

HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY

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# *Report*

OF HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY **2002-2003**

Laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department  
Pursuant to Section 54(4) of the Police Act 1996

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed - 4 December 2003



**REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF  
INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY**

FOR THE YEAR 2002-2003

Queen Anne's Gate  
London SW1H 9AT

**THE RT HON DAVID BLUNKETT**

*Secretary of State for the Home Department*

I present my report upon the police forces of England and Wales  
for the period 1 April 2002 - 31 March 2003

**SIR KEITH POVEY**

*QPM BA(Law)*



## **STATEMENT OF PURPOSE**

To promote the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through inspection of police organisations and functions to ensure:

- agreed standards are achieved and maintained;
- good practice is spread; and
- performance is improved.

Also to provide advice and support to the tripartite partners (Home Secretary, police authorities and forces) and play an important role in the development of future leaders.

## **VALUES**

We will fulfil our remit in a professional, objective and impartial manner.  
We will be firm but constructive and communicate clearly and frankly.  
We will approach our tasks with the utmost integrity and respect the personal confidentiality of discussions held during the course of inspection.

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# Foreword

HER MAJESTY'S CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY  
SIR KEITH POVEY QPM BA (LAW)



*The year under review has been one in which the Police Service has been subject to significant pressures in terms of improvement in performance, reform and modernisation, and delivery against a range of targets. This is in addition to the requirement to rise to a series of challenges in relation to terrorism, major criminality and public order. In general, the service can be proud of a year of substantial achievement and progress, but there is still much room for improvement.*

*The Government is committed to overall improvement in all public services with a clarion call of "Delivery, Delivery, Delivery". In the Home Office, that has translated into a highly focused and much more sophisticated scrutiny of police performance involving close monitoring of outcomes and unrelenting pursuit of achievement of targets. Underperformance has been clearly identified and subject to laser-like examination. HMIC are key players in this scenario.*

*I welcome this focus on performance, but caution against any over-emphasis on statistics without the necessary contextualisation, which is best provided by the professional judgement of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. We have the experience and the credibility to give objective assessments of overall performance, clearly identifying shortcomings or otherwise in the ability of a force or Basic Command Unit to raise its game.*



In what follows, I attempt to throw what I might call informed light on a number of significant issues and important considerations for the Police Service – both during this year and in the future – alongside the overwhelming need to ratchet up performance. An overarching requirement is the need to press ahead with the reform and modernisation programme and to deliver 21st Century policing services to a public that is increasingly being led to expect such improvements.

Substantial progress has been achieved in implementation of the first stages of reform, with record resources being made available to the service. The National Intelligence Model has been adopted by all forces, the National Centre for Policing Excellence has now been set up, the police family has embraced the new concept of Community Support Officers and their useful contribution to crime reduction and public reassurance and the priorities of the National Policing Plan are firmly embedded in local policing plans. The next stage of modernisation has already been articulated by the Home Secretary under the banner of civil renewal, about which more later.

The emphasis on police performance is here to stay, and Chief Officers, BCU Commanders and other deliverers of service will continue to operate in an environment where they can expect their contribution to performance outcomes to be closely monitored, with those responsible for underperformance being held accountable for any shortfall.

For all the efforts that have been expended by the Service on improving performance and meeting targets, the quality of individual officers' and forces' responses to the public at time of need remains of central importance. All too easily, the positive and substantial progress that has been made can be jeopardised by a sloppy or inconsiderate – that is to say, unprofessional – encounter. These find ready expression in the media, leaving the Service with further ground to recover in its quest to reassure the public. I remain concerned that these incidents continue to be all too frequent occurrences and look to supervisors to insist on a customer-focused service in all our dealings with the public.

From left to right: Peter Todd MSC. Ken Williams CVO CBE QPM BA. Sir Ronnie Flanagan GBE MA. David Blakey CBE QPM MBA DL. Sir Keith Povey QPM BA(Law). Mike Franklin. Peter Winship CBE QPM MA(Oxon). Robin Field-Smith MBE MA MCIPD. Tim Hollis QPM. Kate Flannery BA CPFA.

### **ISSUES FACED BY THE SERVICE IN 2002/03**

**PERFORMANCE** Overall, the Service enjoyed another year of successful performance against national and local targets, as Chapter 1 confirms.

The big "headline" crime areas – burglary, robbery (including street crime) and vehicle crime – show that the Service is meeting the challenge with some outstanding achievements in crime reduction in these key areas. However, other forces have not fared so well and it is these that need to do better to close the performance gap.

Chapter 3 describes the emerging Home Office police performance monitoring and management regime, which of itself demonstrates the Government's determination to drive up performance and to narrow the gap between the lowest-performing and highest-performing forces.

It is also a stark reality that the Home Secretary's intervention powers (described in Chapter 3) put HMIC in the position of being required, should it be necessary, to describe a force or a BCU as inefficient and ineffective in order to trigger statutory intervention. I should say that it is my earnest intention as Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary to avoid triggering those intervention powers if at all possible. Rather, it is my objective to see that performance is sustained and improved in those areas where concern is expressed, and we will continue working with forces to establish significant and enduring performance improvements. However, the prospect of the Home Secretary intervening in the ways in which he is permitted remains a very real one, and HMIC will not hesitate to trigger that intervention where continual underperformance requires it.

# Foreword

HMIC has not been immune to these new pressures. So that we can offer the greatest impact and the most support, we are implementing our new inspection methodology, as Chapter 4 describes. For the same reasons, we have begun to adopt a more open and forthright description of individual force performance, first finding expression in our report on Nottinghamshire. I believe that David Blakey's clear exposition of the difficulties then being faced by that force have helped the force and its observers understand better the way forward out of those difficulties.

**POLICE REFORM** I have already briefly mentioned progress on reform. During the past 12 months, the Police Service has been actively embracing the principles of that reform programme, implementing the first phase of its requirements and preparing for the longer-term modernisation proposals. Some of these changes, not least in pay and conditions of service, have proved to be complex and have required senior managers to work ever more closely with the Staff Associations and with Police Authorities to establish clarity. Even so, some of these changes have not been universally welcomed by officers, and this is particularly true of special priority post payments.

We are already providing regular reports to Home Office Ministers about the Service's progress in implementing many of the 39 strands of the reform programme. I should say from the outset that the Service is to be commended on the way the reform programme has been adopted wholeheartedly as a major strategic change exercise. Increased police numbers and the use of Community Support Officers have been notable successes; and while some forces have yet to be persuaded of the direct benefits of some reform strands, and some strands require further Home Office support and/or funding to progress further, I am confident that the programme is making positive progress.

In this context, I note the recent issue by the Home Office of its consultation paper on the future direction of police reform "Policing: Building safer communities together".

**CIVIL RENEWAL AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT** The Police Service has a crucial role to play in creating safe environments within which communities can thrive, and this is central to much of Government policy. The Home Secretary regards strong, empowered and active communities as essential for people to lead self-determined, fulfilled lives.

The Police Service and its partner organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors must continue to work together and find innovative ways of building safer communities: it is important to keep up the momentum and build on what has been achieved so far, not least on tackling street crime and anti-social behaviour. HMIC's contextualisation of performance data will help indicate the extent to which forces are dealing with the civil renewal agenda and identifying ways in which crime can be prevented and reduced by fostering sustainable communities in which criminal activity is not tolerated.

That communities wish to hold their local police to account for their performance is, in my view, a positive development. Increasingly, forces are engaging more closely with their communities, listening to and responding to their interest in influencing how they are policed and how policing priorities are determined and delivered. Civil Renewal will form a major part of the next phase of reform and modernisation.

**LEADERSHIP** One theme of the reform programme is the increasing Government wish to develop the leadership capacity at all levels of the Police Service. I must say that the velocity of movement among the top three ranks in the Police Service, which started last year and continued into this year, is something which concerns me. I believe it is quite right that there should be a constant flow of new blood into the chief officer ranks, and that there should be movement within those ranks so that new challenges enthuse officers continually and so that ideas born out of experience are spread throughout different forces. However, I am witnessing a considerable drain of experience, particularly at the top of the ACPO pyramid: 26 appointments (three at Chief Constable level) were made in 2001/02 and a further 50 appointments (including 15 Chief Constables) during 2002/03.

A significant feature of the Government's broad interest in police leadership issues has been a Home Office consultation exercise about getting the best leaders to take on the most demanding challenges in the Police Service. This project has taken the form of a major review of both cultural and structural issues at the top of the Service, looking specifically at:

- identifying the best leaders and potential leaders, and helping all senior officers manage and develop their careers appropriately;
- making sure that the right people are in the right jobs nationally, and that they are rewarded properly for the jobs they do;

- enhancing mobility among senior officers to increase dynamism at the top of the Service; and
- expanding experience at the top of the Service to ensure that as many new ideas are being brought to bear as possible.

Implementing the outcomes of this review will be of major importance to many aspects of policing, not least ensuring that the top teams in forces have the range of skills and abilities particular to each force's policing situation, and that talent is recognised, developed and rewarded. I look forward, through my Chairmanship of the Police Leadership Development Board, to HMIC playing a major part in this exciting development.

**ORGANISED CRIME AND POLICE STRUCTURES** As I note throughout this report, police performance in dealing with "everyday" criminality has been extremely encouraging; and the concentration of resources by various agencies on major international crime has similarly begun to realise significant returns. However, as regards (Level 2) Cross Border criminality, I believe the Police Service could be better placed to respond. This form of criminality may affect a group of Basic Command Units, neighbouring forces or a group of forces. Issues will be capable of resolution by forces, perhaps with support from the National Crime Squad, HM Customs and Excise, the National Criminal Intelligence Service or other national resources. Key issues will be the identification of common problems, the exchange of appropriate data and the provision of resources for the common good. Some forces, particularly the smaller ones, are ill-equipped to deal with the sort of menace that major criminals now pose. This is not that there is no significant amount of energy, effort and will in those forces, but rather that they face real difficulties in meeting the challenge this generates. A major catalyst in encouraging the Service to address this challenge is the review, commissioned by the Prime Minister, of the way the Service is structured to deal with serious and organised crime. This focus on the 'top end' of criminality, together with the concentration on civil renewal and empowerment of communities at grass roots level, generates a requirement to consider whether the national law enforcement agencies are effectively structured to tackle Level 2 criminality, major public disorder and high-profile cases at force level.

The time is right to open the debate on whether the 43 separate forces in England and Wales, 20 of which comprise less than 2,000 officers, can be sustained in the face of a growing and changing workload and an ever-accelerating reform and modernisation programme.



## **CONSULTATION THROUGH COLLABORATION**

In Dyfed-Powys Police, the Carmarthenshire Citizens' Panel comprises 1,200 members of the public, who are used as a representative group for consultation surveys. A full-time co-ordinator's post has been created in the force's Corporate Services Department, with one quarter of the costs being funded by the Police and the remainder by the two other partners: Carmarthenshire Local Health Board and Carmarthenshire County Council. The Panel has been active for a year and has been used for seven surveys to date, including one carried out as part of a Best Value Review of the Police Authority. This is a good example of effective collaboration with the Health Service.

# Foreword

This is a controversial subject, and I hesitate to enter this particular arena, discussion in which has been vigorous in the past, but it may now be necessary to contemplate a restructuring of forces. In the past, this has been controversial largely in that the logic for amalgamation was based solely on organisational and geographical configurations. That is not my proposal here, rather the pragmatic need to focus energies requires radical thinking about restructuring. Serious consideration must be given to enhanced delivery of policing services and whether the present structure is the most effective to achieve that delivery. I expect to see this debate move forward over the next 12 months, especially in the context of the second phase of the police reform programme and its focus on tackling serious and organised crime.

## **SIGNIFICANT CASES**

**TERRORISM** Clearly, the most significant feature of policing life this year has been dealing with the terrorism threat posed by the fall-out from the Al Qa'ida attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

It is a pleasure to record how valiantly the Police Service has risen to this particular challenge and how quickly it adopted new ways of working to counter these new threats. One example of this was the discovery of a facility to produce the deadly toxin ricin in the heart of London. The Metropolitan Police had to move quickly to contain and isolate this threat, both operationally and chemically; organise and administer the appropriate forensic examinations; and then secure other evidence for consideration by the prosecuting authorities.

All this has called for better access to, and better use of, intelligence about present or imminent terrorist threats. At the same time, there has been the need for more overt activity to demonstrate and underline the Police Service's readiness to respond to these emerging threats. An excellent example of this has been the police command of military units at Heathrow Airport, in response to a reasoned belief that the airport could be a target of a major terrorist operation. The safety of life, limb and property was secured; and disruption to the free travel of business and private passengers and damage to the United Kingdom's economic and financial welfare, were all kept to a minimum. These were important objectives to achieve.

However, it is a fact that these requirements to respond to such intelligence and incidents, and as a result reassure the public, are expensive and take place at a time when resources are already desperately needed to tackle more fundamental crime reduction problems.

**HOMICIDE** A sad event which had enormous significance to the Police Service was the abduction and murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in Soham, in Cambridgeshire in August 2002. As ever in such tragic circumstances, my heart goes out to the families of those children, who were so cruelly robbed of their futures. Murder of children is thankfully a rare occurrence: paradoxically, that makes cases like Holly and Jessica stand out as significant moments in policing. While I still cannot comment on the case itself at this moment, it clearly raises issues of public safety and security, which are no less important than those which claimed the Police Service's attention after the terrorist incidents in the United States.

What arises from significant cases like this for my regional HM Inspectors is the need to reflect in their assessments of individual forces' overall performance, the effort which must (and quite rightly) be directed to the resolution of such cases. In this particular case, a small, rural force was confronted with an extremely expensive and harrowing investigation. The HMI observed in the report of his subsequent inspection of Cambridgeshire Constabulary that: "the effect on policing in the county has been enormous. It is the largest and most challenging investigation in the history of the Constabulary. It has required mutual aid from many other constabularies and Her Majesty's Inspector pays tribute to Chief Constables for the quality of staff they sent to assist. The effect of such a large-scale inquiry is not just felt by the inquiry team. Those members of staff retained on sectors have to shoulder an increased workload to maintain a quality service, and it is only realistic to identify the difficulties in maintaining performance in such circumstances."

The case of Millie Dowler, a 13-year-old girl who went missing in Walton on Thames in March 2002 and whose body was found six months later in Yatley in Hampshire, is an equally tragic and disturbing case. This too placed tremendous resource requirements on a relatively small force. Despite the sterling efforts of so many officers, the perpetrator has yet to be caught and convicted.

## **SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS**

As well as the Police Service response in particular cases, there is also much to say about the larger operations which have been conducted in the past year and which, again, have attracted media attention. I have space to mention only a few examples.



# Foreword

Operation Ore involved the investigation and consequent arrest of those suspected of purchasing images of child abuse via the internet. In this operation, a particular feature was the sheer number of suspects (around 6,000). The publicity given to this case has, hopefully, had a significant deterrent effect on those who believe that any form of transaction across the internet is in some way outside the scope of the criminal law or beyond the reach of the UK police. It is also worth remembering that many of these images are of brutalised children and that, as in many forms of crime, there are people prepared to make a profit from the suffering of others. Let them beware!

Another major call on the Police Service's time and resources was the industrial action taken by firefighters nationally. Here, public safety was paramount to the Police Service, and resources and expertise were deployed alongside the armed forces to ensure, as far as was possible, that public safety was secured. I pay tribute once more to all those officers involved, who in difficult circumstances worked together to achieve a major success in safeguarding the public.

The Police Service's concern about the prevalence of gun crime was brought, tragically, into yet sharper focus by the horror of two young women being gunned down in cold blood on the streets of Birmingham in the early hours of New Year's Day 2003. I am particularly saddened by the loss of young life resulting from these murders: further tragically emphasised by the attrition among rival gangs, which appears to be a feature of the gun crime culture. As I note later, we are conducting an investigation into the illegal use of firearms, and I will report on the findings of that thematic inspection in my next Annual Report. In the meantime, I am pleased to note the volume of firearms handed in during the Government's firearm amnesty. However, I am under no illusion that a significant level of covert ownership of firearms continues. This will be a major challenge for the Police Service.

These major incidents, operations and cases necessarily divert scarce police resources away from the sort of everyday crime problems which the public sees and which they also wish dealt with. These will clearly have an impact on overall performance, not easily reflected in tables of data. I am expecting our new methodology for inspections – Baseline Assessment – to draw out more clearly the drain on resources which these major activities have and the impact on performance generally.

## HMIC

The HMIC top team has seen a period of welcome stability during 2002/03, with no change of personnel during the period under review. However, Mike Franklin left us this summer as the Assistant Inspector of Constabulary (Race and Diversity), on his appointment as Commissioner for the North-West in the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Mike brought a refreshing perspective to his work in HMIC, and I know he will enjoy similar success in this new organisation.

Ken Williams has been awarded the Commander of the Victorian Order in the Queen's Birthday Honours List, recognising his achievements whilst Chief Constable of Norfolk in ensuring the safety and security of the Royal family when resident there. This is a rare award for a police officer and he is to be congratulated.

We know that, as an Inspectorate, we must constantly be looking at our own performance and at our own strategies and policies. We have been sharpening our administrative processes: writing Health and Safety and Race Equality strategies; designing our own Human Resources strategy; and securing further re-accreditation as an Investor in People. I regard all these developments as essential if we are to continue to be able to look the Service firmly in the eye and go about our business of improving performance.

We have devoted much time in developing, trialling and refining our new baseline methodology, which is described more fully in Chapter 4. This methodology will ensure that our contribution to the police performance improvement regime is at its highest level.

A new and demanding requirement placed on regional HMIs has been the need to conduct Performance and Development Review Appraisals with Chief Constables. This is a new step, and one which is central to the Government's wish to enhance the leadership skills of the most senior police officers in the Service. I will report next year on the first round of this process.

I am fortunate in having colleagues in HMIC who are devoted to our work and objectives. I offer my personal thanks to them and my congratulations on a vast array of work well done.

## HOME OFFICE

The Home Office, which continues to be our sponsoring Department, has been undergoing massive change, principally brought about by the Prime Minister's





and the Home Secretary's wish to see improvements in performance in the Criminal Justice services and in the Home Office itself. Delivery targets are now of paramount importance to top officials in the Department, which now operates under a "Working in 3D" (Delivery, Delivery, Delivery) banner.

In this connection, the Home Secretary felt it wise to set out his present expectations of HMIC in a remit letter. I welcomed the clarity which this expression of my remit brought about. I set this out in full in Appendix III.

A preoccupation of the Home Office in this year has been, as part of the Police Reform Programme, the outcomes of the Bureaucracy Task Force as part of its determination to tackle the administrative burdens and inefficient working practices which keep police officers off the streets. The Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce was commissioned to give the Government a Police Service view of what could be done to achieve this, reporting in September 2002 and contained over 50 recommendations about how the presence of police officers in communities might be increased. An action plan to implement most of the recommendations has now been published. The onus is now on forces to deliver by:

- eliminating unnecessary paperwork and other avoidable pressures on front-line officers;
- investing in modern technology;
- making the most effective use of support staff; and
- simplifying and streamlining operational procedures which link into those of other Criminal Justice System agencies.

The Government has now set up a steering group, co-chaired by ACPO and the Home Office, to take these recommendations forward. It will work with all key stakeholders, including Government, to reduce bureaucracy in police stations, on the streets and in court, and to see that non-policing work is conducted by other agencies. Working with the steering group, the Police Standards Unit (PSU) and HMIC are currently drawing up a structure for evaluating the implementation of Taskforce recommendations, including benchmarks against which forces can evaluate their own progress.

The PSU continues to work in parallel with HMIC. I look forward to working with the Unit's new Director, Paul Evans. PSU and HMIC have both worked with the Research Development and Statistics Directorate (RDS) to improve police data and to minimise the burden on forces of the collection of this data;

and have worked jointly with others to develop the performance management regime described in Chapter 3. HMIC's ability to contextualise data within this regime has been a satisfying feature of our work this year.

I am looking forward to fostering the new relationship which HMIC is forging with the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE). NCPE's role in ensuring that the Service uses the best investigative techniques to raise detection rates and reduce crime complements HMIC's role in assessing forces' performance against agreed targets. I wish Sir David Philips well in his new career at the head of NCPE.

I continue to enjoy close, productive and fruitful working relationships with the heads of other Inspectorates and with HMIC Scotland, Sir Roy Cameron. Our mutual interests are clear and understood.

## **RACISM**

As we go to print, I have been shocked and dismayed by the racist attitudes and behaviour recorded in the BBC television documentary "The Secret Policeman". These same feelings of revulsion, disgust and disappointment have been experienced throughout the Service. They have been matched, however, by ACPO's robust response. HMIC and the Service are already working alongside the Commission for Racial Equality in its investigation into residual racism in the police. I am determined that no stone will remain unturned.

## **CONCLUSION**

*In total, therefore, a further year of significant challenges for the Police Service and its partners and associates. As I write, it is ever more certain that the appetite in Government for reform, modernisation and improved performance is far from satisfied. The public, too, demands more from its public services. The Service has made substantial progress towards meeting these ambitions and is increasingly well-placed to continue to make progress. However, there is still much to do. HMIC stands ready, as it has done for almost 150 years, to support the Service in achieving excellence.*

# Chapter 1

## Police performance and achievement

It will already be apparent to the reader that this Annual Report majors on performance, delivery and achievement throughout the Police Service. If anything, the Government's interest in raising the performance of all public services has hardened during the past year, and it is quite right that the Police Service - a service very much in the public eye - should be committed to ensuring that it optimises its performance, despite the complexity of the challenges faced.

As I have already noted, 2002/03 was similar to the preceding years, in that new and evermore demanding pressures confronted the police. This chapter sets out how the Service performed during the year in confronting those difficulties and rising to those challenges. Much remains to be done, of course, and during the next few years, the Service will have to evidence that the substantial investment by the Government in policing has resulted in demonstrable and sustainable improvements in performance. In my last report, I emphasised the importance of the Service developing links to evidence the investment of resources in policing and the outcomes that are achieved. I make no apology for returning to this theme. The need is evermore pressing in those forces whose current performance is disappointing. A particular difficulty faced by the Service is the public perception on the one hand that police performance is stagnating, and on the other hand that crime levels are rising. Neither of these statements are true, as I hope what unfolds in this chapter will confirm.


However, I should say that I remain troubled about the gap that lies between the highest- and the lowest-performing forces. Others, not least the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister, are similarly anxious. There will, inevitably, be variations in performance - reflecting, alone, the different policing situations which confront forces. But it is the size of the variation which gives rise to concern. The less well-performing forces must set about raising their game: the new performance monitoring regime described in Chapter 3, and HMIC's central position in it, will assist.

Most of HMIC's work is founded in police-recorded crime statistics, adjusted where necessary for changes in recording practices. Alongside this is the British Crime Survey, through which the Home Office reaches a separate assessment of the crime experienced by the public. References to both are made in what follows, as it is felt that this provides a more comprehensive picture of crime in England and Wales.

### PERFORMANCE

Two figures usefully summarise the general position.

**FIGURE 1**  
Notifiable offences recorded by the police in 2002/03



First, Figure 1 demonstrates the range of offences which were recorded by the Police Service in this year. As can be seen, there are five primary areas where the vast majority of offences take place: burglary, violence against the person, vehicle crime, other theft offences and other property offences. From this diagram, it is apparent that, proportionally, robbery, drug offences and sexual offences are far fewer. However, and this goes some way to explaining the public's fear of crime levels, these are matters which genuinely trouble the public and in which the media takes a somewhat disproportionate, but understandable, interest.

The total number of crimes recorded by the police in 2002/03 was just under 5.9 million: this represents a decrease of 3% after accounting for the effects of the new National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) (see below). British Crime Survey 2003 figures illustrate that the risk of becoming a victim of crime is one-third lower than in 1995.

**FIGURE 2**  
Percentage change in recorded crime between 2001/02 and 2002/03




Figure 2 illustrates how recorded crime (unadjusted for the effect of the NCRS) has changed between last year and this year. What is certain is that some of the Government's targeted crime areas – burglary, vehicle crime and robbery – are showing reductions. British Crime Survey figures indicate that, since 1997, burglary has fallen by 39% and vehicle-related thefts by 31%. This is particularly heartening, as it demonstrates how the Police Service, working in partnership with other agencies focusing resources on particular problems, can bring about positive and significant change. The robbery figure is especially significant, having been substantially influenced by the Street Crime Initiative – as mentioned in Chapter 2.

I need to add a little about the effect of the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard. All police forces in England and Wales adopted the NCRS by April 2002, although some had moved in this direction a little earlier.

The standard was developed by ACPO following the identification by them and by HMIC of wide variations in crime recording by different forces. The focus of the standard has been to harmonise police forces' approaches to crime recording in order to improve confidence in the recorded crime statistics and to enable a more robust comparison of police performance to be undertaken.

The NCRS was expected to increase the number of crimes recorded. The Home Office estimates that the national picture for total crime demonstrates an overall NCRS impact of 10% on the recorded crime statistics for 2002/03. In other words, the crimes counted in 2002/03 were 10% higher than they would have been under pre-NCRS recording, reflecting a change in recording practice not a real increase in crime. Overall, the effects in 2002/03 have been:


- Burglary +3%;
- Robbery +3%;
- Criminal damage +9%;
- Theft +9%; and
- Violence against the person +23%.

The impact on vehicle theft was estimated using a different method from other offences because most forces were unable to provide incident numbers relating specifically to these types of theft. The result is an adjustment to the change in recorded vehicle thefts from 2001/02 to 2002/03 from -1% to -9%.

Figure 2(a) illustrates the percentage changes in recorded crime between 2001/02 and 2002/03, using NCRS-adjusted figures and data gleaned from the British Crime Survey.

# Chapter 1

**FIGURE 2(a)**  
Percentage changes in the main offence categories, 2001/02 to 2002/03



Recorded crime figures in Figure 2(a) have been adjusted for the effects of the NCRS.

More statistical data is given in the tables in Appendix V to this report. In considering the performance shown in these tables and elsewhere in this report, the following points need to be borne in mind:

- unlike previous years, all the recorded crime data shown in these tables has been collected directly from forces by the Home Office's Research, Development & Statistics Directorate (RDS). Previously, HMIC itself collected this data: placing our data collection needs centrally in the hands of RDS has meant that any possible difference between figures provided by forces to HMIC and RDS has been eliminated; and the burden on forces for providing data has been halved. RDS has been instrumental in developing this chapter of my report, for which I am grateful. Unless indicated

otherwise, all statistical tables and figures are drawn from RDS's Crux-Matrix database. The data is the best available at the time and is believed to be accurate, although subsequent verification may occur;

- in comparing individual forces' performance, as shown in these tables, care needs to be taken. Forces differ in size, population, demography and style - clearly, the challenges that arise in urban policing may be very different from those faced by more rural forces. The Chief Constable's operational independence means that the allocation of resources and the delineation of priorities will properly differ from force to force;
- in a connected sense, comparative performance must also reflect the different volume of offences across offence categories which may be faced by different forces;
- forces' resource inputs and budget allocations vary, and this may have clear effects on performance; and
- performance needs to be measured and assessed, and contemplated over time. Inevitably, even though a period of 12 months is involved, the data in the tables nevertheless represents something of a "snapshot". HMIC is in the business of contextualising data of this kind as a natural by-product of its inspection activity, setting out to advise forces, Ministers, the Home Office and others about the direction of travel and rate of acceleration of performance in each force.

Some of these difficulties can be overcome by comparing the performance of most similar forces and BCUs. The Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) now allows for much more sophisticated comparison of performance - a necessary precursor to the identification of those forces having most to achieve in performance improvements (see Chapter 3).

## PUBLIC SERVICE AGREEMENT TARGETS

Each Government Department - and therefore each public service - has been set high level targets of performance improvement. These find expression in Public Service Agreements (PSAs). The primary objective for the Police Service for the three years of the 2003/06 National Policing Plan is to deliver improved police performance, which will, in turn, contribute to the overall reduction of crime, the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour. To achieve these goals, the Police Service must work in partnership with other national and local agencies in support of crime reduction; continue to develop better



## **FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED - PROTECTING OLDER PEOPLE IN THEIR HOMES**

In the Metropolitan Police's Southwark Basic Command Unit, in South London, two retired Police Officers ran a partnership and jointly funded initiative to tackle the prevalence locally of distraction burglaries committed on elderly residents. The scheme identified possible future targets through demographic analysis and liaison with Social Services. A dual purpose alarm was fitted so that anyone walking to the front door crossed a beam, which triggered the device inside the house, reminding the resident to set the attack chain on the front door and to ask callers for identification. The device also had a panic button, which, via the telephone line, contacted a call centre to request assistance and made the telephone line "live", allowing the device to transmit the words being said in the vicinity so that the operator could gauge what was going on if the householder could not or was prevented from speaking, or was in some jeopardy. This scheme also provided a neck-worn device whereby residents who fell or became ill could summon assistance through the same mechanisms. The take-up of this scheme has been very good, and distraction burglaries have been reduced, and confidence and reassurance gained.

relations with minority ethnic groups; and engage all sections of the community in the fight against crime.

In developing local annual and three-year policing plans, Chief Officers and Police Authorities are required to pay particular regard to these priorities:

- tackling anti-social behaviour and disorder;
- reducing volume, street, drug-related, violent and gun crime in line with local and national targets;
- combating serious and organised crime operating across force boundaries; and
- increasing the number of offences brought to justice.

The Police Service is the main contributor towards the delivery of PSAs 1 and 2, with its focus on reducing crime and the fear of crime and on improving performance, but it also makes a significant contribution to the delivery of many of the other Home Office PSAs. The priorities described above help to focus attention onto the key areas. The Policing Performance Assessment Framework will provide the means of measuring and comparing force performance and so support delivery against these PSAs.


**PSA1** Reduce crime and the fear of crime; improve performance overall, including by reducing the gap between the highest Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) areas and the best comparable areas; and reduce:

- vehicle crime by 30% from 1998/99 to 2004;
- domestic burglary by 25% from 1998/99 to 2005; and
- robbery in the ten Street Crime Initiative areas by 14% from 1999/2000 to 2005; and maintain that level.

**VEHICLE CRIME** Figure 3 shows the percentage change in vehicle crime per 1,000 population in each force between last year and this year. About half the forces in England and Wales have achieved a reduction in this category in the past year and should be commended. It is necessary to look at meeting the PSA target over the full period. Figure 3(a) illustrates how forces are moving towards meeting the PSA target over the full period. It should, however, be borne in mind that the NCRS effect – as mentioned above – may have affected forces differently and these conclusions may be affected similarly.

**FIGURE 3**

% change in vehicle crime per 1,000 population between 2001/02 and 2002/03






## **FIGHTING BURGLARY - STEP BY STEP**

To tackle the rising burglary problem, Dorset Police introduced minimum standards of investigation of burglary dwelling offences. These placed a responsibility not only on the Investigating Officer, but also on first-line supervisors. In addition to outlining the standards, a pro forma also contains a checklist which acts as a prompt to investigating officers. The standards are subject to continual review and a similar approach is being adopted for other volume crimes. HMIC sees this as being a further step towards improving standards of effective investigation, and at the same time reassuring the public that incidents which affect them so personally are taken seriously and professionally.

The range of performance is considerable: some forces are showing a more than 30% decrease, whereas others are being less successful. Overall, though, the trend is again downwards (9% according to the recorded crime figures) after a rise in the previous year. Figure 3a illustrates this downward trend since 1998/99.

**FIGURE 3(a)**  
 Vehicle crime offences recorded in England and Wales 1998/99 to 2002/03




Further information is contained in Table 13 in Appendix V.

**DOMESTIC BURGLARY** Figure 4 shows the percentage change in domestic burglary per 1,000 households in each force between last year and this year. Although more forces have not reduced levels of crime in this area than those which have, 32% of forces have registered a reduction from the previous year. Again, it is proper to look at movement across time and, overall, recorded crime figures indicate a reduction of almost 8%. This is short of the PSA target, although, unlike vehicle crime, forces have an additional year (until 2005) to improve their performance. Figure 4(a) illustrates performance since 1998/99.

# Chapter 1

**FIGURE 4**  
% change in domestic burglary per 1,000 households between 2001/02 and 2002/03








## EXPERT HANDLING OF RAPE REPORTS

The Metropolitan Police's project Sapphire reviewed the force's strategy in rape investigations and victim care. One innovation was the establishment of a sexual assault referral centre in South London, where people reporting offences could consult specially trained officers. Two further centres in other parts of London are now planned. In the nine months from April 2002, there has been a 13% rise in victims reporting allegations of rape, 277 more than had come forward in the previous year. There was also a 23% increase in the numbers arrested for rape, with the force solving 100 more rape cases in the nine months to January than it did in the 12 months to April 2002.

**FIGURE 4(a)**

Burglary dwelling offences recorded in England and Wales 1998/99 to 2002/03



Further information is given in Table 14 in Appendix V.


**ROBBERY** Figure 5 shows how forces have fared in reducing robbery in this year, again expressed in terms of the percentage change per 1,000 population. It is apparent that a considerable number of forces need to apply efforts to reduce the incidence of robberies. Overall, though, within the broad category of recorded violent crimes, the number of robberies fell by an (adjusted) 14%. Figure 5(a) illustrates the trend since 1998/99.

It should, of course, be noted here that many forces' experience of robbery is slight, and the relatively small numbers (and changes to them) are not statistically significant.

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**FIGURE 5**

% change in robbery per 1,000 population between 2001/02 and 2002/03






## **RAISING THE PROFILE OF COMMUNITY POLICING**

The Police Information Technology Organisation has established a pilot scheme in Dorset and Lincolnshire, a process whereby specially trained civilian staff funded by crime and disorder partnerships use Community Support Vehicles to visit rural locations on a published cycle. Modern communications facilities enable staff to access forces' computerised operational systems and the Internet, facilitating a "one-stop shop" policing service for the public, increasing the visibility of policing and prompting reassurance.

**FIGURE 5(a)**

Robbery offences recorded in England and Wales 1998/99 to 2002/03



However, the PSA refers specifically to the ten Street Crime Initiative areas, and sets a target to be achieved over time. The ten forces covered by the initiative accounted for 77% of all robberies in England and Wales, compared to 83% in 2001/02. Figure 5(b) shows that forces are on track to meet the PSA target and that the overall percentage reduction in the year under review is itself ahead of the national percentage reduction. The target requires the forces to maintain the reduction achieved by 2005: forces will need to prepare strategies aimed at securing these positive performance levels.

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**FIGURE 5(b)**

Recorded robberies in England and Wales

	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	1999/00 to 2002/03	% change 2001/02 to 2002/03
Metropolitan Police	36,317	40,992	53,547	42,493	17.0%	-20.6%
West Midlands	10,092	11,351	13,322	10,249	1.6%	-23.1%
Greater Manchester	8,634	9,918	11,027	10,745	24.4%	-2.6%
Merseyside	2,663	2,405	3,155	2,994	12.4%	-5.1%
West Yorkshire	3,088	3,781	5,674	4,947	60.2%	-12.8%
Avon and Somerset	2,381	2,765	4,889	3,504	47.2%	-28.3%
Thames Valley	1,659	2,147	2,894	2,406	45.0%	-16.9%
Nottinghamshire	1,768	2,050	2,726	2,799	58.3%	2.7%
South Yorkshire	1,122	1,438	1,952	2,112	88.2%	8.2%
Lancashire	1,058	1,224	1,608	1,409	33.2%	-12.4%
SCI forces	68,782	78,071	100,794	83,658	21.6%	-17.0%
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>84,277</b>	<b>95,154</b>	<b>121,375</b>	<b>108,045</b>	<b>28.2%</b>	<b>-11.0%</b>

**PSA2** Improve the performance of all police forces and significantly reduce the performance gap between the best- and worst-performing forces; and significantly increase the proportion of time spent on front-line duties.

The responsibility for tracking performance against this PSA has led, in part, to the creation of the new performance monitoring regime, which I describe in Chapter 3.

As I have already noted, while police performance shows highly promising signs overall, the results from individual forces will vary significantly. HMIC's performance development work has as a primary aim raising the performance of those forces which are operating under par, and closing the gap between the best and worst performers. This PSA provides one focus for that work. However, it continues to be HMIC's role to monitor performance across the whole range of policing activity, and some of these other areas are described later in this chapter. Our new Baseline Assessment methodology will facilitate our discharging of this

responsibility, especially as it creates a continuous assessment regime. I see it as essential to ensure that performance rises, and is sustained, across the whole crime reduction environment.

## **DETECTIONS**

The police detected 23.5% of recorded crime in 2002/03; (that represents 1.4 million offences). This detection rate is similar to that observed in 2001/02, although the effect of NCRS may have depressed the current detection rate. The Home Office estimates that the "real" detection rate as being likely to have been between 24% and 26%.

Table 15 in Appendix V shows annual detection rates by police force area and region, from 1997/98 to 2002/03. The changes need to be viewed with some caution. As has been explained, there are variations in the particular 'mix' of crimes with which forces have to deal, so that the effect of the NCRS counting rule changes may have varied.



## RECRUITING A REPRESENTATIVE POLICE SERVICE


South Wales Police has been awarded the National Recruitment Award for its innovative marketing policy targeting the most likely candidates for the Special Constabulary, including those from minority ethnic backgrounds (10% of a recent intake were from such a background). A pilot scheme in Cardiff, in which responsibility for recruitment and training was devolved to a full-time co-ordinator (a police sergeant), has been cited as good practice for increasing recruits from 40 to 160, and has been adopted across the force. A direct induction scheme has also been adopted that assists specials who wish to join the regular force by developing them by means of a NVQ3 award which covers half of the competencies required of police recruits.

### CONFIDENCE AND SATISFACTION

As I have mentioned above, the British Crime Survey (BCS) is a process undertaken by the Home Office to reach an assessment of, among other things, the level of crime experienced by the public, compared with that actually reported to and recorded by the police. For the offences it covers, and the victims within its scope, it is believed that the BCS gives a more complete estimate of crime within England and Wales since it covers both unreported and unrecorded crime, and, in terms of trends, is unaffected by changes in reporting levels and police recording practice.

BCS also covers public confidence in the criminal justice system. In the latest survey, 59% of victims expressed themselves as satisfied with the way the police dealt with their incident. This is a similar proportion to the previous year, following decreases in satisfaction as Figure 6 shows. It is encouraging to see that this decline had halted in these most recent figures.

**FIGURE 6**  
Trend in victim satisfaction with police response



**Notes:**

1. Results from 1996 onwards differ from those previously published because of new calibrated weights.
2. Excludes 'don't knows' and 'too early to say' responses.

Source: Home Office Research, Development & Statistics

# Chapter 1


## POLICING NUMBERS

On 31 March 2003, in England and Wales and at the end of the year under review in this Report, there were 133,366 full-time equivalent police officers, including those on secondment and Central Service (ie in areas such as HMIC, in all totalling 1,940). This is a record number, and well exceeds the Government's target of 130,000 by March 2003 and is ahead of the Government's target of 132,500 by March 2004.

Figure 7 shows how police numbers have changed each year over the past nine financial years.

**FIGURE 7**

Total Police Officer strength (full-time equivalents: change in number of officers from previous year



Source: Home Office Statistics Bulletin 11/03

The Police Service has added 3,763 officers during this year, an increase of 3%. This is an extremely worthwhile addition to the policing family, building on similarly successful years' recruiting throughout the period of the Crime Fighting Fund.

Particularly welcome is the news that minority ethnic officers amounted to 2.9% of the total police strength at 31 March 2003, compared with 2.6% the previous March. This figure represents 3,915 officers, clearly a significant number. I will be looking to forces to maintain their recruitment effort,

reaching out to the minority communities.

I am also pleased to note that women represent 19% of the total strength, at 25,390, compared with 18% the previous March.

In addition, there were 66,389 full-time equivalent staff operating in support of the warranted police officers, in the form of community support officers (1% of total strength), traffic wardens (1%) and other police staff (31%). A further 11,037 special constables were in post.

As I note elsewhere in this Report, forces must maintain their efforts to recruit and take complementary steps to absorb this new talent. Our workforce modernisation thematic inspection (described in Chapter 2) will throw fresh light on relevant issues.


## OTHER AREAS OF PERFORMANCE

**RACIAL MATTERS** Crime which affects the minority ethnic communities continues to attract a high priority in the Police Service. This is essential given the debilitating effects which racist crime has on those whom it directly affects, their families and the wider minority communities. It continues to be a priority in HMIC to ensure that forces do indeed direct significant and appropriate resources to preventing and detecting such crime.

### RACIST INCIDENTS

**FIGURE 8**

Recorded racist incidents





## COMMUNITY RELATIONS - TAKING IT FROM THE TOP

In the Luton BCU, in Bedfordshire, the BCU Commander chairs a Divisional Commanders Commission, which meets quarterly and allows community representatives to discuss community issues. This is a feature of the overall strength of community relations within the BCU, and has attracted Home Office researchers to look to see if this good practice could throw light on the civil disturbances and unrest in other parts of the country. It was favourably commented upon.

As Figure 8 illustrates, recorded racist incidents showed a welcome fall in 2002/03 after several years of increases, returning to the levels of 1999/2000. There remains, of course, much ground to be made up if crimes of this kind are to be reduced still further, to earlier levels. However, I am heartened that the number of incidents which proceed to further investigation is now at over 97% - which demonstrates how seriously the Police Service regards this particular menace.

### RACIALLY AGGRAVATED OFFENCES

FIGURE 9

Racially aggravated offences 1999/00 to 2002/03




Figure 9 shows how these offences have been recorded by the Police Service over the past four years. As can be seen, criminal damage and common assault show minor falls, but other offences of wounding and, in particular, harassment show clear increases. However, the effect of NCRS may also be relevant here, as NCRS had an effect of 9% on criminal damage figures. Overall, the total of offences recorded has risen, although the rate of increase is considerably less than in previous years. I do believe that minority ethnic communities are showing steadily increasing levels of readiness to report crimes against their communities, as a sign of their growing confidence in the Police Service to deal sensitively and productively with their concerns.

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**STOP AND SEARCH** The past 12 months have seen less media attention directed to the question of stop and search, in particular the level of stops directed against minority ethnic members of the public. However, this does not mean that the Police Service has abandoned, or ignored, the need to ensure equality and integrity in this as in any other area of policing activity. This was, of course, a matter commented upon by Sir William Macpherson in his report into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence. He recommended that "the powers of the police under current legislation are required for the prevention and detection of crime and should remain unchanged". I continue to regard stop and search as a positive way of gathering intelligence about crime.


As Figure 10 shows, 2002/03 continued the trend of recent years of a rise in the percentage appearance in stops and searches of people from the minority ethnic communities. It would appear that stop/searches generally have increased, which is likely to be the result of greater vigilance by the Service in the light of heightened concerns about terrorism activity; but this does not fully explain the disparity across ethnic groupings. HMIC will continue to monitor this issue.

**FIGURE 10**  
Percentage of all persons stopped and searched who were of minority ethnic origin

1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03
19	51	14	17	20	23

**COMPLAINTS** It is one of HMIC's statutory duties to review the investigation and handling of complaints. This is an extremely helpful indicator of the level of confidence in which the Police Service is held by the general public. I am pleased to report that, for the third consecutive year (as shown in Figure 11), the number of complaints received has fallen, although, inevitably, there are different ranges for each force within this overall figure. Information in Table 7 in Appendix V shows the results of these complaints. A slightly higher percentage (3.8% compared with 3.4% last year) of complaints were substantiated. This in itself is not significant, but I look to senior management to ensure that their officers act professionally and courteously at all times.

**FIGURE 11**  
Number of complaints recorded by the 43 forces in England and Wales



## OTHER ISSUES

In a Report of this nature, I must deal in some detail with other pressing performance issues which confront the Police Service. However, space permits me to highlight but a few of the other performance dimensions which concern the Police Service and the public, and this section picks out some of these areas.

**SICK LEAVE** Table 9 in Appendix V shows that sickness levels among police officers continue the welcome decline recorded in last year's Report, and is now at 10.4 days per officer. Overall, this is well ahead of the Government's target of 11.5 days per officer by 2006, although five forces still need to better that target. The picture overall is similar in relation to police staff (Table 10), where 11.7 days per member of police staff is ahead of the 2006 target of 12 days, although rather more forces need to better their performance if they are to achieve this target. The Strategy for a Healthy Police Service (launched in November 2002) has contributed to the decline in sickness absence. Through guidance, best practice and funding, this has raised the profile of occupational health, safety and welfare in the Service.





**POLICE MEDICAL RETIREMENTS** Early retirements of police officers on medical grounds have, in the past, attracted adverse media and other public comment. Such comment has diminished this year, and I am pleased to see (from Table 11 in Appendix V) that the number of these retirements has once again also decreased. This downward trend is encouraging and complements an increasing awareness of the benefits of the Strategy for a Healthy Police Service, the Home Office initiative to improve officers' health mentioned above. Overall, the Service is presently meeting (at 6.2 medical retirements per 1,000 officers) the 2004/05 milestone of 7.5. However, more than one-third of forces must improve their individual performance in respect of this milestone.

Furthermore, Table 12 reverses last year's trend, in that police support staff medical retirements have increased, albeit only relatively slightly, and overall the Service is also within the performance milestone. A few forces need to attend to their performance in this area if the overall achievements of the Service are not to be jeopardised in this respect.

**ASSAULTS** Table 8 in Appendix 4 shows that assaults on police officers remain high, with 2002/03 showing a 9% increase over the previous year. The incidence of serious assaults shows, however, a fall of 34% from 2001/02. Nevertheless, and as I note elsewhere in this Report, policing is a hazardous occupation and while steps can be taken (such as training and protective clothing) to minimise risks, the dangers facing police officers will remain. Nevertheless, I do look to senior officers to seek to reduce harm, and especially to reduce the volume of serious assaults.

## **CONCLUSION**

*I end this chapter as I began it - noting that good levels of performance have been exhibited across the Service, but adding that more needs to be done. The performance gap between forces needs to narrow, and the Service must demonstrate - beyond reasonable doubt, not on a balance of probabilities - that it is facing down crime all day, every day.*

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## *Inspection activity*

Our Statement of Purpose at the head of this Report shows that the major role of HMIC is to "promote the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through inspection of police organisations and functions".

We have discharged this role principally by concentrating our inspection activity on six main areas, with the objective that this must always be relevant, timely and add value, and serve to advance further the science of policing. The five main areas of inspection activity are: full force inspections; focused force inspections; Basic Command Unit (BCU) inspections; Best Value Review (BVR) inspections; thematic inspections; and joint inspections. We are also frequently invited to inspect other, non-Home Office forces across any of these specialisms. Appendix IV in this Report shows the volume of activity across these specialisms in which HMIC engaged during 2002/03. HMIC also reviews force resources and efficiency plans; audits Police National Computer and Information Management activity; and inspects police training. I set out in more detail in this chapter the range of this activity.

I am particularly pleased to note how much joint activity there now is across the Inspectorates, with HMIC fully engaged and contributing strongly. This, of course, reflects the Government's wish to see a more cohesive and coherent Criminal Justice System as a vital contributor to much improved standards of performance and delivery – a view I share.

It has to be said that some of our time is spent doggedly working with police colleagues on the minutiae of local policing, steadily improving police performance and practice. Much time is also devoted to raising the Service's perspectives on how it must engage with other partners to deliver the service expected by our communities. Yet more of our attention is directed to working strategically, often at the national level, to ensure that the Service is resourced and directed as best as it can be. Our impact is therefore diverse and constant. I am regularly heartened by seeing how our work – and that of others – is helping the Service deliver real change and real progress.

We are not in the business of quick-fix solutions which would not bear the test of time: rather, we seek to work with forces to embed good practice and deliver sustainable improvement. We promote change and performance improvement, and work with forces to deliver on those fronts, but it is the Service which should receive the plaudits for progress.

Our inspection programme – and the guidance and advice which flows from that – is the catalyst which generates performance improvement in the Police Service. Some of this is fairly rapid – see the Tower Hamlets BCU example below – but most of our work should be seen as being influential over a longer period. Recent thematic have been particularly seminal in provoking significant developments: "On the Record" led to the work to develop the National Crime Recording Standard; "Under the Microscope" has seen a speedy increase in the use of DNA techniques; and "A Need to Know" (see later in this chapter) has seen the onset of regional intelligence centres.

We are also to be seen as part of the wider initiative to improve performance and working practices across the Criminal Justice System (CJS). There is much ground to be taken here. Hence, the importance I attach to the pilot joint inspection presently underway (into CJS interfaces) in Gloucestershire.

### **FULL FORCE AND FOCUSED INSPECTIONS**

It has been the practice each summer for HMIC to compile its programme of force inspection visits on the basis of a thorough assessment of each force's performance during the previous year. This risk assessment process has covered a range of issues including corporate health, service delivery, fair access, and race and diversity, quality of service, leadership, complaints, best value and findings from previous inspections. From this, we have identified those forces which are performing less well than others, and it is upon these forces that we have concentrated our energies. In addition, forces which are performing very well have also been inspected, so that good practice may be identified and disseminated. Normally, if a force has not been inspected for three years, it would automatically be inspected regardless of performance. The regional HM Inspectors visited each of their forces to give feedback on the outcomes of the risk assessment process to the Police Authority and Chief Officer team. For the future, and as discussed in Chapter 4, our new methodology – Baseline Assessment – will be used to determine the range, nature and depth of our inspection intervention with each force.

The force inspections have taken two forms. The full force inspection, as it implies, has been an inspection of the full range of policing functions, with a view to establishing the efficiency and effectiveness of that force overall.



## **INTEGRATED SERVICES: THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS**

A shared communications centre has been built on Wiltshire Constabulary's headquarters site, and a control room of three emergency services – Wiltshire Fire Service, Wiltshire Ambulance Service and the Constabulary – work from the same location, but continue to undertake their separate functions. A feature of this ground-breaking project is a newly installed Command and Control System and a shared integrated database. I see this as offering potential advantages such as improved inter-service operability, more efficient call handling and despatching of resources, the development of improved emergency response overall, and more effective sharing of information. This centre has been completed on time and within budget. HMIC will be looking closely at the results of this project and how it might find expression in other force areas.

Focused force inspections, where the detail of attention derives directly from the risk assessment process, have been undertaken where it was felt that a force would benefit from inspection attention being paid to particular features of policing life in that force.

In 2002/03, there were ten full inspections and eight focused inspections, with the details being given in Appendix IV.

**FINDINGS** HM Inspectors concentrate on drawing out the findings, issues and recommendations which are specific to each individual force's circumstances. However, inevitably, there will be aspects of policing performance which arise in different forces at the same time and which, by way of a by-product, paint a picture of some of the challenges facing forces collectively. What follows is a brief outline of aspects of police activity which have been identified in this year's full and focused inspections, covering strategic issues; performance management; human resources; training; and call handling.

**STRATEGIC ISSUES** We have discerned that there remains an occasional lack of a strategic approach in some forces. Sometimes this is in relation to a specific function, where steps to address these can be relatively easy to find; in others, it relates more to the force's central strategic environment, which gives rise to rather more concern. Examples range from a need to link strategic and financial planning (a prerequisite of modern resource and demand management); through a recommendation that another force develops a public access communications and marketing strategy, and another for a strategy for sustaining and improving call handling; to a requirement that functional strategies are formulated at the executive board level. This troubles me, since managing policing services is a complex business, and strategic direction, policies and practices (all of which need to be understood thoroughly throughout the workforce) need to be in place if a force is to be focusing on its objectives and achieving optimum results.

**PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT** Inevitably, given the Government's interest in raising police performance, this has been a central issue for HMIC. I deal with performance more broadly elsewhere in this Report; however, I note that where performance management has been pointed out as an issue to be addressed, it is often because there is a need to put in place a robust performance management framework. I support this theme,

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particularly as it fits well with moves in the civil renewal context to encourage greater accountability of police officers to their local communities. What we will continue to look for is an environment where components of forces are given clear objectives and targets that contribute to the forces' overall performance; that the performance against those criteria is monitored and analysed against clear timescales; that senior and top management are held to account and hold others to account for outcomes; and that the local communities and media are part of the informed review process.

**HUMAN RESOURCES** It is hardly surprising that in a people-centred service, HMIC should find much to say on the Human Resources field. There is no pattern here of overall shortcomings, but rather a range of recommendations about personal development and appraisal, sickness management and greater HR authority being devolved to divisions and BCUs. HMI (Training) will be alert to regional HMIs' recommendations as he conducts his work in examining force HR strategies.

**TRAINING** A balanced, focused and strategic approach to police training delivery is not always evident in forces, particularly as regards diversity training. As with HR, HMI (Training) - complementing the work of his regional colleagues - will be observing the vigour with which forces take on board our recommendations in the Training Matters and Diversity Matters (see later in this chapter) thematic inspection reports.

**CALL HANDLING** Call handling continues to present difficulties to some forces. I see it as a priority for forces to put in place procedures which improve (and maintain improvement of) this fundamental aspect of their service to the public. Demand for policing services has been growing and the Service's capacity to satisfy this demand starts with effective call handling processes.

## **NORTHERN IRELAND**

Over the last 12 months, we have performed a number of separate inspection activities within the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

The annual inspection of the force took place in September 2002, when the focus of attention was largely on how the PSNI was progressing in terms of: the implementation of the Patten recommendations; how the prevailing

security situation was impacting upon the force in terms of its ability to achieve its goals; and progress towards the provision of community policing.

At the same time, two other inspections were taking place, both of which stemmed from the PSNI's response to the Omagh bombing. One piece of work was suggested by the Northern Ireland Police Board and reviewed the dissemination of intelligence within Special Branch to other parts of the PSNI. The other inspection was commissioned by the Chief Constable and considered how the force went about the investigation of murder inquiries.

In addition to this, we have also been assisting the force in preparation for inspection under the Best Value regime; and HMI (Training) has benchmarked the PSNI in terms of progress against the Diversity Matters thematic inspection report and has worked with St Mary's College, Belfast (teacher training) on behalf of Centrex to learn from best practice.

PSNI will be subject of a full Baseline Assessment alongside the England and Wales forces.

## **BCU INSPECTIONS**

There are almost 300 very different and individual Basic Command Units (BCUs) in England and Wales. Their complement may range from 100 to more than 1,000 officers, and they serve areas as different as densely populated, ethnically diverse inner cities and sparsely populated countryside. They share many aims and objectives. The scrutiny of police performance has moved over time from overall force outcomes to include the performance of individual BCUs. This recognises that policing is a very locally delivered service and should be inspected accordingly.

In my last Annual Report, I wrote at some length about the nature of the BCU inspection programme. Put briefly, BCUs are being inspected over a five-year period from April 2001. The inspections focus on performance against key operational targets and on leadership. The inspections are led by experienced BCU Commanders on short-term secondment to HMIC, so an element of current and relevant peer review is available.

This year has seen the onset of the BCU re-inspection or re-visit programme (as detailed in Appendix IV). We are told by forces that this re-inspection feature is an important component in tracking the performance



change which they seek and the rate at which that change is taking place. For HMIC, it also provides an opportunity to test whether the nature of inspection interventions which flow from the BCU programme are the right ones. This outcome has been fed into the design of the new inspection methodology. At present, we are about halfway through the total inspection programme, and some work is in hand to review the impact of the programme, in terms of outcomes, performance improvement and the gathering of good practice. Some of this is already apparent, as the following example shows. In the inspection of the Tower Hamlets BCU in London, performance was found generally to be poor: crime, in all categories except robbery, showed an increase since the previous year. The BCU Commander was newly in post, and as part of the implementation of the inspection recommendations, refocused his senior management team and drew the BCU up to strength. Even allowing for the introduction of many new probationer Constables, performance 12 months later is greatly improved. Crime is now down in all categories and detections are up, and this improvement is being sustained. It is this sustained performance which is particularly worthy of note, especially as Tower Hamlets is a challenging policing environment. It also demonstrates how supportive inspection techniques are effective and productive.

### BEST VALUE REVIEW INSPECTIONS

Statute provides that we inspect and report on a Police Authority's compliance with the requirements of Part 1 of the Local Government Act 1999 (Best Value). The result of such inspections is subsequently reported to Police Authorities, Chief Constables and the Home Secretary. It is pleasing to note in this second year of inspections that a significant number of the reviews are wide-ranging and strategic, and that many relate to improving those front-line services, which the public will experience directly. BVRs are judged to be a poor, fair, good or excellent service; and to be showing prospects for improvement as poor, uncertain, promising or excellent.

Of the 91 services inspected this year (inspections in 34 of the 43 England and Wales forces), two were judged as 'excellent'; 37 scored as 'good'; 47 as 'fair'; and five as 'poor'. In terms of improvement, seven scored as excellent; 62 as promising; 21 as uncertain; and one as poor. Taken together, Figure 12 shows the pattern exhibited by the 91 inspections.

FIGURE 12

Prospects for improvement?					
Excellent	0	4	3	0	
Promising	4	26	30	2	
Uncertain	1	16	4	0	
Poor	0	1	0	0	
		Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
		A good service?			

Source: HMIC

69 of the 91 reviews scored in the higher two prospects for improvement categories, which is a clear sign that Best Value Reviews are driving improvements to operational policing and to support services. In terms of comparison with year one of BVR inspections, the picture is more mixed. There were fewer services seen as "poor", and a higher number of "good" services with "promising" prospects for improvement, all of which is encouraging. However, there were more services in year one than in year two being classed as having "excellent" prospects for improvement. Trends should become more apparent after a third year, upon which I shall comment in my next report. We have made recommendations for improvement in all relevant cases and will monitor developments as part of our inspection cycle during 2003/04. Those services graded "poor" will receive more specific attention to ensure satisfactory progress.

General findings emerging from inspection in this period are that:

- the Best Value process is becoming more integrated with other (force-driven) improvement planning. In the majority of reviews methodology has been strengthened and refined, leading to generally better reviews and more incisive comments;
- fewer, larger and more strategic reviews are now being conducted;
- there is clear evidence that Best Value continues to drive improvements to policing services; and
- however, there is still scope for engaging external stakeholders more closely in reviews, particularly where partnership issues are relevant and where the implementation of recommendations impacts on other agencies.

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A good practice database is being developed within HMIC to capture the good, potential and noteworthy practices both regarding the Best Value process itself and about the individual services reviewed. This will be of increasing benefit to forces, the Association of Police Authorities, ACPO and ourselves once it is fully populated and made more widely available. From the 91 Best Value inspection reports completed there were 16 examples of good practice and 12 items of potential good practice highlighted. A selection of these good practice examples appear in the panels opposite.

## **THEMATIC INSPECTIONS**

It has been our practice for ten years now to adopt a thematic approach to some of our inspection activity, alongside those inspections of forces which relate to particular performance activities. The strength of thematic inspections, often carried out in partnership with other Inspectorates, is that they focus on particular issues or themes and involve a representative sample of forces to gain a better understanding of current practices and where improvements could be made. Thematic inspections are heavily resource-intensive activities, and our programme is determined partly through our own identification of emerging issues; through ideas for inspection coming from the Home Office and other Inspectorate bodies; in response to requirements coming from the Service itself; and when required by Ministers. Since our resources are not infinite, we must make some hard decisions about where our thematic inspection energy should be concentrated and, inevitably, they are focused on those areas where there is the greatest need.

There have been two significant thematic inspection reports issued in 2002/03.

**'A NEED TO KNOW' – HMIC THEMATIC INSPECTION OF SPECIAL BRANCH AND PORTS POLICING** This inspection identified that Special Branch and SB ports officers are doing an excellent job in sometimes difficult circumstances. Though planned well before 11 September 2001, the events of that day and in other parts of the world since have brought this inspection into much sharper focus than was probably ever anticipated. It was therefore timely for HMIC to take a look in this area. Adoption of the National Intelligence Model across forces by April 2004 has implications, too, for the work of the Branch both locally and nationally, and the inspection and subsequent report has provided a

foundation document upon which Police Authorities can carry out Best Value Reviews of Special Branches.

The inspection did identify that in order to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency, ACPO and Chief Officers should consider the creation of regional Special Branch units based on the current ACPO regions and under the executive control of regional directors answerable to the relevant chief constables management committees. This echoes some observations already made in this report (in my Foreword) about the need for the Service to draw together its resources to focus on organised crime.

**DIVERSITY MATTERS** In my last Annual Report, I announced that HMIC would be conducting a thematic inspection of race and diversity training during 2002. 'Diversity Matters' reported the findings of that work and made 50 recommendations for change. This work had been eagerly awaited by many sections of the community, not least because considerable steps had been taken to ensure that people from many aspects of diversity were consulted about this area of police training. The methodology employed included convening a large number of focus groups within police force areas and consulting with umbrella groups, commissions and high-profile individuals. I am grateful for all their contributions.

The key findings of this work indicate that whilst the Police Service cannot afford to be complacent, it can take comfort in a number of areas. For example, the quality of some of the people currently engaged, the support provided through community partnerships and also the high levels of investment and resource allocation given to provide this training (about £10 million each year and over 140,000 staff trained to date), were each positive findings.

However, more needs to be done to address other issues. These include a need for effective strategies identifying what the training should achieve; fully mainstreaming of Race and Diversity content into all learning activity; and enhancing the role which the community plays in the development of police officers and police staff. There has been effort and commitment expended, but it needs to be consistently applied on a Service-wide basis whilst still meeting local requirements and demands. This is one of the challenges facing those who manage police training strategically.



# Connect

## **1. SERVICE QUALITY - PRIORITISED, RECOGNISED, SHARED.**

A variety of good practice initiatives in Gwent Police:

- the force's accreditation system and its development of National Vocational Qualifications for its call handlers. This is a good aid to improving morale amongst staff and in giving them recognition for their efforts;
- many forces, when implementing centralised call handling facilities, do not make quality an issue. Gwent has put this high on its agenda by making a quality audit part of its strategy and incorporating it into its training programme. As well as looking at the quality of response operationally, it is developing a telephone response evaluation form to assess the quality of service being provided by the call handlers;
- the force's work in developing a disaster recovery and business continuity plan. Many forces either do not consider at all or, at best, will undertake this task after going live. This constitutes a grave danger to public confidence should even the slightest suspension of operations occur. The force is also to be congratulated on the inter-agency co-operation with the Welsh Ambulance Service in agreeing to share accommodation in the event of a disaster.

## **2. ALERTNESS THROUGH PARTNERSHIP**

On improving partnership working:

- Derbyshire Police has recognised that there are significant areas of cross-over in domestic violence, child physical and sexual abuse, and even domestic pet abuse. Amalgamating the units and providing a common IT system has proved very valuable in providing a consistent and comprehensive approach to the problem. 'Hot spot' data has proved effective in identifying particular issues to partners, particularly the Area Child Protection Committee and Social Services.

## **3. SYSTEMATIC PROGRESS**

Warwickshire Police has developed and implemented new professional standards policies and systems:

- the force has recently introduced the use of a case management and administration system within its internal investigations unit. This is a searchable database, which can identify common features from other enquiries, so saving investigation time, as well as acting as a time-saving case management system. This initiative could be transferable to other forces.

## **4. GIVING OUR PEOPLE THE TOOLS FOR THE JOB**

On improving staff training and monitoring performance in West Midlands Police:

- many quantitative measures are in place to monitor performance. However, there are very few forces that have in place procedures to measure quality. We hold up as good practice the system in place to eavesdrop on two calls per month per operator with a score kept of their performance, followed by a monthly face-to-face review. Results are then placed in an operator's personal file and form part of the year-end performance review. Any training or developmental issues are taken account of and progressed;
- training was commended by all staff, who felt that the force had done much to ensure that they had all the skills necessary to do the job properly. The force is congratulated on its efforts to provide developmental training in conjunction with Learn Direct.

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Fundamentally, the Government has demonstrated a commitment to implement all of the recommendations contained in the report, by accepting them and by tasking a strategic level group with their implementation. In addition, both ACPO and the APA have been active in meeting their specific responsibilities, and the Home Office has created a new post specifically to co-ordinate and monitor progress. Longer-term proposals include the creation of a National Centre for Diversity Excellence, similar to that which exists within the Netherlands Police, and also a drive to equip all Criminal Justice System staff with appropriate development, in partnership with others.

I view 'Diversity Matters' as having the potential to take the Police Service in England and Wales (and perhaps ultimately the whole Criminal Justice System) forward in this crucial area. It can be a catalyst for real, lasting and positive changes in the way staff are developed to handle all aspects of race and diversity.

The response to 'Diversity Matters' mirrors that applied to 'Training Matters', published in 2002. The strategic group tasked with implementation of that report is currently encountering some difficulties in relation to the existing and future probationer training programmes. It is to be hoped that vital impetus is not lost and that the 'Diversity Matters' group does not experience similar frustrations.

## **THEMATIC INSPECTIONS IN PLACE**

**WORKFORCE MODERNISATION** Whilst the use of non-warranted staff to carry out roles within policing is not new, their role and significance has shifted substantially from the provision of routine support and administrative tasks, towards the performance of professional and specialist roles crucial to the effective functioning of a modern Police Service. Police staff now increasingly supervise and manage police officers and, in a number of forces, have achieved Chief Officer status. Increasingly, they perform operational support and service tasks, which were previously only carried out by sworn officers.

These changes to the staffing composition of forces reflect the growing requirement for a range of specialist skills and abilities to support the changing nature of policing, the increasing complexity of police organisation and service delivery. These trends have also raised the sensitivity of the issue.

Whilst there is a general acceptance of the need for a professional, dedicated and highly skilled Police staff component in modern policing, there is less consensus regarding the scale and extent of their direct involvement in operational service delivery.

To date, a number of studies have considered aspects of the civilianisation process and its impact on the changing police role, but there is yet to be a comprehensive assessment of this issue. Some of these studies have identified a somewhat piecemeal approach to the process historically and a failure to comprehensively evaluate the benefits and costs of civilianisation. Earlier studies have pointed to a lack of strategic direction. Of course, the pace of change has quickened dramatically in recent years and the Police Reform Programme signals a major shift in Government attempts to modernise the organisation and staffing profile of police organisations.

It is intended that this thematic will provide a comprehensive assessment of the civilianisation process and the role of Police staff in policing. As well as providing a Baseline Assessment of current practice, it will provide an important evidence base to inform any future consideration of further reform and modernisation of the service.

I expect the report to be published early next year.

**CRIMINAL USE OF FIREARMS** The rise in the criminal use of firearms has raised significant concerns for the public at large, within the Police Service and the Government. It is, of course, local communities who suffer the greatest impact upon their quality of life and threat to their feeling of security. HMIC is currently undertaking a thematic inspection of the criminal use of firearms to assess and further develop the good work already underway.

To ensure a comprehensive understanding of the issues, the inspection is exploring not simply the criminal use of firearms, but also the police response to the threat posed and the role of the community in addressing some of the underlying issues that feed into the problems being experienced. The inspection report will be available in the early months of 2004.

I hope that this work will contribute significantly to the current Government-led debate on how a significant threat to local communities can best be addressed.





## HMI TRAINING

The dedicated Inspectorate for police training was established in 2000 and has since produced two major thematic reports, Training Matters and Diversity Matters, addressing probationer training and issues surrounding police race and diversity training. These projects have had a real impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of policing. This is important because of the levels of investment involved and the impact which training should have on operational performance.

The Service is steadily realising that training is the key enabler of performance and ultimately plays a vital role in improving best policing services. Fundamentally, training should aim to equip police personnel with the skills they need to fulfil their jobs professionally. Targets and indicators are important measures of success, but in reality, meeting them relies on the people employed in policing roles. However, this supposes that training and development is delivered consistently, effectively and efficiently in all police organisations. It is a key role for the training Inspectorate, within all its activity, to ensure that training is delivered to nationally agreed standards, provides value for money and supports front-line policing.

The HMI with responsibility for training has, through participation and consultation at the strategic level, influenced the direction of police training to meet these objectives. For too long, training within policing has been viewed as an input and an abstraction, and the work of the training Inspectorate is helping to change attitudes and perceptions, and helping people to realise its importance and relevance in improving performance.

To ensure that this range of work can be dealt with to the proper depth, I have strengthened this arm of HMIC, particularly so that HMI (Training) can now examine HR strategies in forces.

Some of the inspection activity undertaken during the year is outlined below.

**CENTREX** During the summer of 2003, the training arm of HMIC completed the first-ever statutory inspection of the Central Police Training and Development Authority, trading as 'Centrex'. This body, which has a budget of over £100 million, was created out of National Police Training on

1 April 2002 and comprises a number of units, including Foundation Training; Specialist Training in Scientific Support; Information Technology Training; Leadership Development; Crime Investigation; and Operational Support.

The aim of this inspection was to provide the Home Secretary with an indication of the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation at an early stage of its development; to gauge the level of customer and community engagement and satisfaction; and to devise a targeted programme of ongoing inspection activity in line with our statutory responsibility.

The resultant report will serve to ensure that the Police Service fully engages with Centrex. Training is a key enabler of police performance. This can only be effected by improving the skills of its people in line with what communities and the Government demand of police forces and policing in general. Centrex, if it is to meet this challenge, must be more effective and efficient; the inspection activity identifies where and how, but also emphasises that the body must be properly tasked by its stakeholders.

**POLICE SKILLS AND STANDARDS ORGANISATION (PSSO)** HMI (Training) was invited by PSSO to assess the work of the organisation, and make comment and recommendations on how PSSO could best develop within the context of the Justice Sector Skills Council (JSSC). In particular, we looked at the PSSO's use of its resources; the alignment of its work programme with its strategy, and of that programme with those of key partners; and helping the Service make best use of PSSO's strengths.

This work will help determine whether the organisation is best placed with the JSSC, or should seek status as an Expert Body. That debate is underway, informed by the findings of this work: our objective was to ensure the continued effectiveness of the PSSO in supporting the police to achieve optimal performance by ensuring that there is in place an effective structure to develop the skills requirements of the Service to achieve that performance.

**ADULT LEARNING INSPECTORATE (ALI)** HMIC is now working in partnership with ALI, having tested out this relationship on a pilot basis in a number of training inspection activities. Among other things, this has helped us validate our training inspection methodology; provides some

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cross-skilling in both HMIC and ALI; and reduces the burden on forces of providing seconded or loaned staff to conduct inspections. I expect this relationship to further enhance our training inspection capacity.

**BEST VALUE IN TRAINING** HMI (Training) is also well into a programme of inspecting force BVRs in training, a programme based on a risk assessment of force BVRs, leading to selecting those forces where concerns were raised or where noteworthy practice appeared to be coming forward. This programme is already throwing up issues and becoming especially effective. Early outcomes are:

- forces which have failed to address BVRs sufficiently will be held accountable;
- the ability of the Service to genuinely compare will be improved and performance enhanced;
- the Service will be able to demonstrate Best Value;
- communities will have a visible engagement with the service and public satisfaction will improve;
- training programmes will be specifically targeted at objectively identified performance issues - training and non-training issues will be segregated allowing managers to concentrate on appropriate issues affecting performance;
- the cost of police training will be known and budget management will improve;
- the impact of training on performance will be clearly identified, facilitating the most efficient targeting of resources;
- economies of scale will be achieved with savings available for redirection to core policing;
- standards in training will be consistent ensuring that communities are served by well-trained officers wherever they live;
- forces will be informed on strategic issues in a timely manner capable of a consistent response, and duplication of effort avoided; and
- capacity shortfalls in local forces will be addressed through collaboration, thereby ensuring responses to training are undertaken expeditiously.

**PNB SETTLEMENT** Rather unconnected with the foregoing, HMI (Training) has taken on board the role within HMIC of monitoring the impact of the Police Negotiating Board's pay settlement for the Police Service from 2003. This includes examining forces' plans to meet the 15% reduction in overtime over the following three years: this work is underway, and I am taking a close interest in it. Clearly, HMI (Training) has a whole new range of interests and activities with which to engage. He is also closely involved with the workforce modernisation thematic just described.

## **POLICE NATIONAL COMPUTER**

During August 2002 HMIC published the second report on the Police National Computer (PNC) - Data Quality and Timeliness. This report highlighted the efforts of the Service to target the challenges of achieving acceptable levels of performance in relation to providing high-quality and timely entries onto the PNC Criminal Names index (Phoenix).

In March 2001, when HMIC began this inspection, not one of the 48 forces subject of scrutiny was achieving the two main standards demanded within the ACPO PNC Compliance Strategy: against a target of 24 hours for input of arrest/summons details, each force was on average taking up to 55 days to input 90% of such results; with regard to inputting court results, there were around 450,000 cases awaiting results, of which over 220,000 cases were over nine months old. These problems of quality and timeliness were neither new nor unknown prior to the inspection. Since 1996, successive reports from the Police Information Technology Organisation, the Police Research Group and HMIC had highlighted major concerns, but these had passed without discernible improvements being achieved. The impending establishment of the national Criminal Records Bureau sharply refocused concerns and, in particular, attracted the attention of the Information Commissioner and the Home Affairs Committee.

Contained in the report are ten recommendations which when implemented, will significantly turn around the continuing picture of poor, albeit improving, performance. The Home Office is working towards developing a code of practice under the Police Reform Act, which will for the first time, place on forces binding levels of service.

Alongside this, HMIC has taken the opportunity to enhance its approach to auditing and inspecting the Police Service's use of the PNC, including a new team of auditors operating against an enriched inspection protocol, which will encompass all aspects of PNC usage and management within a force.

### EFFICIENCY PLANS

2002/03 was the fourth year in which Police Authorities were required to produce Efficiency Plans, as part of their annual Policing Plans. The Plans indicate how the 2% efficiency gains target set by the Home Office are to be achieved, and are intended to provide a transparent, but basic, link between resource inputs and measurable performance outcomes and are expected to remain in use until a more sophisticated model of linking resources to performance is fully implemented. This new model - the Policing Performance and Assessment Framework - is currently being supported by the Home Office and the Service.

HMIC staff, supported by external auditors, inspect the progress of the Plans of each authority and force throughout the year. Progress reports are provided to the Home Office for Ministers and the Treasury. For 2002/03 two authorities and forces (South Yorkshire and Northamptonshire) failed to achieve the 2% target because their overall performance in the year was considered by the regional HMI to be less than that achieved in the previous year. In this situation, the efficiency gains achieved do not count towards the target. HMIs regularly remind Police Authorities and forces of the importance of monitoring and linking police performance to the achievement of efficiency gains

For the past four years, the Service has delivered over £809m in efficiency gains, which have been recycled back into front-line policing. This represents an average of over 2.5% each year and exceeds the overall target set by Government, as shown by Figure 13.


**FIGURE 13**  
Efficiency gain totals 1999/00 - 2002/03

	NRE £m	2% Target £m	Actual Gains		
			Cashable £m	Non-cashable £m	Total £m
1999/00	7,466	149	112.31	71.57	183.88
2000/01	7,699	154	84.71	101.71	186.42
2001/02	8,238	165	69.1	144.1	213.20
2002/03	8,440	169	91.63	134.3	225.93
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>31,843</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>357.75</b>	<b>451.68</b>	<b>809.43</b>

Source: HMIC

Efficiency gains can be either cashable (typically, specific action that results in reductions in budgets, which are designed to achieve the same for less) or non-cashable, involving the redeployment of resources to improve overall performance. Figure 14 indicates the relationship between cashable and non-cashable efficiency gains over the past four years.

**FIGURE 14**  
Cashable and Non-cashable Efficiency Gains 1999/00 - 2002/03



Source: HMIC

# Chapter 2

The current Government spending review states that the Efficiency Plan will continue for a further three years, beginning with 2003/04 with an increased emphasis on authorities and forces demonstrating specific links between individual initiatives and performance improvements.

## **WORKING WITH OTHER INSPECTORATES**

**"STREETS AHEAD": A JOINT THEMATIC INSPECTION INTO THE STREET CRIME INITIATIVE** The Street Crime Initiative was a unique approach, tackling a single crime problem by treating it as a national emergency. The initiative was driven personally by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, and led directly to a significant reduction in robbery offences in ten force areas. In the year following the start of the Initiative, there were 17,000 fewer victims of street robbery.

The "Streets Ahead" report was published in July 2003 and was the product of the largest-ever joint inspection carried out by HMIC, Ofsted, Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, and Her Majesty's Magistrates' Courts Service Inspectorate; assisted by the Court Service, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation and the Social Services Inspectorate. The inspection found many examples of good practice and effective partnership working across the Criminal Justice System. The report also found a lack of shared objectives, insufficient attempts to capture and recycle emerging good practice, and no mechanism for evaluation. The need for effective post-sentence work, particularly for drug users, was also highlighted.

Streets Ahead noted that the Street Crime Initiative had achieved a significant reduction in street crime and street robbery after six months; victims and witnesses were better supported with improved court facilities; the initiative was well-resourced with an additional £67 million being invested in reducing street crime in the ten areas; and local partnership working was revitalised and energised with a renewed emphasis on delivery.

However, the inspection also showed that the quality of communication both within and between organisations was often poor with evidence of 'silo' mentalities; street crime was not seen as a high priority by all of the ten police force areas or the local partner agencies, and conflicted with locally

agreed priorities in some areas; and there was insufficient focus on breaking the cycle of offending through effective post-sentence supervision and rehabilitation of offenders.

As a result, the joint inspection team made recommendations in a number of areas, such as a 'single pot' funding approach; better planning to ensure that locally agreed priorities are balanced with national goals; better monitoring and tracking of cases through the system from arrest to resettlement; systems to monitor the impact that having a police officer in school has on the number of exclusions, the incidence of bullying and attendance at the school; and that the Government, through the National and Local Criminal Justice Boards, set clear, cross-agency targets for future initiatives to aid the development of relationships between partners within the CJS.

**COURTS LISTING** This inspection, led by the CPS Inspectorate and also with the Magistrates' Courts Inspectorate, into the administrative processes behind Crown Court Listing follows on from an earlier similar report into the Magistrates' Courts. The findings of the inspection are currently being considered by the Courts Service.

**JOINT BVR INSPECTIONS** HMIC and the Audit Commission jointly inspected community safety arrangements in Wiltshire. This was a pilot inspection designed to test out working arrangements and protocols between the two inspectorates in readiness for a likely increase in inter-agency reviews of cross-cutting services.

Previously in Wiltshire, the Police Authority, the County Council and all unitary and district councils had conducted simultaneous Best Value Reviews, leading to a joint county-wide action plan being prepared for moving community safety forward. At the time, this was a bold and innovative step for the authorities to take. The community safety "service" provided across the county was adjudged to be "good" and the prospects for improvement "promising". Joint recommendations were made for all the authorities involved (reflecting the joint nature of the reviews themselves and the need for a strategic, inter-agency agenda for change) with more specific feedback also being provided to each of the authorities individually.



A second joint inspection pilot was undertaken by HMIC and the Audit Commission into community safety in Essex. The review had a specific focus on alcohol- and drug-related crime and disorder throughout Essex. The service was adjudged to be "good" with "promising" prospects for improvement. Joint recommendations were made for all the authorities involved. An improvement plan has been produced, endorsed by all the participants, which will be delivered jointly by the Community Safety Partnerships across Essex.

### SENIOR APPOINTMENTS PANEL

Finally, and while not an "inspection" activity, I should mention the work of the Panel, which I chair and which since August 2001 has provided advice to the Home Secretary on the suitability of candidates to ACPO posts, and which continues to add its value to the leadership agenda. As I noted in my Foreword, the velocity of change within the ACPO ranks is high and provides much work for the Panel. This is a heavy workload, as Figure 15 shows, and I am grateful for the contributions which are made by the Panel members: Ruth Henig (Chair of the Association of Police Authorities); Dame Elizabeth Neville (ACPO); Bernard Hogan Howe (Metropolitan Police Service); Tessa Brooks, our independent member; and Paul Pugh from the Home Office. They help me discharge this important responsibility, which I hold in my capacity as the Home Secretary's professional policing adviser.

**FIGURE 15**  
Number of Chief Officer applications and appointments in the last two years

	2001/02		2002/03	
	Applications	Appointments	Applications	Appointments
Chief Constable and equivalent	34	3	118	15
Deputy Chief Constable and equivalent	18	3	72	12
Assistant Chief Constable and equivalent	101	20	116	23
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>50</b>

Source: Senior Appointments Panel Secretariat

### CONCLUSION

*So, a further year of busy activity for HMIC, where our central role in developing the Service through improved performance and better policing practice has been supplemented and augmented – a year which has seen us move into new areas. Naturally, this presents us with challenges around the priorities which we must attach to these competing demands, whilst maintaining the quality of our work and the level of impact we make. In a way, therefore, the challenges facing us are much the same as those facing the Service. Our new approach to inspection will serve, I believe, to bring those challenges closer together.*

# Chapter 3

## *Police performance monitoring regime*

The monitoring of police performance has long been of central interest to both HMIC and the Home Office. Our long experience is now being deployed by the Home Secretary on police performance improvement in a new regime.

The National Policing Plan (NPP) sets out the monitoring arrangements being established to scrutinise police performance. HMIC is already working with forces to improve performance, and this activity will operate in conjunction with, and be informed by, the new monitoring arrangements.

This chapter sets out the framework within which our work on performance improvement will operate, as well as describing its relationship with the Home Office performance monitoring arrangements. These comprise the Policing Performance Assessment Framework; performance "monitors"; and the Home Secretary's new powers covering a range of engagement and intervention activities.

### **POLICING PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

The Home Office, in partnership with ACPO, APA and the other key stakeholders, is developing a comprehensive and sophisticated means of measuring and comparing police performance - the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF). This will monitor policing performance across six performance areas, known as "domains": citizen focus; helping the public; reducing crime; investigating crime; promoting public safety; and resource usage. The framework will require the development of additional performance indicators to capture the breadth of policing responsibilities, as well as the collection of Activity Based Costing data to establish the link between the resources used and the outcomes delivered. Regular comparative assessment of force (and BCU) performance will allow the Home Office and HMIC to assess the absolute and relative performance of forces. PPAF will be fully introduced from April 2004.

In the interim, the early model is being used to monitor forces' performance across the suite of indicators in the NPP. Improvement will be scrutinised on an indicator-by-indicator basis. Overall force performance will be assessed on the basis of these indicators and other relevant information, including qualitative assessments by HMIC. The process of engagement, collaboration and/or intervention with forces where performance is causing concern, will be driven by these assessments.

PPAF should ensure that the Home Office measures what it values, not the other way round. Comparative assessments, at both force and BCU level, complement local measures agreed by police forces and authorities. In recognition of the performance issues specific to policing major cities, consideration is also being given to comparisons of performance using international benchmarking. That will present, for the first time, a properly rounded picture of police performance, reflecting national priorities and taking into account local circumstances. From time to time, unplanned or specific events - such as major crime, terrorist attack and public order incidents - will have an impact on overall performance, and assessment at national level will take account of such factors.

### **PERFORMANCE "MONITORS"**


The performance monitors, more popularly known as the performance "radars" (and, previously, as "spidergrams"), are a means of illustrating police performance in a comparative way against the PPAF domains. Performance monitors - an example is in the panel opposite - are designed to provide, visually, a representation of performance across a number of different areas of policing responsibilities. Each force's performance against the average score over the Most Similar Force in each domain appears in the form of the pentagram as shown in the example.

### EXAMPLE OF A PERFORMANCE MONITOR

Plot of the average score (over the most similar forces) in each domain is represented as the boundary of the light blue area

The performance of the force in question is shown as the black outline

Scores within each 'domain' are plotted along the five axes



**Better performance is shown further out**

At the time of the first publication of the performance monitors, in February 2003, only one of the domains (domain 4 – providing assistance) could not feature: this will be introduced by the Home Office as PPAF develops. Interim performance indicators (see panel) will feature in the monitors.

Work continues in the Home Office to develop PPAF and to configure the domains – and the links between them – to greater effect. The relationship between the activity domains and resource usage will become clearer, emphasising how activity consumes resources and how resource provision influences performance

#### Interim PPAF Performance Indicators

##### **CITIZEN FOCUS (DOMAIN A)**

Level of public satisfaction with the Police as measured by the British Crime Survey.

##### **REDUCING CRIME (DOMAIN 1)**

Number of burglaries per 1,000 households as measured by recorded crime.

Number of robberies per 1,000 resident population as measured by recorded crime.

Number of vehicle crimes per 1,000 resident population as measured by recorded crime.

##### **INVESTIGATING CRIME (DOMAIN 2)**

Percentage of sanction detections.

Percentage of offences brought to justice.

Number of offenders brought to justice for the supply of Class A drugs, as measured by recorded crime statistics.

##### **PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY (DOMAIN 3)**

Level of fear of crime as measured by the British Crime Survey.

Level of feeling of public safety as measured by the British Crime Survey.

##### **RESOURCE USAGE (DOMAIN B)**

Number of working days lost through sickness as measured by returns submitted to HMIC.

# Chapter 3

## **THE HOME SECRETARY'S POWERS**

The Home Secretary gained new powers of direction in the Police Reform Act 2002. These powers define HMIC's formal and central role in the new police performance monitoring regime, a position I welcome. How this role will be expressed in HMIC's work requires some explanation.

**MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE** HMIC's assessment of comparative force performance, which contributes to prioritising our formal inspection programme (including BCUs, Best Value Reviews and Thematic Inspections), will provide feedback to Chief Officers and Police Authorities about their force's performance, both in absolute and comparative terms. The Baseline Assessment (described in full in the next chapter) is underpinned by the in-depth knowledge that our lead Staff Officers and regional analysts have of force structures, processes and the factors influencing performance.

In addition, HMIC and Home Office officials, including the Police Standards Unit (PSU), consider monthly monitoring information based on Quanta data analysis, which is now being made available to forces.

If there are concerns - for example there has been a significant drop in performance, which is sustained over three months - HMIC would liaise with the force in question to discuss these performance issues. This approach may identify a causal factor and the force may already be initiating a recovery plan to improve performance. We will provide advice and guidance on specific issues and initiatives which have proved to be good practice elsewhere and which have delivered an improvement in performance within a specific area, such as forensic detections.

**ENGAGEMENT** The Police Performance Steering Group (PPSG), which includes representatives of HMIC and PSU would decide whether a formal offer of assistance from PSU should be made - this type of assistance will be categorised as a formal engagement. PPSG would continue to monitor to assess whether the action being taken was securing and sustaining improvement. If there was no significant improvement within a reasonable time scale, both in absolute terms, and in comparison to the Most Similar Force average, the position would be reviewed to consider whether more needed to be done to implement an effective recovery plan, including an escalation to a formal collaboration.

**COLLABORATION** Collaborations are initiated where engagements have not produced sufficient improvement in performance or where there are very serious performance issues to address. They would involve more substantive work with forces where serious, persistent or systematic problems have been identified. PSU (in conjunction with HMIC and others, as appropriate) would look to develop a more in depth programme of work with the force and its authority. This could include collaboration at the more local level of a specific BCU.

Where appropriate, the Home Office may recommend that it would be desirable to call in expert advisers such as HMIC, assistance from partner agencies or support from management consultants, who could provide a review of structures, systems and processes as well as professional advice on finance and personnel issues.

The force in conjunction with its authority would be expected to work up an effective plan and show progress and improvement in the implementation of this plan. PPSG would monitor the progress of the force and, if necessary, advise Ministers on whether a further inspection should be carried out by HMIC.

**FORMAL INTERVENTION** The final level of action would involve the use of powers provided in Section 40 or 41B of the Police Act 1996. The expectation is that formal intervention would usually only follow where an attempt at collaboration had proved unsuccessful. Such a step would require prior Home Secretary approval and would only take place in exceptional circumstances, after detailed discussion with the force at earlier stages.

A formal inspection and assessment conducted by HMIC, under Section 54 of the Police Act 1996 (and at the request of the Home Secretary), would have to precede any direction and to conclude that the force or BCU was not efficient or effective (or was likely to become so) either generally or in a particular respect. The Home Secretary could then decide to direct the Police Authority to take such remedial action as is required in the direction (under Section 4) or to submit an action plan within 12 weeks setting out the remedial measures which the authority proposes to take (under Section 41B). Under a Section 41 direction the authority would be asked to submit an action plan, which would be prepared by the Chief Officer of the force, but the authority could ask





for changes before it was sent to the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary can indicate that the plan was inadequate to the Chief Officer and Police Authority, and the Police Authority would consult the Chief Officer about any revisions required. A revised plan would be submitted to the Home Secretary.

Clearly, though, it would have to be seen that any formal intervention steps would be wholly exceptional, and thoroughly regrettable. HMIC intends to work fully with forces in circumstances of poor performance to avoid intervention. Indeed, we have solid examples, over many years, of how our working with forces will drive up performance.

## **CONCLUSION**

*This new, more structured approach in the Home Office to monitoring police performance was long overdue. As I have shown, we are central to this new regime, but independent from it, enabling me to engage in it, and with it, impartially and in the proper context of operational policing. I see it as a further enabler towards improved performance but not, of itself, a creator of that improvement: that is for the Service itself, working with HMIC and others, who will see that it delivers on both the quantity and the quality fronts, and that the performance trajectory continues to rise.*

# Chapter 4

## *What lies ahead?*

We know that the Police Service will face new operational and managerial challenges throughout the forthcoming year, but by the very nature of its work, it cannot predict accurately where those challenges might arise. What is crystal clear, however, is that a major focus of attention for the Police Service will continue to be on performance, delivery and achievement. The National Policing Plan, which will be updated each year, will provide an impetus to preserving that focus.

The previous chapters have, I hope, demonstrated the pressing need to drive up performance and to improve public satisfaction with the service they receive from their local force.

### **CLOSING THE PERFORMANCE GAP**

Forces do differ from each other and, inevitably, there will be differences between the levels of performance, both in a general sense and in relation to particular crime categories. The Government remains concerned that the spread of performance between the higher-performing forces and the lower-performing forces cannot fully be explained by geographical, social and economic differences alone. It is my view that there will always be a range of performance across England and Wales, but equally, I am convinced that performance can further be driven up to close the gap between the higher- and the lower-performing forces. Our Baseline Assessment methodology will help focus individual forces' attention on the areas where, from our studies, performance improvements can be secured. Tailoring our inspection activity on those areas, and requiring forces to focus their attention, will lead to noticeable improvements in performance.

Relevant here is the Government's initiative to "Narrow the Justice Gap", in which local Criminal Justice Boards must plan to reduce the gap between the number of recorded crimes and the number of perpetrators brought to justice - leading to meeting a national target to bring 1.2m offenders to justice in 2005/06 (or a 17% increase since 2001/02). It is a key measure of the effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System and a crucial indicator of success in reducing crime. Forces will be playing leading roles in achieving that success.

### **THE GAP BETWEEN CRIME FIGURES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME LEVELS**

Improving performance by the Police Service and, to some extent, across the Criminal Justice System more widely, has been evidenced in the overall reduction in crime levels. This has not been matched by a corresponding decrease in the public perception of crime levels and, therefore, in their fear of becoming victims of crime.

How to tackle this? There is an inevitable tension between the Police Service publicising its hardening grip on crime and criminals, and therefore assuring people that they may begin to feel more comfortable about crime levels, and the potential this has to, paradoxically, raise the fear of crime yet further. The Service is beginning to concentrate to a greater degree on reassuring the public.

A large-scale collaborative project in eight forces is seeking to develop a tactical toolkit for public reassurance, based on ring-fenced neighbourhood policing, genuine community engagement and tackling the visible "street signals", which adversely affect public fears and perceptions. There will be an increased emphasis on "localism", which will call for more relevant measures within PPAF and greater accountability for local partners.

Undoubtedly, customer satisfaction and measures of reassurance will become increasingly important and will be reflected in our inspection. In this regard, our inspection approach will increasingly look at customer satisfaction, and I look forward to returning to this theme next year. I will particularly wish to review the extent to which forces have been able to increase the percentage of police officer time spent on front-line duties.

### **PARTNERSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES TO REDUCE CRIME**

As I have already noted, HMIC's commitment to a joined-up Criminal Justice System mirrors that of the Government and finds ready expression in our working closely with other Inspectorates (within and without the CJS) - to which the activities recorded in Chapter 2 attest.



The work being conducted under the aegis of the Criminal Justice Performance Directorate (working to all three interested Government departments) complements that of HMIC and will help to identify those tensions between the agencies and the Inspectorates which need early resolution so that the job of performance improvement can proceed. I am confident that the next 12 months will show significant progress in this field.

### **TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES**

In an ever-accelerating world, technology, as far as the Police Service is concerned, can be both a blessing and a curse. The inventive criminal mind is ever ready to take advantage of advances in technology, and it is the business of the Police Service to keep ahead of these new threats. I pay tribute to the work of, for instance, PITO, the Police Scientific Development Branch and Centrex (especially the National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre) in taking the police science technology forward.

One area where investment has been made is in the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system. ANPR is a software package, which can be used with close circuit television to read car number plates and check those numbers against a range of databases to find out, for instance, if a car is not licensed, has been stolen and other characteristics. ANPR has been piloted in nine force areas during this year, and the results have been encouraging: it has helped the police seize more than £100,000 worth of illegal drugs; to recover over 300 stolen vehicles (valued at over £2m); and £715,000 worth of stolen goods. More than 3,000 people were arrested, the majority for serious crime. I am pleased to note that it is the Home Office's intention that each BCU should have ANPR capability by March 2005.

Another area is the DNA database. Over two million samples are now loaded. In the last year, 21,000 crimes were detected using DNA evidence, an increase of 132% on the previous year.

Yet another is the continuing roll-out of Airwave, the PFI/PPP project to provide the Service with a single, national communications system. This is already providing forces with greater coverage and services, and the potential for communication across borders and agencies.

Other areas - including advanced CCTV, mobile 'phone disablement, designing out crime, finger print technology - will help the Service improve its effectiveness. The Service must be involved in these technological developments and then make full use of the advantage presented in the fight against crime.

### **SPENDING REVIEW 2004**

As I write, Government departments are readying their proposals and bids for resourcing for the years 2005/06 to 2007/08. HM Treasury will expect a business case showing how well present resources are spent, and how the service itself proposes to help fund future improvements through more efficient and effective performance. The Service and APA are working with Home Office officials to build up such a case. The Service will need to demonstrate that the Police Performance Assessment Framework is being put into place and that early results are emerging. These will include preliminary analysis of costs and policing services through Activity Based Costing, which is now being implemented across the Service and which will form an indispensable part of the performance framework.

### **HUMAN RESOURCES ISSUES**

On 31 March 2003 the Police Service was employing over 133,000 police officers and over 66,000 police staff (including community support officers and traffic wardens). Obviously a large employer, it properly regards itself as largely a "people organisation". As noted earlier, HMI (Training) will be scrutinising force HR strategies as part of our remit to drive up performance in areas alongside operational activity, as well as ensuring that the volume and quality of police training is proper and correct.

The Service is fortunate to have been granted increased numbers, and I look to it to make full and better use of uniformed staff - both warranted officers and community support officers - and police civil staff. Our workforce modernisation thematic, already described, will help that process.

# Chapter 4

Two particular issues concern me:

**RETIREMENT "BULGE"** The Police Service is now not far off the need to recruit significant numbers of fresh constables to succeed those officers who joined in large numbers in the mid-1970s and who will have completed their 30 years' service in the next two years. Forces' abilities in this area have been bolstered in recent times by the need to recruit increased numbers as part of the Crime Fighting Fund initiative. I look to forces to identify their future recruitment requirements and plan accordingly.

**ABSORPTION OF INEXPERIENCED STAFF/CIVILIAN OFFICERS** It is important to say that police performance has steadily improved even while significant numbers of new police officers have been absorbed into the operational front-line, as a result of the extra recruitment derived from the Crime Fighting Fund. It is significant to note that these new staff have quickly been brought up to operational effectiveness – both by Centrex and by the forces themselves – but it also indicates that the quality of recruits offering themselves to become police officers is at a high level. I am pleased to note this. I should also remind forces that the absorption strategies that have been developed as a result of this exercise need to be kept fresh and deployed further as recruitment continues and grows.

In terms of diversity, the Police Service in many ways has set the pace for other organisations in the way it has set about building a workforce which properly reflects the communities the forces serve. This achievement has continued at the same time as the massive and prolonged Crime Fighting Fund-inspired recruitment activity, where it would have been easy for forces to dilute the quality and quantity of the diversity of the workforce. As ever, progress needs to continue. I expect each force to create a workforce which fully reflects their communities, with the advantages which this connection with those communities undoubtedly brings. Very recently, recruitment of community support officers has presented a fresh opportunity for the Service to recruit further from the pool of talent in the minority communities: I am confident that I will see positive developments accordingly.

## **LEADERSHIP ISSUES**

My last Annual Report included a full exposition of the structures and processes in place to ensure that leadership issues were properly

addressed in the Home Office, in HMIC and in the Police Service. Those structures and processes are operating well, as I note in my Foreword – I also note there the Home Office work towards getting the best leaders to take on the most demanding challenges in the Police Service. What is beginning to emerge is a range of perspectives on the best way forward. I look forward to involvement in the resulting implementation plan. That plan will need to take careful account of the interests of stakeholder groups; look sufficiently far ahead to deliver a real and sustainable improvement over the current arrangements to identify and nurture talent; and be designed such that performance improvement at force level is not jeopardised in the short term. In other words, a long-term and strategically well-founded approach to leadership issues must be the result. The Service will be expected to respond to this plan in positive ways.

## **SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT**

Public concern about preserving the environment is very high. The Police Service needs to demonstrate that it, too, is aware of how it can enhance sustainable development. The appearance in police fleets of environmentally efficient vehicles is an example of this. Forces need to examine their policies in this area, especially where a solid business case for such policies can be discerned.

## **BASELINE ASSESSMENT - OUR NEW INSPECTION METHODOLOGY**

In common with other Inspectorates, HMIC keeps its inspection methodology under review. The last significant change was the move away from annual inspection to a three-year cycle and the introduction of the Performance Review assessment at the mid-point of the cycle. More recently, we have introduced Risk Assessment to focus our inspection effort and developed systems for inspecting Basic Command Units (BCUs) and Best Value Reviews (BVRs). In 2002, I identified a need to rethink the conventional 'formal' inspection methodology used at force level in the light of changing circumstances, especially the major developments which will flow from the Police Reform Act 2002. We have termed the approach 'Baseline Assessment' because it seeks to monitor change in each force (improvement or deterioration) against a baseline of performance identified in spring 2004.



The Baseline Assessments will draw upon the quantitative data of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework, to which they will add standards-based professional judgement of the quality of the processes that underpin performance. They will produce a tailored, three-year inspection programme for each force, with areas of underperformance being subjected to more detailed inspection. Other types of inspection activity will be integrated into each programme, reflecting the three-year planning process based on National Policing Plans.

I am grateful to the five forces which have allowed us to test the model. It has now been refined and will, I believe, lead to a more transparent and accessible assessment of the strengths and weaknesses in each force, based to a significant degree on self-assessment. More importantly, it should produce shared agendas for improvement, agreed by HMIC, forces and Police Authorities.

The main reasons for the new approach are:

- the Police Reform Programme - to be absolutely sure that our inspection regime reflects the changed emphases and generates evidence-based feedback on how well forces are implementing the key aspects of reform;
- HMIC assessments of efficiency plans, and inspections of Basic Command Units and Best Value Reviews, to ensure that all inspection activity in a force is co-ordinated in a single programme;
- comprehensive performance assessments, to adopt the best features of these multi-inspectorate 'whole organisation' assessments recently conducted of local authorities; and
- pressures to improve the interfaces of the Criminal Justice System - it is a high Governmental priority to make the CJS more coherent and better attuned to the needs of victims and witnesses, in order to improve confidence in the system. HMIC's inspection process needs thus to address relevant cross-cutting issues in more depth than previously.

The main elements will be:

- traffic-light assessments of 23 Police functions and activities (see Figure 16);
- frameworks of questions and the standards expected;

- more use of self-assessment and the views of other regulators and partners;
- assessment of strengths and areas for improvement that are high-level, comprehensive and annual; and
- a tailored programme of inspection activity for each force, based on the assessment and the force's own strategic development programme.

FIGURE 16

#### Operational Performance

1. Tackling Level 2 criminality
2. Volume crime
3. Hate crime
4. Reassurance
5. Call handling
6. Roads policing
7. Critical incidents
8. National crime recording standard
9. Prisoner handling
10. Science and technology management
11. Forensic management

#### Leadership and Corporate Governance

12. Leadership and direction
13. Strategic management
14. Performance management
15. Human resource management
16. Health and safety
17. Professional standards
18. Best value
19. Diversity
20. Resource management

#### Partnership and Community Engagement

21. Crime and disorder reduction partnerships/LSPs
22. CJS/Narrowing the justice gap
23. Consultation and community cohesion.

Source: HMIC

# Chapter 4

The tailored programme of inspection activity will include quarterly visits by HMIC staff officers, inspections of BCUs and BVRs, and focused inspections examining areas of concern following Baseline Assessment. By integrating these activities, there will be a move towards continuous assessment and monitoring of progress, rather than periodic snapshots of performance. Some key features of the previous HMIC approach will, however, be retained:

- HMIs will still engage regularly with forces and Police Authorities, though at a more strategic level;
- risk-based processes will focus inspection effort on areas of weakness;
- HMIC methodology will be shared with forces, Police Authorities and other stakeholders; and
- inspection findings will be published.

While the principles of the Baseline Assessment approach will be retained, the methodology will change significantly in 2004. The frameworks of issues/questions will be realigned to match the policing domains being developed for the Policing Performance Assessment Framework; and quantitative performance will be integrated into the methodology in a more structured way using the principles that will underpin PPAF. These guidelines relate, therefore, to the 2003/04 Baseline Assessment and will be updated thereafter.

In January 2004, Regional HMIs will review the assessments of forces in their regions to ensure that a fair, robust, consistent approach has been adopted in evaluating the evidence and generating gradings. In February a similar process will be carried out nationally to moderate the finding across the four regions.

During March 2004, HMIs will share these provisional outputs with forces and Police Authorities, inviting comments both on factual accuracy and the substantive content. In some cases, the core evidence-gathering will have taken place several months earlier, and it will thus be appropriate to reflect recent significant changes and performance data up to 31 December 2003.

In April and May 2004, Regional HMIs will present the final reports to forces and Police Authorities, after which the reports will be published. The reports will be in a more succinct, accessible style, clearly identifying the strengths and areas for improvement in each of the 23 components.

Following the first Baseline Assessment, a three-year inspection programme will be planned, tailored to the inspection needs of the force and taking account of the force's own strategic development programme. It will include:

- focused inspections on activities/areas of special concern;
- BCU and BVR inspections; and
- quarterly visits by HMIC staff officers.

The quarterly visits will be used to check progress in areas highlighted during the initial assessment and will incorporate other routine HMIC monitoring in areas such as overtime monitoring and efficiency plans. Following all significant inspection activity, the Baseline Assessments will be updated. The results will build towards a formal annual presentation by Regional HMIs to forces and Police Authorities, and publication of the updated assessment.

It is planned, in the autumn of 2004, to republish the Baseline Assessments, following realignment of the framework with the PPAF domains. Thereafter, they will be published annually every autumn. There is broad agreement amongst the Association of Police Authorities, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office that HMIC inputs around strengths and weaknesses will be more timely and helpful if made at the start of the autumn planning cycle.



## **CONCLUSION**

*I began this Annual Report in praise of the achievements of the Police Services. That praise bears repetition. Performance has been steadily improving, at a time of considerable demand and when the pressure to reform and modernise has been relentless.*

*However, if there ever was a time to be complacent, it is not now. The Service has shown how it can deliver on these improvement and development fronts and how implanted have become its modernising instincts. Expectations have been raised and police managers, supervisors and operators - of all specialisms and descriptions - must look for evermore imaginative and innovative steps forward: in sustainable performance improvement, in drawing communities into its decision-making and planning processes, and in being fleet of foot in responding to new criminal challenges. The Service is peopled by diligent, committed and dedicated professionals, who have worked hard to secure the achievements outlined in this Report. They are to be congratulated.*

# Appendix I

## HMIC regional structure





# Appendix II



## THE WORK OF THE INSPECTORATE

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary is an independent Inspectorate. Its principal role is to inspect and report on the performance and efficiency of the Police Service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, inspections are also conducted within other Government bodies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Squad and the Central Police Training and Development Authority (Centrex), while other non-Home Office Police forces (for example, British Transport Police) are inspected by invitation. HMIC also has a duty under the Local Government Act 1999 to inspect police authorities in relation to Best Value.

Her Majesty's Inspectors have a further responsibility, under section 77 of the Police Act 1996, to ensure the correct handling of complaints against the police. The Inspectorate does not itself investigate specific cases, but it is able to assess whether the appropriate procedures have been followed.

### THE STRUCTURE OF HMIC

- Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary is based at the Home Office in London.
- There are now six Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIs), of whom four are former Chief Constables and have geographical responsibilities; two are from non-Police backgrounds, of whom one is responsible for the inspection of Police training throughout England and Wales.
- Three Assistant Inspectors of Constabulary (AICs) provide supplementary policy and inspection support. These consist of two AICs seconded from Police forces (Deputy Chief Constables) and an AIC from a non-Police background who specialises in race and diversity issues. The AICs do not have specific regional responsibilities but conduct inspections in conjunction with the HMIs as necessary.
- Further assistance is provided by police staff officers (seconded from forces), police staff, and civil servants.

## TYPES OF INSPECTIONS

### THE FORCE INSPECTION

A core Inspectorate activity through which HM Inspectors of Constabulary conduct detailed examinations of those areas of policing organisation and practice judged to be central to the efficient and effective discharge of the policing function.

Triggered through a risk assessment process, these standards-based inspections check on the performance of forces in key areas (including ministerial priorities and crime targets, and objectives set locally by Police Authorities) and make recommendations for improvement where weaknesses are identified. Focused forms of these inspections are also conducted in relation to specific areas.

**THE THEMATIC INSPECTION** Examines a key issue across a representative number of forces and comments solely on the effectiveness of performance in relation to that key issue.

This type of inspection identifies deficiencies common to the Service as a whole and disseminates good practice regarding a specific aspect of policing. Such inspections have proved key in identifying critical issues and sticking points, and in offering solutions for moving the Service forward in areas such as race and diversity, sickness absence, efficiency and value for money, crime recording, police integrity, the use of scientific and technological advances to tackle volume crime, and training.

**THE BEST VALUE REVIEW INSPECTION** HMIC is empowered to audit and inspect the extent to which Police Authorities have fulfilled the criteria to achieve Best Value.

This duty of inspection, introduced under the Local Government Act 1999 (Part 1, section 24 (2)), gives HMIC a remit to inspect Best Value in Police Authorities to ensure that Best Value Reviews have been carried out in accordance with the statutory requirements and that they are likely to bring about the desired improvements. HMIC liaises closely with other Best Value Inspectorates, particularly the District Auditors, who also have a role in inspecting Best Value in Police Authorities. HMIC is represented on the Best Value Inspectorate Forum, which ensures co-ordination of inspection activity and methodology.

**THE BASIC COMMAND UNIT (BCU) INSPECTION** Inspections of individual operational police units, factoring in the local context within which they operate, and designed to identify the potential for improvement and to spread good practice.

These inspections focus on the local aspects of policing and are aimed at improving performance, and identifying and spreading good practice. Concentrating on leadership and performance, the inspections seek to identify reasons for variations in performance between apparently similar BCUs. HMIC will seek to inspect every BCU in England and Wales over a five-year period, and has begun to conduct re-inspections.

## THE FUNDING OF HMIC – OUR RESOURCES

The resources for HMIC are provided directly by central Government through the Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group of the Home Office (formerly the Policing and Crime Reduction Group). Each year HMIC receives resources from two separate allocations. Day-to-day running costs (including income) are the subject of a specific funding allocation whilst capital expenditure is accounted for separately.

# Appendix II

For 2002/03 HMIC received a net running cost allocation of £7.63m. Figure 17 indicates how these resources were applied (before income of £0.3m).

It can be seen from the figures that the majority of our costs relate to seconded police officers and Home Office staff (HM Inspectors, non-police Assistant Inspectors, specialist support and administration staff). A key feature of the way HMIC undertakes inspections is through the use of police secondments. For many officers, a secondment to HMIC is increasingly seen as an essential part of their career development.

For resource management, HMIC is considered to be part of the Home Office and must follow its accounting and budgeting arrangements and therefore some costs such as HQ accommodation, corporate IT and central services costs are not charged to individual units and do not appear as costs to HMIC.

Police Authorities and forces in England and Wales, which are funded by the Home Office, are not charged for any inspections. External income is generated from the inspection of non-Home Office forces both within the UK and abroad. 2002/03 was an exceptional year for these inspections, which are carried out by invitation and generated income of £0.3m in the year.

In addition, HMIC received in 2002/03 a capital allocation of £0.2m. This was used, in part, to refurbish our Southern regional office in Woking and to equip a new office for our Wales and Central regional team in Bromsgrove, who relocated from offices in Bristol at the end of a lease.


Comparisons with other Inspectorates indicate (even allowing for central costs within the Home Office not charged to individual units) that HMIC is cost-effective, with overall running costs of less than 1% of the net revenue expenditure for all Police Authorities and forces.

## HOW WE USE OUR RESOURCES

From April 2002, HMIC has implemented an activity recording system to measure how all our resources are applied and to cost all inspection activities. Figure 18 demonstrates how HMIC deployed its resources in 2002/3.

The actual deployment of resources reflected HMIC's statutory responsibilities and our business plan for 2002/03, which focused on a balance between Thematic Inspections, Force Inspections, Best Value Inspections and the continuance of the five-year programme to inspect all individual Basic Command Units in every force. In addition, the Figure also demonstrates the resources applied to activities which are a specific responsibility of HMIC - to provide professional policing advice to the Home Office and to support the process of appointing senior officers in the Service.

**FIGURE 17**  
HMIC expenditure 2002/03



Source: HMIC

**FIGURE 18**  
How HMIC used its resources in 2002/03

	£k	
Force Inspections (including Specialist)	2,288	29%
BCU Inspections	1,546	20%
Thematic Inspections	1,448	19%
Best Value Inspections	833	11%
Advice to Authorities and Forces	356	5%
Senior Appointments	399	5%
Police Support to Home Office, Advice to Ministers, etc	500	6%
Efficiency Plans Inspections	168	2%
Working for other Inspectorates	82	1%
Other	186	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,806</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: HMIC

# Appendix III



30th June 2003

Dear Keith

## **HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY - REMIT**

1. The National Policing Plan sets out the government's commitment to improving police performance, reducing crime and anti-social behaviour, and to increasing public reassurance.

2. One of the critical success factors in meeting these goals is an effective inspection regime and in this Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has a key role to play.

3. The role, and independence, of HMIC is set down in legislation, principally the Police Act 1996. Within this context, I now wish to set out my expectations of the inspectorate in supporting the implementation of the National Policing Plan.

### **OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK**

4. HMIC's stated purpose is:

- To promote, and report on, the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, through inspection of police organisations and functions to ensure agreed standards are achieved and maintained; good practice is spread; and performance is improved.
- To provide advice and support to the Home Secretary and tripartite partners.

5. We have agreed that you will adopt a framework for future inspections that is based upon the comprehensive assessment of performance and I welcome the focus within that framework upon performance against targets; leadership and corporate governance, and partnership and community engagement. The first of these new inspections, to take place this summer, will constitute a "baseline assessment" against which a force's progress will be monitored in future years.

### **REMIT**

6. Within this framework, the primary goal of HMIC's inspection regime should be to support the strategic priorities of delivering improved performance and greater public reassurance with particular emphasis upon:

- The Home Office's Public Service Agreements;
- The four key priorities outlined within the National Policing Plan;
- The milestones set out in the National Policing Plan;

- Achieving greater convergence between the best- and worst-performing forces and BCUs; and
- The implementation and further development of the Police Reform Programme – particularly the work on getting the best leaders into the most demanding roles within the Service.

7. HMIC is already working closely with the Police Standards Unit – work which we expect will develop and strengthen – and other Home Office units to support the implementation of the reform programme and the development of the Policing Performances Assessment Framework (PPAF). The latter, together with the annual risk assessment process, will inform HMIC's tailored three-year inspection programme and, where appropriate, trigger inspections.

8. I am aware that one of the products of this year's assessment will be a progress report on performance and reform issues within each force and I look forward to receipt of these reports. I welcome the trend of recent reports in which the Inspectorate has set out, in unambiguous terms, those areas requiring improvement.

9. I also welcome in particular the developing activity with the Police Standards Unit, other Home Office units and key stakeholders in engaging collaboratively with poorer performing and failing forces and BCUs, and look forward to improved performance outcomes as a consequence. This work includes the development of a formal protocol to clarify the process for escalating HMIC/PSU support and engagement in such circumstances, including any recommendation for formal intervention where appropriate.

### **HMIC'S WIDER ROLE**

10. In addition to HMIC's role as an Inspectorate, you also have a central role in:

- The Senior Appointments Panel
- The recently introduced PDR process for chief officers.

11. You have rightly identified that effective partnerships with other stakeholders in the inspection process will be crucial to the success of much of your planned work and, in particular, I endorse the need for a close working relationship with sister Inspectorates within the Criminal Justice System. This has set an important precedent and I hope to see further developments in this area.

Best wishes

**DAVID BLUNKETT**

# Appendix IV

## *Inspection programme 2002/03*

### **FULL INSPECTIONS**

CAMBRIDGESHIRE

HERTFORDSHIRE

METROPOLITAN POLICE

NORFOLK

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE

POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

and, by invitation

ISLE OF MAN CONSTABULARY

STATES OF JERSEY POLICE

UK ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY CONSTABULARY

### **FOCUSED INSPECTIONS**

**DORSET**

Core performance, particularly call handling and crime investigation

**HAMPSHIRE**

Professional standards

**HUMBERSIDE**

Crime management, custody procedures, community race relations and diversity and professional standards

**NORTHUMBRIA**

Personnel, crime recording and crime management, community policing and call management

**NORTH YORKSHIRE**

Call handling and professional standards

**SOUTH WALES**

Crime management, human resource management, race and diversity, call management, criminal justice, finance and resource management, and complaints and discipline

**WILTSHIRE**

Core performance, professional standards, and people and demand management

**POLICE ADVISERS SECTION**

Professional lead of Prison Liaison Officers in England and Wales, and advisers to HM Prison Service on the Police Service

# Appendix IV



## **BASIC COMMAND UNIT INSPECTIONS**

Avon & Somerset (3)  
Bedfordshire (2)  
Cheshire (1)  
Cleveland (1)  
Devon & Cornwall (2)  
Dorset (1)  
Gloucestershire (1)  
Greater Manchester (1)  
Gwent (1)  
Hampshire (2)  
Hertfordshire (1)  
Humberside (1)  
Kent (3)  
Lincolnshire (2)  
Merseyside (2)  
Metropolitan Police (6)  
Northamptonshire (2)  
Northumbria (1)  
North Wales (1)  
Nottinghamshire (1)  
South Wales (1)  
South Yorkshire (1)  
Staffordshire (2)  
Suffolk (2)  
Surrey (2)  
Sussex (1)  
Thames Valley (2)  
West Midlands (5)  
West Yorkshire (3)  
Wiltshire (1)

## **BASIC COMMAND UNIT REVISIT INSPECTIONS**

Avon & Somerset (3)  
City of London (2)  
Cleveland (1)  
Dorset (1)  
Dyfed-Powys (2)  
Derbyshire (2)  
Greater Manchester (1)  
Gwent (2)  
Leicestershire (2)  
Lincolnshire (2)  
Metropolitan Police (4)  
Norfolk (1)  
Northants (2)  
North Wales (1)  
South Wales (2)  
Staffordshire (2)  
Sussex (2)  
Thames Valley (1)  
West Midlands (3)

## **BEST VALUE REVIEW INSPECTIONS**

Avon & Somerset (1)  
Bedfordshire (3)  
Cheshire (3)  
City of London (3)  
Cleveland (4)  
Cumbria (3)  
Derbyshire (3)  
Devon & Cornwall (2)  
Dorset (3)  
Durham (2)  
Dyfed-Powys (6)  
Greater Manchester (3)  
Gwent (3)  
Hampshire (2)  
Hertfordshire (5)  
Humberside (2)  
Kent (2)  
Lancashire (2)  
Leicestershire (3)  
Lincolnshire (3)  
Merseyside (5)  
Metropolitan Police (2)  
Norfolk (6)  
North Yorkshire (1)  
Northamptonshire (6)  
Northumbria (5)  
North Wales (5)  
Nottinghamshire (2)  
South Yorkshire (2)  
Staffordshire (2)  
Suffolk (7)  
Surrey (1)  
Sussex (5)  
Warwickshire (3)  
West Midlands (1)  
West Yorkshire (2)

# Appendix V

## Performance information

**TABLE 1**

Total recorded crime

Force	2001/02			2002/03		
	Number of recorded crimes	Recorded crimes per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded crimes detected	Number of recorded crimes	Recorded crimes per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded crimes detected
Avon and Somerset	177,196	117.2	14.1	173,866	117.2	15.4
Bedfordshire	52,210	93.8	24.7	60,895	107.5	25.7
Cambridgeshire	69,559	95.3	22.5	85,029	119.8	22.0
Cheshire	70,990	72.3	25.6	84,574	86.0	26.4
City of London	10,093		33.8	10,026		36.2
Cleveland	72,003	129.5	20.5	73,816	136.4	23.4
Cumbria	37,241	75.7	32.6	37,651	77.2	30.7
Derbyshire	89,841	91.9	24.7	103,180	107.9	25.7
Devon and Cornwall	101,425	63.9	31.5	131,240	83.1	28.9
Dorset	54,869	79.2	26.5	62,297	89.8	25.4
Durham	51,478	84.8	0.0	51,177	86.5	0.0
Dyfed-Powys	23,969	49.6	64.1	25,104	51.4	68.3
Essex	113,150	69.5	26.1	136,181	84.3	27.3
Gloucestershire	50,467	89.3	29.9	55,775	98.7	29.2
Greater Manchester	380,801	147.3	20.9	379,126	152.7	21.9
Gwent	46,916	84.2	55.5	61,237	110.8	47.7
Hampshire	135,961	75.7	29.5	152,664	85.9	29.8
Hertfordshire	67,237	64.0	24.4	86,396	83.5	23.0
Humberside	118,039	134.0	19.8	132,734	152.7	20.2
Kent	120,155	75.2	28.2	130,597	82.6	27.9
Lancashire	137,760	96.4	26.1	130,507	92.2	27.3
Leicestershire	88,557	94.3	0.0	96,143	104.0	27.2
Lincolnshire	49,792	78.5	27.3	61,949	95.7	23.0
Merseyside	151,041	107.2	23.8	163,165	119.8	25.3
Metropolitan Police	1,056,513	143.4	14.0	1,079,877	150.4	14.5
Norfolk	58,923	73.3	25.0	71,270	89.3	24.2
Northamptonshire	60,458	96.6	31.2	73,509	116.6	28.4
Northumbria	139,130	98.4	31.2	165,496	119.6	31.2
North Wales	53,839	81.8	27.8	65,133	98.2	28.9
North Yorkshire	59,125	78.4	25.9	67,798	90.2	25.8
Nottinghamshire	159,462	154.5	17.7	161,403	158.9	16.5
South Wales	116,708	94.2	32.6	143,372	119.6	28.6
South Yorkshire	134,764	103.5	23.4	152,057	120.1	20.5
Staffordshire	117,027	110.3	19.5	108,626	103.7	31.4
Suffolk	50,492	74.3	32.5	50,315	75.2	34.0
Surrey	61,457	56.9	25.2	68,452	64.6	21.7
Sussex	135,110	88.7	25.5	130,887	87.5	23.7
Thames Valley	196,980	92.6	24.5	208,523	99.6	25.5
Warwickshire	42,211	82.8	25.1	44,196	87.3	25.7
West Mercia	102,257	89.2	28.4	105,077	90.7	32.1
West Midlands	372,257	142.1	28.9	350,242	137.1	26.3
West Yorkshire	298,847	141.4	19.3	322,794	155.2	20.3
Wiltshire	38,728	63.1	30.2	44,225	72.1	27.7
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>5,525,038</b>	<b>104.4</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>5,898,581</b>	<b>113.2</b>	<b>23.2</b>

Because of its low resident population, figures per 1,000 population are not appropriate for the City of London Police

Crimes which are notifiable to the Home Office include all indictable and triable-either-way offences (that is, all offences which can be tried in the Crown Court) plus a few closely associated summary offences

**TABLE 2**  
Recorded domestic burglaries

Force	2001/02			2002/03		
	Number of recorded domestic burglaries	Recorded crimes per 1,000 households	Percentage of recorded domestic burglaries detected	Number of recorded domestic burglaries	Recorded crimes per 1,000 households	Percentage of recorded domestic burglaries detected
Avon and Somerset	15,995	25.1	10.7	14,561	23.4	16.1
Bedfordshire	3,684	15.7	14.0	3,784	16.8	18.7
Cambridgeshire	4,670	15.4	20.4	5,457	18.9	18.6
Cheshire	5,956	14.5	19.7	6,409	15.8	21.5
City of London	35	11.7	37.1	46	10.6	73.9
Cleveland	8,235	35.8	12.4	7,321	32.8	12.2
Cumbria	2,108	10.0	17.9	2,152	10.3	13.6
Derbyshire	6,748	16.4	21.2	8,551	21.3	16.8
Devon and Cornwall	6,922	10.3	16.0	7,207	10.7	16.3
Dorset	3,346	11.0	17.9	2,947	9.8	18.1
Durham	4,135	16.2	0.0	3,083	12.3	0.0
Dyfed-Powys	714	3.6	41.0	666	3.2	39.2
Essex	5,597	8.2	17.0	7,138	10.6	17.3
Gloucestershire	3,387	14.2	24.1	3,369	14.2	27.2
Greater Manchester	39,081	36.2	8.4	42,396	40.8	7.5
Gwent	2,560	11.3	38.0	3,001	13.1	41.0
Hampshire	7,122	9.6	19.5	6,793	9.3	20.6
Hertfordshire	4,951	11.4	12.0	5,294	12.6	16.8
Humberside	11,012	29.8	10.3	12,213	33.4	11.0
Kent	7,550	11.4	16.2	7,655	11.8	18.5
Lancashire	12,102	20.4	18.2	9,513	16.2	18.9
Leicestershire	6,522	17.3	0.0	6,450	17.4	17.8
Lincolnshire	3,854	14.3	17.6	4,290	15.8	15.1
Merseyside	14,347	24.8	14.6	14,608	25.6	14.7
Metropolitan Police	73,930	23.2	9.3	72,237	24.0	11.8
Norfolk	3,658	10.6	15.4	3,820	11.1	14.4
Northamptonshire	3,838	15.0	15.8	4,871	18.8	16.2
Northumbria	11,244	18.5	16.1	11,179	18.8	17.0
North Wales	2,407	8.8	15.8	3,234	11.6	17.2
North Yorkshire	4,754	15.1	9.7	4,804	15.3	12.9
Nottinghamshire	14,337	33.1	11.2	16,418	38.2	9.8
South Wales	6,845	13.6	20.0	8,060	16.3	18.0
South Yorkshire	16,188	29.5	12.8	17,836	33.6	9.5
Staffordshire	8,066	18.7	13.8	6,458	15.0	18.0
Suffolk	2,447	8.6	19.0	2,284	8.1	20.8
Surrey	3,636	8.2	12.0	4,140	9.6	11.2
Sussex	7,618	11.4	14.2	8,209	12.6	12.0
Thames Valley	13,397	15.5	20.1	13,809	16.7	18.3
Warwickshire	3,046	14.4	24.0	3,070	14.6	23.5
West Mercia	6,014	12.7	17.8	6,239	13.0	20.1
West Midlands	31,219	29.5	18.1	26,942	26.1	18.9
West Yorkshire	34,678	39.1	14.6	36,406	42.6	13.5
Wiltshire	2,391	9.5	18.1	2,724	10.8	18.4
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>430,346</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>437,644</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>14.4</b>

Because of its low resident population, figures per 1,000 household are not appropriate for the City of London Police

Domestic burglary consists of two offences: 28 Burglary in a dwelling and 29 Aggravated burglary in a dwelling

# Appendix V

**TABLE 3**  
Recorded vehicle crime

Force	2001/02			2002/03		
	Number of recorded vehicle crimes	Recorded vehicle crimes per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded vehicle crimes detected	Number of recorded vehicle crimes	Recorded vehicle crimes per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded vehicle crimes detected
Avon and Somerset	40,791	27.0	6.8	36,249	24.4	8.4
Bedfordshire	12,725	22.9	9.8	11,434	20.2	11.3
Cambridgeshire	12,745	17.5	6.4	13,345	18.8	8.9
Cheshire	13,445	13.7	8.9	13,903	14.1	11.5
City of London	891		24.2	694		39.0
Cleveland	14,251	25.6	6.8	14,294	26.4	7.6
Cumbria	4,481	9.1	11.3	4,752	9.7	8.7
Derbyshire	16,303	16.7	8.1	16,792	17.6	9.0
Devon and Cornwall	17,549	11.1	9.2	19,377	12.3	10.7
Dorset	9,809	14.2	6.4	9,417	13.6	6.5
Durham	7,798	12.9	0.0	7,446	12.6	0.0
Dyfed-Powys	2,050	4.2	31.8	2,028	4.2	33.6
Essex	20,861	12.8	10.7	21,570	13.3	10.9
Gloucestershire	8,140	14.4	12.6	7,740	13.7	11.8
Greater Manchester	74,775	28.9	6.3	67,274	27.1	6.5
Gwent	7,016	12.6	44.3	8,332	15.1	32.7
Hampshire	21,859	12.2	8.8	22,263	12.5	11.5
Hertfordshire	14,263	13.6	11.9	16,602	16.0	11.8
Humberside	21,344	24.2	6.3	22,491	25.9	7.0
Kent	20,598	12.9	11.9	20,814	13.2	10.3
Lancashire	21,015	14.7	10.1	18,874	13.3	11.9
Leicestershire	16,353	17.4	0.0	15,986	17.3	14.3
Lincolnshire	6,782	10.7	11.4	7,857	12.1	8.1
Merseyside	29,982	21.3	7.0	28,054	20.6	7.9
Metropolitan Police	174,258	23.6	4.5	173,392	24.1	4.3
Norfolk	9,797	12.2	8.3	10,739	13.5	6.7
Northamptonshire	11,335	18.1	19.8	11,868	18.8	15.6
Northumbria	20,410	14.4	12.0	20,264	14.6	12.8
North Wales	7,661	11.6	8.7	8,096	12.2	10.1
North Yorkshire	8,171	10.8	7.8	9,642	12.8	6.8
Nottinghamshire	28,532	27.6	4.6	31,009	30.5	4.5
South Wales	25,881	20.9	12.9	30,423	25.4	11.6
South Yorkshire	28,721	22.1	5.7	31,189	24.6	5.8
Staffordshire	17,951	16.9	6.6	14,557	13.9	15.2
Suffolk	6,915	10.2	12.9	6,282	9.4	0.6
Surrey	9,394	8.7	6.8	9,989	9.4	6.6
Sussex	21,240	14.0	8.0	21,108	14.1	7.4
Thames Valley	41,780	19.6	11.4	37,629	18.0	11.8
Warwickshire	8,017	15.7	9.9	8,477	16.7	12.2
West Mercia	13,061	11.4	9.0	13,076	11.3	12.6
West Midlands	63,624	24.3	11.7	60,838	23.8	12.5
West Yorkshire	65,436	31.0	7.3	64,207	30.9	7.9
Wiltshire	5,264	8.6	12.9	5,551	9.0	10.5
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>983,274</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>8.17</b>	<b>975,924</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>8.82</b>

Because of its low resident population, figures per 1,000 population are not appropriate for the City of London Police

Vehicle crime consists of three offences: 37.2 Aggravated vehicle taking, 45 Theft from a vehicle and 48 Theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle



**TABLE 4**  
Recorded robberies

Force	Number of recorded robberies	2001/02 Recorded robberies per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded robberies detected	Number of recorded robberies	2002/03 Recorded robberies per 1,000 population	Percentage of recorded robberies detected
Avon and Somerset	4,889	3.2	10.4	3,504	2.4	13.4
Bedfordshire	957	1.7	16.8	997	1.8	18.9
Cambridgeshire	679	0.9	21.5	906	1.3	20.4
Cheshire	472	0.5	32.2	631	0.6	25.0
City of London	46		17.4	45		24.4
Cleveland	1,264	2.3	18.3	1,434	2.6	19.2
Cumbria	144	0.3	42.4	130	0.3	37.7
Derbyshire	1,029	1.1	24.3	1,048	1.1	24.2
Devon and Cornwall	474	0.3	33.8	710	0.4	22.7
Dorset	334	0.5	19.2	437	0.6	17.2
Durham	284	0.5	0.0	287	0.5	0.0
Dyfed-Powys	26	0.1	76.9	40	0.1	75.0
Essex	920	0.6	24.7	1,328	0.8	21.5
Gloucestershire	498	0.9	26.1	521	0.9	40.9
Greater Manchester	11,027	4.3	14.1	10,745	4.3	15.3
Gwent	215	0.4	57.7	329	0.6	40.7
Hampshire	872	0.5	30.0	966	0.5	30.8
Hertfordshire	678	0.6	31.0	862	0.8	30.5
Humberside	1,190	1.4	16.8	1,813	2.1	14.1
Kent	1,003	0.6	26.8	1,242	0.8	24.5
Lancashire	1,608	1.1	24.1	1,409	1.0	30.3
Leicestershire	1,167	1.2	0.0	1,453	1.6	22.8
Lincolnshire	251	0.4	32.3	307	0.5	28.0
Merseyside	3,155	2.2	18.5	2,994	2.2	22.6
Metropolitan Police	53,547	7.3	11.3	42,493	5.9	13.0
Norfolk	401	0.5	24.2	579	0.7	23.5
Northamptonshire	877	1.4	31.9	1,015	1.6	24.3
Northumbria	1,390	1.0	31.7	1,442	1.0	27.9
North Wales	194	0.3	33.5	225	0.3	24.4
North Yorkshire	291	0.4	28.9	362	0.5	20.2
Nottinghamshire	2,725	2.6	16.4	2,799	2.8	18.8
South Wales	595	0.5	41.8	784	0.7	30.7
South Yorkshire	1,952	1.5	23.6	2,112	1.7	22.7
Staffordshire	963	0.9	19.7	900	0.9	24.3
Suffolk	289	0.4	40.5	249	0.4	33.7
Surrey	519	0.5	32.0	605	0.6	26.4
Sussex	1,250	0.8	27.0	1,319	0.9	19.9
Thames Valley	2,894	1.4	25.9	2,406	1.1	29.1
Warwickshire	370	0.7	29.7	354	0.7	26.6
West Mercia	646	0.6	28.0	728	0.6	25.4
West Midlands	13,322	5.1	20.8	10,249	4.0	22.9
West Yorkshire	5,674	2.7	20.3	4,947	2.4	25.5
Wiltshire	279	0.5	32.3	336	0.5	25.0
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>121,360</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>16.33</b>	<b>108,042</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>18.39</b>

Because of its low resident population, figures per 1,000 population are not appropriate for the City of London Police

Robbery consists of two offences: 34A Robbery of business property and 34B Robbery of personal property

# Appendix V

**TABLE 5**  
Number of 999 calls received

Force	2001/02			2002/03		
	Number of 999 calls received	Target time for responding to 999 calls (secs)	Percentage of 999 calls responded to within target time	Number of 999 calls received	Target time for responding to 999 calls (secs)	Percentage of 999 calls responded to within target time
Avon and Somerset	341,630	10	81.3 %	294,920	10	88.5 %
Bedfordshire	110,354	15	93.2 %	98,058	15	94.3 %
Cambridgeshire	129,839	12	85.9 %	119,826	12	81.8 %
Cheshire	157,612	15	92.9 %	118,584	15	91.4 %
City of London						
Cleveland	122,688	10	66.6 %	117,371	10	59.2 %
Cumbria	62,668	10	77.0 %	54,911	10	86.5 %
Derbyshire	162,593	10	92.4 %	137,130	10	92.2 %
Devon and Cornwall	272,352	10	80.5 %	249,154	10	90.3 %
Dorset	113,985	10	72.6 %	90,332	10	69.3 %
Durham	59,926	10	92.1 %	67,072	6	98.3 %
Dyfed-Powys	53,118	8	86.1 %	43,890	8	85.3 %
Essex	273,571	15	89.7 %	225,058	15	89.4 %
Gloucestershire	84,864	12	91.6 %	70,218	12	91.8 %
Greater Manchester	641,041	15	88.3 %	582,243	15	90.6 %
Gwent	81,244	6	93.5 %	78,349	6	84.3 %
Hampshire	379,775	10	73.0 %	273,648	10	91.1 %
Hertfordshire	190,737	10	87.5 %	166,803	10	78.0 %
Humberside	139,136	15	94.7 %	111,102		
Kent	273,872	10	76.9 %	248,306	10	80.3 %
Lancashire	286,350	10	78.6 %	237,219	10	90.2 %
Leicestershire	180,503	15	87.4 %	160,134	15	92.2 %
Lincolnshire	93,734	10	90.9 %	88,508	10	92.2 %
Merseyside	371,775	10	74.8 %	332,667	10	79.9 %
Metropolitan Police	2,496,367	15	73.6 %	2,216,596	15	82.3 %
Norfolk	100,316	10	83.8 %	102,506	10	85.0 %
Northamptonshire	113,066	10	89.5 %	104,381	10	90.6 %
Northumbria	296,105	15	87.5 %	260,252	15	90.1 %
North Wales	109,332	10	94.4 %	110,597	10	88.5 %
North Yorkshire				82,895	5	69.2 %
Nottinghamshire	323,016	10	74.4 %	346,680	15	71.6 %
South Wales	286,337	10	87.4 %	273,301	10	88.2 %
South Yorkshire	207,078	15	90.6 %	247,052	15	87.0 %
Staffordshire	175,366	10	85.7 %	142,866	10	90.5 %
Suffolk	117,452	10	88.8 %	105,351	10	75.1 %
Surrey	147,139	10	87.5 %	134,538	10	88.6 %
Sussex	301,931	10	84.8 %	260,871	10	82.5 %
Thames Valley	379,649	10	91.2 %	314,661	10	89.4 %
Warwickshire	89,051	15	88.2 %	75,075	15	90.1 %
West Mercia	151,279	10	93.9 %	142,665	10	92.3 %
West Midlands	680,757	10	96.2 %	617,531	10	91.4 %
West Yorkshire	533,523	15	74.7 %	480,824	15	83.8 %
Wiltshire	101,065	10	91.5 %	104,669	10	96.1 %
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>11,192,196</b>		<b>82.5 %</b>	<b>10,088,814</b>		<b>84.6 %</b>

The City of London's 999 calls are dealt with by the Metropolitan Police

Humberside did not set a target for 200/03

North Yorkshire is not able to provide data for 2001/02



**TABLE 6**  
Net revenue

Force	Actual net revenue expenditure	Expenditure per Police Officer	Expenditure per member of staff	Expenditure per 1,000 population
Avon and Somerset	206,198,000	65,249	41,693	138,995
Bedfordshire	69,153,000	61,811	40,358	122,092
Cambridgeshire	90,000,000	64,712	41,347	126,761
Cheshire	124,970,000	58,479	39,750	127,041
City of London	57,112,423	70,637	53,242	N/A
Cleveland	94,621,000	63,275	43,701	174,803
Cumbria	72,230,000	62,583	39,473	148,073
Derbyshire	130,778,000	65,077	42,595	136,712
Devon and Cornwall	210,454,000	65,468	41,689	133,317
Dorset	89,886,000	63,209	40,579	129,612
Durham	86,477,956	52,017	38,185	146,177
Dyfed-Powys	65,332,005	56,560	39,392	133,795
Essex	190,376,000	63,387	40,602	117,793
Gloucestershire	74,959,130	60,617	41,046	132,671
Greater Manchester	448,569,000	60,684	42,459	180,671
Gwent	81,268,000	60,318	41,578	147,091
Hampshire	227,500,000	61,364	41,917	127,939
Hertfordshire	138,219,000	69,914	42,196	133,558
Humberside	131,636,000	61,992	43,831	151,463
Kent	213,934,000	61,228	38,180	135,325
Lancashire	203,334,000	60,353	60,353	143,638
Leicestershire	119,914,000	56,039	39,011	129,679
Lincolnshire	77,113,000	62,393	41,087	119,075
Merseyside	267,084,230	64,955	44,860	196,141
Metropolitan Police	2,114,180,000	74,889	53,403	294,422
Norfolk	104,357,000	69,147	42,884	130,790
Northamptonshire	80,805,071	66,133	39,731	128,181
Northumbria	225,412,000	56,107	41,171	162,906
North Wales	93,456,000	60,087	41,261	140,853
North Yorkshire	97,855,000	67,416	44,995	130,231
Nottinghamshire	142,737,000	56,640	38,778	140,517
South Wales	189,009,000	57,818	40,775	157,666
South Yorkshire	189,997,112	59,488	40,374	150,018
Staffordshire	137,716,676	60,724	40,246	131,460
Suffolk	82,301,000	65,769	42,093	122,948
Surrey	134,688,000	69,792	42,602	127,124
Sussex	189,700,000	62,440	41,140	126,847
Thames Valley	292,218,000	74,949	46,307	139,624
Warwickshire	61,159,000	61,163	40,688	120,820
West Mercia	144,400,000	63,283	63,283	124,590
West Midlands	410,930,000	52,471	37,895	160,872
West Yorkshire	323,904,000	56,258	39,052	155,709
Wiltshire	76,987,000	65,885	41,390	125,447
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>8,562,930,603</b>	<b>64,257</b>	<b>44,331</b>	<b>164,404</b>

Because of its low resident population, figures per 1,000 population are not appropriate for the City of London Police

# Appendix V

**TABLE 7**  
Complaints against the Police 2002/03

Force	Number of complaints recorded	Number of complaints finalised	Number of complaints substantiated	Percentage of complaints substantiated	Number of complaints informally resolved	Percentage of complaints informally resolved
Avon and Somerset	630	593	29	4.9	231	39.0
Bedfordshire	195	237	6	2.5	86	36.3
Cambridgeshire	246	268	26	9.7	97	36.2
Cheshire	487	465	14	3.0	214	46.0
City of London	74	32	0	0.0	25	78.1
Cleveland	259	276	5	1.8	143	51.8
Cumbria	205	221	4	1.8	95	43.0
Derbyshire	243	264	2	0.8	174	65.9
Devon and Cornwall	713	804	34	4.2	281	35.0
Dorset	222	271	8	3.0	78	28.8
Durham	169	142	5	3.5	53	37.3
Dyfed-Powys	239	234	11	4.7	126	53.8
Essex	436	504	19	3.8	187	37.1
Gloucestershire	254	232	6	2.6	70	30.2
Greater Manchester	1,647	1,774	66	3.7	586	33.0
Gwent	288	373	12	3.2	150	40.2
Hampshire	741	680	30	4.4	235	34.6
Hertfordshire	371	423	12	2.8	202	47.8
Humberside	282	297	13	4.4	102	34.3
Kent	452	494	17	3.4	104	21.1
Lancashire	628	621	4	0.6	282	45.4
Leicestershire	278	295	3	1.0	121	41.0
Lincolnshire	270	250	3	1.2	141	56.4
Merseyside	507	596	19	3.2	185	31.0
Metropolitan Police	4,277	4,822	164	3.4	1,364	28.3
Norfolk	275	285	15	5.3	94	33.0
Northamptonshire	151	157	1	0.6	78	49.7
Northumbria	557	497	10	2.0	184	37.0
North Wales	344	321	11	3.4	181	56.4
North Yorkshire	332	513	81	15.8	189	36.8
Nottinghamshire	645	622	27	4.3	265	42.6
South Wales	568	607	14	2.3	204	33.6
South Yorkshire	577	579	17	2.9	207	35.8
Staffordshire	538	702	48	6.8	131	18.7
Suffolk	202	203	10	4.9	85	41.9
Surrey	334	463	29	6.3	139	30.0
Sussex	436	648	39	6.0	178	27.5
Thames Valley	599	728	19	2.6	216	29.7
Warwickshire	263	216	22	10.2	44	20.4
West Mercia	357	376	23	6.1	144	38.3
West Midlands	1,885	1,562	47	3.0	552	35.3
West Yorkshire	753	719	14	1.9	422	58.7
Wiltshire	184	196	2	1.0	62	31.6
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>23,113</b>	<b>24,562</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>8,707</b>	<b>35.4</b>

Source: Home Office Research, Development & Statistics

**TABLE 8**  
Assaults on police officers

Force	2001/02				2002/03			
	Fatal	Serious	Other	Total assaults on Police Officers	Fatal	Serious	Other	Total assaults on Police Officers
Avon and Somerset	0	64	272	336	0	0	366	366
Bedfordshire	0	18	76	94	0	8	66	74
Cambridgeshire	0	1	117	118	0	2	149	151
Cheshire	0	5	214	219	0	4	348	352
City of London	0	2	60	62	0	0	43	43
Cleveland	0	44	214	258	0	0	59	59
Cumbria	0	3	77	80	0	12	108	120
Derbyshire	0	0	241	241	0	0	290	290
Devon and Cornwall	0	3	253	256	0	7	319	326
Dorset	0	1	155	156	0	1	196	197
Durham	0	3	301	304	0	1	240	241
Dyfed-Powys	0	7	115	122	0	2	132	134
Essex	0	0	225	225	0	0	260	260
Gloucestershire	0	2	121	123	0	1	148	149
Greater Manchester	0	19	855	874	1	25	909	935
Gwent	0	0	340	340	0	3	178	181
Hampshire	0	5	172	177	0	12	490	502
Hertfordshire	0	0	169	169	0	1	193	194
Humberside	0	12	176	188	0	21	240	261
Kent	0	2	361	363	0	25	342	367
Lancashire	0	57	239	296	0	67	264	331
Leicestershire	0	0	235	235	2	8	202	212
Lincolnshire	0	3	164	167	0	6	162	168
Merseyside	0	0	147	147	0	0	10	10
Metropolitan Police	-	-	1,438	1,438	-	-	1,898	1,898
Norfolk	0	8	163	171	0	6	220	226
Northamptonshire	0	-	136	136	0	-	149	149
Northumbria	0	37	501	538	0	0	691	691
North Wales	0	0	111	111	0	0	91	91
North Yorkshire	0	2	109	111	0	7	118	125
Nottinghamshire	0	3	171	174	1	0	391	392
South Wales	0	0	893	893	0	5	1,037	1,042
South Yorkshire	0	10	199	209	0	3	161	164
Staffordshire	0	5	174	179	0	2	144	146
Suffolk	0	4	166	170	0	1	160	161
Surrey	0	18	157	175	0	0	223	223
Sussex	0	7	277	284	0	11	175	186
Thames Valley	0	5	315	320	0	4	312	316
Warwickshire	0	4	152	156	0	3	201	204
West Mercia	0	18	234	252	0	10	235	245
West Midlands	1	11	1,085	1,097	0	2	1,262	1,264
West Yorkshire	0	6	1,015	1,021	0	2	779	781
Wiltshire	0	11	101	112	0	1	136	137
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>12,696</b>	<b>13,097</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>14,097</b>	<b>14,364</b>

Serious assaults are those for which the charge would be under Sections 18 and 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act

The Metropolitan Police is unable to provide information on the severity of assaults

Northamptonshire Police is unable to separate serious and other assaults

# Appendix V

**TABLE 9**

Days lost to sick leave by Police Officers

Force	2001/02		2002/03	
	Number of working days lost to sick leave by Police Officers	Number of working days lost to sick leave per Police Officer	Number of working days lost to sick leave by Police Officers	Number of working days lost to sick leave per Police Officer
Avon and Somerset	40,021	13.0	35,946	11.4
Bedfordshire	10,145	9.5	8,859	8.0
Cambridgeshire	16,076	12.0	15,812	11.4
Cheshire	28,395	13.8	24,292	11.5
City of London	8,911	12.1	7,197	9.0
Cleveland	17,706	12.2	15,997	10.4
Cumbria 1	4,689	13.4	12,543	10.9
Derbyshire	22,221	11.5	20,130	9.9
Devon and Cornwall	31,464	10.4	28,358	8.9
Dorset	13,828	10.0	15,678	11.0
Durham	17,813	11.1	16,798	10.1
Dyfed-Powys	11,593	10.5	11,084	9.6
Essex	33,681	11.2	31,785	10.3
Gloucestershire	12,835	10.7	13,533	11.0
Greater Manchester	90,383	12.7	81,151	11.0
Gwent	20,661	15.6	17,348	10.5
Hampshire	38,937	11.1	34,398	9.5
Hertfordshire	22,647	11.9	20,354	10.6
Humberside	17,353	8.6	16,617	7.8
Kent	37,529	11.1	37,191	10.7
Lancashire	38,785	11.6	37,169	10.9
Leicestershire	25,927	12.2	22,196	10.5
Lincolnshire	14,499	12.0	14,575	11.9
Merseyside	53,502	12.6	53,617	13.0
Metropolitan Police	275,333	10.4	266,003	9.7
Norfolk	17,945	12.2	15,969	10.5
Northamptonshire	10,151	8.5	13,472	10.9
Northumbria	35,515	9.0	35,807	8.9
North Wales	15,439	10.5	14,212	9.0
North Yorkshire	13,585	9.9	14,348	10.0
Nottinghamshire	26,624	11.4	29,191	12.2
South Wales	40,016	12.7	32,660	10.1
South Yorkshire	37,179	11.6	32,071	9.9
Staffordshire	30,534	14.3	26,008	11.8
Suffolk	10,659	9.0	12,035	9.6
Surrey	22,370	10.9	21,166	10.7
Sussex	32,404	11.1	34,902	11.3
Thames Valley	43,099	11.4	40,821	10.6
Warwickshire	10,468	10.9	10,216	10.3
West Mercia	26,278	13.2	24,656	11.5
West Midlands	99,118	13.1	83,797	10.7
West Yorkshire	65,706	13.4	48,843	9.7
Wiltshire	14,540	13.2	15,262	12.9
<b>England and Wales</b>	<b>1,466,564</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>1,364,067</b>	<b>10.4</b>

**TABLE 10**

Days lost to sick leave by support staff

Force	2001/02		2002/03	
	Number of working days lost to sick leave by support staff	Number of working days lost to sick leave per member of the support staff	Number of working days lost to sick leave by support staff	Number of working days lost to sick leave per member of the support staff
Avon and Somerset	21,599	12.5	24,522	12.8
Bedfordshire	5,675	10.0	5,777	9.2
Cambridgeshire	8,578	1.4	9,856	11.6
Cheshire	13,071	13.7	13,379	12.9
City of London	3,173	13.1	2,513	9.6
Cleveland	9,087	13.9	8,151	11.6
Cumbria	5,945	8.9	6,202	8.5
Derbyshire	13,260	12.1	11,492	9.6
Devon and Cornwall	23,999	13.4	26,554	13.3
Dorset	8,855	10.3	9,853	11.0
Durham	7,483	11.9	8,350	12.6
Dyfed-Powys	4,354	9.7	5,762	11.1
Essex	22,343	12.9	20,309	11.0
Gloucestershire	7,080	11.8	7,639	11.7
Greater Manchester	49,336	14.7	48,992	14.3
Gwent	8,209	12.0	9,160	13.2
Hampshire	18,613	11.3	17,969	9.8
Hertfordshire	12,692	10.9	16,506	12.4
Humberside	10,140	10.2	8,477	8.1
Kent	23,641	11.8	27,898	12.7
Lancashire	19,783	11.7	24,127	14.1
Leicestershire	12,434	13.1	12,167	11.8
Lincolnshire	7,229	11.3	8,547	12.1
Merseyside	22,252	12.4	27,163	13.7
Metropolitan Police	127,322	11.1	130,160	10.7
Norfolk	12,135	13.9	10,880	11.0
Northamptonshire	6,400	7.7	5,165	5.7
Northumbria	18,811	12.6	19,616	12.8
North Wales	9,975	15.0	7,699	10.2
North Yorkshire	7,572	10.7	8,641	11.2
Nottinghamshire	17,948	16.5	17,695	15.7
South Wales	20,769	14.0	21,877	13.9
South Yorkshire	23,060	14.6	25,418	13.7
Staffordshire	13,723	12.4	15,121	12.1
Suffolk	5,615	7.4	6,569	8.1
Surrey	14,392	13.8	16,127	12.9
Sussex	18,043	10.7	21,302	11.9
Thames Valley	19,559	9.3	22,634	9.5
Warwickshire	6,248	13.1	6,115	11.2
West Mercia	13,065	10.2	14,298	10.8
West Midlands	47,296	14.0	43,602	12.6
West Yorkshire	35,400	12.4	32,846	11.0
Wiltshire	5,750	8.1	6,949	9.1
England and Wales	761,914	12.0	794,079	11.7

# Appendix V

**TABLE 11**  
Police medical retirements

Force	2001/02		2002/03	
	Number of medical retirements	Number of medical retirements per 1,000 Police Officers	Number of medical retirements	Number of medical retirements per 1,000 Police Officers
Avon and Somerset	42	13.6	34	10.8
Bedfordshire	8	7.5	7	6.3
Cambridgeshire	10	7.0	8	5.8
Cheshire	22	10.7	25	11.9
City of London	8	10.0	4	4.9
Cleveland	21	14.4	11	7.6
Cumbria	7	6.4	7	6.1
Derbyshire	9	4.9	12	6.0
Devon and Cornwall	19	6.1	9	2.9
Dorset	10	7.0	3	2.1
Durham	15	9.2	11	6.9
Dyfed-Powys	13	11.5	11	9.5
Essex	32	10.8	21	7.1
Gloucestershire	10	8.5	13	10.5
Greater Manchester	57	7.8	33	4.5
Gwent	24	18.0	22	16.3
Hampshire	19	5.3	11	3.0
Hertfordshire	8	4.1	7	3.4
Humberside	11	5.4	10	4.7
Kent	38	11.3	21	6.0
Lancashire	39	11.8	22	6.4
Leicestershire	7	3.4	9	4.2
Lincolnshire	3	2.5	10	8.1
Merseyside	58	14.1	51	12.4
Metropolitan Police	219	8.4	150	5.3
Norfolk	16	10.9	13	8.6
Northamptonshire	6	4.9	3	2.5
Northumbria	33	8.4	21	5.2
North Wales	20	13.3	14	9.0
North Yorkshire	16	11.4	9	6.2
Nottinghamshire	14	6.0	16	6.3
South Wales	50	15.8	33	10.1
South Yorkshire	30	9.4	17	5.3
Staffordshire	24	11.3	22	9.7
Suffolk	13	10.8	12	9.8
Surrey	24	11.9	12	6.2
Sussex	16	5.5	9	3.0
Thames Valley	17	4.4	29	7.4
Warwickshire	7	7.2	8	8.0
West Mercia	28	13.9	20	8.8
West Midlands	30	4.0	21	2.7
West Yorkshire	61	12.5	23	4.0
Wiltshire	3	2.6	15	12.8
England and Wales	1,114	8.8	821	6.2





**TABLE 12**  
Support staff medical retirements

Force	2001/02		2002/03	
	Number of medical retirements	Number of medical retirements per 1,000 members of the support staff	Number of medical retirements	Number of medical retirements per 1,000 members of the support staff
Avon and Somerset	5	3.0	7	3.9
Bedfordshire	4	7.6	1	1.7
Cambridgeshire	2	2.6		
Cheshire	7	7.7	7	6.6
City of London	2	8.1	1	3.8
Cleveland	4	6.4	0	0.0
Cumbria	2	3.2	1	1.5
Derbyshire	3	3.0	5	4.7
Devon and Cornwall	12	6.6	13	6.8
Dorset	4	5.3	1	1.3
Durham	3	4.7	3	5.0
Dyfed-Powys	6	11.9	4	7.9
Essex	8	5.2	9	5.0
Gloucestershire	2	2.8	0	0.0
Greater Manchester	31	9.7	25	7.9
Gwent	6	10.0	0	0.0
Hampshire	3	2.1	2	1.2
Hertfordshire	2	1.7	2	1.2
Humberside	4	4.6	3	3.0
Kent	14	7.2	6	2.8
Lancashire	13	8.2	12	
Leicestershire	2	2.3	1	1.1
Lincolnshire	3	4.1	2	3.1
Merseyside	16	10.0	16	8.7
Metropolitan Police	74	6.6	150	13.2
Norfolk	7	8.6	8	8.7
Northamptonshire	1	1.3	2	2.5
Northumbria	4	2.7	4	2.7
North Wales	5	7.8	8	11.3
North Yorkshire	1	1.4	4	5.5
Nottinghamshire	5	4.6	6	5.2
South Wales	12	8.4	10	7.3
South Yorkshire	8	5.6	5	3.3
Staffordshire	5	4.8	5	4.3
Suffolk	4	5.5	5	7.3
Surrey	6	5.8	6	4.9
Sussex	5	3.2	3	1.9
Thames Valley	1	0.5	2	0.8
Warwickshire	1	2.1	2	4.0
West Mercia	9	6.6	3	
West Midlands	8	2.8	11	3.7
West Yorkshire	10	4.1	13	5.1
Wiltshire	2	3.0	0	0.0
England and Wales	325	5.4	366	6.1

# Appendix V

**TABLE 13**  
Vehicle crime 1998/99 to 2002/03

Force	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	% change
Avon and Somerset	37,823	34,411	32,348	40,791	36,249	-4.2%
Bedfordshire	12,752	14,442	12,592	12,725	11,434	-10.3%
Cambridgeshire	13,233	12,443	11,348	12,745	13,345	0.8%
Cheshire	12,447	12,176	12,253	13,445	13,903	11.7%
City of London	502	611	664	891	694	38.2%
Cleveland	14,301	13,030	13,666	14,251	14,294	0.0%
Cumbria	6,477	5,414	4,278	4,481	4,752	-26.6%
Derbyshire	20,273	18,121	15,737	16,303	16,792	-17.2%
Devon and Cornwall	22,270	21,438	20,145	17,549	19,377	-13.0%
Dorset	12,298	11,427	9,658	9,809	9,417	-23.4%
Durham	10,056	9,126	8,047	7,798	7,446	-26.0%
Dyfed-Powys	2,480	2,203	2,120	2,050	2,028	-18.2%
Essex	22,278	20,429	19,747	20,861	21,570	-3.2%
Gloucestershire	11,196	10,244	8,464	8,140	7,740	-30.9%
Greater Manchester	87,181	87,932	80,592	74,775	67,274	-22.8%
Gwent	9,746	9,107	8,109	7,016	8,332	-14.5%
Hampshire	24,425	23,363	22,182	21,859	22,263	-8.9%
Hertfordshire	13,320	12,578	14,890	14,263	16,602	24.6%
Humberside	25,404	21,880	19,415	21,344	22,491	-11.5%
Kent	29,294	22,465	23,737	20,598	20,814	-28.9%
Lancashire	23,472	20,812	20,353	21,015	18,874	-19.6%
Leicestershire	20,540	18,940	16,200	16,353	15,986	-22.2%
Lincolnshire	6,944	6,871	6,627	6,782	7,857	13.1%
Merseyside	30,337	33,735	30,377	29,982	28,054	-7.5%
Metropolitan Police	163,020	174,997	168,152	174,258	173,392	6.4%
Norfolk	10,834	10,428	9,823	9,797	10,739	-0.9%
Northamptonshire	14,065	12,255	11,440	11,335	11,868	-15.6%
Northumbria	29,416	26,199	22,355	20,410	20,264	-31.1%
North Wales	7,254	7,501	7,186	7,661	8,096	11.6%
North Yorkshire	9,641	8,596	7,585	8,171	9,642	0.0%
Nottinghamshire	26,957	24,716	25,609	28,532	31,009	15.0%
South Wales	36,681	33,053	26,237	25,881	30,423	-17.1%
South Yorkshire	33,304	29,523	26,409	28,721	31,189	-6.4%
Staffordshire	19,464	17,601	16,071	17,951	14,557	-25.2%
Suffolk	6,446	6,501	6,291	6,915	6,282	-2.5%
Surrey	7,107	7,455	9,830	9,394	9,989	40.6%
Sussex	25,334	25,140	23,791	21,240	21,108	-16.7%
Thames Valley	49,047	50,464	42,856	41,780	37,629	-23.3%
Warwickshire	8,961	8,621	7,430	8,017	8,477	-5.4%
West Mercia	16,174	15,743	13,218	13,061	13,076	-19.2%
West Midlands	74,142	77,031	67,356	63,624	60,838	-17.9%
West Yorkshire	64,071	58,298	57,988	65,436	64,207	0.2%
Wiltshire	6,759	6,598	5,271	5,264	5,551	-17.9%
England and Wales	1,077,726	1,043,918	968,447	983,274	975,924	-9.4%

**TABLE 14**

Domestic burglary 1998/99 to 2002/03

Force	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	% change
Avon and Somerset	14,584	13,121	12,396	15,995	14,561	-0.2%
Bedfordshire	3,302	3,709	3,146	3,684	3,784	14.6%
Cambridgeshire	5,628	5,259	4,299	4,670	5,457	-3.0%
Cheshire	5,925	5,379	5,449	5,956	6,409	8.2%
City of London	39	27	48	35	46	17.9%
Cleveland	8,875	7,717	7,138	8,235	7,321	-17.5%
Cumbria	2,298	2,222	2,036	2,108	2,152	-6.4%
Derbyshire	6,603	6,427	6,157	6,748	8,551	29.5%
Devon and Cornwall	7,435	7,416	7,012	6,922	7,207	-3.1%
Dorset	3,828	3,524	3,281	3,346	2,947	-23.0%
Durham	4,597	4,044	3,201	4,135	3,083	-32.9%
Dyfed-Powys	973	696	707	714	666	-31.6%
Essex	6,331	5,868	5,437	5,597	7,138	12.7%
Gloucestershire	4,866	4,160	3,016	3,387	3,369	-30.8%
Greater Manchester	45,739	40,953	39,184	39,081	42,396	-7.3%
Gwent	3,377	3,148	2,580	2,560	3,001	-11.1%
Hampshire	7,892	7,372	6,798	7,122	6,793	-13.9%
Hertfordshire	3,589	3,501	4,201	4,951	5,294	47.5%
Humberside	13,496	13,040	9,778	11,012	12,213	-9.5%
Kent	10,179	8,177	8,063	7,550	7,655	-24.8%
Lancashire	12,189	10,561	10,643	12,102	9,513	-22.0%
Leicestershire	8,937	7,803	6,800	6,522	6,450	-27.8%
Lincolnshire	4,455	4,626	3,805	3,854	4,290	-3.7%
Merseyside	14,177	13,606	12,514	14,347	14,608	3.0%
Metropolitan Police	75,797	79,504	70,169	73,930	72,237	-4.7%
Norfolk	3,711	3,956	3,702	3,658	3,820	2.9%
Northamptonshire	5,110	4,907	3,689	3,838	4,871	-4.7%
Northumbria	15,334	12,543	11,381	11,244	11,179	-27.1%
North Wales	2,449	2,219	2,178	2,407	3,234	32.1%
North Yorkshire	4,822	4,343	3,889	4,754	4,804	-0.4%
Nottinghamshire	13,697	12,612	12,260	14,337	16,418	19.9%
South Wales	9,239	8,383	6,685	6,845	8,060	-12.8%
South Yorkshire	18,405	16,169	14,688	16,188	17,836	-3.1%
Staffordshire	9,974	9,073	7,549	8,066	6,458	-35.3%
Suffolk	2,464	2,332	2,198	2,447	2,024	-17.9%
Surrey	3,100	2,903	4,081	3,636	4,140	33.5%
Sussex	11,026	9,596	8,498	7,618	8,209	-25.5%
Thames Valley	14,434	15,498	13,222	13,397	13,809	-4.3%
Warwickshire	2,887	3,189	2,872	3,046	3,070	6.3%
West Mercia	5,867	5,668	4,948	6,014	6,239	6.3%
West Midlands	37,323	35,583	30,993	31,219	26,942	-27.8%
West Yorkshire	35,952	29,623	30,206	34,678	36,406	1.3%
Wiltshire	2,447	2,149	2,087	2,391	2,724	11.3%
England and Wales	473,352	442,606	402,984	430,346	437,384	-7.6%

# Appendix V

**TABLE 15**

Recorded crime: annual detection rates by police force area and region, 1997/98 to 2002/03

Police force area and region	Percentages						Recorded crime
	1997/98 <sup>1</sup>	1998/99 <sup>2</sup>	1999/2000 <sup>3</sup>	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	
Cleveland	23	23	22	21	20	23	
Durham	30	33	32	34	33	34	
Northumbria	26	30	31	31	31	31	
<b>North East Region</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>30</b>	
Cheshire	34	37	31	30	26	26	
Cumbria	41	44	39	34	32	31	
Greater Manchester	20	25	23	22	21	22	
Lancashire	29	34	29	27	26	27	
Merseyside	31	31	26	28	24	25	
<b>North West Region</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	
Humberside	21	22	19	21	20	20	
North Yorkshire	26	33	31	30	26	26	
South Yorkshire	32	32	25	25	23	21	
West Yorkshire	27	27	25	23	19	20	
<b>Yorkshire and the Humber Region</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	
Derbyshire	26	31	28	26	25	26	
Leicestershire	34	34	30	28	28	27	
Lincolnshire	46	40	28	25	27	23	
Northamptonshire	35	33	33	33	31	28	
Nottinghamshire	26	25	21	20	18	16	
<b>East Midlands Region</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	
Staffordshire	34	32	22	23	24	31	
Warwickshire	29	26	22	22	25	26	
West Mercia	27	34	29	27	29	32	
West Midlands	25	30	27	28	29	26	
<b>West Midlands Region</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	
Bedfordshire	35	33	25	27	25	26	
Cambridgeshire	28	29	25	24	22	22	
Essex <sup>4</sup>	28	29	30	26	26	27	
Hertfordshire <sup>4</sup>	33	34	27	24	24	23	
Norfolk	36	37	30	26	25	24	
Suffolk	39	41	36	35	33	34	
<b>East of England Region</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	

**TABLE 15**

(continued)

Police force area and region	1997/98 <sup>1</sup>	1998/99 <sup>2</sup>	1999/2000 <sup>3</sup>	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03
London, City of	28	33	32	27	34	36
Metropolitan Police <sup>4</sup>	25	22	16	15	14	14
London Region	25	22	16	15	14	15
Hampshire	30	35	32	29	29	30
Kent	31	34	33	28	28	28
Surrey <sup>4</sup>	35	40	32	28	25	22
Sussex	26	25	25	23	25	24
Thames Valley	25	25	20	22	24	25
<b>South East Region</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>
Avon and Somerset	26	24	22	22	14	15
Devon and Cornwall	34	36	35	34	32	29
Dorset	30	31	26	25	27	25
Gloucestershire	26	31	30	31	30	29
Wiltshire	32	38	33	30	30	28
<b>South West Region</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>
Dyfed-Powys	62	69	65	63	64	68
Gwent	51	55	53	57	55	48
North Wales	36	43	36	31	28	29
South Wales	36	39	31	32	33	29
<b>Wales</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>ENGLAND AND WALES</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>ENGLAND AND WALES (excluding London Region)</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>

1. Excluding offences of 'other criminal damage' of value £20 and under prior to March 1998.

2. Percentage detected using the expanded coverage and revised counting rules, which came into effect on 1 April 1998.

3. Revised detections guidance was implemented on 1 April 1999.

4. Forces affected by boundary changes in April 2000.

Numbers of recorded crimes and detections will be affected by changes in reporting and recording.

Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin 07/03

# Appendix VI

## *Glossary*

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ALI	Adult Learning Inspectorate
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
APA	Association of Police Authorities
BCU	Basic Command Unit
BVR	Best Value Review
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
HMCIC	Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HR	Human Resources
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NPP	National Policing Plan
PFI/PPP	Private Finance Initiative/Public Private Partnership
PNB	Police Negotiating Board
PNC	Police National Computer
PPAF	Police Performance Assessment Framework
PSNI	Police Service for Northern Ireland
PSSO	Police Skills and Standards Organisation
PSU	Police Standards Unit
RDS	Research, Development and Statistics
SB	Special Branch