Integration, Islamophobia and civil rights in Europe

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Integration should be defined 'not as a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'.

Roy Jenkins, UK Home Secretary, 1966

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Preface

What's in a word?

If the word is 'integration', everything – assimilation, absorption, accommodation, acculturation and, more recently, community cohesion and adhesion to European values – depending on your take on immigrants generally and on Muslims in particular. Once it was racism that, in trying to get immigrant labour without keeping the immigrant, so to speak, had kept immigrants from becoming citizens. Today, it is nativism (the other side of the racist coin, often disguised as patriotism) that, in trying to flatten society into a homogenous whole, demands that ethnic minorities be cleansed of their cultures and recast in Europe's image before they can be 'integrated' into society. The problem of integration, in other words, lies in the interpretation of integration itself.

And that is what Liz Fekete and her researchers discovered at the very outset. They had started out looking for a solution to 'the problem of integration' objectively, in 'structural and policy barriers', but it soon became apparent that 'the primary barrier to integration was Islamophobia and the debate around integration'. Which, in turn, necessitated an investigation into the construction of an Islamophobic discourse conducted by political parties, the media and the 'liberati' in pursuit of an assimilationist agenda.

The European Union (EU), in its 2004 statement, 'Common Basic Principles', had declared that integration was a 'dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States'. But assimilation is a one-way process, a subsumption of the minority under the majority. And it is a one-way process because it operates solely on the religio-cultural level and not on the socio-economic, which is intrinsically a two-way process, looking into the material factors that prevent 'mutual accommodation'. Hence the problems facing young Muslims – the first generation is too old to be terrorist – such as underachievement, unemployment, crime, drugs,

alienation are viewed not in terms of the socio-economic conditions that they find themselves in (due largely to the collapse of the industrial society into which their fathers were recruited) but in terms of their religious ideology and cultural practices, which then take on the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the process, they become the problem 'Other', the solution to which, of course, is that they become the same (as the natives).

The coefficient of assimilation varies from country to country, depending on its particular history with its Muslim populations and its fixation with its own traditions – such as Germany's blood-based citizenship (jus sanguinis) and Leitkultur (dominant culture), French citizenship by birth and earth (jus soli) and laïcité (secularism), Norway's likhet (sameness), Netherlands' verzuiling (religious and cultural blocs).

In Britain, the very success of post-war multiculturalism following on from the concept of a commonwealth of nations, in establishing integration as a two-way process, led under Thatcher's government to a separatist, state-aided culturalism and the creation of ethnic enclaves. Which after 9/11 and 7/7 came to be seen as harbouring 'the enemy within'. Hence the descent into assimilation, under cover of 'community cohesion', with British values as the yardstick of measurement, as though British values were unique and British culture owed nothing to the Islamic civilisations of the past. But British values themselves become distorted when they are mounted on the back of an Islamophobia which counts among its propagandists not just the political parties and the media but the 'liberati', i.e. the liberal, literary elite.

And all this at a time when, right across Europe, second- and third-generation Muslims are beginning to engage in society, not in terms of the assimilationist agenda but in trying to resolve their own socio-economic problems. But because their engagement is often political and against the status quo – anti-war, anti-racist, anti-police, and self-help oriented – it does not count as part of the integration process.

Increasingly, there is a debate going on among young European Muslims on how to construct an Islam that is relevant to their own experience: a British Islam, a French Islam and so forth (cultural Islam is not a monolith). But none of this is going to flourish in an oppressive, Islamophobic climate. Witness how a local council in Germany thwarted 'the original purpose of Inssan, an organisation set up by young Muslims from different national backgrounds, to form a new kind of mosque and cultural centre and forge a new kind of German Muslim identity, by accusing it of associating with radical terror groups'.

* * *

The above is merely an outline of the obstacles to true integration. Its substantiation is laid out in stark detail in this report, which would never have seen the light of day but for the prescient support of the Barrow Cadbury Trust.

A. Sivanandan
Director

Introduction

Over the last few years, integration has become a hot topic in parliament and policy forums, in the media and academia and in intellectual and literary circles. But much of what has been discussed starts from the majority vantage point. Little attention is paid to the views of minorities. Furthermore, in much of the discourse 'integration' is used as a coded means of making insinuations and venting prejudices about Muslims in ways that stigmatise and humiliate them.

One of the aims of this report is to rectify the imbalances and counter the prejudices by examining the 'integration debate' from the vantage point of Europe's diverse settled Muslim communities.[1] It considers whether the 'very term integration has come to mean quite different things to those who see themselves as the reference point and those who see themselves described as "the problem"'.[2] It tests government integration measures against the yardstick provided by the EU in its 2004 statement Common Basic Principles: a 'dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States'.[3]

Contrary to the popular view, which tends to homogenise the Muslim experience, the national, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds of European Muslim communities are extremely diverse. The first stage of the project, which was conducted over a twelve-month period, involved a literature and data review to ascertain the exact diversity of the Muslim experience, and the socio-economic problems specific Muslim communities face.[4] The European Union Monitoring Centre (EUMC) estimates (conservatively) that there are around thirteen million Muslims living in Europe today (3.5 per cent of the total population).[5] As the largest Muslim communities are to be found in France (3,516,824), Germany (3,400,000), the UK (1,588,890) and the Netherlands (945,000), it seemed right to focus our research there. But it was important also to provide comparisons with countries with smaller Muslim minority communities, such as Austria (338,988)[6] and non-EU Norway (66,578). The second stage of the research involved consultations in these countries. In-depth interviews were conducted with key individuals, mostly face-to-face and a few by phone.[7] In France, all our participants were brought together at a roundtable discussion in Paris conducted by journalists Naima Bouteldja and Victoria Brittain.[8]

Following this consultation, we researched European integration policies, past and present. Comprehending the specific debates in different European countries, requires an understanding of political philosophies which evolved in each country – not least the varying conceptions of secularism. Questions of identity, rights and sovereignty are bound up with citizenship, nationality and histories of migration.[9]

Section One provides a short overview of systems of post-second World War labour migration to Europe, the subsequent settlement of Muslims from diverse ethnic, national, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, and the considerable social and economic problems these first-generation migrants faced in a period when there were no official integration policies. (The legacy of past failures is explored further in Section Three.) What emerged consistently from the consultations as the major problems in public discourse were first the confusion between integration and assimilation and second the racial superiority and Islamophobia inherent in many initiatives.

Hence, Section Two examines the interplay between the media, the market, political parties, public intellectuals and private think-tanks and the ways in which these various actors are advancing an assimilatory agenda under the guise of integration. In the post-September 11 world, the media situate integration within a framework which represents Islam (and Muslims) as a threat. This feeds into the assimilationist logic of political parties and other interest groups, which then seek a return to monocultural societies based on cultural homogeneity. Academics, writers, intellectuals and Muslim celebrities who favour assimilation are then presented as 'expert witnesses' in the integration debate. In the process, all the problems of the Muslim community come to be viewed through a religio-cultural lens and the socio-economic causes of exclusion and marginalisation are ignored.

Section Three looks at government measures to promote integration and community cohesion, particularly via citizenship and immigration reform.

The centrality of citizenship rights in ensuring Muslim communities' full participation is highlighted, as is the fact that a large proportion of Europe's Muslim communities do not have such rights. We question whether a top-down approach to integration, which builds compulsion, threat and discrimination into citizenship and immigration reforms, undermines some of the positive potential for genuine integration. We also examine 'cultural selection' within naturalisation processes and the re-adoption of discredited socio-psychological approaches to race relations such as that based on measuring 'social distance' between migrant and 'host'.

Section Four examines church-state relations with Islam, the widely different understandings of secularism across Europe and how secularism can act as a barrier to integration. The integration of Islam as a religion, given equal recognition with Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism, is an entirely different project from integrating ethnic minorities that are Muslim, but, too often, the two are confused. The way that some governments have resorted to laws banning the headscarf and religious symbols, suggests that the logic of threat, not challenge, informs the approach to equality of status.

Section Five examines the dominant structural, societal barriers to integration and those which emanate from within communities – pointing out the possibilities for removing such barriers. Applying the EU's formula of integration as a two-way process, the report argues that changing Muslim attitudes and practices is symbiotic with changing society's political and cultural traditions hostile to difference and open to racism. Young Muslims will not engage in institutions that are perceived to be discriminatory and self-criticism and transformation within Muslim institutions will become much easier once the climate of Islamophobia is lifted.

The research reveals that despite, or perhaps because of, the stigmatising of Muslims at home and abroad, there is now in fact a far higher degree of participation in the political process and civil society by young Muslims in Europe than ever before. The clash in Europe is not between civilisations (Islamic versus western) but between individuals (of whatever ethnicity, religion or political persuasion) who accept a civil rights framework for discussing integration and those who do not.

References

1. Our research could not cover in full the experiences of the newer refugee communities. However, many of our participants were concerned about the refugee experience and referred to it.
2. John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the state and public space (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 2007).
3. Originally, the main focus of the project involved examining the structural, policy barriers to integration, but, as the research progressed, it became increasingly clear from our participants that the primary barrier to integration was seen as Islamophobia and the debate around integration itself.
4. We decided not to replicate here data and sources available in two recent comprehensive studies of Muslims in Europe: Muslims in EU Cities: background research reports produced by the EUMAP programme of the Open Society Institute which has downloadable reports on Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden (see www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports) and Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, EUMC, 2006, produced by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna. General information on comparative educational attainment can be found in Where immigrant students succeed: a comparative review of performance and engagement in PISA, 2003, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. On issues relating to rights and welfare across Europe see Migration, Citizenship and the European Welfare State by Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen and Stephen Castles, OUP, 2006. The Raxen focal point for each EU country is a useful source of data. Further references to Muslim experience in terms of employment, housing, health, etc in specific countries under study here, can be found in the references to Section Five.
5. The EUMC, since incorporated into the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, states that Muslims are inadequately captured in demographic studies due to serious deficiencies in the availability and quality of demographic data. See 'Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia' (Vienna, EUMC, 2006).
6. We had not originally planned to cover Austria in this report. But an opportunity to do so presented itself in the course of the project.
7. We tried, wherever possible, to carry out interviews with a cross section of key individuals – national or local politicians, academics, teachers and community workers. These were selected in consultation with BME/anti-racist groups with which the IRR's European Race Audit had already built up a working relationship. All direct quotes not otherwise attributed are from our interviewees.
8. Some of that discussion has already been published in Naima Bouteldja, '"Integration", discrimination and the Left in France: a roundtable discussion', Race & Class (Vol 49, no 3, 2008).
9. The project has drawn particularly on the seminal works of migration professor Stephen Castles, cultural anthropologists John R. Bowen and (the late) Marianne Gullestad and international human rights expert Kathleen Cavanaugh.

1
Parameters of the integration debate

When European politicians recently began to discuss integration, many members of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME)[1] groups viewed this as a positive development. For though immigration had been central to the reconstruction of post-war Europe, any integration of Europe's new non-European communities of migrant origin had been achieved despite, not because of, government policy.

Governments had, quite simply, encouraged migration from outside Europe but omitted to plan for the integration of migrant workers. This was partly due to the fact that, in many parts of Europe, immigrants first came under the temporary 'guest-worker' system to work, mainly in manufacturing. For, in the economic boom of the 1960s, Europe was desperate for labour. The migrants were, initially, unskilled or semi-skilled men of working age. Governments, seeing them only as units of labour, did not encourage them to stay. But, then, for a variety of reasons, these men did settle; they called their families to join them or started families in Europe. But this process of family reunification or creation became fraught with difficulties when, by the 1970s the economic boom was over, and manufacturing was in decline.

Governments might have eased such workers' passage from temporary migrants to permanent settlers by, for instance, increasing expenditure on housing, education, health, or creating an infrastructure to aid language acquisition and social adaptation. But, in the early years of settlement, this was left, by and large, to market forces. Another barrier to full integration for guest-workers was the inaccessibility of citizenship. In Germany, for instance, the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent – literally blood) formed the basis of nationality law and this meant that even the children of guest-workers born in Germany found it hard to become naturalised.[2] Well into the new millennium, the German federal government was still insisting that Germany was not a country of immigration. It followed from this that it had neither an immigration policy nor an integration policy, but rather a 'foreigners' policy' (Ausländerpolitik). No wonder then that when Christian Democrat president Angela Merkel, called the first Integration Summit in 2006, Kenan Kolat, Director of the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB), hailed it as a 'historic day'.

In other European countries, such as the UK, France and the Netherlands, where large numbers of workers had been recruited directly from colonies, where there had been more open paths to citizenship,[3] the integration debate had different implications. The possibility was held out that integration measures might help dismantle the institutional barriers that hindered the full political participation of BME groups in the UK, for example, or citizens of North African descent in France (the French do not use the term 'ethnic minority').[4] Could a government focus on integration mean concerted action against inequality, discrimination and the social problems that blighted the futures of so many Pakistani, North African and other Arab and Muslim youth?

In fact, a debate that could have proved productive soured, because the topic, integration, which in earlier decades had been discussed within a socio-economic framework, had begun to be debated within a religio-cultural one.

Europe's non-European communities of migrant origin – Indonesian, Pakistani (Punjabis, Kashmiris, Pathans), Bangladeshi, Indian, Turkish, Kurdish, Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Surinamese, Antillean/Aruba, Ugandan, Kenyan, etc. – are ethnically, culturally, religiously, politically and linguistically diverse. But September 11 and the subsequent war on terror allowed ill-defined anxieties about 'Islamism' to recategorise minority ethnic exclusion and disadvantage as the problems of the Muslim 'underclass'. Thus, the diverse problems of communities of different national and ethnic origin were collapsed into the problem of integrating a category of migrants characterised by their religion (and a supposed common culture). In much the same way that the presence of people of a different colour was once constructed as a social problem, the presence of people of a different culture and religion has become ipso facto problematic.

* * *

The integration debate has taken different forms and been shaped by different events in each of the countries under study. Nevertheless, project participants observed certain common trends which are summarised below.

I Integration equals assimilation and cultural homogeneity

Alev Korun is just one of five minority ethnic politicians elected to Vienna city parliament in 2002. (There is little minority ethnic representation in other Austrian states and Vienna is the only one to have elected councillors from a Muslim background.) As Viennese Green Group spokesperson on human rights and integration, Alev Korun is well placed to review developments in Austria's approach to integration. Her view, that the word integration 'has come to mean assimilation – becoming socially invisible', was echoed by every participant in Norway, Germany, France, Austria and the Netherlands. For Mari Linløkken, deputy director of Norway's Anti-Racist Center, integration 'means assimilation. Others must accept Norwegian values and norms'. In Germany, 'when politicians use the term integration, they are in many cases talking about assimilation', Leitkultur (leading culture) and focusing only on German traditional values', concurred Florencio Chicote, project manager at the Anti-Discrimination Network of the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (ADNB of the TBB).

Interestingly, there is a convergence in these views despite the widely different interpretations of 'integration' in the countries under study. In every case, the concept of integration is understood in terms of each country's national political traditions, the relationship between state power and individual freedom, the way this relationship has evolved over time and the manner in which it is affirmed in a written constitution or practices and norms. In fact, each national tradition has its own political philosophy: each country visualises its coherence as a national community and the relationship between identity, rights and sovereignty, in different ways. Each country institutionalises its conception about how national coherence can be maintained through citizenship and nationality laws that define which 'foreigners' and 'aliens' are afforded the right to integrate into the national community.

This makes the strong assimilationist bent of a country like Germany, for instance, less surprising than the drift towards assimilation that is taking place in the more avowedly culturally pluralist Netherlands. For Germany's blood-based citizenship laws and its traditional understanding of the German Volk (a culturally homogenous national community) have created a strong barrier to any open acknowledgement of cultural diversity. The same is true of Austria. And Norway, despite its reputation for egalitarianism, has historically favoured assimilatory policies towards minorities such as the Sami and the Jews. In fact, as cultural anthropologist Marianne Gullestad explains, this is by no means a contradiction.[5] For the Nordic understanding of egalitarian individualism is hostile to the idea of cultural diversity. Nordic traditions and norms place special emphasis on the idea that people must feel that they are more or less the same in order to be of equal value. In fact, in Norway, likhet (meaning 'likeness' 'similarity' or 'sameness') is the most common translation of 'equality'. Likhet is tied to a whole range of other expressions such as 'to fit in together' and 'to share the same ideas', with the implication that those who are too visibly different provoke hostility and pose a threat to a homogenous, egalitarian society.

The integration debate in the UK and France is more complicated. In Britain, there is an understanding that national identity is multiple – English, Scottish and Welsh. But such pluralism was not extended to include the new immigrants who came to Britain as Commonwealth citizens, though strong political struggles of black communities (principally Asian and African-Caribbean) in the 1960s ensured that the same civil and social rights were extended to BME Britons.[6] The multicultural reality of a diverse society had then to be acknowledged. Hence, assimilation was something that Britain consciously rejected in favour of integration forty years ago. In former home secretary Roy Jenkins' classic definition of 1966, integration is 'not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'. (In the years that followed, though, the specific model of multiculturalism adopted by successive governments in Britain [and the Netherlands] was, as will be argued in Section Three, not without problems and dilemmas.)

Despite this more open attitude, and the success of post-war immigrant communities fighting for multiculturalism and equality, UK participants showed concern that the current debate on 'community cohesion' was

taking the UK backwards, incorporating some of the worst aspects of mainland Europe's 'integration equals assimilation' model.

In France, though, the drift towards assimilation builds on an existing political philosophy, which is underpinned by an assimilationist logic. Here, the Republican tradition of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' ensured that its citizenship laws recognised the principle of jus soli (birth in a country) as conferring nationality rights. France, unlike Germany, considers itself a country of immigration and French nationality laws were, until recently, some of the most open in Europe. (France has the largest Muslim population in western Europe and a far greater proportion of these are citizens than in Germany.) Yet, at the same time, the French model of citizenship which is based on the primacy of civic individualism (the individual participates in politics as a citizen, free of community and ethnic ties) demands the 'melding of cultural and religious "identities" into one common identity'.[7] (This demand is not exclusive to the foreigners' law. In earlier times, the people of the regions were expected to discard their local cultures in favour of becoming true Frenchmen.) The cultural anthropologist John R. Bowen, in attempting to understand French attitudes to the headscarf examined the norms and values associated with the French Republican tradition and found that, unlike its Anglo-American counterpart, it required social conformity as the price of retaining political equality. State institutions, particularly schools, and state policies are designed to integrate children and newcomers into French society by teaching them certain ways of behaving and thinking.

Thus, out of political histories as divergent as those of France and Germany, particular philosophies have emerged that favour assimilation and are hostile to diversity. As Nacira Guénif Souilamas, a sociology lecturer at the University of Paris, explained 'integration is not publicly debated. It is a categorical imperative, a general norm that is imposed on everyone but particularly on one specific group: immigrants and all those gravitating around them.'

II The discussion on integration implies western moral superiority

IRR director A. Sivanandan has repeatedly warned of the dangers posed when a shift towards assimilation is 'passed off as a virtuous attempt at integration'. It is vitally important, he argues, that these two entirely different terms are not used as synonyms. 'Integration provides for the coexistence of minority cultures with the majority culture; assimilation requires the absorption of minority cultures into the majority culture… the aim of assimilation is a monocultural, even a monofaith, society; the aim of integration is a multicultural, pluralist society.'[8]

To assimilate, then, an immigrant must discard aspects of his or her cultural background that do not conform with those of the dominant culture. A debate on integration that makes assimilationist demands presupposes, in Sivanandan's words, that 'there is one dominant culture, one unique set of values, one nativist loyalty'.[9] It creates a hierarchy of cultures underpinned by a sense of the superiority of the majority. 'The discussion is held totally on the premises of the majority. The whole discourse is one of moral superiority', Nina Dessau, a French political scientist and economist, who now lives and works in Norway, told us. In the Netherlands, Dolf Hautvast is worried about the impact of this negative debate on young Muslims. This 'is not a debate about integration but assimilation', he said 'and within it Islam is diminished'. Hautvast, a senior education consultant with a special focus on youth at risk in Dutch cities, is currently designing an educational programme for young offenders from Moroccan or Turkish backgrounds. His concerns were echoed by many of those we interviewed.

In fact, a debate which starts from the premise that Islam is an 'imported religion' is based on a profound ignorance of European history. Islam, ever since its inception in the seventh century, has had a presence in Europe and Muslims have lived in the Baltic and Balkan regions, in the Iberian Peninsula, in Cyprus and in Sicily for centuries. Despite this, Islam is constantly treated as though it were a foreign religion that has had no influence on western history and civilisation.[10]

Indeed, throughout Europe, there are, shockingly, many similarities between the regard in which Muslims are held today and Jews were

held prior to the Holocaust. In much of Europe, and not just in Nazi Germany, Jews were considered, prior to the second world war, to be unassimilable, on account of their holding on to alien values and traditions. While such views about Jews are no longer socially acceptable, it is acceptable to ask whether a religiously observant Muslim can be a good European. For Belal El-Mogaddedi, a board member of the German Muslim League, which was formed by German converts to Islam in 1952, this view of Islam as alien has to be challenged. 'Islam is not foreign – it is a part of Germany, even if just a small part. Being German and being Muslim is not a contradiction at all.'

That false opposition relies on a belief in a cultural superiority, a differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. Fenna Ulichki, a feminist activist of Moroccan descent and former chair of the National Association of Moroccan Women, is one of a number of newly-elected minority ethnic councillors in the Netherlands. A city councillor in Amsterdam for the Groen Links party, Fenna Ulichki believes that the 'integration debate is all about the superiority of Dutch and European culture. The newcomers do not have these values and Dutch society has to teach these values to them.' In the Netherlands, the impact of this debate differs in terms of the policies adopted by the local authorities in the four largest cities of minority ethnic settlement. (Forty-four per cent of the minority ethnic population of the Netherlands live in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, the Hague and Utrecht.) It has been most keenly felt in Rotterdam where, in spring 2004, the local authority initiated the project 'Islam and integration'. This involved the organisation of twenty-five 'expert meetings' to discuss 'the extent to which Islam hindered integration into Rotterdam society'. It culminated in the Rotterdam Code of Conduct which, among other things, suggested that the only language that should be spoken on Rotterdam streets was Dutch. 'The Rotterdam Code of Conduct is a disguised way of asking people to assimilate', commented Dolf Hautvast.

III Emphasis on national identity and 'lead values' undermines Muslims' sense of belonging

When discussion of integration shifts from the socio-economic to the cultural, so, too, does the yardstick of its measurement. Today, the yardstick of integration is determined by adherence to certain values. Very public debates on national identity and national values strengthen the assimilationist logic of the integration debate further: 'they' (the immigrants) need to become more like 'us'. Only by adopting the same values and norms can they really prove that they have integrated.

Again, such debates on national identity and core values need to be related to the different traditions in the countries under review. For debates on national identity highlight the values that particular countries believe that they, uniquely, possess. In Norway, it is the (supposed) sense of equality and generosity that is highlighted, while in Germany, the debate on core values (Leitkultur) has been explicitly linked by the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union to the fact that Germany is a country with roots in a specifically Christian value system. For Dr Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, a professor of intercultural education at the University of Bremen, this is deeply problematic for Muslims. 'The understanding is that Germany is a Christian-based, occidental country. Whenever there is talk about values, the politicians and the churches stress the Christian aspect of German culture. This makes it harder for Muslims to find a place in society. You can never really belong.'

Such linkage of European values to Christianity is not confined to Germany. Kathleen Cavanaugh, lecturer in international human rights law at the National University of Ireland, has drawn attention to an 'increasing European self-identification with a Christian cultural identity' which stands 'in contrast to the demographic realities immigrant populations bring'.[11] There are tensions, she argues, within the EU itself, as to whether it should be defined by a common heritage of Christianity and western civilisation or by modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, tolerance and inclusive multiculturalism.

It is not just the identification of European values with Christianity that erodes Muslims' positive sense of belonging to Europe. A number of young British Muslim women activists from Birmingham told us how the debate on British values and integration was eroding a previously-held positive sense of their British identity. 'We are second-generation – we have our own particular mix – but we are being asked to prove that we are integrated. It makes you feel you don't belong', said Salma Yaqoob, another of Europe's new intake of minority ethnic councillors. Naseem Akhtar, a founder of the Saheli Women's Group told us, 'I have grown up in Britain, having come to Birmingham from Kashmir, Pakistan as a one-

year-old toddler. I see myself as a British Muslim of Kashmiri origin. But now I am asked, "are you British first or Muslim first". No one asks the question of Catholics or Jews.'

The debate on Britishness, which opens out into a debate on national loyalty, increases the feeling among Muslims that they are considered 'outsiders'. The language of 'treason', 'loyalty', 'patriotism' – more appropriate to debate in an embattled country, beset by external enemies – is being introduced into domestic policy-making.[12] Diversity consultant, Alyas Karmani, an imam in Bradford active in a number of community initiatives, warned that 'we can't have a cohesion debate which asks the question "are Muslims a part of Britain". This is the same question the Nazis asked of the Jews.' Many UK participants wondered whether the debate on Britishness showed that assimilation policies were actually being introduced through the back door.

In other countries, they are clearly coming through the front door. The Austrian debate on national values was, we were told, at risk of deteriorating into a hysterical fear of cultural difference in the course of which issues of language and dress have become fetishised. Viennese Green Party city councillor Alev Korun detected a deal of uncertainty about Austrian values in the course of a debate that seemed targeted at those of Turkish origin. 'It's always turned into a majority versus minority issue. If more Muslims come, [the fear is] they will force us to wear hijabs, not allow us to wear bikinis.' Sometimes the tone of the debate is absurd. For instance, 'the Freedom Party in Vienna even forced a parliamentary debate on the eating of pork, suggesting that the majority were victims of the Muslim minority who were forcing them to forego pork. There seems to be a hysteria. When feminists talk about the veil, they shake.'

Norwegian anti-racists, too, pinpointed this same sense of anxiety, of vulnerability in the Norwegian debate about values. 'There is always something unsaid', commented Nadeem Butt, a founding member of the Anti-Racist Center and, since his election in September 2007, the first Asian mayor in Norway (for the Oslo district of Søndre.) 'You get a sense that Norwegian people are afraid of their own identity. So Islam becomes a threat. There is the same attitude when it comes to considering entry into the EU, a fear that we are going to be eaten up.'

IV The debate promotes racial stereotypes

Participants believed that 'integration' was increasingly being used as code for portraying Muslims as coming from a backward culture. Stigmatisation on the basis of colour has morphed into stigmatisation on the basis of faith. 'They talk about integration but they promote racism', commented Ahmed Pouri, Co-ordinator of Participating Refugees in Multicultural Europe (PRIME), based in the Hague.

For all participants, the 'they' Ahmed Pouri referred to were politicians and intellectual elites. In France, this idea that the culture of immigrants (i.e. those of North African, Arab and/or Muslim descent) is inferior has been made respectable by politicians for some years. In January 1991, Jacques Chirac, then mayor of Paris, speaking at an evening banquet, said that foreigners, like the Poles and Portuguese who came to France before the war, presented 'fewer problems than having Muslims and Black people'. He argued that French workers' resentment was justified when they saw on their doorsteps, 'piled up, a family with a father, three or four wives, and a score of kids' who then got access to social security 'naturally without working' and 'if you add the noise and the smell, no wonder the French worker … becomes insane. And saying this is not racist.'[13]

Statements like this should no longer be acceptable. But, in the run-up to his presidential bid, Nicolas Sarkozy declared on television that 'When you live in France, you respect her Republican rules, you don't practise polygamy, circumcise your daughters or slaughter sheep in your bathroom.'[14] His comments so incensed the junior minister responsible for equal opportunities, Azouz Begag, that he resigned. In his book, A Sheep in the Bathtub, Begag accused Sarkozy of unfairly stigmatising the North African community. French participants in our research sometimes despaired at the racist stereotypes engendered by political and media debates. Abdelaziz Chaambi, a member of the Coalition of Muslims from France (CMF),[15] which was formed shortly after Chirac's notorious banquet speech, told us that he felt he was living in 'a period of cultural imperialism'.

Participants expressed the view that the debate on integration was teaching the majority stereotypes. Women, particularly, were presented as submissive to patriarchal values, inactive in the labour force, unable

to speak the language and inappropriately dressed. Miriyam Aouragh, founding member of Together Against Racism and an anthropologist at the University of Amsterdam, believed that 'integration has become a euphemism for discussing the perceived problems introduced by immigrants – crime, fundamentalism, lack of women's emancipation'. In the process, the debate normalises fear of the 'Other' and legitimises racism. Petra Snelders, an Amsterdam (Oud-Zuid) Groen Links councillor, feminist and founding member of the Committee for Residents' Permits for Migrant Women, agreed that the debate 'gives succour to the idea that fear is normal and part of common sense. Here in the Netherlands, the popular saying goes "what the farmer doesn't know, he doesn't eat"'.

V Integration has been connected to the war on terror and countering extremism

The fact that the debate on integration really took off after September 11 and, as a result, has been mixed up with the war on terror and the fight against extremism, has led to further polarisation. Post-September 11, there has been a tendency to treat 'immigrant' and 'Muslim' as interchangeable terms and Muslim communities became more visible and worthy of comment after the events of September 11. Of the countries under study, the UK is the only one to have suffered a domestic terrorist outrage. The London bombings of 7 July 2005 accentuated post-September 11 tendencies in political circles, commented Herman Ouseley, the first Black head of the Commission for Racial Equality. 'Blair and other politicians took the view that Muslims had a problem and had to sort it out. This was wrong. We should have seen this as a collective problem. We had a British problem and Britain had to sort it out.'

The fact that integration is now discussed in the same breath as extremism and terrorism is deeply problematic, as there is a lack of subtlety or differentiation in the debate as to what constitutes the Islamic religion and what constitutes extremism. Particularly in Germany – where intelligence services and police practise the most intensive system of religious profiling in Europe – there is a tendency to lump all observant Muslims together and label them as a potential terrorist threat. Nina Mühe, a cultural anthropologist and researcher for the Open Society Institute EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program[16] drew our attention to Resolution C34 of the 18th Political Convention of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Germany, which is headed 'For German public benefit: supporting and demanding integration, fighting Islamism'. This, argues Mühe, 'illustrates the way integration is spoken about in public'. Even 'if it is often stated that the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are not "Islamists" or extremists, the fact that the statement is constantly reiterated by politicians and in the media draws the attention of the German public to exactly this connection'.

Linking integration with anti-extremism measures reinforces the view that you cannot simultaneously be an observant Muslim and European. (In earlier periods of European history, the allegiances of Catholics and Jews were questioned in much the same way.) In the final analysis, as Belal El-Mogaddedi explained, the 'debate gives the impression that being Muslim poses difficulties in terms of loyalty to the state'. (The possibility that integration tests could be used to determine patriotism is discussed further in Section Three.)

VI Social and economic problems faced by Muslims are divorced from their historical contexts and governments' responsibility

The integration debate also de-links the problems that historically non-European migrant communities have faced from any meaningful context. In this sense, it is a discussion that is unscientific and lacking in intellectual rigour. For structural barriers to integration have not emerged overnight, they have solidified over time. And if such barriers are to be dismantled, then it is necessary to address the mark left by several decades of discrimination – in housing, education, employment, etc – on the lives of the second and third generations. But such discrimination is seldom acknowledged, nor is the fact that integration is a two-way process. For discussions that valorise national identity tend, in turn, to undermine critical awareness. Facts that contradict idealised readings of a nation's treatment of its minorities tend to be swept under the carpet. 'In the Netherlands, racism is not acknowledged', commented Groen Links Councillor, Petra Snelders. Instead, multiculturalism has become the whipping boy for past failures. 'The PvDA is now compensating for its past association with multiculturalism', commented Miriyam Aouragh of

Together Against Racism. 'They now say they were too soft, too idealistic. They have rewritten history and become apologetic.'

Thus, the parameters of the debate on integration set back other government programmes to tackle discrimination. Patterns of ethnic segregation in housing, for instance, are being attributed not to government housing policies in the post-war period but to the cultural propensity of non-EU migrants to live 'parallel lives' in 'parallel communities'. There is concern that, as policy-makers misdiagnose the roots of the problems that diverse Muslim communities face, policies that are set to fail will be adopted and funding wasted in divisive and counter-productive programmes.

A better starting point would be to address the legacy of discrimination left by the guest-worker system and other types of post-war labour migration. Professor Stephen Castles, who wrote the first account of post-war labour migration to western Europe in 1973,[17] stresses that the guest-worker system was based on 'the inferiority and the separation of the foreigner'. Post-war labour migrants were not integrated into western European societies as equals 'but as economically disadvantaged and racially discriminated minorities. As a result, immigrants tended to settle in specific neighbourhoods, marked by inferior housing and infrastructure. Ethnic enterprises and religious, cultural, and social associations developed in these areas.'[18] A. Sivanandan, in his 1976 study of the UK's treatment of its black workers, 'Race, class and the state' recounts 'how the forced concentration of immigrants in the deprived and decaying areas of the big cities highlighted (and reinforced) existing social deprivation'.[19] It is the inherent contradiction between countries wanting labour but not the social cost of the labourer that has 'led to today's ethnically diverse but socially divided European societies'.[20]

But instead of addressing such past failures, the starting point today is rather the myth that immigrants have been shielded by an 'over-generous state'. A secondary myth is that Europe is at risk of 'Islamisation'. Across Europe, vociferous hate campaigns – some manipulated by the extreme Right – are emerging every time an application to build a mosque is submitted to a local council.

In fact, the desire to build a mosque could be interpreted as a sign of settlement and integration. When immigrants from countries like Turkey, Morocco and Pakistan first came to Europe in the post-war period, there were very few mosques. In order to worship, they made do with makeshift prayer rooms, often in their homes or in disused factories. Eventually, with financial help from countries such as Saudi Arabia, they were able to construct more formal places of worship. For the second- and third-generation children of guest-workers and colonial workers, Europe is their home and, as European citizens, they want to construct their own places of worship. This, according to Belal El-Mogaddedi, could be seen as a positive development. 'The construction of the mosques symbolises the fact that second- and third-generation Muslims have accepted that Germany is their home country. It is a statement that they will live, die and be buried here.'

References

1. The terminology varies greatly across Europe – for the sake of consistency, I have used the UK term, BME, throughout.
2. Austrian nationality law is also based on the jus sanguinis principle.
3. In fact, it was only in the late 1970s that the Netherlands recognised that it was a country of immigration. A series of terrorist acts in the 1970s by young Molluccans drew attention to the untenable situation of those assumed to be only temporarily resident. Hence, the 1983 Minorities Memorandum was drawn up, leading to the development of an integration policy. (See Hans Entzinger, 'The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The case of the Netherlands' in Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in liberal nation states (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003).
4. In fact France does not accept that it has minorities. It has issued a reservation to Article 27 (on minority rights) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As all individuals are equal before the law, and the equal rights of individuals are guaranteed, the French Republic, it is argued, is a country with no ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. To which the Human Rights Committee (the monitoring body of the ICCPR) replied that 'The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given state party does not depend upon a decision by that state party but requires to be established by objective criteria'. See Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe. (Oregon, Hart, 2006).
5. Marianne Gullestad, Plausible Prejudice: Everyday experiences and social images of nation, culture and race (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 2006).
6. See A, Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean struggles in Britain' in A Different Hunger: writings on black resistance (London, Pluto Press, 1982). The UK was the only country in Europe where the term black was used in a political sense, to emphasise the unity of all non-white immigrant workers and not the colour of their skin.

7. For a full discussion of this, see John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the state, and public space. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007).
8. A. Sivanandan, 'Attacks on multicultural Britain pave the way for enforced assimilation', Guardian (13 September 2006).
9. Ibid.
10. Jack Goody, Islam in Europe (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004).
11. Kathleen Cavanaugh, 'Islam and the European project' (Muslim World Journal of Human Rights (Vol 4, issue 1, 2007).
12. Derek McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism: Terrorism, integration and human rights (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 2008).
13. See <http://survie-france.org/article.php3?id_article=929 >
14. See Patrice de Beer, 'France's immigration policies' < www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/france_immigration_4338.jsp>
15. The CMF is a national network of Muslim associations and individuals which coordinates social, cultural and political activities at local, national and (occasionally) international levels. Created in 1992, it aims to contribute to public debates and oppose Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination.
16. 'Muslims in EU Cities: social cohesion, participation and identity' <www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/eumuslims>
17. Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (London, Oxford University Press, 1973).
18. Stephen Castles, 'Guestworkers in Europe: a Resurrection?' International Migration Review (Vol 40. no 4, Winter 2006).
19. A. Sivanandan, 'Race, class and the state' in A Different Hunger, op. cit.
20. C. Shierup, P. Hansen and S. Castles, Migration, Citizenship and the European Welfare State: a European dilemma (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).

2
The role of the media, the market and the academy

Participants felt that public discussion of integration had strayed far from the two-way process of mutual accommodation. One reason they gave was that politicians and a coterie of individuals with an assimilationist agenda had established a cultural-religious framework for discussing any issue related to integration. Another was the way that specific international events and domestic issues were framed in the media and then projected on to the integration debate. In order to situate participants' concerns, we examine below the role of the media, the market, political parties, public intellectuals and private think-tanks in the polarisation around integration.

I International events frame domestic discussions

Much of the way that the public understands integration relies on the way it is 'reported' in the media. In this, the digital age of 24-hour news coverage, where hundreds of television channels compete for viewers, hyped-up stories tend to grab attention. (Much the same can be said of the print media.) BBC TV presenter Jeremy Paxman pointed out in his 2007 James MacTaggart Lecture that by far the most important consideration for broadcasters today is impact, as impact gives competitive edge. When news items are hastily put together to maximise impact, the kind of in-depth reporting needed to contextualise the Muslim experience and the problems associated with integration will be hard to achieve.

Unfortunately, the context that broadcasters in particular provide often relates not to the domestic situation – to interaction between Muslim minorities and the mainstream here in Europe – but to international events. Terrorist events abroad and fears that 'imported' Islamic fundamentalist and 'illiberal, intolerant' movements will take root in

'modern western' Europe, increasingly frame the domestic news in reporting of issues related to the Muslim community. (This seems to apply equally to those countries which have not experienced any direct threat from Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism and those which have.)

Since September 11, Norwegian participants told us, events outside the country have framed the debate on integration, with Muslims being held responsible for events in other parts of the world. 'Muslims were not the topic of discussion here ten to fifteen years ago, but then you had 9/11 and everything changed', Shoaib Sultan, general secretary of the Islamic Council (formed in 1993) told us. 'You can count on the fingers of one hand the times the Norwegian newspapers mention something good about Muslims', he continued, observing that, 'this is not only a problem for Muslims, it is also to do with the way journalism is evolving.' The Norwegian media's response to the Danish 'cartoons affair' and violent protests in Iran against the cartoons, were cases in point.[1] There were no violent incidents in Norway, 'just a peaceful demonstration', explained Henrik Lunde, Director of Information at Oslo's Anti-Racist Center, yet 'there was an outpouring of anger directed towards Muslims because of what protestors did in Iran'. When a Norwegian Christian fundamentalist newspaper reprinted some of the Danish cartoons, the editors of all mainstream newspapers supported its editorial decision in the name of freedom of expression. 'Even though the Islamic Council responded by saying that while Muslims were angry and hurt, they would try to put this behind them and go forward as "we are all brothers in this country and must treat each other with respect"', Shoaib Sultan recalled, 'papers, websites and blogs were flooded with anti-Muslim statements and hatred'.

Unlike Norway, the UK experienced its own outrage on 7 July 2005 when terrorists killed fifty-two people in suicide bomb attacks on the London transport system. Birmingham councillor for the Respect Party, Salma Yaqoob, recognised how important it was that prominent Muslim community leaders respond to terrorist outrages by issuing strong statements. 'Non-Muslims need to hear us make these statements and I recognise that this is important', she told us, adding that the pressure on her to respond to any terrorist event in any part of the world was unrelenting. 'After the Virginia shooting, when we realised that the killer wasn't a Muslim, the relief that went through the community! Everything's distorted. You want to empathise but your reaction is perverse – thank goodness the perpetrator wasn't a Muslim.'

II The media projects 'scare scenarios' that pander to majority fears

Issues of integration are illustrated by the media with images of Islam that, all too often, pander to the fears and insecurities of the majority. When the same images and symbols are projected time and time again, they can induce a kind of collective hysteria in the majority while, at the same time, rendering Muslim minorities increasingly vulnerable.

In Leicester, we talked to a group of Somali community leaders who had settled there after leaving the Netherlands and Sweden because of feeling isolated. Somali Advice and Information Centre representative Abdilhakim Hussein spoke of his greater sense of belonging in the UK, a society he described as more open than 'closed Sweden'. But he also told us that he felt threatened by the media, 'which gives an unbelievable picture of Islam. Sky News and debates about Islam and terror affect you emotionally.'

There seems to be very little reflection within the media about the way stories on integration are framed and illustrated. An independent assessment by Sabine Schiffer, a lecturer in media education and communication studies at Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg, demonstrates how the visual impact of news reports is underestimated and how the juxtaposition of certain images in news reports may contribute to 'scare scenarios'. Having studied television news reports and newspapers, she found that nearly every time the issue of 'foreigners' was discussed on television it was illustrated with pictures of women wearing headscarves, triggering a chain of associations and assumptions among viewers that, essentially, 'Islam is foreign'.[2] (Alev Korun, the Viennese Green Party spokesperson on integration also observed that in nearly every Austrian TV discussion about integration, the presenter spoke against a background depicting a veiled woman.) Furthermore, Schiffer argued, the way in which media images were used in the integration debate in Germany had polarised issues, undermining attempts to promote religious tolerance. One example was the choice of visuals to illustrate the London attacks; spoken reportage was 'intercut with images of praying Muslims', making it 'difficult to escape the implied conflation of the motif Islam = terror'.[3] One participant in this research, Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, professor of

intercultural education at the University of Bremen, confirmed that negative images of Islam framed the debate on integration in Germany. 'Any report on the Turkish community will be accompanied by photos of a Turkish neighbourhood with Turkish advertisements and women wearing the headscarf. It provides an image of life in a ghetto where the minority has no contact with the majority.'

III Urban myths and 'ethnic crime' are woven into the integration debate

There was a strong feeling among participants that the media disproportionately focused on issues of crime and urban violence in relation to minorities. Ethnic breakdowns of crimes gave the false impression that specific crimes were the preserve of certain groups, which also happened to be Muslim. (Moroccans in the Netherlands, North Africans in France, Pakistanis in Norway, Turks in Germany and Austria, Somalis in all countries, were stigmatised in this way.)

There is a relationship between the way the media report on crime and the way 'crime' is then threaded into political pronouncements on integration. For instance, after a documentary on Pakistani gangs by director Ulrik Imtiaz Rolfsen was broadcast on Norwegian television, the state secretary for Integration, Immigration and Diversity, Libe Rieber-Mohn, drew on Rolfsen's claim that Pakistanis 'tend to cheat the state, they learn this in Pakistan' to argue that, as Pakistanis were not used to democracy, it was important that they accept Norwegian values.[4] In fact, most members of urban youth gangs would have learnt their code of values in Norway, where they have been brought up.

Once myths develop about the provenance of particular crimes, they become difficult to dispel and provide the framework for future reporting. In France, there has for some time been interaction between the way the media links certain crimes to young people of the banlieues and the way politicians pronounce on and ethnicise these crimes.

Media reports suggesting that gang rapes (tournantes) were pioneered by young men of North African origin first began to circulate at the end of the 1990s. Sociologist Laurent Mucchielli attempted to counter such racialised readings with data showing that the phenomenon of collective rapes dated back at least to the 1960s, when they were attributable to non-immigrant gangs. He provided further evidence that the incidence of rape had not increased over the past twenty years, despite media reports to the contrary. According to Mucchielli, what had changed was not the practices, but the claims attributing them to Arab-Muslim culture rather than to urban social problems.[5]

The way that anti-Semitism in France is now seen as a cultural-religious phenomenon demonstrates not only the interplay between media and politicians but also between both and an alarmist scholarship. Following the publication in 2002 of The Lost Territories of the Republic: anti-Semitism, racism and sexism in the educational sphere (Les Territoires perdus de la République: Antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme eu milieu scolaire), the media began to attribute anti-Semitic violence in France to North African youth. This highly influential book, cited by then President Chirac in 2003 and worked into at least one of his speeches, blamed problems of violence in schools on 'Arabic-Muslim culture'. Edited by Holocaust historian Georges Bensoussan (under the pseudonym Emmanuel Brenner), it featured testimonies by middle and high school teachers about acts of so-called 'communalism' committed by Muslim pupils in poor districts in and around Paris. In fact, Bensoussan had adopted an extremely controversial classification scheme for identifying 'communalist' acts and failed to examine discrimination against North African youths in the educational system. His 'indices of communalism' conflated verbal insults against Jewish students and teachers with action related to the maintenance of Islamic proprieties, such as wearing the headscarf, and performing regular religious observance.[6] Teachers who expressed views on the Middle East conflict were included under the category 'teacher-arsonists'. Le Monde Diplomatique journalist Dominique Vidal is one of the few who has systematically criticised the cultural-religious paradigm used by Bensoussan and others for discussing anti-Semitism, intergroup tensions and violence. Vidal has shown that an impartial analysis of official government data reveals that the perpetrators of anti-Semitic violence come from a range of backgrounds, the common denominator being that most are teenagers with a history of juvenile delinquency. If the media analysed the detail of government reports, he argued, they would learn that the main targets of racist violence are (in descending order) Maghrebis, Gypsies, Black people and Jews.[7]

Florencio Chicote, coordinator of the ADNB in Berlin, told a similar story. 'In Berlin-Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, the district commissioned an analysis of the social problems in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg', he told us. But the subsequent public discussion of the research downplayed the many social problems the migrant community faced (including racism and Islamophobia) and focused mainly on the question of 'Islamism', within which anti-Semitism was attributed mostly to the actions of Muslim youth.

IV The media creates celebrities out of assimilationist Muslims

Participants felt that the media were acting as gatekeepers, privileging those voices in the Muslim community that supported an assimilationist agenda. Those privileged – often with very individualistic or extremist agendas – have become celebrities, enjoying inordinate media coverage while the voices of other Muslims, who do not support assimilation, are silenced or ridiculed.

Anthropologist Marianne Gullestad at the University of Oslo calls this a 'star system' which results in a 'diversion of public attention and a crippling of critical awareness'.[8] She shows how the media elevate individual Muslims who support the majority view of immigrant culture as backward and European culture as innately homogenous and morally superior. 'Star systems', in the context Gullestad provides, can even be seen as a continuation of colonial reward systems under which'natives', alienated from their indigenous societies, were embraced by the new foreign rulers.[9]

Norwegian participants felt very strongly that Muslim, media-created celebrities supporting an assimilationist agenda were hindering the integration process. One example cited was that of Shabana Rehman, a Norwegian-Pakistani stand-up comedian and columnist in the tabloid newspaper Dagbladet who has been described as one of the most powerful women in Norway.[10] Among other exploits, Rehman has been photographed nude with a Norwegian flag painted across her body while dramatically throwing away her Pakistani clothes. And, at the opening of a film festival in Haugesund in August 2005, Rehman, after kissing the Norwegian cabinet minister of culture on the mouth, pulled down her pants and showed her behind to the public. According to Gullestad, who has analysed Rehman's newspaper columns and media stunts, Rehman has embarked on a 'radical project of individual emancipation against patriarchal and religious oppression'. But, in order to carry this through, she has not only followed 'tabloid genre conventions by focusing on the sensational and the sexually titillating' but formulated her criticisms in a way that reinforces the stigmatisation of a paternalism towards Muslim minorities in Norway en bloc.[11]

Discussion with Norwegian participants about the public reaction to Rehman revealed something akin to a missionary zeal in the way that Norwegian society adopts such figures. The life of Iffit Qureshi (who is Scottish but now lives and works in Norway) changed immeasurably after she took up pen to criticise Rehman in a column for the Morgen Bladet. Now a full-time writer and journalist, Qureshi asked why a Muslim like Rehman who supports the dominant view of Norwegians of Muslims as from a backward culture gains such prominence. Doesn't it in some way reveal more about the overwhelming sense of moral superiority held by the mainstream than the seeming backwardness of Muslim minorities?

Another celebrity favoured by the Norwegian media is Kadra Noor (known just as Kadra), a young Norwegian-Somali girl who is linked to the controversial private think-tank, the Human Rights Service (see p39). 'Kadra likes to provoke. They are making her into a front-figure, a martyr for the majority', a concerned Iffit Qureshi told us. Noor first achieved celebrity status after appearing in two controversial TV programmes about female circumcision in October 2000.[12] In a more recent incident, Kadra claimed to have been beaten up by eight Muslim men while they shouted 'Allah is great'. Even before the case had been reported to the police, Kadra appeared on television, dishevelled and with black eyes, giving her version of the attack. 'The media was exposing us to 24-hour coverage – there was a highly publicised meeting with the prime minister who pledged his support – and a web-page was set up in solidarity.' But the facts that later emerged about Kadra's beating were rather different. She was not attacked by unknown assailants but had argued with a group of young people, some of whom were friends, with whom she was enjoying a boozy Saturday night out in Oslo. These friends, angered by her TV appearance and her misrepresentation of the quarrel, then went on television to give their version of events. The police later dropped the

case, but in the meantime there had been countless demonstrations in major cities in Kadra's support under the slogan 'Against violence and for freedom of speech'. Even when the truth about the incident became known, Norwegian society continued to shield its adopted child. When Kadra won the 'On the Edge' philosophy prize – an annual award for 'a person who through words and deeds has given us new perspective on the lives of human beings' – few in the media detected the irony.

V Assimilationist feminists dominate the media

In the Netherlands, one individual, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, dominated the media discussion of integration for a number of years in ways that left no space for other views. Despite the fact that Hirsi Ali sat in the Dutch parliament for the Liberal Party (VVD), the media failed to note her political vested interest. Hirsi Ali, it needs to be recognised, did not support the integration of Muslims, but advocated their assimilation into Dutch society on the grounds that Islam was a reactionary and pre-modern religion that held Muslim women in bondage to patriarchal values. Her association with Theo van Gogh in the making of the 14-minute film Submission, and his later assassination by a Muslim fundamentalist are well known. What is less known, however, is that within the Netherlands there had been criticism of the role Hirsi Ali had played in polarising the integration debate. Submission, for example – in which episodes from the lives of four fictional Muslim women who suffer violence at the hands of men are related to verses from the Qur'an, calligraphed on the skin of the actresses' alluring, whipped and semi-naked bodies – was criticised by academic feminist Annelies Moors for its 'unimaginative resonance with the visual imagery of Orientalism' and for being, 'in essence, little more than the age-old Orientalist sexual fantasy – a call to white men to save Muslim women from Muslim men.'[13] The respected historian Geert Mak has argued that the cinematic techniques used in Submission to essentialise Muslims were similar to those used by Goebbels in his infamous Nazi propaganda film The Eternal Jew.

In the Netherlands, participants told us that September 11 was a much less significant factor in the deteriorating debate on integration than the rise of Hirsi Ali and the reaction to the killing of Theo van Gogh. Miriyam Aouragh of Together Against Racism helped form Stop the Witchhunt shortly after van Gogh's murder. 'This was our 9/11', she remarked. In the hysteria that followed the murder, right-wing voices were amplified and it became virtually impossible to point out that van Gogh 'had taken derogatory language against Muslims to new heights and made anti-Muslim racism commonsense'. The murder was used by the media as providing incontrovertible proof of the failure of integration.

There had been feminist voices within the Netherlands which openly disagreed with Hirsi Ali. It was, they argued, quite possible to counter domestic violence within the Muslim community without essentialising Muslims or stigmatising them as backward. But Hirsi Ali contradicted any feminist who did not support her views, disregarding claims that her provocative approach was making their work more difficult. We discussed this with Petra Snelders, the Amsterdam Groen Links councillor who has worked in crisis centres, and her colleague Fenna Ulichki, who was chair of the National Association of Moroccan Women for six years. 'Hirsi Ali was embraced by people because she made domestic violence a cultural thing', commented Snelders. 'Many Dutch white women's organisations adored her. She gave them a simplistic narrow explanation for the problem of domestic violence.' Fenna Ulichki agreed. 'If we Moroccan women spoke about investing in shelters for women, then Hirsi Ali would say that this is not the issue. The debate was never one that focused on the real problems of us women.'

Naima Bouteldja, a French journalist of Algerian descent who now lives in London, told us that the Algerian-French feminist Fadela Amara succeeded in poisoning the debate on integration in France in much the same way. Amara was of the younger generation that rose to prominence in association with the socialist anti-racist movement SOS Racisme. A Socialist councillor, Amara quickly became a 'media star' due to her role in the organisation Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither whores nor submissives). Today, Fadela Amara is one of Sarkozy's cabinet ministers. As junior minister, with responsibility for urban issues, Amara and justice minister Rachida Dati are wheeled out as proof that 'assimilated' ethnic minorities have a future in France.

'When the organisation Ni Putes Ni Soumises was formed after the brutal murder of a young Arab girl in the banlieues', explained Naima Bouteldja, 'its programme was initially against sexual violence and against the social conditions and governmental neglect of the banlieues'. However, after Amara became a 'star in the media, the discourse on social issues was removed and the talk was only about male violence –

stereotyping all Arab (as well as black) men as violent. Of course, sexism, machismo and male violence exist in the suburbs, as it does in all areas of society, one cannot deny this. But soon Fadela Amara began to reduce this to, first, an urban issue, and then, an issue of Islam.' This reinforced the existing media attitude which attributed gang rapes to Arab-Muslim culture. But when sociologist Laurent Mucchielli attempted to challenge Amara's interpretations, he was denounced for 'intellectual terrorism'. Amara also refused to work with any North African women's organisation which supported a woman's right to wear the headscarf.

The pre-eminence of a cultural-religious framework for discussing male violence extends beyond the mass media and beyond national borders. Today, in Germany, according to Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, a particular genre of women's biographical writing which 'gives the impression that forced marriages and honour crimes are a specifically Islamic phenomenon' has gained prominence. The publishing industry has discovered that personal accounts which view gender abuses solely through the lens of culture and religion are lucrative and marketable. And the marketed individual victim of gender crime becomes transformed into an expert on integration.

The media and the market privilege certain voices in the gender abuse debate, while marginalising others. Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, an expert on integration, who has served as an adviser to the federal government on questions of Muslim women and youth, carried out a survey in 2005 of 950 young girls from a migrant background. The report was well received on publication.[14] Yet its findings, that young migrant women were highly motivated in terms of education and willingness to participate in the labour market, did not conform to the dominant view that such women lived restricted and traditional lives dominated by issues of forced marriage and honour crimes. Karakaşoğlu finds that research like hers has been cast aside for more 'racy accounts' as provided by the publishing industry. 'Now these biographies are appearing on the market, unfortunately nobody remembers these studies, which could help us better estimate the degree to which forced marriages really affect the realities of a majority or a minority women… The publishing industry is interested in books which serve society's need for horror. The whole way that this was transformed into an "exotic" subject began in Germany with Ayaan Hirsi Ali's I accuse followed by The Foreign Bride edited by Necla Kelek. Many saw in this trend a chance to be read, to achieve public prestige. They have discovered a niche market. But with their books, they reinforce a very old image, namely that of the exotic Orient, which from my perspective is long outdated.'

Karakaşoğlu is not alone. In 2006, fifty-eight social scientists signed an open letter in Die Zeit accusing the authors of populist non-fiction works on Islam of having written inflammatory pamphlets that made unscientific generalisations on the basis of individual cases. They were alarmed that, in contrast, scientific sociological studies barely got any attention.[15]

VI Promoting the notion of self-segregation

The consequences of discounting proper sociological studies can be seen in the role the media play in promoting the idea that Muslim communities choose to 'self-segregate' in 'parallel societies'. This 'parallel societies' framework has been a strong feature of the debate in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, where it is linked to an attack on multiculturalism.

Here again, there has been a mutually reinforcing relationship between the media, anxious for impact, and politicians, anxious to grab headlines, particularly at election time. According to cultural anthropologist Nina Mühe, the German debate about parallel societies is not based on empirical evidence or sociological study. 'The social phenomenon of parallel societies is hardly ever defined, the absence of any definition makes it extremely powerful as a means of raising associations of various sorts when touched on by politicians and the media.'

When the Social Democrat-Green coalition government (1998-2005) attempted to introduce new laws for immigration, integration and citizenship which would eradicate the concept of a Volk tied together by jus sanguinis (blood/descent), the Christian Democrats tried to get the upper hand by opposing any such reform. They introduced, instead, a debate on Leitkultur (leading culture). The central thrust of the Christian Democrats' argument was that Turkish immigrants, not German society, were responsible for their social, political and economic marginalisation because of their refusal to assimilate into the 'leading culture'. It was not long before Muslims' 'failure' to integrate was being attributed to cultural or religious factors – hence the fascination with 'parallel lives'.[16]

In both the UK and the Netherlands participants talked of the way politicians and the media equated the failure of integration with 'self-segregation'. In the Netherlands, the 'self-segregation' framework favoured in political and media circles was popularised in 2000 by sociologist Paul Scheffer.[17] In his book, The Multicultural Drama, Scheffer warned of social disintegration due to the emergence of a Muslim underclass that was not only socially and economically defined but also did not share some of the basic values of Dutch society. His solution was cultural adaptation (as opposed to cultural diversity) and a policy of 'Dutchification'. Participants told us that the multicultural policies pursued by past Social Democrat and Green coalition governments, and critiqued by Scheffer, had not been without problems, built as they were on the foundations of the Dutch secular model of 'pillarisation'.[18] Nevertheless, it was disingenuous to blame multiculturalism, that is, cultural diversity and the presence of immigrants, per se, for the pressing problems in poor neighbourhoods. These had been caused by years of social neglect and urban decline. 'This decline of social life and neighbourhood has been blurred with the attack on multiculturalism', Miriyam Aouragh told us. 'The structural reasons for change in neighbourhoods' are never discussed.

In the UK, in a similar way, press and politicians, as well as scholars peddling scare scenarios, have made overblown claims about self-segregation, which is then linked to the failure of multiculturalism. For instance, in a much trailed speech in February 2007, Conservative Party leader David Cameron attacked Muslims for 'living apart' from British society and linked this to the failure of multiculturalism. It is a claim that cuts across the political divide. The head of the former Commission for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips (a former Labour Party mayoral candidate for London) has attacked multiculturalism and warned that Britain may be 'sleepwalking into segregation'.

Such claims are based on generalisations and over-simplifications. According to Herman Ouseley, also a former head of the Commission for Racial Equality, such thinking originated in the response to the disturbances in the northern towns of summer 2001. 'As the government introduced the concept of "community cohesion" aimed at bringing people from different backgrounds together, the debate started to develop along the lines that segregation is caused by Muslims choosing not to mix.' 'What happened next was that the specific problems of Muslim communities living in racially segregated communities in the northern towns of Burnley, Oldham and Bradford – were treated as though they were typical of the national picture, as though the living of "parallel lives" was common across the country.' The recent Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which supports the government's approach to community cohesion, shares Ouseley's view that 'the northern town disturbances of 2001 … were about very specific local problems'. The Commission was deeply concerned that 'excessive coverage of racial segregation is spreading the incorrect view that the whole of England is spatially segregated'.[19]

VII Public intellectuals with assimilationist, Islamophobic frameworks are dominating debate

In different European countries there are different views on who constitutes an 'expert'. In Norway and France, for instance, one is far more likely to see university professors and academics participating in television discussions on integration and minority issues than in the UK. 'Perhaps in no other country does applied philosophy intertwine with media campaigns to the extent it does in France', commented John Bowen.[20] For example, French political commentator Alain Finkielkraut is not only a lecturer in social sciences at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris but a media celebrity having presented 'Répliques', a weekly discussion-based radio programme on France Culture, for twenty years.[21]

In the Netherlands, academics and writers are not so much called upon by the media to act as experts, as transformed into celebrities and cultural icons through their intervention in the integration debate. Writer, film director and professional provocateur, Theo van Gogh was one example. But the late Pim Fortuyn, who launched his own political movement specifically to campaign against the Islamisation of the Netherlands, started professional life as a university sociology lecturer before making a name for himself as a TV chat show personality and media columnist. More recently, the journalist Fleur Jurgens has achieved celebrity status following the publication of her best-selling 'study' The Moroccan Drama, in which she located the causes of crime in the culture of immigrants from Morocco's Rif Valley. With a nod to Scheffer, Jurgens concludes that the Netherlands has been too soft

on Moroccan youngsters and that their culture, not Dutch society, is to blame for the failure of the multicultural experiment.

Jurgens contends that she wanted to investigate 'how far the family background of problem Moroccan youngsters contributed to their tendency to fail in Dutch society'. But fellow journalist Pieter van Os, angered by her unprofessional bias, pointed out that Jurgens had answered her own question before she began.[22] She did not interview any young Moroccans for her research. Instead, she relied on the opinions of sixty-six 'experts' of her own choosing. In advertising her book, Jurgens presented herself as 'an ordinary person with a strong feeling of social responsibility'. In reality, 'she is a journalist on the right-wing HP/De Tijd newspaper whose research was paid for by the Police Academy'. According to van Os, her approach illustrates the problems when journalists delve into research 'in an effort to justify their own point of view'. The result is a book that 'damages the professional honour of journalists and ultimately trust in our profession.'[23] Dolf Hautvast, an educationalist who works with Moroccan youngsters, commented that the book 'has led to a hardening of public opinion against youth at risk. Moroccan boys aged eight to sixteen are being stigmatised. They are routinely portrayed in negative ways and as hostile and dangerous.'

VIII Appealing to public prejudice has become political strategy

The last ten years has seen the emergence of new extreme-Right, anti-immigration and Islamophobic political parties, usually with no community roots and often organised around a personality cult. Such parties, nostalgic for a monocultural past, resort to the politics of stigmatisation, blaming minorities for a decline in living standards and a loss of national identity. However, in the information age, where political parties put a high premium on communications strategies, the stigmatisation of Muslim communities is no longer confined to the extreme Right. Communication strategists of more mainstream parties consider appeals to prejudice as acceptable and marketable. In France, young people from the banlieues have felt the impact from politicians directly. Former Socialist prime minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement referred to them as 'savages', Sarkozy called them 'scum'. But participants at our roundtable discussion questioned how much Sarkozy believed the stereotypes he generated. They believed that young Arabs and Muslims were victims of the centre Right's strategy for Sarkozy to associate himself with such prejudices in order to steal the electoral garb of Jean Marie Le Pen.

It is hard to deny that the marketing of prejudice has not been built into the electoral strategies of the many extreme-Right and anti-immigrant parties now a feature of electoral politics across Europe. For prejudice is the raison d'être for their existence. Alev Korun (Green Party) told us that in Austria 'the FPÖ [Freedom Party] and the BZÖ [Alliance for the Future of Austria] are imposing a language hegemony and definitions of integration that other political parties are constantly having to fight against'. 'More or less the whole campaign [of the Freedom Party in Vienna was against Muslims and foreigners. They used terms such as "Home instead of Islam" and "A free woman instead of the obligation to wear the headscarf". Often the tone of debate is farcical.' Korun found it particularly amusing that extreme-Right parties with highly conservative agendas on the family, women and social issues presented themselves as champions of feminism. In Norway too, the Progress Party (FrP) has 'quietly crossed the boundary and become the mainstream'. Nevertheless, politicians from all political parties were held responsible for the deterioration of the current debate. 'It always gets worse around election time. It's the same pattern every time. The Progress Party sets the agenda and the other parties cynically follow', commented Norway's first Asian mayor, Nadeem Butt.

Across mainland Europe not only are political strategists following in the footsteps of the extreme Right, but, some in centre-left parties are adding to an anti-Muslim climate by their over-dogmatic secularism. According to German academic, Nina Mühe, while centre-left and Left parties may have more liberal views when it comes to immigration, when it comes to the Muslim community, they can fall prey to a particular Islamophobia 'nourished by a mixture of feminism and secularism'.

IX Misconceptions and stereotypes spread through selective use of research

Politicians also stand accused of using statistics and academic research extremely selectively. In June 2006, Austrian minister of interior, Liese Prokup, citing 'Perspectives and challenges regarding the integration of Muslims' (a survey commissioned by the Austrian government after the 2005 London bombings), claimed that 45 per cent of Muslims in Austria were not integrated and did not wish to be. But the authors of the study had in fact made no such claims, merely dividing the 340,000 Muslims living in Austria into four categories – religious Conservative, traditional conservative, moderate liberal and secular. On the basis of combining the first two categories, and operating on the assumption that strong religious affiliation was equivalent to non-integration, Prokup arrived at her alarmist 45 per cent statistic.[24] After repeated criticism, Prokup attempted to soften her stance by speaking of the 'great distance' between Muslims and Austrian society. Nevertheless, according to Hikmet Kayahan of the anti-racist organisation ZARA, the damage had been done. 'This terrible study is always being referred to. And the extreme Right uses it as a scientific basis for its argument that Muslims do not want to integrate.' (Indeed, the story can be found on far-Right websites under the heading 'Many Muslims too backward to integrate in Austria'.)

The growing influence of privately funded research that serves specific political agendas has been raised by Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning from the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Private think-tanks, they warn, are increasingly shaping national debates.[25] They cite the example of the Policy Exchange, whose report on Muslim social attitudes, 'Living Apart Together', was published to provide 'academic' cover for the UK's Conservative Party leader David Cameron's speech attacking multiculturalism and the work of prominent Muslim organisations.[26] Very few of the media reports, that publicised Cameron's claim that a significant minority of Muslims were 'living apart', made it clear that Policy Exchange had an overtly political agenda. In fact, the Conservative MP and shadow education spokesman Michael Gove (author of Celsius 7/7 – How the West's policy of appeasement provokes fundamentalist terror and what has to be done now) was the founding chair of Policy Exchange. Smyth and Gunning warn that such reports replicate stereotypes that threaten community cohesion.[27]

Another private think-tank that has served to polarise opinion and poison public debate is the Human Rights Service in Oslo, which was established in 2001 to examine 'issues and problems peculiar to multiethnic societies'. Its highly controversial director, Hege Storhaug, has succeeded in ensuring that nearly every public debate on integration in Norway summons up issues such as female circumcision, forced marriages and honour killings. Despite her extreme stance, Storhaug is constantly presented in the media as a neutral expert on integration. In reality, her work and use of statistics are highly selective, biased and influenced by anti-immigrant discourse. For many of our research participants, Storhaug's privileged position in the media was reprehensible. As in the Netherlands, where the views of Hirsi Ali were privileged over those of other women, the privileging of Storhaug has had a detrimental impact on women's organisations such as MiRA which has worked for some time to protect women from forced marriages.'It is difficult to intervene in the media on this issue now in a way that does not demonise Muslims', Fakhra Salimi, director of MiRA told us. 'We have refused to participate in the TV debate because the way they frame the debate is not serious and we refuse to debate with Hege Storhaug. The cases of forced marriages are few, we are working on these cases, but we can't get the message across.'

Participants felt that the only useful strategy was to refuse to engage in public debate with Storhaug or the Human Rights Service because of Storhaug's emotional outbursts and demonisation of her opponents. She has even gone as far as describing the respected MiRA Centre as working 'In the Service of the Patriarchs'.[28] Anyone who has read the sensationalising, unscientific and self-referencing work of Storhaug would be staggered at the level of support she continues to receive from the Norwegian government. The Labour Party supports her centre to the tune of 2.5 million Kroner; in the words of Anti-Racist Center deputy director Mari Linløkken, 'the Labour Party minister for labour and inclusion sees it as his job to bring Storhaug's proposals into government.'

References

1. On 30 September 2005 the Jyllands-Posten, a Danish paper, published twelve cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed (allegedly to reveal the extent of consorship amongst the mainstream media against their creator, who could not find a publisher). Muslim organisations in Denmark and then throughout the world protested as the cartoons (one of which portrayed the Prophet as a terrorist) were reproduced in papers in more than fifty countries. The escalating violence, in which police fired on crowds protesting against the western countries which had published the cartoons, resulted in over one hundred deaths.
2. Sabine Schiffer, 'The headscarf and the media: a symbol which has become instrumentalised' <www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-2 66/i.html?PHPSESSID>
3. Sabine Schiffer, 'Muslims, Islam and the media: taking the initiative against scare scenarios' <www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-308/i.html>
4. Aftenposten (4 March 2007).
5. Laurent Mucchielli, Le scandale des "tournantes" (Paris, La Découverte, 2005) as cited in Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, op.cit.
6. See Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, op.cit.
7. Le Monde (23 February 2007).
8. Marianne Gullestad, Plausible Prejudice: Everyday Experiences and Social Images of Nation, Culture and Race (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 2006).
9. This was a point made eloquently by Ronan Bennett (Guardian 19 November 2007) In the Belgian Congo, writes Bennett, the colonisers used to employ a system of rewarding colonised people who alienated themselves from indigenous society: they were raised to the officially designated category of évolués.
10. Details of Rehman's media stunts are provided by Marianne Gullestad in Plausible Prejudice, op.cit.
11. Gullestad, Plausible Prejudice, op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. Annelies Moors, 'Submission', ISIM Review (No. 15, spring 2005).
14. Yasemin Karakaşoğlu and Ursula Boos-Nünning, 'Living multiple worlds. A study on the living conditions of girls and young women with a migrant family background' (Waxman, Münster, 2005).
15. Die Zeit (2 February 2006).
16. Hartwig Pautz, 'The politics of identity in Germany: the Leitkultur debate' (Race & Class, Vol. 46, no. 4, 2005).
17. For a critique of Scheffer and other Dutch intellectuals see Rudolph Peters, '"A dangerous book": Dutch public intellectuals and the Koran', European University Institute Working Papers (No. 2006/39).
18. Under this, each ethnic group organised around its own 'pillar' and separate institutions (including schools) in a model of religious/cultural separatism.
19. Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 'Our shared future' (London, June 2007).
20. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, op. cit.
21. The importance of Finkielkraut in constructing a cultural-religious framework for considering issues of anti-Semitism and violence cannot be overemphasised. He has also attempted to popularise the view that white people are the true victims of racism, which he defines as the Francophobia and Judaeophobia inherent in Arab-Muslim culture.
22. Pieter van Os, De Groene Amsterdammer (20 April 2007).
23. Ibid.
24. For further details, see Margareth Prisching, 'The headscarf as a symbol of non-integration? Integration of Muslims in Austria' (European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, EDAP 3/2006).
25. Marie Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, 'The abuse of research', Guardian (13 February 2007).
26. Another Policy Exchange report, 'The hijacking of British Islam' has since been exposed as based on fabricated evidence. The report, which claimed that twenty-six out of nearly 200 mosques surveyed had been found to be selling extremist material, made front page headlines when it was launched in October 2007. In December 2007, however, the BBC's Newsnight programme revealed that researchers on the programme had falsified the receipts that were meant to prove that the books had been purchased at certain mosques. See Seumas Milne, 'Cameron must rein in these toxic neocon attack dogs', Guardian (20 December 2007).
27. It is essential, they claim, that 'sound research' is 'undertaken by scholars – including think-tanks – who are not interpreting data to promote a preconceived political agenda', adding that researchers are also citizens who have a responsibility to ensure research does not exacerbate divisions or contribute to the demonisation of members of our population.'
28. <http://www.dagbladet.no/kronikker/961001-kro-1.html>

3 Promoting integration

A variety of new measures have been introduced and citizenship laws reformed across Europe supposedly to enhance integration. But participants questioned whether these measures would serve to rectify or exacerbate past injustices, and how far the assimilationist philosophy of public discourse had informed them.

I Governments fail to consider how 'integration contracts' and citizenship laws act as barriers to integration

It is only with full citizenship rights that an individual can fully participate in society. Yet, over the last few years, many northern and western European countries have placed a high premium on measures that have a strong symbolic message, such as the 'integration contract'. This applies to new citizenship applicants as well as, in some cases, long-term foreign residents and new residents seeking work permits. This contract has serious implications for Europe's Muslim communities, a large proportion of whom (including Muslims who came to Europe as children or were, in some cases, born there), do not have citizenship status. Pan-European statistics indicating the breakdown of citizens and non-citizens within Muslim communities are hard to find. But the International Crisis Group states that in Germany, although roughly half of today's Turkish-origin population was born in the country, the vast majority (1.9 million of 2.5-2.6 million) still holds only Turkish citizenship.[1] In the Netherlands in 2005 an expert suggested that around one-third of all immigrants of Turkish origin were not Dutch citizens.[2] The 'parallel lives' argument would imply that Muslims had chosen not to take up citizenship because their primary identification was with their homelands. But the reality is that European citizenship laws may act as a barrier to full integration via naturalisation.

II Instead of emphasising rights and responsibilities, integration contracts build in penalties and sanctions

The new 'integration contracts' involve tests of language acquisition and knowledge of the history, traditions, administrative systems and culture of the host society.[3] The underlying idea is that citizenship should not be considered an automatic right for those who have, nevertheless, fulfilled residency requirements, do not have a criminal record and can prove they will have no recourse to public funds. Citizenship, it is believed, should be more of a prize than that, and its granting should be celebrated through ceremonies and rituals (on the US model) that act as an induction into the rights and responsibilities associated with the democratic way of life.

In theory, the focus on integration and the greater emphasis on learning and instruction could be a good thing. 'It means that we no longer see the immigrant only as an economic unit, as just a labourer', Groen Links Amsterdam councillor Petra Snelders told us. But the positive aspects of the integration measures are being undermined in a variety of ways, not least, she says, through the 'negative debate and the sanctions attached to so many of these schemes'.

While the passage from long-term resident to naturalised citizen is becoming more difficult, 'what worries people the most' Baruch Wolski, of the Kanafani Inter-Cultural Initiative in Vienna told us, is the way in which these integration measures are 'tied into a system to take away people's elementary rights'. It is the use of sanction and threat that is proving counterproductive. In Germany, the recent Immigration Amendment Act makes 'successful participation' in integration courses a precondition for residency and other rights and the aliens' authority can order foreigners to take part in integration courses by 'administrative fiat' (Verwaltungszwang).[4] 'I consider that the improvement and extension of existing integration courses is an important measure and one step towards better participation', cultural anthropologist Nina Mühe told us. 'It opens up the possibility not only to learn basic German but also to move more easily within the administrative and other systems of society.' However, the weakness of the new regulations is the increased use of threat, with 'penalties of up to €1, 000 for refusing to participate, with

social or youth welfare offices mandated to report cases of integration deficiencies to the aliens department. The pressure on new immigrants could prove counterproductive and hinder integration. It could be seen as compulsion and threat rather than a right and an opportunity.'

Our Dutch participants felt, in particular, that integration policy in the Netherlands has become repressive. 'If you don't integrate you're punished' they argued. But the problems associated with the Dutch integration plan, introduced by the previous Conservative-Liberal administration, go further than compulsion. The plan was subjected to legal challenge for institutionalising discrimination. It obliged residents under 65, who had spent less than eight years in the Netherlands during their schooling, to undergo a course to help them integrate into Dutch society and gain command of the Dutch language. But because this obligation was imposed only on naturalised Dutch citizens (and not those who were citizens by birth) it amounted to discrimination by ethnic origin, according to the Equality Commission. The Commission challenged it as a possible contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights. More recently, the current minister for living neighbourhoods and integration, Ella Vogelaar, acknowledged that the standard of the language test was set too high and that the older generation of immigrants found it particularly hard to pass.

Participants at the roundtable discussion in Paris pointed out that new categories of people are being caught in the expanding logic of integration contracts. For instance, a new law passed in July 2006 imposed a language requirement even on those seeking a residence permit. (In the past, a foreigner did not have to prove integration to secure a permit but only to secure French nationality.) Abdellali Hajjat, a PhD student at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, is researching the concept of assimilation in French citizenship laws and the administrative uses to which it is put. He told us that 'the shifting of this legal category indicates not only the hardening of requirements for entering and staying in France, but also, more specifically, the introduction of an unprecedented cultural dimension to this part of the legislation on foreigners.' The same situation apparently prevails in Austria, which has some of the toughest criteria for residence in Europe.

III Emphasis on language acquisition is belied by lack of language class provision

'Language, language, language is the mantra', said Khalid Salimi, the director of Horisont, an inter-cultural centre in Oslo, when we asked him to outline the main aspects of the Norwegian government's integration policy. (He added, amid much laughter, that 'the second thing is how we dress'.) It was a view replicated by many of our European participants who, nevertheless, welcomed the greater emphasis placed on language acquisition. But while government interest in promoting language learning was welcomed, the sanctions and penalties built into such projects were not. The high standard of the language requirement was also criticised. That governments are not prepared to adequately resource and finance language classes suggests the emphasis may be symbolic. The way that the emphasis on language reinforced particular stereotypes about communities was also contested, with Muslim women in particular feeling strongly that the 'language integration discourse' stigmatised them.

In Germany, it was not until the Social Democrat-led government set up the Süssmuth Commission in 2000, to draw up modern laws on immigration and integration, that the question of an integration strategy was finally addressed. While the intention of the Süssmuth Commission was to provide practical guidelines for integration, such as a detailed programme concentrating on language acquisition, the Christian Democrats undermined it by refocusing the debate on Leitkultur and German identity. By 2005, though, the Christian Democrats, now in power, seemed prepared to move on. Having finally accepted that Germany was a country of immigration, the government provided funding for integration and, in 2005, the first language courses were introduced. But a positive debate about the merits of language acquisition soon fell prey to the dominant way of thinking – namely that immigrants lived in parallel societies where acquisition of the German language was not prioritised. The new slogan of the Federal Republic concerning integration is 'Fördern und Fordern', which translates as 'Assisting and Demanding' . To '"Assist and Demand" is talked about as if we had been assisted in the past', argued Yasemin Karakaşoğlu. 'In fact the assistance was never even there. All the old migrants who don't know German are talked about as if there had been thirty

years of language courses. For the last thirty years, we have had no integration structure whatsoever, so how can we be to blame?' In this debate, the significant achievements of the Turkish community have been systematically overlooked. For instance, academic research indicates that the proportion of ethnic Turks holding higher educational degrees and better jobs has increased, not only compared to the first generation, but also over time. In addition, the socio-economic status of the Turkish community is higher in Germany than that of other immigrant communities in the Netherlands or France.[5] These are considerable achievements, given the absence of any federal integration policy and given the nature of the citizenship laws that denied citizenship to the second generation. And these achievements need to be set against the failures in the German educational system to adapt to the needs of Turkish pupils. According to Stephen Castles, until at least the late 1970s, virtually nothing was done to prepare teachers for the task of teaching foreign children (in particular there was no specialised teacher training). In effect, the education system worked to virtually guarantee that second-generation immigrants remained at the lowest occupational and social levels of society.[6]

The debate over language acquisition also impacts negatively on Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, particularly women, in the UK. Here, the language debate has tended to focus on the number of Muslim women who are not in the labour force and Muslim mothers who do not speak English (and, thus, disadvantage their children). Paradoxically, the UK government has made it a requirement for citizenship that a certain level of language acquisition is achieved, while at the same time slashing funding for English language classes – a measure that impacts most harshly on minority ethnic communities in poorer areas. The daughters of the first generation are very angry about the way their mothers have been denigrated in the media language debate. 'The contribution of our mothers has not been recognised', said Salma Yaqoob, who was born in Bradford to Pakistani parents. What concerns her is that 'a different yardstick' is used to judge Muslim women from that used for white, middle-class women. No one questions their right to stay at home and bring up a family. Typical comments from Muslim women participants included: 'Our mothers can understand English, but they lack confidence speaking it.' 'At the time they arrived in the UK, there was a different culture in society. It was more the norm that mothers were housewives and stayed at home to look after children.' 'It is rather late to talk about learning the language when these women were given no support in learning English in the first place.'

A similar situation pertains in the Netherlands where the integration debate also concentrates on language acquisition but ignores the state's historic failure to provide integration structures for the wives of immigrant guest-workers – the males being viewed as temporary units of labour. Halleh Ghorashi, professor in diversity management and integration at the Free University in Amsterdam, is deeply critical of the government's current approach. In a radio interview she pointed out that when Turkish and Moroccan women first arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, they were not expected to integrate. 'The idea was that the only reason they were here was because their husbands had jobs … they didn't need to integrate in society because they were only going to be here for a while.' But now that these women have stayed, the government wants to force them to integrate and actively participate in Dutch society.[7] For Ghorashi, policies should encourage greater participation rather than stigmatise the group and place obligations upon them. For, 'when you oblige the whole group to do that, you send these women a signal that they don't want to do it themselves.' She continued: 'What I hear from the migrant women is that there is little room for their own voice and the way that they want to shape their own futures. Rather than stigmatise, the government should support self-organisation amongst Moroccan and Turkish women, groups such as Oemnia (I wish). Since Oemnia was established five years ago, it has helped over 400 Moroccan women in Amsterdam from first, second and third generations. They can attend a variety of classes, such as Dutch language classes or courses to help them set up businesses, or market their skills in making traditional handcrafts.' According to Oemnia director Samira Boucetta, it is the person-centred approach which makes it so successful. 'We help the women make choices, and we stand by them all along the way until they reach their goal. We see the participants as individuals and we do everything we can so they participate fully in society.'[8]

There are also concerns that the language debate will impact negatively on education policy. Norwegian educational psychologist Sunil Loona, who remembers a time when immigrant children were deemed 'poor readers' because of failures in educational language support provision, is worried that the 'issue of mother tongue has become politicised'. In

some places, educational authorities, arguing that a foreign mother tongue is a major barrier to educational achievement, fail to modernise educational systems and develop appropriate methods for teaching pupils with a non-European first language. Even though the OECD ranked the German school system last among those of seventeen industrialised nations when it came to supporting migrant children, some Länder are still refusing to acknowledge the validity of research that shows that children who start school speaking only their mother tongue perform well (and in many cases outstrip their peers) in a positive learning environment.[9] The argument still persists in Germany that, if children cannot speak German when they start school 'they have from the outset no chance'. The words are those of CDU politician Wolfgang Bosbach.[10] Hence, Bavaria has gone so far as to announce obligatory language tests for pre-school foreign children even before they start school. Parents will be fined if they fail to register their children for the classes or tests.[11] Researcher Bernhard Perchinig noted, in a recent report on Austria, that teachers often mistake problems immigrant children have with German as a sign of low intelligence. Given that two-thirds of those who finish school in Vienna without qualifications are the children of immigrants, Perchinig concluded that Viennese schools were failing immigrant children.[12]

IV Controls linking spousal immigration from non-EU countries to a pre-entry language requirement do not aid integration

Another problem identified was the introduction of a discriminatory principle in immigration controls. Participants told us that new immigration controls tying spousal immigration from non-EU countries to a pre-entry language requirement have been introduced as a supposed integration measure when, in their opinion, they are really aimed at limiting the family reunification of non-EU Muslim immigrants. These are discriminatory measures which contravene the right to a family and private life as protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Turkish community in Germany and the Moroccan community in the Netherlands have been principally affected by these laws and there is ongoing discussion in Norway about similar measures. In the UK, a consultation process on a government proposal to bring in a pre-language entry test for non-EU spousal immigration is currently underway.

The positive expectations in Germany about the first integration summit (called by Angela Merkel) had already been checked by political and media discourse that highlighted Muslims as unable to integrate. Yet many Turkish organisations felt it was still possible to make headway, until, that is, the run-up to the second integration summit in the summer of 2007, when the government introduced new legislation which created major barriers for further spousal immigration from non-EU countries. This immigration law obliged the prospective spouses of non-European nationals to pass a 90-minute German language exam before applying for a visa. In future, spouses could only join their partners if, on arrival in Germany, they did not need to follow an integration course on account of their existing knowledge of the German language. As the law excluded citizens of the USA, Canada, Israel and Japan on the grounds that the 'immigration of citizens of these states lies in Germany's special migration-political interest', the measure was widely seen as discriminatory.[13] Turkish groups also argued that the new measures were unreasonable as it would be fairer to demand knowledge of the German language when an individual had spent some time in the country and had been provided with the opportunity to learn. 'The law reflects Germany's attitudes toward the Turkish immigrant community', commented Kenan Kolat, head of the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB). 'They do not want family reunion among low income immigrants, they do not want any German citizens of Turkish origin, they tell the Turks to put up with it or leave the country.'

For the four largest Turkish organisations participating in the integration summits, a dialogue that they had entered in good faith, had led nowhere. They decided to boycott the second summit on the grounds that integration was undermined when discrimination was institutionalised into immigration controls. Furthermore, they argued, dialogue must be a two-way process, not something imposed by government, top down. (All the measures proposed by Turkish organisations at the first summit had effectively been ignored.) Such criticisms, however, were misrepresented in the German media which quickly turned to the familiar 'parallel societies' peg to hang the boycott upon. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described the boycott as an anti-democratic response to a democratic process and linked it to

a desire among some foreigners to 'maintain a self-centred and self-sufficient way of life under more generous circumstances than in their homeland, in other words to live with their own kinds of ghettos and parallel societies'.[14]

The German government's discriminatory immigration controls were justified on the basis that the marriage patterns of specific minority groups were a major barrier to integration. Turkish men were accused of importing brides from rural areas of Turkey who were barely literate and could not speak German. This, it was argued, doomed integration efforts to failure as the problems of the poorly educated non-German-speaking 'first generation' were bound to reproduce themselves from one generation to the next. Cultural anthropologist Nina Mühe believes it is important to unpick the many inaccuracies upon which such an argument rests. It presents German society as 'generous to a fault' while airbrushing out the discrimination faced by Germany's original Turkish workers. In reality many 'rural families, who came to Germany during the first phase of labour recruitment, have tried their best to get a good education for their children'. Moreover, 'recent studies have shown that … being from a poorly educated, rural family does not necessarily hamper the chances of receiving a good education for the children of the second and third generation. If many of these children suffer today from underachievement, the reasons have first of all to be looked for in the educational system which is, at certain points, not yet able to respond to intercultural needs.'

The UN human rights' inspector and the director for education at the OECD concur. Drawing on the 2006 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) report, OECD director Barbara Ischinger points out that differences in the educational performance of immigrant children and native students were more pronounced in Germany than in almost any of the forty other countries studied. The report highlighted the fact that in countries with well-established and well-structured language support programmes for immigrant children, especially in early childhood, the performance of second-generation immigrant children tended to be much closer, if not equal, to that of the majority population.[15]

In other European countries, the argument that the marriage patterns of ethnic minority communities constitute a major barrier to integration, because of the reproduction of disadvantage and underachievement, is beginning to be used to justify a call for discriminatory immigration controls. In The Moroccan Drama, journalist Fleur Jurgens took the view that the Moroccan community was destined to repeat cycles of deprivation and underachievement as long as Moroccan men married illiterate rural women from the Rif valley. In fact, the Netherlands had already introduced the most far-reaching version of the 'integration contract' in Europe; it sets a pre-arrival integration examination to prove assimilability, directed principally at applicants (mostly Moroccan and Turkish) for family reunification and marriage. (As in Germany, EU nationals, Canadians, Japanese, New Zealanders and North Americans were exempt.) The syllabus includes a DVD entitled 'To the Netherlands', which illustrates Dutch life by showing gay men kissing in a meadow and topless women on the beach. Dutch officials denied that the basis of the integration test was to stop the flow of immigrants from Muslim countries, claiming that they merely wanted all applicants to consider whether or not they would fit into a permissive society (which would doubtless automatically disqualify orthodox Dutch Catholics).[16]

In Norway, Hege Storhaug, the director of the Human Rights Service, is a major proponent of discriminatory immigration controls. On the untested presumption that marriage is only a pretext for more immigration by 'population groups from non-western countries', particularly Somalia and Pakistan, Storhaug calls for immigration controls as a necessary bulwark against the importation of 'patriarchal structures, values and traditions' which impede integration. In 2007, the Norwegian government was considering introducing higher thresholds for non-EU immigrants (economically and in terms of the age requirement) seeking to bring in a spouse from abroad. These were seen as measures targeted at the Pakistani community. In the UK, a similar debate took place, led by MP Ann Cryer (Keighley and Ilkley) and directed at the Pakistani and Kashmiri communities of northern towns. Cryer claimed that the principal cause of the northern disturbances of 2001 could be traced to the practice of arranging marriages with foreign spouses, which led to poor levels of English and consequent underachievement.[17] The anti-immigration lobby Migration Watch (which has links with Hege Storhaug's Human Rights Service) also argued that 'intercontinental marriages', which tended to create ethnic ghettos, put British core values at risk.

The introduction of such discriminatory immigration controls rests on the argument that poverty and social exclusion are due to cultural factors which emanate from the Muslim world. In order to justify discriminatory spousal immigration controls, governments resort to untested theses which stereotype, because they homogenise, whole communities and limit their civil rights. But there is no one 'Muslim' experience. Although in the first period of settlement Muslims from diverse national and ethnic backgrounds may have come principally to fill jobs in manufacturing and other areas of working-class life, these experiences have not remained frozen over time. Today, there is considerable class stratification within Europe's diverse Muslim communities, particularly as the second and third generations have moved into higher education and the professions.[18] What seems to be happening is that specific problems associated with traditional communities that have, for a variety of reasons, not progressed as well as others are being projected on to the entire Muslim population in Europe. In addition, the problems of the more traditional communities have been divorced from any historical or social understanding. Zakaria Hamidi, a Moroccan immigrant who went to the Netherlands to join his father as a young boy, helped found a self-help project in Rotterdam, Ettaouhid, which, among other things, provides an opportunity for Muslims with higher educational qualifications to use that for the benefit of the community. Hamidi pointed out that, in the Netherlands today, many 'more Moroccans are going into higher education and participating more in society'. Where specific problems exist they need to be understood in relation to 'objective' factors such as the history of migration. 'The first generation Moroccans were labourers. They were not highly educated and believed that they would come to work and return home', he told us, adding that 'migration from rural areas to the city, from one country to a westernised society, brings problems.' It was precisely these problems, suggested educationalist Dolf Hautvast (echoing Nina Mühe's observations about Germany) that were never addressed by the Dutch education system which 'neglected to give support to parents in bringing up children in a highly individualised and complex society'.

V Denial of naturalisation and dual nationality to Muslims compounds assimilationist strategies

Without citizenship and attendant rights, an individual can never fully participate in social and political life. Anyone who does not enjoy full voting rights may be denied membership of a trades union or political party – as well as certain employment opportunities. He/she may be prohibited, for instance, from working in the civil service, law enforcement or for the local education authority. In addition, the cost of naturalisation is often prohibitively high for Europe's poorer, long-term foreign residents seeking citizenship, leading some commentators to believe that the true purpose of this more rigorous citizenship process has less to do with integration than a desire to limit the number of those immigrants with little economic capital seeking citizenship.[19]

Participants were also concerned about arbitrary cultural selection in the administrative processes of naturalisation. Examples include citizenship being denied to long-term Muslim residents of the EU (including women who wore the headscarf) on the grounds of religious or political affiliation. Particularly in Germany and France, civil servants seem to have internalised an 'assimilationist logic' when dealing with naturalisation requests, resulting in the accusation that citizenship laws are being used to mould social, cultural and political conformity.[20]

In France, such 'assimilationist logic' is not new. Since 1927, assimilation has been a condition for naturalisation, although what was meant by 'assimilation' was never clearly defined. However, in the 1990s, Michèle Tribalet, the head of the influential National Demography Institute (INED), advanced the view that overt, publicly displayed, religious affiliation should be taken as an indicator of lack of assimilation on the grounds that too much religion meant too little assimilation.[21] Researcher Abdellali Hajjat told us that 'currently, the vast majority of cases of "assimilation deficiency" concern very devout or simply practising Muslims, as well as Muslims affiliated to Muslim organisations'. However, cultural and religious selection within naturalisation processes is difficult to prove as public records exclude details which could be challenged in court. 'Candidates can be rejected on the grounds of insufficient assimilation, whether in their dress, their language, their travel outside the country, or the positions they have

taken on Islam. The police verify whether a candidate for naturalisation has assimilated, and in their inquiry sometimes ask about private habits', according to John Bowen.[22]

In France, there is a very real danger that officially sanctioned prejudice against observant Muslims could lead to arbitrary decision-making by civil servants (influenced by the security services) when it comes to naturalisation decisions. The administration has 'a wide margin of manoeuvre in implementing the law', Nacira Guénif Souilamas told us. 'It becomes a personal assessment involving a subjective dimension, and this is severely problematic in the exercise of the law, which is supposed to be applied evenly by every civil servant.' Fouad Imarraine, of the Coalition of Muslims from France (CFM), describes this as the '"politique du guichet" – the politics of arbitrariness, which means that, on the whim of a civil servant or an intelligence officer, you are going to be judged worthy or unworthy of the Republic, of the French culture, of integration.'

For the participants at our roundtable discussion, one problem lies in the French nationality code which, as previously stated, requires an applicant for citizenship to prove assimilation into the Republic. But another dimension has been added post-September 11 concerning individuals holding membership of a Muslim organisation, that has no association with violence but is critical of the government. This may be enough to justify denial of citizenship. The converse can also happen, as Abdellali Hajjat explained, using the example of the state's treatment of the Union des Organisations Musulmans de France (UOIF). In the 1990s, membership of the UOIF was considered reason enough for refusing a naturalisation request. But when the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) was formed in 2000, Sarkozy, then interior minister, promoted the UOIF as one of the principal actors in the CFCM. Today, people from the UOIF will be granted nationality because, in a sense, they have become incorporated into the 'clientelist strategy of the former Minister of Interior'. The 'definition of assimilation has been transformed by involving the state's relationship to Muslim organisations and their degree of allegiance'.

The French participants identified this as a form of 'constitutional patriotism', whereby citizenship applicants had to declare allegiance to the state. Nina Mühe highlighted the growing tendency in Germany to, similarly, refuse citizenship to long-standing Turkish residents on the grounds of affiliation to Islamist organisations. In her research on Muslims in Germany for the Open Society Institute, she exposed the growing rejection of naturalisation requests from members of the organisation Milli Görüs, which represents a large number of Turkish-Germans. (In one case, four members of Milli Görüs, were even stripped of their German citizenship, although this was overturned on appeal.) Another similarity with France lies in Germany's new Immigration Amendment Act which paves the way for institutionalised discrimination against Muslim applicants. Under this law, public authorities are obliged to notify the aliens' department of, and exchange personal data, about foreigners 'in need of special integration', without defining what this 'need' entails, thus providing for unchecked powers of interpretation.[23]

The aspirations of long-term Muslim European residents are also being blocked by denying citizenship to those with dual nationality. Currently, different countries have different approaches to dual nationality, but attitudes are hardening. Post-September 11, the principle of dual nationality has been attacked in the media, those with such nationality are sometimes portrayed as a security threat because of their supposed divided loyalty. This has to be set within a profound shift in political thinking set in train by globalisation. European governments have embarked on a 'recalibration of what it means to be a citizen', adjusting citizenship laws to respond to what they perceive to be the dangers posed by increased immigration and cultural diversity in citizenship.[24] In this climate, long-term non-EU foreign residents, who seek to retain the nationality of their homelands, are finding that dual nationality is being blocked. This has particular implications for Europe's Moroccan and Algerian communities, as they are prohibited by the laws of their birth countries from relinquishing their nationality.

Germany is home to the highest number of Third Country nationals in Europe, yet has one of Europe's lowest naturalisation rates, partly because of its opposition to dual nationality.[25] While this needs to be seen in the context of hostility to any change to the blood (or descent) principle in citizenship laws, it could be argued that the fears of 'foreign infiltration'(Uberfremdung), manipulated by the Nazis, have, since the second World War, been transferred from Jews to Turks. This was detectable in the 'Heidelberg Manifesto' launched by a number of German academics in 1981, which argued that citizenship via naturalisation threatened the ethnic purity of the German Volk.

But with the loosening (of the jus sanguinis principle in Germany – brought on by popular pressure) the focus has shifted more towards the restriction of dual nationality. Hence, when the Social Democrats on coming to power in 1998 proposed a major citizenship reform which would have allowed for dual nationality, Roland Koch, the leader of the CDU in Hesse launched a petition campaign 'yes to integration, no to dual nationality'. Dual nationality meant conflicts of loyalty and hindered integration because of its failure to guarantee 'voluntary and lasting orientation towards Germany' (ie assimilation into Leitkultur). Up until 2008, Länder were free to pursue independent policies on dual nationality but, in reality, the federal government's approach to dual nationality constitutes a major disincentive to allow it, 'in part because of the emotional aspects involved, but also because of the sheer inconvenience and cost'.[26] The situation has become more complicated still because, as from January 2008, young naturalised citizens with dual nationality will have to choose between one passport or another on their eighteenth birthday. If they fail to do so, they will automatically lose their German passports when they turn twenty-three. An estimated 300,000 young Germans will be affected by this.

A similar debate is taking place in the Netherlands where there are an estimated one million residents with dual nationality. This is largely due to the fact that, from 1992 to 1997, dual nationality was permitted. As from 1997, it was allowed only in exceptional cases. Now, dual nationals feel under threat because of the emotionally charged parliamentary debate initiated by the extreme-Right Freedom Party (PvV) politician Geert Wilders, supported by the Liberal Party (VVD). The debate included highly personalised attacks on newly appointed Labour Party state secretaries Ahmed Aboutaleb (of Moroccan origin) and Nebahat Albayrak (of Turkish origin) whose loyalty to the Dutch state was called into question on account of their dual nationality. Initially, it looked as though the first ethnic minority members of any Dutch cabinet would be hounded out of office. But a number of important professional and trade union bodies spoke out against what was described as a new form of McCarthyism. The National Federation of Christian Trades Unions (CNV) said that the way dual nationality was being linked to questions of loyalty created mistrust in precisely those professions where the need for trust was paramount. Jan Kleian, the chairman of the union representing the military, ACOM said that 'Soldiers feel that if the loyalty of state secretaries is being questioned today, the integrity of Muslim soldiers could be up for discussion tomorrow.' And Marleen Barth, chair of CNV Education, said that it was totally unacceptable that people with dual nationality were now considered unsuitable for all sorts of jobs because of presumed divided loyalties.[27]

VI Integration is being measured on cultural and psychological scales rather than economic and social ones

There has also been a marked drift in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands (both associated with multiculturalism) away from traditional indicators of integration – participation in the labour market, income levels, inequality and poverty, educational achievement, home ownership, etc – towards new nebulous indicators which relate to 'values'. A lack of integration is now to be indicated by a pervasive interest in the home country, reaffirmation of ethnicity, use of foreign language media, extreme religious affiliation, and so on. But far from being a new, forward-looking thesis, the reliance on cultural values is regressive. It is reminiscent of the 1950s, when assimilation was the dominant paradigm within race relations sociology and, underpinned by the theories of the 'Chicago School', the view was that migrants should undergo a process of 'acculturation'. They needed to renounce their inappropriate pre-migration cultures in order to embrace the values, norms and behaviour of the receiving society.[28] In the 1960s and 1970s, though, particularly in the US and the UK, such ideas were questioned by minority struggles against racism and for cultural recognition and social equality. Nevertheless, today, these views have resurfaced, with politicians increasingly favouring those theorists whose work chimes best with the 'integration into values' approach.

And recourse is also being made by academics and policy-makers to very old fashioned 'race relations' paradigms of social distance (between immigrants and host). The reasons for this shift towards measuring socio-psychological aspects of inter group relations are hotly debated. Some believe that, as the state's influence on the labour market wanes through globalisation, governments seek to micro-manage the inevitable fall-out by encouraging social connectedness and creating contact between different groups so as to bridge 'distance'. In the UK, it is precisely this 'contact

thesis' that now dominates the new 'community cohesion' agenda as the expectation grows that 'social mixing will dissolve "alien" cultures into a monolithic Britishness'.[29] Ever since the Cantle report of 2001 into the causes of the disturbances in the northern towns, community cohesion has become the dominant model of race and integration policy in the UK. Commenting on the degree of ethnic segregation in the northern towns, Cantle concluded that multiculturalism had helped create this ethnic divide and suggested that, in future, funding of community groups should favour organisations that promoted community cohesion. New indicators of integration advanced by the government include 'meaningful interaction' and 'developing a sense of belonging', with greater emphasis placed on '"bridging" activities that bring people from different backgrounds together'. Drawing on US political scientist Robert Putnam's theory of social capital, the UK government distinguished between bonding capital (when people interact within their own ethnic group) and bridging capital (when people interact with groups outside their own), and emphasised the need for government action to promote the latter.

On the positive side, the new approach signals a shift away from some of the worst aspects of the ethnic and culturalist approach of previous government policy, first critiqued by IRR director A. Sivanandan.[30] Adopted in the wake of Lord Scarman's report into the 'disturbances' in Brixton of 1981, which found 'disadvantage' to be the main cause of the riots, policies gave rise to funding strategies based on redressing ethnic needs and problems. In the process, ethnicised patronage in local and national government was encouraged and different ethnic groups, previously united in tackling racism and social issues, competed as to which was the more ethnically and/or culturally disadvantaged and, therefore, the most deserving of help. At the same time, the increasing resentment among white, working-class communities was channelled into support for far-Right organisations like the British National Party.

Unfortunately, the debate ushered in around community cohesion has not, as yet, led to more socially just and inclusive programmes, and the concomitant unity between socially disadvantaged and disconnected groups. Instead, the UK government has merely turned multiculturalism into a whipping boy for past governmental mistakes. It now argues that the problem has been 'too much "multiculturalism", and not enough integration (read assimilation) or the more euphemistic term "community cohesion"'.[31]

What is striking is that, while the route to assimilation may be different in each European country, the dangers posed by new conceptual models are so similar. German and French participants criticised the new 'constitutional patriotism' but so, too, did British participants who warned that 'allegiance to the state' had entered the discourse. This was not least because the community cohesion agenda had become confused with the anti-terrorist agenda. Within both, participants warned, governments favoured groups which were uncritical of its policies, including foreign policy. But when it came to integration, such compliant groups were ill-equipped to respond to pressing problems of settled Muslim communities – in housing, education, employment etc – which meant that the needs of the most disadvantaged would not be met. 'Nowadays everyone understands issues only in terms of the community cohesion agenda', commented Alyas Karmani, a diversity consultant in Bradford. Herman Ouseley agreed, adding that 'to attract funds in modern Britain today, you must not talk about racism; you must not talk about challenging inequalities. Real issues like poverty and housing are being detached from the community cohesion project.'

The need for social connectedness that informs community cohesion policy in the UK is also evident in Austria,[32-] Norway and the Netherlands, where participants were beginning to feel its impact on education and family policies. Sunil Loona, an educational psychologist and advisor at the Norwegian National Centre for Multicultural Education, was alarmed by a new government approach which focused on 'changing the identity, the morals and values of these children'. Others in Norway were worried by recent Progress Party proposals to take children into care (on the grounds of child protection) if, by the age of 5, they do not speak Norwegian, as well as cut down on culturally sensitive care measures for the BME elders (on the grounds that, if they cannot adapt to the Norwegian system, they should go home). Amsterdam Groen Links councillor Petra Snelders was deeply concerned about the ethnicisation of research on family and women's issues, including domestic violence, in the Netherlands. She also detected an authoritarian tone in education, where the underachievement of BME children was routinely 'thrown back on the parents. This has now grown to such cruel proportions', she told us, 'that it is now openly said that if parents cannot bring up their children properly, these children should be placed in foster care.' The former Dutch interior minister Rita Verdonk proposed, in 2004, a 'theoretical integration ladder' to judge the level of integration

an individual achieved, with immigrants earning or losing points based on language proficiency, employment, residence in an immigrant suburb, truancy of children, and so on. (A previous suggestion to introduce an integration badge was quietly abandoned after opposition politicians declared it reminiscent of the Star of David that Jews had been forced to wear.)

Participants feared that a concept of integration based on measuring the distance of the 'immigrant' from the norms and values of the 'host' society would lead to an ethnic hierarchy; a league table of assimilation, with those ethnic groups at the bottom of the league (often the newest arrivals) subject to more punitive measures (including deportation). Through collective stereotyping based on ethnicity, individuals would be rendered more open to discrimination in employment, education, housing and so on. And the idea would grow that ethnicity, not poverty, lay at the heart of disadvantage. 'In 2004, when the idea of an integration table was circulated', PRIME director Ahmed Pouri told us. 'Iranians were seen as the best integrated, and Somalis the worst.' According to Khalid Salimi, director of Horisont, the same is true in Norway where 'Somalis have taken over from the Pakistanis' as the most stigmatised group. Social distance theory makes it even harder for BME groups to speak out against racism or discrimination, because, increasingly, to criticise racism is to reveal your distance from the mainstream. Politicians even argue that using the word 'racism' creates 'distance', Fakhra Salimi told us, adding that 'they most certainly don't accept the term Islamophobia. Islamic names and symbols cause "distance"; this is what they tell us now.'

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14. This, and further examples of media responses to the boycott, can be found in European Race Bulletin (No. 62, Winter 2008).
15. Deutsche Welle (16 May 2006).
16. See Liz Fekete, 'Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right', Race & Class (Vol. 48, no. 2, 2006).
17. See Arun Kundnani, 'From Oldham to Bradford: the violence of the violated', in The Three Faces of British Racism, Race & Class (Vol. 43, no. 2, 2001).
18. We have already noted the considerable achievements of the Turkish community in Germany. In the Netherlands, too, according to the government's integration report 2007, while in the mid-1990s around 6 per cent of students of non-western origin were in higher vocational education and university, the proportion has now exceeded 12 per cent. As cited in Migration News Sheet (December 2007).
19. An article in the Austrian newspaper Der Standard (30 July 2007) makes precisely this point. It argued that there was a vertiginous drop in the number of residents seeking citizenship after the previous government (ÖVP-BZÖ coalition) tightened laws governing these applications in 2006. This was attributed partially to the dramatic increase in the fees for the procedure. For instance, applicants for citizenship used to have to pay an additional €174 for citizenship to be granted to spouses. This supplementary fee has increased to €700. Similarly, children could be naturalised free of charge before the amendment of the law; under the new system, naturalisation costs €200 per child.
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4
Integrating Islam into secular Europe

Europe prides itself on a secular tradition shaped by the Enlightenment and the battle to free the individual from religious coercion and the feudal power of the church. As a result, religious rights in Europe have tended to focus more on freedom of conscience and individual expression, and less on how to extend religious pluralism to new minority communities within an increasingly multi-faith society. And this, despite the neutrality inherent in secularism, where a clear separation exists between church and state and the state guarantees not to identify with any one religion or privilege the religion of the majority over the minority.[1]

For obvious historical reasons, churches and religious communities with a long-standing presence in Europe have gained a particular status and certain privileges. And it is, therefore, this model of church-state relations which governments use when attempting to integrate Islam, identified as a 'new European religion'. It is precisely this lack of formal official recognition that has, in the past, created considerable difficulties for Muslims when registering as a religious community, constructing places of worship or providing for burial under Islamic law. Despite the extreme-Right rhetoric invoking the 'Islamisation of Europe', the reality is that in many parts of Europe an Islamic religious infrastructure barely exists. It was only in 2006, for instance, that the first Muslim cemetery was opened in Denmark,[2] a country which still requires newborn Muslim babies to be registered with the Christian church.

I Attempts to incorporate Islam as a religion are being confused with attempts to integrate Muslims

Islam is now the second largest religion in many countries of Europe. Governments are responding to this new reality by attempting to establish a formal dialogue with religious representatives of the Muslim community. There are also attempts to provide a clearer framework for the recognition and training of imams; the provision and monitoring of religious instruction courses in school and the recognition of Muslim organisations eligible for public financial support. Yet, even these attempts to 'integrate Islam' have become enmeshed in controversy, as governments confuse integration of a religion with the social, economic and political integration of ethnic minorities that happen to be Muslim. Other critics believe that secularism is being misunderstood, and, in some cases, betrayed.

In order to understand the historical reasons for the disadvantaging of Islamic communities, it is necessary to identify the different models of secularism that exist across Europe. Different countries have different conceptions about the role of religion in society and the separation (or lack of separation) of church and state, which, in turn, have shaped national responses to issues of cultural and religious diversity.

For the Muslim communities of France and Germany, specific problems in achieving religious recognition are linked to traditional understandings of secularism. In France, secularism (laïcité) evolved out of the struggle of the Republic to free the individual from the dominance of the Catholic church. Here, secularism is defined by a strict separation between religion and politics and the relegation of religion to the private sphere.[3] However, once the State Council (Conseil d'État) confers legal recognition on a religious association certain benefits accrue – associations are exempted from taxes, municipalities can provide help in building places of worship, organising access to public spaces for special services. On the other hand, the concordat between church and state in Germany (and Austria) affords the church a role in the public sphere (for instance in religious instruction in schools and kindergartens), with other officially recognised religious communities afforded special status and rights. The fact that Islam has been locked out of this privileged status accounts for the specific problems associated with 'integrating Islam' in Germany. But in Austria – unique among western European countries due to its empire's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and the incorporation, therefore, of a Muslim minority – the situation is rather different. By 1912, Islam had been granted the status of an officially recognised religious community. The Islamic Religious Authority (IGGiÖ) has enjoyed the status of a public corporation since its foundation in 1979 and, through the Islamic Academy for Religious Education, exists as an official interlocutor with the state, with the right to give religious instruction in state schools.[4]

The partial secularisation of the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, paradoxically, may account for the greater presence of official religious infrastructures for Muslims in these countries. In the UK and Norway, there is still an established state church – the Church of England and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway respectively. In Norway, a written constitution upholds the principle of non-discrimination in freedom of religion, which means that, if the state finances the Lutherans, then it honour bound to finance other 'faith' communities too, such as Islam and even 'secular humanists'. In the UK, the state does not finance the church, nor does it legislate against its activities. And, in line with Anglo-Saxon traditions of freedom of conscience in religion, there has been substantial accommodation of Islamic religious requirements, in relation to places of worship, school uniforms and burials.

In the Netherlands, with its history of religious wars, the state acted to guarantee religious pluralism, with each religious group organised around its own 'pillar' and maintaining separate social institutions (including schools) in a model of religious and cultural separation. The structural feature of societal organisation in the Netherlands is known as verzuiling (pillarisation), a principle that dates back to the seventeenth century when Amsterdam was Europe's busiest mercantile centre and financial interests dictated that, if business was to thrive, religious differences had to be set aside and antagonistic groups kept physically separate. Despite a loosening of the pillarisation system in the 1960s, due to strong secularisation, the model largely informed the pluralist, multicultural orthodoxy of the 1960s – 'integration with maintenance of one's own identity'. Just as there had been Catholic, Protestant and secular pillars in the Netherlands, there could be a Muslim one too. Since the 1980s, the state has subsidised Islamic (and Hindu) schools.

Criticisms levelled at governments about integrating Islam relate to the limitations within each of these secular models. In the Netherlands, the perceived lack of regulation and different standards of Islamic schools are highlighted in public discourse, as in the UK. But in other parts of Europe, where there are few if any Islamic schools, this has not emerged as a substantive issue. It is in Germany and France, where the state is just beginning to enter into an official relationship with Muslim religious groups, that criticism is at its sharpest. French participants in this research were united in criticising the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), founded in 2003 as a national elected body to serve as an official interlocutor with the state to regulate and improve the conditions of Muslim worship. The CFCM's original formation came firmly under the state model of laïcité, as its stated purpose was to integrate Islam in the Republic on an equal basis with other faiths.[5] But the CFCM moved from this limited role as the state increasingly interfered in its internal workings. Sarkozy, then interior minister, selected the CFCM's leadership not in consultation with the Muslim community of France, but with the governments of those countries from which the leaders came. 'In its insistence on managing Islam as a foreign phenomenon, even as it attempts to institutionalise an "Islam of France"', argues Mayanthi Fernando, 'the state has ironically overlooked the most likely vector of a truly French Islam: French-born Muslims themselves.'[6]

Sarkozy had a clear aim – to increase the power of religious interests and involvement day-to-day over poor estates, on the grounds that religion ensures civil peace and moral order. Thus, the CFCM was expected by government to fulfil a community relations function – pronouncing on issues such as inner-city violence, the headscarf ban, violent Islamism and the Israel-Palestine conflict. For that, it has been discredited in the eyes of the wider Muslim community for whom it has no mandate to speak on social and political issues. Participants at the Paris roundtable discussion believed it was essential for religious Muslims to break from a 'non-functioning, colonial-style, and unrepresentative body'.[7]

In Germany, though the model of secularism under which the state seeks to integrate Islam is somewhat different, the criticisms of attempts to 'integrate Islam' are remarkably similar. According to participants, the objective of integrating Islam has not been met in Germany due to the confusing way in which the government has set about 'constructing dialogue'.

As the first integration summit was launched, the government announced the first Islam Forum, held in Berlin in September 2006. Its aims were to address domestic relations between the majority population and Islam in Germany, to define an equal status for Islam with other religions, leading to a new social contract, and eventually the formation of a new representative body for German Muslims. For Werner Schiffauer, chair of comparative and social anthropology at Viadrina European University at Frankfurt/Oder, the forum had, from the outset, pursued a policy of assimilation. 'No discussion takes place with Moslems on equal terms. The state lays down certain requirements which the Moslem communities are expected to meet ... a genuine dialogue would involve identifying common interests ... the German Conference on Islam is more likely to result in disintegration than integration.'[8] It was unclear from the beginning whether the function of any new umbrella organisation would be religious or political. Now, having urged the participants of the Islam Forum to create such a network the government has distanced itself from the newly-formed Muslim Coordination Council and announced that it can only have a limited role in political dialogue.

II Intolerance about the headscarf reveals secularism as a barrier to integration

Positive attempts to integrate Islam are undermined when a state bans Muslim women from wearing certain items of clothing on the grounds that religious symbols have no place in the public sphere. Several European countries have now introduced laws banning school students from wearing the headscarf and, in these countries, civil servants, too, are prohibited from wearing items of religious clothing which, it is argued, compromise the neutrality of the state, or act as a symbol of non-integration. A variety of concerns are used to justify such state bans, ranging from the threat posed by such items of clothing to national security and social cohesion, to issues of gender equality, child protection, integration and principles of secularism.[9] But, whatever the justification, such laws have profound implications for integration and social cohesion.

The fixation – obsession one might say – in the media and politics with religious clothing is fuelling the intolerance of the majority, while, simultaneously, increasing the fears of the minority. The bans have ended up creating social exclusion, not inclusion. Many women and girls who refuse to take off the headscarf, particularly in France and parts of Germany, have been penalised through measures that limit their access to education and employment and, even, in some cases, participation in everyday affairs.

The 2004 French Law against the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in schools was non-discriminatory, in that it applied to all religions (Sikhs who wore the turban, Jews who wore the yarmulka as well as, in principle, Christians who wore oversized crucifixes). Furthermore, the law, when seen in the context of the French Republican tradition's emphasis on the school as an instrument of the secular state for the public education of future citizens, could be seen as a continuation of the laïcité principle.[10] However, the context in which the law was passed was certainly not impartial. Parliamentary and media debate had highlighted the wearing of the headscarf as a threat to state secularism and neutrality (laïcité). Furthermore, the law was introduced following a specific recommendation for precisely such a ban by the government commission set up to evaluate the state of laïcité. (The French civil code already prohibited civil servants, which includes teachers, from wearing religious symbols in state institutions which are regarded as public places.) Today, the 2004 law is being interpreted in such a way that the civil rights of Muslim women and girls who wear the headscarf are severely restricted. Ultimately, a girl who refuses to take off the headscarf will be expelled from school. Some schools have also banned headscarf-wearing mothers from joining extra-curricular school activities, such as school trips.[11] The Ministry of National Education has stated that the 2004 law has had the welcome result of ensuring that religious symbols in schools have practically disappeared. But critics point out that this positive evaluation does not take into account those pupils who have chosen to be educated abroad, in private schools (mainly Catholic),[12] or through the National Centre for Education at a Distance. Nor does it acknowledge the stigmatising aspects of the ban: the fact that Muslim mothers and daughters have been humiliated and abused in educational institutions and in other walks of life. Doctors and municipal offices have refused entry to women in headscarves; they have also been excluded from juries and prevented from acting as witnesses at marriage ceremonies. There have been cases where individuals have abused women in headscarves on the street, in subways, on the buses on the grounds that French law does not allow the wearing of religious symbols in 'public places'.[13]

There is no federal state ban in Germany prohibiting the headscarf, but at least half of Germany's sixteen states have banned women wearing it in public buildings and when working for the state. Some states have acted in an openly discriminatory way, allowing Christian and Jewish religious symbols while forbidding the headscarf. Furthermore, teachers with a yarmulka, a cross around their neck or wearing a Catholic religious habit are allowed to teach in almost all Länder on the grounds that these are signs of a western Christian tradition. In fact, the bans adopted in Germany are justified less as a secular measure than as a tool to promote integration. For the headscarf is regarded as 'a sign of holding on to the traditions' of the 'society of origin' and thus an expression of 'a lack of cultural integration'.[14] Muslim women in Austria – despite a more legally secure position – also exist within an increasingly intolerant climate engineered, in part, by extreme-Right electoral parties which have sloganised 'A free woman instead of the obligation to wear the headscarf' in its campaigns. Hikmet Kayahan, who worked until quite recently for Vienna's only funded anti-racist organisation, ZARA, told us, 'I have been in this field for fifteen years and only now am I hearing of cases where woman have their hijabs torn off and are spat on.' True to form, right-winger Jörg Haider, state governor of Carinthia, has proposed a ban on the hijab on the grounds that it would act as a bulwark against the Islamisation of society. (It is traditional for old women from the majority population to wear headscarves in southern Carinthia, but when asked whether his prohibition would cover these headscarves, Haider said that it was permissible for women to wear headscarves for 'folkloric purposes' but not for religious reasons).[15]

Unlike in Germany and France, in the UK, Norway and the Netherlands, there is no state ban on the headscarf (although the Netherlands is discussing specific legislation aimed at banning full face-coverings). In the UK, there has been a protracted media debate on the wearing of full-face veils, following an intervention by the, then, Labour Leader of the Commons and ex-home secretary Jack Straw. The result of this debate has been greater stigmatisation of all Muslim women. 'We are either poor pathetic females needing rescuing or we are a threat because of

the clothes we wear. Well, which way is it?', asked Respect councillor Salma Yaqoob wryly.[16]

There are positive signs, though, that several European governments do not consider state bans on religious clothing a legitimate integration measure and reject the suggestion that Muslim women can only be fully European if they unveil. Recently, the UK communities' minister Hazel Blears said that what was important was not what Muslim women wore, but what they did. The Danish prime minister has stated clearly that it is not the job of the state to concern itself with matters of religious clothing which was a personal matter even when it crossed over into the public sphere. He added that, 'It's shocking to see how tempers can flare up over seeing a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf. Leave them be!'[17]

In the discussions we had with Muslim men and women in the course of this research, it was obvious that Europe's Muslims, whose families came from different regions of the world, with different cultural traditions, have quite diverse opinions on religious clothing.[18] But this diversity of opinion never encompassed the rejection of the idea of personal choice. All participants maintained a civil rights framework for any discussion on the wearing of the headscarf (although there was some disagreement over full-face coverings). Precisely such a civil rights approach has been advocated by IRR director A. Sivanandan when he drew attention to the responsibilities of a 'secular state to ensure the same range of choices to all its citizens, excepting only that these do not cut across the range of choice of any other citizen.'[19]

III Christian fundamentalist organisations and extreme-Right electoral parties are seeking to ban the building of mosques and minarets

Many of the participants saw much to celebrate in the interfaith dialogue at grassroots level across Europe. For Shoaib Sultan, general secretary of the Islamic Council in Norway, the positive role played by the churches in fostering interfaith dialogue was one of the reasons why there was not such a strong post-September 11 backlash against Muslims in Norway as in other European countries. What is of concern, however, is that international pressure from elites within the different Christian denominations could undermine all that has been so carefully built up by religious representatives and faith groups at a national and local level. Some elements of the church leadership, sensing a loss of power and influence, appear to feel threatened by attempts to integrate Islam. For them, the introduction into the school curriculum of lessons on Islam is a step too far, as is the notion that, in the future, one may well talk of Europe as a continent with Judaeo-Christian-Islamic roots.

In Germany, inter-faith dialogue has experienced its worst setback. When Cardinal Karl Lehmann, Chair of the German Bishops' Conference, declared that Germany should not show 'uncritical tolerance' by treating Islam like other religions, there was great disappointment.[20] More worrying was a statement by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cologne, Joachim Meisner, at the time of a vociferous anti-mosque campaign in the city. In a radio interview, he said that the planned mosque gave him an 'uneasy feeling' and that 'immigration of Muslims has created a breach in our German, European culture'.[21] Previous dialogue with the Lutheran church also seems to have been jeopardised after the Lutherans rejected a request for a joint commission to discuss faith differences. A position paper for the EKD (the umbrella body for twenty-three Lutheran churches in Germany) seemed to suggest a strengthening of the barriers between Islam and Christianity with the implication that, at a community level, dialogue should be restricted.[22]

Yet, in Germany, at a local level, many are attempting to challenge these trends. In Cologne, for instance, despite the archbishop's stance, many ordinary Roman Catholic clergymen have supported the mosque application. Andreas Renz, in charge of interfaith dialogue at the Catholic Archdiocese of Munich, says that small fundamentalist groups are exerting a disproportionate influence 'with letters to newspapers, with telephone calls to the archdiocese and with their activities at public meetings.' Renz stresses the fact that these groups are unrepresentative of Catholic and the Lutheran-reformed churches as a whole, and that they undermine positive inter-religious dialogue at the grassroots. Nevertheless, they represent a broad spectrum which stretches from the far Right to the very centre of society.[23]

In Austria, too, some Christian figures have failed to show a generous spirit in the face of attempts to integrate Islam. Egon Kapellari, Bishop of Graz, declared in August 2007 that, 'As long as Christians have to

hide themselves in Islamic countries, Muslims should not build mosques which dominate towns' skylines in countries like ours'. He spoke at a time when the Freedom Party and the Alliance for the Future of Austria were mobilising for a nationwide ban on mosques and minarets, and would not have been unaware of the hostile climate in which he was speaking. Around the same time he made his comments, extreme-Right leader Jörg Haider stated, 'We certainly prefer the chiming of church bells to the call of the Muezzin' . Even more alarmingly, Erwin Pröll, conservative Austrian People's Party governor of Lower Austria, declared that 'Minarets are something artfremd (strange) and things which are artfremd do not do a culture any good in the long run.'[24]

In France and the Netherlands, it is the extreme Right that has launched crusades to protect Christian identity. France's five million Muslims have only 1,500 mosques or prayer houses, most of which are small, modest halls, often described as 'basement mosques'. But the Front National and other extremists have launched a legal challenge to block the construction of mosques in Marseille, Montreuil (a suburban town east of Paris) and Creteil (also a Paris suburb). Bans on the headscarf should, they argue, be extended to mosques and minarets. In the Netherlands, extreme-Right politician Geert Wilders has called for the Qur'an to be banned on the basis that it is the equivalent of Mein Kampf and 'Islam is more a violent political ideology than a religion'.[25]

But linking Islam to terrorism is not solely the preserve of the extreme Right. Far too often, it is mainstream politicians who do so and help in this to shape government anti-terrorist policy. This gives succour to the extreme Right which seeks to manipulate fears over Muslims, religious clothing, symbols and places of worship for electoral advantage, projecting itself as the champions of a marginalised European Christian heritage. The tragedy is that this manipulation of fear, insecurity and prejudice takes place at a time when Muslims are, after years of marginalisation, seeking to build a religious infrastructure capable of meeting their daily needs. There are some 1,200 institutions used as mosques in Germany but only 159 of these are recognisable from the outside as mosques (the others are normally rooms in buildings used for other purposes).[26] Are Muslims only welcome if they are not visible?', asked Belal El-Mogaddedi, a board member of the German Muslim League, adding that 'The mosque is an expression of visibility. The root cause of the rejection of the mosque is a rejection of visible Muslim life.'

It is this burgeoning visibility that German participants identified as at the root of citizens' campaigns (sometimes backed by neo-Nazis) in Berlin, Frankfurt, Cologne, against the construction of mosques and minarets. It was necessary, they argued, not just to oppose the racism inherent in many of these campaigns, but also to engage in long-term initiatives aimed at dispelling the fears of the ordinary citizen. The validity of this point was recognised by Zakaria Hamidi, programme manager of De Nieuwe Horizon (The New Horizon) in Rotterdam. While 'there is fear of Islam, fear of the visibility of Muslims, and also pure racism … we must deal with all these things separately', he told us. 'In terms of fear, Muslims must recognise that it is legitimate to be afraid and we must spend time explaining to ordinary people about Islam… The fact that people vote for Wilders is a signal of fear and we have to deal with this also.' Many initiatives have sprung up in Germany with this focus. The Day of the Open Mosque initiated by the Muslim Council of Germany involves special programmes and lectures in mosques on the public holiday celebrating reunification. This has been a great success (in Saxony it was selected by the local government as an exemplary social project), as has the House of Religions Project which brings people of all faiths together to discuss common perspectives as well as create special programmes for schools. 'The ordinary Muslim is not in Germany to cause conflict', observed Belal El-Mogaddedi. 'It is only the stubbornness of certain politicians and in some religious quarters that is causing problems. If they keep on rejecting any visible sign of Muslim life, they are creating conflict. If you open up, you experience openness. But if you reject, you experience rejection.'

References

1. My understanding of the limitations inherent within European secularist models draws heavily on the ideas of Kathleen Cavanaugh, 'Islam and the European Project' in Muslim World Journal of Human Rights (Vol. 4, no. 1).
2. It was desecrated even before it opened.
3. But whether the French actually fully practise laïcité is a moot point. The Law of Separation (1905) led to the expropriation of religious property by the state – a move the churches refused to accept. This led to a compromise whereby the state agreed to pay for the maintenance of all religious property built before 1905 and allows churches (and synagogues) to use them. This means that today the government subsidises the Catholic religion far more than other religions. And as Islamic mosques did not exist in 1905, they are not subsidised. Another anomaly allows for the exemption of the eastern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which were under German control at the

time of the 1905 Law. These provinces kept the 1801 concordat system which allows clergy to receive government salaries (the system has not been extended to imams). France explains this as an exceptional historical anomaly that does not undermine the general principle of laïcité.

4. There are claims, though, that it is unrepresentative of all Austria's Muslims, particularly the Shiite and Alevi.
5. Mayanthi Fernando, a doctoral candidate in anthropology at the University of Chicago explains this in 'The Republic's "Second Religion": recognizing Islam in France' in MERIP (Vol 35, no. 2, 2005).
6. Ibid.
7. This accords with Mayanthi Fernando's observation that 'the state's contemporary management of Islam through the creation of the CFCM echoes older, colonial forms of governance. In Algeria, for example, the French colonial administration centralized and bureaucratised the indigenous Islamic justice system, bringing previously autonomous judges (qadis) and legal scholars (ulema) under the purview of the State.'
8. 'No integration?!' <www.goethe.de/ges/pok/prj/nac/ref/sch/enindex.htm>
9. See Liz Fekete, 'Enlightened fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the right' in Race & Class (Vol 48, no. 2, 2006).
10. The principles of laïcité have not prevented the state from subsidising private, religious-backed Catholic and Jewish schools. One in six French schoolchildren attend the 8,500 state-subsidised Catholic schools. There are only three Islamic schools in the whole of France.
11. The country's anti-discriminatory body has challenged schools to change their guidelines as the 2004 law only concerned students, and to extend it to Muslim mothers was a form of 'discrimination on religious grounds'. Collectif contre Islamophobie en France, 'Communiqué Concernant les mamans voilées exclues des activités scolaires' (10 June 2006).
12. According to Dominic McGoldrick, in some Muslim areas Catholic schools have up to 70 per cent Muslim pupils on the school roll. Dominic McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic headscarf debate in Europe (Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2006).
13. See John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves, op.cit
14. See Liz Fekete. 'Enlightened Fundamentalism? Immigration, feminism and the Right', Race & Class, op.cit.
15. Der Standard (4 September 2007).
16. For a full analysis of the impact of Straw's intervention see Gholam Khiabany and Milly Williamson, 'Veiled bodies – naked racism: culture, politics and race in the Sun' in Race & Class (forthcoming).
17. Prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen spoke on the theme of religion and politics in his traditional Constitutional Day Speech in June 2007. See Migration News Sheet (July 2007).
18. See also Emma Tarlo, 'Hidden Features of the Face Veil Controversy' in ISIM Review (Spring 2007).
19. A. Sivanandan, 'The patriot game', a working paper for the Institute of Race Relations (2004).
20. Deutsche Welle (25 June 2006).
21. For the full details of the Cologne anti-mosque campaign and the Archbishop's comments see European Race Bulletin (no. 62, Winter 2008).
22. There has been much speculation as to why the Lutheran church has taken this stance. It could be the growing influence of Christian fundamentalism within the Evangelical Alliance, an umbrella organisation for 1.3 million evangelical Christians, or it could be the influence of Udo Ulfkotte, head of the Christian movement Pax Europa. A former editor of the Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung, he is regarded also as a media expert on security, intelligence and Islamic extremism.
23. See Claudia Mende, 'Anti-Islamic movements in Germany: "Islamophobic – and proud of it"', The American Muslim (5 October 2007).
24. See European Race Bulletin (no. 62, Winter 2008).
25. Ibid.
26. Figures quoted in Deutsche Welle (13 October 2007).

5
Facing the barriers

Selective research, media sensationalism and irresponsible politicians all contribute to an Islamophobia which goes on to misdiagnose the real barriers to integration. In this concluding section, we attempt to come to a clearer reckoning of the main factors (compounded by that Islamophobia), which, for our participants, militate against and for 'integration'.

First, there are undoubtedly external, structural factors which loom large in the life chances of Europe's Muslim communities:[1] economic restructuring has decimated the manufacturing sector into which migrants were originally absorbed; racial discrimination in the labour market is rife and is now compounded by a religious prejudice which is applied to those who are visibly Muslim; anti-discrimination laws are weak and not stringently applied.

Second, it appears that young people are keened not just to the social and economic discrimination against their parents but also to the more recent, popular Islamophobia born out of 9/11 and the War on Terror. Some, as our participants reveal, are internalising society's Islamophobia, with potentially profound psychological consequences. As external barriers to integration compound internalised feelings of failure, schools and educational programmes prove unable to address the specific needs of young Muslim children.

And what of factors internal to a community that may militate against 'integration'? There are minorities within some Muslim communities that have held on to attitudes and practices (especially towards children and women) which seriously hinder integration. And old-style leaders within such communities, sometimes supported by state funding and patronage, have contributed to a situation in which the desire for change amongst a younger generation can be stifled. But participants have also described the processes already under way that show how internal barriers to integration can be dismantled by forces within the

community. The polarisation that has taken place over the last ten years and alienated some sections of the young has simultaneously galvanised others. Never has Muslim participation in the political process and civil society been higher. And there, across issues, that unite communities and groups, a true, organic interracial cohesion is being created.

We examine below the way that participants characterised the barriers against Muslim integration and the possibilities they saw for change and progress.

Class and economic restructuring

The problems of the most disadvantaged Muslim communities in Europe are no different, our participants constantly reminded us, from those of other minority ethnic groups, or, indeed, from those of the marginalised white working class. 'The issues that Muslims face relate to everyone … to poor people who are discriminated against in housing, employment, justice, etc', commented Pierre Didier of the Movement of Immigration and the Banlieues (MIB). It is these material issues that need to be addressed if social cohesion and social integration are to improve. 'What is seen as a Muslim issue is often a class issue', echoed Shoaib Sultan of the Islamic Council of Norway but, he went on, 'if you talk about class in Norway, people think you are a Communist!'

The truth is that rapid economic change and the introduction of flexible production and labour regimes to meet the needs of a deregulated market have radically changed traditional working-class employment patterns. Muslims, over-represented in those parts of the European labour market most severely affected by restructuring and industrial decline, are victims of trends beyond their control. Sociologists Stephen Castles, Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Peo Hansen have shown that, prior to the decline in manufacturing industries, immigrants actually enjoyed a higher rate of employment than national majorities.[2] That their rate of participation in the labour force has declined is due not only to their previous over-representation in manufacturing and other sectors hit by restructuring, but also to their weaker bargaining power, which made them vulnerable to discrimination and mass dismissals. To put it another way, it was governments' failure to protect immigrant communities from racial discrimination in the labour market that led to disproportionate

levels of unemployment, which were then blamed on cultural deficit within the affected communities (most notably Muslim ones). In fact, it was only from the 1990s onwards that minority ethnic populations began to be officially classified on the basis of religion, having been previously categorised according to language or region of origin. Now, a singular religious identity is presumed to override all other distinctions and affiliations.

The impact of globalisation also led to a reduction in a state's power to protect its labour force from the impact of the market economy. Impotent to deal with many rising economic inequalities, policy-makers moved from attempting to tackle poverty and inequality to managing the fragmentation of communities via strategies to promote social cohesion and social connectedness. This has been mirrored by a shift in government funding for research. Projects focusing on inequality and class stratification do not enjoy the levels of support they once did.[3] 'Equal pay is not even discussed in Norway', commented writer and political scientist Nina Dessau. 'You have an extraordinary amount of studies about immigrants and crime, but very few studies about discrimination and unemployment.'

Racial discrimination in employment

Throughout, this report has argued that the public discussion on integration suffers from an almost wilful blindness to the historical record. So too does the discussion on employment, equal pay and the labour market, which suggests that Europe has a grand track record of combating discrimination. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact 'underdeveloped' is the most accurate way of describing Europe's anti-discrimination legislation – many countries only introduced such legislation after 2000 and then as a result of pressure from the EU. In Germany, France and Austria, in particular, anti-discrimination measures are still alarmingly weak.

In every country we visited, participants highlighted the high levels of discrimination in the labour market as one of the most significant barriers to integration. Yet this is a subject barely touched upon in the current top-down integration debate. In France, the absence of appropriate legal anti-discriminatory measures is perhaps not so surprising given the official delusion that in the 'indivisible Republic' all citizens are equally French. As there are no ethnic minorities, it stands to reason there is no racial discrimination either. And as it is illegal to collect statistics on ethnicity or race in France, research on ethnic or racial discrimination is virtually non-existent. The anti-discrimination bodies that do exist (introduced to meet EU requirements), such as Le Haut Comité à l'Intégration and Le Haute Autorité de Lutte Contre les Discriminations et pour l'Egalité (HALDE), were regarded by participants as toothless bodies with no powers of sanction. Furthermore, the government was seen as lacking the political will to fight discrimination.

In the UK and the Netherlands, with their more pluralist approach to integration, anti-discrimination law has a longer history. The first Race Relations Act was introduced in the UK in 1965 and the Equal Treatment Act, which forbids discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity or religion, was introduced in the Netherlands in 1994. Nevertheless, even in the Netherlands and the UK discrimination against Muslims has become more socially acceptable post-September 11.[4]

* * *

But in Norway, France, Germany and Austria, government inertia is being challenged. Ironically, it is voluntary sector organisations that bring together people from all cultural and religious backgrounds, that, in exemplary models of community cohesion, are fighting racial discrimination. Norwegian campaigners from the Organisation Against Public Discrimination (OMOD), formed in 1993 to counter discrimination in the public services, have been the most successful in the aforementioned countries in bringing about change. Norway was the first country in the world to introduce laws against gender discrimination, but it was only in 2006 that the office of the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombudsman extended its brief to include discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, national origin, ancestry, skin colour, language, religious and ethical orientation. Nevertheless, there are still high levels of discrimination against non-white people in Norway, and the Muslim community suffers from disproportionate levels of unemployment.[5] Both the Anti-Racist Center and OMOD work to counter discrimination in employment, particularly within the public services where the attitude is, increasingly, that some jobs are not suitable for immigrants (read Muslims). The director of a hospital in Elverum, for instance, refused to

appoint a Muslim doctor as the head of the maternity and gynaecology ward on the grounds that this specific ward should not be headed by a Muslim, and that he was neither Norwegian nor Nordic.[6] Furthermore, the statutory Manpower Services agency frequently receives requests from employers for white workers only.[7] And although the police have finally developed a system for recording hate crimes, rank and file police officers have not been given training on how to combat racist crimes.

In Germany, Austria and France, campaigners have to complement government initiatives. Groups like the ADNB of the Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg and ZARA in Austria provide support to the victims of discrimination that governments fail to provide. In Germany, where the government only incorporated EU directives against discrimination into national law in 2006,[8] it has been left to groups like the ADNB to train lawyers for racial discrimination cases. In France, too, community groups have set the lead by campaigning for ethnic monitoring and race-based studies as a basis for countering the formidable racial discrimination against those who live on run-down ethnically mixed housing estates.[9] DiverCités is a collection of associations from the neighbourhoods of Lyon which provides training and advice against discrimination, particularly in schooling, prison and law enforcement. The Movement of Immigration and the Banlieues (MIB) carries out similar work in the field of policing.

New impact of religious discrimination

Indeed, in all countries Muslims may come to find themselves particularly disadvantaged in the labour market, as religious discrimination, sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, is added to existing entrenched racial discrimination. (In fact, where Muslims are concerned, it seems that 'race' is increasingly collapsed into religion, just as Judaism became a racial category in 1930s Europe.) Viennese Green politician Alev Korun sees a parallel between prejudice based on skin colour and prejudice based on religion in Austria where in employment 'the hijab is now almost the equivalent of a dark skin colour'. According to Samy Debah, of the Collective Against Islamophobia, 'nobody in France would openly say "I won't hire you because you're a woman or you're black" but they would say, "I won't hire you because you wear the headscarf."' In Norway, too, there have been a number of cases involving discrimination against women wearing the hijab at work, which have been referred to the Ombudsman.[10]

Religious discrimination against Muslim women is not an issue confined to countries with official state bans on the headscarf, but in all countries the debate about the veil appears to have a negative effect on Muslim women's employment opportunities.(Bearded Muslim men can also be similarly affected.) In the Netherlands, young Muslim schoolgirls, we were told, now find it far more difficult to obtain training opportunities if they wear a headscarf. For headscarf-wearing women with higher educational qualifications, the private sector is a no-go area, which leaves better educated women with only the prospect of employment in the public services. But even there, it would seem, wearing the headscarf means women collide with an unofficial glass ceiling, since the attitude prevails that women must not be obviously Muslim. Some local authorities, for instance, do not allow Muslim women employees who wear the headscarf to take part in public functions. There is much anecdotal evidence which calls out for future in-depth research on the impact of laws prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf on Muslim women's employment and educational opportunities in Europe.[11] If governments limit the right of Muslim women to integrate in the labour market, they should not be surprised if extremist Islamist organisations then politicise the issue of the veil.

Religious discrimination is not confined to the headscarf. As we have already noted, the 'loyalty discourse' that has arisen out of attempts to limit dual nationality, is lowering the confidence of Muslims employed in the police force, the army and other public services. The concerns raised by the Dutch trades union CNV Education, that those with dual nationality are now considered unsuitable for all sorts of jobs because of presumed divided loyalties, need to be thoroughly investigated. Meanwhile, in Norway, where the police are trying to recruit more police officers from minority backgrounds, a survey into the attitudes of senior police officers found that they do not trust minorities and doubt their loyalty.[12]

Alienation of the young and internalised Islamophobia

Immigrant communities have always put a high premium on education as a way out of the problems associated with economic marginalisation and social exclusion. Muslims are no different. But when the majority society's perception of Muslims as alien and ineradicably different penetrate an individual's sense of identity, this can create serious emotional problems. While some Muslims may over-compensate to prove their assimilation, others, particularly the young, may disengage completely. They can develop a certain sense of hopelessness 'leading to a kind of counter-culture, a refusal to participate, on the basis of "I don't want what I can't get"'. Bradford higher education student, Jawad Ahmed, described the psychological impact since the US and London bombings. 'It's like a rope around your neck … you can't breathe.'

Throughout, this report has highlighted the long-term impact of the failure of educational systems to adapt to post-war multicultural realities, leading to educational underachievement amongst successive generations from an immigrant background. Many participants, particularly those who work in the educational field and are passionately committed to young people, felt strongly that the current integration debate was setting back any progress that had been made. It was hindering Muslim children's ability to develop normally. 'A child is never seen as just "Aisha or "Mustafa", never seen as just a child, but always as a member of group', commented Dutch senior educational consultant Dolf Hautvast. Employers are influenced by scare scenarios about Muslims and think twice before providing a young Muslim with training or employment opportunities. In the UK, government research published in 2006 showed that the proportion of Bangladeshi and Pakistani 18-year-olds in England and Wales who were not in work, education or training had more than doubled in two years.[13]

The current debate may skew education perspectives and policies too. 'There is no culture of integration in schools. The emphasis is on assimilation, changing identity, the morality and the values of the children', says Norwegian psychologist Sunil Loona. While 'this is not productive of an education that stimulates children' he warns, the end result could be the complete alienation of young people from an immigrant background. 'They do not identify with majority society. Although born here, they identify themselves as foreigners.' Similar points have been made by German academics who found that the descendants of Turkish migrants tended to be stereotyped in the classroom and, on the basis of the teacher's distorted understanding of the child's ethnic difference, disproportionately selected to be sent to special schools for children with learning and behavioural difficulties where predictably they failed to obtain the school leaving certificate necessary to enter the labour market.[14]

Young people responded by reaffirming a religious identity and turning society's view of themselves into a badge of difference. 'It's a kind of identity politics – a defensive response and I don't know how far it will go', commented Sunil Loona. In Birmingham, Azkar Mohammed, who works for the educational mentoring scheme Pioneers Leading the Way (which addresses the underachievement of Pakistani and Bangladeshi children), had similar concerns. 'The children we mentor live in areas of social deprivation with huge levels of unemployment and have multiple problems, including a lack of self-esteem. If you are constantly told that you are from a failing community which is also potentially dangerous of course this will have an effect. If you come from an area of social deprivation, the only thing you have is your pride. You become defensive of the only thing you have ownership of – your religion.'

Participants felt that young people's sense that they did not belong was reinforced by the lack of recognition in debates on national identity of the huge contribution immigration has made to Europe. Participants like Birmingham Respect councillor Salma Yaqoob felt that through the establishment of an inclusive school curriculum, and through placing a high premium on educational resources that teach the history of their contribution it would be possible to promote 'a positive educational approach – rather than one based on "you guys don't fit in"'. 'If I'd known a bit more about our history in this country this would have helped me to deal with feelings of alienation', she told us. One way in which Pioneers Leading the Way counters strong feelings of alienation amongst the Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils it mentors is by teaching them about the anti-racist history of the UK – by showing them that was happening to Muslims today had happened to other communities before.

In the Netherlands and the UK, where there is an acceptance of cultural diversity, educational resources are available and many schools have set a lead in excellence. Still, much needs to be done as acknowledged by Fenna Ulichki, who is engaged in a documentary project to illustrate the history of women in labour migration to the Netherlands.[15] In the UK, Sir Keith Ajegbo, in a report commissioned by the government in the wake of the July 7 bombings, has called for an improvement in the way that citizenship and diversity is taught in schools, arguing that more could be done to ensure children 'explore, discuss and debate their identities'.[16] As a result, a new element on 'Identity and diversity: living together in the UK' has been introduced into the Citizenship Curriculum.

* * *

Countries with a more monocultural outlook face a longer journey in modernising the school curriculum to incorporate the immigrant contribution. In France, groups like the National Social Forum of the Banlieues (NSFB) are attempting to preserve the 'wealth of stories and traditions of political and social commitment' that emanate from the banlieues through the construction of a 'cultural collective narrative drawn from the experience, stories and memories of our neighbourhoods'.[17] NSFB points out that the anti-racist struggle of the Beurs' movement, which, in the 1980s, organised the huge March for Equality, has been airbrushed out of the political record in favour of a sanitised Republican version of anti-racism as exemplified by SOS Racisme (an anti-racist organisation linked to the Socialist Party) and its slogan 'touche pas à mon pote'.

Ironically, the introduction of an inclusive curriculum that teaches the history of immigration would lead to precisely the strategies needed to educate against all forms of prejudice and discrimination, including anti- Semitism. Yet in Germany and France, it is not the government but the grassroots that has developed the most innovative approaches. The public discussion of 'the new anti-Semitism', which, on occasions, stigmatises Muslim communities as the carriers of prejudice, obscures the fact that anti-Semitism is a problem for the whole of German society, argues Florencio Chicote of the ADNB. What one needs, therefore, in order to address anti-Semitism in its entirety are targeted resources and strategies – some directed at white German youth attracted to general anti-Semitic ideology and some at those Muslim youth who fall prey to anti-Semitism, partly due to a failure to identify with the experiences of other minority ethnic groups and partly due to their reading of events in the Middle East. 'What we attempt to do in our educational work', Chicote told us, 'is to develop pedagogical approaches capable of changing perspectives and creating empathy for different types of discrimination'. Other participants drew our attention to groups such as Theater Grenzenlos (Theatre Without Borders) which works with young Muslims in Berlin on drama projects aimed at showing the links between Islamophobia and xenophobia and helping young people from difficult social backgrounds express their feelings and problems in a constructive way. Its play 'Intifada in the classroom' was regarded as a model of integration and shown across Berlin, winning the support of the Berlin Senate. Several young actors from a Muslim background stated that, prior to the project, they never had German friends, but this changed via their interaction through drama.[18]

In France, too, many Jewish and Muslim leaders are rejecting the polarisation that comes from the current debate on anti-Semitism. The Jewish-Arabic and Citizens' Group for Peace, which was formed in Strasbourg, has worked with young Muslim youth who, through their identification with the Palestinian cause, confuse 'Jews' with Israel. New pedagogical approaches aimed at stopping young Muslims using Jews as an outlet for fears and social frustrations have been developed. There is a strong focus on creating more of a support network for these youths, for example through better integration into the labour market or in community associations.[19]

Internal attitudes and practices

Throughout this report, we have sought to counter the prevailing idea that Muslim culture and religion are the primary forces preventing integration. However, there are obviously factors internal to some Muslim groups or sub-groups that can hinder full social participation and may even be outside the law (particularly in relation to treatment of women and children). All our participants were eager to talk about such internal barriers. But, in doing so, they felt a strong need to discuss problems in ways that were constructive and did not heap further opprobrium on communities already under siege. 'A social atmosphere where you are attacked as a group and stigmatised in your religion is not conducive to self-criticism', said Alev Korun. But it is precisely because

such self-criticism is vital that it needs to take place in an environment free from racial, cultural and religious prejudice.

Internal barriers to integration are usually strongest within certain sub groups of particular national communities, originally from rural areas, where society may be based on clan structures, where conservative, traditional and patriarchal values are strong and where formal education and literacy levels are weak. Sub-sects within Islam which have a more feudalist (or orthodox) approach, and in which adherents fear a loss of religious identity through intermarriage can also present internal barriers. (Such sub-groups exist in all religions – Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish.) In the normal course of events traditional, patriarchal attitudes (often justified in the name of religion) loosen over time, as second and third generations progress educationally, integrate into the labour market and become socially mobile. But what seems to be happening now is that the gradual process of integration via education is failing. Those who cannot overcome the external barriers imposed through poor educational policies, a minority within a minority, are left behind and retreat further into tradition and orthodoxy. Here, a conservative male leadership puts a brake on mobility and change by enforcing traditional clan structures based on value systems that prioritise 'honour' and 'loyalty'.[20]

In traditional areas of immigrant settlement there is a rise in structured, long-term male unemployment and the entrenchment of poverty. Although levels of inequality and poverty vary across Europe, it is in precisely those areas where the poverty gap is growing most rapidly and where unemployment and related social problems are high (family breakdown, alcohol and drug abuse, crime, domestic violence, and so on) that cultural insularity, reactionary traditionalism, retreat into religious sub-sects, and patriarchal attitudes are at their highest.

* * *

Such social conditions are of course experienced by all those living in poverty – BME or majority population. While the destruction of the cultural richness of white working-class lives through the decline in manufacturing may not have strengthened patriarchal attitudes through a retreat into a fundamentalist version of Christianity, some working-class people have, in the absence of progressive political leadership and the decline of trades unions, been left open to the racist, sexist and homophobic attitudes of white supremacist groups and neo-Nazis. Integration measures should not just be addressed to BME communities but also to the disenfranchised working class as a whole which has been left behind by change.

The development of locally based strategies to confront the human rights abuses inherent in forced marriages, honour crimes, and violence against women and children is vital. But, critically, such strategies must involve a combination of approaches – in which prosecution is just one. There needs to be partnership with community organisations, particularly those women's groups with a wide community reach that are already struggling to eradicate the reactionary aspects of tradition within their own communities. In the northern UK town of Bradford, for instance, it has been suggested that there is a trend for some young Asians (whose families came from particular rural areas) to choose partners from abroad.[21] It is here and in parts of the country with similar sub-groups and social conditions, where the greatest concerns about forced marriages have been aired But the debate is stymied by politicians when they reach for solutions based on curtailing the right of all Muslim men to marry a partner from abroad.

In Germany, Yasemin Karakaşoğlu and Sakine Subasi have conducted research highlighting initiatives around forced marriage across Europe based on approaches other than the sensational and spectacular ones favoured in the media.[22] The German government is now considering whether to open up a new programme of research on this issue. But in other countries, for example Norway where the Human Rights Service dominates the debate and has the ear of politicians, our participants were less hopeful that an era of more enlightened practice was on the way.

Muslim leadership and funding policies

Another internal barrier identified by some participants was poor community leadership. An older generation, with antennae in the 'home country', has had too firm a grip on local politics, obstructing attempts by a younger generation and women to come forward and take up leadership positions. But the institutional arrangements favoured by

European national and local politicians – paternalism and clientelism, rather than dialogue and genuine partnership – have played no small part.

There seem to be two issues in play – one relating to the religious, and the other to the political, sphere. We have already outlined criticisms of the French and German governments' attempts to create official bodies to liaise between government and organised Islam. An added criticism made of the French government is that, through its promotion of the CFCM, it has overlooked the 'unresolved generational gap' that divides the Muslim community and that French-born Muslims are more likely to embody a truly French Islam. The French Collective of Muslims states that the CFCM, far from embodying an Islam of France, is unrepresentative of the millions of French citizens of Muslim faith whose cultural affinities lie within France rather than North Africa or Turkey. The CFCM is seen as unconcerned about the needs of young French Muslims, who are less interested in waging proxy battles between 'home countries' and more interested in constructing a viable way of life as fully Muslim and fully French.[23]

The truth of the matter is that internal change in religious matters cannot be imposed from without, but must come from within. States can appeal and cajole, they can create spaces and forums for new voices to be heard. But when they attempt to legislate for religious change through the back door, say via anti-terrorist measures, this is bound to provoke a counter-productive reaction. It is true that when imams preach solely in Arabic, Mirpuri, Bengali and so on, then the younger members of the congregation whose language is now English, Norwegian, French, German, etc, may feel alienated. But it is also true that when governments demand, via legislation and in the name of national security, that imams preach in European languages, younger generations will close ranks with their elders, fearing that they will contribute to the greater stigmatisation of their religion if they, too, are openly critical. Alyas Karmani, an imam who preaches in English, told us that the mosque leadership is failing to locate Islam within a British context. While the younger generation has been stifled by the older generation, 'the current debate that brands them and their religion as extremist' stifles them in a different way. An interesting exchange between two Somali community leaders in Leicester occurred on the language issue. Abdurahman Gulad of the Somali Media Services told us that the national security climate was leading to 'fear' amongst imams. 'They want the imams to speak in English, so that they can monitor what they say', he said. But Abdulali Sudi of KAL-KAL (Supporting People) felt 'there was a 'positive side. If everyone speaks English, everyone will understand.'

In Germany, the ability to bring about internal change within the mosque leadership is frustrated by a climate of overt hostility towards any visible sign of Islamic religious expression, with local authorities thwarting attempts to construct mosques. Cultural anthropologist Nina Mühe works with Inssan, a Muslim organisation which was originally set up by young Muslims in Berlin from different national backgrounds who wanted to form a new kind of mosque and cultural centre where German would be used and a new kind of German Muslim identity forged. But Inssan's attempts to create such an exciting project aroused the suspicion of the town city planner (also the Christian Democrat mayor for the Neukölln district of Berlin) who accused Inssan of associating with radical terror groups and tried to block the planning permission for the mosque.[24]

Poor political leadership, both from established BME organisations and elected representatives, was also identified as a problem by French and English participants. In France, where there has been little parliamentary support for the campaigns of young people in poor neighbourhoods, the strong hostility towards communautarisme[25] militates against non-white politicians identifying themselves too closely with 'Muslim' or 'black' issues. The poor of the banlieues have 'always been left alone' when it comes to 'fighting for social issues', Pierre Didier of MIB told us, adding that, in the past, politicians and intellectuals have only 'exploited and hijacked' social struggles. As a result, the 'political autonomy' of the banlieues was considered vital, although Didier emphasised that 'self-organisation' in no way implied a separatist agenda. The Social Forum of the Banlieues has also stated that the only way to avoid the political manipulations of the past is through self-organisation.

In the UK, the retreat into culture and religion followed a vibrant civil rights and anti-racist struggle from the 1960s to the 1980s. After the Scarman report into the 1981 Brixton 'riots' (the worst race-related disturbances mainland Britain had seen), a strong and united inter-ethnic community leadership broke down. This has been

linked by IRR director A. Sivanandan to Lord Scarman's finding that 'racial disadvantage' not institutional racism was the main cause of the disturbances.[26] Acting upon the idea that the people were disadvantaged, in part by their own communities, a new funding strategy was introduced nationally and locally to redress ethnic needs and problems. Racial problems were being given cultural solutions. Such policies then furthered the ambitions of a tranche of 'ethnic' community leaders, who did not always act in the best interests of the entire community. For decades, this stultification of community leadership went unchecked. But, after the £25m. damage caused in the 2001 disturbances, policy-makers suddenly woke up to the fact that, in certain parts of the UK, different ethnic communities were leading separated lives. Lord Herman Ouseley's investigation into the disturbances on behalf of Bradford Vision[27] (a strategic partnership of the public, private, voluntary and community sector) found that a 'doing deals culture' had taken root in the town hall, where the elected political leadership kowtowed to poor community leadership in the interests of keeping the peace. Furthermore, local authorities had contributed to community entrenchment by allowing social and economic programmes to develop along self-styled cultural and faith tracks, which fuelled a drift towards segregation.

Thus, the northern disturbances, as well as the bombings of 7 July 2005 by 'home-grown' British Muslim terrorists, provided an opportunity for the UK government to rethink funding strategies and reverse regressive trends. Following the investigations of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, the government has declared that funding should be redirected towards groups working across communities that promote integration and cohesion. Groups that represent single communities are seen as potentially self-segregating and ipso facto problematic.[28]
A scheme like Pioneers Leading the Way underfunded by local agencies (the official big mentoring and befriending networks are favoured, despite limitations in their community reach) has suffered from precisely this kind of thinking. This is an organisation that provides mentors for Pakistani and Bangladeshi children, aged 5-18, in thirty local schools, drawn from professionals who mostly give of their time and expertise voluntarily. 'We face a city council that does not want to engage with the community. And a community leadership that has been corrupted', concluded Azkar Mohammed.

Political participation is increasing

Despite these pressing problems, there seems to be something of a sea-change in the levels of social and political participation of Muslims in the countries studied. Muslims now play a greater role than before in the voluntary sector, professional employment bodies and trade unions, in parliament and local government and in student, anti-racist, civil rights and inter-ethnic movements. Paradoxically, though, these increased civic roles barely seem to register as indicators of positive integration. Perhaps this is because the motivations for participation in civil society cannot be easily reduced to official classifications, which tend to presume that a singular identity – religion – overrides all other facets. But the lives of Muslims, just like everyone else's, are multi-dimensional. They come from a range of social and economic backgrounds and a religious identification is only one of many identities which could motivate them to play a role in civil society and professional life. So that when people who happen to be Muslim identify with broader movements for social rights, they may well organise in ways that do not relate to their faith. One good example of this comes from Germany where over 100 immigrant organisations united in May 2007 to launch the Forum for Migrants, a sub-group within the Equal Welfare Alliance, an older and well-established body which works within the voluntary and social sector to promote the interests of the most marginalised and disadvantaged sectors of society. London Citizens and Birmingham Citizens (an alliance of active citizens and community leaders, including faith groups, community associations, trades unions etc) act on similar principles, with member groups emphasising not their particular route into the organisation but their shared commitment to justice, human dignity and self-respect.

An analysis of voting patterns and political involvement signifies the shift towards integration in the political arena. Evidence from some European countries shows that people of immigrant origin – and a large proportion would be Muslim – are turning out to vote in ever greater numbers and participating more in political parties. In the UK, the 'black vote' has been far more important to the mainstream political parties than it has been in continental Europe and Scandinavia. This is partly due to the fact that the immigrants from the former Commonwealth were not guest workers but citizens and, therefore, had the right to vote long before many immigrants in mainland Europe. However, it is also linked

to the electoral system in the UK, which unlike continental systems based on proportional representation, does not select its parliamentary representatives after a general election and on the basis of the candidate's position on a party list. On the contrary, MPs have to fight for the vote of each and every member of a local constituency, and this means that the minority vote, though marginal, is still important (it could, for instance, provide the 'swing' that elects or ousts an MP). This is one of the reasons why there are more non-white MPs in the UK than in other European countries.

But there is evidence of significant change in several other European countries. Since 2006, at parliamentary and local government level, there has been a significant increase in minority ethnic representation in the Netherlands, partly due to minority ethnic involvement in the small, but growing, Socialist Party (SP) since 2001 and partly due to the fact that more candidates from Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds have progressed through the ranks of the Labour party (PvdA). In fact, PvdA gains in the May 2006 local elections and November 2006 general election were attributed to the record turnout by voters of non-European origin who voted against the governing coalition on account of its policies on immigration, Islam and integration. Sadet Karabulut (of Turkish origin) and Fenna Ulichki (of Moroccan origin), whom we interviewed for this research, both benefited from these shifts in voting patterns in the Netherlands. As did Nadeem Butt in Norway. Butt, having progressed through the ranks of the Labour Party, is now the first mayor (of an Oslo suburb) of Asian origin.

In France, where all five of parliament's non-white MPs represent Overseas Departments, more minority candidates than ever before stood for political parties in the April 2007 general election.[29] There was also a massive surge in minority voter registration – as thousands of small, vocal political action groups representing Africans, Arabs and young people were formed across the country, challenging the political monopolies held by unions and other organisations.[30] One positive result of this grassroots surge is that the taboo on ethnic monitoring has been broken. Groups linked the lack of ethnic monitoring to the fact that nothing had been done to stop racial discrimination, despite the fact that the 2005 disturbances were the worst 'riots' in France in nearly forty years.

All the evidence suggests that, despite the limitations of the French Republican model, young Muslims strongly identify as French. Young people tend to highlight not their Muslim identity but the fact that they are French citizens of Arab or North African origin. French young people of North African or Arab origin seem to identify with the universalism of the Republican model while opposing its hostility to cultural difference. Ironically, the banlieues, despite long-term social and economic neglect, are sites of inter-cultural interaction where the retreat into culture and religion is less pronounced than in certain parts of the UK. In some respects, the banlieues parallel the inner cities of the UK of the 1960s and 1970s, where the inhabitants – Asian and African-Caribbean – came together as a people and a class and where the term 'Black' was used as a unifying statement of political affiliation.[31] Naima Bouteldja explained that 'Within the suburbs, a significant proportion of the population are white working class, African, Arabs, and they all face the same stigmatisation because they come from poor neighbourhoods.' 'The banlieue is, despite everything, mixed. Eighty per cent of these kids go to the local state school where they mix with each other. So, in France, there is mixité.'

Many participants feared that positive gains were being undermined because of double standards in public life. There was a higher expectation of Muslim political leaders and demands were made of Muslim political and religious bodies that were simply not being made of other religious groups. Khalid Salimi, director of the Norwegian inter-cultural organisation Horisont believes that: 'When it comes to gender rights, no reservations are made about women's right to equality. But when it comes to non-white people, we are told we have to be integrated before we can be allowed equal rights.'

The media, too, tend to set special tests for Muslim leaders. Of course it is right that the media investigate malpractice in religious and ethnic organisations, but it is equally important that investigations are proportionate and impartial. But when media commentators not only assume that Muslim politicians come from a single, homogenous, backward culture, but also make continual demands on spokespersons to prove their 'enlightenment values' and 'integration' by constantly denouncing the wayward members of their own community, this puts them under a great deal of pressure. Salma Yaqoob told us that she feels as though she were 'living in a goldfish bowl. I always feel that I

must perform, be an ambassador for the Muslim community. It's quite draining.' Abdul Razak Osman, Labour councillor in Leicester, said the climate had made him cautious about 'whom I speak to and what I say, as you never know who is recording you'. Because of the emphasis on 'loyalty' and 'patriotism', politicians of immigrant origin are constantly being asked to prove their adherence to the nation; to the extent that, as Dutch trades unionist Charlotte van Baaren put it, Turkish politicians 'are scared to speak up and are being silenced'.

Greater involvement in civil society and inter ethnic campaigning

When Muslim youth are discussed, too often the emphasis is on Islamic fundamentalism and the danger of radicalisation in a population which is presumed to be fundamentalist inclined. But our evidence suggests that, since the anti-Iraq war mobilisation, there has been a significant increase in young Muslims' involvement in anti-racist and civil rights movements. As Salma Yaqoob has cogently argued, 'the dominant character of Muslim radicalisation in Britain today points not towards terrorism or religious extremism, but in the opposite direction: towards political engagement in new, radical and progressive coalitions that seek to unite Muslim with non-Muslim in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strategies to effect change'.[32]

Anita Rathore of OMOD, which fights against discrimination in Norway, observes that more students from minority backgrounds are now in higher education and that this is reflected in the media, where more young people are voicing their opinions, rejecting assimilation and articulating specific minority views. There has been an impressive upsurge in civil rights activism among young Norwegian people. An incident in August 2007 when paramedics refused to treat Ali Farah, a 37-year-old Somalian-Norwegian, who had suffered serious injuries, including a fractured skull, on the grounds that he was incoherent and had wet his trousers, led to mass demonstrations in four Norwegian cities. The Dutch anti-racist movement has similarly been transformed by the participation of more and more people from an immigrant background who, according to Miriyam Aouragh, 'do not think in terms of going back to their own country but are integrated and think of themselves as Dutch-Moroccan, and so on'. Some of the most highly attended meetings on university campuses in recent years have been organised by Stop the Witchhunt and Together Against Racism. Indeed, Dutch participants gave the impression that they are living in a time of significant transition. 'The period of Hirsi Ali has reached its end. And we now hope that socio-economic issues can be discussed', concluded Amsterdam Groen Links councillor Fenna Ulichke. Even in Austria, where the Muslim community is numerically smaller and less confident, there have been impressive new initiatives amongst students and young people. The Kulturverein Kanafani, which publishes the journal Der Wisch, is a students' initiative bringing together Muslims and non-Muslims at the University of Vienna for intercultural dialogue. And Muslim Youth Austria has been active in public debates, stating quite clearly that for it integration is not an issue: 'we are integrated, and we don't want to go on talking about it forever', it says.

What all these positive initiatives suggest is that there is not a division between British, Austrian, French, German, Norwegian or Dutch Muslims and the so-called 'host' societies. The division today is between those who accept a civil rights framework for discussing integration and those who do not. The division is also between those who seek inter-cultural dialogue and inter-racial activities to establish a more just, more outward-looking society in which everyone can play a part, and those (across the political and religious spectrum) who hold on to outdated ideas of cultural purity and fear a modern Europe where the minority as well as the majority is given a voice.

References

1. Despite the difficulties of collecting comparable data across European countries which do not collect statistics by ethnicity and/or origin/descent on a systematic basis, there is obvious evidence that on many indices ethnic groups which are Muslim (eg people of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Netherlands, of Turkish background in Germany, of Pakistani and Bangladeshis descent in the UK, of Maghrebians in France etc) systematically fare far worse than their white counterparts. A few statistics are included below.

- Employment: In the Netherlands, 16 per cent of those of migrant descent were unemployed in 2005 as compared with 6.5 per cent of the total. (Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, Austria, EUMC, 2006). While 86 per cent of native Dutch were in permanent jobs, only 71 per cent of Turkish and 76 per cent of Moroccan workers were. (Migrants, minorities and employment in the

Netherlands, Dick Houtzager and Peter Rodrigues, Dutch Monitoring Centre, EUMC website 2002). In 2000, while 27 per cent of Dutch were in the lowest occupations, 46 per cent of Turks and 42 per cent of Moroccans were. 25 per cent of native Dutch were in the highest occupational groups as compared to 6 percent of Turks and 5 per cent of Moroccans. In Norway, in November 2006, while the unemployment rate for the whole population was 1.8 per cent, for immigrants it was 6.1 per cent and of those registered unemployed, 22 per cent were immigrants. (The Directorate of Labour) In Germany, the unemployment rate of 'foreigners' in 2004 was twice the general average of 10 per cent with Turkish residents having the highest rate. (EUMC,2006). A 2001 study found that 10.1 per cent of Turkish people felt discriminated against in the job market. In the 15-30 age group 0.5 per cent of Turkish residents were 'highly qualified workers' as compared with 5 per cent of Germans. (Migrants, minorities and employment in Germany, Elmar Hönekopp et al, EUMC website). In the UK, Muslims had the highest unemployment rate in 2004, 13 per cent for men and 18 per cent for women (EUMC, 2006). That year the Commission for Racial Equality revealed that while the unemployment rate for whites was 4.3 per cent it was 14.5 per cent for people of Bangladeshi descent and 12.9 per cent for those of Pakistani descent. Working age Bangladeshi and Pakistani women were four times more likely to be unemployed than white British women. (Moving on up? The way forward: report of the EOC's investigation into Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women and work, Equal Opportunities Commission, 2007. The hourly rate was £8.00 for white workers and £6.23 for Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers. (Commission for Racial Equality fact file 2, 2007, CRE website). Pakistani women in fulltime work earned on average 28 per cent less than white British men in fulltime work. (EOC, 2007) In France, a study found that a person with a Maghrebian name had five times less chance of getting a positive response to a CV than a native French person (EUMC, 2006). Youth of Algerian origin under 30 with a high school diploma had a 32 per cent unemployment rate as compared with 15 percent of French youth with the same qualification. And the unemployment rate of populations of immigrant origin is generally twice the rate of the overall population, and even higher among youth of North African origin .(Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2006)

- Housing: In the Netherlands, 33 per cent of Turks and 35 per cent of Moroccans live in housing where there is less than one room per person as compared with 3 per cent of native Dutch. (National analytical study on housing, Jacky Nieuwboer, DUMC, EUMC website, 2003).While only 4 per cent of Norwegian whites live in dwellings of less than 50 square metres, 17 per cent of non-western immigrants do. (Population and Housing Census, 2001) Turkish households have the least amount of living space in Germany, 27 square meters as compared with 46 for Germans. Every fifth Turkish household has no central heating as compared with one in twenty German households. (National analytical study on housing, Gisela Will, EUMC website, 2003) In the UK, between 1997 and 2004 homelessness increased by 34 per cent overall, but 56 per cent for Indian/Pakistani and Bangladeshi families. Half of all children of Bangladeshi descent live in conditions officially regarded as overcrowded and Asian families are three times more likely than white to live in houses deemed unfit for habitation.(The black and minority ethnic housing crisis, Shelter website, 2004) In France, migrant households, particularly from the Maghreb tend to live in overcrowded households and their residential mobility is circumscribed. (EUMC, 2006) While 17.6 per cent of the French population live in subsidised housing projects, 50 per cent of North Africans and 36 per cent of Turkish families live there.(Brookings Institution Press, 2006)
- Poverty and illness: In the Netherlands, while 10.1 per cent of households nationally were on low incomes in 2003, 29 per cent of all Turkish households, one third of Moroccan and half of newly-arrived Somali, Afghan and Iraqi households were on low incomes.(Poverty monitor, Vrooman et al, Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, 2006) Though 15 per cent of native Dutch older people are said to have 'severe physical limitations', the figures are 46 per cent for Turks, and 57 per cent for Moroccans. (Health and well-being of older members of ethnic minorities, R. Schellingerhout, ed, Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands, 2004) In Norway, 0.5 per cent of non-immigrant families have net incomes of 150,000 Kroner but 6.5 per cent of first and second-generation families from Asia, Africa, South America and Turkey have such an income. (Statistics Norway, website) In Germany 27.6 per cent of Turks earned over 4,000 DM a month as compared to 47.2 per cent of Germans. (Will, 2003). In the UK in 2002/3, while 18 per cent of white households were deemed to be on low income, 65 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households were so deemed. (DfES, 2005) In 2005/6 16 per cent of the weekly income of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households came from social security benefits as compared to 5 per cent for whites. (Department of Wages and Pensions, 2007) In France retired migrant workers have a life expectancy 20 years lower than the national average. (EUMC, 2006)
- Education and training: In Germany, only 10 per cent of students from a Turkish background go to Gymnasium (academic schools which can lead to university entrance) as compared with one third of German students. Twice as many Turkish students as German ones get classified as needing 'special education'. In 2004/5 fewer than 25,000 of 235,989 Turkish 18–25-year-olds were in universities – the Chinese actually outnumbered them. (Islam and Identity in Germany, Europe Report 181, International Crisis Group, 2007) In the UK, in 2004, 12.4 per cent of Pakistanis and 7.8 per cent of Bangladeshis, as compared with 17.1 per cent of white people had a degree qualification. 31.7 per cent of Pakistanis and 44.4 per cent of Bangladeshis had no formal qualification, the figure for white British being 15.2 per cent. (Office of National Statistics, 2005).

2. Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen and Stephen Castles, Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: a European dilemma (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006).
3. Yet evidence points to increased inequality due to discrimination. In the Netherlands, more ethnic minorities work below their level of training than do native Dutch. (Dick Houtzager and Peter R. Rodrigues, Migrants, Miinorities and Employment in Netherlands: exclusion discrimination and anti-discrimination, Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2002). In France, the rate of unemployment for young people of immigrant origin with a college degree (16 per cent) was twice that of the majority population with a college degree in 2002. Algerian immigrants and youth of Algerian origin under the age of thirty who hold a high school diploma had an unemployment rate of 32 per cent while the rate was just 15 percent for French youth in general. (Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaiise, Integrating Islam: political and religious challenges in contemporary France, Brookings Institute, 2006). In Germany, the 2001 Representative Study published by the Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Order, found that 10.1 per cent of Turkish people questioned felt discriminated against in the employment sector. This was higher than any other ethnic group. (See Hönekopp, Elmar et al, 'Migrants, minorities and employment in Germany: exclusion, discrimination and anti-discrimination, RAXEN 3 report to the EUMC' (EUMC, 2002). In the UK, according to the Department for Work and Pensions, Muslim graduates were less likely to be in employment than other graduates.

4. BBC Radio Five Live carried out a survey, sending out fictitious CVs with white-sounding, black-sounding and Muslim-sounding names. Those with Muslim names were least likely to be invited for interview. See S.R. Ameli et al, 'British Muslims' expectations of the government: Social discrimination across the Muslim divide' (London, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2004).
5. Statistics Norway estimates that the unemployment rate for first generation immigrants is 6.1 per cent, compared to 1.8 per cent for the rest of the population. The highest unemployment rates were for Africans (13.2 per cent), followed by Asians (8.3 per cent). The higher unemployment rate for African immigrants was connected to the high proportion of recently arrived migrants, particularly refugees from Somalia. <www.ssb.no/english/subjects/06/03innvarbl_en>
6. The director later apologised but in a way that emphasised his regret that the statement has been reported in such a way that appeared both discriminatory and hurtful. (Information from the Anti-Racist Center.)
7. The Anti-Racist Center is working with Manpower Services on projects to challenge racist attitudes in recruitment.
8. See Marcus Lieppe, 'Reports from a developing country: on the failure of the anti-discrimination law and the perspectives thereafter', Statewatch (Vol. 16, no. 3/4, May-July 2006).
9. In response to complaints that non-white graduates with top-class degrees found CVs went unanswered because of non-French surnames, the government has advocated the principle of anonymous CVs – although a law to that effect has yet to be brought in. Sarkozy was the only one of the presidential candidates to back the introduction of ethnic monitoring.
10. In July 2007, the Ombudsman ruled that the dismissal of a woman who wore the hijab was unlawful, discriminatory and in violation of gender equality law. <www.ldo.no/no/TopMenu/Uttalelser/2007/Oppsigelse-pa-grunn-av-hijab-er-multi-diskriminerende>
11. In the UK, a study based on two years' research of employment patterns of BME women found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are more likely to be restricted to certain kind of jobs, despite having good qualifications. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women with a degree or equivalent are five times more likely to be unemployed than white women with degrees. (Equal Opportunities Commission, 'Moving on up? The way forward: Report of the EOC's investigation into Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black Caribbean women and work', 2007).
12. Berit Berg, 'Tillit pa prove' – on ettik mangfold og etnisk diskriminering in Sor-Trondelag politidistrikt (2007).
13. Quoted in the Guardian (29 November 2006).
14. Gomolla and Radtke carried out an empirical study of the elementary school system in Bielefeld and found that ethnic difference was used as a criterion to take children – the overwhelming majority of whom were of Turkish origin – out of the normal school environment and place them in special classes. As cited by Czarina Wilpert 'National case study: Muslim youth in Germany focus on youth of Turkish origin'. Paper presented at the International Conference Muslim Youth in Europe. Typologies of religious belonging and sociocultural dynamics, Edoardo Agnelli Centre for Comparative Religious Studies (Turin, 11 June 2004).
15. Part of this documentary project involves compiling a photographic archive of Moroccan women in western clothing and without headscarves when they first arrived in the Netherlands and comparing this to today where many Moroccan girls are adopting more traditional clothing. Ulichki believes that by showing the 'diversity of our own society, using our own images and within our own context' we will show women that there are other references, not just religious references, within which to discuss our emancipation.
16. Keith Ajegbo, Diversity and citizenship: curriculum review (Department of Education and Skills, 2007).
17. Call for the National Social Forum of the Banlieues 22-24 June, 2007, Paris. <www.fsqb.free.fr/appel.htm>
18. <www.olleburg.de/projekte/projekte_theater.html>
19. See Willy Beauvallet and Corinne Grassi, 'Blaming the "other": Judeophobia and Islamophobia in France', News from Within (December 2003). For some positive examples of cooperation between people from different religious backgrounds see 'Islamophobia and its consequences on Young People – example of good practice' (Budapest, Youth Directorate of the Council of Europe, 2004).
20. Purna Sen, programme director of the Asia region of Amnesty International notes that honour crimes and forced marriages are not the Islamic phenomenon that some media commentators and alarmist scholars would have us believe. See Purna Sen, '"Crimes of honour", value and meaning' in Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain, (eds), 'Honour': crimes, paradigms, and violence against women (London, Zed, 2006). One participant also pointed out to us that in Germany there is a tendency to see anyone from a migrant background of Turkish origin as Muslim. In fact, 7 per cent of the Turkish community are Yezidi, Assyrian or Armenian Christians. A significant number of recent honour crimes have involved the Yezidi minority who are not Muslim. While this does not mean that we should stigmatise Yezidis, it means that appropriate strategies to reach out to this community are not being developed due to Islamophobia.
21. An estimated 50 per cent of marriages in the Asian community are inter continental marriages, according to Bradford Vision.
22. Y. Karakaşoğlu and S. Subasi, S: 'Ausmaß und ursachen von zwangsverheiratungen in europäischer Perspektive. Ein Blick auf Forschungsergebnisse aus Deutschland, Österreich, England und der Türkei.' In:BMFSFJ (HG): Zwangsverheiratungen in Deutschland. Konzeption und Redaktion: Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte. Baden Baden. Nomos Verlag, 2007.
23. Mayanthi Fernando, 'The republic's "second religion": recognizing Islam in France', MERIP (Vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 2005).
24. For more information see <www.inssan.de>
25. 'Communautarisme', explained Naima Bouteldja, 'is an ambivalent French neologism'. 'In general, it's used by white people to denounce ethnic minority groups perceiving them as wanting to keep to their own "community" and solely guided by the needs and interests of their own group.'
26. A. Sivanandan, 'Rat and the degradation of black struggle', Race & Class (Vol. 26, no. 4, 1985).
27. Lord Herman Ouseley, 'Community Pride Not Prejudice – Making Diversity Work' (Bradford Vision, 2001).
28. The Institute of Race Relations is concerned that the government does not seem to have recognised that what a group does is more important than what a group is, that integration and cohesion should be the by-product of any funding agenda but not its goal. Social problems inevitably impact on different groups differentially and the groups most affected will often be the ones leading the fight to combat them. See Jenny Bourne, 'The baby and the bath water: community cohesion and the funding crisis', IRR News Service <www.irr.org.uk/2007/november/ha000014.html >
29. The trend contines as evidenced by the March 2007 municipal elections. The Socialist Party and the ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) have both given prominence

to Muslim candidates on party lists. The 'Independent Bobigny for All list' which fields both Muslim and non-Muslim candidates, has been formed with the specific aim of campaigning for a new deal for marginalised youth.

30. Young people from the banlieues, wrote Angelique Chrisafis had previously been written off as a politically insignificant voter pool. But the record number of people registering to vote on the housing estates in the April 2007 presidential elections pushed the electorate to its highest number in twenty-five years, forming a potentially powerful swing vote (Guardian, 29 March 2007).
31. A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean struggles in Britain'(London, IRR, 1986).
32. Salma Yaqoob, 'British Islamic political radicalism' in Tahir Abbas, (ed.), Islamic Political Radicalism: a European perspective (Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

List of participants

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Miriyam Aouragh, anthropologist working on Middle East issues, University of Amsterdam. Founding member of Stop the Witchhunt (Stop de Hetze) and Together Against Racism (Samen Tegen Racisme).

Charlotte van Baaren, National (and Rotterdam) council member ABVAKABO FNV (Dutch public services union).

Houria Bouteldja, The Indigenous of the Republic (Les Indigènes de la République), France.

Naima Bouteldja, French journalist and researcher based in London.

Kamile Batur, Kanafani Inter-Cultural Initiative (Kulturvevien Kanafani), Vienna.

Nadeem Butt, Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet,AP) mayor of the Søndre district of Oslo.

Abdelaziz Chaambi, Coalition of Muslims from France (Collectif des Musulmans de France) and DiverCités, Lyon.

Florencio Chicote, Project manager of the Anti-Discrimination Network of the Turkish Union of Berlin-Brandenburg (ADNB of the TBB).

Samy Debah, Chair, Coalition Against Islamophobia in France (Le Collectif contre l'Islamophobie).

Nina Dessau, writer and political scientist, Norway.

Pierre Didier, Movement of Immigration and the Banlieues (Mouvement de l'Immigration et des Banlieues), France.

Belal El-Mogaddedi, Board-member, German Muslim League.

Zhor Firar, Emergence, Paris.

Vincent Geisser, Senior researcher, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Aix-en-Provence and President of the Information Centre for the Study of International Migration, (Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations Internationales), Paris.

Corrine Grassi, Jewish-Arabic Citizens' Group for Peace, Strasbourg.

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Abdurahman Guled, Somali Media Services, Leicester.

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Sadet Karabulut, MP, Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) spokesperson for social affairs, Netherlands.

Dr. Yasemin Karakaşoğlu, Professor of Intercultural Education, specialising in Islamic issues, University of Bremen.

Hikmet Kayahan, anti-racist campaigner, Vienna.

Sajda Khan, teacher, Yorkshire.

Alev Korun, City Councillor, Green Party (Die Grünen), Vienna and spokesperson for the Viennese Green Group on migration, integration and human rights.

Mari Linløkken, Deputy Director, Anti-Racist Centre (Antirasistisk Sentre), Oslo.

Sunil Loona, educational psychologist and advisor, Norwegian National Centre for Multicultural Education.

Henrik Lunde, Director of Information, Anti-Racist Center (Antirasistisk Sentre), Oslo.

Sajida Madni, lead organiser, Birmingham Citizens.

Azkar Mohammed, Project manager, Pioneers Leading the Way, Birmingham.

Nina Mühe, cultural anthropologist, Europe-University Viadrina in Frankfurt/ Oder; Researcher on 'Muslims in EU-Cities', project of the Open Society Institute, EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program.

Abdul Razak Osman, Council member, Leicester City Council (Charnwood ward) and Leicester Cabinet Councillor for community cohesion.

Lord Herman Ouseley, former head of the Commission for Racial Equality, author Community Pride Not Prejudice – Making Diversity Work (Bradford Vision, 2001).

Liam Pickles, higher education student, Bradford.

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