%	8 out of 8	48.6%	35 out of 37
% of victims of racist incidents satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3a)	N/A	64.5%	N/A	73.1%	8 out of 8	71.5%	29 out of 37
% of white users very/completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3b)	N/A	47.4%	N/A	55.7%	8 out of 8	56.8%	36 out of 37
% of users from BME groups very/completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3b)	N/A	35.8%	N/A	46.6%	8 out of 8	44.1%	35 out of 37
Difference between very/completely satisfied rates (SPI 3b)	N/A	11.6 pts	N/A	9.11 pts	N/A	12.7 pts	N/A
% of white users satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3b)	N/A	72.4%	N/A	77.6%	8 out of 8	78.0%	35 out of 37
% of users from BME groups satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3b)	N/A	62.9%	N/A	72.9%	8 out of 8	71.2%	35 out of 37
Difference between satisfied rates (SPI 3b)	N/A	9.52 pts	N/A	4.73 pts	N/A	6.8 pts	N/A
% of PACE stop/searches of white persons which lead to arrest (SPI 3c)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
% of PACE stop/searches of persons from BME groups which lead to arrest (SPI 3c)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Difference between PACE arrest rates (SPI 3c)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
% detected violence against the person offences for victims from BME groups (SPI 3d)	N/A	23.3%	N/A	30.4%	6 out of 7	24.7%	30 out of 34
% detected violence against the person offences for white victims (SPI 3d)	N/A	25.0%	N/A	40.4%	7 out of 7	34.6%	31 out of 34
Difference in violence against the person detection rates. (SPI 3d)	N/A	1.752 pts	N/A	10 pts	N/A	9.9 pts	N/A
Difference between PACE stop/searches per 1,000 white and per BME population	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Racially or religiously aggravated offences per 1000 population	0.53	0.55	3.6 %	0.52	5 out of 8	0.70	27 out of 42
% detected racially or religiously aggravated offences	54.4%	52.0%	-2.4 Pts	44.3%	3 out of 8	36.4%	8 out of 43

1B: Neighbourhood Policing and Community Engagement							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of people who think that their local police do a good job (SPI 2a)	N/A	47.1%	N/A	48.8%	6 out of 8	48.6%	25 out of 42

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

1C: Customer Service and Accessibility							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs very or completely satisfied with respect to making contact with the police (SPI 1a)	N/A	53.4%	N/A	67.2%	8 out of 8	65.9%	36 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs very or completely satisfied with respect to action taken by the police (SPI 1b)	N/A	41.3%	N/A	54.1%	8 out of 8	54.9%	36 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs very or completely satisfied with respect to being kept informed of progress (SPI 1c)	N/A	31.2%	N/A	36.8%	8 out of 8	38.8%	35 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs very or completely satisfied with respect to their treatment by staff (SPI 1d)	N/A	58.3%	N/A	68.9%	8 out of 8	69.5%	37 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs very or completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 1e)	N/A	46.6%	N/A	55.1%	8 out of 8	55.6%	36 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with respect to making contact with the police (SPI 1a)	N/A	84.8%	N/A	88.3%	8 out of 8	87.8%	31 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with respect to action taken by the police (SPI 1b)	N/A	69.2%	N/A	74.2%	8 out of 8	75.4%	35 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with respect to being kept informed of progress (SPI 1c)	N/A	56.1%	N/A	55.6%	4 out of 8	58.5%	26 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with respect to their treatment by staff (SPI 1d)	N/A	87.0%	N/A	87.3%	6 out of 8	87.8%	23 out of 37
% of victims of domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime and RTCs satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 1e)	N/A	71.6%	N/A	77.3%	8 out of 8	77.3%	35 out of 37
% of people who think that their local police do good job (SPI 2a)	N/A	47.1%	N/A	48.8%	6 out of 8	48.6%	25 out of 42
% of victims of racist incidents very/completely satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3a)	N/A	28.9%	N/A	47.7%	8 out of 8	48.6%	35 out of 37
% of victims of racist incidents satisfied with respect to the overall service provided (SPI 3a)	N/A	64.5%	N/A	73.1%	8 out of 8	71.5%	29 out of 37
% of PA buildings open to the public which are suitable for and accessible to disabled people	*	95.0%	*	64.4%	2 out of 7	76.9%	6 out of 38

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

2A: Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes Against Vulnerable Victims							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of domestic violence incidents with a power of arrest where an arrest was made related to the incident (SPI 8a)	N/A	*	*	43.2%	*	55.7%	*
% of partner-on-partner violence (SPI 8b)	*	*	*	81.6%	-	74.1%	-
Racially or religiously aggravated offences per 1000 population	0.53	0.55	3.6 %	0.52	5 out of 8	0.70	27 out of 42
% detected racially or religiously aggravated offences	54.4%	52.0%	-2.4 Pts	44.3%	3 out of 8	36.4%	8 out of 43

2B: Volume Crime Reduction							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% risk of an adult being a victim once or more in the previous 12 months of a personal crime (excluding sexual offences) (SPI 4a)	10.7%	5.1%	-5.6 Pts	6.4%	4 out of 8	5.3%	22 out of 42
% risk of a household being victim once or more in the previous 12 months of a household crime (SPI 4b)	24.2%	23.2%	-1 Pts	18.4%	7 out of 8	17.9%	38 out of 42
Domestic Burglary per 1,000 households (SPI 5a)	14.14	10.00	-29.3 %	11.60	3 out of 8	14.40	17 out of 43
Violent crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5b)	20.81	20.22	-2.8 %	18.76	7 out of 8	22.44	27 out of 42
Robberies per 1,000 population (SPI 5c)	1.08	0.87	-19.3 %	0.77	6 out of 8	1.68	27 out of 42
Vehicle crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5d)	14.62	12.56	-14.1 %	12.29	5 out of 8	13.99	25 out of 42
Life threatening crime and gun crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5e)	0.48	0.44	-7.7 %	0.36	6 out of 8	0.61	22 out of 42
Total recorded crime per 1000 population	109.56	100.93	-7.9 %	93.34	7 out of 8	105.37	25 out of 42
Violent Crime committed by a stranger per 1,000 population	4.29	3.78	-11.7 %	6.04	3 out of 8	9.87	8 out of 34
Violent Crime committed in a public place per 1,000 population	6.74	6.46	-4.1 %	9.36	2 out of 8	13.86	7 out of 34
Violent Crime committed under the influence of intoxicating substances per 1,000 population	1.23	1.88	52.7 %	4.04	1 out of 8	4.16	6 out of 32
Violent crime committed in connection with licensed premises per 1,000 population	1.03	1.03	0.4 %	1.40	2 out of 8	1.44	8 out of 32
% of domestic burglaries where the property has been burgled in the previous 12 months	9.2%	7.7%	-1.5 Pts	6.9%	6 out of 8	8.3%	22 out of 37

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

2C: Working with Partners to Reduce Crime							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% risk of an adult being a victim once or more in the previous 12 months of a personal crime (excluding sexual offences) (SPI 4a)	10.7%	5.1%	-5.6 Pts	6.4%	4 out of 8	5.3%	22 out of 42
% risk of a household being victim once or more in the previous 12 months of a household crime (SPI 4b)	24.2%	23.2%	-1 Pts	18.4%	7 out of 8	17.9%	38 out of 42
Domestic Burglary per 1,000 households (SPI 5a)	14.14	10.00	-29.3 %	11.60	3 out of 8	14.40	17 out of 43
Violent crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5b)	20.81	20.22	-2.8 %	18.76	7 out of 8	22.44	27 out of 42
Robberies per 1,000 population (SPI 5c)	1.08	0.87	-19.3 %	0.77	6 out of 8	1.68	27 out of 42
Vehicle crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5d)	14.62	12.56	-14.1 %	12.29	5 out of 8	13.99	25 out of 42
Life threatening crime and gun crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5e)	0.48	0.44	-7.7 %	0.36	6 out of 8	0.61	22 out of 42
Total recorded crime per 1000 population	109.56	100.93	-7.9 %	93.34	7 out of 8	105.37	25 out of 42

3A: Investigating Major and Serious Crime							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Life threatening crime and gun crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5e)	0.48	0.44	-7.7 %	0.36	6 out of 8	0.61	22 out of 42
Number of abductions per 10,000 population	0.151	0.027	-81.8 %	0.009	7 out of 8	0.016	33 out of 42
% of abduction crimes detected	9.1%	50.0%	40.9 Pts	57.1%	2 out of 8	34.9%	9= out of 43
Number of attempted murders per 10,000 population	0.29	0.33	14.3 %	0.11	8 out of 8	0.14	39 out of 42
% of attempted murder crimes detected	38.1%	70.8%	32.7 Pts	80.0%	7 out of 8	72.7%	30 out of 43
Number of blackmail per 10,000 population	0.301	0.12	-59.1 %	0.19	2 out of 8	0.28	11 out of 42
% of blackmail crimes detected	31.8%	44.4%	12.6 Pts	29.4%	3 out of 8	26.2%	13 out of 43
Number of kidnappings per 10,000 population	0.411	0.4	-3.3 %	0.41	3 out of 8	0.53	24 out of 42
% of kidnapping crimes detected	43.3%	55.2%	11.8 Pts	45.4%	2= out of 8	44.3%	18= out of 43
Number of manslaughter per 10,000 population	0.014	0.096	600 %	0.033	8 out of 8	0.025	42 out of 42
% of manslaughter crimes detected	100.0%	85.7%	-14.3 Pts	76.0%	2 out of 8	119.2%	18 out of 43
Number of murders per 10,000 population	0.11	0.082	-25 %	0.076	6 out of 8	0.138	14 out of 42
% of murder crimes detected	87.5%	100.0%	12.5 Pts	108.8%	3= out of 8	94.5%	13= out of 43
Number of rapes per 10,000 population	3.18	3.23	1.7 %	2.23	8 out of 8	2.65	36 out of 42
% of rape crimes detected	14.7%	21.2%	6.5 Pts	26.4%	7 out of 8	29.5%	38 out of 43

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

3B: Tackling Level 2 Criminality							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Violent crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5b)	20.81	20.22	-2.8 %	18.76	7 out of 8	22.44	27 out of 42
Life threatening crime and gun crime per 1,000 population (SPI 5e)	0.48	0.44	-7.7 %	0.36	6 out of 8	0.61	22 out of 42
Number of Class A drug supply offences brought to justice per 10,000 population (SPI 6c)	0.15	0.12	-22.5 %	0.19	N/A	0.25	N/A
% of all Class A drug supply offences resulting in a caution or conviction that relate to cocaine (SPI 6c)	20.9%	23.8%	13.7 %	17.2%	N/A	21.9%	N/A
% of all Class A drug supply offences resulting in a caution or conviction that relate to heroin (SPI 6c)	3.0%	11.9%	291.5 %	42.3%	N/A	43.7%	N/A
Number of joint operations between the force and NCS	*	*	*	*	N/A	3.94	N/A
Number of joint operations between the force and Revenue and Customs	*	*	*	*	N/A	6.78	N/A
No. of confiscation orders	38	24	-36.8 %	12.0	N/A	43.16	N/A
Total value of confiscation orders	£672,654	£2,279,924	238.9 %	£326,770	N/A	£1,179,340	N/A
No. of forfeiture orders	25	9	-64 %	5.9	N/A	18.21	N/A
Forfeiture value	£17,483	£8,026	-54.1 %	£6,223	N/A	£79,822	N/A
Trafficking in controlled drugs per 1000 population	0.42	0.28	-32.6 %	0.37	2 out of 8	0.45	8 out of 42
% detected trafficking in controlled drugs offences	92.2%	65.2%	-27 Pts	91.5%	8 out of 8	91.7%	43 out of 43

3C: Investigating Hate Crime and Crime Against Vulnerable Victims							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of domestic violence incidents with a power of arrest where an arrest was made related to the incident (SPI 8a)	N/A	*	*	43.2%	*	55.7%	*
% of partner-on-partner violence (SPI 8b)	*	*	*	81.6%	*	74.1%	*
Racially or religiously aggravated offences per 1000 population	0.53	0.55	3.6 %	0.52	5 out of 8	0.7	27 out of 42
% detected racially or religiously aggravated offences	54.4%	52.0%	-2.4 Pts	44.3%	3 out of 8	36.4%	8 out of 43

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

3D: Volume Crime Investigation							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% detected of vehicle crimes (SPI 7e)	13.0%	13.4%	0.4 Pts	13.5%	5 out of 8	10.1%	16 out of 43
% detected of violent crime (SPI 7c)	48.9%	48.7%	-0.2 Pts	57.8%	8 out of 8	49.5%	34 out of 43
% detected of domestic burglaries (SPI 7b)	24.8%	23.3%	-1.5 Pts	19.1%	3 out of 8	15.9%	9 out of 43
% detected of robberies (SPI 7d)	18.7%	23.5%	4.8 Pts	26.6%	7 out of 8	19.9%	27 out of 43
% of notifiable/recorded offences resulting in a charge, summons, caution or taken into consideration at court (SPI 7a)	14.6%	17.8%	3.2 Pts	23.6%	8 out of 8	21.4%	39 out of 43
% total crime detected	23.0%	23.4%	0.4 Pts	29.0%	8 out of 8	25.7%	36 out of 43
% sanction detected of vehicle crimes	11.0%	12.6%	1.6 Pts	12.4%	5 out of 8	9.3%	16 out of 43
% sanction detected of violent crime	20.7%	28.4%	7.7 Pts	37.9%	8 out of 8	34.3%	41 out of 43
% sanction detected of domestic burglaries	21.7%	20.9%	-0.8 Pts	17.2%	2 out of 8	14.3%	8 out of 43
% sanction detected of robberies	17.2%	21.3%	4.1 Pts	24.0%	7 out of 8	17.2%	28 out of 43
% detected racially or religiously aggravated offences	54.4%	52.0%	-2.4 Pts	44.3%	3 out of 8	36.4%	8 out of 43
Number of notifiable/recorded offences resulting in conviction, caution or taken into consideration at court (SPI 6a)	12629	12875	1.9 %	18995	N/A	27381	N/A
% of notifiable/recorded offences resulting in conviction, caution or taken into consideration at court (SPI 6b)	14.9%	17.5%	2.6 Pts	21.8%	7 out of 8	20.7%	38 out of 42
Number of Class A drug supply offences brought to justice per 10,000 population (SPI 6c)	0.15	0.12	-22.5 %	0.19	N/A	0.25	N/A
% of all Class A drug supply offences resulting in a caution or conviction that relate to cocaine (SPI 6c)	20.9%	23.8%	13.7 %	17.2%	N/A	21.9%	N/A
% of all Class A drug supply offences resulting in a caution or conviction that relate to heroin (SPI 6c)	3.0%	11.9%	291.5 %	42.3%	N/A	43.7%	N/A

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

3E: Forensic Management							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Burglary Dwelling - % scenes examined	81.0%	89.7%	8.7 Pts	88.2%	4 out of 8	85.4%	18 out of 42
Theft of motor vehicle (MV) - % scenes examined	42.0%	42.7%	0.7 Pts	52.1%	7 out of 8	40.1%	31 out of 42
% fingerprint recovery from burglary dwelling scenes examined	33.0%	45.7%	12.7 Pts	41.7%	3 out of 8	32.1%	9 out of 42
% fingerprint recovery from theft of MV scenes examined	45.0%	62.8%	17.8 Pts	54.9%	2 out of 8	48.9%	6 out of 42
% DNA recovery from burglary scenes examined	8.0%	9.1%	1.1 Pts	10.8%	5 out of 8	8.2%	19 out of 42
% DNA recovery from theft of MV scenes examined	27.0%	27.0%	0 Pts	21.6%	2 out of 8	20.1%	9 out of 42
% fingerprint identfs from recovery at burglary dwelling scenes	27.0%	19.1%	-7.9 Pts	15.2%	2 out of 8	16.8%	14 out of 42
% DNA matches from recovery at burglary dwelling scenes	*	36.4%	N/A	24.1%	2 out of 8	35.5%	20 out of 42
% DNA matches from recovery at theft of MV scenes	*	36.0%	N/A	31.0%	3 out of 8	38.3%	24 out of 42
% fingerprint identfs from recovery at theft of MV scenes	27.0%	24.8%	-2.2 Pts	21.6%	3 out of 8	27.9%	24 out of 42
% conversion of fingerprint identfs to primary detections	59.0%	52.1%	-6.9 Pts	47.1%	4 out of 8	45.3%	17 out of 41
% conversion of fingerprint identfs to total detections (incl. secondary)	159.0%	107.8%	-51.2 Pts	100.0%	2 out of 8	82.5%	9 out of 41
% DNA primary detections per match	68.0%	55.0%	-13 Pts	52.3%	3 out of 8	49.5%	17 out of 42
% DNA total detections per match (incl. secondary)	238.0%	132.1%	-105.9 Pts	118.3%	2 out of 8	88.7%	7 out of 42

3F: Criminal Justice Processes							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Number of notifiable/recorded offences resulting in conviction, caution or taken into consideration at court (SPI 6a)	12629	12875	1.9 %	18994.5	N/A	27380.9	N/A
% of notifiable/recorded offences resulting in conviction, caution or taken into consideration at court (SPI 6b)	14.9%	17.5%	3 Pts	21.8%	7 out of 8	20.7%	38 out of 42
% of arrest summons entered onto the PNC in one day (target 90%)	91.8%	90.4%	-1.4 Pts	78.9%	1 out of 8	82.0%	4 out of 43
% of court results entered onto the PNC in 10 days	19.9%	38.8%	19 Pts	61.7%	6 out of 8	54.5%	36 out of 43
Number of sanction detections	11,674	13,111	12.3 %	20,556.0	N/A	27,659.4	N/A
PYO's arrest to sentence within 71 day target (from COMPASS)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Prosecution Team performance measurement - using COMPASS data	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Management and targeted execution of warrants (COMPASS)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Implementation of pre-charge advice and monitoring of 47(3) bail (COMPASS)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

4A: Reassurance							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
BCS Fear of Crime (% very worried about burglary) (SPI 10a)	11.1%	10.2%	-0.9 Pts	9.6%	6 out of 8	11.3%	22 out of 42
BCS Fear of Crime (% high levels of worry about vehicle crime) (SPI 10a)	15.2%	15.5%	0.3 Pts	11.3%	7 out of 8	12.5%	34 out of 42
BCS Fear of Crime (% high levels of worry about violent crime) (SPI 10a)	23.8%	19.8%	-4 Pts	14.1%	7 out of 8	15.1%	37 out of 42
BCS Feeling of Public Safety (% high levels of perceived disorder) (SPI 10b)	17.0%	16.4%	-0.7 Pts	13.7%	6 out of 8	15.8%	28 out of 42
% of reported domestic violence incidents that involved victims of a reported domestic violence incident in the previous 12 months.	28.1%	27.7%	-0.4 Pts	34.3%	4 out of 8	37.8%	12 out of 34
% of domestic burglaries where the property has been burgled in the previous 12 months	9.2%	7.7%	-1.5 Pts	6.9%	6 out of 8	8.3%	22 out of 37

4B: Reducing Anti-Social Behaviour and Promoting Public Safety							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Number of RTCs resulting in death or serious personal injury per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled (SPI 9a)	*	6.79	*	5.03	*	5.69	25 out of 35
Number of RTCs resulting in death or serious injury per 1,000 population	*	0.79	*	0.55	7 out of 7	0.51	32 out of 34

5A: Call Management							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
The local target time for answering 999 calls (secs)	12.	12.	0 %	10.88	N/A	11.1	N/A
Number of calls answered within local target time	98,065	107,029	9.1 %	131,128	N/A	254,988	N/A
% of 999 calls answered within locally set target time	85.3%	84.3%	-1.1 Pts	89.1%	8 out of 8	87.3%	30 out of 39

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

5B: Providing Specialist Operational Support							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Total number of operations involving the authorised deployment of Authorised Firearms Officers where the issue of a firearm was authorised	104	241	131.7 %	190.1	N/A	378.5	N/A
Number of operations where the officers have not commenced operations before being stood down	98	113	15.3 %	20.3	N/A	22.5	N/A

5C: Roads Policing							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Number of RTCs resulting in death or serious personal injury per 100 million vehicle kilometres travelled (SPI 9a)	*	6.79	*	*	7 out of 7	5.69	25 out of 35
Number of RTCs resulting in death or serious injury per 1,000 population	*	0.79	*	0.55	7 out of 7	0.51	32 out of 34

6A: Human Resource Management							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
Number of working hours lost due to sickness by police officers (SPI 13a)	92.39	98.33	6.4 %	75.20	8 out of 8	70.57	33 out of 37
Number of working hours lost due to sickness by police staff (SPI 13b)	93.90	77.69	-17.3 %	63.02	7 out of 8	63.72	29 out of 37
Medical retirements per 1,000 police officers	2.12	2.82	32.8 %	3.13	5 out of 8	2.9	20 out of 39
Medical retirements per 1,000 police staff	3.58	1.94	-45.9 %	2.3	4 out of 8	2.16	15 out of 39

*This data was not available at time of publication

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

6C: Race and Diversity							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of police recruits from BME groups (SPI 12a)	5.6%	2.0%	-3.6 Pts	3.5%	N/A	3.9%	N/A
% of people from BME groups in the economically active population of the force area (SPI 12a)	N/A	4.6%	N/A	4.5%	N/A	8.0%	N/A
Ratio of BME groups resigning to all officer resignations (SPI 12b) (white officers: BME officers)	1: 3.09	1: 2.09	-32.6 %	1: 1.15	7 out of 8	1: 1.47	27 out of 37
% of female officers compared to overall force strength (SPI 12c)	19.7%	20.9%	1.2 Pts	21.9%	7 out of 8	21.2%	22 out of 42
% of female police staff compared to total police staff	63.9%	63.6%	-0.3 Pts	63.4%	4 out of 8	62.3%	19 out of 42
% of white police officer applicants appointed	*	*	*	24.5%	N/A	26.9%	N/A
% of BME police officer applicants appointed	*	0.0%	*	12.2%	N/A	24.0%	N/A
Difference in % of applicants appointed	*	*	*	12 pts	N/A	2.8 pts	N/A
% of female police officer applicants appointed	*	0.0%	*	26.2%	N/A	29.1%	N/A
% of male police officer applicants appointed	*	0.0%	*	21.8%	N/A	24.2%	N/A
Difference in % of applicants appointed	*	0	*	4.3 pts	N/A	4.9 pts	N/A
Difference between voluntary resignation rates of male and female officers	1: 0.61	1: 1.58	157.6 %	1: 1.72	4 out of 8	1: 1.41	26 out of 39

6D: Resource Management							
Indicator	2003/04	2004/05	Change	MSF Ave 2004/05	MSF Rank 2004/05	National Ave 2004/05	National Rank 2004/05
% of police officer time available for frontline policing (SPI 11a)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
% of time spent on frontline duties (including crime prevention activities) by all police officers and staff (including CSOs)	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
% of police officer time spent on visible patrol	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
% of police officers in operational posts	86.1%	84.9%	-1.2 Pts	91.4%	8 out of 8	88.2%	38 out of 41
Total spending per police officer	£70,205.91	£74,792.49	6.5 %	£72,463.30	N/A	£121,668.41	N/A
Total spending per 1,000 population	£135,855.91	£145,318.64	7 %	£147,656.39	N/A	£320,496.85	N/A

*This data was not available at time of publication

Appendix 2: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

ACC	assistant chief constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	automatic number plate recognition
ARV	armed response vehicle
ASB	anti-social behaviour
ASBIT	anti-social behaviour implementation team
ASBO	Anti-Social Behaviour Order
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic command unit
BME	black and minority ethnic
BVR	Best Value Review
CBM	community beat manager
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CDRP	crime and disorder reduction partnership
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CJS	criminal justice system
CJU	criminal justice unit
COMPASS	a national information technology system for tracking, managing and recording caseload information
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

CRM	customer relations management
CTP	costed training plan
DCC	deputy chief constable
DDA	Disability Discrimination Act
DISG	diversity integrity steering group
DIU	divisional intelligence unit
DMM	daily management meeting
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
DV	domestic violence
Efficiency Plan	Government requires each force to make measurable efficiency gains of at least 2% per annum
EWTD	European Working Time Directive
FCR	force control room
FEB	force executive board
Gender Agenda	an ACPO/Home Office initiative to promote equal opportunities for women in the police service
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HOLMES	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
HR	human resource
ICF	integrated competency framework – an amalgamation of the national competency framework and the national occupational standards framework
IiP	Investors in People

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

iQuanta	a web-based tool for policing performance information and analysis, developed by the PSU of the Home Office
IS/IT	information services / information technology
Level 2 Criminality	criminal activity that takes place on a cross-boundary basis
LCJB	local criminal justice board
MAPPA	multi-agency police protection arrangements
MIT	major investigation team
MLO	minority liaison officers
MSF	most similar forces – a way of grouping forces to which each police force can be compared that has similar social and demographic characteristics
MV	motor vehicle
NAFIS	National Automated Fingerprint Identification System
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standard
NCS	National Crime Squad
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NSPIS	National Strategy for Police Information Systems
PA	police authority
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PCSO	police community support officer
PDR	performance development review
PFI	private finance initiative

*Cambridgeshire Constabulary – Baseline Assessment
October 2005*

PIP	professionalising the investigative process
PNC	Police National Computer
POCA	Proceeds of Crime Act 2004
PPAF	police performance assessment framework
PSA targets	Public Service Agreement targets – these have been agreed between Government departments and HM Treasury. Police forces are expected to make a significant contribution to achieving several of these targets.
PSU	Police Standards Unit
PYO	persistent young offender
QA	quality assurance
RES	race equality scheme
RTC	road traffic collision
Sanction detections	offences that are detected by way of charge, summons, caution, fixed penalty for disorder or offences admitted on a signed 'taken into consideration' schedule
SGC	specific grading criteria
SIO	senior investigating officer
SLA	service level agreement
SOCO	scenes of crime officer
SPI(s)	statutory performance indicator(s) – used to monitor key aspects of police performance and form a critical component of performance assessments. SPIs are set each year following consultation with partners in line with powers under the Local Government Act 1999. Also known as 'best value performance indicators'.
TCG	tasking and co-ordination group

Volume crime not a technical term but normally refers to high incidence vehicle crime, burglary and in some areas robbery